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THE AMERICAN CASEBOOK
SERIES
For

years

past the science of law has been taught by lectures, the
more recently by the detailed study, in the

use of text-books and
class-room, of selected

cases.

has its advocates, but it is generally agreed that the
lecture system should be discarded because in it the lecturer does
the work and the student is either a willing receptacle or offers a
It is not too much to say that the lecture system
passive resistance.

Each method
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is doomed.

the means of text-books as a supplement or substitute for the formal lecture has made its formal entry into the educational world and obtains widely ; but the system is faulty and must pass
away as the exclusive means of studying and teaching law. It is an
improvement on the formal lecture in that the student works, but if it
cannot be said that he works to no purpose, it is a fact that he works

Instruction

by

from the wrong end. The rule is learned without the reason, or both
rule and reason are stated in the abstract as the resultant rather than
we forget the rule we cannot solve the problem; if
as the process.
we have learned to solve the problem it is a simple matter to formulate
The text-book method may strengthen the mema rule of our own.
ory; it may not train the mind, nor does it necessarily strengthen it.

If

A

text,

if it

be short,

is at best a summary,

and a summary presup-

poses previous knowledge.
If, however, law be considered as a science rather than a collection
of arbitrary rules and regulations, it follows that it should be studied
Thus to state the problem is to solve it ; the laboratory
as a science.
the lecture, and the text yields to the actual
The law reports are in more senses than one books of
experiments, and, by studying the actual case, the student co-operates
with the judge and works out the conclusion however complicated
the facts or the principles involved. A study of cases arranged historically develops the knowledge of the law, and each case is seen to
be not an isolated fact but a necessary link in the chain of developThe study of the case is clearly the most practical method,
ment.
for the student already does in his undergraduate days what he must
do all his life; it is curiously the most theoretical and the most practical.
For a discussion of the case in all its parts develops analysis,
the comparison of many cases establishes a general principle, and
method

has displaced

experiment.

(iii)

PREFACE

IV

the arrangement
and classification
of principles dealing with a subject make the law on that subject.
In this way Training and knowledge, the means and the end of
legal study, go hand and hand.
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ject in this way and that the system loses sight of the difference between the preparation of the student and the lifelong training of the
lawyer.
Many collections of cases seem open to these objections,
for they are so bulky that it is impossible to cover a particular subject with them in the time ordinarily allotted to it in the class. In
this way the student discusses only a part of a subject.
His knowledge is thorough as far as it goes, but it is incomplete and fragThe knowledge of the subject as a whole is deliberately
mentary.
sacrificed to training in a part of the subject.
It would seem axiomatic that the size of the casebook should correspond in general to the amount of time at the disposal of instructor
and student.
As the time element
in most cases,
nonexpansive
half to two-thirds of the
only
quantity,
necessarily follows that,
cases in the present collections can be discussed in class, the present casebooks are
third to
half too long. From
purely practical
mistake to ask students to pay for
and economic standpoint
1,200 pages when they can only use 600, and
must be remembered
that in many schools, and with many students in all schools, the matter of the cost of casebooks
important. Therefore, for purely
believed that there
demand for casebooks
practical reasons,
whole in the class-room.
physically adapted and intended for use as
But aside from this, as has been said, the existing plan sacrifices
It
not denied that training
knowledge to training.
important,
law student, considering the small amount of actual
nor that for
knowledge the school can hope to give him in comparison with the
more important than
vast and daily growing body of the law,
mere knowledge. It is, however, confidently asserted that knowledge
is, after all, not unimportant, and that, in the inevitable compromise
between training and knowledge, the present casebooks not only devote too little attention relatively to the inculcation of knowledge,
but that they sacrifice unnecessarily knowledge to training.
begreater effort should be made to cover the general prinlieved that
given subject in the time allotted, even at the expense of
ciples of
But in this proposed readjustment
considerable sacrifice of detail.
of the means to the end, the fundamental fact cannot be overlooked
that law
developing science and that its present can only be unIt
derstood through the medium of its past.
recognized as imsufficient number of cases be given under each topic
perative that

a
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The obvious advantages of the study of law by means of selected
cases make its universal adoption a mere question of time.
The only serious objections made to the case method are that it takes
too much time to give a student the requisite knowledge of the sub-

PREFACE

*

treated to afford a basis for comparison and discrimination ; to show
the development of the law of the particular topic under discussion;
and to afford the mental training for which the case system necesit is proposed to
To take a familiar illustration:
sarily stands.
abortion, one on
on
one
case
include in a casebook on Criminal Law
if in order to
and
office,
an
from
libel, two on perjury, one on larceny
intent to
on
of
cases
specific
number
do this it is necessary to limit the

If

such a degree as to leave too few on this topic to develop it
and to furnish the student with training, then the subjects of
tion, libel, perjury, and larceny from an office should be wholly
ted. The student must needs acquire an adequate knowledge of

fully

abor-

omitthese

but the training already had in the underlying principles of
criminal law will render the acquisition of this knowledge comparatively easy. The exercise of a wise discretion would treat fundamentals thoroughly; principle should not yield to detail.
Impressed by the excellence of the case system as a means of legal
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subjects,

education, but convinced that no satisfactory adjustment of the conflict between training and knowledge under existing time restrictions
has yet been found, the General Editor takes pleasure in announcing
prepared with special reference to
a series of scholarly casebooks,
the needs and limitations of the class-room, on the fundamental subjects of legal education, which, through a judicious rearrangement
of emphasis, shall provide adequate training combined with a thorThe collecough knowledge of the general principles of the subject.
tion will develop the law historically and scientifically; English cases
will give the origin and development of the law in England ; American cases will trace its expansion and modification in America ; notes

will suggest phases omitted in the printed case.
annotations
Cumulative references will be avoided, for the footnote may not hope
to rival the digest.
The law will thus be presented as an organic growth, and the necesand

sary connection between the past and the present will be obvious.
The importance and difficulty of the subject as well as the time that
can properly be devoted to it will be carefully considered so that each
book may be completed within the time allotted to the particular subject.

It

is equally obvious that some subjects are treated at too great
length, and that a less important subject demands briefer treatment.
A small book for a small subject.
In this way it will be alike possible for teacher and class to com-

plete each book instead of skimming it or neglecting whole sections;
and more subjects may be elected by the student if presented in shorter form based upon the relative importance of the subject and the
time allotted to its mastery.
Training and knowledge go hand in hand, and Training and Knowledge are the keynotes of the series.

PREFACE

VI

If

it be granted that all, or nearly all, the studies required for admission to the bar should be studied in course by every student — and
— it
the soundness of this contention can hardly be seriously doubted
of
collections
follows necessarily that the preparation and publication
of cases exactly adapted to the purpose would be a genuine and by
And
no means unimportant service to the cause of legal education.
of
a
systematic
this result can best be obtained by the preparation
series of casebooks constructed upon a uniform plan under the super-
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vision of an editor in chief.
For the basis of calculation the hour has been taken as the unit. The
General Editor's personal experience, supplemented by the experience
of others in the class-room, leads to the belief that approximately a
book of 400 pages may be covered by the average student in half a
year of two hours a week; that a book of 600 pages may be discussed
in class in three hours for half a year; that a book of 800 pages may
be completed by the student in two hours a week throughout the year ;
and a class may reasonably hope to master a volume of 1,000 pages
The general rule will be subject to
in a year of three hours a week.
some modifications in connection with particular topics on due consideration of their relative importance and difficulty, and the time

ordinarily allotted to them in the law school curriculum.
The following subjects are deemed essential in that a knowledge of
them (with the exception of International Law and General Jurisprudence) is universally required for admission to the bar:
Administrative Law.
Agency.
Bills and Notes.
Carriers.
Contracts.
Corporations.
Constitutional Law.
Criminal Law.
Criminal Procedure.
Common-Law Pleading.
Conflict of Laws.
Code Pleading.

Insurance.
International Law.
Jurisprudence.
Mortgages.
Partnership.
Personal Property, including
the Law of Bailment.

Damages.

Suretyship.
Torts.
Trusts.
Wills and Administration.

Domestic Relations.
Equity.
Equity Pleading.
Evidence.

Real Property. \ 2d
1 3d

"

Public Corporations.
Quasi Contracts.
Sales.

International Law is included in the list of essentials from its intrinsic importance in our system of law. As its principles are simple
in comparison with municipal law, as their application is less technical,

Vll

PREFACE

and as the cases are generally interesting, it is thought that the book
may be larger than otherwise would be the case.
As an introduction to the series a book of Selections on General
Jurisprudence of about 500 pages is deemed essential to completeness.
The preparation of the casebooks has been intrusted to experienced
and well-known teachers of the various subjects included, so that the
experience of the class-room and the needs of the students
nish a sound basis of selection.

will fur-

While a further list is contemplated of usual but relatively less important subjects as tested by the requirements
for admission to the
bar, no announcement of them is made at present.
The following gentlemen of standing and repute in the profession
have written or are at present actively engaged in the preparation of
the various casebooks on the indicated subjects:
W. Kirchwey, Professor of Law, Columbia University, School
of Law. Subject, Real Property.
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George

Nathan Abbott, Professor of Law, Columbia University.
(Formerly
Dean of the Stanford University Law School.)
Subject, Personal Property.

Frank Irvine, Dean of

the Cornell University

School of Law.

Sub-

ject, Evidence.

Harry

Dean of the University
Subject, Corporations.

S. Richards,

Law.

of Wisconsin

School of

James Parker Hall, Dean of the University of Chicago School of Law.
Subject, Constitutional Law.

William R. Vance, Dean of

the University

of Minnesota Law School.

Subject, Insurance.
Charles M. Hepburn, Professor of Law, University of Indiana. Subject, Torts.
William E. Mikell, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
Subjects, Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure.
George P. Costigan, Jr., Professor of Law, Northwestern University
Law School. Subject, Wills and Administration.
Floyd R. Mechem, Professor of Law, Chicago University.
Damages.
(Co-author with Barry Gilbert.)

Subject,

Professor of Law, University of Iowa.

Subject,

Barry Gilbert,

Damages.
(Co-author with Floyd R. Mechem.)
Thaddeus D. Kenneson, Professor of Law, University
Subject, Trusts.

Charles Thaddeus Terry,
Subject, Contracts.

Professor

of New York.

of Law, Columbia University.

Mil

PREFACE

Albert M. Kales, Professor
ject, Persons.

of Law, Northwestern University.

Sub-

Edwin C. Goddard, Professor of Law, University of Michigan.

Sub-

ject, Agency.

Howard L. Smith, Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. Subject, Bills and Notes.
(Co-author with Wm. Underhill Moore.)
Wm. Underhill Moore, Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
Subject, Bills and Notes. (Co-author with Howard L. Smith.)
Edward

of Law, University of Minnesota.

S. Thurston, Professor
Subject, Quasi Contracts.

Crawford D. Hening, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
Subject, Suretyship.
Clarke B. Whittier, Professor
ject, Pleading.

of Law, University of Chicago.
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Eugene A. Gilmore, Professor
Subject, Partnership.

Ernst Freund,

Professor
Administratiz'e Law.

of Law, University of Wisconsin.

of Law, University of Chicago.
of Law, University

Frederick Green, Professor
Carriers.

Sub-

of Illinois.

Subject,
Subject,

Ernest G. Lorenzen, Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
Subject, Conflict of Laivs.
Frederic C. Woodward, Dean of the Stanford University Law School.
Subject, Sales.
George H. Boke, Professor of Law, University of California.
ject, Equity.

Sub-

James Brown Scott, Lecturer on International Law and Diplomacy in
Johns Hopkins University; formerly Professor of Law, Columbia University.
Subjects, International Law; General Jurisprudence.

Washington, D. C, October,

Following

are the books

Administrative
Law
Agency
Bills and Notes
Carriers
Conflict of Laws
Constitutional Law
Corporations

Criminal Law
Criminal Procedure

of

James Brown Scott,

General Editor.

1913.

the Series now published, or in press:
Damages
Partnership
Persons
Pleading
Sales
Suretyship

Trusts
Wills and Administration

AUTHOR'S PREFATORY NOTE
It

is

of

the fact that Agency is a modern subject in
the law that Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England,
a striking proof
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does not mention the subject by name, and barely makes a four-line
reference to one sort of agent in his classification of servants. The

old cases do, of course, sometimes deal with pure agency questions,
but the agent is usually referred to as a servant or a factor, and the
questions in issue are generally settled upon some principle of the law
of Master and Servant. Agency is essentially a business" relation;
hence its modernness, if that term may be permitted ; hence, also, the
singular fact that until within very few years courts treated it as a
broadened service, involving wider discretion, and failed to see that
its main difference from service is that it deals with a relation for a
very different purpose — in other words, that the difference is in kind
even more than in degree.
To an extent the law of Principal and Agent is an outgrowth of the
law of Master and Servant. The doctrine of respondeat superior is
most active in both. The old cases of Master and Servant are therefore in one portion of the field of Agency valuable and illuminating,
and are equally valuable to illustrate either relation ; but they deal to
a considerable extent with questions of tort liability as to third persons, and of contract and tort between the primary parties to the relation, and these are far from being the most important parts of the
A casebook on Agency, then, if it is well proporlaw of Agency.
tioned, will be made up of modern cases far more than will a work
on Property, for example, or on Contracts in general. The present
work contains many early cases of historical importance, some involving Agency, but more turning on questions arising out of the relation
of Master and Servant. Very largely, however, selections have been
made from modern cases, in which the courts are dealing with real
agency matters.
No one has stated more clearly and aptly than the learned Chief
Justice Shaw, in the Norway Plains case, the great merits and advantages of the common law, that instead of a series of detailed practical rules adapted to precise circumstances, which would become obsolete when conditions change, it consists of a few broad, comprehensive principles, founded on reason, natural justice, and enlightened
public policy, which by usage, custom, and still more by judicial exposition, are adapted to new practices and new combinations of fact, as
conditions change and a new practice or a new course of business arises ;
so that in this new field, without the aid of legislation, the principles and
(ix)

x

authok's prefatory note

1,

a
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is

it

a

it

it,

rules soon become precise and established, by a development from cases
most nearly analogous, modified and adapted tO' the new circumstances.
By such a process as this has the law of this modern subject of Agency
taken, and modified and amplified, ancient rules in cases most nearly
analogous, until we have, largely without the aid of statutes, the great
body of law in this business relation, the development of which was
essential to the growth of the modern commercial world, in which the
maxim "Qui facit per alium facit per se" enables one man to be at the
same moment in as many places, and as widely apart, as the extent of
his resources and the character of his ability permit him to secure
and maintain agencies.
Whatever the relation between the present
idea of Agency, and the old conception of the incidents attaching to
the relation of Master and Servant, we cannot understandingly and
correctly deal with the questions of Agency without recognizing, on
the one hand, that it evolved from the law of Master and Servant, and
and, on the other, that in its
has not become entirely severed from
most important fields
has developed
great body of law quite apart
from its ancestral subject, because
is, as the other
not, essentially
business subject, developed in response to the demands of our mod~
_
ern commercial world.
_^
Edwin C. Goddard.
Ann Arbor, November
1913.
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THE RELATION
CHAPTER I

fe^Ut-^t* LX-eJL t^t£
DEFINITION AND NATURE OF THE RELATION f/U^i^^L.
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, BOOK I, CH.
There is yet

a

fourth species of servants, if they may

14,

I,

4.

be so called,

stewards,
being rather in a superior, a ministerial, capacity, such as
factors, and bailiffs, whom, however, the law considers as servants pro
tempore, with regard to such of their acts as affect their master's^oj
employer's

property.

ECHOLS
(Supreme

Court of Alabama,

v.

1909.

STATE^^ T^^^
158
Alafci^S^uth.

From a conviction of embezzlement defendant ap^eals^^
Simpson, J. The appellant was convicted of the offense

f^AJL

f gLjew
£xnA&"~-

servant, oi
zlement; the affidavit charging that he, "being an agent,
vx
own us .•■■v
his
to
clerk of affiant, embezzled or fraudulently converted
secretes, with inmoney to about the amount of $18, or fraudulently
another,
$18 in money
tent to convert to his own use. or to the use of
<
office
or employ
his
ion by virtue of
which has come into his po
the
against
light
The evidence for the state, in its strongest
ment."
suit
a
to
make
tailor,
agreed
defendant, is that the defendant, being a

of clothes for
which

the prosecutor

was to be paid in cash
a. — l

a certain amount of money, part of
and the remainder to be paid in the fu-

for

Godd.Pb.&

/I

(U\t—
^

oiembez^^^

l^fj/^k
«
gJL
.

(T^-
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ture; that the prosecutor made the cash payment and demanded his
suit of clothes; that defendant refused to deliver it without the payment of more money, and also refused to return his money.
This court said, in discussing a former statute (which was identical
with section 6831 of the Code of 1907, in so far as the point involved
is concerned), that an agent is "one who undertakes to transact some
business or to manage some affair for another, by the authority and on
account of the latter, and to render an account of it" ; also that
"
'agent,' as employed in this section, imports a principal, and implies
employment, service, delegated authority to do something in the name
and stead of the principal." Pullam v. State, 78 Ala. 31, 34, 56 Am.
The relation of principal and agent did not exist between
Rep. 21.
the prosecutor and the defendant, but the relation of seller and purchaser. The defendant did not undertake to do anything in the name
The money was not placed in his hands
and stead of the prosecutor.
to be used or cared for, and accounted for to the prosecutor, but was
paid to him in part settlement for a suit of clothes, and thereby beWhatever
came the money of the defendant, to use as he pleased.
other liability or penalty the defendant may have incurred, he could
Consenot be convicted of embezzlement on the facts of this case.
quently the defendant was entitled to the general charge, as requested
and refused.
The judgment of the court is reversed, and the cause remanded.

STERNAMAN

v.

METROPOLITAN

of New York,

(Court of Appeals

318,

1902.

88 Am.

LIFE INS.

CO.

170 N. Y. 13, 62 N. E. 763, 57 L. R. A.
St. Rep. 625.)

Appeal from a judgment for defendant in an action upon a policy
of insurance issued to plaintiff upon the life of her husband, George
Sternaman.
The contract provided that the application for the insurance should become part of the contract of insurance, and that the
medical examiner, in writing in the answers of the applicant, was the
Upon the death of the
agent of the latter and not of the company.
insured payment of the policy was refused, on the ground that some
of the answers written in by the medical examiner were not true, and
hence the policy

Vann, J. 1

was void.

stating the facts:] The decision of this appeal
substantially upon the following question : When an applicant
for life insurance makes truthful answers to all questions asked by the
medical examiner, who fails to record them as given, and omits an
important part, stating that it is unimportant, can the beneficiary show
the answers actually given, in order to defeat a forfeiture claimed by

[After

turns

i Part of

the opinion

is omitted.

Ch. 1)

DEFINITION AND NATURE OF THE RELATION

3

the insurer on account of the falsity of the answers as recorded, even ^jA^Mut^-n
9 ^^^
if it was agreed in the application that the medical examiner, employed i^
'
/
and paid by the insurer only, should not be its agent, but solely the
of
insured?
the
agent
i/^~— ^L^v~t/"-A
While, as a general rule."U? bn^^fUThe power to contract is not unlimited.
there is the utmost freedom of action in this regard, some restrictions/L'VLd^t* /T ^£^
_ [fa L,
are placed upon the right by legislation, by public policy, and by the

f

^

pia^j^

Parties cannot make a binding contract in violation'^^^^ 'i^-jjkru*
nature of things.
of law or of public policy. They cannot in the same instrument agree . y^/f 7
that a thing exists, and that it does not exist, or provide that one is the
^/^ px<^l£c^
agent of the other, and at the same time, and with reference to
/>
same subject, that there is no relation of agency between them. They _
cannot bind themselves by agreeing that a loan in fact void for usury \slo J^-^^^-.^
which actually exists ^^^ n-^^-yyxiy0 Qr7i/4U
not usurious, or that a copartnership
They cannot by agreement change the laws ot
them does not exist.
'
nature or of logic, or create relations, physical, legal, or moral, which

oL^Ji

J)

t^^^Vj

/'

In other words, they cannot accomplish the imposcannot be created.
sible by contract.
The parties to the policy in question could agree that the person who
filled out part A of the application was the agent of the insured and
There is a difference in the nature of the work
not of the company.
of filling out the blank to be signed by the insured, and that of filling
The
out the blank furnished for the use of the medical examiner.
one
well
as
be
done
insured,
by
and
may
former is the work of the

person as by another. He may do it himself, or appoint an agent to do
it for him. It is quite different, however, with the work of the medical
examiner, because that requires professional skill and experience and
The inthe insurer permits it to be done only by its own appointee.
himself,
to do
a
nor
appoint
physician
work
do
that
sured can neither
the
selection
insists
properly
upon
insurer
making
very
because the
itself. The medical examiner was selected, employed, and paid by the
it,

a

it

by

a

The insured had nothing to do with him, except to submit
companv.
by him, as the expert of the company, and to answer
an
examination
to
This he was
the questions asked by him in behalf of the company.
insurance;
for
the
companv
required
in
to
to
do
order
procure
forced
medical examination by an examiner selected and
him to undergo
itself, before
would act upon his application for
polinstructed
examined,
select
the
exambe
nor
refuse
to
neither
could
He
icy.

to pay him for the work when done.

it,

-,

t

lJ

"'

\

-^<j
I

I!

il

if

iner, and he was not responsible
the latter was negligent or unfit for
the duty assigned to him. He could not direct or control him, but the
required him to make the examination,
company could and did; for
of the application blank, and report the facts with his
fill out part
The insured made no contract with the examiner, and was
opinion.
under no obligation to pay him for his services. The company, how- ^jO
and agreed
ever, made
contract with him to do certain work for
a
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THE RELATION

4

(Part

1

became such in spite of the law and the facts? This is not a case of
agency of one party for one purpose, and of another party for a different purpose; for the physician was employed for a single purpose
only, and that was to make a physical examination of the insured, ask
him the questions furnished by the company, record his answers, and
They were not the questions of the insured, put to
report the result.
himself, to elicit facts for his use. He knew the facts. He did not

need to question himself to find out what he knew, nor to employ an
The questions were those of the company,
agent for that purpose.
for
it
carefully prepared
by skillful hands, and furnished to its medical
asked,
be
so
that it could learn what the insured knew
examiner to
facts for its use, and what was done by
It
needed
the
himself.
about
its own examiner to get the facts and report them to the company was
The
its work, done for its benefit and in the course of its business.
to
in
questions
response
were
volunteered,
but
were
not
given
answers
asked by the company, as much as if, impersonated, it had actually

It

it

it,

asked them as an individual. Whatever it told Dr. Langley to do for
did itself. "Qui facit per alium, facit per
in the view of the law,
se."
appointed Dr. Langley its agent for the purpose named, and
he derived all his authority to act from the company, which could regulate his conduct by its rules, and could provide for such security to
protect its interests from the consequences of his neglect or default
saw fit.
cerCan parties agree that facts, which the law declares establish
tain relation, not only do not establish that relation, but establish diCan A. appoint B. his agent for a definite purpose,
rectly the opposite
the agent
not the agent of A., but
and then agree with C. that B.
of C. for that purpose there being no agreement whatever between B.
and C.

?

;

is

is

?

a

as

it

is

a

It

"is
legal
An agency
created by contract, express or implied.
employed and aurelation by virtue of which one party (the agent)
thorized to represent and act for the other (the principal) in business
The distinguishing features of the agent
dealings with third persons.
Mechare his representative character and his derivative authority."
is
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As between the examiner and the insured, the relation of principal
and agent did not exist, while, as between the examiner and the company, that relation did exist by operation of law; yet it is claimed
that, as between the insured and the company, the examiner was
the agent of the former only, because he had so agreed, not with
the examiner, but with the company itself. Under the circumstances,
an agreement that the physician was the agent of the insured was
like an agreement that the company or its president was his agent.
It was in contradiction of every act of the parties and of every fact
known to either. The law, when applied to the facts, made the physician the agent of the company, and not of the insured ; and can it be
held that, as the insured agreed that the physician was his agent, he

aJ^%LujaJ+

0""
h. 1)

DEFINITION AND NATURE OF THE RELATION

^h>^

5

Story, Ag. § 3. "To constitute agency there must be
Whart. Ag. § 1. What was
consent both of principal and of agent."
The defendant,
examiner?
and
the
the
between
company
the contract
Having some
through
agents.
act
could
only
being a corporation,
Dr.
examination,
it
requested
medical
of
a
form
in
the
do
to
work
him
and
between
relation
of
agency
the
It
created
it.
do
to
Langley
itself by employing him, paying him, etc. It alone could discharge
him, and to it alone was he responsible for disobedience or negligence.
It could control his conduct by any reasonable instructions, and hold
em,

Ag. §

1 ;

•'

'

It prescribed certain questions that
him liable if he violated them.
he should ask, and required him to take down the answers in a blank
prepared by itself. It could sue him if he did not do it properly, and
he could sue the company if it did not pay him for doing it. Thus we
have an agency between the company and the examiner established
by mutual agreement, with the right on the one hand to instruct, to

/

^

'.
'

:

it

The relation of prinnot sue the insured for compensation.
either
them,
by virtue of any
cipal and agent did not exist between
contract or by operation of law.
What was the contract between the insured and the insurer? With
the relations above described as existing between the insurer and theexaminer in full force, and in the absence of any legal relation between
insurer,
the examiner and the insured, an attempt was made by the
of
relation
the
to
subvert
insured,
the
by an agreement imposed upon
and
the
him
between
relation
itself,
and
establish
its own examiner to
insured, without the consent of either given to the other. There was

/^

it,

a

While the contract between the doctor and th||(^.
no tripartite contract.
third party
the latter agreed with
existence,
in
was
still
company
two
the
between
parties/
fact
exist
in
not
did
contract
that
only that
but did exist between two parties who did not make it/
who made
This was not possible by any form of words, any more than to make
We think that the medical exam- /^
black white, or truth falsehood.
iner was the agent of the defendant in making the examination of/
the insured, recording his answers, and reporting them to the com-

Judgment reversed.
The dissenting

omitted.

2

pany.

opinion

of Parker, C. J., with whom C.rny, J., concurs,

v

a

/

t

/

\

could

2
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>f\

discharge, and to hold liable for default, and on the other to compel
Hence what the examiner did in U
payment for services rendered.
the course of his employment the company did, and what he knew
the company knew.
from discovery while acting for
(LAS
What was the contract between the insured and the examiner?
The insured did not employ the examiner, and the
None whatever.
■
examiner did not agree to work for him. Neither was under any legal y.
instruct
not
the/
could
obligation or liability to the other. The insured
doctor, nor discharge him, nor sue him for negligence, and the doctor

the relation

G

KINGAN & CO.
(Appellate

Court of Indiana,

v.

1894.

SILVERS
13

Ind. App.

(Parti
et al.
SO,

37

N. E. 413.)
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Appeal from a judgment for defendant in an action on a promissory
note bearing interest at 8 per cent., "after maturity." The note was
procured by plaintiff's traveling salesman, one Nichols, who, without
the consent or knowledge of defendants, altered it by striking out the
words "after maturity" and inserting words so as to make it bear 8
Plaintiffs never approved the alteraper cent, interest "from date."
tion, and now sue upon the note as originally made.
It was no part
of the duty of Nichols to make settlements, nor to take notes, but in
this instance he had been instructed by plaintiffs to procure from defendants a note to cover their indebtedness to plaintiffs, and to transmit
the same to his principals.
Lotz, J. 3 [After stating the facts, and pointing out the general
principle that public policy demands that a material alteration of a
written instrument shall destroy it so as to prevent a recovery upon
*
* * The rules that now prevail, as we gather them from
it:]
the decided cases, are: (1) That the alteration of a note or written instrument in a material matter by a stranger is but a spoliation, and
does not destroy it, and a recovery may be had on it in its original
condition.
(2) If the plaintiff, the obligee, or the holder make an alteration in an immaterial matter, the alteration does not destroy the note,
but a recovery may be had on it in its original condition.
(3) But if
the alteration be in a material matter, and be purposely or intentionally
made by the plaintiff, the obligee, or the holder, such alteration destroys the note or instrument, and no recovery can be had upon it in
The last rule is the same as
either its original or altered condition.
one of the rules laid down by Lord Coke in Pigot's Case, and is still
the law.
If the case at bar falls within this latter rule, then the demurrers
were correctly sustained.
The change in the note was not made by
the plaintiff's order or direction, but it intrusted certain business to
If the alanother as its agent, and such person made the alteration.
teration was made by the agent while in the transaction of the principal's business, and in the scope of his authority, then the act of the
agent is the act of the principal, — "qui facit per alium facit per se."
The solution of this case depends upon the relation existing between
Nichols and the plaintiff at the time the alteration was made. If he
was the plaintiff's agent, and the act was within the scope of his authority, then his act must be deemed the act of the plaintiff, and the

If his position was that of a mere stranger
law is with the defendants.
to the note, then the law is with the plaintiff.
The appellees rely confidently upon the case of Eckert v. Louis, 84
:; I

'art of the opinion is omitted.

Cll.

1)

liEFINITION AND NATURE OF THE RELATION

'

7

I

Ind. 99, as furnishing a rule binding upon this court, and as decisive
l/Y-fl-iAjLjLrC-/'
The facts of that case briefly are that n^j^yf,
of the questions here involved.
it,
>
a note had been signed by a principal and his surety, and was by the
^'principal delivered to the agent of the payees. In a short time afterA^-<?
the delivery the note was altered in a material respect, by the person a^
to whom it had been delivered.

Such change was made in the presence
; but the change was without the
~^^""
~
~
Suit was instituted against the~^ri
^
The court held that v *-* oT^-^C/uK^
surety alone on the note in its altered condition.
It <X_j£c — V^there could be no recovery in such an action against the surety.
seems to us that the bare statement of the facts shows the correctness h<WAJnryis*JLA-^
,
7/ fr
of the holding.
The note was changed in a material respect, and yet .
/l-^ <A
The position oc- *-<?^Av
the effort was to enforce it in its altered condition.

of the principal, and with his consent
knowledge or consent of the surety.
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cupied by the person making the change was wholly immaterial to the-^^^^
A
If he was a stranger to the note, and his act a
decision of that case.
—
spoliation, the note could not be enforced against the surety in its
Neither could the payees enforce the note in its
altered condition.
altered condition, if the person making the change was their agent.
There could be no recovery upon the note in its altered condition.
What is said in that case on the subject of agency is foreign to the
point in judgment, and cannot be deemed authority. Even if it be conceded that what is said in that case upon the subject of agency correctly states the law as to the facts of that case, still the facts there
There the agent was instructed and
are very different from this case.
directed by the principal to collect the money, or obtain undoubted
security, and not to leave until he had done so. In making the change
the agent's "sole effort and desire were to obey strictly the orders of the
plaintiff (the payee) which were * * * to collect their debt or pro* * * undoubted security."
The alteration was made in the
cure
presence of the principal debtor, and with his knowledge and consent.
In making the change the agent was acting with a third party in commercial dealings.
The payees sought to enforce the note in the altered
In so doing, they accepted and ratified the action of their
condition.
Under such circumstances, it
agent, and made his act their own act.
was
was unimportant whether the agent
acting within his authority or
The subsequent ratification made his
not at the time of the alteration.
of
Here
the
effort is not to enforce the note in
act the act
the payees.
its altered condition, but in its original state.
Again, the case to which
That was an acwe have alluded differs from this in another respect.
tion against a surety, and a surety is a favorite of the law.
The appellees further insist that Nichols was the agent of the payee
in making the alteration; that he was acting in the line of his agency,
thai his wrongful act is imputable
and undercolor of his employment;
In support of tlii ^ position appellees' learned coun el
to his principal.
"
'Whatever a man sui juris may do
say this is upon the legal maxim,
of himself, he may do by another,' and, as a correlative, whatever is
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(Part

1

done by such other in the course of his employment is deemed to be
done by the party himself.
On this principle the liability of one person
for the acts of another who is employed in the capacity of an agent
is extended to the wrongful and tortious acts of the latter committed
in the line and under color of the agency, although such unlawful acts
were not contemplated by the employment, and were done by the agent
in good faith, and by mistake.
In other words, where a principal directs an act to be done by an agent in a lawful manner, but the agent
errs in the mode of executing his authority to the prejudice of another
This is a correct stateperson, the principal will be held responsible."
ment of the law. The same principles extend to the relations existing
between a master and his servant. Thus, if the engineer of a railway
company negligently run a train of cars over a person who is without
fault, the company is liable for the injury caused. The same doctrine
is applied to the willful acts and the mistakes of agents and servants,
committed by them while acting within the scope of the agency or line
of the employment.
May v. Bliss, 22 Vt. 477 ; Luttrell v. Hazen, 3
Sneed (Tenn.) 20; Pennsylvania Co. v. Weddle, 100 Ind. 138; Rail-

road Co. v. McKee, 99 Ind. 519, 50 Am. Rep. 102; Crockett v. Calvert, 8 Ind. 127.
At the time Nichols made the alteration of the note, was he the agent
or servant of the plaintiff in respect to his duties pertaining to said
note?
It is averred that he was the traveling salesman, but that he
was not a general agent, and had no authority to make settlements or
take notes on plaintiff's account, nor was that any part of his duties ;
that, being about to go to Lebanon in the course of his duties as such
traveling salesman, the plaintiff instructed him to procure for plaintiff
from the defendants a note on account of an indebtedness due from
them to the plaintiff. But the averments of the complaint negativing
the fact of agency will not control if it appear from all the averments
The same person may be a
that the legal relation of agency exists.
special agent for the same principal in several different matters. Nichols was the agent of the plaintiff to sell goods. He was also its agent
to procure the note. We are here concerned with the latter agency
Did his relation as agent cease when he obtained the note, or
only.

If

the
did it continue until the note was delivered to the plaintiff?
agency ceased when the note was obtained by him, what relation did
he sustain to the plaintiff in the interval of time between the delivery
to him and the delivery to the plaintiff ? This leads to the inquiry, who
In the primitive conditions of
are agents, and who are servants?
society, the things which were the subjects of sale and trade were few
There was little occasion for any one to engage in comin number.
mercial transactions, and when it did become necessary the business
But the
was generally transacted by the parties thereto in person.
strong and powerful had many servants, who were usually slaves.
The servants performed menial and manual services for the master.
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§§

a
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§

Story, Ag.
concerning purchases) in describing this relation.
Agency, properly speaking, relates to commercial or business transactions, while service has reference to actions upon or concerning things.
An
Service deals with matters of manual or mechanical execution.
clothed
the more direct representative of the master, and
agent
Mechem,
servant.
with higher powers and broader discretion than
Ag.
The terms "agent" and "servant" are so frequently used interapt to conclude
changeably in the adjudications that the reader
the
think,
however,
that
history of the
they mean the same thing. We
between
difference
that
there
law bearing on this subject shows

it

them. Agency, in its legal sense, always imports commercial dealings
between two parties by and through the medium of another. An agent,
negotiates or treats with third parties in commercial matters for another.
When Nichols was engaged in treating with the defendants
concerning the note, he was an agent. When the note was delivered
was in law delivered to the plaintiff, and he ceased to treat
to him,

*

*

*

J.,

J.,

4

a

it

It

All his duties concerning the note then
or deal with the defendants.
to the
was his duty to carry and deliver
related to the plaintiff.
He ceased
plaintiff. In doing this he owed no duty to the defendants.
to be an agent, because he was not required to deal further with third
He was then
mere servant of the plaintiff, charged with the
parties.
duty of faithfully carrying and delivering the note to his master.
When Nichols made the alteration in the note he was the servant, and
not the agent, of the plaintiff.
Judgment reversed.
Davis, C.
and Gavin,
dissent.
The rest of the opinion is an historical survey of the relation of master
and servant
It is often said that the distinction between principal and agent
*
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As civilization advanced, the things which are the subjects of commerce increased, and it became necessary to perform commercial transactions through the medium of other persons.
The relation of principal and agent is but an outgrowth or expanThe same rules that apply
sion of the relation of master and servant.
other.
There
is a marked similarity
the
to
the
apply
to
one generally
It is often
in the legal consequences flowing from the two relations.
difficult to distinguish the difference between an agent and a servant.
This difficulty is increased by the fact that the same individual often
combines in his own person the functions of both agent and servant.
Agents are often denominated servants, and servants are often called
The word "servant" in its broadest meaning, includes an
agents.
difference between
however, in legal contemplation,
agent. There
The Romans, to whom we are indebted for
servant.
an agent and
many of the principles of agency, in the early stages of their laws
used the terms "mandatum" (to put into one's hand, or confide to the
discretion of another) and "negotium" (to transact business, or to treat

THE RELATION
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TAYLOR

et al. v.

1

DAVIS' ADM'X.

Court of the United States, 18S4.
28 L. Ed. 163.)

(Supreme

(Part

110

TJ.

S.

330,

4

Sup.

Ct. 147,

Davis
Taylor and Davis were trustees of the Cairo City property.
agreed to resign his trust to one Parsons, and Taylor and Parsons then
agreed to pay Davis, out of the trust funds as they should come into
This
their hands, the amount due him at the time of his resignation.
they never did. Davis died, and his administratrix sues to hold them
They claimed to have acted only for
personally on their agreement.
the trust property.
Mr. Justice Woods 5 [After stating the facts and disposing of a ques* * * A trustee is not an agent. 6 An agent
tion of practice:]
The two relations are essenand servant is difficult to define.
The true distinction lies in the nature of the service to be
Merritt v. Huber, 137 Iowa,
performed and the manner of its performance.
135, 114 N. W. 627 (1008).
The distinction is often said to be a question of
discretion ; the agent having more or less discretion, while the servant acrs
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U.
under his master's direction and control.
S. 518, 10 Sup. Ct. 175, 33 L. Ed. 440 (1889); McCroskey v. Hamilton, 108
Ga. 640, 34 S. E.
75 Am. St. Rep. 79 (1899); Gibson v. Hardware Co., 94
Ala. 346, 10 South. 304 (1S91), post, p. 19. Occasionally the distinction is important in criminal actions under a penal statute referring to servants.
An
Regina v. Walker, 8 Cox. ('.
agent cannot be punished under such a statute.
C. 1, Dears. & B. 600, 4 Jur. N. S. 465, 27 L. J. M. C. 207, 6 W. R. 505 (1858).
Independent Contractor. — In determining the liability of a contractor to
third persons for acts or contracts of a second person, it often becomes necessary to determine whether such second person dealt with the third person
as an independent
contractor or as the agent or servant of the first contractor. The distinction is said to lie in this : That the agent or servant
represents the will of the employer, while the independent contractor represents that will only as to the result of the work, and not as to the means
whereby it is accomplished.
Jensen v. Barbour, 15 Mont. 582, 39 Pac. 906
QS95), citing Bibb's Adm'r v. N. & W. R. Co., 87 Va. 711, 14 S. E. 163 (1891) ;
The distinction beBrackett v. Lubke, 4 Allen, 138, 81 Am. Dec. 694 (1862).
tween an independent contractor and an agent is well illustrated by comparing Casement v. Brown, 148 U. S. 615. 13 Sup. Ct. 672, 37 L. Ed. 582 (1893)
(independent contractor),
with Railroad v. Banning, 15 Wall. 649, 21 L. Ed.
See, also, Burns v. McDonald, 57 Mo. App. 599 (1894).
220 (1872) (agent).
The independent contractor, like the agent, enters into business relations with
third persons, but on his own account, and not, like the agent, in behalf of
his employer.
Atlas Lumber Co. v. Schenck, 2 Colo. App. 246, 29 Pac. 1137
and master
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tially similar.

Ill,

(1892).
b Part

of the opinion

is omitted.

Rowe v. Rand, 111 Ind. 206, 12 N. E. 377 (1887), in which one
who called himself a "trustee" was held, nevertheless, to be an agent, with
Lyle v. Burke, 40 Mich. 499 (1S79), where it was held, per Cooley, J., that
an instrument providing for placing in the hands of defendant a fund for
the support of the maker of the instrument during life, and to be thereafter
divided, created a trust, and not a mere agency, revocable by the maker's
In the former case the court said : "A trustee is one to whom an esdeath.
tate has been conveyed in trust, and, consequently,
the holding of property
in trust constitutes a person a trustee. An agent is one who acts for, or in
place of, another, denominated the principal, in virtue of power or authority
In the case
conferred by the latter, to whom an account must be rendered.
of an ordinary agency for the sale or disposition of property the title to the
See, also,
property, as well as to the proceeds, remains in the principal."
e Compare

si

T.

^j(Lufr-i^u\

t
-/xti<s**~ n

/f-^£<^-^
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a

is

a

is

it,

represents and acts for his principal, who may be either a natural or
artificial person. A trustee may be defined generally as a person in
whom some estate interest or power in or affecting property is vested
for the benefit of another. When an agent contracts in the name of
his principal, the principal contracts, and is bound, but the agent is not.
When a trustee contracts as such, unless he is bound, no one is bound,
The trust estate cannot promise; the confor he has no principal.
As a trustract is therefore the personal undertaking of the trustee.
and
the
for
purpose
with
the
estate,
power
tee holds the
although only
he
personally bound by the contracts he makes as
of managing
trustee, even when designating himself as such. The mere use by the
promisor of the name of trustee or any other name of office or emtrustee acts in
Of course, when
ployment will not discharge him.
entitled to indemnify himgood faith for the benefit of the trust, he
self for his engagements out of the estate in his hands, and for this
credit for his expenditures will be allowed in his accounts
purpose
*

in er-

was pointed out that, while trusty
v. Gaud, SS 111. 490 (1878), in which
and confidence were reposed in an agent, his relation to his principal doe^
not fall under any recognized class of trusts.
Agency and Partnership. — In the leading case of Cox v. Hickman,
H. L. Cas. 268, 11 Eng. Reprint, 431,
B. X. S. 47, 99 B. C. L. 47,
Jur.^
^ JTi
*-~-^-^
Wy. R. 754
L. T. Rep. N. S. 185,
N. S. 105, 30 L. J. C. T. 125,
(1S60)(*
that the law of partnership (1860)^/
was laid down by Lord Wensleydale
And the most certain test of/part*
ranch of the law of principal and agent.
&^t/<-<^
nership is, not the sharing of profits, but the authority of each partner to
Per Cooley,
act as principal for himself and as agent for the other partners.
N. W. 785, 40 Am. Rep. 4G5 (1881).
.1.. in Beecher v. Bnsh. 45 Mich. 188,
partner'.
It has sometimes been
But the ordinary agent is. of course, not
is the agreement that he is to share in the
urged that he becomes one if
undoubtedly true, if he becomes himself
That
rofits of the enterprise.
mere agent, provided he acts only Cor
principal; but he may still remain
share
others in the enterprise, and as compensation for his services receives
of the profits. The question is one of intent, to he gathered, not from what
the parties called the relation, but from the legal effect of the acts and conEllsworth v. Pomeroy, 26 Ind. 158 (1866); Eastman
tracts in the transaction.
Leading case);
v. Clark, 53 N. FI. 276, 16 Am. Rep. 192 (1872)
Parchen v.
p.i.-. 588, 51 Am. Rep. 65 (1885) (collecting the auAnderson.
Mont. 138,
thorities).
Agent and Lessee. — An agent is sometimes put In charge of bis principal's
Here, too, the i«"- al result depends, not upon
so-called lease
business under
the names used by the parties, but upon the legal effect of their acts and
representative
capacity
If the "lessee" was merely acting in
agreements.
state v. Page,
Speers, 108,
for the "lessor," the relation is one of agency,
"s (1843).
business on bis own acIf the lessee conducts
10 Aiu. Dec.
count, even though he pays as rent part of the profits, the relation is that
of landlord and tenant.
N. W. 785, 40 .yiu.
Beecher v. Bush, 45 Mich. 188,
Rep. 165 (1881).
(a

r

7

a

,:

1

a

a

5

•",

a

a

^

a

is

it

a

7

1

it

U

3

8

8

7

it
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by the court having jurisdiction thereof.
The judgment of the court below for the plaintiff, defendant
ror in this court, was affirmed.

>-i
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TAYLOR
(Supreme

Court of Arizona,
U. S. 120,

v.

(Part

1

BURNS.

8 Ariz. 463, 76 Pac. 623,
1904.
27 Sup. Ct. 40, 51 L. Ed. 116.)

affirmed

in

203
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Action to quiet title to three mining claims. Taylor based his claim
on an agreement in which Burns "sells" to him the claims upon condition that, whenever he shall negotiate and sell them to any third persons, he shall pay to Burns $45,000 and one-eighth of any excess he
may secure.
Sloan, J. 7 [After stating the facts:] * * * The only question involved is the construction to be given the agreement between
Taylor and Burns. The contention of the appellant is that the agreement amounted to a sale to him of the mines for a given and valid
The contention of counsel
consideration expressed in the instrument.
for the appellees is that, from the instrument as a whole, it clearly
amounts to nothing more than a power of attorney authorizing Taylor
to negotiate the sale of the claims upon the terms stated in the agreement, revocable at will. Upon the latter contention, it was admitted
by the appellant that, if the instrument was revocable at the will of
Burns, such revocation was made by Burns on February 27, 1903.
It is a settled rule of construction of instruments of this character
that the intention of the parties must govern, as this intention is eviWilliams v. Paine,
denced by a consideration of the entire instrument.
"The elementary canon
169 U. S. 76, IS Sup. Ct. 279, 42 L. Ed. 658.
is not that particular words may be isolatedly considered, but that the whole contract must be brought into view and
interpreted with reference to the nature of the obligations between the
parties, and the intention which they have manifested in forming
them."
O'Brien v. Miller, 168 U. S. 287, 18 Sup. Ct. 140, 42 L. Ed.

of interpretation

469.

Tested by this rule, the agreement cannot be construed as a conveyFor a consideration, Burns agreed to sell upon certain terms and
These terms and conditions were that Taylor
conditions expressed.
was empowered and authorized to sell and negotiate the mines for any
price above $45,000; that, upon such sale being made, he should pay
to Burns $45,000 of the purchase price, and one-eighth of the excess
of the purchase price over and above $45,000, and that both parties
should aid and assist each other in the negotiation and sale of the
claims, in order that they might quickly be sold, and the consideration realized; and that further, upon said sale, Burns should execute
ance.

any deed or deeds of conveyances that might be necessary to convey
It will be noted that
or purchasers.
a good title to the purchaser
sum
or
sums
of money whatnot
was
to
obligated
pay any
Taylor
which
would
in
permit a reis
the
instrument
There
ever.
nothing
of
price.
of
the
Burns
Taylor
purchase
against
part
any
covery by
7

Part of the opinion is given on p.

225,

post.
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Upon no theory can the instrument be construed as a sale in prseAs an agreement to sell in futuro, it lacks the essential element
of mutuality, in that Taylor was not obligated to pay the purchase
or even to effect
price, or any part of
sale.
Again, the instrument expressly provides that, in case Taylor should effect
sale, the
deed of conveyance should be made by Burns, which
an admission
that the instrument was not to be construed as divesting Burns of his
title, and that
conveyance from him would be necessary to vest his
title in any purchaser.
Not only does the contract fail to vest any
title in Taylor, but
does not contemplate that Taylor should ever
acquire the title.
merely provides that upon the contingency of
sale to another, brought about by his efforts or the joint efforts of
himself and Burns, Taylor should share in the proceeds of such sale.
whole,
Taking the instrument as
appears that
was intended
as
of
power
merely
sale of
attorney authorizing Taylor to effect
the mines, upon the terms mentioned, as the agent of Burns.
We hold, therefore, that the agreement did not confer any title to
or estate in the mines in question upon Taylor, and that the findings
and decree of the trial court are correct.
The judgment will be affirmed.
it

*

*

8

SNEIXING

v.

Court of Georgia,

(Supreme

ARBUCKLE BROS.
104 Ga. 362,

1S9S.

30 S.

E. 863.)

a

The case involved the construction of
contract which Arbuckle
Bros, were accustomed to make with those who sold their coffees. The
contract provided, among other things, that all goods consigned remain the property of the consignor until sold and paid for, the con-

a

;

is

;

;

signee holding as factor; that goods shall be sold only at the prices
and terms fixed by the consignors
that the consignee guarantees the
sale of all coffee consigned and payment therefor within 60 days
that he will remit such payment, whether the whole of the consignment
sold or not and that the consignee assumes the risk of any
fall in price and the benefit of any advance.
One Allen sold coffees under such
contract.
Before paying for
certain goods he became insolvent, and his assignee collected for the
coffee so sold. Arbuckle Bros, sue the assignee to recover this money.
I

b

Fish, J.° The case turns upon the proper legal construction
given to the written agreement or contract between Arbuckle
If, as contended by the defendants in error, the legal
and Allen.

v. Melick,

97 Iowa,

564, 66 X. W. 780 (1896).

Part of the opinion

is omitted.

18

9

16

&

1

To the same effeel are Lenz \. Harrison,
111. 598, 36 N. E. 567 (1893);
Williams .Mower
Reaper Co. v. Raynor, 38 Wis. 119 (1875); Dewes Brewery Co. v. Merritt, 82 Mich. 198,
N. W. 379,
L. R. A. 270 (1890); Norton
»
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(Part

1

effect of the paper in quejstion is to create between the parties thereto
the relation of principal \and factor, — the latter selling the goods of
Bros, are
the former under a del credere p^nMissi on, — then Arbuckle
entitled to the funds in the hands of Allen's assignee, arising from
accounts against customers to whom Allen had sold goods consigned
If, on the other hand, this paper, properly
to him by the Arbuckles.
construed, rendered the relation of the parties that of vendor and
purchaser, then Arbuckle Bros, were not entitled to the proceeds of
The contract is certainly a very extraordinary one,
these accounts.
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Some of its stipuand contains seemingly contradictory provisions.
lations, if construed only in connection with others of a kindred naOther
ture, seem to indicate the creation of a del credere agency.
harmonize
stipulations, taken in connection with those which readily
with them, clearly show a contract of sale. It appears to have been
drawn for the purpose of enabling Arbuckle Bros, to "run with the

hare, or hold with the hounds," according as, in the exigencies of a
— on the one hand, to hold
given case, their interests might dictate,
bound,
event,
in any
to pay for all goods shipped to
Allen absolutely
in the event of his failure
hand,
him by the Arbuckles; on the other
to pay and his insolvency, to enable them to successfully claim all unsold goods in Allen's possession, and the accounts, or their proceeds,
against his customers, representing goods which he had sold, but for
which he had not paid Arbuckle Bros.
The contract must be construed in the light of all of its provisions,
and the legal outcome of its several stipulations, construed together,
The mere name which may have been
must control its classification.
given to it by the parties thereto cannot change the legal effect of its
In Herryford v. Davis, 102 U. S. 235, 26 L. Ed. 160, the
stipulations.
supreme court of the United States construed a written contract between a car manufacturing corporation and a railroad company to be
the fact that the contract, in the language of
a sale, notwithstanding
the court, "industriously and repeatedly spoke of loaning the cars to
the railroad company for hire for four months, and delivering them

for hire." Mr. Justice Strong, delivering the opinion of the
"What, then, is the true construction of the contract?
court,
this question is not to be found in any name which the
to
The answer
for

use

said:

parties may have given to the instrument, and not alone in any particular provisions it contains, disconnected from all others, but in the
ruling intention of the parties, gathered from all the language they
have used. It is the legal effect of the whole which is to be sought for.
See, also, Hays v.
The form of the instrument is of little account."
373;
Cowan v. ManuA.
R.
99
833,
11
741,
E.
L.
S.
Ga.
85
Jordan,
facturing Co., 92 Tenn. 376, 21 S. W. 663; Manufacturing Co. v.
Cole, 4 Lea, 439, 40 Am. Rep. 20.
Under the fifth clause of this contract, Allen was bound to remit
to Arbuckle Bros., at fixed times, the full price of each consignment,

Irv-^x^
Ch. 1)

*f AsMc^ ~£l^_
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made to him by the customers to whom he
upon which he sold to such customers, and
any sales had been made by him or not ;
fixed times, to remit to the Arbuckles at a
at the time when the goods were consigned
to him. Allen's obligation, then, was radically different from that of
a mere del credere agent ; for he did not simply guaranty to Arbuckle
Bros, that the customers to whom he sold their goods on a credit
should pay them, through him, as their agent, the price for which the

without regard to payments
sold the goods, or the terms
without regard to whether
and he was bound, at such
price fixed by them to him

goods were sold to such purchasers, but he agreed, at the expiration
of 60 days from each consignment, to remit to Arbuckle Bros, full
payment for the entire consignment, regardless of the question whether
the goods of which such consignment consisted had been sold by him
or not. If none of the goods of such consignment had been sold by
Allen, he was just as much obligated to pay Arbuckle Bros, for them,
fixed by the latter at the time of the consignment, as he
would have been if he had in fact sold all of the goods contained in
In keeping with, and as if to emphasize, this clause
the consignment.
of the agreement, the tenth clause expressly stipulated that if, at the
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at a price

expiration of 60 days, Allen had not paid for the goods, the Arbuckles
What
should have the right to draw on him for the price of the same.
stronger feature of a sale on 60 days' time can there be than a stipulation which renders the consignee, from the moment the goods are received by him, absolutely and unconditionally bound at the end of
that time to pay for them, and to pay for them at a price fixed at the
time they are consigned?
As if the provisions which we have
enough to hold Allen bound, under any
for the goods at the price fixed when
the sixth clause provided that he was to

just been discussing

were not

and all circumstances, to pay
they were consigned to him,
insure Arbuckle Bros, against
So, if the market price fell.
any decline in the price of the goods.
And, as if to
the loss was Allen's, and not that of the Arbuckles.
balance this provision, the seventh clause provided that, if the goods
advanced in price, Allen was to have the benefit of such advance. So,
if the market price rose, the profit was Allen's, and not that of Arbuckle Bros.
Why should Allen assume the risk of any decline in
the price or market value of the goods, if the goods belonged to Arbuckle Bros.? Why should he be entitled to the benefit of any increase

if

they did not belong to him? Why
should he be compelled to pay for the goods at the end of 60 days,
whether he had sold them or not, if he was simply an agent to sell the
These earmarks indicate a sale, and, taking
goods for the consignors?
difficult,
the apparently con
it
is
notwithstanding
very
them together,
in the price

or value of

the goods,

flicting provisions of the instrument,
effect of this contract.

is the legal

to escape

the conclusion

that such

16
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(Part

1

When we further consider that no account of sales was to be rendered by the so-called "factor" to his alleged principals; that he was
not required to furnish to them the names of the parties to whom he
sold upon a credit, and the terms of the credit which he extended, nor
to report or transmit to them the evidences of indebtedness, if any,
which he received from such customers;
that, no matter how much
cash he might accumulate from sales within the 60 days, he was under
no obligation to remit it to them until the 60 days had elapsed, and
then was bound to remit not simply as a del credere agent accounting
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to his principals for the money of such principals in his hands, and
for the amount of matured indebtedness against customers who had
failed to meet their obligations, but to remit the whole amount of the
and that discounts, such as are usual in cases of
entire consignment;
sales upon time, were to be allowed upon all bills paid before the expiration of 60 days from their dates, — the conclusion seems unavoidable that the true legal relation between the parties to this agreement
was that of vendors and vendee. The stipulation that the title to the
goods should remain in the Arbuckles until Allen had sold them is not
It might make the sale, as beinconsistent with a contract of sale.
The seller of personal
tween the parties, to that extent conditional.
property often stipulates that the title thereto shall remain in him until
the purchase price is paid. As Allen wanted the goods for the purpose
of reselling them at retail to his customers, if the stipulation had
gone to this extent it would have seriously hampered his business, and
caused him to lose the benefit of the 60-days' credit extended to him.
The stipulation in question may therefore be treated as simply an
effort on the part of the vendors to retain the title until the vendee
had either sold the goods or paid for them ; the retention of title, by
express provision, ceasing when he sold the goods, and by necessary
implication ceasing when he paid for them. Nor is the fact that Allen
was to sell the goods at prices fixed by Arbuckle Bros, necessarily
It is not very uncommon in these
inconsistent with the idea of a sale.
times for the manufacturer of a certain article to endeavor to fix the
price at which it shall be sold at retail by the merchants who purchase
it for that purpose.
This effort on the part of the manufacturer is
doubtless for the purpose of establishing a uniform price, applicable to
all markets, and to prevent competition between the retailers.
Coming now to stipulations and expressions which really seem to
conflict with the idea of a sale, how futile to call the instrument in
and, in its opening
question a "special selling factor appointment,"

sentence, to "appoint" Allen a "special selling factor," when under its
provisions he is bound as a purchaser?
Of what avail was it to introduce provisions which, taken by themselves, indicate the creation of a
del credere agency, and yet to bind the so-called "factor" to pay for
Of what use was it to
the goods, whether he ever sold them or not?
declare in one clause that Allen should never become a purchaser of

DEFINITION AND NATURE OF THE RELATION
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the goods consigned to him, when in a subsequent clause it was stipulated that he should pay for them, at the end of 60 days, at a price
The latter clause annihilates
fixed at the time of the consignment?
As is well said by Mr. Justice Strong in Herryford v.
the former.
Davis, supra, "It is quite unmeaning for parties to a contract to say it
shall not amount to a sale, when it contains every element of a sale,

J.,

debiting himself with the price specified in the price list, not specifying
the particular contracts, nor giving the names of the purchasers, nor
the price at which, nor the terms on which, he had sold the goods ; and
in the next month he paid to Towle & Co. the moneys which were due
to them in respect of the sales thus accounted for. He frequently had
the goods bleached or dyed before he sold them, but gave no account
to Towle & Co. of the expense. In discussing the nature of the rela-

it

a

a

:

tion between the parties under this course of dealing, James, L.
"The case seems very analogous to one suggested by Mr. De
said
If publisher publishes for an
Gex in the course of the argument.
author, and sells for the author, and holds all the copies of the book,
and at some specified time has to return to the author an account of
all those sold, and pay for them at
price fixed between the author
and the publisher, the publisher being at liberty to make his own
could never
bargains with retail booksellers all over the country,

supposed that the relation of creditor and debtor or vendor and
purchaser ever existed between the author and the retail booksellers.
have not the slightest doubt that
great quantity of 'agency business'
carried on in the same way in the country, and that there are
large dealers who have agents in all the towns of Great Britain and
Ireland. Possibly they may say: 'We will give you the goods. You
shall be the sole person whom we supply in
particular district, and
a

be

a

is

I

A.—

2

GODD.PB.A

it

is

if

in

a

is

a

we shall not call upon you to pay until you have disposed of them.
You are at liberty to sell upon your own terms. We have nothing to
do with the persons with whom you deal, but we look to you to pay
at our trade prices for the goods you sell. You must return the sales
that you have made up to certain times. We will give you
certain
credit, but when that has expired we look to you to pay us the cash.'
That
the kind of bargain
very reasonable bargain, and that
which, in my opinion, the course of dealing shows to have existed
this case; and,
of
so, how
possible to say that the proceed
the sales were trust moneys in the hands of Mr. Nevill?
Mr. Nevill
is
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and transmission of ownership."
Probably the leading case among cases of this character is that of
Ex parte White, 6 Ch. App. 397. In that case there was no written
contract, but the course of dealing between the parties showed that
consigned goods of
Towle & Co., who were cotton manufacturers,
their manufacture to Alfred Nevill, accompanied by a price list, and
he sent them monthly an account of the goods which he had sold,

18
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1

was not to pay immediately, and if he sold for cash, it seems to me
impossible that Towle & Co. could have any right to say: 'You have
sold the goods for cash.
Therefore hand over the moneys to us at
once.' Nevill would have said»: 'No; the bargain between us is that
I am to give you an account at the end of the month, and to pay you
at the end of another month.
My selling for hard cash does not alter
the nature of the bargain between you and me, or entitle you to call
upon me to hand the moneys over to you, or to put the moneys in
medio and keep them for you.'
The proceeds of sale were his own
moneys, and not trust moneys, and he was at liberty to deposit them
with a banker, or deal with them as he pleased."
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How

aptly the lord justice's illustration of the impossibility of the
existence of any right in Towle & Co. to demand the proceeds of cash
sales from Nevill applies in the case at bar ! To such demand upon
the part of Arbuckle Bros., Allen could have replied: "No; under the
bargain between us, I am not to give you any account of sales at all ;
I am simply to pay you for the goods at the end of sixty days. 'My
selling for hard cash does not alter the nature of the bargain between
you and me, or entitle you to call upon me to hand the moneys over to
"

In the
you, or to put the moneys in medio and keep them for you.'
same case from which we have quoted, Mellish, L. J., said : "It is
quite clear that Nevill, if he sold these goods, was to pay Towle & Co.
for them, at a fixed price, — that is to say, a price fixed beforehand beNow, if it had been his
tween him and them, — and at a fixed time.
duty to sell to his customers at that price, and to receive payment for
them at that time, then the course of dealing would be consistent with
his being merely a del credere agent, because I apprehend that a del
credere agent, like any other agent, is to sell according to the instructions of his principal, and to make such contracts as he is authorized
to make for his principal ; and he is distinguished from other agents
simply in this : that he guaranties that those persons to whom he sells
shall perform the contracts which he makes with them ; and therefore if he sells at the price at which he is authorized by his principal
to sell, and upon the credit he is authorized by his principal to give,
and the customer pays him according to his contract, then, no doubt he
is bound, like any other agent, as soon as he receives the money, to
hand it over to the principal. But if the consignee is at liberty, according to the contract between him and the consignor, to sell at any
price he likes, and receive payment at any time he likes, but he is
bound, if he sells the goods, to pay the consignor for them at a fixed
price and at a fixed time, in my opinion, whatever the parties may
think, their relation is not that of principal and agent. The contract
of sale which the alleged agent makes with his purchasers is not a
contract made on account of his principal, for he is to pay a price
which may be different, and at a time which may be different, from
those fixed by the contract.
He is not guarantying the performance.
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by the persons to whom he sells, of their contract with him, which is
the proper business of a del credere agent ; but he is to undertake to
pay a certain fixed price for those goods, wholly independent of what
the contract may be which he makes with the person to whom he
sells ; and my opinion is that, in point of law, the alleged agent in such
a case is making on his own account a contract of purchase with his
This decision was affirmed
alleged principal, and is again reselling."
by the house of lords, sub nom. Towle v. White, 21 Wkly. Rep. 465.
We have quoted at some length from this case, because it has been
regarded as very high authority by the courts in this country, and
has been often cited and followed.
While there were some features
indicating a sale in that case which are not in the present one, we regard the features in this case which indicate a sale, taken all together,
as being really stronger than those of a similar character in the case
decided by the English court.
We think that the single fact, in the
case at bar, that Allen was bound to pay for all goods which he received from the Arbuckles, whether he ever sold them or not, outweighs any facts indicating a sale in that case which are not found in
this one. 10 * * *
Judgment for plaintiffs below reversed.

GIBSON
(Supreme

v.

SNOW HARDWARE

Court of Alabama,

1891.

94

Ala.

340,

CO.
10

South.

304.)

Action against Airs. Gibson on account for hardware sold upon
the order of her son, John Brady, for use upon a building constructed
for her by one Allen. The evidence showed that she had allowed
him to purchase other material for her and that she had paid for it.
Mrs. Gibson denied that he was her general agent, or was ever authorized to make the purchases for her.
McO.ku.an, J. 11 [after passing upon various questions of evidence
and charges] held: * * * Nor was there error in excluding the
io in passing upon a similar contract In Arbuckle v. Gates. 95 Va. 802, 30
E. 496 (1898), the court said: ••The agreement was an attempt to accomTo make a sale of personal property, and
plish that which cannol be done:
at the same time to constitute the buyer simply an agent of the seller to
hold the properly until it is paid for. The two things are incompatible
and
The agreement had in it every element of sale. II was, iii
cannol coexist.
It does not matter by
BUbstance and effect, a sale, and must be so declared.
what name the parties chose to designate it.
That does not determine its
The courts look beyond mere names, and within, to see the real
Character.
nature of an agreement, and determine from all its provisions taken together,
and not from the name that has lieen given to it hy the parties, or from seme
The court then reviewed
Isolated provision, its legal character and effect."
An elaborate discus
and discriminated the principal cases on the subject.
sion is ulso to he found in Arbuckle v. Kirkpatrick, 98 Tenn. 221, 39 S W
3, 30 I,. It. A. 285, 00 Am. St. Rep. 854 (1897).
1 1 Part of the opinion is omitted.
S.

THE . RELATION

(Part

1

testimony of Mrs. Gibson to the effect that she had paid Allen for
the material charged in the account sued on. That fact could exert
no influence on this case in any aspect.
Brady was her agent, and
had authority to bind her to the payment of the account to the J. SnowHardware Company, palpably payment by her to Allen or anybody
else would not avoid her liability to plaintiff; and, if Brady was not
her agent, she would not be liable to plaintiff, whether she had paid to
Allen or not.
The inquiry was foreign to the case, and properly
eliminated from it.
"A
Agencies are of three classes, — universal, general, and special.
universal agent is one authorized to transact all of the business of
his principal of every kind; a general agent is one who is employed
to transact all of the business of his principal of a particular kind or in
a particular place;
a special agent is one authorized to act only in a
transaction."
Mechem, Ag. § 6; 1 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law,
specific
"A
348
et
special agency properly exists when there is a delep.
seq.
of
authority to do a special act." Story, Ag. § 17. "A special
gation
1 Ross,
is
one
authorized to do one or two special things."
agent
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If

"A special agent is appointed only for a particular purCont. 41.
Chit. Cont. 285.
pose, and is invested with limited powers."
In the case at bar there was not only the declaration of Brady that
he was Mrs. Gibson's general agent, but other evidence from which
the jury might have inferred that he represented her generally in making purchases, or, at least, that he was her agent for all purposes in
respect of the opera-house, including the making of the contract with
Allen, the purchasing of material, the supervision of the work, changing of plans, and specifications, etc. This would, in our opinion, con-

stitute him her general agent with respect to that enterprise, if the
jury found the facts in line with these tendencies of the evidence,
having authority to do, not "one or two special things," not "a single
act" merely, but all acts necessary to the consummation of the enterAnd the court's charge to the jury at plaintiff's inprise in hand.
stance, that one who deals with a general agent is not bound to inquire as to the extent of his authority with respect to the matter of
the agency, and that, "if the plaintiffs show that John Brady was Mrs.
Gibson's general agent in building the opera-house, they [it] would
have a right to deal with him in regard to matters connected with the
opera-house, without inquiring the exact extent of his authority,"
was pertinent to the evidence adduced, and a correct exposition of the

law applicable to it.
§§ 283-287.
Reversed

12

*

*

Coffin Co. v. Stokes, 78 Ala. 372;
*

Mechem,

Ag.

for errors in admission of evidence.

12 See, also, Pacific Biscuit Co. v. Dugger, 40 Or. 362, 67 Pac. 32 (1901),
post, p. 342, and compare Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Butchers' & Drovers'
Bank, 16 N. Y. 125, 14S, 69 Am. Dec. 678 (1S57), post, p. 334, dissenting opinion of Comstock, J. For full discussion, see post, p. 342 ff.
General and Special Agents. — It has often been said that the terms "gen
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kind, and that
eral" and "special" mark a difference in degree, rather than in
act more or
but
general,
agents
are
Most
clear.
often
not
is
distinction
the
In
p. 342.
authority.
post,
See
upon
their
limitations
special
less under
Springfield Engine Co. v. Kennedy, 7 Ind. App. 502, 34 N. E. 856 (1893),
relative.
the court says: "The terms -general agent' and 'special agent' are
He is then
An agent may have power to act for his principal in all matters.
strictly a general agent. He may have power to act for him in particular
He is then a special agent. But within the scope of such particular
matters.
genmatters his power may be general, and with reference thereto he is a
R.
Atchison,
&
F.
T.
S.
v.
in
Cross
question
discussing
the
In
agent."
eral
Co., 141 Mo. 132, 42 S. W. 675 (1S97), the court said that the distinction in
very unsatisthe books between general and special agencies was sometimes
factory. It marks, not a diversity of the principles governing the principal's
liability, but merely adjusts the actual measure of it. But compare Butler
v. Maples, 9 Wall. 766, 19 L. Ed. 822 (1869), in which it was held that "the
distinction between the two kinds of agencies is that the one is created by
power given to do acts of a class, and the other by power to do individual
acts only"; i. e., whether an agency is general or special is dependent on
whether the agent is empowered to do acts of a class, or only individual acts,
and it is quite independent of whether the authority is limited and restricted,
or not.
Universal Agent.— It may well be doubted whether there is such a things ^ 1/irtriA-^
Qtr*MUyl
as a universal agent. In Wood v. McCain, 7 Ala. 800, 42 Am. Dec. 612 (1S45),
^
the court, in discussing the power of an agent, left in charge of his princi-iTK^
pal's business during the absence of his principal from the state, to assign
his book accounts to a creditor, said, per Collier, C. J.: "The precise lan-(£/
guage employed in the bill of exceptions, is this: 'Stedman visited North [)
Carolina and left Wm. A. Revis his general agent, or agent generally (said
Kevis having no written authority), to transact his business in this State;
that he delivered up his books and accounts for medical services to said agent
(including the account against garnishee) for settlement, and that said agency
It is supposed by
was advertised and generally known in the neighborhood.'
the counsel for the plaintiff in error, that as Revis was the general agent of
his principal, it must be presumed he was authorized to make the assignment
This conclusion is by no means a necessary sequence from the
in question.
General, are clearly distinguishable from universal agents, that
premises.
is from such as may be appointed to do all the acts, which the principal can
personally do, and which he may lawfully delegate the power to another to
do. 'Such an universal agency may potentially exist; but it must be of the
And, indeed it is difficult,' says Mr. Justice Story,
very rarest occurrence.
'to conceive of the existence of such an agency, inasmuch as it would be to
make such an agent the complete master, not merely dux facti, but dominus
rerum, the complete disposer of all the rights and property of the principal.'
Such an unusual authority will never be inferred from any general expressions, however broad, but the law will restrain them to the particular businesa of the party, in respect to which, it is presumed, his intention to deleThus, if a merchant in view of
gate the authority was principally directed.
his temporary absence, should delegate to an agent his full and entire authority to sell his personal property, to buy any property for him, or on his
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^

account, or to make any contracts, or to do any other acts whatsoever, which
he could do if personally present — these general terms would be limited to
buying or selling, connected with his ordinary business as a merchant; and
would not be construed, to apply t"
without some more specific designation,
ami
a sale of his household furniture, or library, or the utensils, provisions,
Story's Ag. 20, 21. The difference beother necessaries used in his family.
tween a general and special agent, is said to he this: The former is appointed in net in the affairs of his principal generally, and the latter to acl
in the former case, the principal will he
concerning Borne particular object,
<-,m
bound by the acts of his agent, within the seope of the general authority
those acts are violative of his private Instructions
ferred on him. although
In the latter ease, if the agent exceeds the special authority
and directions.
Paley on
Id.
conferred on him, the principal is nol bound by his acts.
Ag. L99; Miiiin v. Commission Co., 15 Johns. 44, 54, 8 Am. Dee. 219."
Compare Gulick v. Grover, 33 N. J. Law, 163, 97 Am. Dec. r28 (1868) (in
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CHAPTER

(Part

1

II

THE PARTIES TO THE RELATION

SECTION

1.— WHO

MAY ACT AS PRINCIPAL

CALEY
(Supreme

Court of Indiana,

v.

MORGAN.

1887.

114

Ind.

350, 16 N.

E.

790.)

Action by Caley to quiet title to forty acres of land of which he
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was in possession

and claimed to be the owner.
Cross-complaint
by
Morgan setting up claim of title and demanding that it be quieted.
Caley claimed by conveyance direct from one Lucas ; Morgan, upon
a sheriff's sale antedating the conveyance to Caley, upon a judgment
entered by confession by Lucas in favor of one Hendrix.
This judgment was assigned to Morgan by one Milligan, acting under a power

of attorney from Hendrix.

Niblack, J. 1

[After stating the facts and holding that the judg* * * It is next
ment by confession was effective and valid:]
claimed that authority to assign a judgment cannot be conferred by a
power of attorney, and that, at all events, the power of attorney from
Hendrix to Milligan was inoperative, because it was not recorded in
some record in the recorder's office of Huntington county.
Any person capable of transacting his own business may appoint an agent to
act in his behalf in all the ordinary affairs of life. In many cases the
appointment may be by parol only, but may, in any case, be in writing. For some purposes the appointment must be by a letter or power
of attorney, which makes the agent an attorney in fact. A person thus
appointed, however, is none the less the mere agent of the person
appointing him.
Story, Ag. p. 2, § 3 ; Ewell's Evans, Ag. 1 ; Roehl
v. Haumesser, 114 Ind. 311, 15 N. E. 345, (No. 13,062.) A power of
attorney is valid as between the parties, and for all ordinary purposes,
without being recorded.
It is only when notice to third parties is
requisite that the recording of a power of attorney becomes material.
There was, consequently, nothing in the facts, as the court found them,

which a wife, having full authority for her husband in business matters, was
paper
held not to be a universal agent with power to indorse accommodation
in his name), with Barr v. Schroeder, 32 Cal. 609 (1867) (which holds, though
it was not necessary to a decision, that an agent having similar power as to
his principal's property, was a universal agent),
i Part of the opinion is omitted.
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which restrained Hendrix from constituting Milligan his attorney in
fact to sell and assign his judgment against Lucas, or which invalidat* * *
ed Milligan's assignment of the judgment to Morgan.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

DAVIS

v.

LANE.
1S39.

10

N. H.

156.)

Plaintiff's intestate held a note for $50 against Lane. Foss' wife
On the day
had been his general agent, transacting all his business.
of his death, when he was wholly senseless and beyond hope of recovery, she gave this note to one Prescott, to whom deceased owed
Lane paid the note to Prescott, and the administrator now sues
$46.
to recover the amount of the note.
Parker, C. J. 2 * * * There is no pretence that a wife, as such,
has any authority to dispose of the husband's goods, or adjust his af-

5

2

1

in

a

a

a

a

2

4

8

;

2

it

2

is

it,

fairs, by reason of his incapacity to transact business.
But it is contended, in this case, that the wife having had a general power to transact business for her husband previous to his illness,
nothing but an express revocation of that power, or some occurrence
which divests and transmits the property, as death, or bankruptcy,
will terminate her authority to act as the agent of her husband, and
that she therefore might well dispose of the note in question, notwithstanding her husband was utterly insensible and incapable of any
volition whatever, and this well known to her and to Prescott, to
and notwithstanding he continued in that state
whom she passed
until his decease.
The authorities show that the death of the constituent terminates
coupled with an interest so that
the authority, unless the power
Harper v. Little,
of
the agent.
in
name
the
be
executed
may
Admr.,
Mason's
Hunt
v.
Rousmaniere's
25
Am.
Dec.
11
18,
Greenl.
Wheat. 174,
L. Ed. 589; WatR. 244, Fed. Cas. No. 6,898; Id.,
Livermore on Agency, 302. So bankCamp. 274;
son v. King,
Parker v. Smith, 16
revocation.
ruptcy, on his part, operates as
power to
single woman terminates
East's R. 386. So marriage of
LiverSalk. 399;
her behalf.
Anonymous,
confess
judgment

;

;

is

more on Agency, 307.
put to the power of the principal to act
In all these cases an end
and, moreover, the operation of law transfers the estate, upon which
In
the power might operate, to the custody and control of others.
no
this latter respect these cases are unlike the one before us and
authority has been cited, or found, which will directly settle the present
case.
-■
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(Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire,

The rest of the opinion

is on page 282.
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(Part

1

We are of opinion, however, that the authority of the agent, where
the agency is revocable, must cease, or be suspended, by an act of
Providence depriving the constituent of all mind and ability to act for
himself, and that this doctrine can be sustained by very satisfactory
principles.

An authority

to do an act, for, and in the name of, another, presupposes a power in the individual to do the act himself, if present.
The act to be done is not the act of the agent, but the act of the principal ; and the agent can do no act in the name of the principal which
the principal might not himself do, if he were personally present. The
principal is present by his representative, and the making or execution
of the contract, or acknowledgment of a deed, is his act, or acknowl* * *
edgment.

MacFABXAND
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(Supreme

Court of Missouri,

v.

HEIM.

127 Mo. 327,
Rep. 629.)

1S94.

29

S.

W.

1030,

48 Am.

St.

Action against a guarantor of a lease of land belonging to Mrs.
MacFarland, and described "as her general estate." Her husband had
acted for her in making out the lease, and he and a janitor, Harding,
for her had secured Heim's signature as guarantor of the lease. Judgment for defendant.
Sherwood, J. 3 [After passing upon the consideration for the guaranty and holding there had been no assumption by Heim of any legal
* * * But the trial court erred in holding and instructliability:]
ing that Mrs. MacFarland (not being seised of an equitable separate
estate) could have any agent, either in Harding or in her husband, to
bind her by any act of theirs, or that she could ratify their void acts.
A void act is incapable of ratification. It is impossible to understand
what is meant by the words "general estate," of which it is said Mrs.
MacFarland was seised. It suffices, for the present purpose, that it is
stated in the record that it was not her "equitable separate estate."
It is among the fundamentals of the common law that a married
woman is incapable of contracting, and her supposed contracts are
void.
This is still the law, except where statutory modifications have
If thus incapable of contracting, then incapable, also, of
occurred.
authorizing another to contract for her; for this would be to make
"* * *
the stream rise higher than its fountain head. Story says :
Every person, therefore, of full age, and not otherwise disabled, has a
But infants, married women,
complete capacity for this purpose.
idiots, lunatics, and other persons not sui juris are either wholly or
partially incapable of appointing an agent. Idiots, lunatics, and other
persons not sui juris are wholly incapable; and infants and married
3

Part of opinion is omitted.
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I

it

;

9

S.

1,

S.

S.

;

course she could not appoint an agent. Wilcox v. Todd, 64 Mo. 388
Hall v. Callahan, 66 Mo. 316; Silvey v. Summer, 61 Mo. 253; Henry
W. 663, 17 Am. St. Rep. 580; Flesh v.
v. Sneed, 99 Mo. 407, 12
21
W. 907, 37 Am. St. Rep. 374; Mueller v.
Lindsay, 115 Mo.

a

S.

is

it

6

Kaessmann, 84 Mo. 318.
Counsel for defendant, however, make citation of Mead v. Spalcontrary doctrine,
W. 384, as asserting
ding, 94 Mo., loc. cit. 48,
does, for
there broadly asserted that "there can be no
and so
The two cases
doubt but the husband may be the agent of the wife."
cited from our own Reports do not sustain that position, because the
first one was one where the land of the wife, the proceeds of which
it

a

is

a

in

is

Eystra
she brought suit for, was "her sole and separate property."
Rodgers v. Bank,
The second one cited
v. Capelle, 61 Mo. 578.
69 Mo. 560, where the subject of the suit was the wife's money acquired by her under the married woman's act of 1875 (section 3296,
Rev. St. 1879),
But that section authorizes the wife to appoint her
husband as her agent for the disposition of her personal property, provided the authority be
writing, and we have expressly held that, in
section,
woman, respecting her personal propmarried
regard to that
held
under
its
feme sole. Blair v. Railroad Co.,
provisions,
erty

fore judgment affirmed.

All

concur.

9

S.

a

is

a

S.

1

89 Mo., loc. cit. 391,
W. 350. We therefore decline to follow the
in
v.
Mead
ruling
Spalding.
On account of the reasons expressed in
prior part of this opinion,
the case, such
the error mentioned
harmless one, and, when this
error in giving erroneous instructions constitutes no ground for reAm.
W. 45,
versal.
Fitzgerald v. Barker, 96 Mo. loc. cit. 666, 10
ThereSt. Rep. 375; Brobst v. Brock, 10 Wall. 519, 19 L. Ed. 1002.
is

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:45 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

is

if

;

8

is
a

a

it

6.

§

a

is

it,

it,

* * *
women are incapable, except under special circumstances.
women,
to
married
ordinarily, they are incapable of
So in regard
*
* * With regard to her sepor
an
attorney.
agent
appointing
or to
be
entitled to dispose of
she
perhaps,
may,
arate property,
in
or
relation
to
such
an
because
incumber
attorney,
through
agent
feme sole.
say, 'pergenerally treated as
separate property she
haps' for
may admit of question, and there do not seem to be any
Story, Ag. (9th Ed.)
satisfactory authorities directly on the point."
A similar doubt has been elsewhere intimated. Weisbrod v.
Railway Co., 18 Wis., loc. cit. 40, 86 Am. Dec. 743, and cases cited.
has long been steadily maintained that
In this state, however,
feme sole (Turner
feme covert, as to her separate estate in equity,
Am. St. Rep. 319, and
W. 897,
v. Shaw, 96 Mo., loc. cit. 28,
and therefore may charge her separate estate, and make
cases cited)
she had
an agent in regard thereto, to all intents and purposes as
But, where she
not thus
never passed sub jugum matrimonii.
seised, we have held, over and over again, that, not being sui juris, of
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(Supreme

Court of Texas,

v.

1901.

(Part

1

SAPIEHA.
94 Tex.

430, 61 S.

W.

115.)

Brown, J. The Court of Civil Appeals for the First District has certified to this court the following statement and questions :
"In this cause, now pending before this court on motion for rehearing, we respectfully certify for your decision the questions hereinafter
set out.
The facts are as follows :
"T. D. Mason, by his guardian, brought this suit to remove cloud
from his title to certain lands, alleging title in himself.
The instruments which are alleged to constitute the cloud are a power of attorney purporting to have been executed by T. D. Mason to one J. W.
Tolson, and a deed from Tolson to the appellee, Sapieha, conveying
the land in question.
Mason seeks to have both annulled on the ground
that he was an imbecile at the date of their execution.
Mason acquired
the land through the will of his deceased grandfather, the tract being
devised to him and his brother, D. O. Mason, as tenants in common.
On 6th day of July, 1878, T. D. Mason executed and delivered to
J. W. Tolson a power of attorney, whereby Tolson was authorized, as
his attorney in fact, to sell his interest in the land, and to make a deed
to the purchaser.
This instrument was duly signed and acknowledged
and
him,
was
promptly placed of record in the county where the
by
On the 19th day of March, 1879, Tolson, as such
land was situated.
attorney in fact, executed and delivered to the appellee, Sapieha, a
deed conveying the entire tract of land ; D. O. Mason, the brother of
T. D. Mason, joining in such deed, and thereby conveying his interest
Appellee paid a fair and adequate price for the land, the deed
reciting the amount, and its payment, and the transaction was in all
respects fair and open. At the date of the execution of the power of
attorney, T. D. Mason was about 35 years old, and the undisputed evidence shows that he was at that time, had been from his birth, and was
at the date of the trial, an imbecile, without mental capacity to manage
his affairs, and that on that account he was without mental capacity
to contract at the dates of the two instruments above named.
Sapieha
had no knowledge or notice of Mason's mental condition, and dealt
with Tolson without knowledge of any fact which should have led him
to inquire as to the mental condition of T. D. Mason. T. D. Mason
had never been under guardianship at the date of these transactions,
A guardian
and had never been judicially declared of unsound mind.
also.

was first appointed for him in 1891.
"In the absence of opposing testimony, we find, as did the trial
paid by Sapieha
court, that T. D. Mason received the consideration
for his interest in the land. Wade v. Love, 69 Tex. 524, 7 S. W.
225.
Notwithstanding the pleadings of appellant set up the power of
attorney and deed which he assails, no offer is made to return the
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statu quo.
"The questions propounded are: (1) Is the power of attorney from
T. D. Mason to Tolson void as against the appellee, the principal being
non compos mentis at the date of its execution?
(2) If only voidable,
will the appellant be permitted to rescind the power of attorney and
deed made in pursuance thereof, in the absence of an offer to return
the purchase price, or otherwise place the purchaser in statu quo ?
"In disposing of this appeal this court, in view of expressions in

Cummings v. Powell, 8 Tex. 81 ; Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294, 11
S. W. 1101, 5 L. R. A. 176, and other Texas cases, treated the deed
to Sapieha as if it had been made by Mason in person; and held the
power of attorney, as well as the deed, voidable only. The question
seems not to have been directly decided in this state, and we therefore
certify the above questions. Your attention is called to valuable notes
in 16 Eng. Rul. Cas. 735, 6 Eng. Rul. Cas. 54, and Swafford v. FerguSapieha, being a nonresident of
son, 3 Lea, 292, 31 Am. Rep. 639.
the United States, was cited by publication, and, not appearing either
in person or by attorney, the trial court appointed an attorney to represent the nonresident.
"Judgment being rendered in Sapieha's favor, a fee was allowed him
for his services, which was taxed as costs against the plaintiff. Question : Was it lawful to tax such fee against the plaintiff in a suit of
this character?"
To the first question we answer, the power of attorney mentioned in
Elston v. Jasper, 45 Tex.
this question was voidable, but not void.
294,
11
S. W. 1101, 5 L, R. A. 176;
409; Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex.
11
344,
S. W. 347; Cummings v.
Ferguson v. Railway Co., 73 Tex.
insane
person is not void, but, like
Powell, 8 Tex. 81. The deed of an

Irvine v.
that of an infant, is voidable, at the election of the party.
is
doctrine
this
that
We
believe
Irvine, 9 Wall. 626, 19 L. Ed. 800.
can
We
of
this
country.
courts
in
the
not now seriously controverted
see no difference in principle between the act of making a deed which
passes the title and making an instrument which authorizes another
In this state the powers of persons over
person to do the same thing.
are
so nearly the same that no distinction
real and personal property
in
the
capacity required for making a sale and
can be said to exist
The law provides different methods
other.
the
transfer of the one or

the will of the party, but places no greater restriction
It has been held upon
upon the power to sell the one than the other.
make
a power of attoran
or
infant
lunatic
may
a
that
sound reasoning
for them ; such
entered
into
be
contracts
might
which
simple
ney by
of commercial
and
transfer
indorsement
notes,
the
or
of
as the signing
Dutch,
Hastings v.
229;
Dec.
457,
7
Am.
14
Mass.
v.
Whitney
paper.
Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 195 ; 1 lardy v. Waters, 38 Mc. 450.
In the case of Whitney v. Dutch, cited above, a partnership was
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formed between an adult and a minor, and in the course of the busiexecuted a note in the firm name. When the minor became of age he ratified the note, but when suit was brought upon
it he pleaded his infancy, and claimed that the note was void, and not
The supreme court of Massachusetts held that
subject to ratification.
the note was voidable, and that
having been ratified by the minor
after reaching his majority, was
valid claim against him. That court
"Then, upon principle, what difference can there be between the
said
ratification of
contract made by the infant himself and one made by
another acting under
parol authority from him? And why may not
the ratification apply to the authority as well as to the contract made
a

a

:

a

it,

ness the adult partner

a

is
a

it

a

Hastings v. Dollarhide, before cited, the issue was upon the validity of
the transfer of
promissory note made by the agent of the payee, who
minor; and
was
was claimed that the transfer was void because
the minor could not confer power upon another to transact such business for him. In each of the cases, however, the court held the trans-

if

a

is

a

it

fer good when ratified by the minor after arriving at majority. In
other words, the court held the power of attorney to be voidable, and
had been done by the
the act, being ratified, became valid, just as
infant himself.
The Supreme Court of this state in the case of Cummings v. Powell
intimated very strongly the opinion that
power of attorney executed
by an infant or a lunatic authorizing the sale and conveyance of real
estate was merely voidable; but the question was not involved, and
the opinion
not authority.
In the case of Ferguson v. Railway Co.
the court did in fact decide that the power of attorney given by an
infant was voidable only. The question was in the case,
proper subject for its decision, but in the close of the opinion the court placed the
decision upon another question.
In Askey v. Williams the defendant,
minor, employed an attorney to defend him against
criminal charge,
and to secure the fee gave
note with a deed of trust upon land cona

a

a

The debt being unpaid, the trustee sold the
power of sale.
taining
land to pay the note, and in suit for the land the validity of the sale
was held that the deed of trust which contained the
was in issue.
that the sale made by the trustee under
power of sale was voidable
the power was subject to be avoided by the minor, just as
the deed

if

;

It

a
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it

if

It

under it?
they may
may be said that minors may be exposed
But they will
delegate power over their property or credit to another.
be as much exposed by the power to make such contracts themselves,
and more, for the person delegated will generally have more experience
in business than the minor.
And
sufficient security against the
danger from both these sources that infants cannot be prejudiced, for
the contracts are in neither case binding, unless, when arrived at legal
competency, they voluntarily and deliberately give effect to the contract
And in such case justice requires that they should be comso made.
In the cases of Hardy v. Waters and
pelled to perform them."
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had been executed by the minor in person.
We regard this case as
directly in point, and as deciding the very question presented.
It is
true that in the course of the opinion Judge Gaines remarked that
powers given by a minor, when coupled with an interest, were held to

opinion is not placed upon that ground. The following language of the court shows that the power was sustained as
if it had been a deed, placing them upon the same basis : "If the infant
had conveyed the land absolutely as a fee, his deed would not have
been void, but he could have avoided it within a reasonable time after
coming of full age upon payment of a just compensation for the servWe think the same rule should apply in
ices rendered by his grantee.
be voidable ; but the
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this case."

The contention of the appellant that the power of attorney and the
deed made under it which are involved in this controversy are absolutely void because the maker of the power of attorney was at the
time a lunatic is supported by the greater number of adjudicated cases.
It is the doctrine of the English courts, and has been followed in
the supreme court of the United States and by the supreme courts of
a number of the states without questioning the soundness upon which
it is based, or its consistency with the system of laws under which

Of the cases which sustain
property rights are held in this country.
this rule we cite the following: Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall. 9, 21 L. Ed.
73 ; Philpot v. Bingham, 55 Ala. 435 ; Armitage v. Widoe, 36 Mich.
124; Fetrow v. Wiseman, 40 Ind. 148; Lawrence's Lessee v. McArter,

10 Ohio, 37;
Fonder v. Van Home, 15 Wend. 631, 30 Am.
Dec. 77; Pyle v. Cravens, 4 Litt. 17. In Dexter v. Hall, cited above,
the supreme court of the United States reviews at length the English
cases, and criticises the doctrine that the contracts of infants and
lunatics are voidable only; finally basing its judgment upon the proposition that contracts made by infants and lunatics, and not delivered

We quote the following to show
by the hand of the maker, are void.
the basis of that opinion : "The doctrine that a lunatic's power of
attorney is void finds confirmation in the analogy there is between the
situation and acts of infants and lunatics.
Both classes of persons are
* * * Yet it is
regarded as under the protection of the law.

universally held, as laid down by Lord Mansfield in Zouch v. Parsons.
Burrows, 1804, that deeds of an infant which do not take effect by
delivery of his hand (in which class he places a letter of attorney) are
void. We are not aware that any different rule exists in England or
in this country." In the same court, the same judge, Justice Strong,
delivered an opinion in the case of Irvine v. Irvine, 9 Wall. 617, 19
L. Ed. 800, which involved the validity of a sale made under power
3

contained in a mortgage, in which case that court held that the sale
was voidable; saying: "Whatever may have been the doubts o
entertained, it has long been settled that the deed of an infant, being

the relation
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an executed contract, is only voidable at his election;
that it is not
void.
It operates to transmit the title."
The ablest judges who have dealt with this question have not undertaken to sustain by reason the rule adopted by the supreme court of
the United States.
In the case of Armitage v. Widoe, before cited,
Judge Cooley said: "On the authorities, no rule is clearer than that
an infant cannot empower an agent or attorney to act for him." And
that able judge contented himself with a citation of authorities in
support of a rule for which he could assign no sound reason.
In
Philpot v. Bingham, before cited, Judge Stone, of the supreme court
of Alabama, said of this question : "From such an array of authorities,
sanctioned as the principle has been by this court, we do not feel at
liberty to depart, although the argument in favor of the exception is
rather specious than solid. We therefore hold that the power of attorney under which the plaintiff's land was sold, made, as it appears to
have been, while he was an infant, was and is what the law denominates void."
In the case of Fetrow v. Wiseman, above cited, the
supreme court of Indiana, after having stated the proposition,
said :
"The proposition may not be founded in solid reason, but it is so held
by all the authorities." These are fair samples of the cases which
uphold the doctrine that the power of attorney of an infant or a
lunatic is absolutely void.
The fundamental principle of the cases in
which the doctrine originated is wholly absent from and at variance
with our system of laws, and we feel that the strong reasoning of
Judge Hemphill in Cummings v. Powell, and the qualified decision in
Ferguson v. Railway Co., supported by the later case of Askey v. Williams, furnish a safer guide by which to regulate the property rights

of the people of this country, and are more in harmony with our
system of laws. We therefore follow them in preference to the arbitrary rule asserted in the greater number of decisions upon that question. 4 * * *
[The answers to the second and third questions are
omitted.]
4 The above case cites the leading cases holding a lunatic's power of attorney absolutely void.
But see, also, Trueblood v. Trueblood, 8 Ind. 193, 65
Am. Dec. 756 (1856) ; Turner v. Bondalier, 31 Mo. App. 582 (1S8S), and note
to 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 247. The following may be added as holding a power by
an insane person voidable merely, at the option of the principal when he
reaches a lucid period, or valid, so far as to save the rights of tbird persons
"who, before the insanity intervened, became interested in the power by reason of a consideration advanced, or who, in ignorance of the incapacity, and
in good faith, parted with a consideration of value, relying on the apparent
authority of the agent."
Matthiessen
& Weichers Refining Co. v. McMahon,
Adm'r, 38 N. J. Law, 536 (1876) ; Blinn v. Schwarz, 177 N. Y. 252, 69 N. E.
542, 101 Am. St. Rep. 806 (1904), affirming 63 App. Div. 25, 71 N. Y. Supp.
343

(1901).

That an infant's power of attorney is voidable merely, and not void, is
maintained in Simpson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 184 Mass. 348, 68 N. E. 673,
See, also, Hardy v. Waters.
63 L. R. A. 741, 100 Am. St. Rep. 560 (1903).
38 Me. 450 (1853);
Patterson v. Lippincott, 47 N. J. Law, 457, 1 Atl. 506
S4 Am. Rep. 178 (1885), and extended note in 18 Am. St. Rep. 629.
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SECTION 2.— WHO MAY ACT AS AGENT

KING
(High Court of Chancery,
S L. T. Rep. N. S.
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& M. 343,
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L. J.

Ch. 646,

New Rep. 442, 11 Wkly. Rep.
Eng. Reprint, 149.)

633, 2
71

Vice Chancellor Sir W. Page Wood. The point raised in this case,
though not covered by express decision, seems to fall within the general rule that an infant is incapable of entering into a binding contract.
The actual contest arises thus: A testator having chosen to devise
estates, upon trusts requiring discretion as to the expediency, as to
the time, and as to the manner of a sale, to three persons, one of whom
is an infant, the question is, whether a contract for sale entered into
by those three trustees is a valid contract, which this court can speThere are numerous authorities which approach
cifically perform.
this question, but none which decide it. All of them are distinguished
from this case by the well-known difference between power and property, a marked distinction which has been invariably upheld.
There can be no doubt upon the authorities from the earliest times,
that if a man, by his will, gives an infant a simple power of sale withAll the decisions on the
out an interest, the infant may exercise it.
subject are referred to by Lord St. Leonards in his work on "Powers,"
They all turn on the execuand I need not discuss them minutely.
tion of powers ; and there is not a single authority upon the question
whether an infant can sell an estate devised to him upon trust for
There is an opinion of Mr. Preston's, mentioned without dissale.
approval by Lord St. Leonards, that an infant can exercise a power
even though it be coupled with an interest; but this is very different

from selling an estate vested in the infant by a devise in fee.
It is to be observed, that all the cases relied on with reference to
powers, have gone upon the principle that the infant, in executing the
power, is a mere conduit-pipe, as it has been termed, of the will of the
donor of the power; so that when the estate is created, the infant
was said in the case in Bridgman) is merely the instrument by
whose hands the testator or donor acts. The donor, it is said, may
This prinuse any hand, however weak, to carry out his intentions.
in
trust
to an indevise
case
of
a
the
reach
to
fails
altogether
ciple
(as

fant.

It is not in the power of a testator to confer upon an infant a
capacity in himself which the law dors nol give him, although he may
He can
make the infanl his hand, his agent, to execute his purpose.
not give an estate to an infant and say thai he may sell it. when the
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It is unfortunate that the testator
law says that he cannot do so.
an
as
a trustee; but the inconvenience
selected
infant
should have
from
circumstance
in
the
particular case, is not to be
this
arising
which
result
from
that
would
holding an infant to have
with
compared
If the defendants still
a capacity to sell, which the law denies him.
shall dismiss
adhere to the offer made by them before the litigation,

I

the bill with costs. 5
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5 In Lyon v. Kent, 45 Ala. 656 (1871), it is said : "Any one, except a lunatic,
an imbecile, or child of tender years, may be an agent for another." The court
approves Story on Agency, §§ 6, 7, 9, to the effect that monks, infants, femes
outlawed, or excommunicated,
villains and aliens,
covert, persons attainted,
If the principal is willing to intrust the busimay be agents for others.
ness to an infant and third persons consent to deal with him, they cannot
While
later object to his incapacity. Cameron v. Ward, 22 Ga. 168 (1857).
the infant agent may bind his principal, the infant himself, of course, will in
no way incur contractual liability thereby, either to his principal or to third
persons. Talbot v. Bowen, 1 A. K. Marsh. 436, 10 Am. Dec. 747 (1819).
See,
also, ante, p. 143 (infant as agent of parent).
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1.—

^Tt^SlEVERWOOD

IN GENERAL

v.

(Court of Appeals of Maryland,

LATROBE

188S.

68

Md.

et al.
620,

13

Atl.

'
161.)

complaint by appellant for an injunction to restrain the
of managers and superintendent of a cemetery company from
interfering with appellant's right by obstructing or denying to his
The comagents free access to a lot in the cemetery which he owned.
pany had adopted a by-law prohibiting any person, other than a lot
holder or a member of his or her family, from doing any work in
From a
the cemetery, except by a permit from the superintendent.
judgment denying relief plaintiff appeals.
Yellott, J. 1 [After stating the facts:] * * * Nothing is clearer than that if a man, in the transaction of his own business, has a right
to do any act, he can perform it by the hands of his agent. The general
maxim, as old as our system of jurisprudence, is that whatever a man
sui juris may do of himself, he may do by another. Co. Litt. 258. Had
not this principle been always recognized, it is difficult to perceive how
the multiform transactions of mankind could have been successfully
conducted.
The maxim, "qui facit per alium facit per se," carries with
recognition of the right of every man, unless
by implication,
fiduciary capacity,
exercising certain delegated powers, and acting in
Therefore,
of his business.
to employ an agent in the transaction
right to
man has
when, by the terms of
deed or other instrument,
or
either with his own hands
by the
do
certain thing, he can do
interfered with by the grantor
the agent
hands of an agent, and
When burying
an interference
with the rights of the grantee.
right of
corporation,
lots in
cemetery have been conveyed by
other
which
like
right to
conferred on the purchaser
any
property
of
Case
the
Church,
471.
Unlike
real estate.
Windt v.
Sandf. Ch.
of
virtue
lot
the
by
to
has
title
Partridge, 39 Md. 631, the appellant
deed of conan instrument of writing, under seal, which operates as
The act of 1837 declares the property thus acquired to be
veyance.

Bill of
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a

a

a

a
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a

a

a
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a qualified

to the purposes

fee limited

of sepulture.
rhe second clause of the instrument, conveying the property, gives
him the right to plant and cultivate trees, shrubs, and flowers.
This
he could do either with his own hands or by employing an agent to do
the work for him.
When he accepted the deed, and paid the purchase
he acquired this right.
Had he heen unable to secure the
possible; and even probable, that he would not have purright, it
chased the property.
No order subsequently passed by the grantors
can be so construed as to have
retroactive operation, and thus limit
or annul the privilege secured to the grantee by
solemn instrument
under seal.
As said by Alderson,
"When the law allows
party
to contract,
will not permit that contract, by any matter arising ex
Clark
F. 106.
Giles v. Grover,
post facto, to be made of no value."
In Ashhy v. Harris, L. R. C. P. 523, this very question was decided.
The burial board of the parish of St. Pancras, being
corporation,
had granted,
an instrument under seal, the privilege of making and
constructing
private grave, and the exclusive right of burial and

The grantee had been accustomed to plant and
interment therein.
Ten years after the grant
cultivate flowers by the hands of agents.
had been made, the board determined to undertake the planting of
graves themselves, and the superintendent was authorized to prevent
Notice
other persons from entering the cemetery for such purpose.
was also given to the owners of private graves of the determination
of the board. After such notice had been given, Harris, as the agent
of the grantee, entered for the purpose of planting the grave conHe was assaulted, and an
veyed by the said instrument under seal.

is

;"

It

action for damages was instituted.
was held that "the board clearly
had no right to make regulations to interfere with that which they had
that "any subsequent regulations made by
granted in perpetuity
them would he repugnant and void.
They might make general rules
and regulations for the management of the cemetery, but not special
rules which would derogate from prior grants."
clear that the court below committed an error in refusing to
grant the relief asked for in the bill of complaint, and its decree should
therefore be reversed.
Decree reversed and cause remanded.
Bryan and MiLLER, JJ., dissent.

It
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SECTION 2.— EXCEPTIONS.

COMBE'S CASE.
(Court of Common
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In

Pleas,

1G13.

9

Coke,

75a,

77

English Reprint,

843.)

by William Atlee, against Daniel Banks and Thomas
Osborn of taking of his cattle at Harmonsworth, in a place called
Walnut-Tree Close, in the county of Middlesex, &c.
Which plea
began Trin. 8 Jac. Reg. Rot. 330.
Upon the pleading, and issue
joined, and special verdict given, the case was such. Thomas Combes
copyholder in fee of ten acres of pasture in H. of the manor of
Harmonsworth in the county of Middlesex, by his deed 22 November,
5 E. 6, constituted
and ordained William Combes and Stephen Erlie
two copyhold tenants of the same manor his lawful attornies, to surrender vice & nomine suo to the lord of the said manor, the said ten
acres of pasture to the use of John Nicholas and his heirs, and afterwards at a court held of the said manor 8 Julii anno 6 E. 6, the said
attornies tunc tenentes dom' per copiam Rot' Cur' in eadem Cur' ostenderunt scriptum praed' gerens dat' praedict' 22 Nov' anno 5, supradicto, et iidem Willielmus et Stephanus authoritate eis per praed' literreplevin

am attornatus

dat' in plena cur' sursum reddiderunt in manus dom'
acras pastune ad opus & usum praed' Johannis Nicholas
suorum, who was at the same Court adhaeredum et assignatorum
mitted accordingly ; and that within the said manor there was not
any custom to surrender copyhold land, &c. by letter of attorney either
in Court or out of Court.
And if the said surrender by letter of
praed'

decern

attorney of the said lands held by copy, &c. was good or not, was the
doubt which the Jury referred to the consideration of the Court. And
this case was argued at the bar, in Michaelmas,
Hilary, and Easter
Terms, and in this term, and in tins it was also argued by the

Justices

Bench; and in this case two points were moved.
1. If a surrender could be made by force of the letter of attorney.
2. If the
attornies had pursued their authority.
As to the first it was unanimously agreed by all the Judges in their
several arguments, that the surrender in the case at bar made by
at the

letter of attorney, was good; and their reason was, because everv
copyholder having a customary estate of inheritance, may de communi
jure, without any particular custom, surrender his lands held by copy
in full Court, and therefore in pleading, the copyholder
need nol
whi<h

a

is

custom

within

the manor to surrender
in Court; for that
per
totam Angliam, is the common law as it is
usage
held in 34 If. 8, Br. Custom 59, & 34 II. 8, Dy. 54.
Quod habetur
lietudo inter mercatorcs per totam Angliam, &C. is no good man-
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the
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ner of alledging a custom, for that is the common law; and in the
Book of Entries, Tit. Tresp. Divisione Copyhold 1. f. 568, no custom
is alledged to enable a copyholder to surrender in full Court, no more
than that a copyholder may make a lease for one year; because that
he may do by the general custom of the realm, which is the common
law, vide Bracton, lib. 2, c. 8. Then if a copyholder may surrender
his estate in Court by the general custom of the realm, which is the
common law, from thence it follows that he may do it by attorney,
as a thing incident by the common law; and that will more clearly
appear if the reason of such things which a man cannot do by attorney be well considered.
And therefore if a man has a bare authority
coupled with a trust, as executors have to sell land they cannot sell
by attorney; but if a man has authority, as absolute owner of the
land, there he may do it by attorney, as cestuy que use might after
the statute of 1 R. 3, and before the statute of 27 H. 8, for cestuy
que use had an absolute authority to dispose of the land at his will,
without any confidence reposed in him, as appears in 11 EHz. Dyer,
283, and there a judgment

is cited in 25

opinion of some Judges in

H.

H.

8, accordingly,

against the

But in the case at bar, the
copyholder has a customary estate of inheritance, and not an authority
or power only. Also there is a difference betwixt a general absolute
power and authority as owner of the land, as aforesaid, and a particular power and authority (by him who has but a particular interest)
to make leases for life or years.
And therefore if A. be tenant for
life, the remainder in tail, &c. and A. has power to make leases for
9

7, 24.

rendering the ancient rent, &c. he cannot make a lease by
letter of attorney by force of his power, because he has but a particular
power which is personal to him ; and so was it resolved in the case of
the Lady Gresham at the assises in Suffolk in quadragesim' 24 El. by
Wray and Anderson, Chief Justices, Justices of Assise there. Also
there are some things personal, and so inseparably annexed to the person of a man, that he cannot do them by another, as doing of homage
and fealty; so it is held in 33 E. 3, Trespass, 253, the lord may beat
his villain for cause, or without cause, and the villain shall not have
any remedy ; but if the lord commands another to beat his villain without cause, he shall have an action of battery against him who beats
him in such case.
So if the lord distrains the cattle of his tenant,
although nothing be behind, the tenant for the respect and duty which
belong to the lord, shall not have trespass vi et armis against him ;
but if the lord commands his bailiff or servant in such case to distrain
where nothing is behind, the tenant shall have an action of trespass
vi et armis against the bailiff or servant. 2 H. 4, 4, a; 11 H. 4, 78, b;
21 years

1

H. 6,6, a;

9

H.

7, 14, a.

Littleton in his chapter of Burgage holds, that where in a borough
he who is seised of lands in fee may devise by custom, there the
owner of such land may devise that his executors shall sell, which
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they shall do as attornies to him, 3 E. 3, Coron. 310, by the custom of
a manor a freehold will pass from one to another by surrender in Court,
against the will of the lord, and where the custom is such, the tenant
may do it by attorney, vide 14 H. 4, 1, a, by Hankford, & vide 19

Ass.

p. 9.

And it

was said, as he to whose use a surrender is made may be
by attorney, so a copyholder may surrender by attorney in
full Court ; and the case of him to whose use seems the stronger case,
because he who is to be admitted is to do fealty, which none can do
fealty but he who shall be admitted, and therefore in such case the
lord may refuse to admit him by attorney; but if he admits him by
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admitted

attorney, it is good enough.
But Hil. 28 Eliz. in Chapman's Case it was held in the King's Bench,
that where the custom of a manor is, that the copyholder out of Court
may surrender into the hands of the lord of the manor by the hands
of two customary tenants, who in effect are but instruments or attornies of the copyholder to take his surrender, that in such case the
copyholder by his attorney cannot surrender into the hands of the
lord by the hands of two copyhold tenants ; for inasmuch as the surrender in such case ought to be warranted by the custom, the sur-

without special custom to warrant it by attorney will not be
good. Also that was upon the matter by attorney to make a surrender
by others who are but attornies, for that is not warranted by the parBut
ticular custom of the manor to make a surrender out of court.
warrants
custom,
in the case at bar the common law, and no particular
the surrender, and therefore it may well be made according to the rule
But it was resolved, that
and reason of the common law by attorney.
and
form of the surrender
the attorney ought to pursue the manner
custom,
the
as
copyholder himself ought
in all points according to the
render

to have done ; as if the surrender by the custom ought to be by the
rod, or by any other thing, or in any other manner, the attorney ought
And the Chief Justice said, that the stile of a copyto pursue it.
holder imports three things: 1. Nomen, his name. 2. Originem, his
3. Titul' his assurance : his name is tenant by copy
commencement.
court-roll,
for his name is not tenant by court-roll, but by copy of
of
court-roll,
is the sole tenant in law that holds by copy of any
who
a
2. His commencement, ad
record, charter, deed, or any other thing.
voluntatem domini ; for at the beginning he was but tenant at the will
of the lord. 3. His title or assurance secundum consuetudinem manerii, for the custom of the manor has fixed his estate, and assured the
land to him so long as he doth his services and duties, and performs
And therefore Danby saith in 7 E. 4, 19,
the customs of the manor.
a, that by the custom he is as well inheritable to have the land as tenant
And it was resolved thai
to hold his freehold by the common law.
this case was stronger, because the letter of attorney was made to
But it was
those who were tenants by copy, &c. of the said manor.
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agreed, that where an infant at the age of fifteen years may make a
feoffment that he cannot do it by attorney, because a custom which
enables a person disabled by the law, ought to be pursued, and an
infant can do nothing to pass any thing out of him by attorney: vide
11, H. 4, 33, a, and it would be hard, if men in prison, or sick, or
beyond the sea, could not make surrenders of their lands held by copy
for payment of their debts, or preferment and advancement of their
wives and children, &c. Nota, reader, this is the first case that I have
known which was adjudged in this point.
2. It was resolved, that when any has authority, as attorney, to do
any act, he ought to do it in his name who gives the authority; for
he appoints the attorney to be in his place, and to represent his person ;
and therefore the attorney cannot do it in his own name, nor as his
proper act, but in the name, and as the act of him who gives the auAnd where it was objected, that in the case at bar, that the
thority.
in their own names ; for the
attornies have made the surrender
entry is Quod iidem Willielmus et Stephanus, &c. sursum reddiderunt
&c. It was answered and resolved per totam curiam, that they have
well pursued their authority ; for first they showed their letter of
attorney, and then they authoritate eis per praed' literam attornat' dat'
sursum reddiderunt, &c. which is as much as to say, as if they had
said, we as attornies of Thomas Combes surrender, &c. and both these
ways are sufficient ; as he who has a letter of attorney to deliver
seisin saith, I as attorney to J. S. deliver you seisin ; or I by force
of a (this) letter of attorney deliver you seisin ; and all that is well
done and a good pursuance of his authority : but if attornies have
power by writing to make leases by indenture for years, &c. they cannot make indentures in their own names, but in the name of him who
gives them warrant. But if a man by his will in writing devises that
his executors shall sell his land, and dies, there the executors in their
own name may sell the land for necessity, because he who gives them
authority by his will (which takes effect after his death) is dead; and
yet in such case the vendee is in by the devisor.

LYON
(Court of Appeals

of New York,

v.

MITCHELL.

1S67.

36 N.

Y.

235, 6S2, 93 Am.

Dec. 502.)

Action upon an agency agreement with plaintiff's testator by which
defendant agreed to pay him a commission of 10 per cent, of the sale
The steamers
of steamers to be sold by him as agent of defendant.
were sold to the United States government and defendant refused to
pay the commission.
Hunt, J. 2 [After deciding another point:] * * * The defendant insists also that the contract, as established by the evidence,
2

Part of the opinion is omitted.

Grover,

J.,

dissented.
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was in conflict with good morals and against public policy, and thereThe evidence showed that the defendant asked the plaintiff
fore void.
if he could sell those steamers. He replied that he did not know.
Defendant said : "You are acquainted with the republican members
of the administration?" The plaintiff replied that he was acquainted
with some, and had friends who could introduce him to others, and
who could aid him.
The defendant submitted to the court a series of propositions, which
he requested him to charge, and under the fourth one of which, he
desires to raise the present question.
That proposition commences in these words: "Any contract which
conflicts with the morals of the time, and contravenes any established
It then
interest of society, is void, as being against public policy."
This is
asks the application of such principles to the present case.
the only one of the requests looking to this subject.
The defendant I think had no right to ask a charge that "any contract which conflicts with the morals of the time," is void, as being
To make a contract thus void, it must be against
against public policy.
sound morals.
Morality is defined by Paley to be "that science which

Paley, Mor. Ph. b.
teaches men their duty, and the reason of it."
1. c. 2.
"Morality is the rule which teaches us to live soberly and
It hath four chief virtues, justice, prudence, temperance
honestly.
and fortitude." Bp. Home's Works, vol. 6, charge to clergy of NorTo make a contract void on the principle claimed, it must be
wich.

The "morals of the time" may be
against morality as thus defined.
the people may have
vicious; public sentiment may be depraved;
Sound
all gone astray, so that not one good man can be found.
.norals, as taught by the wise men of antiquity, as confirmed by the
precepts of the gospel, and as explained by Paley and Home, are
They are the same yesterday and to-day.
unchangeable.
The proposition under consideration also contains a statement that
a contract which "contravenes any established interest of society," is
This position is equally unsound,
void, as being against public policy.

I

will not enlarge upon it.
examination of this question upon the merits has also brought
me to the conclusion that no valid objection can be made to the decision of the judge at the circuit.
The whole of the defendant's fourth request to charge, and upon
which the question arises, is as follows: "Any contract which conflicts with the morals of the time, and contravenes any established
If the
interest of society, is void, as being against public policy.
jury believe that the agreement on which this action is brought was
made in reference to the influence of the plaintiff, or his friends,
with the republican members of the administration, or with any per-

but

My

whose duty it was to act in
sons connected with the administration,
the purchase of steamers, and the percentage as commissions was

»

„
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,
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fixed in reference to that influence, that the contract is void and no
action can be sustained upon it."
The defendant and those concerned with him had these four steamThe coasting trade in which they had been employed
ers on hand.
Open war
was broken up by the inauguration of war at the south.
against the government of the United States had been commenced
The vessels were
nearly a month before the date of this contract.
useless for the service in which they had been employed, and for the
A deduction of ten
business in which the defendant was engaged.
to that
of
commissions
per cent upon their value, or the payment
such
under
a
sale
to
amount was not an unreasonable inducement
be
therefore
can
intentions
corrupt
of
No inference
circumstances.
than
was
usually
commission
a
of
larger
drawn from the payment

paid for the services of an agent or broker.
The proposition under consideration, it will also be observed, makes
no reference to corrupt intentions on the part of the agent, or of pecuniary influences to be used by him, or secret service to be employed.
It presents but a single point, namely, that if the fact that the plaintiff or his friends had influence with the administration, or with those
whose duty it was to purchase steamers, was an inducement to the
contract, then the contract is void.
Two classes of cases are cited in support of this proposition, viz. :
Where a contract has been made to induce a particular legislative action, and where a contract has been made to procure appointments to
office. Several cases of these classes are referred to in the recent case
of Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. 45, 17 L. Ed. 868, and are cited with
Among them is Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 16
approval.
How. 314, 14 L. Ed. 953, where the principle is laid down that all

for obtaining legislation, or
contracts for contingent compensation
to use personal or secret or sinister influence on legislators, is void.
That where an agent contracts to use or does use secret influences to
The learned
affect legislative action, the contract respecting it is void.
morality
and
sound
"Public policy
judge in deciding the case says:
the
stamp
should
courts
put
require that
do therefore imperatively
convoid
every
and
act,
on
pronounce
every
of their disapprobation
sully
be
to
would
of
which
tendency
tract the ultimate or probable
the purity or mislead the judgments of those to whom the high trust
It was further said that all contracts
of legislation is committed."
to evade the revenue laws are void, as well as all marriage brokage
contracts, and contracts for procuring appointments to office. In aid
of these views may also be cited Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts, 152,
31 Am. Dec. 750, which was an agreement to obtain signatures for
5 Watts & S. 315, 40 Am.
a pardon, and Clippinger v. Hepbaugh,
Dec. 519, which was an agreement to procure the passage of a legislative act by personal influence, and Pingry v. Washburn, 1 Aikens,
264, 15 Am. Dec. 676, which was an agreement to pay for the withdrawal of opposition to an act of the Legislature, and Harris v. Roof,
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489, which was an agreement to obtain legislative action
recognizing an ancient land grant, and Debenham v. Ox, 1 Ves. Sr.
276, which was an agreement to pay for soliciting a will in favor of
Of the same general character is Gray v. Hook, 4 N. Y.
another.
449, where two persons being applicants for an office, it was agreed
that one should withdraw and aid the other in procuring the office,
and in consideration thereof the fees should be divided between them.
10 Barb.

cited is a salutary one.
Certain other rules and
Care is necessary however in its application.
the
right to sell and disThus
principles are also to be remembered.
It is a right
of
ownership.
pose of property is an essential element
unrestricted
enjoyment.
and
full
the
to
to which the owner is entitled
an ownof
the
within
range
are
of
sale
manner
So the time, place and
sale or
at
private
or
by
agent,
sell
He
personally
er's rights.
may
his
zeal,
his
who
by
that
agent,
He
auction.
may
employ
by public
obto
be
likely
character
may
his
or
his
good
acquaintance
activity,
So also a suitor in the
tain the best price for the articles to be sold.
courts of justice may employ that advocate, who in his opinion has
cases

To do so
the best qualifications to obtain the judgment he desires.
Learning, industry, eloquence, high personal
is his undoubted right.
character, the esteem in which he is held by the court, may all justly
It is allowable
be considered by the party making the employment.
committee,
or before
to employ counsel to appear before a legislative
the
which
in
measure
a
the Legislature itself, to advocate or oppose
v.
Hillyer
474;
Barb.
Mills,
36
v.
Mills
individual has an interest.
Trarene, 1 Am. Law Reg. 146; Howden v. Simpson, 10 Ad. & Ell.
It is allowable, and not unusual, to employ counsel thus to ap193.
the governor of the state, when he has under considerabefore
pear
tion the propriety of giving his sanction to a bill which has passed
Will it be insisted that no advoboth branches of the Legislature.
cate can be legally employed thus to appear, unless he is of doubt-

is

is

it,

ful reputation, or personally offensive to the Legislature or governor,
or unless he belongs to a different political party? I apprehend not.
An advocate of high personal character would naturally and most
properly be employed in the discharge of such duties, and one who
was likely, by his personal qualities or his political position, to be acThe possession
ceptable to the body before which he was to appear.
would
to
reference
and
of
of such qualifications, and the knowledge
avowed
honest
purpose,
an
For
the
employment.
form no objection to
made, and by the use of
to the body before which the appearance
Authorities supra.
lawful.
this
and
sound
reasoning,
just argument
These principles are equally plain with those restricting the sale of
The
Neither class of cases can be overthrown.
political influence.
to be so applied that both may be pre; erved.
think
distinction may also well be made upon those cases which
Personal solicitations of legiswill dispose of the present question.

A

I

law

is
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The agreement was held void.
The general rule as laid down in the
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V

Fcrsonal solators or of judges is not a lawful subject of contract.
licitations of the president, the governor or the heads of department
favors or for clemency, is nol the lawful subject of a contract.
The apprehension that considerations other than those of a high sense
of duty and of the public interest, may thus be brought to influence
their determination,
But a different prinforbids this employment.
ciple prevails where property is offered for sale to the government,
and where a bargain is sought to be made with them, and where there
;^ no concealment of the agency.
It then becomes a matter of traffic.
The agent says that he has vessels or arms for sale, and that he can
furnish the government with what it needs and at a fair price; that
the vessels are owned by Mr. Mitchell, or the arms are manufactured
at 1'rovidence.
L\s a general principle, the seller desires to qbtain a
high price. whilc\the buyer desires to purchase at a low one.j This
element is known and appreciated by each party in making a ^bargain.
1 know of no principle upon which a seller should be compelled to
employ an agent who would be looked upon with suspicion and distrust by the party to whom he wished to sell. In a time of revolution,
when the Southern Confederacy,
against which the arms or vessels
were to be used, had friends at the North, would it be a legal objection to an agent desiring to sell munitions of war, th/t his loyalty
I cannot think so./ The present
to the government was undoubted?
No fraud upon the govcase was one of bargain and sale simply.
ernment is imputed, no suggestion is made of pecuniary influence
to be used, no intended corruption is suggested. The ca\fi to be decided is free from the existence of any of these elements.
J
An agent of the same political party with the executive or the heads
of departments, having acquaintances and a reputation ^which would
enable him to make an advantageous presentation of his merchandise,
may in my opinion, be lawfully employed to make such sale, and with
reference to those qualifications.
The decision in Tool Co. v. Norris,
2 Wall. 45, 17 L. Ed. 868, confounds a sale or traffic openly made by
an avowed agent to a party wishing to purchase, with the forbidden
case of an interference
with legislative action or executive clemency,
where the party does not profess to act upon commercial principles.
There is a manifest difference in the principle governing the cases.
I think that case was not well considered, and cannot adopt it as an
authority for the present.
Judged by the principles I have set forth,
the ruling at the trial was correct.
The rule of damages was rightly laid down, and
see nothing in
the other points raised which will require a new trial.
Judgment should be affirmed. 3

I

with .Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543, 100 Am. Dec. 5.35 (18G9), in
BCompare
which a contract for services to procure legislation was held to be void, as
"leading to secret, improper and corrupt tampering with Legislative action."
Compare, also, two contracts for services in procuring the location of a post
Elkhart County Lodge v. Crary, 98 Ind. 238, 49 Am. Rep. 746 (1884);
office.
Beal v. Polhemus, G7 Mich. 130, 34 N. W. 532 (1887).
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an attorney, on a contract
to pay him P5$ of any money secured, to personall
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TRIST
(Supreme

v.

Court of the United States,

43

CHILD.
1S74.

21

Wall.

441,

22

L. Ed.

623.)
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Bill to enjoin Trist from drawing from the United States Treasurydepartment money appropriated by Congress to pay a claim of Trist.
"lild had been employed as attorney to secure the allowance of such
claim on a contract to pay him 25 per cent, of any sum secured. Trist
now refuses to pay Child.
Mr. Justice Swayne, 4 delivered the opinion of the court. [After
considering other matters:] * * * But there is an objection of

still greater gravity to the appellee's case.
Was the contract a valid one ? It was, on the part of Child, to procure by lobby service, if possible, the passage of a bill providing for
the payment of the claim.
The aid asked by the younger Child of
T rist, which indicated what he considered needful, and doubtless proposed to do and did do himself, is thus vividly pictured in his letter
After giving the names of sevto Trist of the 20th February, 1871.
eral members of congress, from whom he had received favorable assurances, he proceeds : "Please write to your friends to write to any
member of congress.
Every vote tells, and a simple request may seSet every man you
cure a vote, he not caring anything about it.
a
for
a
at
work.
if
he
knows
know
page,
page often gets a
Even
vote."

Roman law it was declared that "a promise made to effect
purpose, as to commit homicide or sacrilege, is not binding."
Just. Inst. lib. 3, tit. 19, par. 24. In our jurisprudence a contract
may be illegal and void because it is contrary to a constitution or statute, or inconsistent with sound policy and good morals.
Lord Mansfield said (Jones v. Randall, 1 Cowp. 39) : "Many contracts which are
not against morality, are still void as being against the maxims of
sound policy."
It is a rule of the common law of universal application, that where
a contract express or implied is tainted with either of the vices last
or the thing to be done, no alleged
named, as to the consideration
right founded upon it can be enforced in a court of justice.
Before considering the contract here in question, it may be well^
way of illustration, to advert to some of the cases presenting the
subject in other phases, in which the principle has been adversely
Tn the

uase

applied.

Within the condemned category are: An agreement to pay for supporting for election a candidate for sheriff, Swayze v. Hull, 8 N. J.
Law, 54, 14 Am. Dec. 399; to pay for resigning a public position to
make room for another, Eddy v. Capron, 4 R. I. 395, 67 Am. Dec.
541 ; Parsons v. Thompson, 1 II. Bl. 322; to pay for not bidding at
a sheriff's sale of real property, Jones v. Caswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 29,
• Pa ri

<>f t be opinion

is

omitted.
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Am. Dec. 134; to pay for not bidding for articles to be sold by the
at auction, Doolin v. Ward, 6 Johns. 194; to pay for not
bidding for a contract to carry the mail on a specified route, Gulick v.
Bailey, 10 N. J. Law, 87, 18 Am. Dec. 389; to pay a person for his
aid and influence in procuring an office, and for not being a candidate
himself, Gray v. Hook, 4 N. Y. 449; to pay for procuring a contract
from the government, Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. 45, 17 L. Ed. 868 ;
to pay for procuring signatures to a petition to the governor for a
pardon, Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts, 152, 31 Am. Dec. 750; to sell
land to a particular person when the surrogate's order to sell should
have been obtained, Overseers of Bridgewater v. Overseers of Brookfield, 3 Cow. 299; to pay for suppressing evidence and compounding
a felony, Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 347 ; to convey and assign a part
of what should come from an ancestor by descent, devise, or distribution, Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Mass. 112; to pay for promoting a marriage, Scribblehill v. Brett, 4 Brown Pari. Cas. 144 ; Arundel v. Trevillian, 1 Ch. Rep. 47 ; to influence the disposition of property by will
in a particular way, Debenham v. Ox, 1 Ves. 276.
See, also, Add.
Cont. 91; 1 Story, Eq. c. 7; Collins v. Blantern, 1 Smith Lead. Cas.
676, Am. note.
The question now before us has been decided in four American
cases.
They were all ably considered, and in all of them the contract
was held to be against public policy, and void.
Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & S. 315, 40 Am. Dec. 519; Harris v. Roof's Ex'r,
10 Barb. 489; Rose & Hawley v. Truax, 21 Barb. 361; Marshall v.
Railroad Co., 16 How. 314, 14 L. Ed. 953. We entertain no doubt
that in such cases, as under all other circumstances, an agreement exWithin this
press or implied for purely professional services is valid.
category are included, drafting the petition to set forth the claim, attending to the taking of testimony, collecting facts, preparing arguments, and submitting them orally or in writing, to a committee or
other proper authority, and other services of like character.
All these
things are intended to reach only the reason of those sought to be influenced.
They rest on the same principle of ethics as professional
services rendered in a court of justice, and are no more exceptionable.
But such services are separated by a broad line of demarcation from personal solicitation, and the other means and appliances
which the correspondence shows were resorted to in this case. There
is no reason to believe that they involved anything corrupt or different
from what is usually practiced by all paid lobbyists in the prosecution
of their business.
The foundation of a republic is the virtue of its citizens.
They
are at once sovereigns and subjects. As the foundation is undermined,
the structure is weakened.
When it is destroyed, the fabric must fall.
1 Montesq.
Such is the voice of universal history.
Spirit of Laws, 17.
The theory of our government is, that all public stations are trusts,
and that those clothed with them are to be animated in the discharge

2

government
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of their duties solely by considerations of right, justice, and the public
They are never to descend to a lower plane. But there is a
good.
In his intercourse with those
correlative duty resting upon the citizen.
in authority, whether executive or legislative, touching the performance of their functions, he is bound to exhibit truth, frankness, and
Any departure from the line of rectitude in such cases, \s>//\
integrity.
No people can
not only bad in morals, but involves a public wrong.
have any higher public interest, except the preservation of their liberties, than integrity in the administration of their government in all
its departments.
_
The agreement in the present case was for the sale of the influence
and exertions of the lobby agent to bring about the passage of a law
for the payment of a private claim, without reference to its merits,
by means which, if not corrupt, were illegitimate, and considered in
connection with the pecuniary interest of the agent at stake, contrary^
No one has a right, in such''
to the plainest principles of public policy.
circumstances, to put himself in a position of temptation to do what
The law forbids the
is regarded as so pernicious in its character.
inchoate step, and puts the seal of its reprobation upon the

^V/*

under-^r

•*/

JwsnJccrr

taking.
of the country were to hire adany of the great corporations
in this way, to procure they
themselves
of
venturers who make market
the
promotion of their priview
to
with
a
law
passage of a general
vate interests, the moral sense of every right-minded man would instinctively denounce the employer and employed as steeped in corrup-

If

/

>

j

tion, and the employment as infamous.
the instances were numerous, open, and tolerated, they would
be regarded as measuring the decay of the public morals and the de- ^
No prophetic spirit would be needed to for-generacy of the times.
The same thing in lesser legistell the consequences near at hand.
lation, if not so prolific of alarming evils, is not less vicious in itself, L4^\
The vital principle of both is the same.
nor less to be condemned.
The evils of the latter are of sufficient magnitude to invite the most

If

The prohibition of the law rests upon a solid
serious consideration.
It involveA
bill
is apt to attract little attention.
foundation.
private
much
discussion.
fails
to
interest,
and
excite
usually
no great public
Not infrequently the facts are whispered to those whose duty it is
to investigate, vouched for by them, and the passage of the measure
the agent is truthful, and conceals nothing, all i^
is thus secured.
If he uses nefarious means with success, the spring-head and
well.
To legalize the traffic of such
the stream of legislation are polluted.
service, would open a door at which fraud and falsehood would not
fail to enter and make themselves felt at every accessible point. It
If the tempted
would invite their presence and offer them a premium.
agenl be corrupt himself, and disposed to corrupt others, the transi
He has the means in his hands, with
tion requires but a single step.
every facility and a strong incentive to use them. The widespread

If
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suspicion which prevails, and charges openly made and hardly denied,
lead to the conclusion that such events are not of rare occurrence.
Where the avarice of the agent is inflamed by the hope of a reward
contingent upon success, and to be graduated by a percentage upon
the amount appropriated, the danger of tampering in its worst form
is greatly increased.
It is by reason of these things that the law is as it is upon the subIt will not allow either party to be led into temptation where
ject.
the thing to be guarded against is so deleterious to private morals
In expressing these views,
and so injurious to the public welfare.
we follow the lead of reason and authority.
We are aware of no case in English or American jurisprudence like
the one here under consideration, where the agreement has not been
adjudged to be illegal and void.
We have said that for professional services in this connection a
But where they are blended
just compensation may be recovered.
forbidden,
the whole is a unit and
are
which
those
with
and confused
That which is bad destroys that which is good, and they
indivisible.
Services of the latter character, gratuitously renperish together.
dered, are not unlawful. The absence of motive to wrong is the founThe tendency to mischief, if not wanting, is
dation of the sanction.

Where
greatly lessened. The taint lies in the stipulation for pay.
that exists, it affects fatally, in all its parts, the entire body of the conWhere there
In all such cases, protior conditio defendentis.
tract.
neither
party.
is turpitude, the law will help
The elder agent in this case is represented to have been a lawyer of
The appellee is said to be equally worthy.
ability and high character.
This can make no difference as to the legal principles we have conThe law is no
sidered, nor in their application to the case in hand.
respecter of persons.
Decree reversed, and the case remanded,
the bill. 5
s See, also, Tool Co. v. Norris, 2
pare with Stanton v. Einbry, 93 U.
contract upon a contingent fee for
That a contract for services
ment.
quences in the future violations of
41 Kan. 364, 21 Pac. 230, 13 Am. St.

Wall.

53, 17
23 L.

with directions
L. Ed.

S68

to dismiss

(1S64),

and com-

Ed. 9S3 (1876), upholding a
a claim against the governprosecuting
to aid or protect from injurious consethe law is void, see Bowman v. Phillips,
Rep. 292, 3 L. R. A. 631 (1SS9).
S. 548,
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1

DuER, J. This is a motion to set aside a report of a referee, as contrary to law and evidence.
The action is brought by the plaintiffs, as the printers and publishers of a newspaper in the state of Michigan, to recover the amount
of their bill for printing an advertisement of the sale of real estate,
under an execution which was issued from the circuit court of the
United States for that district, upon a judgment recovered in that
court by the present defendants.
The plaintiffs were employed and
authorized to publish the advertisement, and to continue its publication with notices of the postponement of sale from week to week,
for a period of nearly eighteen months, by the deputy marshal, in
whose hands the execution had been placed for collection, and it is
insisted that this employment created such a privity between the plaintiffs and defendants as entitles the former to maintain this action.
The referee, adopting this view of the case, has reported that there
is due to the plaintiffs the sum of $510, which is the amount of their
bill exclusive of interest.
Upon the hearing, various objections to the report, arising upon
the facts as well as upon the law, were forcibly urged by the counsel
for the defendants, but the only question we have found it necessary
to consider, and shall determine, is the main question of law, upon
which the right of the plaintiffs to recover at all depends, namely,
whether there exists such a privity of contract or of law, between
them and the defendants, as can render the latter personally lia* * *
ble.

In our

judgment, therefore, the liability of the defendants depends
the proper answer to be given to the general question,
upon
solely
whether the plaintiff in an execution is directly and personally responsible upon every contract which the marshal or sheriff, to whom
the execution has been delivered, may find it necessary or convenient
* * *
to make, in order to render the process effectual.
1

I'iirt of the opinion

is omitted.
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(Part

1

The argument that has been relied on in this case as supplying this
It is said that a mardemonstration may be stated in a few words.
shal or sheriff, to whom a fi. fa. or other process has been delivered,
becomes by the very act of its delivery the agent of the plaintiff in
* * *
whose favor it is issued.
We have always understood, and until better instructed must continue to believe, that the relation of principal and agent is in all cases
a voluntary relation, springing from a contract, to which, as to all
It is described
other contracts, the consent of the parties is essential.
writers, by
all
relation
the
text
a
and treated as
by
purely voluntary
whose
treatise
Livermore,
Story,
and
upon the
Paley, by
by Judge
subject, although one of the earliest, is perhaps the most complete and
As all these writers explain
accurate of his numerous publications.
the relation, it is from the principal, and from the principal alone, that
the agent derives his authority.
It is the will of his principal that
fixes the limits of his authority, regulates its exercise and determines
its existence.
The principal appoints, directs, controls, removes him.
It is plain that these observations cannot be applied to the relation
between the marshal or sheriff, and the suitors, who in the prosecution
of their legal rights are constrained to employ him. As they have not
the power of selection, nor he the liberty of refusal, it cannot be said
that this relation flows from the will of the parties.
It is the creation
of the law, not the result of a contract.
He is a public officer, who,
when he acts for individuals, acts, not by virtue of their choice or of
his own agreement, but in discharge of a positive, independent duty.
He is appointed by the government, or elected by the people, is removable only by the appointing power or by process of law, and unless
where special instructions are given to him, it is the law, and the law
alone, that defines his authority and prescribes his duties, and controls
him in their discharge.
When special directions are given to him the
plaintiff is, doubtless, responsible for his acts, so far as the directions
are followed, and in such cases the officer, within a limited sphere
and in a restricted sense of the term, becomes the agent of the
* * *
suitor.

I

is

a

a

is,

We do not deny, but on the contrary distinctly admit, that in every
civil suit in which the sheriff is employed, a privity, avid therefore a
mutual liability, does exist between him and the plaiifftiff, but it is a
privity which the law, and not the consent of the parties, creates and
defines. It does not flow from the ordinary relation of principal and
agent, nor is it governed by the rules upon which the rights and liabilities of the parties in that relation usually depend. There
indeed,
partial analogy, by which the counsel for the plaintiff and the referee
have probably been misled, but the analogy fails in the material circumstances upon which the liability of
principal for the acts of his
It
agent
reasonably founded.
perfectly just, that he, who employs an agent, should be responsible for the acts, within the scope
of his authority, of the person whom he selects, trusts and controls;
is
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but it is not just that any person should be responsible for the acts of
a public officer, whom, without regard to his own wishes, the law commands, and unless he choose to abandon his rights, compels him to
employ.
It is not just that he should be liable for the acts of a person whom
he does not select, may not trust, and has no power to remove.
So
far as by special instructions he controls his discretion, and so far as
he participates in the wrongful acts of the officer, he is justly liable,
* * *
and no further.
The report must be set aside, with costs to abide the event. 2 '■

POLE
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(House

of Lords,

1S62.

9

Jur.

v.

LEASK.

N. S. S29,
N. S. 645.)

33

L. J.

Ch.

155

Leask, a broker in the colonial fruit trade, was introduced to Pole
& Co. by one Anderson, and was at the interview directed to make
purchases under the direction and orders of Anderson. Large purchases were made, and acknowledged by Pole & Co. as made in accordance with their intentions, up to a certain period.
Thereafter,
Anderson ordered Leask to make further purchases, and fraudulently
appropriated to himself moneys and goods, so that there was a loss
on the business.
Leask sued to hold Pole & Co. liable on the ground
that they had made Anderson a partner, or at least an agent.
The
Lord Chancellor rendered the prevailing opinion, holding Pole & Co.
liable upon those grounds.
Lord Cranworth did not regard the facts as showing even an
agency at the time of the purchases, and in a much quoted dissenting
opinion laid down the following propositions:
My Lords, before I examine in detail the facts of this case, I desire
to advert very shortly to one or two general propositions
connected
with the law of agency, which I think were sometimes lost sight of
in the argument of this case at your Lordship's bar. First,
then/ as
to the constitution by the principal of another to act as his agent./No
one can becomeVhe agent of another person except by the will ofvhat
Other person.
His will may be manifested in writing, or orally, or
simply by placing another in a situation in which, according to ordinary rules of law, or perhaps it would be more correct to say, according to the ordinary usages of mankind, that other is understood to
represent and act for the person who has so placed him; but in every
« See, also, Markwlck v.
L".» w. R. ::i;i (1880),

Hardlngham, 15 Ch. Div. 339, 43 L. T. Rep. N. S.
holding that the relation of principal and agent
requires the consensus of both parties; Central Trusl Co. v. Bridges, 57 Fed.
T:,:; . ' i; i. 6 C. <'. a.
539 (1893); in re Carpenter (D. C.) 125 Fed. 831 (1903).
Godd.Pb.& a.
847,

Lj ^iU <^

igS^&P*

THE HHLATIOX

(Part

1

a

that the principal

stopped from disput-

3

to exercise, or otherwise

is

is

it,

case it is only by the will of the employer that an agency can be
created.
This proposition, however, is not at variance with the doctrine, that
where one has so acted as from his conduct to lead another to believe
that he has appointed some one to act as his agent, and knows that
that other person is about to act on that behalf, then, unless he interposes, he will, in general, be estopped from disputing the agency,
It is, however, necessary to
though in fact no agency really existed.
bear in mind the difference between this agency by estoppel, if I may
s6 designate
and
real agency however constituted.
Another proposition to be kept constantly in view is, that the burden of proof
on the person dealing with any oi*e as an agent, through
He must show that
\vhom he seeks to charge another as principal,
the agency did exist, and that the agent had the uthority he assumed
ing it.

;

is

It

is

^axM^^K,
GEYLIN

2

Houst. (Del.) 311, the
v. DE VILLEROI (1860)
C. J.) gave to the jury these instructions
"There
no special character or description of written instrument,
nor any particular form of words, necessary to the appointment of
an agent. The modes of appointment are various, and the agency may
may
be created either by express words, or acts of the principal, or
and conduct of the
be implied or inferred from the circumstances
4

(Gilpin,

it

is

:

In

court

is

it

It

;

The authority conferred may be either general or special
parties.
and the fact of agency, of either description, may be established, either
may be shown directly, by express
by direct or indirect evidence.
Or,
may be imwords of appointment, either spoken or written.
plied or inferred, or indirectly shown, by evidence of the relative sitthe subject
uation of the parties, the nature of the business which
of controversy, and the character of the intercourse between them,
provided

the facts and circumstance

disclosed by the evidence, fairly
1

3

South. 340 (1SS6), post, p. 773,
See, also, Hill v. Helton, 80 Ala. 52S,
holding that to establish agency the alleged principal must in some way, directly or indirectly, be connected with the circumstances.
Another portion of these instructions is found post, pp. 334, 774.
*
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;

a

is

Unless this principle
strictly acted on, great injustice may be the
for any one dealing with
person assuming to act as
consequence
agent for another can always save himself from loss or difficulty by
applying to the alleged principal to learn whether the agency does exist, and to what extent. The alleged principal has no similar mode of
he may be ignorant of the fact that any one
protecting his interests
assuming to act for him, or that persons are proposing to deal with
is, therefore,
his agent.
another under the notion that that other
important to recollect constantly where the burden of proof lies.
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The acts and doings of the party sought
justify such an inference.
to be charged as principal, in relation to the subject matter, may be,
and often are, quite as expressive

and significative

as words

spoken.

3

SECTION 2.— IMPLIED AGEXCY
TRUNDY

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:46 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

(Supreme

v.

Judicial Court of

FARRAR.
Maine,

1S50.

32^Me.

t>25.)

Assumpsit upon three negotiable notes given by defendant to the
proprietors of the town of Bailey ville, indorsed by "Samuel Kelly,
Agent." The authority of Kelly so to indorse the notes is the question
of the case. To prove his agency plaintiffs offered to show by parol,
that he had acted as agent of the proprietary from 1834 to the present ..
I
time, giving deeds, indorsing notes, bringing suits, and taking care
i/p^>al<sts-?^}
the property.
The court ruled this evidence inadmissible for tl*£^^ Q*^. <x_
purpose. They then introduced records of the proprietors showing the .
s*J>W t{/^
choice of Kelly as agent, and that he had acted as agent from \\\s^' nr?^^ _~
\
election to the present time, that they have no other agent, and that <^ u< -^-^he had transacted all their business.
This and other similar evidence //s<>v^-^ <---,'
^^^
the presiding judge ruled insufficient to show authority in Kelly to
/

indorse notes.
If, in the opinion of the whole court, the aforesaid rulings were
correct, and the evidence insufficient to maintain the action, the plaintiff is to be nonsuit ; otherwise a new trial is to be granted.
Tenxkv, J. "A general agency exists, where there is a delegation to**
do all acts connected with the particular business or employment."

/

Story's Agency, § 17. "The principal will be bound by the acts of his
agent, within the scope of the general authority conferred on him."
[bid. § 126.

The authority of an agent may be created verbally, without writing.
excepting for Mime special acts, and may be inferred from the relation
of the parlies, and the nature of the employment, without proof of
any express appointment.
It is sufficient if there be satisfactory evidence of the fact, that the principal employed the agent, and that the
agent undertook the trust.
The agency must be antecedently given,
or be subsequently adopted. 2 Kent's Com. Lect. 41, pp. 477 and 47s.
It is very usual to prove the agency by inference from the habits
and course of dealing between the parlies.
These may be such as to
show that there was an appointment sufficiently broad to cover the
b See, also, Hall v. Smith, 3 Kan, App. 886, it Pac. 908 (1896),
man v. Metropolitan Life ins. Co., ante, p. 2, Reynell v. Lewis,

517,527(1846).

w

/

and SternaW.

jL

15 M. &

n

,

(K^p

-fnAJL/<Jcy
'

52

(Part

1

acts done by the agent, or that there has been a continued ratification
thereof; the principal would be bound by either.
"Having himself
recognized another as his agent, by adopting and ratifying his acts,
done in that capacity, the principal is not permitted to deny the relation to the injury of third persons."
2 Greenl. Ev. § 65; Story on
Agency, §§ 56, 127.
"When an agency actually exists, the mere acquiescence may well give rise to the presumption of an intentional
ratification of the act."
Ibid. § 256.
On the question, whether a person is an agent of a corporation or
not, the same presumptions are applicable to such bodies, as to inI
dividuals, and that a deed, or a vote or by-law is not necessary to
V establish a contract, promise or agency.
Maine Stage Co. v. Longley,
Vi/
14 Me. 444; 2 Greenl. Ev, § 62.
"In America the general doctrine is
now firmly established, that whenever a corporation is acting within
the scope of the legitimate purposes of its institution, all parol contracts made with its authorized agents, are express contracts of the
corporation."
Story's Agency, § 53. "In all matters of daily necessity within the ordinary powers of the officers of a corporation
aggregate, or touching its ordinary operations, the authority of its
2 Greenl.
agents may be proved, as in the case of private persons."
Ev. § 62.
The notes in suit were given by the defendant to the proprietors of
Baileyville, for a lot of land, which he purchased of them, and indorsed by Samuel Kelly as agent.
The questions presented are,
whether there was sufficient evidence from the vote of the proprietors,
of authority in Kelly to negotiate the notes in their behalf ; and wheth-

/
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/

er there was evidence before the jury upon which they should have
passed in relation to the existence of the agency, arising from the conduct of the proprietors.
The vote passed June 9, 1834, was introduced as evidence by the
plaintiff, without objection, and is in these words; "Voted, that the
agent be and is authorized to bargain and sell any of the lands of the
proprietors, to attend to the disposing of the grass thereon, and the
working out of the proprietor's taxes, and to attend to such other
business as may concern the general interest."
This vote is very comprehensive.
The terms used, in the vote of an organized proprietary,
would authorize the transfer of their lands by their agent. The right
to bargain and sell them involves the power to receive the consideration. The authority to attend to such other business as may concern
the general interest, will embrace the power to receive notes, for the
consideration and payment of the same ; and if it was found more for
the interest of the proprietors to negotiate those notes, than to obtain
the sums secured thereby, by directly calling upon the makers, it would
not exceed the limits of the agency.
It was shown by the records that Samuel Kelly was chosen agent in
the year 1834, and that he had acted as such from that time, to the
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it,

notes as the consideration of deeds given by him of the proprietors'
lands, and transferred notes given therefor; and as the notes and
securities held by the proprietors were transferred by the proprietors
themselves, he was their general agent, and clothed with the power to
do that, which had for so long a time been done without any objecThe acquiescence of the proprietors in these
tion, made by them.
acts, many of which must have been generally known, during the time.
he acted as their sole agent, and they had meetings and passed votes in
him to
relation to his authority, was evidence that they had authorized
and that he
transact their business in the manner in which he did

was possessed of full power to perform all the duties of their general
agent.

a

6

;

if

is

The objection to Kelly's authority to transfer the notes in suit does
not come from the proprietors, but from the defendant, who dealt with
He received the value of the notes,
them through their agent, Kelly.
bound to pay the amount to some one. The facts in proof are
and
such as would induce the plaintiff to conclude, that Kelly was the
so, good faith reagent or was held out to the world as such, and
This would
quires, that the proprietary should be bound by his acts.
effectually protect the plaintiff from loss, and would equally secure the
second time. We think,
defendant from all exposure to pay his notes
of the vote of the proprietors, there was evidence of the
jury.
agency of Kelly, which might with propriety be submitted to
stand
for
to
action
According to the agreement of the parties, the
trial.
is

a

independent

The implied authority rests not so much upon the number as upon the
in Anderson v. Johnson, 74
'character of the previous acts of the agent,
was held that "a single act of an assumed
Minn. 171. 77 X. W. 26 (1898),
single recognition of his authority by his principal, if sufficiently
agent, and
in their character, may he sufficient to prove
positive and comprehensive
St. P. R. Co., 24 Minn
agency to do similar acts" — quoting Wilcox v. C, M.
&

a

It

«
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time of the trial of the action, indorsing and transferring notes, given
for lands, sold by him as their agent, giving deeds and generally transacting their business, and all their business, they having no other agent ;
that in the year 1836 the greater part of their lands, then unsold, was
transferred, to be held in severalty ; and that the notes and securities
The proprietors having
held at that time, were transferred to him.
these acts of his, it
for
some
purpose,
elected Kelly as their agent,
them,
and
were acquiesced in.
known
to
inferred,
were
may fairly be
inference,
that as he took
make
the
to
A jury might be authorized

269

(1877).

THE RELATION

GREGORY
(Supreme

Court of Washington,

v.

(Part

LOOSE.

1S98.

19 Wash.

599,

54 Tac. 33.)

Riverside Shingle

Action against Loose, doing business as
Company. Appeal from judgment for plaintiff.
Anders, J. On and prior to February 5, 1895, the Riverside Shingle
Company was the owner of a shingle mill at Machias, in Snohomish county; and on or about that day it conveyed all of its property, including the shingle mill, to the Snohomish National Bank,
The mill was therein payment of its indebtedness to the bank.
after known and designated as the Riverside Shingle Mill. Soon
after the transfer the bank started up the mill, under the general
of appellant, Loose, who was the bank's cashier, and
supervision
shingles from bolts furnished by other
proceeded to manufacture
One R. P. Mathews was employed to
parties having them for sale.
operate the mill, with authority to contract for and estimate shingle
In September or Ocbolts, subject to the approval of the appellant.
tober, 1895, said Mathews employed one C. R. Gregory to construct a
logging road to some timber which appellant had contracted for, and
the
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1

which was to be cut either by appellant or his vendors, and removed
within five years from the date of the contract, which contract was in
writing. Said Gregory, by the direction or consent of Mathews, employed the respondent and several other persons to labor on the road.
As superintendent of construction, said Gregory kept the time of the
men employed, and on or about October 25, 1895, demanded from Mr.
Loose the amount alleged to be due them respectively for their labor.
Payment was refused on the ground that the making of the road had
not been authorized by appellant, and that neither appellant nor the
This action
bank had any knowledge that it was being constructed.
claimed
to be due
amount
the
recover
to
instituted
was thereupon
for labor
him,
others,
to
claims
were
assigned
whose
and
respondent

performed in the construction of the road.
It is not claimed that either the respondent or any of his assignors
was personally requested or authorized by Mr. Loose to perform the
labor for the value of which this action is waged, but the contention is
that Mathews was appellant's agent to construct the road, and as such
agent was authorized to bind appellant for the payment for the labor
performed thereon. And it cannot reasonably be claimed that Mathews' act in authorizing Mr. Gregory to construct the road was ratified by the appellant, for we discover no evidence of such ratification
in the record. If, therefore, Mathews was the agent of appellant for

the purpose claimed, it was either because appellant held him out to
the public as such agent, or because what he did in that regard was
within the authority which appellant had actually given him, or within
the apparent authority which he knowingly and without dissent permitted him to assume. 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) pp. 988, 989.

Qui* <y\^MJ^SA^^
,
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THE RELATION

amount of the respective orders was reported to appellant by Mathews,
and was generally deducted from the sum due to the person who received the goods, and paid to the drawee, although it appears that in
several instances such payment was refused.
Respondent introduced evidence at the trial to the effect that Mathews negotiated a contract for timber for appellant with certain designated persons, but the contract was finally executed by appellant himself, and contained no provision whatever for the building of a logging
road ; and this, too, notwithstanding the fact that the witness C. R.
Gregory testified that Mathews, when negotiating for the timber, said
to the vendors thereof, who were insisting that a road should be con-

a

;

a

a

a

is

it,

it,

and we will
"\Ye will make the contract with this in
structed to
the contract which we mentioned
This
build that road immediately."
above as providing for the removal of the timber purchased within
five years. Evidence was also introduced by respondent to the effect
right of way
that Mathews made an arrangement with one Eddy for
over his land for
logging road in favor of appellant, and located the
lease
but, like the timber contract, this contract, which was
same
term of five years, was executed by appellant himself, — one
for

is

I

it

is

it

in

is

in

a

It

in

a

is

[it

in

a

lessor.
Packard, as well as said Eddy, being
The first and principal question to be determined is, do the facts
above set forth, singly or together, warrant the finding that Mathews
bad the power to bind the appellant by the act of authorizing the buildAnd we are of the opinion that this quesquestion?
ing of the road
tion must be answered in the negative, for no such power oa'n legititrue
mately be deduced from the facts appearing in the record,
particular thing may be implied fromVhe habits
that an agency to do
this instance
and general course of dealing between the parties, but
nothing of the kind could be shown, as no loWing road had ever been
also true that the
constructed or authorized by the appellant.
particular lyflsiness or transaction may
authority to act as an agent in
the course of the agent's employoften be implied from acts done
not to be inferred, however,
"But
some other business.
ment
is,
case,
to be implied without reason, or preany
that authority
The
sumed without cause.
implication must be based upon facts, and
cannot arise from any mere argument as to the convenience, utility, or
sought to
So, too, the facts from which
propriety of its existence.
in
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The actual authority, as we have said, which was delegated to
Mathews, was authority to operate the Riverside Shingle Mill, and to
contract for shingle bolts, and estimate the value thereof, subject to
The bolts were paid for in every instance
the approval of appellant.
bank,
and generally, if not always, by checks
by appellant at the
U. K. Loose, Agent." During MathMill.
"Riverside
Shingle
signed :
ews' employment at the mill, he sometimes gave orders on merchants
for the delivery of limited quantities of groceries or other merchandise
The
to men who were furnishing shingle bolts or working in the mill.

56

the relation

(Part

1

are to be given their natural, legal, and legitimate effect,
and this effect is not to be expanded or diminished in order to establish
or overthrow the agency." Mechem, Ag. § 85. See, also, Story, Ag.
But it is well settled in the
§ 87; McAlpin v. Cass'idy, 17 Tex. 449.
law of agency that the extent of implied authority is limited to acts

be implied

of
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a like kind with those from which it is implied, and that an implied
power is never extended by construction beyond the obvious purpose
for which it is granted.
1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1002;
Mechem, Ag. §§ 85, 274, 312; Story, Ag. § 87; McAlpin v. Cassidy,
supra ; Graves v. Horton, 38 Minn. 66, 35 N. W. 568. 7
Applying these principles, it seems plain to us that the building of a
logging road was not within the scope of the authority, real or apparent, delegated to Mathews; for it is an act of an entirely different

kind from that of operating a shingle mill, contracting for shingle
bolts, or conducting preliminary negotiations for a right of way, or
In our judgment, if it can be
the purchase of a quantity of timber.
inferred from the facts in this case that he was authorized to build the
road in question, it might with equal propriety be inferred that he
was authorized to construct a railroad at the expense of the appellant,
for the one is as foreign to his employment as the other. It was the

duty of Mr. Gregory to ascertain the extent of Mr. Mathews' authority
before engaging in this undertaking, and he had no reasonable excuse
for not ascertaining it. Hurley v. Watson, 68 Mich. 531, 36 N. W.
726.
He could have ascertained the fact by simply asking a question,
but, instead of doing so, he relied upon the acts and representations of
the assumed agent; and he admitted in his testimony, in effect, that
The testiin so doing he acted unreasonably, and in fact foolishly.
mony also shows that he himself had previously advised the appelnot to build a road at that time of the year. Giving due weight to
all the material evidence in the record, it seems clear to us that there
was not sufficient evidence to justify a verdict in favor of the respondent, and the learned trial court therefore erred in not taking the case
from the jury at appellant's request.
error, we think, to permit certain witnesses to testify as
f~ It was also
to what this supposed agent told them that appellant said, or had conI
eluded to do, with respect to this logging road. This was clearly hearNor were the acts and decI
say testimony, and hence not admissible.
larations of Mathews competent evidence in proof of agency.
CoN
megys v. Lumber Co., 8 Wash. 661, 36 Pac. 1087.

lant

/

\

7 See, also, Hazeltine v. Miller, 44 Me. 177 (1857), holding that, while the
authority of an agent to act for and bind his principal may be implied from
the fact that such agent has been accustomed to perform acts of the same
general character for his principal with his consent, yet the acts from which
such authority is to be implied must be of the same general character and
From authority to collect for his principal money from the use and
effect.
sale of property could not be implied authority to embark on business enterprises for his principal.
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^cts:

Co, Nat'l.B»nk o f Coraraeree.
~~~

Mill

Columbia

Ptf. Co. had de»lt for years with def. b*nl
custom between them called for the endorsement
of checks with a rubber stamp. One Heilpern,
bookkkeper of ptf., without their authority ,
^resented a number of checks at def. bank, duly
endorsed, ^nd received the c«sh for them. Ptf.'
brings this action in conversion for the checks.
Def. °ttempts to show an implied or at least an
armprent authority in Heilr>ern to transfer the
checks, without the signature of the ptf T s.
tre° surer, ^nd receive the money for them.

A

'ourt

:

^here

The rule governing
one re r ron°bly and

this c°se is *s follows:
h«s been
good f»ith

in

led to "believe from the p^e r r r ace of authority
eh * -nrinci^ r
r>ermits his ^pent to h D ve, *nd
v
r
ec use of ruch beliefh»s in good f°ith de^lt
witb the r r ent, the -nrincir> c will not be allowed
to fleny the rgeney, to the prejudice of the one
r ~>
Sealing. One m*v be estonped by his 666866ff6

l

:>*>ble

nepligenee

l

p

s

!W

well °s intentionTRIAL GRANTED.
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°cts.
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Certain portions of the charge of the court to the jury are objected
to by appellant, but we perceive no substantial error therein, except
in the application of the general principles of law announced to the
facts of the case; but it is unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of
the several objections raised, as the judgment must be reversed for
Reversed and remanded for further proreasons already indicated.

Dunbar,

J.,

ceedings.
dissents.

V

SECTION 3.— BY ESTOPPEL,
COLUMBIA MILL CO.

Gilfillan,

NATIONAL BANK OF

1893.

/

MERCE.

Court of Minnesota,

COM^^^i/

52

Minn.

224.

W.

53 N.

1061.)

a

i.

is,

;

a

a

is

C.

J.8

corporation in the business,
The plaintiff was
flour, and the defendant
and
selling
at Minneapolis, of manufacturing
the conversion of 19
for
action
The
bank at that place.
was
different banks or
firms
upon
or
different
persons
checks drawn by
concerns, each payable to the order of, and the property of, the plaintiff. The allegations of the complaint are that one Leo Heilpern feloniously abstracted and purloined the checks from plaintiff, wrongfully
rubber
and without authority impressed on the back of each, with
stamp, the words "Columbia Mill Co.," and wrote underneath his
name, L. Heilpern, and wrongfully sold and disposed of them to defendant, which collected and appropriated to its own use the money
called for by them. Heilpern was plaintiff's bookkeeper and cashier
e. the payhe had charge of its books and its "petty cash,"
that

sales at retail.
was on Heilpern's authority to dispose of and
was conceded that he had no
the checks.
the
question was narrowed to that of
so, and
be not included in
further
question,
implied authority, and the
or negligently
either
intentionally
had
the
plaintiff
that, as to whether
to be so condefendant,
or
permitted
with
business
its
conducted
so
had a right in good faith to believe, and did believe,
ducted, that
it

it

if

it

It

ments received upon its
The sole controversy
receive the money for
express authority to do

a

it

S.

It

that Heilpern had the authority he assumed to exercise, and, acting on
and because of such belief, received the transfer of the checks, and
appeared that, when the relation of banker
paid him the money.
and patron between defendant and plaintiff began, the latter left in the
Zeidler, its treasurer,
signature book of the former the signature of
in its transactions with
as of the only person authorized to sign for
short period, when he was absent, his
the bank, and except during
■
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(Part

1

it,

It also appeared
was the only signature in the bank for that purpose.
when plainthat
a
for
usage
continued
and
years
that there grew up
to its orcredit,
checks
bank,
payable
to
its
for
deposit
tiff sent to the
der, it made no other indorsement on them than by impressing it with
Whether there was a similar usage in any other bank
a rubber stamp.
It existed between these parties. It also appeared that
is immaterial.
Heilpern and his predecessors in employment as bookkeeper and cashier, extending over a period of two or three years, were accustomed
and receive the money
to take or send to the bank, and transfer to
for, checks, mostly small ones, payable to its order, with no indorse-

it

is

a

petent for defendant to show the course and manner of conducting
business in the office of plaintiff, so far as the bookkeepers and cashier
had charge of it. The officers of plaintiff testified that Heilpern had
no authority to transfer the checks and receive the money, and that
they never knew of the bookkeeper and cashier doing so with plaintiff's
manSuch
checks. But the jury were not bound to their testimony.
as
been
have
proved
office
in
the
might
business
the
ner of conducting
have
must
the
officers
that
in
finding
the
jury
have
justified
would
known of the custom of the bookkeeper and cashier in regard to

is

is,

a

it

was acquiesced in by
checks; and had that been found, and that
plaintiff, the intention to vest authority might have been implied.
For the sake of convenience, we make distinction between implied
such as the principal in fact intends the agent to
authority — that
implied from the acts and conduct of the
have, though the intention
—
principal and apparent authority, — that is, such as, though not actually intended by the principal, he permits the agent to appear to have.
The rule as to apparent authority rests essentially on the doctrine of

/

if

^J-

a

is

that, where one has reasonably and in good
estoppel. (The rule
from the appearance of authority which
believe
to
beenVled
faith
to have, and because of such belief has in
his
agent
permits
principal
the principal will not be allowed to
the
with
agent,
faith
dealt
good
deny the agency, to the prejudice of the one so dealing.
One may be estopped by his acts of culpable negligence, as well as
the plaintiff
through culpable
and
by his intentional acts
negligence
to
have
bank
authority to transpermitted Heilpern to appear to the
latter
reasonably and in
the
and
fer the checks and receive the money,
he had that aubelieve
to
appearance
such
good faith was induced by
;

/A

\
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is

is,

It

ment except with the stamp, or with none at all.
was upon this custom mainly that defendant relied to show implied or at least apparent authority in Heilpern to transfer the checks
without the signature of Zeidler, and receive the money for them.
And because one dealing with an agent may show actual authority in
such authority as the principal in fact intended to vest
him, — that
to be shown by acts and conin the agent, although such intention
duct, rather than by express words, — without showing that he (the
person dealing with the agent) knew when he dealt with him of the
was comto be implied,
acts and conduct from which the intention
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F^cts:

t,

Munn .

Action for specific t>erformPnce of a contract under sepl to sell l n nd. Defs. objected thpt

it

c

wps executed
by a

uthorized

to execute
Court :

for x>tf. by an agent who wps not
written nower of p-tty. under se«l

said instrument.

Ipw would require a se^l in
this cpse, but modern courts hpve relaxed this
rule. A se°l is not necessary to the vplidity of
the contr«ct here. All th Q t he statute of frauds
requires is th*t the contract be written and
signed by vendor. Authority of agt. m«y be conferred by r>arol; neither a written authority or
an authority under sepl is required. The contract
here is binding on the principal.
The

common
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thority, and on that belief received and paid for the checks, plaintiff
cannot deny the authuiity, for to permit it to do so would sanction a
,:
*
frauc* *

Order denying to defendant
charge to the jury.

a new

trial reversed, for error in the

SECTION 4.— EXPRESS AUTHORITY
I. In General — Written Power

<r~
n

d*^-

A^-ff

WORRAIX^rT MUNN.
(Court of Appeals of New York';

1851.

5 N.

Y.

229, 55 Am.

Dee. 330.)

$ALjlJI*
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//

Z>yisL^£c

jJ

r
Action for specific performance of a contract under seal to sell land.
* ^^
The defendants objected to the contract for various reVsons, one of ^
which was that it was executed for plaintiff, Noah Worrall, by Henry fit!& ^#7v\^?i~#~*
.
Worrall, who was not authorized by a written power of attorney un- *
ler seal to execute said instrument.
From a decree of the* SupremcJ^^t^/ £Um^C_
,urt dismissing complainant's bill an appeal is taken.
V
^L>^&ts<7
b See. also, Hackett v. Van Frank, 105 Mo. App. 3S4, 79 S. W. 1013 (T9Q4),
holding that to establish agency by estoppel the party asserting the agenc^S^.
APsj.jP l^3
/J^*^<must have been deceived, and that he must have relied on the acts of the
principal creating the estoppel. It is not so in the case of an actual agency, •2*^ixt-*£^c^«^<*--^«L-See, also, Clark v. Dillman, 10S Mich. 625, 66 N. W. 570'.
implied or express.
(1896), in which the court says:
"It is undoubtedly the law that a person
-x_---^_
may he bound by the representation
and acts of another, as agent, where
/«
there has been such a holding out as to reasonably lead one dealing with him
But all of the elements of an *•) ~~0
to believe in the existence of such agency.
*
There must be conduct calculated to mislead, and
estoppel must be present.
circumstances
which justify the claim that the alleged ^^^^O t/^\
it must be under
principal should have expected that the representations would be relied and
and, further, it must appear that they were relied and acted*-?*
acted upon;
(jiiX^l
upon, in good faith, to the injury of an innocent party.
.
Mechem, Ag, SS s 5,
The rule that
86; Railroad Co. v. Chappell, 56 Mich. 190, 22 N. W. 278.
estops a party from denying the existence of an agency is a shield, and not
a sword: and unless the jury could find from the evidence that the defendant acted iu good faith, and in the honest belief that Pressburg bad authority
to sell this piano for $450, and that he purchased it to his injury, a verdict
for the defendant should not have been rendered.
There is no allusion in ~~74 ■
the charge to the other elements essential to an estoppel, and, in the testi- //AA-^v C-A~*il4^
mony returned, we discover no avowal of belief in, or bona tide reliance upon,
the authority of FreSSburg, unless the circumstances
were sufficient evidence
0/hA I'lJU^
t<>•_'<>
to the jury upon this subject.
In any event, there was ample opporJury
for
the
to
the
contrary. .Maxwell v. Bridge Co., 11 Mich.
unity
find
Ferguson v. Millikin. 12 Mich. 143, \ X. W. 185; Morrill
154, 2 X. W. 639;
l- t Mich. l'Tp. note;
v. Mackman,
De .Mill v. Moffat. 49 Mich. 125, L31, L3
X. W. :;s7;
Fletcher v. Circuit Judge of Kalkaska, M Mich. 193, 45 X. W.
17 Conn. 219."
641 ; Bank v. Todd.
In Dispatch Printing Co. v. Nat. Bank of Commerce. 109 Minn. I to. L24
X. W. 236 (1910), the court attempts a distinction between apparent authority,
resting mi the conscious permission by the principal of acts beyond the powers granted, and authority by estoppel, which has its hasis in the neglect of
the principal.

f

/

'-

f

ftjispJ

/

the relation

GO

(Part

1

stating the facts and disposing of some other obThe only remaining questions to be considered
are, whether the authority of Henry Worrall to execute the counterpart should have been under seal ; whether he executed the agreement
binding
an the name of his principal; and if the counterpart was not

Paige,
jections:]

J.

10

*

[After
*

*

Noah Worrall, whether the original was binding on Prall.
It is a maxim of the common law that an authority to execute a
of
Ideed or instrument under seal must be conferred by an instrument
rule
This
seal.
under
one
by
that
fcqual dignity ank solemnity ;
A disposition has been manifested by most of the
purely technical.
relax its strictness, especially in its application to
courts
American
/think the doctrine as
transactions.
Commercial
and
partnership
conveyance or any
now prevails may be stated as follows, viz.
act
required to be by deed, the authority of^the attorney or agent ^o
the instrument or act
must be conferred by deed; but
execute
seal will not render
seal, the addition of
would be effectual without
a

it

a

a

it

if

is

I I
if

]
(to

is

is,

(on

a

is

It

is

a

it

ciple.

seal.

Story on Part.

is
a

it

1.

117;

3

under

§

instrument

§

is

is

a

of
partner to act for his copartners and to
founded
in the copartnership property
interest
their
and
bind them
acts
for his
far
as
he
of
So
doctrine
agency.
common-law
the
upon
rule
Thus,
general
Part.
on
Story
an
he
agent.
partners,
of the common law that one partner cannot, from the mere relation of
partnership, bind his copartners by deed or instrument under seal,
even in commercial dealings unless specially authorized to do so by an
The whole authority

Kent's Com.

(6th

47.

1

io Part of the opinion is omitted.

3

§§

a

is

it

if

it

if

a

is

§

3

it

Ed.)
This rule springs from the common-law maxim before mentioned,
applicable to the general relation of principal and agent. There are
numerous cases in the American courts in which the rule has been reto the
laxed as regards partnership transactions, in order to adapt
Thus
48.
Com.
Kent's
117;
Part.
on
Story
necessities of trade.
established,
that
now
firmly
to
partners
the doctrine as applicable
the
of
partnership
the
scope
within
partner
act
done
by
wherever an
done by an unsealed instrument, then, albusiness would be valid
will be valid and bind his
under seal,
an
instrument
by
done
though
prior parol authority or adopted by
authorized by
copartners
121, 122; Anderson
Story on Part.
subsequent parol ratification.
Brock. 462, Fed. Cas. No. 365, Marshall, C. J.;
v. Tompkins,
a
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if

parol auexecuted under
an authority under seal necessary, and
or
instrument
the
thority or subsequently ratified or adopted bv parol,
rule
the
that
said
act will be valid and binding on the principal^
confined in its applications transactions between
as thus relaxed
distinction between partners and
seems to me that
But
partners.
rule as relaxed and qualified by
the
other persons in the application of
foundation of reason or prinno
solid
recent decisions, stands upon
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Kent's Com. (6th Ed.) 48; Smith v. Kerr, 3 Comst. (3 N. Y.) 150;
Gram v. Seton, 1 Hall, 293, Jones, C. J. ; Skinner v. Dayton, 19 Johns.
513, 553, 10 Am. Dec. 286; Everit v. Strong, 5 Hill, 163; Tapley v.
Butterfield, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 515, 35 Am. Dec. 374; Cady v. Shepherd,
And the rule that one partner
11 Pick. 400, 403, 22 Am. Dec. 379.
cannot bind his copartners by deed without an authority under seal has
been held in several cases not to apply to a case where one partner
conveys by deed property of the firm which he might have conveyed
The mere addition of the seal
by an unsealed instrument or by parol.
Mete.
1
Tapley v. Butterfield,
not vitiate the conveyance.
does
(Mass.) 515, 35 Am. Dec. 374; Anderson v. Tompkins, 1 Brock. 462,
Fed. Cas. No. 365 ; Everit v. Strong, 5 Hill, 165 ; Milton v. Mosher,
In Gram v. Seton, supra, Chief Justice Jones,
7 Mete. (Mass.) 244.
of the Supreme Court of the city of New York, held that the authority of one partner to bind his copartners by deed may even be implied
No good reason
from the acts and acquiescence of the copartners.
and
other persons
between
partners
a
distinction
for
can be assigned
in relation to the technical rule of the common law, that in all cases
an authority to execute a deed must be by deed. The rights and liabilities of partners in their acts for each other are governed by the same

rules as are the relations of principal and agent; each partner being
considered an agent for his copartners; and the same questions of express and implied, general and special authority, must arise between
partners as between principal and agent. Upon principle, therefore,
whenever an instrument, either as between partners or principal and
agent, would be effectual for the purpose intended without a seal, the
addition of a seal should not create the necessity of an authority under
seal to authorize

an agent to execute it.

11

J., speaking of a spe5
under seal, says :
without
authority
an
attorney
cialty executed by
shall
not
that
it
operate at all. If
follow
it
in
case
does
not
such
"Yet
the contract may be made without deed, the seal shall not prevent its
inuring as a simple contract, though the authority be by parol or mereIn
ly implied from the relations between the principal and agent."
Skinner v. Dayton, 19 Johns. 554, 558, 10 Am. Dec. 286, in the Court
of Errors, Spencer, C. J., held that the contract executed in that case
by Skinner, under seal for the directors of the company, ought not i<>
i a personal covenant of Skinner in equity, and that the
company were liable for a breach of the covenant, although the authority of Skinner was not conferred by deed; and such was the deciSkinner was a director, and the p
sion of the Court of Errors.
dent of an association for manufacturing cotton, and entered it
In Lawrence v. Taylor,

contract
contract

113, Cowen,

The
machinery for the company.
of
the
acts
and
assent
parol
by the suhse<iuent

for the making of
was ratified

Hill,

some

Cor any purpose without
may be appointed
The agenl of a corporation
the use of a seaL
See Fitch v. Steam Mill Co., 80 Me. 34, 12 M\. 732 (188S),
and the cases t here cited.
■i

<>2

the relation

(Part

1
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stockholders.
The court decided that such subsequent ratification was
an adoption of the act of the agent and equivalent to a previous positive and direct authorization to do the act.
In Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 Johns. 60, 10 Am. Dec. 193, a contract under seal had been entered into by the defendants as a committee of the corporation
of the city of Albany, with the plaintiffs, without authority under seal from the corporation.
But the corporation
had subsequently recognized by parol the authority of the committee
to make the contract, and it was held that the contract was binding on
the corporation,
and that an action of assumpsit would lie against the
corporation for its breach.
In Bank of Columbia v. Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299, 307, 3 L. Ed.
351, a committee of the corporation,
without any authority conferred
in
their
deed,
a
contract
own names as such committee
had
made
by
under their private seals, and the Supreme Court of the United States
held that as the whole benefit of the contract resulted to the corporation, and as the corporation had by its acts subsequently adopted the
contract, an action of assumpsit would lie on the contract against the
corporation.

In White v. Cuyler, 6 T. R. 176, where a wife unauthorized by her
husband made an agreement under seal with a servant, providing for
the services of the latter, and the servant performed the services, it
was held that although the covenant of the wife could not bind the
husband, the servant could, nevertheless, maintain assumpsit against
In Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. 352, it was decided that
the husband.
an
agent who contracts for the use of a corporation under
although
his own seal does not bind the corporation by the deed, yet if he had
authority to make the contract it shall be binding on the corporation as
evidence of such contract.
In Evans v. Wells, 22 Wend. 340, 341, Senator Verplank said that
these rules as to sealed instruments were not applicable to cases where
a deed is not necessary, and that in such cases an act of the agent under seal may be ratified by acts in pais.
In Hanford v. McNair, 9 Wend. 54, an agent had executed a contract under seal for the purchase of timber, not being authorized by
Sutherland, J., said that subsequent acts of the principal recogdeed.
and
nizing
carrying the agreement into effect might be sufficient to
make the contract binding on the principal as a parol contract.
In Blood v. Goodrich, 12 Wend. 527, 27 Am. Dec. 152, and in Hanford v. McNair, 9 Wend. 54, the Supreme Court, in laying down the
common-law rule that an authority to execute a deed must be conferred by deed, did not advert to the distinction between cases where
the conveyance or contract must be made under seal and cases where
These authorities show that
they would be effectual without a deed.
there is no distinction between partners and other persons in the application of the modern rule, that wherever an instrument, would be

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:46 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Lawrence v. Taylor ,

Patte:

Assumpsit. Declaration counted on

a

Pr*tt
for Pr°tt end Taylor, a co-partnershin. Pr*tt
w^s now dead, and this suit is brought against
Taylor to recover back money paid to Pr*tt on the
contract

to convey l^nd,

executed

by one

contr-ct. Def. claimed that Pratt was not properly authorized to act for him so as to make him

liable.

!

ourt

:

and

it is

here

def.,

is

written authority here,
All th*t is necessary
ratification of the s»le by

There was no
not required.

to show a
and the evidence

shows

of frauds is no defense, for

in contracts to convey

ment

"by

n^rol is

that.

it is

l^nd , «s

sufficient.

The

statute

provided th»t

this
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effectual without a seal, it will be valid and binding on the principal,
although executed under seal by an agent without authority by deed, if
authorized by a previous parol authority, or subsequently ratified or
adopted by parol.
In this case a seal was not necessary to the validity of the contract
for the sale of the lands at Haverstraw. All that the statute of frauds
requires is that a contract for the sale of lands shall be in writing, and
that such writing express the consideration and be subscribed by the
party by whom the sale is to be made, or by his agent lawfully authorized. The authority of the agent may be conferred by parol; neither
a written authority or an authority under seal is required.
2 R. S.
135, §§ 8, 9; McWhtirter & Baldwin v. McMahan, 10 Paige, 386;
Lawrence v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 107. It results from the foregoing authorities that the counterpart of the agreement executed by Henry
Worrall under seal was binding on his principal, although his author* * *
ity to execute it was not conferred by deed.
Decree of the Supreme Court reversed.

11.

Power of Attorney under Seal

(A) In
LAWRENCE
(Supreme

General
v.

TAYLOR.

Court of New York,

1843.

5

Hill,

107.)

Assumpsit. The declaration contained the common counts, and
also counted upon a contract to convey land in the village of Toledo,
Ohio. The contract was executed by one Pratt for Pratt & Taylor,
a co-partnership.
Pratt was now dead, and the action was against
Taylor to recover back money paid to Pratt on the contract. Defendant claimed that Pratt was not properly authorized to act for him so
as to make him liable.
Verdict for plaintiff sustained.
Cowkx, J. 12 There was no written authority to Pratt by which
Had the subject of the contract been personal
Taylor was bound.
property belonging to the firm, no special authority would have been
necessary ; but at law it is otherwise as to land, whatever may be the
rule in equity.
Out of the court of chancery, real estate, though belonging to partners and employed in the partnership
business — the
title standing in their joint names — is deemed to be holden by them
as tenants in common or joint tenants for all purposes.
One cannot,
in virtue of the partnership power, sell for the other.
Coles v. Coles,
IS Johns. 159, 161, 8 Am. Dec. 231 ; Anderson v. Tompkins, 1 Brock.
456, 463, Fed. Cas. No. 365; 2 Bell's Com. 614; Story on Partner12

Part of the opinion

is omitted.
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(Part

1

In order to bind Taylor, therefore, a special auship, 146 to 149.
thority was necessary for the particular transaction.
If a parol authority was sufficient, I am not prepared to say that
here is not evidence of such an authority actually subsisting when the
If, after a man has agreed to sell my propcontract was executed.

a

it

it

it

I

a

i.

2

;

3

;

9;

6,

8,

§§

S.

2

is

it

;

if

a

a

is

a

&

a

;

a

if

It
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;

a

if

it,

erty and has signed my name, I claim an interest in the sale, it is by
no means to be taken for granted that upon such a claim a jury would
not be warranted in saying I told the man to affix my signature.
It
seems the proof of some authority was considered so plain at the trial
that the counsel for the defendant declined going to the jury upon it.
In the Court of Chancery, perhaps, the mere partnership in these
lands would have been sufficient to render the contract binding on
Taylor. See Story on Partn. 129 to 132, and the note. They were
treated as partnership property by the contract; and in admitting the
Taylor in the same breath advalidity of that and claiming under
In equity they would,
mitted that the lands belonged to the firm.
in truth belonging to the firm, have been treated as personal estate
and that court without any thing more might have decreed
(Id.)
Such being the equity of the case,
specific execution by both partners.
seems to me
would not have been rash presumption, from what
Taylor said to Macy and Smith, that Pratt was expressly instructed
by Taylor to affix the copartnership name.
was sufficient, however,
ratification of the
the proof showed
sale by Taylor
and
think
showed so much, at least, very clearly.
Here was
written contract to convey in the name of the firm, made
as of property
The plaintiff promised to pay the
belonging to it.
contract to which the name of the
money to "Pratt
Taylor," on
firm was subscribed by Pratt.
First $10,000 and afterwards $2,000
were received by Pratt on the contract.
Of Taylor's common interest
in the land there
no dispute, and he repeatedly claimed in the hearconing of third persons, that he had an interest in the contract;
tract under which money had been and was yet to be paid to Pratt
in the names of the two as joint payees. This was evidence of
positive acquiescence and adoption of the contract by Taylor
and
there
be no objection to such an authority being by parol, both must be considered as joint receivers.
It was said for Taylor that the authority, not being written, was
void by the statute of frauds.
But neither the New York nor Ohio
statute requires that the authority should be in writing.
Both are
in this respect like the English statute, which, though
require that
an agent to convey real estate should be appointed by writing, omits
that requisite when the contract
e. to convey at
future
executory,
R.
69 (2d Ed.)
Sugd. on Vend. 120, 121 (Brookf.
day.
Wooddes. 428
Ed. of 1836), and the cases there cited
Story on
Ag. 51, and note (2); Lloyd's Pal. on Ag. 158 to 160;
Kent's Com.
613 (4th Ed.).
The statute of frauds draws the distinction on its face
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between conveying, and contracting to convey lands. I In the former
the agent must be made by writing; in the lattfej; a writing is
not required, but thNe books all concur that the appointment may be
The OhioVtatute, made an exhibit, is the same in this reby parol.

spect with our own.
An authority, by .Adopting the transaction, may as well be conferred where the question of agency arises under the statute of frauds,
The cases to this effect are cited in Davis
as under the common law.
also Story on Ag. 240, and the cases
325.
Shields,
24
Wend.
See
v.
Such adoptive authority relates back to the time of the
there cited.
transaction, and is deemed in law the same to all purposes as if it had
Story on Ag. 234, § 239; Id. 237, § 242.
been given before.
If the writing given by the agent be under seal, and that be essential, another rule comes in independently of the statute of frauds. The
authority must be of equal dignity, or the contract can not operate.
Nor can a specialty executed by attorney operate as such in any case,
Story on Ag. 50, § 49 ; 2 Kent's Com.
unless his power be under seal.
case, it does not follow that it shall
in
such
even
Yet
613, 4th Ed.
the contract may be made without deed, the seal
not operate at all.
shall not prevent its enuring as a simple contract, though the authority be by parol, or merely implied from the relation between the prin-

If

Story on Partn. 179 ; Andercipal and agent ; as if they be partners.
son v. Tompkins, 1 Brock. 462, Fed. Cas. No. 365, per Marshall, C.
of what shall
J. This doctrine has no connection with the question
13
* * *
be a sufficient agency under the statute of frauds.

(B)

Pozver to

Fill Blanks in

a Deed

SHEPPARD'S TOUCHSTONE,

p.

54.

is

it,

Every deed well made must be written, i. e. the agreement must be
all written before the sealing and delivery of it ; [or as part of the
5ame transaction,
and as a cotemporaneous act, or, at latest, while the
oeed is in fieri ;] for if a man seal and deliver an empty piece of paper
or parchment, albeit he do there withal give commandment that an obligation or other matter shall be written in
and this be done accordno good deed.
ingly, yet this
ia As sustaining Hie older and stricter rule as to sealed authority to make
instrument, see Gordon v. Bulkeley, 14 Serg.
R. (Pa.) 331 (1820).
<:or>n.PR.& A. —
&

sc:i led

5

a
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CRIBBEN
Court of Oregon,

(Supreme

v.

1

DEAL.

21 Or.
Rep. 746.)

1891.

(Part

Pac.

27

211,

1016,

28

Am.

St.

it

;

it

It

it,

it

a

it

a

a

it

is

&

is

a

a

is

&

&

a

6

1

It

a

is

Part of the opinion is omitted.

2

S.

a

is

it
is

valid deed.
delivered,
v. Nelson,
true that Chief Justice Marshall, in U.
It
the
bound
follow
ancient
to
No.
felt
15,862,
74, Fed. Cas.
J
4
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it

it,

Suit in equity to set aside a deed of general assignment, in which
by parol authority an agent had inserted the name of the assignee
after the deed had been signed, sealed and acknowledged, but before
delivery.
Lord, J. 14 [After stating the facts and quoting Sheppard's Touchstone, said of the doctrine there laid down :] * * * This is founded
upon that ancient and technical rule of the common law that the authority to make a deed, or to alter or fill a blank in some substantial
cannot be verbally conferred, but must be created by an
part of
As the deed was under seal, to alter
instrument of equal dignity.
or complete
by the insertion of the name of the grantee required
So firmly rooted was this principle
the authority to be under seal.
deed may have been
that
mattered not with what solemnities
name
sealed,
inserted, and delivwas
the
and
unless
grantee's
signed
ery was made to him, or some one legally authorized under seal,
nor conwas
imposed no liability on the party making
nullity.
was, in fact, no deed.
ferred any rights upon the party receiving
blank with the name
Hence
was held that parol authority to fill
of
grantee could not be conferred without violating established principles of law and rendering the deed void.
true that in the case
This doctrine still prevails in England.
Anstr. 225, Lord Mansof Texira v. Evans, cited in Master v. Miller,
field held otherwise, but this was in effect overruled in Hibblewhite
W. 200, on the ground that an authority to
Mees.
v. McMorine,
sealed instrument could not be given by parol, but must be
execute
given by deed, although this latter case seems more or less trenched
W. 465, and
upon by the decision in Eagleton v. Gutteridge, 11 Mees.
Steward,
14 Mees.
v.
v.
and
in
West
Id.
Davidson
778,
Cooper,
by
W. 47. But the rule has never been universally accepted in this country, and, however the holding of some courts may be, still the better
deed
that when
opinion and the prevailing current of authority
blank left therein for
regularly executed in other respects, with
sufficient to authorize the
the name of the grantee, parol authority
insertion of the name of such grantee, and that, when so 'filled out and
Brock.

rule, but

Cribhen

F-cts:
eier l
authority
f-fter the
p

t,

De c

l.

Action in equity to set aside

assignment

,

in which

a deed
an figent by r>arol

had inserted the name
deed h»d been signed,

of

of

the assignee

sealed,

fih*

and

acknowledged, but before delivery.
Court :
Under the old common l*w x>*rol authora blank with the name of a grantee
ity to

fill
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could not be conferred.

prevails in

3ngl»nd .

doctrine

The

In this county,

still

however,

the weight of authority is that when a deed is
regularly executed in other respects, parol authority is sufficient in a ease of this kind to
make a valid deed.

/?/Uf
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^
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a

:

it

:

it
is

it,

his opinion clearly indicates that he felt that the authority to fill a
He
blank in an instrument under seal should be held to be valid.
in
645,
3
L. Ed.
says: "The case of Speake v. U. S., 9 Cranch, 28,
unreceived,
be
determining that parol evidence of such assent may
probable that the same
and
doubtedly goes far towards deciding
in
particular between
this
the
distinction
court may completely abolish
this
"If
question depended
Again
sealed and unsealed instruments."
course of things
ordinary
in
the
which
action
of
rules
on those moral
not be much
would
there
transactions,
human
to
courts
are applied by
which the
effect
the
have
to
ought
that
this
paper
in
saying
difficulty
And
have."
should
intended
execution
of
its
the
time
at
parties
"I say with much doubt, and with
he concludes with this statement
strong belief that this judgment will be reversed, that the law on

it

is

:

3

is

is a

it

2

;

sacredness of contracts by deed, both of which have little importance
and the prevailing current of American authority and
in this country
the practical instincts and business experience and sense of our people
Redf. R. R. p. 124.
are undoubtedly otherwise."
Wall. 24, 17 L. Ed. 780, the court says: "AlIn Drury v. Foster,
was at one time doubted whether parol authority was adethough
sealed instrument, the
quate to authorize an alteration or addition to
sufficient."
Again, in
power
the
that
better opinion of this day
90, the
28
Ed.
517,
Ct.
L.
Sup.
119,
110
Withrow,
U.
S.
Allen v.
Iowa,
in sevas
law
in
is,
the
be,
and
probably
"It
may
court says

said

:

Kent,

"The

rule

invoked

is

purely technical.

a

it

it

a

a

it,

:

a

it

a

a

a

eral states, that the grantors in a deed conveying real property, signed
grantee, may aublank for the name of
and acknowledged, with
thorize another party by parol to fill up the blank." "But," he condeed thus exetinues, "there are two conditions essential to make
conveyance of the property described in
cuted in blank operate as
and this
The blank must be filled by the party authorized to fill
must be done before or at the time of the delivery of the deed to the
In the case at bar these conditions were fulfilled.
grantee named."
In Inhabitants of South Berwick v. Huntress, 53 Me. 89, 87 Am.
deed, bond, or other
party executing
Dec. 535, the court held that
instrument, and delivering the same to another as his deed, knowing
perfect into be filled necessary to make
were are blanks in
strument, must be considered as agreeing that the blanks may be thus
filled after he has executed it. In delivering the opinion of the court,

J.,
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is

it,

a

the verdict is, in my opinion, with the defendants."
state of afThe rule was purely technical, and the outgrowth of
The reason
exist.
now
not
fairs and condition of the law which does
law itself
the
fails
reason
the
when
and
the life of
of the law
and
sealed
between
distinction
the
At the present day
should fail.
are
graducourts
the
and
fast
disappearing,
unsealed instruments
As Judge Redfield said: "But
[the
ally doing away with them.
substantial, and to found itself
than
technical
be
rather
to
seems
rule]
either on the policy of the stamp duties, or the superior force and

Practically

the relation

68

(Part

(C)

is

a

*

*

*

it

is

it,

is

:

J.,

there is no real distinction in this matter between bonds and simple
contracts.
There is no more danger of fraud or injury or wrong in
allowing insertions in a bond than there is in allowing them in a promissory note or bill of exchange, and in neither can unauthorized alterations be made with impunity.
Considering that the assumed difference
rests on a mere technical rule of the common law, we do not think
that the rule should be extended beyond its necessary limits, viz., that
a sealed instrument cannot be executed by another, so that its distinguishing characteristic as a sealed instrument is in question, unless
by an authority under seal."
Likewise, in Bridgeport Bank v. New York, etc., R. Co., 30 Conn.
"Nor can any reason be assigned, which
274, Ellsworth,
said
founded in good sense, and
not entirely technical, why
blank in
an instrument under seal may not be filled up by the party receiving
after
executed, as well as any other contract in writing, where
the parties have so agreed at the time. In either case, the contract,
when the blank has been filled, expresses the exact agreement of the
parties, and nothing but an extreme technical view, derived from the
ancient law of England, can justify the making of any distinctions
between them."
The court, after citing other American cases to the same effect, sustained the decree dismissing the bill. 15

Statutes

Abolishing Sealed Requirements

SWARTZ
(Supreme

Court of Iowa,

Action to recover
one Davis, who held

1877.

v.

BALLOU.

47

Iowa,

188,

29

Am. Rep. 470.)

*

*

*

J.

a

Defendant claimed under
possession of land.
deed which had been perfected in every respect
Plaintiff sent this
by plaintiff, except that no grantee was named.
instrument to one Louther, who inserted the name of Davis as granPlaintiff denied the authority of Louther to do what he had done.
tee.
16
Servers,
[After stating the facts, and holding that Louther
had at least implied authority by parol to fill in the grantee's name:]
is The modern view is upheld in an able opinion by Mitchell, J., in State
23 Minn. 551 (1877).
The same view is taken in Lafferty v. Lafferty, 42 W. Va. 783, 26 S. E. 262 (1S96), and in Bridgeport Bank v. N. Y.
N. H. R. Co., 30 Conn. 231 (1861).
That authority to fill blanks in
deed
must be conferred by power under seal is held in Mosby v. Arkansas,
Sneed
citing
leading
the
case of Hibblewhite v. McMorine,
M.
(Tenn.) 324 (1857),
W. 200, in which the English court, per Parke, B., overruled the earlier
case of Texira v. Evans, decided by Lord Mansfield, and cited in
Anst. 228
6

4

a

&

v. Young,

1

&
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(1792).
!« Part

of the opinion is omitted.

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:46 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

F«-cts:

Action to recover possession of l^nd.
Def. claimed under one Davis, who held a deed
which had been perfected in every w«y by ptf., e:
exee-nt that no grantee w°s named, Def. sent this
instrument to one Louther who inserted D°vis *>s
grantee. Ptf. denied his authority to so do.
Court :
Louther had at le»st implied authority
in the grantee's name. Since
by parol to
seals have been abolished in this state, the
reason for the old common law rule is gone .
The rule applicable here is: "If a person
competent to convey real estate sign and ackowledge a deed in blank, and deliver same to
an agt. with an express or implied authority
up the blank and perfect the conveyance,
to

fill

fill

its validity

cannot be controverted. Parol

authority is sufficient.

VERDICT

AFFIRMED.
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is

eft

II. It must be remembered that the deed, in its imperfect condition,
was fully delivered to Louther. Whether authority may be conferred
in express terms by parol to insert the name of a grantee in a deed
perfect in all other respects, or that it may be implied from the acts
and corduct of a grantor as between him and a purchaser in good
faith, are questions which have been largely discussed, and the authorities are not in accord on the subject.
These questions first came before this court in Simms v. Hervey,
19 Iowa, 273, and are there elaborately considered, and the authorities referred to by Dillon, J. It is unnecessary to restate the arguments or make another citation of the authorities, except to say it is
apparent the rule that such authority cannot be conferred rests largely,
if not entirely, on the common-law doctrine in relation to instruments
under seal, such doctrine being that such authority could only be conferred by instrument under seal.
Seals having been abolished by statute in this state, and, therefore,
not necessary to the validity of a conveyance of real estate, it would
seem, as the reason for the rule has ceased, that the rule itself should
The exact question in the present case
not be further recognized.
It is true, the writer of
was not determined in Simms v. Hervey.
the opinion seems to have concluded the better rule would be to deny
It is certain, howthat such authority could be conferred by parol.
This is apparent from the
ever, the court did not concur in this view.
opinion, and the subsequent case of Owen v. Perry, 25 Iowa, 412,
96 Am. Dec. 49, the opinion in which was written by Wright, J., and
who concurred in the conclusion reached in Simms v. Hervey. See,
also, Devin v. Himer, 29 Iowa, 297; Clark v. Allen, 34 Iowa, 190.
It may be said the facts in none of these cases present the questions
in the case at bar, yet it will be found difficult to draw a distinction
in legal effect between the present case and Owen v. Perry.
Without entering into a discussion of the reasons, and referring to
authorities at greater length, we conclude, as the result of our investigation, that the decided weight of modern authority, and reason,
is in favor of the rule announced by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Drury v. Foster, 2 Wall. 24, 17 L,. Ed. 780.
It is there said :
"If a person competent to convey real estate sign and acknowledge a
deed in blank, and deliver the same to an agent with an express or
implied authority to fill up the blank and perfect the conveyance, its
validity could not be well controverted.
Although it was at one time
doubtful, whether a parol authority was adequate to authorize an alteration or addition to a sealed instrument, the better opinion at this
See, also, the late cases of Van Etta
dav is the power is sufficient."
v. Evenson, 28 Wis. 33, 9 Am. Rep. 486; Field v. Stagg, 52 Mo. 534^
14 Am. Rep. 435 ; Schintz v. McManamy, 33 Wis. 299.
The contrary rule was adopted in California, in the recent case
Upton v. Archer, 41 Cal. 85, 10 Am. Rep. 266.
No authorities are
cited except Story and Dunlap's Paley on Agency, and
said
it
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(Part

1

the case comes within the "sixth section of the statute of frauds."
Whether the statute of frauds of California is different from that of
this and other states, we are not advised. 17 * * *

Affirmed.

(D)

Deeds as Equitable Contracts

MORROW

v.

HIGGINS.

Court of Alabama,

(Supreme

to Convey

1S56.

29

Ala.

te

448.)

Bill for injunction

to restrain an action at law to recover land, for
the conveyance of the legal title, and for general relief. Complainant
had purchased the land of an agent, who by the authority of a letter
Error from a
from the owner had executed to complainant a deed.
decree dismissing

the bill.
letter exhibited

Walker, J. The
a

it

a

is

a

7

4

&

2

§

& a

it

a

a

in

§

162.
Although the deed executed
Story on Agency, 209,
bono."
ineffectual
as
conveyance of the legal
this
be
case
the
may
agent
by
written
title, because the authority of the agent was not given by
instrument under seal,
may be upheld in chancery as evidence of
49; Cocke v. Campbell
Story on Agency, 55,
contract to sell.
Hill, Eq. 167 [29 Am. Dec.
Smith, 13 Ala. 236; Welsh v. Usher,
Wend. 285; Story on
H. Canal Co.,
Dubois v. Delaware
63]
;

Agency, 160, notes.
The principles above laid down are conclusive in favor of the equity
of the appellant's bill and therefore the decree of the court below
reversed, and the cause remanded, at the costs of the appellee.

is

;

§
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part of

it,

with complainant's bill, and made
clear authority to sell the land. Wilson v. Troup,
was
Johns. Ch. 25; [Herbert v. Hanrick] 16 Ala. 581.
"It may be asserted, as general rule, that in all cases, where an
agent has contracted within the sphere of his agency, and the princourt of
not by the form of the contract bound at law,
cipal
ex
principal
upon
the
principles
will
aequo et
enforce
against
equity

a

it On the effect of statutes abolishing distinctions between sealed and unCo. v. Janu, 90 Minn. 393, 96 N. W.
see, also, Streeter
sealed instruments,
112S

(1903).
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ften«

.best
:

iotas?
o'

Facts:

!

lor r ow v . Hjg gjns

Bill

.

for injunction

action at law to
- ce of the leg»l

to

restrain

an

recover land, -for the convey-

title,

end

for general reli«

Commit in^nt h*d purchased the l*nd of an agt.,
who by the authority of a letter from the own«
had executed to > 1m a deed.

Court

:

The

letter here is clearly

an author

the lana. The rule

?=n
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i

is that in all c°s<
agt. h*s contracted within in sphere
rhere
of his authority, and the principal is not "by
the form of the contract hound at >w, a courl
of equity will enforce it ^g^inst the princip?
upon principles of euity and good conscience,
to ^-ell

'i'he deed

may he

contract to

upheld

sell.

here as evidence

VERDICT FOR DEF.

of

a

REVERSED.
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in the Principal's Presence

LEWIS

v.

WATSON,

(Supreme Court of Alabama, 1892.
98 Ala. 479. 13 South. 570, 22 L. R. A. 207,
39 Am. St. Rep. 82.)

a

*

*

it

;

it

it

;

;

it

J.

;

3,

;

J.

is

2.

&

4

a

is

it

it

it,

1. Some rulings were made en the trial in respect of Watson's title
to the land prior to the sheriff's sale and conveyance of
as his property, to Holley, and upon testimony in relation thereto.
These are
of no importance in the case, and, whether erroneous or not, in the
abstract, need not be considered, since the defendant — claiming, as he
does, under that title, and having recognized its validity by purchasing
at the sheriff's sale, and now further recognizing
reliance upon
by
the acquisition of
through that sale, and upon adverse possession
since that time under the color of title, with which, at least, he was
invested by the conveyance then made by the sheriff —
not in
position to impeach Watson's original title.
Ware v. Dewberry, 84 Ala.
568,
South. 404; Houston v. Farris, 71 Ala. 570; Tennessee
C.
R. R. Co. v. East Alabama Ry. Co., 75 Ala. 516, 525, 51 Am. Rep. 475.
The evidence as to the execution of the deed by the sheriff to
Holley was that of the probate judge of the county, and
as follows:
A. Thompson, the sheriff, could not write his name, and that
"That
he [the witness]
frequently wrote in the sheriff's office for said
Thompson that he indorsed the levies on the execution here in evidence, and wrote the deed of Thompson, as sheriff, to Alfred Holley,
dated May
1875 that said deed and indorsements on said levies are
in his handwriting; that said
A. Thompson was present when said
deed was written that
was written in the sheriff's office, at Thompson's instance, and under his direction
that, after the deed was written, Thompson told him to sign his name, as sheriff, to the deed, which
he did, and then, as judge of probate, took Thompson's acknowledgment to the deed, and carried
into the probate office, and afterwards
*
recorded
and that some one came and got the deed from
the probate office after
was recorded, but don't now remember who
was."

it
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McCleixan, J. 18 This is a statutory action for the recovery of a
certain lot of land in the town of Andalusia. Watson is plaintiff, and
Lewis, as administrator of one Holley, deceased, is defendant.
Plaintiff derives title from one Dixon by deed appearing to have been executed in 1866.
Defendant claims title through Watson, under a sale
and conveyance by the sheriff to his intestate in 1875, made in satisfaction of certain judgments against Watson, and also by virtue of an
adverse possession on the part of the intestate and himself subsequent
to said sale and conveyance.

is T'.irt of the opinion

is omitted.

the relation
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(Part

1

J.:

is

if

it

is

is

it,

it,

if

It is not entirely clear, on this testimony, that Thompson was actually and immediately present when his name was subscribed to the deed
by Fletcher, by his direction; but, manifestly, there was room for an
inference to be drawn to that effect by the jury. If he was so present,
as the jury might have found, the subscription to the instrument was
as efficacious as if he had been able to write his name, and with his
own hand had written
or he being unable to write his name, as
he had made his mark, and the words, "his mark," had been written
against
and the signature thus made attested by two witnesses.
present, and authorizes
This on the principle that where the grantor
another, either expressly or impliedly, to sign his name to the deed,
as binding upon him, to all intents
then becomes his deed, and
The reahe had personally affixed his signature.
and purposes, as
"The name being
thus stated by Shaw, C.
son for the doctrine
written by another hand, in the presence of the grantor, and at her

a

a

a

*

*

*

9

5

1

§§

a

a

and clear capacity, but, through physical inability, incapable of making
deed." Gardner
mark, could never make
conveyance or execute
232, 233;
Devi. Deeds,
Cush. 483, 52 Am. Dec. 740;
v. Gardner,
Kime v. Brooks,
Ired. 218; Frost v. Deering, 21 Me. 156; Videau
v. Griffin, 21 Cal. 390; Rev. St. Me. 1857, p. 56; Lovejoy v. Richardson, 68 Me. 386; Bird v. Decker, 64 Me. 551.
For errors in the trial, reversed and remanded.

a

I.

SECTION 5.— RATIFICATION

ELLISON
(Supreme

v.

Definition

JACKSON WATER CO.

Court of California,

1859.

12 Cal.

et al.
542.)

a

a

a

ditch, or
Action to recover $48,154.14 for the construction of
with
contract
the
water
under
canal,
Bayerque held
company.
that,
and
claimed
plaintiff
ditch,
the
him to comon
to
induce
mortgage
had
construction,
adopted
the
and
ratified
the conBayerque
plete
tract. Judgment against defendants, and Bayerque appealed.
19
Field,
[After stating the facts, and disposing of the case

19

*

*

against the company:]

*

J.
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;

is

her act.
The disposing capacity, the act of mind, which
request,
are the essential and efficient ingredients of the deed, are hers and
she merely uses the hand of another, through incapacity or weakness,
written sign.
instead of her own, to do the physical act of making
full mind,
To hold otherwise would be to decide that person having

Part of the opinion is omitted.

As

against the company,

the judg-

Sllison

Fr c t p

:

3ourt

:

v_. _

Jackso n 7/pter

Co .

Action to recover a sum of money for
conptruction work, under a contract with the
w r ter Co. Beyre^ue
held a mortgage on the work,
and ptf. claimed that, to induce him to complete
it, Bayre^ue had adopted and ratified the contract
To

adoption and

ratification there

relation, actual or

must

assumed, of principal
wps
and agt. There
none here between the "Tater Co.
and B AYre^ue. The evidence does not show any
undertaking upon which Bayre^ue can be personally
charged on the contract between ptf. and the Watei
Co.
VERDICT FOR DEF.
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N

It is only necessary, then, to deaffirmed.
m ent for damages must be
"adoption and ra ification of Bayer
termine the effect of the alleged
asserted upon the ditch.
nue and the validity of the lien
q
that Bayerque "adopted and ratified
It cannot in strictness be said
These terms are
and the company.
th contract between the plaintiff
party acting or assumcontracts made by
only
or ratify the act
adopt
then
The latter may
inor to act for another.
a

to'

he

intends
the contract,
of the company to Ellison upon
on
obLat
of the contract on the
wo ds guaranteed the performance
contained
In examining, then, the evidence
company.
to «*bhsh
tends
even
or
we findnothing which establishes
charged.
be
personally
can
taking upon which Bayerque
remanded.
Reversed as to Bayerque, and

Facts

Court

o£

Kansas,

First CTat'l.

1883.

Bank

20

Kan

311

v.

^„t

or in other
the
part
the re cord,
any under

DRAKE.

ax Am. Reo. 646.)

of Ft, Scott v.

Drake ,

:

(g

FIRST NAT. BANK OF FT. SCOTT

Action to recover money claimed to have
been wrongfully appropriated by Drake while acting
as cashier of a bank in which he owned 4/5 of the

He later sold the stock and ptfs. elaim
the amt. withdrawn by him should have been
r>*rt of the ^«?ets, T)ef. claimed that the bank
ptf. as directors
and tha
books shored the f°cts
their knowledge, and so h°d
were charred ^'ith
'

stock.

either author

Court:

1

f

t

t

th r

"eel

or

ratified his acts.

were not charged with the
to ratification.
Lf ra down the rule that wherever there is a voidr.ct, confi .rmation of that act by the party
is in l«w
rumed to be bound
ratification.
which

is essential

a

1

The d' rectos

e

fowled re
e
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i

however

^
o

■

it

t

to

,

W>e

,n
and Ellison was not made
"contact between
Wtot
rom
authonty
or for his benefit, or upon any
oayeiquc
mat
.
this
is
terms,
by these

:

XX W^

JUDGMENT EEVEP.SSD.
21

Tart of the opinion is omitted.
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(Part

1

it is therefore only a branch of the doctrine of principal and agent.
Burrill, in his Law Dictionary, says that "ratificais too limited.
tion is the confirmation of a previous act done either by the party himself, or by another ; that it is the confirmation of a voidable act" ; and
cites as authority Story, Ag. §§ 250, 251, and also 2 Kent, Comm. 237.
One of those citations treats of the relations of principal and agent ;
the other, of the confirmation of the acts of an infant by himself after

This

Bouvier, in his Law Dictionary, gives similar scope
becoming of age.
We think, therefore, it will not do to
to the meaning of ratification.
say that it is strictly a branch of the doctrine of principal and agent.'
It is the confirmation of a voidable act. It is entirely immaterial what
that is which renders the act voidable ; whether a lack of present power
toinake a valid contract, as in the case of infancy, or because of fraud
on the part of the other contracting party, or
nd misrepresentation
because it is the unauthorized attempt of an assumed agenMo bind his
that act
principal. / Wherever there is a voidable act, confirmation
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\f

22
by the party assumed to be bound is in law a ratification.
On the ground that the evidence should have been submitted to the
jury, reversed and remanded for a new trial.

SCHREYER

v.

TURNER FLOURING MILLS CO.

(Supreme Court of Oregon, 1896.

29 Or.

1, 43 Pac.

719.)

Action to recover money loaned to the promoters of defendant corprior to its incorporation.
Woolverton, J. 23 [After disposing of another point:] * * *
The defendant, while it may not have been in esse at the date fixed by
the complaint, yet it could, at any time after its organization, by adop| tion, make the contract its own. It has been said that the adoption of a
former contract is the making of a contract as of the date of the adoption. McArthur v. Printing Co., 48 Minn. 322, 51 N. W. 216, 31 Am.
St. Rep. 653. In their primary signification, there is a manifest distinction between "adoption" and "ratification." The one signifies to take
and receive, as one's own, that with reference to which there existed no
prior relation, either colorable or otherwise ; while the other is a confirmation, approval, or sanctioning of a previous act, or an act done, in
the name or on behalf of the party ratifying, without sufficient or legal
But, as
authority, — that is to say, the confirmation of a voidable act.
poration

the terms relate to contracts, some lexicographers treat them as synonyTo
mous.
Rapalje thus defines "adopt — adoption": "Of contract.
22 in Gallup. Trustee,
v. Fox, 64 Conn. 491, 30 Atl. 756 (1S94), the court
This
held that "ratification is the adoption of a previously formed contract."
broad view of ratification is approved in Hartman v. Hornsby, 142 Mo. 368,
44 S. W. 242 (1897).
ss Part of the opinion is omitted.
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it

is

it,

adopt a contract is to accept it as binding, notwithstanding some defect
which entitles the party to repudiate it. Thus, when a person affirms a
voidable contract, or ratifies a contract made by his agent beyond his
authority, he is said to adopt it." See Rap. & L. Law Diet. 31. See,
also, And. Diet. Law, 36.
Now, as regards a contract made or an
obligation incurred by the promoters of a corporation in the name of,
or for and in behalf of, a contemplated corporation it would seem that
an adoption or a ratification thereof by the corporation after it had
developed into a legal entity would mean one and the same thing, and
would be accomplished by one and the same process.
True, the promoters cannot be the agents of an unborn corporation ; but, where they
have assumed to act for
and to contract in its name, the approval
and confirmation of such acts by the corporation, when organization
has been duly accomplished, are but the ratification of the acts of an
unauthorized agent. And the result
the same, whether we call
is

§

*

*

*

4

it

tions involved.
to say, authorities are not wanting which
Suffice
hold them to mean one and the same thing.
See
Thomp. Corp.
5321, and Stanton v. Railroad Co., 59 Conn. 285, 22 Atl. 300, 21 Am.
St. Rep. 110.

Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.

STEFFENS
(Supreme

Court of Minnesota,

v.

NELSON

1905.

94

Minn.

et al.
365,

102

N. W. 871.)

2.

*

* J.

a

a

*

a

mechanic's lien on defendant's property.
Action to foreclose
25
Jaggard,
[After stating the facts and passing upon another
The plaintiff Steffens had no office; he had
point:]
The
placed the number of his residence on his cards and billheads.
agent of the contractor called there in Steffens' absence, gave his wife
check of the contractor, dated ahead, for the amount of Steffens'
claim, and directed her to sign
She signed that receipt, "Pereceipt.
ter Steffens, Maria Steffens."
She had no express authority from her
husband so to do. This receipt was taken by the contractor to the

24 In MeArthur v. Times Printing Co., 48 Minn. 319, 51 N. W. 216, 31 Am.
St. Rep. 653 (1892), the contract was oral and not to be performed within
year from the date of the agreement between the plaintiff and the promoters
of the corporation.
The court held that there was not
ratification by the
corporation,
for this would have related back to the time of the agreement
with the promoters, at which time the corporation was not in existence.
Moreover, such
contract would have come within the statute of frauds, and
so have failed for not being in writing.
But the corporation, by accepting the
services after it came Into existence, bad "adopted" the contract, thereby making it date from the time of the adoption, and so not within the statute.
2* Part of the opinion is omitted.
a

a

a
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"adoption" or "ratification."
But
not very material here to determine whether, as relating to
contracts, these terms are synonymous, or are capable of being thus
distinguished, as they might be were the statutes of frauds or limita-
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owner and agent of the mortgagee, and was present at the time of settlement with the contractor about noon on Saturday, April 12th.
On
the afternoon of that day the wife gave her husband the contractor's
check, and explained that she had to sign a paper for it. The husband
took the check and deposited it ; that check was never paid.
The wife, like another person, may be made an agent for her husband, and as such impose upon him obligations by his authority, express or implied, precedent or subsequent. Hopkins v. Mollinieux, 4
Wend. 465; Benjamin v. Benjamin, 15 Conn. 347, 39 Am. Dec. 384;
Willingham v. Simons, 1 Desaus. (S. C.) 272.
The proper decision of the question thus presented depends upon
consideration of a neglected distinction between ratification and estoppel. 26 Lord Coke said: "The name 'estoppel' or 'conclusion' was giv-
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Serena Land & Water Co., 113 Cal. 221, 41 Pac.
showing the importance of the distinction between
ratification and estoppel when the mode of ratification is prescribed by statute.
In Forsyth v. Day, 46 Me. 176 (1858), May, J., puts it thus: * * *
When a person assumes authority to act, when in fact no such authority exists, and the assumed principal lies by and sees his name used under such
circumstances, to the prejudice of innocent parties, and does not subsequently
intentionally ratify or adopt those acts, still he may, under certain circumstances, be estopped from denying such authority.
If a man will remain
silent when he ought to speak, he will not be permitted to speak when he
ought to remain silent.
In such cases, as the authorities cited in defence
fully show, it must appear, before the assumed principal can be charged,
that the other party was induced to act, or did act to his own prejudice, by
reason of the acts and conduct of the party attempted to be charged, or, in
other words, on the faith that such acts and conduct were in fact what they
assumed to be.
It would be a reproach to the law, if a man could be permitted to lie by and see another act to his injury, upon the faith of his conduct, and acts which he knew were calculated to mislead him, and then turn
round and say that he did not intend that which his conduct and his acts
fairly indicated.
No instruction upon this point was asked or given.
The
jury were further instructed that if Daniel, after he had knowledge that his
name had been put upon the note in suit, as a maker, ratified and adopted
the same, he would be bound thereby, although his name was originally placed
upon said note without authority.
The soundness of this instruction is not
questioned.
The words ratified and adopted as contained in it, seem to have
been used as synonymous, and, in fact, a ratification is but the adoption of
*
*
*
an act purporting to be the act of the party adopting it.
A contract necessarily implies, in its making, the assent of the parties to be bound
by it, and such assent cannot exist in fact without corresponding
intention.
A contract, therefore, cannot exist without the intention of the party, either
express or implied, to make it. It is not his contract until he has in some way
intentionally assented to it. He may, however, by his conduct, as we have
already seen, bind himself so far that he will be estopped to deny the validity
So, also, in the case of a subsequent ratification or adoption
of the contract.
of a contract, made in his name without authority, such ratification or adoption cannot exist, in fact, without or against the intention of the party to
be bound by it. The party, however, may, by his conduct, estop himself from
denying an intention to ratify or adopt it. The distinction between a contract intentionally assented to, or ratified in fact, and an estoppel to deny
the validity of the contract, is very wide.
In the former case, the party is
bound, because he intended to be ; in the latter, he is bound notwithstanding
there was no such intention, because the other party will be prejudiced and
defrauded by his conduct, unless the law treat him as legally bound.
In the
one case, the party is bound because this contract contains the necessary ingredients to bind him, including a consideration.
In the other, he is not
2 8 See, also, Blood v.
45 Pac. 252 (1S96),

1017,
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own act or acceptance stoppeth or closeth up his
However much this definition
mouth to allege or plead the truth."
may have been criticised as vicious (Everest & Strode on Estoppel, 916; Bigelow on Estoppel, 5), it is a braef statement of the effect of
the essential principle of estoppel, viz.i "that, vfchenever one of two
innocent persons must suffer by the act oi. a thirdAhe who enables such <
third person to occasion the loss must sustain it") Lickbarrow v. Alason, 2 T. R. 63 ; 1 Smith, Leading Cas. 759 ; Ewart/on Estoppel, 9.
Ratification, on the other hand, means confirmation. /"To ratify ^s to
give sanction and validity to something done withoutyauthority." J Evans, Principal and Agent (Bedford's Ed.) 90. ,'The underlying principle upon which liability for ratification attaches is that he who has
commanded is legally responsible for the direct results and for the natural and probable consequences of his conduct, and that it is immaterial whether that command was given before or after the conduct.
( The substance of estoppel is the inducement to another to act to his
The substance of ratification is confirmation after conduct.
prejudice.
"This is enough," said Mr. Bigelow, "to indicate that there may be.
It is common enough at
danger in using the, term 'estoppel' freely.
present to speak of acquiescence and ratification as an estoppel. Neither the one nor/the other, however, can be more than part of an estoppel, at best, f An estoppel is a legal consequence — a right — arising
from acts or conduct, while acquiescence and ratification are but facts
presupposing a situation incomplete in its legal aspect, i. e., not as yet
attended with full legal consequences.
The most that acquiescence or
ratification can do— and this either may under circumstances do—is
to supply an element necessary to the estoppel, and otherwise wanting,
as, e. g., knowledge of the facts at the time of making a misrepresentation.
But each stands upon its own grounds, and must be made out
in its own way, not necessarily in the way required by the ordinary
estoppel by conduct."
Bigelow on Estoppel (5th Ed.) pp. 456, 457.
And see Reinhart on Agency, 101.
An unauthorized act may be made to operate by ratification as an
estoppel upon the person in whose behalf it was done. That ratification presupposes knowledge on the part of such person ratifying.
If
he intentionally ratify what another has done for him without authority, and actually or constructively knows also of the circumstances connected with the unauthorized acts which are the basis of the estoppel,
he should clearly be held bound thereby.
See Dimond v. Manheim, 61
Minn. 171, 63 X. W. 495.
In this case the acceptance of the check given to plaintiff by his wife
operated to ratify the receipt signed by her for him.
In the eyes of
en because a man's
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bound for these reasons, but because he has permitted the other party
act to his prejudice under such circumstances,
that he must have known,
be presumed to have known, that Buch party was acting on the faith of
conducl and acts being what they purported to be, without apprising him
the contrary."

to
or
his
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the law, at least, he knew that this receipt would be used as evidence
of the payment of the debt by the contractor to whom it was delivered.
He is responsible for the direct results and the natural and probable
His situation is not therefore
consequences of the act he has ratified.
different, in law, from that of other creditors who signed receipts before the date of settlement, and who, as he did also, accepted and now
He is not entitled to recover beretain the check of the contractor.
cause of his ratification.
See Ewart on Estoppel, 133, 137, 139.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, except as to the plaintiff,
Steffens, and the defendants Delamater & Son. As to them, let judgment be entered in accordance with this opinion.

II. The Act Ratified
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ALEXANDER
(St. Louis Court of Appeals,

Missouri,

v.

1904.

WADE.
106

Mo. App. 141, 80 S. W. 19.)

Wade offered to sell to Hays and Rodgers his stock of merchanThe latter knew there was a debt for the stock, and refused to
buy unless Wade would deposit with the bank $1,800 to pay his comTo this Wade consented, and a deposit of $1,750
mercial creditors.
Out of this
and some duebills was made as the "Chas. Wade Fund."
fund the bank had paid all but $635.08 to commercial creditors of
Wade, when Alexander, who was not such a creditor, commenced suit
The bank
by attachment against Wade and had the bank garnished.
fund,
held
for credin
which
it
it
had
no
interest
the
that
alleged
itors, and asked to be protected in disbursing it according to the agreement. The above parties interpleaded, each claiming the fund.
Bland, P. J. 27 [After passing upon some minor and technical mat* * * 3. The arrangement under which the $1,750 were
ters:]
deposited in the bank by Wade is out of the ordinary. The deposit
was made on the demand of Hays and Rodgers, yet neither of them
knew who Wade owed, or what particular firms or individuals would
be benefited by the deposit.
They undertook to act for Wade's commercial creditors as a class— that is, for the creditors to whom he
was indebted for the goods they were purchasing from him — and not
Their primary
for all his creditors, nor for his creditors generally.
motive was, perhaps, to avoid any imputation of fraud to themselves,
in having made the purchase of the goods with knowledge that Wade
Whatever may have
was largely indebted for their purchase price.
been their motive, their action was not only lawful, but commendable,
and the contract which they made with Wade in respect to the deposit
was one which his creditors might lawfully have made with him, and
dise.

27

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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therefore might ratify after it was made, although Hays and Rodgers
had no authority from the creditors to make it.
As is said by Mechem on Agency, at section 112: "It is therefore
the general rule that one may ratify the previous unauthorized doing
by another in his behalf of any act which he might then and could
still lawfully do himself, and which he might then and could still lawfully delegate to such other to be done." fin Suddarth v. Lime Company, 79 Mo. App. 592, it was held that; if A. had no authority to
contract for B., yet if B. ascertained that he had so contracted, and
In McCracken v. City
ratified the act, he was bound by the contract.
of San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591, Field, C. J., said: "To ratify is to give
validity to the act of another. A ratification is equivalent to previous
It operates upon the act ratified in the same manner as
authority.
though the authority had been originally given." See, also, Ruggles
v. County of Washington, 3 Mo. 497;
Summerville v. Railroad, 62
Mo. 391 ; Hartman v. Hornsby, 142 Mo. 368, 44 S. W. 242 ; Bank v.
Hughlett, 84 Mo. App. 268.
The creditors for whose benefit the deposit was made, being possessed with the power to make the contract themselves in their own
behalf, 28 might thereafter ratify the contract made by Hays and Rodgers, although the latter were without authork, to act as their agents,
and the ratification would operate upon the deposit as though Hays
and Rodgers had authority, as agents of the creditors, to contract for
the deposit for the purpose for which it was made.
It is admitted
that the interpleaders are commercial creditors of Wade, and hence
are creditors for whose benefit the deposit was made.
By their interplea they have ratified the act of Hays and Rodgers, and occupy
the same situation in respect to the deposit as if it had been made for
their benefit under a contract with their authorized agent or with
themselves,
and, being for their benefit, ratification will be presumed.
Kingman & Co. v. Cornell-Tebbetts Co., 150 Mo. 282, 51 S.
W. 727. * * *

Judgment for interpleaders

MEMPHIS
(Supreme

affirmed.

& C. R. CO. v.

Court of Mississippi,

1874.

SCRUGGS.
50

Miss.

284.)

Appeal from

a decree of specific performance of an award.
One
Scruggs made a contract with appellant company to erect a
hotel and eating house on the right of way.
He later sold this to his
wife. Under the terms of the contract the parties later desired to

J. W.

28 In

Shepardson v. Gillette, 133 Ind. 125, 31 N. E. 788 (1893), it was held
of school trustees could not ratify a tax levy by the trustees
•if the civil town, because the act was not one which originally the school
trustees possessed the power to do.
See, also, McCracken v. San Francisco,
16 Cal. 591 (1SG0), per Field, J.

that

a board
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terminate the relations, and submitted to arbitrators the amount the
company should pay. They awarded $31,666.66.
Paton, C. J. 29 [After holding that an award by arbitrators was
* * * It is contended by counsel for appellants that
binding:]
M. J. Wicks, the president of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad
Company, had no authority to enter into the submission on behalf
of said company. We think the resolution passed by the board of
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directors of the company on the 25th day of January, 1871, conferred
the authority upon the president to submit to arbitration as a mode
of ascertaining the value of the property by disinterested parties, as
On that day the minutes of tfie
provided in the original contract.
board of directors show "it was resolved that the president is hereby
authorized to receive the hotel at valuation as provided for by said
The appellants being a corporation aggregate, a mere arcontract."
tificial being, could act only through the instrumentality of an agent
A power to "agree with the proprietor" of land for the
or attorney.
purchase was held to authorize an agreement to pay such sum as arAlexandria Canal Company v. Swann, 5
bitrators should award.

So we think the authority confer83 [12 L. Ed. 60].
red by the board of directors upon the president to receive the hotel
at the valuation of disinterested parties, clothed him with the power
to refer to arbitration. And the appearance of the appellees before
the arbitrators, by their agents and counsel without objection to the
reference, amounts to a ratification of the act of the agent, and estops
them from making any objection to the submission after the award
Where the principal, upon a full knowledge of all the
was made.
circumstances of the case, deliberately ratifies the acts, doings or omissions of his agent, he will beVbound thereby as fully, to all intents
and purposes, as if he had originally given him direct authority in the
premises, to the extent which siich acts, doings or omissions reach.
Story on Agency, 283, § 239.
At common law, however, thfre is a distinction between the ratification of acts which are void and the ratification of those which are

How. (U. S.)

In the former case/the ratification is inoperative for any
Acts
purpose whatever ; in the latter, full validity is given to the acts.
which are illegal, immoral or against public policy fall within the former class. For, in such cases, the original contracts or acts being void,
ought not to be allowed to acquire any validity from their being subsequently confirmed; since the same noxious qualities adhere to the
But whatever may
ratification as existed in the original transaction.
class
of cases, properly
former
in
the
be the force of this distinction
a party aswhere
of
to
cases
agency,
understood, it is not applicable
authority
without
another,
any
but
for
himself
for
act,
not
sumes to
whatsoever, or by an excess of the authority delegated to him, in cases
where the principal may lawfully do the act. In all such cases, if the

voidable.

29

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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HENRY CHRISTIAN BUILDING
Court of Pennsylvania.

(Supreme

&

*

affirmed.

Decree

LOAN ASS'N

181

1S97.

Pa.

201,

37

v.

Atl.

WALTON.
261,

59

Am.

St. Rep. 636.)

Appeal from judgment for defendant.
facias sur mortgage.
$1,000 mortbalance due on
Plaintiff was attempting to collect
found his
and
the
jury
Defendant denied having signed
gage.
it,

a

a

Scire

J.

9,

a

it is

a

a

a

Fell,

a

forgery.
The distinction between the power to ratify acts void befraud affecting individual interests only and the power to
cause of
public wrong has been carefully defined
ratify acts which involve
contract on
The right to avoid
in
decisions.
our
and preserved
for his
party
to
the
injured
privilege
given
fraud
of
the ground
may be waived; but he cannot give validity
own protection, and
The earlier cases which held that all contracts
to an illegal contract.
vitiated by fraud are insusceptible of confirmation, are, in effect, overand Negley v. Lindsay, 67 Pa.
ruled by Pearsoll v. Chapin, 44 Pa.
was

signature

:

A

is

a

is

is

is

5

Am. Rep. 427. The distinction between the cases pointed out
217,
in the opinions in Shisler v. Vandike, 92 Pa. 447, 37 Am. Rep. 702,
this
and Lyon v. Phillips, 106 Pa. 57,
contrary to good faith, and the fraud afWhere the transaction
allowed; but where the
fects individual interests only, ratification
crime the adjustment of
involve
of such a character as to
fraud
of the act from
ratification
the
forbidden by public policy,
which
admit of ratifinot
does
Forgery
not permitted.
which
springs
to represent,
of,
nor
behalf
profess
on
act
not
cation.
forger does
the
counterfeits;
subsequent
and
he
handwriting
the person whose
it is is

also, Daughters of American Revolution
Atl. 366 (1003); Rawlings v. Neal, 120 N. C.
Boutelle v. Melendy, 19 N. II. 190, 49 Am. Dec. 152
Godd.Pr.& A.—
so See,

54

204
v. Schenley,
271, 35 S. E. 597

Pa.

572,

(1900);

(1848).

*/
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it

it

a

a

§

a

it

whether
principal subsequently ratines the act, he is bound by
And
ratification once
be for his detriment or for his advantage.
of all the material circumdeliberately made, with full knowledge
242.
on
Agency,
Story
stances, cannot be recalled.
submission to arto
party
be
As the corporation may lawfully
follows
an
agent,
through
only
effected
bitration, and as this can be
of auin
excess
be
may
although
the
of
agent,
that the submission
acts
as by
its
well
by
as
corporation,
the
ratified
be
by
thority, may
its
appearance
done
by
think
was
we
And
this
confirmation.
express
before the arbitrators by its agent and attorney, without objection to
the authority of the arbitrators. This conduct and act on the part
recognition of the authority of the
of the railroad company was
ratification thereof. 30
arbitrators, and amounted to

-
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1

a

base an equitable estoppel.
The attempt to bring the case within the principle of the decision
in Garrett v. Gonter, 42 Pa. 143, that a deed or contract executed
pretended authority, may be
professed agent, acting under
by
affirmed.
confirmed, failed for want of proof. The judgment
is

a

(Supreme

Court of Minnesota,
196,

1S89.
12 Am.

v.
40

HAYES.
Minn.

531, 42 N.

W.

467,

4

WILSON

L. R. A.

St. Rep. 754.)

it

a

*

*

*

a

J.

It

a

The owner
Action by Wilson to enforce his right of redemption.
$5,000, sefor
note
Wilson
to
of the property, Douglas, had given
later
repurand
had
note
Wilson
negotiated
cured by mortgage, which
certificate
and
the
foreclosed,
had
been
A
prior mortgage
chased.
Wilson now claimed the right to redeem
of sale assigned to Hayes.
appeared that Wilson
as mortgagee of the subsequent mortgage.
had altered the note given him by Douglas by erasing the word "annually," and inserting the word "quarterly," so as to make the interinstead of annually.
est payable quarterly,
31
Mitchell,
[After disposing of other defenses in plaintiff's
new trial for errors in the instructions of the
favor, and ordering
becomes
new trial,
With reference to
court below
of the
ratification
proper to consider the effect of Douglas' so-called
he
of
discovery
the
that
upon
The court found
alleged alteration.
not
did
and
unauthorized,
and
fraudulent
as
denounced the alteration
apnot justified by the evidence. While
This
acquiesce therein.
is

it

it

:]

si Part of the opinion is omitted.

;

it

— then the holder,
pears that, upon being shown the note by the bank,
— he asserted that
yet, so falhad been altered since he delivered
it
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it

it

it,

adoption of the instrument cannot supply the authority which the
forger did not profess to have. "A forged bond or note obviously
wants the essentials of a contract, because the intention is not to bring
the minds of the obligor and dbligee together, but to practice a fraud
Hare, Cont. p. 285.
on both."
J
All of the assignments of eAror which were insisted upon at the
argument relate to the instruction given to the jury that, if the mortgage upon which the action was founded was a forgery, there could be
and that no act of the defendant thereafter could
no ratification of
make
binding upon him. There can be no doubt of the correctness
of the first part of this instruction, and, in view of the evidence, the
whole of the instruction was free from error. Magee, who committed
the fraud, was the accredited agent of the building association, and
He may have repin the preparation of the mortgage.
represented
not the slightest
there
was
but
matters,
in
other
resented the defendant
the mortgage.
of
the
executing
for
his
purpose
evidence of
agency
Nor was there evidence of any act of the defendant upon which to

v<
U
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it

it,

it,

according to his own admissions, he repeatedly
If the alteraand without objection.
voluntarily
on
paid interest
to
all the auwould,
according
this
ratification,
of
tion was capable
may be
ratification or adoption, whichever
thorities, amount to
mere spoliation by a third party, or
the alteration was
called.
made by the holder by mistake or accident or innocently, and withdid not destroy the note, or at least
out fraudulent intent, so that
would not
was the evidence,
did not extinguish the debt, of which

from repudiating

it

it

it

if

a

If

is

is

Some of the cases holdproof and presumption, already considered.
ing the negative of the question place the doctrine upon grounds of
public policy; others, upon the ground that ratification involves the
relation of agency, and that ratification can only be effectual when
done by the agent avowedly for or on account of the printhe act
that the very nature of ratification presupposes the act done
cipal
for another, but without competent authority, and hence can have
forger never acts or assumes to act
forgery, for
no application to
the
ground that, in the absence of
upon
others put
for another
or adoption of the forged inratification
consideration,
the
any new
;

it

a

a

;

mere nudum pactum.
would be
forgery capable of ratification take the ground
holding
that, so far as considerations of public policy are concerned, the ratification of forgeries should stand on the same footing as that of other
of
contracts, and should be held valid, unless made in consideration
that
compounding the felony, or for some other illegal consideration
can make no difference whether the
as to the want of authority
forgery; that this want of auact was or was not
unauthorized
the very /thing which the ratification cures, and to which the
thority
maxim applies, 70mnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori
cases

is

a

it

;

a

The

a

strument

33

<n«,J

Ohio St. 405,

31

^

Am. Rep. 546;

a

;

Bank v. Crafts,

4

Wright,

;

5

6

;

is

;"

is

"dragged back and made equivthat the ratification
aequiparatur
contract, but
not
a
ratification
that
alent to
prior command"
of
the
party,
the
name
ratifying
in
an adoption of one previouslyTiaade
98
Hook,
R.
Exch.
L.
Brook
v.
and requires no consideration.
/See
445
Am.
Shisler
Pa.
391,
Rep.
67
County,
McHugh v. Schuylkill
v. Vandike, 92 Pa. 447, 37 Am. Rep. 702; Owsley v. Philips, 78 Ky.
Ferry v. Taylor, 33 Mo. 334; Workman v.
517, 39 Am. Rep. 258;
a
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a

is

a

invalidate or affect the mortgage, which can only be discharged by
In such case
the payment or extinction of the debt secured by it.
But suppose
immaterial.
wholly
the question of ratification would be
forgery.
to
law
in
made,
amounting
the alteration was fraudulently
Douglas
ratified
by
be
subsequently
this
could
remains,
The question
so as to make the note in its altered form his contract?
capable of being ratified, so as
forgery
The question whether
in the absence of cirinstrument,
the
forged
on
liability
create
to
one upon which there
an estoppel in pais,
constituting
cumstances
almost as much conflict of authorities as upon that of burden of

Allen,
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Wellington v. Jackson, 121 Mass. 157; Hefner v. Vandolah,
62 111. 483, 14 Am. Rep. 106; Forsyth v. Day, 46 Me. 176.
In the large majority of the cases usually citec' in support of the
proposition that a forgery can be ratified, it will be found that the
question was presented in connection with circumstances creating an
estoppel, or that there was in fact no fraudulent making or altering,
but merely a lack of sufficient authority; and hence such cases are
Where the ratification is made to a third party, — the
not in point.
holder of the instrument, who was not a party to the forgery, — we
are not called upon to decide whether or not such ratification would
All the authorities cited
create a valid liability on the instrument.
by appellant to the effect that a forgery may be ratified are of this
class. 32 But we have found no case where it has been held that a
forged instrument can be ratified so as to give the forger himself a
right of action upon it. It is legally impossible in such a case that the
relation of principal and agent could exist between the parties, for
one man cannot be the agent of another to make a contract with himHence it would seem that the doctrine of ratification can have
self.
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447;

no application to such a case.
the entire instrument was a forgery, in the popular sense, it
would require no argument to prove that a mere assent to or ratification of it in the hands of the forger would be a mere nudum pactum. But in law there is no distinction between a forgery in making
The altered instrument is not the contract
and a forgery by altering.
of the maker, and in legal contemplation is as entirely a forgery as
the alteration was not fraudulent, so that it did not dethe other.
stroy the instrument, or at least did not extinguish the debt, we can see
how a subsequent assent to it would create a liability on the instruParties can alter their contract by mutual consent,
ment as altered.

If

If

and this requires no new consideration, for it is merely the substitution of a new contract for the old one, and this is of itself a suffifor the new. And what a party may assent to
cient consideration
when done he may assent to afterwards, so as to bind himself, if there
be a consideration to support it. But where there has been a fraudulent alteration of a written contract, which not only destroys the
instrument but extinguishes the debt, it seems to us clear on principle
that a subsequent assent to the alteration, given to the party who made
a2That a forgery may be ratified, see Greenfield Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen,
But the cases all agree that a ratification is not effective if made
upon the consideration that the forger shall not be criminally prosecuted.
Brook v. Hook, L. R. 6 Exch. 89, 40 L. J. Exch. 50, 24 L. T. Rep. N. S. 34,
It has been doubted whether there can really be any
19 W. R. 506 (1871).
other consideration that would lead one to assume an obligation on a note to
Henry v. Heeb, 114 Ind. 275, 16 N. E. 606, 5
which his name was forged.
Contra : Greenfield Bank v. Crafts, supra ; Hefner
Am. St. Rep. 613 (1888).
It is also well settled that
v. Vandolah, 62 111. 483, 14 Am. Rep. 106 (1872).
the maker or indorser of the forged instrument will be liable when the eleHefner v. Vandolah, 57 111. 520, 11 Am. Rep.
ments of estoppel are present.
Workman v. Wright, 33 Ohio St. 405, 31 Am. Rep. 546 (1878),
39 (1871);

447 (1862).

and other cases cited supra.
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a

it,

mere
in any view of the case,
without any new consideration,
McHugh v. Schuylkill Co., supra; Workman v.
promise.
Wright, supra; Owsley v. Philips, supra. Order reversed.
naked

III. The Essentials of Ratification
(A) Agent Act As Agent
L.

513,

12

Scott, N. R. 894, 46 E. C.

L. J. C. P.,
L. 235.)

306,

6

Dowl.

&

1843.

TUMMAN.

v.

Man.

Plea, not guilty.
us, on the rule obtained by
verdict for them against the defendant Tumthe plaintiffs, to enter
mon, for the sum of £2. 16s. 6d.
the court should think that the
trespasser for the original
subsequent ratification made him liable as
The seizure of the plaintiff's goods was made by an officer
seizure.
of some court, without any previous authority from Tummon, who appeared on the trial to be the plaintiff in some other suit, the precise nature of which did not transpire, but who was found by the jury not to
have given any precedent authority to take the goods of the plaintiffs,
was made. The question, therebut to have ratified the taking after
v
fore,
dry question of law, whether the subsequent ratification by
the defendant Tummon of the seizure under such circumstances,
the same in its consequences as
precedent command given by him
and we think upon the authorities and upon the reason of the thing itself, that
not. That an act done for another by
person not ashimself,
for
but
to
act
for
such
other
suming
person, though without
any previous authority, would, indeed, become the act of the principal,
the known and well established rule
subsequently ratified by him,
of law. In that case, the principal
bound by the act, whether
be
for his detriment or advantage, or whether
be founded on
tort or
contract,
be done by his previous authority.
Hen.
There was this precise distinction taken in the Year Book,
heriot, claiming property in
the bailiff take
for
pi. 35, "that
himself, the subsequent agreement of the lord would not entitle him
to be considered as the lord's bailiff at the time.
But
he took
at
the time as bailiff of the lord, and not for himself; although he did
so without any command of the lord; yet the subsequent ratification
The same distincby the lord would make him bailiff at the time."
tion
laid down by Anderson, C. J., in Godbolt's Reports, 189. "If
one have cause to distrain my goods, and
stranger, of his own
wrong, without any warrant or authority given him by the other, take
not as bailiff or servant of the other, and
bring an action
my goods

Tindal,

de bonis asportatis.

This

case comes before

a

it

a

it
is

;

a

is

is
a

it

if

a

it

it

is

is

if

;

I

a

is

it

if

a

if

it

7

a

4,

—

■

if
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of trespass against him, can he excuse himself by saying he did it as
Can he so father his misdemeanor on another?
bailiff or servant?
He cannot," &c.
In the present case, the sheriff's officers, who were the original trespassers by taking the goods of the plaintiffs, were not the servants or
agents of the defendant Tummon, but the agents of a public officer or
They did not asminister, obeying the mandate of a court of justice.
sume to act at the time as agents or bailiffs of the then plaintiff, Tummon, but as the servants of another, namely, the sheriff, by executing
the process directed to him by the court, and this forms the distinction
between the present case and that of Parsons v. Loyd, which was reIn the present case, the sheriff,
lied on in the course of the argument.
or the sheriff's officers, seized under a valid process, but in Parsons v.
Loyd the sheriff had acted, not under the authority of the court, but
under the direction of the plaintiff in the original action, who, by suing out a void process, was in the same situation as if merely he had
really directed the sheriff or his officers to make the arrest ; and, on
the latter supposition where a ca. sa. or a fi. fa. has been set aside for
irregularity it becomes a nullity, and no doubt the sheriff acts as the
servant, and by the command of the plaintiff, who sued it out, and
who is consequently liable as principal for the act of his agent. If the
defendant Tummon had directed the sheriff to take the goods of the
present plaintiffs, under a valid writ requiring him to take the goods
of another person, the previous direction would undoubtedly have
made him a trespasser, on the principle that all who procure a trespass to be done, are trespassers themselves ; the sheriff would be supposed not to have taken the goods merely under the authority of the
writ, but as the servant of the plaintiff. But where the sheriff, acting
under a valid writ, has seized the wrong person's goods, a subsequent
declaration of the plaintiff in the action, ratifying and approving the
taking, cannot alter the character of the original taking, and make it
a

wrongful taking by the plaintiff.
We think, therefore, that the defendant Tummon is not shewn to

be

a trespasser, and that the rule must be discharged.
Rule discharged.

WYCKOFF, SEAMAN
(Supreme

Court of Iowa,

&
1905.

BENEDICT
127

Iowa,

v.

399,

DAVIS
103 N.

W.

et al.
349.)

From a judgment for the deReplevin to recover two typewriters.
fendant, plaintiff appeals.
DeEmer, J. One Dahlberg was plaintiff's agent at the city of OtDefendants Davis and
tumwa for the sale of Remington typewriters.
Ottumwa,
and Dahlberg was
in
house
a
running
gambling
were
Rush
In this gambling den he, Dahla frequenter of their establishment.
Dahlberg
berg, lost several hundred dollars of his employers' money.
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is,

had authority to sell and deliver typewriters in his particular locality,
which included the city of Ottumwa, and to collect the purchase price
therefor, and also to collect plaintiff's accounts in general within the
territory allotted to him. In September of the year 1902, Dahlberg
was short in his accounts with his employers to the extent of nearly
During this month he sent two checks to his principal purport$800.
These checks were
ing to represent some collections made by him.
drawn on an Ottumwa bank, and, when returned, were dishonored by
Plaintiff, through its other agents, was demanding a setthat bank.
tlement by Dahlberg, and he, Dahlberg, went to defendant Davis for
help. Davis finally loaned him $125, but insisted upon the delivery of
the machines in question as security for the loan.
To this Dahlberg
yielded, and pursuant thereto delivered the machines to Davis, and at
the same time, at Davis' request, he, Dahlberg, issued a receipt to Davis, in the name of the plaintiff company, showing payment of the sum
of $205 in full for the two machines. Dahlberg did not receive more
than $125, and he did not sell the machines to Davis. Davis says in a
half-hearted way that he purchased the machines from Dahlberg, but
his own testimony shows that the transaction was a pledge rather than
a sale.
With the money so received Dahlberg took up the two protested checks ; but plaintiff had no knowledge as to where the money
came from until after it had actually been received and credited.
Thereupon one of plaintiff's agents went to Ottumwa to settle its affairs with Dahlberg, and then learned of the pledge of the machines.
This action of replevin was then instituted, resulting in the judgment
heretofore stated.
While many questions are argued, there is but a single proposition
involved in the case, and that
may plaintiff recover the machines
from Davis without returning the $125 loaned by him to Dahlberg?
Much
said about the rules applicable to gambling transactions, which
has nothing to do with this case.
Davis did not return, nor did Dahlberg receive, the $125 because of any change of heart on the part of
Davis.
No one pretends that this $125 was any part of the money
It practically conceded that was loan from
won from Dahlberg.
Davis to Dahlberg, induced to some extent, perhaps, by the thought
that, as Dahlberg had lost his money in defendant's establishment, he,
but
Davis, would be more likely than any one else to make the loan
at the same time Davis was not conscience-smitten,
for he demanded
and received what was thought to be adequate security for the loan.
But this loan was not made to plaintiff company, or to Dahlberg as
agent of the company, but to Dahlberg individually, to enable him to
meet
shortage due his principal. He had the right as an individual
to borrow money of whom he would, but he had no authority to pledge
the property of his employers as security for his individual debts.
No
agent has any such implied authority, and
not claimed that any
such express authority was given.
Dahlberg told Davis that he was
short in his accounts, and that he wanted the money to send to his em-

it

is

a
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1

This being true, it is clear that the loan was not made either
ployer.
in fact or form to the company.
Dahlberg did represent that t'he machines belonged to him individually, and that he had a perfect right to
sell them ; but he did not represent to Davis that he had authority to
pledge them for a loan either to himself or to his principal.
Divested of all extraneous matter, the case is this: Dahlberg had
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possession of the machines as agent for the plaintiff, with authority
to sell the same and to collect the purchase price. He was short in his
accounts with his principal, and applied to Davis for a loan to make
up this shortage, stating the facts to him, Davis. He represented to
Davis that the machines were his, and that he had authority to sell
them. Davis loaned $125 to Dahlberg individually, and took the machines as security for the loan, but, in order to make the transaction
appear as a sale, insisted upon a receipt showing a sale rather than a
pledge. Dahlberg did not, of course, own the machines, and he could
not pledge them as security for his individual indebtedness.
These being the facts, the ultimate conclusion is clear. Dahlberg having no express or implied authority to pledge the machines as security for his
own debt, the transaction was not binding upon the plaintiff, and it
may recover its property, unless it be that, by receiving the money as
a result of the transaction, it ratified the same and is estopped from
Of course, if Dahlberg had assumed to act as an
asserting its title.
agent for his company in securing the loan and pledging the machines,
and plaintiff had received the money so obtained, it could not repudiate the transaction without returning the money.
But that is not this case. Here the loan was not made to the plaintiff either actually or ostensibly, but to Dahlberg in his individual caThe property
pacity to enable him to meet a shortage to his company.
was not pledged as the property of the company, but as Dahlberg's. 33

Dahlberg was indebted to his company on other accounts, and the loan
was to enable him to make up his shortage to his principal. The company had the right to receive its money from its agent to apply on this
shortage, no matter what its source, so long as the agent had not un3 3 See, also, Watson v. Swann, 11 C. B. N. S. 756, 31 L. J. C. P. 210, 103 R.
C. L. 756 (1S62) ; Commercial Bank v. Jones, 18 Tex. Sll (1S57) ; Pittsburgh
& Steubenville R. R. v. Gazzam, 32 Pa. 340 (1858) ; Hamlin v. Sears, S2 N.
Y. 327 (1880), holding that "the doctrine properly applies only to cases where •
one has assumed to act as agent for another." And it has been held that the
agent must not merely assume, but that he must profess to act as agent.
Ferris v. Snow, 130 Mich. 254, 90 N. W. 850 (1902) ; Mitchell v. Minn. Fire
Ass'n, 48 Minn. 278, 51 N. W. 608 (1892) ; Keighley v. Durant, [1901] A. C.
In this
240, 70 L. J. K. B. 662, S4 L. T. R. N. S. 777, 17 T. L. Rep. 527.
last case it had been decided by the lower court, 1 Q. B. 629, 69 L. J. Q. B.
382, 82 L. T. Rep. N. S. 217, 16 T. L. R. 244, 48 Wkly. Rep. 476 (1900), that
intention to act as agent was enough, though the agent had
an undisclosed
To the same effect is Hayward v.
not openly professed to act for another.
Langmaid, 181 Mass. 426, 63 N. E. 912 (1902).
In Greenfield Bank v. Crafts,
4 Allen, 447 (1862), the court went so far as to hold that an agt "may be
ratified where there was no pretense of agency."
This case involved the
ratification of a forgery.
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It
dertaken to act in his capacity as agent in obtaining the money.
was not bound to return the money, because its agent borrowed the
same in his individual capacity and pledged his principal's property as
security therefor, not as agent, but representing himself to be the owner thereof, with authority, in virtue of such ownership, to sell. The
doctrine of ratification has no application to such a state of facts, for
there is nothing to ratify ; nothing was done on the company's behalf
or in its name ; the transaction was in the name of Dahlberg and for
In such cases the rules relating to ratification
his individual benefit.
manifestly do not apply. Thacher v. Pray, 113 Mass. 291, 18 Am.
Rep. 480; Mechem on Agency, § 127; Hamlin v. Sears, 82 N. Y. 327;
White v. Sanders, 32 Me. 188.
We are then brought down to the simple question as to which of the
parties to this litigation has the better title or right to the possession
of the property.
Plaintiff is conceded to have been the owner.
If it
has lost its title, it was through the act of Dahlberg, its agent. Dahlberg had no authority, either express or implied, to mortgage or pledge
the property for a debt of his own.
Bray v. Flickinger, 69 Iowa, 167,
28 N. W. 492; s. c, 79 Iowa, 313, 44 N. W. 554.
Even if Dahlberg
had assumed to mortgage the property as the property of his principal,
he would not have had authority to do so under power to sell and collect the purchase price, although here the question of estoppel by ratification might perhaps arise.
See, as supporting these conclusions :
Mordhurst v. Boies, 24 Iowa, 99; Gilbert v. Baxter, 71 Iowa, 327, 32
X. W. 364; Van Vechten v. Jones, 104 Iowa, 436, 73 N. W. 1032;
Edgerly v. Cover, 106 Iowa, 670, 77 N. W. 328.
Xone of the cases cited and relied upon by appellee are in point, for
in each there was some act done by the agent in the name of or on behalf of his principal which was the subject of ratification.
This is not
true in the case at bar, and plaintiff was not obliged to see if there was
any "taint on the money" which was paid it by its agent, Dahlberg, in
satisfaction or part satisfaction of his account with it. Even if the
money were tainted, there is no principle of either law or morals which
would prevent the plaintiff from receiving it.
The judgment of the district court, which was evidently based upon
the theory of ratification, is wrong, and it is therefore reversed.
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(B) Existence of Principal
In
(Chancery

re

EMPRESS ENGINEERING

CO.

Division of the High Court of Justice, 1S80.
43 L. T. N. S. 742, 29 Wkly. Rep. 342.)

:

16 Ch.

Div.

125,

Glasier & Archer agreed with Cottier, who acted for

a company,
to be registered as a limited company, to be called the Empress Engineering Company, to sell to the company for £3,000. the
All costs,
right to manufacture and sell the Empress water motor.
both before and after the company should have been registered, were
to be borne by the company, including 60 guineas to Jones & Pride, so-
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intended

This
licitors, for the incorporation and registration of the company.
comthe
after
agreement the directors of the company, by resolution
On the winding up of the company,
pany was organized, ratified.
and other charges.
Jones & Pride put in a claim for the 60 guineas
how
it was possible
not
see
I
do
that
I
must say
JESSEL, M. R.
The
he did.
than
otherwise
decided
have
to
for the Vice-Chancellor
the
comfor
so-called
the
agent
and
the
promoters
contract between
pany of course was not a contract binding upon the company, for
the company had then no existence, nor could it become binding on

the company by ratification, because it has been decided, and, as it
appears to me, well decided, that there cannot in law be an effectual
ratification of a contract which could not have been made binding
on the ratifier at the time it was made, because the ratifier was not
It does not follow from that that acts may not
then in existence.
be done by the company after its formation which make a new contract to the same effect as the old one, but that stands on a different
I am of opinion, therefore, that there was no contract bindprinciple.
ing the company to pay this £63. to Messrs. Jones & Pride.
Supposing, however, that there was, it is then contended that a
mere contract between two parties that one of them shall pay a certain sum to a third person not a party to the contract, will make that
third party a cesui que trust. As a general rule that will not be so.
A mere agreement between A. and B. that B. shall pay C. (an agreement to which C. is not a party either directly or indirectly) will not
prevent A. and B. from coming to a new agreement that next day
If C. were a cestui que trust it would have
releasing the old one.
am far from saying that there may not be agreements
that effect.
which may make C. a cestui que trust. There may be an agreement
like that in Gregory v. Williams, 3 Mer^ 582, where the agreement
was to pay out of property, and one of the parties to the agreement
may constitute himself a trustee of the property for the benefit of the
So, again, it is quite possible that one of the parties to
third party.

I

the agreement

may be the nominee

or trustee

of the third person.
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at To the same effect, see Melhado v. Porto Allegre, New Hampburg
Brazilian Ky. Co., Limited, L. K.
(J. F. 503, 31 L. T. Kep. N. S. 57, 23 W.
ft. .",7 (1874), holding that if
promoter lias spent time and money in forma

ing
company, and the company accepts the benefits <>f his efforts, the com
pany cannot ratify so as to become liable, for at ilio time of the agreement
was non-existent and therefore Incapable of contracting.

it
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As Lord Justice James suggested to me in the course of the argument
that a married woman may nominate somebody to contract on her behalf, but then the person makes the contract really as trustee for somebody else, and it is because he contracts in that character that the
cestui que trust can take the benefit of the contract.
It appears to
me, therefore, that on both the grounds mentioned by the Vice-Chancellor this claim cannot be supported.
There is another ground suggested, namely, that as the company
has had the benefit of the registration they ought to pay for it.
But
the answer to that is this — that was not the claim brought forward.
The claim brought forward was for an agreed sum of £63., and any
order we make (I do not know whether it is necessary to express
will not prejudice that claim, which
merely for an amount due for
services the benefit of which has been taken by the company.
am entirely of the same opinion.
James, L.
think
perhaps as well that we should say that Gregory v. Williams seems to be misunderstood.
When that case
considered with
the careful criticism with which the Master of the Rolls has examined
appears quite clear that there was there
transfer of property
with
declaration of trust in favour of
third person, which was a
mere covenant to pay money to that
totally different thing from
As regards the other point, notwithstanding what was said
person.
by Vice-Chancellor Malins in Spiller v. Paris Skating Rink ComCh. D. 368,
pany,
appears to me that
settled, both in the
Courts of Law and by us in the Court of Appeal in that case to which
we have been referred of In re Hereford
South Wales Waggon
Ch. Div. 621, that
Engineering Company,
company cannot ratify
contract made on its behalf before
came into existence — cannot
ratify
nullity. 34 The only thing that results from what
called
ratification or adoption of such
contract
not the ratification or
adoption of
qua contract, but the creation of an equitable liability
depending upon equitable grounds.
man not
inequitable for
to pay for the services of which he has taken the benefit.
That was
the only ground upon which we have held that, in that case, Walter
Head would have had
claim for services before the registration of
the company, had not an equitable defense been effectually set up on
the ground of
fraudulent concealment of the agreement.
The appeal will be dismissed with costs.
James, L.
will be
without prejudice to any equitable claim on
quantum meruit.
may
add, as the Master of the Rolls pointed out to me in the course of the
argument, that in Gregory v. Williams,
Mer. 582, the man with
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(Parti

whom the contract was made was one of the plaintiffs, and the only
defence there would have been misjoinder of plaintiffs, and that is
a defence which the Court was not likely to view with much favour.

BATTELLE
(Supreme

v.

NORTHWESTERN CEMENT
PAVEMENT CO.

Court of Minnesota,

1887.

37

Minn.

CONCRETE

&

89, 33 N.

W.

327.)

it

a

it

it

it

it

is

it

it

It

(i.

made, and the mortgage was foreclosed ; but the property did not sell
for enough to pay the debt, and the plaintiff was held for the defiFrom judgment for the plaintiff
He now sues to recover.
ciency.
trial,
a
new
the defendant appeals.
and an order refusing
GiLFiLLAN, C. J. It is self-evident that a corporation is not bound
e., those who bring about its
by engagements of its "promoters,"
in advance.
cannot have
organization,) assuming to contract for
The promoters are not the corhas an existence. 35
agents till
This
so,
poration, and their contracts cannot be its contracts.
though the promoters become, at the creation of the corporation, its
After
comes into existonly stockholders, directors, and officers.
ence and operation,
may, by adopting the engagements thus made
might make
for
in advance, make them its contracts, precisely as
similar contracts had no previous engagements been entered into.
contract by adopting
There can be no difference between its making
made
in
advance
for
by promoters, and its
an agreement originally
&

in Rockford, R.

I.

St. L. R. Co. v. Sage, 65 111. 328, 16 Am. Rep. 587
the court, while declining to say that a promoter cannot recover for
services and expenses before the organization of the company, if the company
afterwards accepts and receives the benefit of them, nevertheless regards it
as more reasonable to hold services performed or expenses incurred prior to
the organization as gratuitous, in view of the general good or private benefit
expected to result from the objects of the corporation.
The same court, in
Wood v. Whelen, 93 111. 153 (1879), held that there could be no question of
the right of directors to ratify and confirm the action of promoters of the
and Bruner v. Brown, 139 Ind. 600, 3S N. B. 31S (1S94), extended
corporation,
See,
this power to ratify to contracts to pay promoters for their services.
also, Stanton v. N. Y.
Eastern Ry. Co., 59 Conn. 272, 22 Atl. 300, 21 Am.
St. Rep. 110 (1S90); Paxton Cattle Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Arapahoe,
21
Neb. 621, 33 N. W. 271, 59 Am. Rep. 852 (1S87), citing Low v. Conn..& Passumpsic Rivers R., 45 N. H. 370 (1S64).
corporation, which with full knowledge of all the facts assumes and
That
agrees to the terms or accepts the benefits of
contract made by its promoters,
will be bound thereby, or at least will be estopped to deny its liability, has
But this does not hold unless the evidence of such acceptbeen often held.
Buffington v. Bardon, SO Wis. 635. 50 N. W. 776 (1S91)
ance is clear.
Bell's
Cap R. Co. v. Christy, 79 Pa. 54, 21 Am. Rep. 29 (1875). A corporation may
ratify
contract made when it was
de facto corporation only.
Whitney
v. Wyman, 101 U. S. 392, 25 L. Ed. 1050 (1879).
ss

a

;

a

a

&

(1872),

a
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Before the incorporation of the defendant, the plaintiff had agreed
with two of its promoters to buy a piece of real estate and to sell the
same to the company.
This he did, giving a mortgage back, and the
Default was
company, when it was formed, assumed the mortgage.

ps:

Battalia y._".w.

C.&C.

PAVS Z-SITT Co
,
"~~"

Before the incd-ooration of def., ptf. h°d
-reed with two of its -oromoters to buy a tr^ct of
ntf and
sell sr me to Co. This he did, giving back
krtgage, »nd the Co., when it w*s formed, assumed
b mortgage. Mortgage l*>ter w*s foreclosed »nd
le nro-narty sold, but not enough was realized to
m the debt, * n d r>tf. w^s held for the deficiency.
» now
sues to recover,
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irt:

The directors ana
ire knew of the contract,

stockholder of Def. Co.
*nd received the benefit
conveyed in their business. Th^t is

the land it
e^uifcalent of adopting same, and they are li»bl
ider it, the same as
an entirely new" contract
'

ie
td

been made.

if

VERDICT

FOR

PTF.
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No greater formality can be remaking an entirely new contract.
in
the
other
in
the
one
case
than
; and if it could make an enquired
tirely new similar contract, without the use of its seal, or without
writing, or without formal action of its hoard of directors, it may also
so adopt an agreement, assumed to be made for it in advance by
It is not requisite that such adoption or acceptance be
promoters.
express, but may be shown from acts or acquiescence of the corporation or its authorized agents as any similar contract may be shown.
It is true that the relations between the promoters and the agents
and shareholders may be such, or the engagements made in advance
by the promoters be of such a character, that the matter of adoption
The highest
will be scrutinized by the courts with great strictness.
In this case no complaint can be made
degree of fairness is required.
Not only did every stockholder
as to the fairness of the transaction.
and director and officer of the corporation, after it was formed, know
that the property was conveyed to it upon the agreement that, when
formed, it should assume and pay the indebtedness to which the property was subject, but each of them was a party to that agreement.
After receiving the benefit of the previous engagement, and accepting
and using the property in its business, knowing that, as part of the
price of the property, the corporation was to pay the indebtedness,
it can hardly be permitted now to deny its liability to pay it ; and the
same may be said as to the claim that, because plaintiff was a director,
the agreement of the corporation, by its adoption of the previous arrangement with him, was not binding upon it. The rule that a contract between a director of a corporation and the corporation is voidable at the instance of the latter, or of its stockholders, cannot be applicable to a case where all interested in the corporation, its officers,
directors, and stockholders, not only know of but consent to
and
where the property acquired by the corporation under the contract
kept and used by
no one dissenting.
The evidence was sufficient to sustain
verdict for plaintiff, within
the rules herein stated. Order affirmed.

(C) Act Dolie for

WATSON

S.

756,

31

L.

J.

C. P. 210,

103

756.)

shipped

on steamer

La

The further facts ap-

is

It

J.

am of opinion that this action cannot be sustained.
of contract.
important, therefore, not only to
the subjectlof the contract, but who are the parties
/

is

SWANN.

B. N.

the opinions.

C.
action
ascertain what
an

the Principal

policy of assurance on goods
there was
loss by jettison.

I

Eulk,

v.

11 C.

18C2.

E. C. L.

is

in

pear

on which

Pleas,

a

Action on
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a

(Court of Common
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1

to it ; for, it is clear law that no one can sue upon a^ contract unless it
has been made by him, or has been made by an agent professing to
act for him, and whose act has been ratified by him.
Now, here, the
contract was not made by the plaintiff ; nor did it purport to be made
on his behalf ; it purported to be made by Smith on his own behalf.
And it is clear that the plaintiff never intended to ratify that contract
in toto, but part of it only, viz., so much of it as was sought to be
A very wide extension has been given
appropriated to him by Smith.
to the principle I have adverted to as to the parties to a contract, in
respect of policies of insurance, viz., that persons who could not be
named or ascertained at the time the policy is effected are allowed to
But then they must
come in and take the benefit of the insurance.
be persons who were contemplated at the time the policy was made.
Here, however, Watson was not and could not be contemplated as
being a party to whose benefit the policy should enure, at the time it
The policy was effected by Smith in December, 1860.
was effected.
He was not at that time employed by Watson. The first intimation
he received from Watson that he wanted to effect an insurance, was
received by him in January, 1861, when he was requested to take out
on his behalf an open policy for £5000. against jettison on deck. Finding himself unable to effect such a policy as Watson required, he had
recourse to the expedient of appropriating a part of his own contract
to Watson.
No doubt, the principle contended for on the part of the plaintiff
But
is one of considerable importance to the mercantile community.
I am clearly of opinion that Watson cannot sue upon this policy. It
may be that Smith might maintain an action as trustee for the parties
really interested : but it will be time enough to consider that if the
question should arise. No case can be found of a running policy having been appropriated to cover a risk not contemplated at the time.
With
Such a proceeding is entirely unknown to the law of contract.
the consequences we have nothing to do, even though the effect of
our decision should be to throw doubt upon the validity of running
The cases to which the learned counsel for the plaintiff have
policies.
referred seem to me to be entirely in conformity with our present
In Lucena v. Craufurd and Routh v. Thompson, the prizes
decision.
were vested in the Crown ; the Crown, therefore, was interested in
the policies, and substantially they were effected on the behalf of the
Crown : in both, the very risk insured against was the risk in respect
Here, it is quite certain that the
of which the action was brought.
underwriters did not undertake this risk; and that, if asked to do so,
I therefore think, that, upon the declarathey would have refused.
tion and the fifth plea, denying that the policy was made for the use
and benefit or on account of the plaintiff, the defendant is entitled
to judgment.
Willes, J. I am of the same opinion. \To entitle a person to sue
or
upon a contract, it must clearly be shown that he himself made
it,
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that it vtas made on his behalf by an agent authorized to act for him
at the timte, or whose act has been subsequently ratified and adopted
The law obviously requires that the person for whom the
by him.
agent proflessjes to act must be a person capable of being ascertained
but there
not necessary that he should be named
at the timye.
to
reasonable
amount
shall
of
him
as
description
must be such
In
designation of the person intended to be bound by the contract.
the present case, the policy was effected on goods "to be valued and
No person was pointed out at the
declared as interest might appear."
time the policy was effected as the person who was to be the owner
Smith was professing to act for himself at the
of the goods insured.
Goods shipped on his own account, or
time of making the policy.
possibly/By him as agent for another person, would be covered by the
policy
stranger who had given him no orders to effect
policy. //But
the
benefit
assume
ratification
for hiiM clearly cannot by any supposed

of administrators and of assignees of
The doctrine of
totally different footing.
bankrupts stand upon
ratification involves this, that the act of ratification shall have reference to the time when the act was done which the supposed principal
To illustrate our opinion, we may refer to J;he
professes to ratify.
In the ordinary policy, the broker'who
case of an ordinary policy.
declares that he does so as well in his own name as for
effects
and in the name and names of all and every other person or persons
and the person
to whom the same death, may, or shall appertain, &c.
effected or
must be either the broker by whom
who sues upon
No subbe
effected.
was intended to
the person on whose behalf
the
to
sue
upon
right
stranger
sequently acquired interest will give
The

of theUcontract.

cases

*

*

a

a

it

it

it
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policy.

*

36

also rendered opinions.
and Keating,
for
the defendant made absolute.
verdict
Rule nisi to direct
a

J

J.,

Williams

(D) Who

may Ratify

FIRST NAT. BANK OF TRENTON
(Supreme

Court of Missouri,

1876.

v.

GAY

21 Am.

63 Mo. 33,

et al.

Rep. 430.)

Action on instrument in this form:
Trenton, Mo., May 13, 1S74.
Ninety days after date we promise to pay to the order of Robert
L. Gillilan, six hundred and fifty dollars, for value received, with interest after maturity, at the rate of ten per cent, per annum, at the
not paid at maturity,
First National Bank of Trenton, Mo.; and
SHERWOOD,

37

J.

if

"$650.00

Ch. 213,
3ee, also, Marsh v. Joseph,
S. 558, r. W. B. 209 (1897).
•■:'Pari of the opinion is omitted.
1
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and the same is placed in the hands of an attorney for collection, we
agree and promise to pay an additional sum of ten per cent, as attorNathan Gillilan.
ney's fee.

"Samuel Gay."
On the above instrument there was this indorsement :
"For value received, I assign the within note to First National Bank
of Trenton, Mo., and waive protest, notice of protest, and demand of
Robert L. Gillilan."
payment.
The petition alleged, among other things, that in consequence of the
non-payment of the instrument at maturity, it was placed in the hands
of an attorney for collection, and asked judgment not only for the
principal sum with interest, but also asked for four per cent, damages
for non-payment, as well as ten per cent, damages as an attorney's fee.
In addition to other matters, the defendant, Nathan Gillilan, put in
A trial was had, resulting in a verdict for
a plea of non est factum.
* * *
plaintiff and judgment accordingly.
But while we may freely concede that all means necessary and proper for the accomplishment of the end were intended, yet this concession cannot be permitted to embrace the extraordinary means and
measures resorted to by the son, in the present instance. These considerations conspicuously show the exceeding impropriety of giving the
The second instruction was equally erinstruction above mentioned.
roneous as the first. The evidence of plaintiff's own witnesses, the officers of the bank, shows that the father, in proffering the use of his
name, for the accommodation of the son, distinctly stated "that he and
Robert were both good ; that he did not wish to go out of the family
for security, that there was no necessity for doing so." This language
It plainly indicates that while
is susceptible of but one construction.
the father was willing to become the surety of his son, he at the same
time desired to restrict that suretyship to the members of his family.
And he had the undoubted right to so restrict his liability. And, as a
necessary sequence therefrom, the son had no power to disregard
these restrictions which were imposed on him.
These remarks are but the application of a very familiar doctrine
Thus,
respecting agents who possess only special and limited powers.
his
in
name
of
the
to
indorse
bills
authorized
draw
and
an agent
or
name,
in
bill
his
own
indorse
a
no
to
draw
or
power
has
principal,
in the joint name of himself and principal. Stainback v. Read, 11
Grat. 281, 62 Am. Dec. 648. A ruling similar to this in point of prinAnd
ciple, was made in Mechanics' Bank v. Schaumburg, 38 Mo. 228.
it matters not whether the addition of the name of Samuel Gay to the
note, prior to its delivery, affected the rights or interests of Nathan
He has the right to say, when asGillilan injuriously or otherwise.
certaining that his instructions have not been followed : "I never gave
assent to this contract."

The instruction referred to was erroneous, therefore, as already
stated, because there was not a particle of evidence tending to show
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that Nathan Gillilan was willing, at the outset, to assume with Samuel
Gay, or indeed any one else, outside of his family, a joint liability
in the execution of any paper whatever, much less the instrument in
suit. There are other errors in this instruction but we need not point
them out, as they have been already passed upon in our remarks upon
And the errors we have pointed out were not
the first one given.
aided or cured by the harmless platitude which the court of its own
motion gave, "That, unless the jury find from the evidence in the case
that Nathan Gillilan authorized Robert L. Gillilan to sign his (Nathan
Gillilan's) name to the instrument in suit, the jury must find for the

But although it may be true that Nathan Gillisaid Nathan Gillilan."
to sign his name to the instrument on which
authority
not
did
lan
give
the claim of the plaintiff is based, yet it was doubtless in his power,
upon full knowledge of what had been done, to give it the sanction
of his approbation.
There have been many refinements adopted about this doctrine of
ratification; refinements which savor more of subtlety than of sound
With some exceptions, not necessary to be adverted to
judgment.
here, the general proposition is, however, undoubtedly correct, that
he who may authorize

in

may ratify in the end. This
matter,
easily understood, constantly
the
of daily life, and
occurrences
ordinary
soundness,
and diswithout
subtleties
by
And there is, therefore, no force. in the
that there would have to be a new con-

the beginning,

is a common sense view of
acted and relied on, in the
should not be frittered away
tinctions without difference.
point urged on our attention,
act. VNo insideration in order to attach validity to a confirmatory
dependent consideration is required in the case of an accommodation
indorser, surety\etc, in the first instance, and it is difficult to see why
anything more should be required on subsequent sanction than on
original assent. Commercial Bank v. Warren, 15 N. Y. (1 Smith)
577, and cases cited.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (McHugh vs. County, 67 Pa.
391, 5 Am. Rep. 445, and cases cited) has, it seems, uniformly held
that there could be no ratification without a new consideration, where
But this court, in the case of Dow's
the original act was mala fide.
Ex'r v. Spenney's Ex'r, 29 Mo. 386, where the point, indeed, was not
expressly raised, but where there was no proof of a new consideration, held that ratification might occur, even where the ratifier's name
had been forged. There is, however, no proof of bad faith in this
case; so that the Pennsylvania decisions to which we have been cited.
even if regarded as sound, would be inapplicable
here. 88 * * *
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

it

is. of course, a corollary to the principal case that a ratification ran
made when the party ratifying possessed the power to perform the
:iet ratified.
-Marsh v. Fulton County, 10 Wall. 676, L9 I- Ed. 1040 (1870).
as
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KELSEY

v.

(Part

1

NATIONAL BANK OF CRAWFORD COUNTY.

(Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania,

1S71.

69

Pa. 426.)

Plaintiff, a detective, sues in assumpsit to recover $5,000 reward
for detecting the felon, who had robbed the bank of $150,000, and
He offered to prove that the cashier had ofrecovering the money.
fered $5,000 reward in the presence of some of the directors, and
that more than a majority of the directors with full knowledge sanctioned what the cashier had done. Further plaintiff testified that he
arrested the clerk of the bank and recovered nearly all the money.
He now brings error to the court of common pleas for a nonsuit.

It is not necessary to decide whether the cashier
ex officio had authority to offer the reward in question for the detecIf he had no authority, the
tion of the thieves that robbed the bank.
bank is liable for the reward if the offer was acquiesced in and ratiThe law is well settled, that a principal who
fied by the directors.
neglects promptly to disavow an act of his agent, by which the latter
has transcended his authority, makes the act his own (Bredin v. Dubarry, 14 Serg. & R. 30) ; and the maxim which makes ratification
equivalent to a precedent authority is as much predicable of ratification by a corporation as it is of ratification by any other principal,
and it is equally to be presumed from the absence of dissent (Gordon
v. Preston, 1 Watts, 387, 26 Am. Dec. 75).
It was accordingly held in Bank of Pennsylvania v. Reed, 1 Watts
& S. 101, that though the authority of the cashier does not extend
so far as to justify him in altering the nature of the debt due the
bank, or in changing the relation of the bank from that of a creditor
to that of an agent of its debtor, yet a subsequent acquiescence of the
bank in such an exercise of power would be conclusive upon it. In
delivering the opinion of the court, Rogers, J., said: "It is a very
clear and salutary rule in relation to agencies, that when the principal, with the knowledge of all the facts, adopts or acquiesces in the
acts done under an assumed agency, he cannot be heard afterwards
to impeach them, under the pretence that they were done without au'Omnis ratihabitio mandato
thority, or even contrary to instructions.
When the principal has been informed of what has
sequiparatur.'
been done, he must dissent and give notice of it in a reasonable time ;
If
and if he does not, his assent and ratification will be presumed."
then the directors of the bank were informed that the cashier had
offered the reward, it was their duty promptly to disavow the act,
they did not intend that the bank should be bound by it. If they
their assent and
had notice of the offer and did not dissent from
Nor was
ratification
must be presumed.
necessary, in order to
bind the bank by their acquiescence, that notice should have been
board.
given to the directors, when sitting in their official capacity as
a

it

it,

if

>» Tart of the opinion
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If

the case should have been permitted to go to the jury. We think that
the evidence was sufficient, and that it should not have been withheld
from them.
It tended directly to show that the cashier offered the reward at
the instance of one of the directors, and upon his suggestion that "the
directors would bear him out in it," and that the offer was made in
the presence of three of the directors ; and that the plaintiff "separately met all the directors and talked the matter over with them,"
so, can there be any
with the exception of William Davis, Jr.
doubt that the evidence showing the directors' knowledge of the offer
In a town like Meadville it could
was sufficient to go to the jury?
hardly have happened that the bank should have been robbed of so
large an amount and that a reward should have been offered by the
cashier for the detection of the thief, and telegraphed to the police
headquarters at Cleveland, Erie and Pittsburg, without the fact being
And if so, the directors must
known to almost the entire community.
have been informed of it. But whether so or not, the evidence touch* * *
ing the question was amply sufficient to go to the jury.
40
Judgment reversed, and a procedendo awarded.

If

.">

♦o See. to the same effect, Moody & Meckelburg
Co. v. Trustees of M. E.
Church, 99 Wis. 49, 74 N. W. 572 (1896), citing Mechem on Agency, SS L58, 167:
also Oregon Ry. Co. v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. (C. C.) 28 Fed. 505 (1886), and
cases there cited.
Ratification by Corporations. — That a municipal corporation can ratify
action of its agents, which the corporation could in the first
an unauthorized
P.orou^h, L95 Pa.
was held in Hell v. Waynesboro
instance have authorized,
But this is only possible when the party ratifying
299, 15 All. 936 (1966).
A hoard of supervisors, with
possessed the power to perform the act ratified.
no power to vote or issue bonds without a vote of the county, cannot therewithout a vote of the county, because they could
fore ratify a subscription
in the first instance.
Marsh v. Fulton County. ]0
not make a subscription
Wall. 676, 1!) L. Ed. 1646 (1876).
as an individual, may ratify a
And the slate, upon the same principles
state of Wisconsin v. Tmcontract, either by formal act of the Legislature,
Inus, 26 Minn. 1. 19 N. W. 259, 37 Am. Rep. 395 (1879); or by acquiescence
conby the Legislature alter full knowledge of the terms of the unauthorized
tract, ami enjoyment of the benefits of it. Jewell Nursery Co. v. state.
s.
The ratification, to be effective, must be made
l>. 623, 59 N. W. L625 (1894).
by the same agency of the state which would have bad original power to do
the act
state of Ohio v. Ex'r of Buttles,
Ohio St. 369 (1854).
3
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they were personally cognisant of the offer made by the cashier,
it was their duty to call a meeting of the board and disavow the act,
if they were unwilling that the bank should be bound by it. It would
be unjust to permit the plaintiff to spend his time and money for the
detection of the thief, on the faith of the promised reward, and then
when he had succeeded in
to repudiate the offer, as unauthorized,
apprehending the thief and restoring to the bank the stolen securities
The question of the bank's liability for the
found on his person.
If the evidence.
reward turns on the fact of notice and acquiescence.
tending to show that the directors had notice of the offer and that
they acquiesced in it, was sufficient to establish the fact, if believed,

100

TRUDO

v.

1

ANDERSON.

(Supreme Court of Michigan, 1S62.

10

Mich.

357, 81 Am. Dec. 795.)

Trudo left his horse with one McAlister to be sold. While McAlister was absent, his employe, Miller, exchanged it for another horse.
McAlister suspected that this other horse was stolen, which was the
Anfact, but nevertheless sold him conditionally to one Gleason.
derson loaned $30 to the party who had traded for plaintiff's horse,
Plaintiff now brings replevin. Judgment
taking the horse as security.
for the defendant.
Christiancy, J. 41 [After ruling on a matter of jurisdiction :]
* * * The Court found as a fact that the plaintiff, in July, I860,
was the owner of the horse in question; and to warrant the judgment in favor of the defendant, it must appear, first, that the property, or the plaintiff's right of possession, had been divested, or second,
we must be satisfied that the Court below was right in holding that
a demand of the property was necessary before the institution of the
suit. To authorize the judgment on the first ground the Court must
have found, as a fact, the ratification by the plaintiff of the exchange
made by the servant of his agent, and of the subsequent conditional
for the simple
sale by McAlister of the horse received in exchange;
authority of McAlister to sell the horse for the plaintiff would not
have authorized the exchange if made by McAlister himself, much less
when made by his servant ; and the conditional sale of the horse received in exchange could in no way bind the plaintiff, unless ratified
and adopted by him.
But while the finding sets forth the particular
facts and circumstances in evidence with more particularity than necessary, and is therefore thus far more in the nature of evidence than
of a finding of facts, it fails entirely to find directly the fact of ratification, or any fact or state of facts which would, in law, constitute
such ratification.
Certain facts are set forth in reference to a conditional sale made by McAlister of the horse received by his servant
in exchange for the plaintiff's horse; but these facts, though probably
with others considered by the Judge as circumstances tending to the
proof of ratification, cannot be treated as a finding of that fact by
the Court. If admissible and sufficient to authorize the inference of
ratification,
they were certainly no more than mere evidence, and
A finding of facts should set
it was for him to draw the inference.
forth the facts found, not merely the evidence tending to prove them.
Upon a special verdict the Court can draw no mere inference of fact
which the jury have failed to draw from the evidence. But we see
nothing in this evidence which, without other facts not found, could
even tend to the proof of ratification; as the plaintiff himself does
not appear to have had any connection with the conditional sale, nor
either before or after the transaction.
even to have been informed of
it,
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And an agent cannot ratify an act done by himself or his servant beyond the scope of the agency, so as to bind the principal : otherwise
an agent might enlarge his own powers to any extent without his
principal's consent.
Judgment reversed.

*

*

*

42

(B) Knowledge of Facts

VALLEY BANK OF PHCENIX
(Supreme

Court of Arizona,

1905.

9

Ariz.

v.

BROWN.

311,

83 Pac.

362.)

In December, 1902, the bank, by its president
the defendant bank.
and manager, drew a check for $1,000 against plaintiff's deposit, and
loaned that sum to one L. D. McClure, taking a promissory note payable to plaintiff, due in one year, and bearing interest at the rate of
McClure was a retail druggist, carrying on
10 per cent, per annum.
As collateral security for the loan,
Phoenix.
of
in
the
city
business
he pledged a warehouse receipt for whisky in bond in Kentucky, and
agreed to set apart a portion of his stock of goods, to be held by one
The warehouse receipt was
F. H. Lyman, his attorney, as receiptor.

The goods to be set aside inventoried $1,042.07. A
Mr. Lyman relarge part of them were of a perishable character.
ceipted for the goods, and saw some of the goods segregated from

of

small" value.

the stock, but was not requested by the bank to check them over, nor
did he do so, nor was he requested to exercise more than a nominal
control over them; the actual custody and control remaining in McThere was a verbal agreement between McClure and the bankClure.
to the effect that, should McClure desire to use any of the goods mentioned in the inventory, he could pay the bank the schedule price and
take them.
About one month after the loan was made, plaintiff was called to
the bank, and told by the president that he had loaned $1,000 of her

This was the first knowlmoney to McClure on "gilt-edged" security.
She was not told the nature of the
edge she had of the transaction.
security, nor the manner in which it was held. Thereafter McClure
That an
«2 See, also, Rullard v. De Groff, 59 Neb. 783, 82 N. W. 4 (1900).
acts of another agent, if he could originally
agenl may ratify the unauthorized
have authorized the Bubagent to do them, is held in U. S. Exp. Co. v. RawX. E. ::::7 (1886); state of Ohio v. Ex'r of Buttles.
Bon, 106 iii-l. 215,
Bui if such original authority is lucking, then the flrsl
Ohio St. 309 (1854).
ratification of the acts <>fanother agent,
agent cannot bind his principal by
Green, 75 Mich. 1!)7. 42 N. W. 808 (1889).
[ronwood Store Co. v. Harrison
Ami certainly an agent has no power to ratify his own unauthorized acts.
I'.ritt v. Gordon, 132 [owa, 431, L08 N. W. 319 (190G).
«a part of the opinion is omitted.
&

a

::

<",
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Appeal from a judgment of the District Court in favor of the plaintiff and appellee.
Campbell, J. 43 Plaintiff below, appellee here, was a depositor of

the relation

(Pari:

1

paid the interest monthly to plaintiff, who receipted to him for the
same.
During the month of March, 1903, the cashier of the bank
suggested to plaintiff that she had better look over the securities connected with her loan, and handed the papers relating to them to her.
These papers, with the exception of the receipt given by Lyman, are
not in evidence. She did not examine the papers, but returned them at
once to the cashier, who assured her that the securities were perfectly
Some time theregood. All of the papers remained with the bank.
after, plaintiff attempted to negotiate a purchase of real estate, and told
the broker of the McClure note. The broker, in response to her suggestion, and with a view to accepting the note if satisfactory in part
payment, examined the note and securities, and declined to accept it ;
Shortly before
merely telling her that the note was not satisfactory.
the note became due, McClure failed in business.
Investigation disclosed that of the goods supposedly set aside as security for plaintiff but a small portion remained. During this investigation plaintiff
learned for the first time the precise nature of the goods pledged, and
the conditions under which they were held.
Shortly after learning
the facts, she notified the bank that she repudiated the act of the bank
in making the loan, tendered the interest she had received, offered
to indorse the note to the bank without recourse, and demanded payment of the $1,000. The bank refused payment, and this action was
brought.

9

9

is

1

is

is,

did the plaintiff
The principal question requiring our attention
ratify the auction of the bank in making the loan under such circumThe principles of law involved
stances as to be binding upon her?
better settled, both upon principle and auare clear. "No doctrine
thority, than this, that the ratification of an act of an agent previously
unauthorized, must, in order to bind the principal, be with full knowl44
If the material facts be either supedge of all the material facts.
unknown,
treated as invalid, because
the ratification
pressed or
Pet. 607,
founded in mistake or fraud." Owings v. Hull,
L. Ed.
246.

a

it,

a

I

a

is

is

is

a

Speaking through Chief Justice Bigelow in the case of Combs v.
Scott et al., 12 Allen, 493, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts say:
"Ratification of
past and completed transaction, into which an agent
purely voluntary act on the part
has entered without authority,
No legal obligation rests upon him to sanction or
of the principal.
No duty requires him to make inquiries concerning it.
adopt it.
no legal obligation or duty to do an act, there can be
Where there
well
no negligence in an omission to perform it. The true doctrine
make a contract in the name of
learned text-writer: 'If
stated by
person who has not given me an authority, he will be under no obliof it.'
nor will he be bound to the performance
gation to ratify
also,
on
See,
44.
171,
note
Paley
on
Agency,
Agency,
Livermore

1
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44 See especially the opinion of Brewer,
2y Kan. 311, 44 Am. Rep. 646 (1S83).
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'o.' Whoever, therefore, seeks to procure and rely on a ratification
is bound to show that it was made under such circumstances as in law
to be binding on the principal, especially to see to it that all material
facts were made known to him. The burden oi making inquiries and
of ascertaining the truth is not cast on him who is under no legal obligation to assume a responsibility, but rests on the party who is enThis is not
deavoring to obtain a benefit or advantage for himself.

1

;

;

§

or mistaken maperson sought to be charged has misapprehended
terial facts, although he may have wholly omitted to make inquiries
of other persons concerning them, and his ignorance and misapprehension might have been enlightened and corrected by the use of diligence on his part to ascertain them." See, also, Story on Agency,
Wheeler v. Northwestern Sleigh Co. (C. C.) 39 Fed. 347
243

*

*

*

is

it

a

a

is

it

a

a

&

Am.
Eng. Enc. Law, 1190.
fact that the plaintiff was not informed
The trial court found as
careful conas to the character or value of the securities, and, after
was not
to
that
we
are
not
evidence,
say
prepared
sideration of the
circummaterial
such
knowledge
of
A
lack
justified in so finding.
the
unless
not
ignobinding,
without
ratification
stance, and
inThe
carelessness.
mere
not
and
willfulness
from
resulted
rance
bank,
the
held
by
the
collateral
concerning
other
or
papers
ventory
with the exception of Mr. Lyman's receipt, are not in evidence, and
we cannot say how much information plaintiff would have acquired
We think the evidence shows the plaintiff
had she examined them.
45
to have been careless, but not willfully ignorant.
Judgment affirmed.
4B But if the principal takes advantage of the unauthorized act, ho cannot
willfully ami purposely shut his eyes to means of information within his pos-

8,

it

8,

session and control, and seek to retain the benefits and at the same time
112 N. W. 894 (1907);
Johnson v. Ogren, 102 Minn.
repudiate the act.
Forrester, 52 N.
Jones v. Atkinson, 68 Ala. 107 (1880), citing .Median v.
if. however, he accepts money lawfully due him, with no knowlV. -~~ (1873).
act by the agent, he does
is the proceeds of an unauthorized
edge that
Smith v. Tracy. 36 N. Y. 79
QOt by retaining the money ratify such act.
NO N. W. Col (1JID1); Thaehor
(1867); Sliull v. New Hirdsall Co., If, S. 1).
Pray 113 Mass. 291, is Am. Rep. 180(1873); Lime Rock Bank v. Plimpton,
money
17 Pick. (Mass.) i.v.i. 28 Am. Dec. 286 (1835), supra. 803, holding thai
Wheeler
having no earmarks does not stand on the same grounds as chat tels
Sleigh Co., 39 Fed. 347 (1889); Hamlin v. Sears, 82 N. Y.
v. Northwestern
;

v
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a

a

a
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The needful information or knowledge
only just, but it is practicable.
is always within the reach of him who is either party or privy to a
transaction which he seeks to have ratified, rather than of him who
stranger.
and to the details of which he may be
did not authorize
or
be
willfully
can
ignorant,
mean
to
We do not
say that
person
own
his
poswithin
information
his
means
shut
to
of
purposely
eyes
ratifisession and control, and thereby escape the consequences of
acts into which he has deliberately entered;
cation of unauthorized
that ratification of an antecedent act of an agent
but our opinion
which was unauthorized cannot be held valid and binding where the
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MOYLE

v.

1

CONGREGATIONAL SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE
CITY.

(Supreme

Court of Utah,

1897.

16

Utah,

69, 50 Pac.

S06.)

it,

it,

it

it,

it,

Action by Moyle, as assignee of the Burton-Gardner Company,
against the defendant for $11,012.85, alleged to be due for work and
materials in building the defendant's church building.
The original
contract was with Barber & Co.
Owing to dissatisfaction, this was
assigned by the consent of the building committee to the Burton-Gardner Company.
It was claimed by the latter that the written assignment was made merely to get rid of Barber & Co., and that the chairman of the building committee, one Hollister, now deceased, made
an oral agreement with the Burton-Gardner Company to complete the
Plaintiff claimed that
church and be paid whatever it was worth.
Hollister had ostensible authority to make the oral contract, and in
any case the society, by accepting and keeping the building, had ratified the contract and was bound to pay in accordance with it. Judgment for plaintiff for $6,801.84 and interest.
Minor, J. [After stating the facts and holding there was no im* * *
plied authority in Hollister to make the oral contract:]
The trustees authorized the building committee to make a contract
with Barber & Co. to build the church on the terms stated in the conNeither the trustees nor the buildtract, and with no other persons.
ing committee ever directed any contract to be made with Burton or
the Burton-Gardner Company to build the church, or to complete
building
except that which grew out of the written assignment.
Nor has either body, or any member of
ever knowingly ratified any
contract with the Burton-Gardner Company to build the church.
Nor
does
appear that either of the bodies representing the church, and
or any member of
having authority to speak for
except Hollister, had any notice or knowledge of any verbal contract between
Hollister and the plaintiff company to complete the church, in violation
of the written agreement made and agreed to by all the parties. When
completed, the church paid the full contract price, together with extras, as provided for and agreed upon under the contract.
These payments were mostly made to Burton, until after Hollister's death, and
then, by the direction of Burton, they were paid to the Burton-Gardner
Company, and many of the checks passed through Mr. Burton's hands.
act of
It
well established that the ratification of an unauthorized
be
effectual
and
the
in
order
to
on
must
binding
principal,
any agent,
and ignohave been made with full knowledge of all material facts
of any of the essential circumrance, mistake, or misrepresentation
stances relating to the transaction alleged to have been ratified will
;

is

1

J.

390, 90 Pac. 262 (1907)
Marsh
128, 75 L. T. Rep. N. S. 558, 45

Wash.
Ch.

;

Heinzerling v. Agen, 46
327 (1880)
Ch. 213, 66 L.
v. Joseph [1897]
€V. R. 209.
;
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I.IOyle

cts

v. Congregational society

,

:

Action by Lloyle as assignee of Burton Co f ,
gainst def. to recover some 11000. oo alleged to
for work and material in building the def's
9 due
building.
Contract originally was with
hureh
arber. Owing to dissatisfaction, the contract wps
ssigned in writing to Gprdiner Co. Latter claims
k*.t the written assignment w°s made to get rid of
^rber, and that the chairman of the building
ommitte, now deceased, m^de an oral agreement witt
to complete the church and be paid
»rdner Co.
h°tever it w«s worth. Ptf. claims that def. t by
h°d r c tifiec
cce^ting the building *nd keeping
n
r
ct m^de by the dece sed chairm°n.
he contr
art :
There wsa no implied ruthority to make this
p
There wrs no r r tific^tion "S no one
contract.
r
of
thir
1 contr- ct except the m^n who m^de
orlew
There was no knowledge
id he w p unauthorized.
c
the rn«t«riel f^ctsr def. p°id the full
sre of
>ntr- ct ^rice ur>on the completion of the building
■8. uneyoidPbl; benefitted by ptf's. work and
■teri r ls, but it does not follow that they are

it,
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therefor. The work, etc., tannet be segregJble
te^
from the rem r inder and returned to ptf.
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absolve the principal from all liability, by reason of the supposed adoption or assent to the previously unauthorized acts of the agent. Baldwin v. Burrows, 47 N. Y. 199; Bennecke v. Insurance Co., 105 U.
S 355, 26 L Ed. 990; Dupont v. Wertheman, 10 Cal. 354.
And, in adopting and ratifying what the principal had authorized
the agent to do. he was not adopting and ratifying that which was
Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y. 79. We are satisfied that the
unauthorized.
church did not, through its directors or building committee, ratify
It is true, the church retains the structhe alleged acts of Hollister.
ture built upon its real estate ; but we know of no way by which the
alleged work performed upon the church building can be segregated
It does not follow that beand returned to the plaintiff.
from
its completion, thereby unafter
the
building
used
church
cause the
materials furnished, the
and
work
the
benefit
of
the
having
avoidably
Mills v. Berla
church would therefore be liable for the value thereof.
;

S.

W. 910 Baldwin v. Burrows, 47 N". Y. 199.
(Tex. Civ. App.) 23
are of the opinion that the plaintiff offered no valid testimony to
show that Mr. Hollister had authority to bind the defendant by the
Nor was there any ratification of his alleged
alleged parol contract.
acts in that respect by the church, building committee, or trustees of
The alleged verbal contract varies and contradicts
the church, shown.
the written contract and assignment by which the parties were bound,
and that testimony concerning the verbal contract with Hollister was

THOMPSON
(Supreme

v.

LABORINGMAN'S MERCANTILE

Court of Appeals
90S,

of West Virginia, 1906.
L. R. A. [N. S.] 311.)

60

&

*

and remanded.

W. Va.

MFG. CO.
42,

53

S. E.

6

Reversed

*

*

improperly received in evidence, and should have been stricken out on
46
defendant's motion at the close of plaintiff's case.

S.

it

»« Other parts of this opinion are found
17 Pax! of Hi" opinion is omitted.

post, pp. 842, S41.

is

*

*

*

a

is

J.

&

a

note for $382.39, signed "Laboringman's
Action by Thompson on
M. Co., P. M. Murphy, Pres." Judgment for plaintiff. Reversed and judgment for defendant.
It not
Poffenbarghr, 47 [After stating the facts:]
as
or
power
presiinherent
authority
had
any
pretended that Murphy
That
therefor.
the
note
company's
and
execute
borrow
dent to
money,
corporation, in
not possessed by the president of
such authority
the absence of an express delegation thereof, has been determined by
Bank v. Kimberlands, 16 W. Va. 579; Third National
this court.
E. 544. Nor
Bank v. Laboringman's, etc., Co., 56 W. Va. 446, 49
pretended that he had any antecedent express authority from the
board of directors to so bind the corporation.

M.

is
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The judgment rests upon two propositions, the first of which is
that there is evidence which would justify a finding that the defendant, with full knowledge, allowed Murphy to so act and deal, in respect to its business, as to constitute a representation to the public
of authority in him to borrow money on its account. The facts relied upon to sustain this proposition are of the same character as those
set up in Third National Bank v. Laboringman's,
etc., Co., and, in
that case, they were deemed and held wholly insufficient for that purpose. They were almost contemporaneous in date with the transaction with Thompson.
It does not appear that he had any knowledge
of but one such transaction, namely, the first one had with George
B. Thompson.
Nothing in the testimony indicates that the directors
of the corporation had any knowledge of this transaction subsequently
had with George B. Thompson, or the one had with W. W. Golightly.
In the absence of any knowledge of these facts on the part of the
board of directors, there is no foundation for saying the corporation
held Murphy out to the public as an agent authorized to borrow money
for use in its business. A verdict of a jury, predicated upon such
testimony, could not be sustained, and therefore the evidence is clearly
insufficient upon a demurrer thereto.
The other view is that of ratification of the unauthorized act of the
There is no claim of an express ratification.
The conpresident.
tention is that it is a ratification by acquiescence and retention of
benefits. As noted in the statement of the evidence, it does not appear
that the account which was set off against the note at the time of its
Mr. Thompson's
execution was due from the defendant company.
evidence goes no further than to say it was so represented to him by
Murphy, and he acted upon that information. Whether the company
received the benefit of the check given for the balance of the note
does not in any way appear from the evidence.
The alleged reception of benefits stands wholly upon the representations made to Mr.
The check is not produced, so as to show
Thompson by Murphy.
whether it was payable to Murphy individually or to the defendant,
nor if payable to the defendant, whether it was deposited to its credit
or cashed by Murphy and the money used by him. Starting with the
admitted fact that the act of Murphy in borrowing this money was
outside of, and beyond, his authority, it would be contrary to legal
principles to say that his representations or acts, relating thereto, are
binding upon the company. What he said as well as what he did was
beyond the scope of his authority, and it is well settled that, only such
acts and declarations of an agent are binding upon his principal as
Had said sum
were done and made within the scope of his authority.
defendant,
it
be
that
it could have
the
a
due
been
debt
may
of $200
This we do not decide. But it
been rightfully paid to its president.
was borrowed money. The acquisition of it was an unauthorized act,
and the custody of it was, therefore, necessarily not on behalf of the
Hence, the agent's possession of it raises no presumption,
principal.

cts

Thompson
:

v. I>boringman'

Action on

s I*Iero.

Co.

note signed by Def. Co. by
is no evidence to show that
authority to borrow money and

a

ts president.
he

president

There

h^d

nd

retention of the benefits,

therefor, either inherent
express
antecedent
the board of directors
fuom
r
corporation.
bind
the
so
def.
e
Ptf. maintains
hat ratification of the president's authorized
ct may be implied from the def f s. acquiescence
xecute the Co's. note
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and lays no foundation for an inference, that the principal received
* * *
the benefit of it.
not,
This may
however, be conclusive of the case.
A principal may
ratify the unauthorized act of his agent without having received the
benefit thereof.
It may be that the defendant did receive the money
notwithstanding the lack of evidence here to show that fact. The
authorities do not seem to hold the reception of benefits to be an essential element of ratification.
Nor is any reason perceived why it
should be. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the other evidence
relied upon to show ratification.
This consists of the silence of the
defendant from March or April, 1901, when, it is claimed, the note
was brought to the attention of the general manager and one or more
of the directory, until/the 5th of September, 1901, a period of probably
five or six months.
an agefocy actually exists, the mere ac["Where
quiescence of the principal may well \i\e rise to the presumption of
an intentional ratification of the act." iStory on Agency, § 256.
The
authorities almost uniformly say that- acquiescence after knowledge
of an unauthorized act is evidence of ratification, and such acquiescence need not be for any considerable length of time.
What length
of time will depend upon the nature of the transaction and the situation of the parties affected or interested.
"Silence of the alleged
principal, when fully advised of what has been done in his behalf bv
one who attempts to act as his agent without authority, may be sufficient from which to infer a ratification of the unauthorized
act."
Lynch v. Smyth, 25 Colo. 103, 54/Pac. 634; King v. Rea, 13 Colo. 69,
21 Pac. 1084; Union M, Co. v/Bank, 2 Colo. 248;
Bank v. Fricke,
75 Mo. 178, 42 Am. Rep. 397. rWhere the relation of principal and
agent exists, but in the particular transaction the agent has exceeded
bis authority, an intention to ratify wjll be presumed from the silence
of the principal beyond a reasonable/time after having knowledge of
the transaction, if he has an opportunity to express his dissent."
Mc'
Geoch v. Hooker, 11 111. App. 649.
"It is a salutary rule, in relation
to agencies, that when the principal is informed ofVvhat has been done,
he must dissent, and give notice in a reasonable time, or otherwise, his
assent to what has been done shall be presumed." ,Cairnes v. Bleecker,
12 Johns. (N. Y.) 300.
To the same effect, see Bredin v. Dubarry,
14 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 30;
Fuel Co. v. Lee, 102 Wis. 426, 78 N. W.
584; McLaren v. Bank, 76 Wis. 259, 45 N. W. 223; Hoosac M. &
M. Co. v. Donat, 10 Colo. 529, 16 Pac. 157; Breed v. Bank, 4 Colo.
481; Smith v. Fletcher, 75 Minn. 189, 77 N. W. 800; Sheldon, etc.,
Co. v. Eickemeyer, etc., Co., 90 N. Y. 607; Alexander v. Cauldwell,
83 N. Y. 480;
Phillips v. Lumber Co., 130 Cal. 431, 62 Pac. 749;
Bank v. Railway Co., 117 Cal. 332, 49 Pac. 197; 4 Thomp. Corp.
§§ 5286, 52*x.
Occasionally a case is found which seems to conflict with the proposition just stated. Thus, in Railway Co. v. Jay, 65 Ala. 113, the court
-<< ins to have inclined to the view that silence and
acquiescence, after
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knowledge received, is not evidence of ratification, and that no duty
rests upon the principal to disavow the unauthorized act of his agent,
unless the party dealing with the agent would be misled to his injury
by failure to repudiate the act properly or the act is in reference to
a matter as to which, by the usage of trade, a prompt reply is deFor this proposition, Smith v. Sheeley,
manded when notice is given.
L,.
12 Wall. 358, 20
Ed. 430, and 2 Greenl. Ev. § 66, are cited. 2
the
Greenleaf on Evidence, § 67, seems to assert two propositions,
first of which is that mere silence after notice of an unauthorized act,
with full knowledge of the circumstances, is evidence of ratification,
but not conclusive ; and the second, that if the silence of the principal
is contrary to his duty, or has a tendency to mislead the other party to
As an instance of this, the rule govthe transaction, it is conclusive.
erning transactions among merchants, under which an act is deemed
to be assented to, after the lapse of a reasonable time when notice
This is a species of estoppel,
thereof has been given is mentioned.
rather than an instance of ratification by acquiescence, and it seems to
This disbe the principle which rules the case of Smith v. Sheeley.

See Smith v. Fletcher, 75 Minn.
tinction is marked in other cases.
25 Cob. 103, 54 Pac. 634; Breed
800;
v.
Smyth,
Lynch
N.
W.
189, 77
481.
Bank,
4
Colo.
v.
That acquiescence, with full knowledge of the material facts attending an unauthorized act is evidence from which a ratification may be
inferred, when no element of estoppel is involved, is made plain by
Where the president of a corporation, witha number of decisions.
out authority of the board of directors, sold all of its personal property, and the purchase money was garnished in the hands of the venand no steps were taken by the
dee by a creditor of the corporation,
debtor corporation either to affirm or repudiate the act of its president, the silence of the corporation was held to be sufficient evidence
Fuel Co. v. Lee, 102 Wis.
of ratification of the unauthorized sale.
of
a
officers
corporation, without author426, 78 N. W. 584. Where
its
property by mortgage, third parties,
ity, have given liens upon
such as unsecured creditors,

cannot impugn the transaction

on the sole

ground of want of authority in the officers. Moller v. Fiber Co., 187
Pa. 553, 41 Atl. 478; Cooper v. Potts, 185 Pa. 115, 39 Atl. 824; Ragland v. McFall, 137 111. 81, 27 N. E. 75. In these cases the only evidence of ratification is the mere silence and acquiescence of the principal.
These

authorities may justify the position of counsel for the appellee in saying that acquiescence alone is evidence of ratification.
The books assert the proposition over and over and contain numerous
illustrations of it. But there is one element which enters into it that
must not be lost sight of. When the circumstances are such as to
call for the application of the law of estoppel, rather than the mere
law of ratification, it may be that the principal can bind himself withThe situation may be
out full knowledge of all the material facts.
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such as to make it his duty to know.
The means of knowledge may
or within easy reach, and his relation to the third party
such as to estop him from saying he is without knowledge.
But, in
the absence of such circumstances, the authorities are unanimous in
holding that there can be no ratification by acquiescence, unless the
principal has full and complete knowledge of all the material facts
attending the unauthorized act. "Any ratification of an unauthorized
act, in order to be made effectual and obligatory upon the alleged principal, must be shown to have been made by him with a full knowledge
of all the material facts connected with the transaction to which it
relates ; and especially must it appear that the existence of the contract and its nature and c/bnsideration were made known to him."
Mechem on Agency, § 129.! "A ratification of the unauthorized acts
of an attorney in fact, without a full knowledge of all the facts connected with those acts, is not binding on the principals.
;No doctrine
is better settled on principle and authority, than this, that the ratification of the act of an agent previously unauthorized must, in order
to bind the principal, be with a full knowledge of all the material
facts.
the material facts be either suppressed or unknown, the ratOwings
ificatio\i is invalid, because founded on mistake or fraud."
v. Hull, -9 Pet. (U. S.) 607, 9 L. Ed. 246.
Want of such knowledge prevents the possibility of ratification by
silence, and it invalidates an express ratification,
as will be clearly
disclosed by an examination of the following decisions : Bosseau v.
O'Brien, 4 Biss. 395, Fed. Cas. No. 1,667; Fuller v. Ellis, 39 Vt.
345, 94 Am. Dec. 327 ; Meyer, Weis & Co. v. Baldwin, 52 Miss. 263 ;
Forrestier v. Bordman, 1 Story, 43, Fed. Cas. No. 4,945; Bank v.
Bank, 13 Bush (Ky.) 526, 26 Am. Rep. 211; Craighead v. Peterson,
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be at hand

/If

72 N. Y. 279, 28 Am. Rep. 150; Reese v. Medlock, 27 Tex. 120, 84
Am. Dec. 611; Bennecke v. Insurance Co., 105 U. S. 355, 26 L,. Ed.
990; Lynch v. Smyth, 25 Colo. 103, 54 Pac. 634; Smith v. Kidd, 68
N. Y. 130, 23 Am. Rep. 157; Bell v. Cunningham, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 69,
7 L. Ed. 606; Ward v. Williams, 26 111. 447, 79 Am. Dec. 385; Navigation Co. v. Dandridge, 8 Gill & J. (Md.) 248, 29 Am. Dec. 543 ;
Combs v. Scott, 12 Allen (Mass.) 495; Bank v. Jones, 18 Tex. 811 ;
White v. Davidson, 8 Md. 169, 63 Am. Dec. 699 ; Bannon v. Warfield,
42 Md. 23; Bohart v. Oberne, 36 Kan. 284, 13 Pac. 388;
Bryant v.
Moore, 26 Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec. 96; McCants v. Bee, 1 McCord, Eq.
(S. C.) 383, 16 Am. Dec. 610; Billings v. Morrow, 7 Cal. 171, 68 Am.

Dec. 235.

From the review of the evidence herein given and conclusions
stated respecting the same, it is plain that full knowledge of the material facts relating to the transaction between Murphy and Thompson is not shown to have been in the possession of the defendant corporation at any time before the institution of this action. Mr. Thompson docs not testify to any statement, on his part, to the general manager or Mr. Getty, as to what the consideration of the note was. Nor

Tin: RELATION

1 10

( 1 'art

1

in the testimony of John F. Thompson or George
Thompson, tending to show that they revealed to any director the
circumstances which constituted the m - >ui m1 for executing the note.
No notice was given of the satisfaction of the Blackwater
Lumber
Company account out o\ the note, or that the residue of it was represented by a check payable to the corporation.
Nothing in the evidence shows that any record in the hank in which the corporation kept
itself, discloses the
its deposit^ or on the honks of the corporation
to the, use of the defendant
receipt of the money, or its appropriation
This failure to bring home to the defendant knowledge of
company.
the material facts, in connection with its silence, makes a fatal defect
n the case, and, therefore,
the court should have sustained the demurrer to the evidence.* 8 * * *
As the demurrer to the evidence should have been sustained, and
no (.nor has been shown in the action of the court in excluding evidence offered, the judgment must be reversed, the demurrer sustained,
is there anything
I'..

KEIXEY
(Supreme Judicial

v.

NEWBURYPORT

Court of Massachusetts,

with its costs in the

&/A. H. R. CO.

1886.

141

Mass. 490, G N. E. 745.)

Action upon certain promissory notes. Upon a verdict for plaintiff,
defendant alleged exceptions.
C. Allf.x, J. The first ground of defense is that by virtue of St.
1871, c. 381, § 6, the defendant was forbidden to build its road until a
certificate had been filed in the office of the secretary of the commonwealth, signed and sworn to by the president, treasurer, clerk, and a
majority of the directors, stating that the whole amount of the capital
stock had been unconditionally subscribed for by responsible parties,
and that 50 per cent, of the par value of each share of the same had
been actually paid into its treasury in cash.
It appeared by the auditor's report that such a certificate was filed in season, but he received
evidence to show, and found as a fact, that 50 per cent, of the par
value of each share had not been paid in, though the whole of the capital stock had been duly subscribed for, and more than 50 per cent, of

-..-.
ing that

UN,,.

*.»

the whole amount of it had been paid in at the time of the making of
the contract for the construction of the road.
Under these circumstances, the defendant contends that it had no power to enter into a

1
1
1
«-

Am. Rep. 145 (1870), holdLadd v. Bildebrant, liT Wis. 135,
principal musl have knowledge, nol only of every material fact

relating to the act or contracl alleged to have been ratified, but also of every
tact requisite to enable him i" repudiate it. or the means of knowledge must
shall be liis fault if lie docs not.
l>e at hand. BO that he may obtain it. or
principal may in- bound where la- bad nol inn knowledge, if all the
Thompson v. Mfg. Co., supra,
t08"; Pope
elements of estoppel art- present.
v. Armsby Co..
Cal. 159, t:: Pac. 589 (1896).

ill

p.

it
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and judgment rendered here for the defendant,
court below, as well as costs in this court.

F»ets

:

Action ur>on certain notes. The defs. set
defenre that they h*d no power to enter into
■ contract
for the construction of its ro»d ; th^t
the c ct w^s ultr^ vires- thP t therefore "11 -Dromisiven to r>*y therefore were void c nd
er ^nd notes
■ "■

o-TD^ble

of ratification,

been used

by them

the notes, etc. The reason alleged for their
l p ck of power w^s th°t they did not h^ve the required °mount of c^-oit^l stock p°id in °t the time th<
contract w«s m-°de, °s re uired "by statute .
Another defense is th°t the notes here
were given to its own directors, who were forced
»s sureties to complete the contract ur>on the default of the original contractors, *=nd that they
rre subject now when held by ptfs. to the s~me
defenses -s formerly
on
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contract for the construction of its road ; that the act was ultra vires ;
that the unanimous action of the stockholders would not cure the taint;
and that all promises to pay for work and materials in building the
road, and all notes given therefor, are void and incapable of ratification, and that it cannot now be held responsible therefor, although for
nearly 10 years it has held, enjoyed, operated, and taken the earnings
of the road so built for it, and paid the interest on the notes. 40 In
reference to this ground of defense, it is sufficient to say that, according to cases heretofore decided, it has been declared to be unavailable.
It was not intended by the legislature to allow corporations to escape
First Nat. Bank of Salem v.
from their just debts in this manner.
476;
Co. v. Whittier, 117 Mass.
Axle
117
Mass.
Augur Steel
Almv.
See, also,
451;' Whitnev v. Wyman, 101 U. S. 392. 25 L. Ed. 1050.

Davis v. Old Colonv R. R., 131 Mass. 260, 41 Am. Rep. 221 ; Monument Xat. Bank v. Globe Works, 101 Mass. 57, 3 Am. Rep. 322 ; Gold
Min. Co. v. National Bank, 96 U. S. 640, 24 L. Ed. 648; National
Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621, 25 L. Ed. 188; Harris v. Runnels,
12 How. 79, 13 L. Ed. 901 ; O'Hare v. Second Nat. Bank, 77 Pa. 96.
The defendant then contends that the notes in suit cannot be enforced because they were given to its own directors in payment for the
construction of the road by them, and are now held by the plaintiff
subject to all defenses which might have been made to a suit upon
them by the payees. Upon this point the only question properly before us is whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant the jury in
The presiding
finding a ratification of the notes by the corporation.
submitted to
void,
and
were
the
notes
originally
assumed
that
judge
Being of the opinion that
the jury the single question of ratification.
there was sufficient evidence to warrant the verdict on the question of
ratification, we have no occasion to consider whether it might not also
have been proper to submit to the jury the question of the original
validity of the notes under proper instructions.
It seems to
The first request for instructions was properly refused.
refer to a supposed theory of the plaintiff that the notes might he ratiwhereas the sole question submitted to the jury
i. e.. by the
whether they had been ratified by the stockholders;
The third request is open to the same objection.
corporation itself.
The second request sought to incorporate into the doctrine of ratification a new element; namely, that, in order to make a valid ratification, the principal musl have not only known all the facts, hut also the
legal effect of the facts, and then, with a knowledge both of the law
and facts, have ratified the contracts by some independent and subfied by the directors,

stantive ad.

It is suffi
This requesl also was properly refusedj
ratification is made with a full knowledge of all tlie material facts.
Indeed, a rule Somewhat less Stringent than this may properly be laid

if

a

-..-. also, Byatl v. Clark, n^ \. v. ■".'":. 23 v. i:. 891 (189TO : wii.br
in. c;,i. c.ic. r,i !•;,<•. his:; iis-.is,; contra: Brown v. Rouse, 104

i:. .•,!,..

<•:,!. t 7-_\ :;s

p ac . 507 11894).

Tin: RELATION

I 1-

down

when

one purposely

shuts his eyes

(Part
to means of

within his own possession and control, and ratifies

1

information

deliberately,
to it which he cares to have.
having all the knowledge in respect
Combs v. Scott, 12 Allen, 493, 4 l>7; Phosphate of Lime Co. v. Green,
I.. R. 7 C. P. 43, 57.
The fourth and fifth requests wore both to the effect that on all the
evidence the jury would not be warranted in finding a ratification.
The circumstances of the case were such as to render the inference of
ratification natural and easy, especially in view of the lapse of time
since the notes were given. There was uncontradicted evidence tending to show that the directors made a contract with one Gowan for
building the road for a certain price in money and stock, and that he
gave to the company a bond, with Kelley and Binney as sureties, for
the faithful performance of his contract.
Gowan failing to perform
his contract, the board of directors called on the sureties, who themwith notice that they would be
selves were directors, to perform
held liable to the company for all damages that might accrue to the
Therefore the sureties proceeded to finish
their default.
company
the road according to the contract, in which originally they had no inThe road, as completed by
terest. The price was fair and reasonable.
them, was
well-built road. The advancements made by them were
in consequence of the notice given to them by the directors, and not
with any fraudulent design to obtain any pecuniary benefit for themselves from said contract.
The settlement was made with them by the
directors under authority of
general vote of the stockholders authorsettlement,
them
to
make
and the notes in suit were given.
izing
any
contract between
corporation and its directors
As general rule,
not absolutely void, but voidable at the election of the corporation.
Such a contract does not necessarily require any independent and substantive act of ratification, but
may become finally established as
valid contract by acquiescence.
The right to avoid
may be waived.
Union Pac. R. R. v. Credit Mobilier, 135 Mass. 376, 377; Twin Lick
Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.
587, 23 L. Ed. 328; Hotel Co. v. Wade,
97 U.
In the
13, 24 L. Ed. 917; Ashhurst's Appeal, 60 Pa. 290.
present case, such ratification or waiver might well be inferred; and,
indeed, we do not see how any other inference could fairly be drawn
from the acts of the company in holding and operating the road for
from
so many years without taking any steps to repudiate the notes
the payment of interest
from the acceptance of the report of the
1878; and from the actreasurer on October
1875, and October
ceptance of St. 1884, c. 149, authorizing the company to issue bonds
to an amount not exceeding $30,000 for the purpose of extinguishing
its floating debt. Exceptions overruled.
a

a

a

a

a

2,

6,

;

;

S.

S.

it

a

it

is
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1
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*.

instrument.

It is

etmnstsnt for fin p gt., who h°s due
ro co.itr- ct on behalf of prin., so to
n
e^ceite n instrument, c s to make himaelx person^ll;
res-noiisible for his principal. Court looks to
form of instrument itself to ascertain whether it
is contract of prin. or r-gt f -person c lly. Here -^ddit
ion of word -°gent or other designation to signature
would not ^lone m^ke contr n ct th°t of orineLpal.
P~rticul°r form of execution is not matsrilf,
instrument is subst ■n tidily done in n^me of princip
Defs. ^re duly described in body »s contracting
Principal's «=nme must be signed to instrump^rty.
ents under se^-1, but th°t is not c c se here.
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Minn.

motion

333,

1-1-3

et al.
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of defendants
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for

a new

trial.

Mitchell, J. This
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action was brought on the covenants of a lease
last eight months of the term, viz. from Seprent
for
the
to recover
The evidence discloses the following
1, 1891.
1890,
to
May
tember 1,
facts: Nora Grove No. 23, U. A. O. D., of which the defendants were
members, was an unincorporated association or society of individuals,
formed for social and benevolent purposes, and not for gain or pecunAmong other officers, they had three trustees, of whom
iary profit.
The scope and extent of
defendants Robinson & Larson were two.
take charge of the propwas
to
the powers and duties of these trustees
& Larson, without auRobinson
In May, 1886,
erty of the association.

thority, so far as appears, from their associates, procured from plaintiff the lease referred to, of the upper story of a certain building, for
the term of five years, at an annual rent of $300, payable $25 monthly
in advance. The lease runs to them as trustees of the association, and
there is and can be no question but that in taking the lease these trusIn July, 1886,
tees assumed to act for and in behalf of the society.
the members of the association, including the defendants, entered into
possession of the premises, and continued to hold their meetings there
until some time in the fall of 1890, when the society disbanded. While
therefor, $25 per
the society occupied the premises, they paid rent
never
reported to or
was
lease
The
month, up to September 1, 1890.
also be asit
may
and
its
of
meetings,
acted on by the society at any
terms of
what
the
knew
ever
nor
Wilson
sumed that neither Ilervin
there
know
that
not
even
Hervin,
did
that
perhaps,
and
the lease were,
that
show
to
evidence
there
is
abundant
But
lease.
written
was any
both of them knew that some agreement had been made in behalf of
the association, with plaintiff, for the use of the premises, and that
without inquiring, or in any way attempting to inform themselves, as
to what the terms of that agreement were, they, in common with their
associates, went into possession and continued to use and occupy the
premises for the purposes of their society until they disbanded.
It seems to us that neither of the counsel has fully grasped the legal
principles applicable to this stair of facts. ( »f course, a benevolent or
in any prop4 club or association of this kind is not a partnership,
all, for the
liable,
liable
at
if
are
of
members
nsc
that term. The
of their associates, on the ground of principal and agent, and not
Hence, it i- undoubtedly true that only those members
who authorized or subsequently ratified the act of these trust
Bates, Partn. § 75; Lindl.
taking this lease would he bound by it.
Partn. § 144; Flemyng v. Hector, 2 Mees. & W.

of partnership.

Uodd.Pb.A

a

in

I I I

k

kki.ation

(Tart

1

Guie, 97 Pa. 493, 39 Am. Rep. 818.
Bui it is duo that
ratified the aci are liable, and in our
ipinion the act of Hervin and Wilson amounted to a ratification.
It is sometimes said that, to constitute a ratification of an unauthorized act of an agent, the principal musl have had knowledge of all the
As to a past and completed transaction, this would be
material facts.
true,
but
there arc many cases where the conduct of the pringenerally
cipal may amount to a ratification, although he may not know all the
facts as to the unauthorized act of die agent in his behalf.
Me may
ratify by voluntarily assuming the risk without inquiry, or he may deliberately ratify upon such knowledge as he possesses, without caring
Lewis v. Read, 13 Mees. & W. 834, Kelley v. Railroad Co.,
for more.
141 Mass. 496, 6 X. I-.. 715.
Where, as in the present case, the defendants Hervin & Wilson hail
notice that an unauthorized contract had been made in their behalf for
the use i^i these premises, it was their duty, before accepting its benefits. t<> ascertain what the terms of that contract were.
By going into
in, and enjoying the use of the premises, without any attempt
to ascertain the terms of the lease under which they entered, they must
be held to have deliberately intended to take the risk of ratifying upon
such knowledge as they had. 60
2. The statute of frauds, which defendants invoke, has no application to the case.
Of course, to bind the plaintiff, the lessor, it was
necessary that the lease should be in writing, and subscribed by him.
But a lessee neither "creates, grants, nor declares" any estate or interest in lands.
By accepting a lease, he is bound by all its covenants
to be by him performed, and this acceptance need not be in writing.
The authority of an agent to procure or accept it for him is not required to be in writing, and, as original authorization may be by parol,
so may ratification.
Order affirmed.
\72

;

Ash

v.
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all the members who subsequently

LEWIS
(Exchequer

of Pleas,

II.

v.

READ.

V. 1845.

L3 .Mees.

& W.

sal.)

Case. The first count was for illegally distraining and selling the
cattle of the plaintiff for rent due to the defendant Read from one
John Lewis, without duly appraising the same; the second count was
in trover: the third was for selling them for less than the best price.
holding that Ignov. Walker, 5 Heisk.
See, also, Walker
425 (1871),
rance "i' tin- facts, whether due i" want of Inquiry by tin- principal and uegled to ascertain the facts, or otherwise, will render the ratification Ineffectual,
and stnU,.< v. Mackay, 64 Hun, 639, 19 X. V. Supp. 918 its'.)!:), in which it
was -Mid that a principal may. if In- chouses, adopt or ratify his agent's acts
without full information, if his intent to do so he clearly manifest.
If he
ueii confidence in his agent's judgment
and fidelity that he is willing
i>. abide any reasonable lialality winch the agent has honestly
and in good
faith assumed to impose on him. lie may take the risk of the agent's act
tvithout Inquiry, and adopt the whole act.

Cll. 4)
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a

a

it

J.,

Plea, not guilty, by statute. At the trial, before Coleridge.
at the
last assizes for Montgomeryshire,
appeared that the plaintiff's brother, John Lewis, was tenant from year to -ear to the defendant Mr.
mill and tarm called Aberborthen, and
Crewe Read, of
mountain
sheep-walk called Penybryn; and that, being in arrear with his rent,
the other defendants, by the verbal direction of
Mr. Owens, who

Mr. Read's general agent for the management of his estatej on
May. 1844. distrained about forty sheep belonging to the
plaintiff to satisfy the rent, which were sold, under Mr. Owen's directions, for £14. 15s. Mr. Owens had expressly directed the defendants
not to take any thing but what they should find on Aberborthen or on
was

11th

a

it

if

(

(

by

a

It

:

Penybryn.
The main questions in the cause were, first, whether the sheep
(which were clearly shown to be the property of the plaintiff, and not
of John Lewis) were or were not distrained upon the sheep-walk of
Penybryn, or beyond its boundary; and, secondly, whether, at the
time of the distress, John Lewis's tenancy in, or possession of the
farm and sheep-walk continued
on both which points there was conflicting evidence.
appeared that the defendants had in the first instance seized upon
dozen sheep, which they found on the Penybryn
mountain, and that, while they were driving them down, and somewhere very near the boundary of the Penybryn sheep-walk, these were
joined
the other sheep, which had been straying upon an adjoining sheep-walk belonging to another farm.
Mr. >wens received the
proceeds of the sale of the sheep, and accounted for the money to Mr.
Read; but there was no direct evidence that either Mr. hvens or Mr.
Read was informed where the sheep were taken, or had any distinct
knowledge that the distress was not made on the Penybryn sheepThe learned Judge, in summing up, told the jury, that,
walk.
the
sheep were distrained off the Penybryn sheep-walk, although
might
near the boundary as to amount t"
mere irregularity in the
bailiffs; or if. at the time of the distress, the tenancy of John Lewis
Penybryn had determined, and he did not continue
possession of
it, the defendants were all liable on the count
trover.
The jury
found, that the first lot of sheep were taken on Penybryn, but that
there was no evidence to satisfy them where the others were taken:
and that, at the time of the distress, John Lewis had ceased to he the
tenant, and did not continue
possession of Penybryn; and therein

in

in

in

a

upon, under the direction of the learned Judge,
verdict was entered
for the plaintiff against all the defendants on the count in trover, dam/.'14.

15s.

in

by

in

a

a

in

Michaelmas Term last, obtained
rule nisi for
new
Welsby,
trial, on the ground of misdirection; contending, that, without eviof the ratification
the defendant Lead of the irregularity
the execution of the distress, with knowledge of such irregularity, he
trover; that there was no evidence of such ratiCould not he liable
■
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Tin:

RBI \ TION

(Part

1

if tlicrc were, thai the question had not been left to the
jury.
\Y. Yardley and E. Beavan (with whom were Jcrvis and Wilkin)
now showed cause: First, the scle of the sheep, the proceeds of which
were received by the defendant Read, was a conversion for which he
was clearly liable on the count m trover.
[1'arki',, B. But then you
must slunv a joint conversion, and there was no evidence that the
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fication, or,

other defendants look part in the sale.J
Secondly, the whole transaction, from the original seizure down to the sale of the sheep, may be
regarded as one continued conversion, to different parts of which all
the defendants were parties; the bailiffs by the actual seizure, and the
defendant Read by directing, through his agent, the sale of the sheep,
But, even supposing that the origand receiving the proceeds of it.
inal seizure is to be regarded as the conversion complained of, there
was sufficient evidence of a ratification by the defendant Read of the
It appeared
illegal act of the other defendants in making the seizure.
that Mr. Owens was his general agent for the management of his estate ; and the receipt by him, through such agent, of the proceeds of
the illegal distress, without inquiring into the circumstances, was sufficient evidence against him that he adopted the acts of the bailiffs
done on his behalf.
Welsby (with whom was Townsend), in support of the rule: The
conversion complained of at the trial clearly was the original seizure
of the sheep, and not the sale. The previous authority did not warrant the seizure off Penybryn ; and there was no evidence of a ratifiA party cannot
cation by the defendant Read of that illegal seizure.
be made a ivrongdoer
by his merely receiving the proceeds of a distress made for his benefit, unless he knew it to have been wrongfully
made. At all events, the question of ratification ought to have been
left to the jury. [He was then stopped by the Court]
Parke, B. I am afraid the rule must be absolute. There is no
doubt that the acts of the defendant Read, in directing, through his
agent Owens, the sale of the sheep, and receiving the proceeds, were
a sufficient ratification of the act of the bailiffs in making the distress,
as to such of the sheep as were taken on the Penybryn sheep-walk, because the taking of them was within the original authority given to the
bailiffs by Owens as the agent of Read.
But as to the others which
were not proved to have been taken on Penybryn, and as to which,
therefore, the authority was not followed, Mr. Read could not be liable in trover, unless he ratified the act of the bailiffs, with knowledge
that they took the sheep elsewhere than on Penybryn ; or unless he
meant to take upon himself, without inquiry, the risk of any irregularity which they might have committed, and to adopt all their acts. 01
5i See, also,
by a principal
nal authority
ris there was

Tucker v. Jerri-. 7". Me. 184 (1883), in which the ratification
Said the court: "Of origiof a tort of the agenl was involved.
even to commence a suit in the name or for the benefit of Jerno evidence whatever—of ratification, none but the failure to
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There appears to have been evidence quite sufficient to warrant the
jury in coming to the conclusion, that he did*,- in this sense, ratify the
acts of the other defendants
but, as this question was not left to the
jury, the defendant is entitlea^to a new trial.
Aldersox, Rolfe, and Peatt, BB., concurred.
Rule absolute.

J

.

THACHER
(Supreme

Judicial Court of

v.

Massachusetts,

Kep

/

PRAY.
1873.

113

Mass.

291,

Am.

18

480.)

and mailed to Thacher, who cashed it, supposing it was in payment for
the potatoes. When he learned that Pray had the horse he demanded
its return, but refused to give up the proceeds of the check. The court
below charged that the retention of the $100 after full information
of the transaction, and the refusal to restore it to Pray, was an adoption of the whole transaction.
Verdict for defendant, and plaintiff alleges exceptions.

Endicott, J. The instructions upon which this case was given to
jury failed to notice an important portion of the evidence. If the

the

It

by

t

it,

only dealings between the plaintiff and Gray related to this horse, and"
the money paid for the horse by the defendant to Gray, who had no
authority to sell, had been sent to the plaintiff, the taking and keeping
it might be a ratification of the sale by Gray; or if the plaintiff had
he should return the money so received.
wished to rescind
But the
evidence in the case required other and further instructions,
appeared that the plaintiff had sent potatoes to Gray for sale, and there
was evidence tending to show that the check for $100, taken
Gray

Is

a

a

a

a

v

7

I

I

I

\

i.

□

I

it

direct Its discontinuance as soon as
came to bis knowledge that it had
commenced In his name when Chase's attorney
presented the bond Cor his
approval.
The question is whether thai omission Imposes upon the defendliability for Chase's tort, if be committed one.
anl
To bind one to the
performance
of
contract which another without authority lias assumed to
Cor bim, the ratification musi be made with
full knowledge of all
material tacts.
'Ignorance
or misapprehension
of any of the essential dr
cumstances relating to the particular transaction alleged to have been ratified
will absolve the principal from all liability by reason of any supposed adop
linn of or assent to the previously unauthorized
acts of an agent.'
Combs
v. Scott, il' Allen,
r.>:<. And this
bo even though the Ignorance or mlsap
prehension arises Crom the negligence and omission of the defendanl (<>make
any Inquiry relative to the subject-matter.
Ibid.
To bold one respon
tor
tori aol committed by iiis orders, bis adoption of and assent to the
■ame musi al all events be clear and explicit, and founded on
clear know!
edge of the tori
which has been committed.
Adams
. Freeman,
Johns.
117;
Wesl v. Bhockley,
liar. 287; Kreger v. Osborn,
Blackf. 74; Abbotl
v. Kimball, L9
it Am »<■<•.
661
708]."
a
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Thacher sold one Gray potatoes and left with him a horse to keep,
but not to sell. Gray owed Pray, and sold him the horse to satisfy the
debt, receiving in addition a check for $100. This check he indorsed

1 IS

THE

(Part

RELATION

1

on accounl of the wrongful sale of the horse, was paid over to the
plaintiff, received In him, and credited on accounl of the potatoes, and
the plaintiff did not know the horse had been sold, for a long time afterward.
These facts justify the plaintiff's prayer for instructions, and
we think they should have been given.
It docs not affect the rights of the parties th.it the same check which
defendant gave Graj was given to the plaintiff, if it was applied to
the settlement of an existing account hetween them, without any nosale of the
tice that it \\a^ a part of the proceeds of the unauthorized
hands
was
in
the
plaintiffs
payable
it
indorsed
by Gray
Being
to bearer, transferable by delivery, and subject to the same rules as
hank hills, coupons, or other instruments payable in money to hearer.

a

it

a

a

is

ere.

Exceptions

sustained.

(F) Ratification
RUDASILL

v.

in

1

Part

FALLS.

(Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1885.

92 N. C. 222.)

Plaintiff, defendant,

&

by

a

note for
and one Green became sureties on
Oates to A. V.
the firm of Jenkins, Homesley
given
HomesGreen and Jenkins became insolvent and Oates died.
Falls.
Deley wished to keep the factory running to protect the sureties.
claimed
bill of sale of $2,000 of property, which plaintiff
fendant
was in behalf of the sureties, and to protect them and enable HomesDefendant denied that he had ever
ley to continue to run the factory.
for such purpose, or that plainion
of
any
into
property
come
Action to recover from defendtiff had agreed to the arrangement.
plaintiff, on the allegation that the defendant
ant the moiety, paid
value to discharge
received from their principals property sufficient
The court instructed the jury to find for plaintiff
the entire debt.
$1,600,

if

in

by

it
a

g
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it,

Spooler v. Holmes, 102 Ma-. 503, 3 Am. Rep. 401. It is as if Gray
hail cashed the check and sent the identical or other hills to the plain17 Pick.
159, 28
It was held in l.ime Rock Bank v. Plimpton,
tiff.
Am. Pec. 286, where an agent had lent the money of his principal to
his private creditor, who appropriated it to the payment of the debt,
the creditor not knowing at
that the principal could not recover
time of the loan that the money belonged to the principal.) The creditor had the right to secure his private debt, and being mpney having
A party
did not stand on the same ground as chattels.
no ear mark,
whom
he
of
the
person
from
into
authority
not bound to inquire
be
debt,
would
doctrine
for
different
of
in
payment
receives money
this,
no
in
there
was
as
In
case
that
mischief.
of
great
productive
privity hetween the parties, and the equities were much stronger than

<*
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by

a

a

j

a

is

in

is a

if

is

a

/ ojk

for defendant if they believed his. Judgthey believed his testimony;
ment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Smith, C. J. 52 * * * The instruction in this alternative form
But there is an intermediate
as far as it goes.
is unexceptionable
aspect of the case presented in the testimony, and perhaps warranted
The result
by it, which was not brought to the attention of the jury.
does not necessarily depend upon the terms of the first arrangement,
nor the extent of the authority conferred upon the defendant, as agent
of his associate sureties.
Assuming the plaintiff's representation to be true and his memory
of what occurred entirely accurate, his statement is not in accord with
of Homesley, who made the proposal, and the latthe understanding
ter may have refused to make the assignment at all, except upon the
If then, the
condition of a continuance of the factory operations.
defendant could not effect the object of the agency under the prescribed limitations and exceeded them in what was done, the plaintiff had an election to ratify or repudiate what was done on behalf
of all. This he was bound to do, and he could not sever parts of a
single agreement embraced and expressed in the two writings, so as
to take advantage of that which was favorable without the whole being assumed. The agency being exceeded, he was not bound by what
the agent did in the name and for the common benefit, but he was
in its entirety or not to recognize
bound to take the arrangement
its/ obligations at all.
a transac{"The principal cannot of his own mere authority ratify
tion in part and repudiate as to the rest," Is the language of Mr. Jus"He must either
tice Story in section 250 of his work
Agency.
adopt the whole or none."
Another recent author lays down the same doctrine thus: "A nullitransaction."
So well estabfication must extend to the whole of
treated as an agent
respect
this principle, that
party
lished
From this
transaction, the whole
to one pari of
thereby ratified,
rule of universal application that
contract
maxim results
where]
one man as agent of another, th^ person on
has been entered into
it

it

without
whose behalf
has been made "cannol take the benefit of
The contract must he performed in its integrity."
hearing its burdens.

Ewell's Evans' Agency, 70 (Ed. of
The rule rests upon sound reason

1879,

p. 95).
abundant

Crawauthority.
Ga. 270; Banl
ford v. Barkley, 18 Ala. 270; Hodnett v. Tatum,
Or. 115.
v. Hanner,
14 Mich. 208; Coleman v. Stark,
The record, and these instructions asked, presenl this view of the
and the defendant had
right to have them, or their equivalent,
of
The judge was mistaken in his
the jury.
given for the guidance
a

1

9

and

of

pinion

is

Part

in

reading of tin- series of instructions
his charge.
mbodied
ti

hurried
i
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omitted.

asked, in supposing

they
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THE
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(Parti

they been given the resull might have been different, 1>nt at
charge ought to have presented the case in this aspect to
oi the jury, and there is error in his mistake to do
the consideration
*
* *
Had

least

the

For error

in the record

a

new trial was ordered.

MUNDORK1*
of Pennsylvania,

Court

WICKERSHAM.
<;::

L869.

l'a.

Rep.

87, 3 Am.

531.)

it

it

is

by

it,

Assumpsit upon a note which plaintiff delivered to the agent of
defendant, and which it was alleged had been lent to defendant on a
stipulation signed by the agent that the defendant would protect it at
From a nonPlaintiff had to take up the note at maturity.
maturity.
suit plaintiff brings error.
If an agent obtains possession of the property of
SiiAKSwoon.
I.
another, by making a stipulation or condition which he was not authorized to make, the principal must either return the property, or,
was
if he receives
must be subject to the condition upon which
founded upon
the former owner.
This proposition
parted with
principle which pervades the law in all its branches:
"Qui sentit
commodum, sentire debet et onus."
The books are full of striking
and more especially in cases growing out of the
illustrations of
relation of principal and agent. Thus, where
conparty adopts
tract which was entered into without his authority, he must adopt
He cannot ratify that part which
beneficial to himself
altogether.
and reject the remainder: he must take the benefit to be derived from
the transaction cum onere.
Broom's Legal Maxims, 632 Hovil v.
Pack,
East, 164; Coleman v. Stark,
Or. 115. In the familiar case
of the sale of
servant, who, without authority, warrants
horse by
the soundness of the animal, the master having received the price enhanced by the warranty, even though ignorant of
responsible.
Nelyear v. Hawke,
Esp. 72; Alexander v. Gibson,
Campb. 555;
Williamson v. Canaday, 25 N. C. 349. Where the agent of the insured,
false and unauthorized repeffecting an insurance, makes
resentation, the policy
void.
Where one of two innocent persons
must suffer
the fraud or negligence of
third, whichever of the two
accredited him, ought to bear the loss. Fitzherbert v. Mather,
T. R. 12. The holder of note
responsible for representations made
broker employed to sell
though contrary to his instructions.
Mete. (Mass.) 193, 35 Am. Dec. 358. A principal
Lobdell v. Baker,
who sues to enforce
contract,
bound by the representations made
by his agent, in order to induce the opposite party to make it. Bennett v. Judson, 21 N. Y. 238; Ehvell v. Chamberlain,
Bosw. 320;
Id., 31 X. Y. 611. So
debtor cannot have the benefit of
compromise and release, effected by his agent, without adopting all the repit,
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a

a

4

a

is

1

a

1

a

by

is

a

in

5

2

is

a

a

1

7

;

is

it

a

a

it,
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is

it

a

a

a

it

if

If

awarded.

NATIONAL IMPROVEMENT

CONSTRUCTION CO.

&

Judgment reversed, and procedendo

MAIKEN.

Court of Iowa,

v,
i

(Supreme

'7.

103

Iowa,

lis,

N. W.

72

v.

431.)
a

Suit in equity to recover the contract price for erecting
The latter allege failure to fulfill
factory for defendants.

canning
the

con

tract, and a compromise settlement with one Silvers, agent of plaintilt. Plaintiff denies the authority of Silvers to do more than receive
for defendant.
Appeal from judgment
DEEM] i-:.
Now.
mUSl
that Silvers did
not have authority to settle the dispute between these parties,
lie asd

B.

Co., L28 <ia. 699, 64

B.

b<

it

*

Dolvln v. Am. Harrow
786 (1906).
'•!' the opinion
omitted.

li

A. (N. s.i
m Part

*

J."

*

;
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it

a

a

it

it

is

resentations made by the agent to the creditors, in negotiating it.
If an agent borrows money for his
Crans v. Hunter, 28 N. Y. 389.
principal, and procures another to become surety, and the surety afterwards pays the debt, the principal is answerable to the surety.
Higgins v. Dellinger, 22 Miss. 397. There is a very strong case in Barber'/
v. Britton, 26 Vt. 112. 60 Am. Dec. 301, where the defendant sent
a servant to employ the plaintiff, who was a physician, to visit a boy
'
who had been injured in their service, and directed him to tell the
plaintiff that they would pay for the first visit. The servant neglected •
to mention this, and employed the plaintiff generally.
He attended the
boy until he recovered, and the defendants were held liable for his.
whole bill. Many of these cases are put upon an implied authority,
but the more reasonable ground, as
seems to me,
that the party,
benefit, must take
having enjoyed
cum onere.
The defendant in this case received
note signed by the plaintiff.
which was delivered to the defendant's agent, upon the faith of an
undertaking that he would protect
at maturity.
He has enjoyed the
benefit of the transaction.
He used the note in his business, and
doubtless received the proceeds of its discount.
The plaintiff has been
at maturity, as his possession of the note with the
obliged to pay
defendant's endorsements proves, at least prima facie.
He
nowseeking to enforce the contract evidenced by the receipt.
Why shall
not the defendant bear the burden of the transaction, as he has received the benefit?
the note was not an accommodation note, but
founded on value;
the plaintiff did owe the defendant the amount
of it, and the defendant was not bound to protect
at maturity, then
there was
palpable fraud committed by the plaintiff, in requiring
the agent to sign such
receipt, and this would be
full defence to
the action. 53

706, 28

L. B.
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sumed to possess this power, however, and defendants paid him reHe received the money, delivered
lying upon the truth of his claim.
up the contract, conveyed the property to the defendants, delivered
them his power of attorney, and took the money received in settleWhen he arrived there, he reported Ins
ment with him to Chicago.
As soon as they were advised as to what he
doings to his principal.
done,
had
they attempted to repudiate and rescind his action, and
the controlling question in the case is whether or not they did rescind.
The well settled rule of law is that, when an agent transcends his
power, his principal, upon being informed of the transaction, must
repudiate or rescind the same within a reasonable time, or he will be
It is also elementary that a principal
held to have ratified the act.
cannot ratify a part of tin- agent's unauthorized acts, and reject the
The rule lias thus been stated in the case of Bryant v.
remainder.
Moore, -'<> Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec. 96: "There is no doubt that if one
■\ knows that another has acted as his agent without authority,
or has exceeded his authority as agent, and with such knowledge accepts money, property, or security, or avails himself of advantages
* * *
derived from the act, he will be regarded as having ratified it.
if. for instance, a merchant should authorize a broker, by a written
memorandum, to purchase certain goods at a price named, and the
broker should exhibit it to the seller, and yet should exceed the price,
and this should be made known to the merchant when he received
the goods, if he should retain or sell them he would ratify the bargain made by the broker, and be obliged to pay the agreed price."
And in the case of Benedict v. Smith, 10 Paige, 126, the court, in
discussing a question ruled by the same principle as the one at bar,
* * But where one person assumes to act as the agent
said:
of another, without authority, the person for whom he assumes to
act cannot claim the benefit of his agency in part only, and reject it
And where the attorney of recas to the residue of the transaction.

"*

ord goes beyond his general power in compromising or taking security
For a debt intrusted to him for collection, if the client, upon being
informed of the transaction, does not dissent without any unreasonable delay, the court may presume the attorney had a special power
thus to act; especially where the client receives the benefit of the setaken for him by the attorney."
A]'] -ell ant recognized this rule of law, and, in giving the notice to
which we have referred, attempted to repudiate the transaction; and
It gave notice of the
the real question is whether or not it did so.
repudiation, and demanded the return of the property and of the papers delivered to the defendants, but the only return it made of the
money was to deposit it to the order of the president of the canning
company, in a building in Chicago, with notice that, if the property
and papers were not returned and the money accepted, it would credit
it upon defendants' account.
Having received the money from the
defendants at Moravia, it was the duty of plaintiff, in case it desired

curities

Ch. 4)
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to rescind, to offer

the same back to them at that place. Defendants
were not required to go to Chicago or to any other place to get it.
It had come into the possession of plaintiff through the acts of its
agent, — unauthorized though they may have been, — and it was its duty
to tender the same back to the defendants at the place where received.
Eadie v. Ashbaugh, 44 Iowa, 519; Pars. Cont. (6th Ed.) p. 679;
Story, Ag. § 259 ; Miles v. Ogden, 54 Wis. 573, 12 N. W. 81 ; Strasser
31 N.
v. Conklin. 54 Wis. 102, 11 N. W. 254; Elwell v. Chamberlin,
Y. 611; Hatch v. Taylor, 10 N. H. 538; Bank v. Oberne, 121 111.

X. E. 85.
As the plaintiff did not restore the money collected by Silvers on
the faith of the settlement, but, on the contrary, accepted it, and un-
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25, 7

dertook to apply it on the defendants' account, it cannot be beard to
Defendants were
say that the acts of its agent were not authorized.
not compelled to act under the notice given them by the plaintiff until
their money was returned, or offered to be returned, at Moravia, Iowa.
An offer to deliver it to them at Chicago was not sufficient, unless,
possibly, they or some of them authorized to receive it were present
in Chicago when the tender was made. The case relied upon by appellant (Harper v. Insurance Co., 5 C. C. A. 505, 56 Fed. 281) clearly
There are a few exceptions to these general
announces this doctrine.
rules. For instance, it is held that, when a party
and well-recognized
has fraudulently procured the execution of a contract, he is not entitled to an offer to restore what he has received as a condition precedent

Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 51 Iowa, 68, 50 N. W.
Again, it has been held that if one, by fraudulent representations, procures a set I lenient and discharge of a cause of action, it is
merely a receipt for a gratuity, and plaintiff may maintain his action
O'Brien v. Railway Co., 89 Iowa,
without returning the money paid.
X.
cases
are
based upon the doctrine that one
W. 425. These
644, 57
who attempts to rescind a transaction on the ground of fraud is not

to rescission.
2X7.

required to restore that which he would be entitled to retain either
by virtue of the contract soughl to be set aside or of the original liaSee. also, Allerton v. Allerton, 50 X. Y. 670; Bebout v. Bodle,
bility.
Another exception recognized by some of the au38 ( »hio St. 500.
thorities is to this effect: that "ratification does not arise when the
principal accepts the results of an unauthorized act, not as a matter
of choice, bul merely for his own protection, to prevenl further loss
or liability therefrom." This exception is recognized in the following

Triggs v. [ones, l ( > Minn. 277,
among other cases:
Mills v. Berla (Tex. Civ. App.) 23 S. W. 910; Nye v.
431, ?2 X. W. 39; Crooker v. Appleton, 2? Me. 131.
Without committing ourselves to this lasl named
sufficient to saj that there is no claim, either in the

48

X. W.

1113;

Swan, 49 Minn.
exception,

it

is

pleadings or in
argument, that plaintiff was justified in withholding the money under
It- claim in this respect is that defendants knew of
any such rule.
and that they were guilty of fraud in making
t's authority,

(Parti

THE RELATION
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the settlement, and that (lie case comes under the first exception

named,
have recognized as being the law.
True it is that defendof the terms of the agent's power of attorney, hot it is also
they believed from his representations, and from the conthey placed upon the instrument, that he had full power
:•> settle the dispute and compromise
the claim.
There is no evidence
that, in effecting the settlement, they intruded to defraud the plaintiff.
(hi the contrary, they acted in the utmost good faith. They did not
intend to pay plaintiff any money except in settlement of the claim;
.in their payment he said to he a mere gratuity, as in the O'Brien
The ease of Stainer v. Tysen, 3 Hill, 280, relied upon by apBut, aside from all this, the question here is
pellant, is not in point.
one of repudiation of contract or settlement because of fraud, but
rather as to an agent's power to make a settlement, and the exception
If, with the authority of the agent conceded, there
has no application.
was a question as to the character of the settlement, there might be
room for application of the doctrine announced in the Hendrickson

which we
ants knew
true that
struction

Case.

He was
settlement.
make
the
authorized
to
not, as we have seen, expressly
He, however, assumed to do so, and his principal accepted the benefits
thereof with full knowledge of what had been done. Having ratified
was the same in law as if exthe acts of its agent, the transaction
5n
authorized, there was no fraud, and consesly authorized.
quently the plaintiff was not justified in retaining the money while
It canat the same time asserting that its agent was guilty of fraud.
not take the benefits of its agent's contract, and at the same time reThe case of Hakes v. Myrick, 69 Iowa, 189, 28
pudiate its burdens.
X. W. 575, recognizes this distinction, although it is not made as promAs the account was fully settled by
inent as it might have been.
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The ultimate question here is the authority of the agent.

If

plaintiff's agent, it is not entitled to recover.

Affirmed.

several independent and severable things,
a transaction contains
some within and some beyond the agent's authority, the principal may adopt
the former and repudiate the latter; but not when the transaction is an entirety. Nye v. Swan, 49 .Minn. 431, 52 N. W. 39 (1892); Miller v. Board of
When the third person
Education of City of Sacramento, 44 Cal. 166 (1872).
knows the agent's want of authority, he cannot set up a ratification of the
Bryant
unauthorized
i art from acceptance of that which was authorized.
v. Moore, u<; Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec. '.h; (1846); Watson v. Bigelow, 47 Mo. 413
Compare Henderson v. Railway Co., 17 Tex. 560, 576, 67 Am. Dec.
(1871).
Win ii

675

(1856).

Neither can the ratification of one act be established from a previous ratification of another similar, but distinct, act. Forsyth v. Day, 41 Me. 382 (1856),

ante, p. 76.
So also ratification by a railway company
of a promise by an agent to
pay plaintiff a sum of money does not ratify an additional promise by the
agent to give defendant employment for life, of which promise the company
had no knowledge, even though the company made the payment and furnished
the employment for a time.
Bohanan v. B. & M. It. Co., 70 N. II. 526, 49
Atl. 103 (1900).
To the same effect is St. John & Marsh Co. v. Cornwell,
52 Kan. 712, 35 Pac. 7x~> (1894); Roberts
v. Francis, 123 Wis. 78, 100 N. W.
1076

(1904).
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(G) New Consideration

GRANT
(Supreme

Judicial Court

v.

BEARD.

of New Hampshire, 1S70.

50

N. H.

129.)

Assumpsit to recover for repairs on two wagons. Plaintiff alleged
that defendants' father, who brought the wagons to be repaired, was
their agent and could and did bind them to pay for the repairs.
Whether the father was their agent, whether they owned the wagons
or received any benefit from the repairs, and whether they subsequently assented to and ratified the contract, were the questions in
*
dispute, on which the evidence was conflicting^
Foster, J. (The ratification, upon fuJUcrToCvledge of all the circumstances of the case, of an act done^^yone who assumes to be an agent,
is equivalent to a prior authority^ By such ratification the party will
bound as fully, to all intents and purposes, as if he had originally
jfiven express authority or direction concerning the act.
A parol contract may be ratified by an express parol recognition
)i the act, or by conduct implying acquiescence, or by' silence when
And so the principal may
the party, in good faith, ought to speak.
J
Story on Agency,
be estopped to deny the agent's original authority.
v. Taylor, 10 N. 11. 538;
Contracts,
112;
Hatch
on
239;
Metcalf
§
Despatch Line v. Bellamy Mfg. Co., 1ZN. H. 232, 37 Am. Dec. 203;
Davis v. School District, 44 N. H. 399; Warren v. Wentworth, 45
N. H. 564; Forsyth v. Day, 46 Me. 194; Ohio & Mississippi R. Co.
Middleton, 20 111. 629.
Such ratification relates back to and incorporates the original contract or transactions, so that, as between the parties, their rights and
interests are to be considered as arising at the time of the original
act, and not merely from the date of the ratification ; and a suit to
enforce the obligation assumed by the party who ratifies is, to all intents and purposes, a suit founded upon the original act or contract,
Davis v. School District, before
and not on the act of ratification.
cited; Low v. Railroad, 46 N. H. 284; Doggett v. Emerson, 3 Story,
7M, Fed. Cas. No. 3,960; Mason v. Crosby, 1 Woodb. & M 342, Fed.
Cas. No. 9.234; Clark's Executors v. Van Riemsdyk, 9 Cranch, 153,
v.

3

L. Ed.

688 ;

Culver v. Ashley,

19

Pick.

301 ;

Forsyth

v. Day, bef< n i

cited.

Therefore the original consideration applies to the ratification, thus
made equivalent to an original contract, and supports the implied
upon which the presenl action is founded.
operates directly, and nol merely as presumptive
inally done b) the authority of the de
evidence thai the ad fendants; and therefore it is unnecessary to consider whether or not
The subsequent
the evidence tend- to -how an original authority.
no
confirmation of the agent's act; and there
assent
per -<•.
pr< mise

is

a

The ratification

is,
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it'

valid distinction between a ratification of the agent's act, and a direct
and original promise to paj for the services rendered by the plaintiff.
for the original
Wherever there would have been a consideration
no agenl or party assuming to act as agent had interengagement
vened, such original consideration
sufficient to sustain the act of

if

(H)

Necessity

BROWN
Supreme Judicial

v.

Court of Massachusetts.

of

-

50

,

new trial granted.

Pc

a

;

if

1

is

is

reason the verdict must be set aside, and

i

Intent

HENRY.
IS!)!).

172 Mass.

559, 52 N. E. 107.°..)

a

a

Action on contract to recover damages for refusal to deliver about
25,000 pounds of coal, alleged to have been sold to plaintiffs by
The latter gave
"bought note," which defendants rejected.
broker.
for plaintiffs.
verdict
to
Defendants except

Kxowi.tox,

the written

a

by

broker inserted in

It

appeared upon the undisputed evidence that the
memorandum of sale certain provisions
The jnry
the defendants.
which were not expressly authorized
found that there was no custom under which he could bind the deHe was not the defendants' general
fendants by these agreements.
sale could be inquired
agent, and the terms of his authority to make

J.
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it

a

it

is

a

is

a

is

a

is

ratification.
new consideration, to
In none of the cases cited
the subject id
hut the logical dealluded
as
the
to
ratification,
necessary;
support
duction from the principle that the ratification relates hack to and covpropoers the original agreement,
wholly inconsistent with such
sition; and the contrary doctrine
expressly held in numerous cases.
Commercial Bank of Buffalo v. Warren, 15 N. V. 583, and cases cited.
There was abundant evidence, in the present case, from which the
jury might have found that the defendants owned the wagons and
received
positive benefit from the repairs; but such evidence and
not material that
such finding were wholly unnecessary, because
benefit from the other
the party making the promise should receive
sufficient
any trouble, prejudice, expense, or inconparty's act;
made. Metcalf
the
venience accrued to
party to whom the promise
Contract,
Contracts,
431.
on
Parsons
163;
on
We are therefore of the opinion that the instruction of the court to
the jury "that
they found that the defendants did not authorize
their father to make the contract as their agent, but afterwards assented to what he had done, their assent would not make them liable
unless they owned the wagons at the time they were repaired, or reand for this
ceived some benefit from the repairs," was erroneous

se See,
430 (1876),

also. First National Bank of Trenton v. Cay. <;:: Mo. ••:::.21 Am. Rep.
ante, p. 95.
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He could bind the defendants only by such contract as they
into.
Coddington v. Goddard, 16 Gray, 436;
authorized him to make.
Remick v. Sandford, 118 Mass. 102.
Under the instructions of the court, and the finding above stated,
the verdict for the plaintiffs must rest on a finding that the defendThe jury were allowed to find
ants ratified the broker's contract.
the
on
that
the ground
plaintiffs were right, and the deratification
contention that the
defendants'
in
to
the
regard
fendants wrong,
broker was not authorized to sell the wool at the price named in the
contract ; it appearing that the defendants stated, as their reason for
repudiating the contract, that the broker had no authority to sell the
wool at that price, and failed to make any objection to the provisions
of the contract about credit, and the allowance of interest, unexpired
These latter provisions were inserted in
storage, and fire insurance.
There was no evidence
the contract by the agent without authority.
that the situation of the plaintiffs was changed, or that their rights
were in any way affected by reason of the form of the defendants'
objection and disavowal.
Where something is to be done by one of two parties as a condition
precedent to his exercise of a right against the other, the other may
waive the performance, either wholly or in part. If there is an attempt
which falls short of the requirement, and if objection
at performance,
is made by the party for whom it is done, with a statement of the
grounds of his objection, the objector often is held to have waived his
right afterwards to object, on other grounds, when the other has gone
forward, relying upon the implied representation that the performance
Clark v. Insurance Co., 6 Cush.
in other particulars.
is satisfactory
44;
342, ?3 Am. Dec.
Searle v. Insurance Co., 152 Mass. 263, 2? X.
!•'.. 290; Curtis v. Aspinwall, 114 Mass. 187, 19 Am. Rep. 332; Insurance Co. v. Norton, 96 U. S. 234. 24 I.. Ed. 689; Titus v. Insurance
These cases rest upon the ground that, when one
Co., 81 X. Y. 410.
is stating objections, a failure to disclose a ground of objection, in a
particular which easily could be remedied, tends to mislead the other
party to his detriment, and is so contrary to justice and good morals as
to work an estoppel against doing it afterwards.
Xo such principle is applicable to the presenl case.
We have an
unauthorized contract made by an agent. The plaintiffs had no rights
under it immediately after it was made.
They have no rights under
"Ratification of a past and
it now, unless the defendants ratified it.
into
an
which
agenl has entered without aucompleted transaction,
T
act
Xo
the
part of the principal.
a
on
is
purely voluntary
thority,
Combs v.
rests upon him to sanction or adopt it."
legal obligation

tf, however, one
Bank v. Crafts, 2 Ulen, 269.
<>i"a general power, but in a mode nol san
tioned by its terms, and if any benefit comes to the principal from the
act. ratification may be implied pretty quickly from lapse of time with
Foster v. Rockwell, I'M \la-s 167.
knowledge of the circumstances.
ott, 12 Allen, 493

;

is acting in the execution

*
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The evidence is undisputed that,
being informed of the contract, the
The naked question
repudiated it.
cipal, on learning of an unauthorized
it. giving a reason for so doing which

within

a

reasonable

time

after

it

If

is

it,

1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d
pudiate it in part, and adopt it in part.
eases
eited.
1
and
192,
Ed.)
There is a class of cases in which the principal receives a direct
benefit from an act of an agent, and it is held that, if he retains this
benefit for a considerable time after he obtains full knowledge of the
transaction, he thereby ratifies the act. Brigham v. Peters, 1 Gray,
139; Sartwell v. Frost, 122 Mass. 184; Coolidge v. Smith, 129 Mass.
Here, too, there is an element of estoppel which does not exist
554.
in the case at bar. One cannot have the benefit of an unauthorized
act of an agent without confirming it. Ordinarily, a principal is not
called upon to give reasons for declining to be bound by an act undertaken without authority.
The controlling reason is that it was unauThe particulars in which it lacks authority, usually, are of
thorized.
If the other party relies upon
he has the burden
no importance.
unauthorized,
of showing ratification.
the principal insists that

it

is

and does nothing and says nothing which warrants the other party in
as ratified, the mere fact that he
incorrect in his statement
treating
of the particulars of the want of authority does not change his repudiation of the act into an adoption of it.
We are of opinion that the instructions in regard to ratification were
erroneous, and that the jury should have been instructed that there
was no evidence that the defendants ratified the contract declared on.
See Price v. Moore, 158 Mass. 524, 33 N. E. 927.
Exceptions sustained.
•

7.r

J.:

v. Fletcher,

"Ratification,

,

Minn. 189. 77 N. W. 800 (1899), it was said by
like authorization, is generally the creature of
intent
but that intent ni.iv often he presumed by the law from the conduct
of the party, and that presumption may be conclusive, even against the actual
Intention of the party, where his conduct has been such that it would be inequitable to others to permit him to assert that he had not ratified the unauthorized act of his agent."
In Smith

Mitchell,
:
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defendants in the present case
is presented whether, if a princontract of an agent, repudiates
proves to be without foundation,
In the absence of
such repudiation is equivalent to an adoption of it.
anything beyond this to work an estoppel, we are of opinion that it is
not.
Ordinarily, ratification of an agent's act is a mere matter of
intention.' 7 In the present ease, the defendants, as soon as the facts
were ascertained, manifested in the clearest manner their intention not
to ratify, and their subsequent conduct has all been consistent with
They could not retheir original repudiation of the attempted sale.
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IV. Mant*3r of Ratification
■

ZOTTMAN
(Supreme

v.

(A) In

General

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO.

Court of California,

1S62.

20

Cal.

96,

81 Am.

Dec. 96.)
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Action to recover for extra services performed by plaintiff in making improvements on a certain square in San Francisco. A contract
was made by the common council, but afterwards the special committee and superintendent appointed by the council concluded that a
stone base for an iron fence should be substituted for the wooden
Accordone, contracted for, and that the fence should be painted.
ingly in the presence of the other city officers they ordered the contractor to perform this extra work, and assured him the city would
pay. During the progress of the work all the members of the common council were aware of the order and of the extra work done,
but the bill was never paid.
The city charter provided for action by
the council by aye and nay vote, with publication in a city paper. "All
contracts for work" were to be let to the lowest bidder after public
notice. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.
Field, C. J. 58 [after stating the facts:] * * * A contract
made in disregard of these stringent but wise provisions cannot be the
ground of any claim against the city. Individual members of the common council were not invested by the charter with any power to improve the city property, and any directions given or contracts made
by them upon the subject, had the same and no greater validity than
like directions given and like contracts made by any other residents
of the city assuming to act for the corporation.
And if individual
members could not thus make any valid contract originally, they
could not by any subsequent approval or conduct impart validity to
such contract.
But we go further than this; the common council
i could not by any subsequent action give validity to a contract
thus made. The mode in which alone they could bind the corporation
by a contract for the improvement of city property was prescribed by
the charter, and no validity could be given by them to a contract made
in any other manner.
The rule is general and applies to the corporate
authorities of all municipal bodies; where the mode in which their
power on any given subjeel i an be exercised is prescribed by their
charter, the mode must be followed.
The mode in such cases constitute the measure of the power. Thus, where authority is conferred
to sell property, with a clause thai the sale shall be made al public
auction, the mode prescribed is essential to the validity of the sal
68

part of tiic opinion
Godd.Pb.4 A.— 9

Is omitted.
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1

Aside from the
indeed there is no power to sell in any other way.
This is
mode designated there is a want of all power on the subject.
obvious to require argument, and so arc all the adjudications.
Thus in Head v. Providence Insurance Company, - Cranch, 156, 2
1.. Ed. 229, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in speaking of bodies which
is to
have only a legal existence, says: "The act of incorporation
it
all
power
possess;
it
the
they
them an enabling act;
gives them
enables them to contract, and when it prescribes to them a mode of
contracting, they must observe the mode, or the instrument no more
creates a contract than if the body had never been incorporated."
See
McCracken v. City of San Francisco, 16 Cal. 619 ; Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Carroll, 5 Barb. 649; New York Fire Insurance Co. v.
Ely, 5 Conn. 568, 13 Am. Dec. 100.
As a necessary consequence flowing from these views, a contract
not made in the prescribed mode, cannot be affirmed and ratified in
disregard of that mode by any subsequent action of the corporate
authorities, and a liability be thereby fastened upon the corporation.
Ratification is equivalent to a previous authority; it operates upon the
contract in the same manner as though the authority to make the contract had existed originally. The power to ratify, therefore, necessarily supposes the power to make the contract in the first instance ; and
a power to ratify in a given mode supposes the power to contract in
Therefore, where the charter of a city authorizes a
the same way.
sale of city property only at public auction, a sale not thus made is
from its very nature incapable of ratification, because it could not
have been otherwise made originally. So where the charter authorizes
a contract for work to be given only to the lowest bidder, after notice
of the contemplated work in the public journals, a contract made in
any other way — that is, given to any other person than such lowest
bidder — cannot be subsequently affirmed.
Were this not so, the corwhat they are
porate authorities would be able to do retroactively
prohibited from doing originally.
We had occasion, in the case of McCracken v. City of San Francisco,
to give to this subject great consideration,
and we there held, that
where authority to do a particular act can only be exercised in a particular form or mode, the ratification must follow such form or mode,
and that a ratification can only be made when the principal possesses
at the time the power to do the act ratified.
The doctrines there
laid down we regard of vital importance for the protection of the interests of municipal corporations, and without an adherence to them,
restrictions such as were embodied in the charter of San Francisco —
or at present are embodied in the consolidation act — upon the corporate authorities, may be practically disregarded and defeated.
Since
that decision was rendered, we have had our attention called to the
case of Brady v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 16 How. Prac. 432, where
these doctrines are affirmed in an opinion of great force, and applied
to an alleged contract for work done upon a street in the city of New
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The alleged contract in that case was made by the street commissioner on behalf of the city, and was for the performance of work
upon the street in accordance with certain specifications, the stipulated
price to be paid upon the confirmation of an assessment for the work
The work was performed in accordance with
by the common council.
contract,
and seventy per cent of the contract
the
of
the provisions
for the entire price was made for
an
assessment
and
was
paid,
price
The amendment of 1853 to the charter of
the work and confirmed.
that city requires that "all work to be done and all supplies to be
furnished for the corporation, involving an expenditure of more than
$250, shall be by contract founded on sealed bids or on proposals made
in compliance with public notice for the full period of ten days ; and
all such contracts, when given, shall be given to the lowest bidder with
In consequence of the manner in which the bids,
adequate security."
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York.

made upon the proposals for the work, were tested, the lowest bidder
could not be ascertained; it was therefore held that the contract was
The question was then raised whether, under the
illegal and void.
And
circumstances, the defendants were liable for the work done.
this question was discussed by the court in two aspects — whether they
were liable to the plaintiff as upon a quantum meruit, because the
work had been performed and accepted ; and whether the common
council had the power to waive the original defect in the plaintiff's
claim, and by their action affirm his title to recover, so as to give him
of the charter had
a right of action, notwithstanding the requirements

with.
similar aspects that the question of the liability of the
"The corpocity of San Francisco presents itself in the present case.
officers and
its
chosen
"can
act
ration," said the court,
through
only
labor
work
and
done
for
actually
If
not
may
agents.
pay
they
only
but
bound
are
statute
with
the
legally
requisites,
a
compliance
without
ik >t been complied

It

is under

to such payment, then no contract is necessary, and the restrictions
If they may dispense with a contract,
in the statute are a dead letter.
then and then only can they confirm an illegal and void contract, and
of the
then also by any acceptance of the work and a confirmation
The relaContract by resolution, they repeal the statute pro hac vice.
and it- officers hear to the subject, the
tion which the corporation
duties they owe to the public and those upon whom the burden is to
fall, and the nature of the power- they possess, forbid us to concede
any such force to their acts.
B) the charter the power is limited and

corporations can only hind themselves by con
It may
expressly or impliedly authorized to make.
upon a contractor that all compensation
een a hardship
sometime
for work done, etc.. should be denied him ; but it should he remembered
when he deals in
that h'-. no less than the officers of the corporation,
for in the charter, is bound to ee to it
a matter
ly provided
If he neglect this, or ch,.
that the charter i- complied with.
a

familiar rule

that

they are

tal -■ the hazard,

he i- a mere volunteer,

and suffers only what he
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If

statute forbids the contr.net which he
or ought to know
before he places his money
The analogy drawn from the obligation of an
individual to pay for work which he accepts, although there has been
wholly fails to reach the
no previous contract for its performance,
Here, neither the officers of the corporation nor the
present case.
any of the agencies through which they act, have any
corporation,
power to create the obligation to pay for the work, except in the
mode which
expressly prescribed in the charter; and the law never
forbids the party to agree to
implies an obligation to do that which
do.
And for the like reason the defendants cannot be treated as
ratifying the unauthorized acts of its agents. The difficulty lies not
the want of original power in the agents to make the conmerely
tract, but
the want of power in the corporation itself to make the
An
contract otherwise than in the mode prescribed by the charter.
contract may ratify or affirm
individual having power to make
when made by one who without authority assumes to be his agent,
the individual have himself no such power, he can no more bind
but
himself retroactively to its performance by affirmance or ratification
The
than he could have done so prospectively in the first instance.
power to have made the conpower to ratify ex vi termini implies
particular mode implies the power
tract, and the power to ratify in
68
to have made the contract in that manner."
Judgment affirmed.
the

a

*

*

*

a

(B) Written Ratification

JUDD
(Supreme

v.

Court of Minnesota,

ARNOLD.

1884.

31

Minn.

430,

18

N. W. 151.)

so

The opinion of Cope, J., is omitted,
Part of the opinion is omitted.

a

it

a

It

a

1,

;

a

;

5,

J.

a

Appeal by defendants from
judgment for restitution in an action
for unlawful detainer.
Gilfillan, C. eo Action under chapter 84, Gen. St. 1878, to recover rented premises detained after the expiration of the term.
It
appears that plaintiff rented the premises to defendant Arnold for
one year, terminating April 30, 1883
and February
1883, he, assuming to act as plaintiff's agent, executed in her name to defendants
Tibbitts and Myers
written lease of the premises
the term as to
part of them to commence May
1883, and to continue as to all till
one year from the last date. Arnold had no authority in writing to
rent the premises.
The lease stipulated for
gross monthly rental
for the rooms.
was therefore an entire and not
severable lease,
and for
term exceeding one year. By the terms of the statute
was
required to be in writing, and, being executed by an agent, his au5
8
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if

a

it,

in

in

it

is

by

it,

it,

have anticipated.
has made, he knows
or services at hazard.
to
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thority to execute it was required to be in writing. "No estate or
interest in lands, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year,
* * * shall hereafter be created, granted, assigned, surrendered,
or declared, unless by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing, subscribed by the parties creating, granting, assigning,
or declaring the same, or by their lawful agent theresurrendering,
Our
Section 10, c. 41, Gen. St. 1878.
unto authorized, by writing."
while,
that
in
this
:
statute of frauds is peculiar, among other things,
by section 10, authority in an agent to execute an instrument creating
or conveying the estate must be in writing, by section 12 his authority to make an executory contract to create or convey it need not be
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in writing.

Minor

v.

Willoughby,

3

Minn.

225

(Gil.

154).

A ratification by the principal of the not properly authorized act
of the agent must be by an act of the character required for original
G1
Where that must be in writing, the ratification must also
authority.
Browne, St. Frauds, § 17; Fitch, Real Est. Ag. 57;
be in writing.
McDowell v. Simpson, 3 Watts, 129, 27 Am. Dec. 338 ; Lawrence v.
Taylor, 5 Hill, 113; Ingraham v. Edwards, 64 111. 526; Holland v.
Hoyt, 14 Mich. 238. To permit an oral ratification would, in many
The evicases, let in the very evils which the statute aims to exclude.
dence of oral ratification by plaintiff of the lease executed by Arnold
Of course, a principal may, by his acts
was therefore of no effect.
or declarations, lay the basis for an estoppel as to the due authority
of the assumed agent. But, in a case like this, to make the assent

and acquiescence of the principal, and acts of the lessees in reliance
thereon, operate as an estoppel as to the authority of the assumed
agent to execute the lease, it is essential that she should have known
what sort of lease the agent had assumed to execute in her name.
—
The lessees must be supposed to have known the law that written
And
authority in the agent was required to execute such a lease.
before they could rightfully rely and act on her assent to and acquiescence in a lease as evidence that she had authorized it in writing,
they should have been sure that she was informed of the character
of lease the agent had assumed to execute. The only evidence as
to her information on the point was that defendant Arnold testified
he told her he had agreed to rent the rooms to the other defendants
t"<»r a Mar from May 1, 1883, and defendant Tibbitts testified he (fid
her he and Myers had a lease for one year, to commence May 1, 1883.
This was net such a lease as was in fact executed. The information
thus given was not sufficient as a basis for an estoppel as to the lease
*
* *
in question.

Judgment affirmed.
oi gee, also, Johnson v. Fecht, L86 Mo. 886, 846, 88 B. W. 1077 (1904), dtlng
v. McGroarty, 11<» Mo. 546, L9 S. W. 830 (1892), and Despatch Lin<
203 (1841),
ckets v. Bellamy Mfg. Co., L2 V 11. 205, 280 282, 37 Am. 1
a leading case.
The effeel of a statute prescribing the mode of ratification
Is dl cu
ed in Mmris v. Ewlng, 8 N. D. 99, 7<; N. W. L047 (1898).

Hawkins
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(C)

HEATH
(Supreme

Judicial

under Seal

Ratification
v.

NUTTER.

Courl ol Maine,

L862.

50 Me. 378.)

a

is

I..

that he had by letter and verbally ratified the act of Rich. The judge
ruled that the power of attorney was not sufficient to authorize the
i\ccd by Rich, and excluded the evidence offered.
Ai'i'i.iiox, C. I. The power of attorney to Rich did not empower
him to convex the demanded premises to the inhabitants of Tremont.
The authority "to grant any and all discharges by deed or otherwise,
,th personal and real," as fully as the principal might do, cannot be
fairly construed as enabling the agent to convey by bill of sale, or by
all the personal and real estate of his principal.
deed of warranty,
Xor can the authority to convey by deed be found elsewhere.
required to be done in the name
Whenever any act of agency
of the principal under seal, the authority to do the act must be conA power to convey lands must
ferred by an instrument under seal.
possess the same requisites and observe the same solemnities as are
Gage v. Gage, 30
deed directly conveying the land.
necessary in
250.

must be
parol ratification
Am. Dec.

deed

Ill;

§

X. H.

49, 50; Montgomery v. Dorion,
Story on Agency,
of
an unauthorized conveyance by
So the ratification
252.
seal.
Story on Agency,
under
by an instrument

not sufficient.

Stetson v. Patten,

2

424;

§§

11.

is

(■

X.

A

Greenl. 359,

Paine v. Tucker, 21 Me. 138, 38 Am. Dec. 255;
11
Wend. 54; Despatch Line Co. v. Bellamy Mfg.
Hanford v. McNair,
Co.. 12 X. 11. 205. 37 Am. Dec. 203.
full knowledge of the
The plaintiff received his conveyance with
court
The remedial processes of
equitable rights of the tenants.
At comof equity may perhaps afford protection to the defendants.
a

a

9
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Writ of entry. Both parties claim under Charles D. Robbins, Heath
under his quitclaim deed, dated February 17, 1858, Nutter under deed
Nutter ofof Robbins, by Rich, his attorney, dated May 3, 1854.
fered to prove h\ Robbins that Rich was his agent under power of
attorney, given him to enable him to make the deed; that Robbins
told Heath he had nothing to quitclaim, but was induced by Heath
to believe there would he no impropriety in giving said quitclaim deed;

mon law their defence fails.
Defendants defaulted.
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JENKINS.

1S95.

120

Mo. 647, 31 S. W. 938.)
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Action for $2,700 and interest for rent. The lease was in writing
and under seal, signed by defendants in person and by plaintiffs by
agent. Defendants paid the rent for six months, but gave timely notice in writing that because the lease was not signed by plaintiffs, nor
by their agents duly authorized in writing, they would end their tenNine months before the expiration of that time
ancy September 30.
they moved out and sent the keys to plaintiffs, who refused to accept them and each month demanded the rent. Upon the defendants'
refusal to pay, this suit was brought.
Sherwood, J. 62 [After holding that performance by plaintiffs took
* * *
(d) But, in addithe lease out of the statute of frauds:]
tion to the foregoing reasons, others readily occur why the defense
That statute does
of the statute of frauds must prove unavailing.
not require that a lease, or, indeed, any instrument, should be under
Admit, then, that plaintiffs' agents had no authority to bind them
seal.
and unnecessary , seal
still the unauthorized
by a sealed instrument,
may be treated as superfluous and disregarded, and the sealed instrument deemed an unsealed one. and may be ratified as a simple contract
And that a
Mechem, Ag. §§ 95, 141, and cases cited.
in writing.

in writing made without authority is susceptible o'
no one questions.
In illustration of this point is the early case of Maclean v. Dunn.
4 Bing. 722, where Lord Chief Justice Best said: "It has been argued
Vhat the subsequent adoption of the contract by Dunn will not take
thi- case out of the operation of the statute of frauds, and it has been
insisted that the agent should have his authority at the time the consimple contract
oral ratification,

tract is entered into. If such had been the intention of the legislaBut the statute only
ture, it would have been expressed more clearly.
in writing to he signed by the
requires some note or memorandum
party to he charged, or hi- agent thereunto lawfully authorized, leaving us to the rules of common law as to the mode in which the agent
Now, in all other cases a subsequent -aucis to receive hi- authority.
—
tion is considered the same thing in effect as assent at the time,
in
and.
retrotrahitur, et mandato aequiparatur' ;
'omnia ratihabitio
contract,
an
of
a
agent,
signed by
my opinion, tin- subsequent sanction
of the statute more satisfactorily than
it out of the operation
Where the authorit) is given before
an authority given beforehand.
hand, the party musl trusl to hi- agent. If it be given subsequently to
the contract, the party know- that all has been done according to bis

wi-hes."
M-t <.f tin' opinion

Lb omitted.

,

Tin:
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(e)

There

117.

(Part

1

are authorities, also, which hold that one partner may
an act under seal done by his copartner.
Gwinn v.
( »0;
3 Kent. Conun.
Partn.
49;
Story,
(13th Ed.)

ratify by parol
kookcr.'-M Mo.
§

relation

J

(f) The doctrine

has in sonic instances been extended beyond the
hero mentioned, so as to embrace cases where one person not
sustaining the relation of partner to another may execute an instrument under seal, and the same may he ratified by matter in pais with
'Phis is the rule announced in Maslike effect as were they partners.
sachusetts.
Holbrook v. Chamherlin, 116 Mass. 155, 17 An: Rep.
14c, and cases cited. 98
In Worrall v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229, 55 Am. Dec. 330, after an
elaborate review of the authorities, it is there said: "These authorities show that there is no distinction between partners and other persons in the application of the modern rule that wherever an instrument would be effectual without a seal it would be valid and binding
on the principal, although executed under seal by an agent without
authority by deed, if authorized by a previous parol authority, or subsequently ratified or adopted by parol." 5 N. Y. loc. cit. 243, 5 Am.
See, also, Hunter v. Parker, 7 Mees. & W.
Dec. 330, and cases cited.
322; State v. Spartanburg & U. R. Co., 8 S. C. 129; Hammond v.
Hannin, 21 Mich. 374, 4 Am. Rep. 490; Adams v. Power, 52 Miss.
828; State v. Shaw, 28 Iowa, 67.
As the result of these authorities, it should be held that the act of
plaintiffs in putting defendants into possession of the premises, which
they did on April 1, 1891, and the acceptance by them of rent for several months thereafter from defendants in conformity to the written
lease, was an ample ratification of that instrument.
(hi Besides, the old lease having expired by its own terms on April
1, 1891, defendants
were put into possession under and by virtue of
the new lease, and enjoyed all the advantages they could have received
had the new lease been formally valid in every particular. It does not
lie in their mouths to denounce as invalid a lease under and by virtue
of which those advantages were obtained.
Holbrook v. Chamberlin,
* * *
116 Mass. loc. cit. 161 ; State v. Shaw, 28 Iowa, loc. cit. 75.
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Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.

"

See, also, Adams v. Power, 52 Miss. 828 (1876), and Holbrook v. Chamberlin. in; Mass. 155, 17 Am. Rep. 146 (1874), in which the court held it to be
the settled doctrine in Massachusetts
that the unauthorized execution of a
deed by an a cent may be ratified by parol. Compare Reese v. Medlock, 27
Tex. 120, 84 Am. Dec. 611 (1863).
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(D) Implied Ratification
(a)

In General

RALPHS

Court of California,

HENSLER.
1893.

97

Cal.

296,

32 Pac.

243.)

Action to foreclose a mortgage on defendant's property, given to
secure three promissory notes, executed for defendant by her attorney
in fact, James P. McCarthy, to plaintiff's testator, Kimball Hardy.
Defendant denied that McCarthy's power of attorney authorized him
notes or mortgage, and for a further defense set up that
to make
/the
he had, /as her agent, paid the interest and secured an extension of
the notds. ^To show this a writing purporting to be signed by Hardy
was introduced.
Judgment for plaintiff.
Vaxclief, C. 64 [After stating the facts:] * * * There was
no evidence tending to disprove the genuineness of this writing, or
the signature of Hardy; but the testimony of McCarthy that the
interest had been paid was disputed by the testimony of the plaintiff.
But for the purpose of the question now being considered (that of rat-

it

§§

is

it

;

is

is

it

:

J.,

ification) it is immaterial whether the defendant paid the interest or
not, for, whether she complied with the conditions upon which Hardy
agreed to extend the time of payment or not, her averment, in her
of the agreement for
answer, that she authorized the procurement
th extension of time, in the absence of evidence that she ever repudiated the execution of the notes or mortgage by her assumed agent, is
prima facie sufficient evidence of her ratification of such execution.
"We do
said
In Taylor v. Association, 68 Ala. 229, Brickell, C.
was shown that there was assent to and confirmation
not mean that
not essential, for ratThat
of the transaction expressed in words.
and
conduct of parties
more often implied from the acts
ification
and
than
expressed in words
having an election to avoid or confirm
of
the
conduct
having
and
principal,
the
acts
implied whenever
full knowledge of the fact, are inconsistent with any other supposi
tion than that of previous authority, or an intention to abide by the
146-157.
was unauthorized." See, al<", Mtechem, Ag.
actfthough

a

It

a

at least to strengthen

by

p.

a

circumstance tend-]
think the power of attorney was admissible as
ratification,
showthe other evidence of
showed that
ing the relation between defendant and McCarthy.]
that lie was authorized
stranger to defendant;
McCarthy was not

irfr

a

r.'irt of the opinion

la

1;

to some extent in regard to all her real property in this^Ute, even though he may not have been authorized to
lvs Mr. MeVhem (section 160),
mortgage it.]/" All the author
"agree that/rie relations of the parties have much to do in determinratification." Where an authoring whether or not there has been

to act as her attorney

•
»
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ized agent transcends his authority, the liability of the principal to be
held to have ratified the unauthorized acts by mere acquiescence is
much greater than it would be in case an utter stranger bad assumed
to act as agent without any authority
for any purpose whatever; because, "in general, where an agent is authorized to do an act, and he
transcends his authority, it is the duty of the principal to repudiate
the act as mm ui ;is he is fully informed of what has been thus done
*
*
*
in bis name,
else be will be bound by the act as having
Ward v. Williams, 26 111. 447, 79 Am.
ratified it by implication."
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1 )ec. 385.

But where an utter stranger assumes to act as agent, without any
authority for any purpose, the assumed principal is not required to
repudiate so promptly, in order to repel the charge of having ratified
the unauthorized
acts by acquiescence ; since in the latter case the
assumed agent bears no ostensible relation as agent to the person for
whom he assumes to act, and therefore third persons are not so liable
to be deceived by his pretensions, it being their own fault if they deal
with him as agent without some apparent evidence of his authority.
And since the undisputed evidence made a prima facie case of ratification, the finding that the notes and mortgage were executed by defendant was thereby justified, the ratification being equivalent to orig* *
*
inal authority.

Judgment and order reversed.

61

fyb${j(AA\
HARTLOVE
(Court of Appeals

Roberts,

J. This

v.

of Maryland,

WM.
1S99.

FAIT
89

CO.

Md. 254, 43 Atl. G2.)

case was tried in the court below before the judge

court of Baltimore city, without the intervention of a jury. The verdict and judgment being against the appellant, he has accordingly appealed. The facts are briefly as follows:
The respective parties to this cause are both dealers in the canning
and sale of tomatoes.
The appellant authorized James Kean, a member of the firm of James Kean & Co., brokers in canned goods, to sell
for him 2,000 cases of standard three-pound tomatoes; and on the
25th of March, 1897, he did, through the instrumentality
of said agent,
sell said tomatoes to the appellee, at 55 cents per dozen, or $1.10 per
case, "net cash in ten days," September delivery, of the pack of 1897,
with an allowance for labels of about one dollar per thousand, in plain
cases, and to be delivered at the appellee's wharf in the month of September, 18 7
On this state of facts, it is contended on the part of the appellant
at large, sitting in the superior

that there is no evidence in the record legally sufficient to establish the

"See,

also, Ballard v. Xy... 138 Cal. 588, 596, 72 Pac. 156 (1903); Lee v.
10 Ala. 755, 77",
\\ Am. Dec. 505 (1846), quoting Story on Agency,
62, 83, 234 to 253; Kraft v. Wilson, 104 Cal. xvii, 37 Pac. 790 (1894).
Fontaine,
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sued on, which is admitted by the appellant to be the only
question before the court upon this appeal, and is substantially the
language of the appellant's third prayer, which was rejected by the
court below. The evidence in the record shows plainly the acceptance
of the bought note, and the only objections made to it by the appellant
were his strictures upon the terms of payment made to Mr. Kean, his
There never was, until after the bringing of this suit, the
broker.
slightest attempt by the appellant to repudiate the contract, either with
the said broker for the appellee, or directly with the appellee itself.
The price of canned tomatoes advanced rapidly in the early fall of
On the 23d of September, 1897, the appellee wrote the appel1897.
lant asking him to hasten the delivery of the tomatoes sold by ECean &
And on OcCo. The appellant made no reply to this communication.
tober 18, 1897, the appellee again wrote him that he had failed to fulcontract

as stipulated, and that suit would be brought against
He then
him if he did not deliver the goods as agreed upon by him.
called on the appellee, and informed its president that he could not deliver the goods, because his factory had burned down, and the farmers
had failed to meet their contracts with him, and that it would be useKean,
less to sue him, and no judgment could be made out of him.
which
in
the
with
appellant
conversations
his broker, testified to several
he made substantially the same statements as he had made to the apThis action was then brought below, and for the
pellee company.
first time the appellant set up the defense that he had never authorized the sale of the goods, and had never ratified Kean's action in makIt is ading such sale ; but the proof fails to sustain this contention.
mitted on behalf of the respective parties to this appeal that the only
question here to be considered and determined is whether there is any
evidence in the .record legally sufficient to show "that the appellant ever
ratified the written contract, and agreed to deliver the goods therein
It is in point of fact
mentioned to the appellee, net cash in ten days."
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fill his contract

No exception as to the admissibility of
question in the case.
reserved,
and the only contention arises on
the proof offered has been
third prayer of the appellant,
the
the refusal of the court to grant
evidence.
the
The appellant's speeffect,
is,
a
demurrer
to
in
which
cial exception to the appellee's first prayer, which was intended
to raise substantially the same question which was presented by the
appellant'- third prayer, was overruled by the court.
It will be appropriate here to state the views of the learned judge
who presided below, and has in plain terms correctly expressed the law
the sole

In passing upon the mot ion made by the defendant for a
the case.
new trial, Judge Dennis said: "When the case was tirxt heard, T took
of which a fresh examination of the
a view la view the correctness
grapher's notes of the testimony has confirmed) thai the contract
of sale negotiated through Capt. Kean, as agenl of the defendant, and
It is true that, when Kean presented to
the plaintiff was complete.
the defendant the 'sold note,' the latter objected to the item of ten days

of

THE

1 10

RELATION

(Part

1

but lie did not repudiate the contract on that account, but
which he certainly would not have
took the 'sold note' and kept
In the latter event,
done had he intended to repudiate the contract.
note
at
all.
Certainly nothing
would
have
receive
the
he
refused to
that was said or done on that occasion, or afterwards, ever led Kean
to believe otherwise than that the transaction was completed, and he
'bought
so reported to the plaintiff, to whom he gave the corresponding
wholly inconsistent
And the defendant's subsequent conduct
with his present contention;
for he not only kept the 'sold note,' but
when, several months afterwards he was called upon by the plaintiff
then; and when, shortto perform the contract, he never repudiated
he did not comply, he
afterwards, he was threatened with suit
defended his noncompliance by stating that he had suffered losses from
fire and other sources, and was not able to carry out the contract, —
thus recognizing,
the strongest way, the validity of the contract the
of
he
now disputes."
existence
which
The rule of damages properly applicable in this case will be found
the appellee's second prayer, which was granted by the
embodied
court below, and
supported by McGrath v. Gegner, 77 Md. 338, 26
Atl. 502. 39 Am. St. Rep. 415; Pinckney v. Dambmann, 72 Md. 184,
Brown v. Muller, L. R.
19 Atl. 450;
Exch. 319.
not
As to the question of ratification of the acts of the agent,
necessary that there should be any positive or express confirmation,
and for this purpose the conduct of the principal
construed liberally
253, 255, 256, 258. Martin, J.,
in favor of the agent.
Story, Ag.
delivering the opinion of the court in the case of Pitts v. Shubert, 11
better settled than
La. 286, 30 Am. Dec. 718, says "No principle
that he who
contract has been made for him, and
notified that
subject to his ratification, by
person who pretended to have authority
for that purpose,
unless, immediately on bepresumed to ratify
informed
thereof,
Hatch
v. Taylor, 10 N. H.
he
it."
repudiates
in^
Benj. Sales,
882.
From
careful examination of the ruling of the court below, we
have failed to discover any error.
follows from what we have said
that the judgment must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed, with costs to
the appellee.
:

is

§§

is

it
is

7

is

is

it,

a

a

is

It

a

§

:

SANDERS
("Circuit Court of Appeals

v.

PECK.

of the United States, Seventh Circuit,
C. A. 530, 87 Fed. 61.)

Woods, Circuit Judge. 06

1898.

30

C.

The bill in this case was brought by
Joshua C. Sanders, the appellant, against Ferdinand W. Peck, William R. Page, Harvey W. Booth, and David T. Corbin, to set aside
sale of 22 bonds, of $1,000 each, executed by the Riverside Improve-

a
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Part of the opinion is omitted.
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The sale 'was made on September 10, 1890, by Cormerit Company.
bin, as agent of the owners, to Peck, who was represented in the transaction by Page and Booth, and the bill charges a conspiracy of the defendants to cheat and defraud Sanders out of his interest in the bonds,
and in certain decrees in which the bonds, excepting two, had been
merged. The appellees answered, denying all fraud, averring a purchase in good faith through Corbin, who, as agent and attorney of the
owners of the bonds, it is alleged, had full authority to make the sale,
and setting up certain orders and decrees of the circuit court of Cook
county, 111., in the case of Peck against Chicago & Great Western Railroad Land Company and others, as an adjudication of Peck's title as
against the title asserted by Sanders.
It is not found necessary to rehearse the numerous facts incident to
That Corbin had
this litigation. A few propositions are controlling.
to Hendrickson
had
which
bonds
belonged
no authority to sell the two
is clear, and the preponderance of the evidence seems to us to be that
the sale made of the other bonds was unauthorized, and that, having
been notified of the appellant's ownership and of his denial of Corbin's
authority before the purchase money was paid, Peck and his agents
proceeded at their peril in an effort to consummate the sale by paying
the price to Corbin and by taking assignments of the decrees, which,

though obtained in the names of Ver Nooy and Temple, belonged to
the appellant. IBut, though unauthorized, we are of opinion that Sanders ratified th^sale by his subsequent conduct, when, with full knowledge of the circumstances, he entered into negotiations with Corbin
for a settlement of the account between them on the basis that the sale
to him for the price rewas valid, and that Corbin was
accountable
ceived for the bonds or decrees. ! In that negotiation, which was entered upon without any reservation of a right to repudiate the sale if
should not be effected, a sum was agreed upon as proper
compensation to Corbin for making the sale, and the difference between them which prevented an adjustment was in respect to a matter
This unreserved asin no way connected with the sale of the bonds.
Bertion of ownership of the proceeds amounted to recognition of the
validity of the sale. [A ratification once fairly made, it was not revocable,
ff it be saidViat this ratification did not extend to the Hendrickson bonds, of which Sanders was not then the owner, he is ne\
ertheless in no better position, in respect of those bonds, because of
his failure for more than a year after acquiring llendrickson's title to
* *
*
quest ii m the -ale.
The decree below is affirmed.

a settlement
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DANAHER
(Supreme

(Parti

RELATION

v.

GARL<

Courl of Michigan,

1876.

>CK.
•"•■".
Mich.

'JO.").)

Danaher had a contract for railway construction, and sublet a part
Garlock sues For the board of laborers,
the work to Poh) & Dye.
The evidence showed payment by
contracted for by Bony & Dye.
Danaher's ag< nl of a previous hoard bill upon their order.
l'li; Curiam.
We think there is no material distinction between
07
as to the proof introthis ease and Wells v. .Martin. 32 Mich. 478,

of

duced to show liability.
We discover no evidence in the record tending to show an original
of any arrangeby Danaher, or any act of ratification,
undertaking
made,
and
the
bill
of exceptions
have
ment which lain & Dye may
out; and the
is
set
all
the
of
testimony given
states that the substance
to bear
to
the
evidence
supposed
in
his
referring
charge
after
judge,
on the point, stated that it was substantially the testimony produced
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by both parties.

The judgment

should be set aside, with costs, and a new trial or-

dered.

TEBBETTS
(Supremo

v.

MOORK.

Court of Judicature of New Hampshire,

1849.

19 N.

II.

369.)

Assumpsit for goods sold and delivered. Verdict for defendant.
Woods, J. No objection is made that the auditor's report was perWe
mitted to be read to the jury, in the form in which it was offered.
can therefore take no other view of it than as containing a statement
of facts properly laid before the jury. It finds that the articles in
question were ordered by the sons of the defendant, in his name, and
That
by the plaintiffs delivered to the sons and charged to the father.
on former occasions articles had in like manner been delivered by the
plaintiffs to the same individuals, and the defendant had paid for
them, without objection, but without knowing that articles so ordered
and delivered were included in the account.
"7 In Wells v. Martin, '.VI Mich. ITS (1875), cited above, the court held that
proof that defendants' paymaster had paid a portion of a previous bill on the
order of a subcontractor,
and hail said they intended to pay the bill in suit,
is no evidence of a ratification by his principal of authority in the person who
incurred the debt.
1
of the unI a mere efforl on the part of the principal, after knowledge
anthorized act ><\'the agent, to avoid loss thereby, will not amount to ratification, so as to relieve tin- agent from liability., Triggs v. Jones, 46 Minn. 277,
)^ N. \V. 1113 (1891), post, p. l'.tn; Oglesby v. Smith, 38 Mo. App. G7 (1SS9).
attempt to settle with one's agent, who has surreptiN<>r is an abortive
tiously sold one's property, a ratification of the sale, so as to preclude any
Gilman Linseed Oil Co. v. Norton, 89 Iowa,
remedy againsl the purchaser.
See. also, Humphrey v. Havens,
t::i. 56 N. W. 663, 18 Am. St. Rep. 100 (1893).
12 Minn. 298 (GiL 196) (1867) in which the principal had ratified a previous
■
entirely
character.

of the agenl of an

different

(tsJJLuvU**
Ch
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Two clear propositions may be stated upon these facts : First, the
relation in which sons stand to a father involves no authority on their
part to contract debts in his name and in his behalf. /They cannot bind
him by their acts, without authority emanating froru his own will to
do so, any more than mere strangers cam I In the case of things necessary for their support, the relation of / a Nfather to his sons may be
shown in aid of other proof of the authority of the latter; but such
is not the present case.

I
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The second proposition is that the ground upon which the law raises
of authority in an agent from a course of previous
a presumption
acts,"? is that those acts have been done with the consent or acquiesFor to
cence W the principal, and, of course, with his knowledge.
say that one has assented to an act, without knowing that it has been
Perhaps the facts which are
performed, is an absurdity in terms.
commonly received and are legally admitted as evidence of this knowledge may sometimes exist consistently with a want of it. And such is
But proof that the supposed printhe nature of evidence in general/
cipal knew of the acts shown in evidence of the agency is always re-

\

\

quired.

the strongest acts of ratification is payment./ It is evidence
that the party knew and approved of the act so ratine/. But it is evidence which may be rebutted, and is rebutted in the present case, by
proof which satisfied the mind of the auditor, and, as was suggested
The judge therefore correctly inin the outset, must satisfy us.

/Among

the jury that no inference could legally be made from the
payments made by the defendant for articles ordered by his sons and
delivered to them by the plaintiffs, such payment having been made
without any knowledge on the defendant's part that he was paying fo
such things; and there must be
structed

Judgment on the verdict.

W< )<>1>S v.

of New York City and County,

Pleaa

(Common

46

Action

FRANCKLYN.

N.

v. st.

L892.

10

N.

T. Supp.

377.

Rep. 396.)

by Woods to recover for work, labor, and services performed
for
alleged agent. Appeal from judgmenl
I of defendants'

plaint ill'.
I'.i-i i:oit,

/

in this case is whether plaintifl
evidence, authority on the part of Still-

].' The decisive question

■itablishedl

by competenl

to ;i ratification
to do future acta doea no! amounl
Britl v. Gordon, L32 towa, 131, 108 N. W. 319, n Ann.
eventa
id upon certain
i: i"" hilly If tiic power la conditi
107 (1906).
Ticonic Water Power & Mfg. Co. v. Lang, 63 Me.
which do nol trVnaplre.
Brown v.
3 Pet 69, 7 L. Ed- 608 (1830);
Bell v. Cufinlngham,
180 (1874);
•« A

:

power of attorney

alreadj

dpne.

137 Mich.

35,

100

V

W.

L67 (1904).

-
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THE

(Parti

man to bind defendant as his principal.
In considering this question,
evidence o\ Stillman's declarations tending to show his authority to act
defendant should be eliminated, bi&ause it is admissible for no
such purpose, but only for the purpose of showing credit was intended
to be given to the defendant.
Stringham v. Insurance Co., 4 Abb.
People's Bank v. St.
Dec. 315; Marvin v. Wilber, 52 N. Y. -'70;
T
. Y. 512, 17 N. E. 408.
Anthony's R. C. Church, 109
Outside such declarations the validity of the judgment depends upon
[acts substantially as follows: Plaintiff performed eertain work, labor,
and services in repairing the buildings ^73 and 879 B roadway and 17
East Eighteenth street, which were owned by Sir Bache Cunard, upon
Stillman's request and representation that he was authorized by deOf these premises Stillfendant to employ plaintiff for such purpose.
man had assumed full management and control at the request of the
defendant; but the defendant, in making such request, acted for and
as the agent of Cunard, the owner.
Stillman did whatever he thought
necessary for the preservation of the premises, caused repairs to be
made, collected rents, paid expenses, and remitted the balance to dePrior to plaintiff's last
fendant for the owner's, Cunard's, account.
claim
in
and
the
of
the
suit he had performed
accruing
employment
similar services under precisely the same circumstances, for which, at
Stillman's direction, he on one occasion rendered a bill to defendant,
which was paid when presented.
It cannot be said that the facts recited would support an inference
of Stillman's authority to bind defendant, construed most favorably to
plaintiff, despite Stillman's apparent equivocation as a witness for him.
It is obvious, though Stillman entered upon the agency of Cunard's
buildings at defendant's request, that he was Cunard's, and not defendant's agent. The fact that defendant was the depositary of the rents
accruing to Cunard from the buildings no more had the effect of substituting defendant for Cunard as principal than would an agent's deposit in any case of his principal's funds with a banker for transmission create the relation of principal and agent so as to charge the
banker with liability for the acts of the depositor.
It is true that authority to do a particular act may be inferred by a course of dealing
between an alleged principal and his assumed agent, as in a case where
a principal
has repeatedly recognized and approved of * : milar acts,
(Bank v. Putnam, 1 Abb. Dec. 80; Wood v. Railroad Co., 8 N. Y.
160; Hammond v. Varian, 54 N. Y. 398; Olcott v. Railroad Co.. 27
N. Y. 546. 84 Am. Dec. 298; Bank v. Clements, 31 N. Y. 33;) but
we are unable to find any sanction in principle or authority for holding
that the ratification of a single act would justify an inference that any
further similar act would likewise meet with recognition, or that the
assumed agent is thus empowered to subject the alleged principal to
liability upon subsequent unauthorized contracts.
For this reason we
must regard defendant's payment of plaintiff's bill for services on a
former occasion insufficient to justify the inference that Stillman had

\
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authority from defendant to employ plaintiff as his agent. 69 The facts
therefore did not authorize plaintiff's recovery, and the motion to dismiss his complaint should have been granted.
Judgment reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant
to abide the event.

WADE
(Supreme

v.

WOLFSON.

Court of New York, Appellate Term,

1904.

90 N. T. Supp. 1078.)
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Action for goods sold and delivered. From judgment for defendant,
plaintiff appeals.
Per Curiam. The defendant's wife had no apparent authority 4ck
to bind him to the purchase of stock for his perfumery business, and,
crediting his testimony, there was no ground for holding him to a
ratification, his acts in relation to the goods being in no way inconsistent with the actual oral agreement made by him with the salesman,
-whereby he (defendant) was to sell the goods on commission.
That
this was the agreement, the justice has found upon a simple conflict
of evidence, and there is nothing improbable in the defendant's assertion that he knew of no other.
Judgment affirmed, with costs. 70

(b)

Accepting

T)

Benefits

HANEY SCHOOL FURNITURE CO. v. HIGHTOWER
BAPTIST INSTITUTE.
(Supreme

Court of Georgia,

1901.

113

Ga.

2S9,

38

S.

E.

7G1.)

Action on an open account for thirty school desks, a reading chart,
and some blackboards.
Defendant was a corporation, created to carry
on a school, and was managed by a board of trustees.
This board
hired one Booth as principal of the school, and he had bought the
supplies sued for. Judgment for defendant.
Little, J. [After stating the facts and ruling on a motion by
88Th.it a railway company had paid a physician, hired by a conductor, t<>
attend n person injured by his train. <!nry imt simw ii ratification of such unemployment, bo as to bind the company for a subsequent unauauthorized
thorized employment of the physician
for another person Injured.
Wills v.
Int. A <;. N. R. en., ii Tex. Civ. App. 58, 92 S. W. •J?:: (1906).
Bui a single
art of an agent and a recognition ot it by the principal may be so unequivocal
and of bo positive ami comprehensive a character as n> place the authority oi
the agent to do similar arts for the print [pal beyond any question.
The value
b proof does nut depend bo much upon the number of arts as upon their
character,
if the evidence Is doubtful, it La a question for the |ury. Wilcox
v. i'.. M. & st. i\ i:. Co., L' I Minn. 269 (1871
to Accord:
Bromley v. Aday, 70 Ark. 851, 68 8. W. 82 (1902); White Sew
i'h. Co. v. 11in & Co., 136 N. C. 128, L8 8. B. 575 (1904).
Uodd.Pb.A A. i"
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1

* * * 2. Plaintifl
motion to amend the petition:]
sought to have the verdict set aside on the ground that ii was contrary
It is our opinion
to the evidence, and without evidence to support it.
that under the evidence the plaintiff was entitled to have a verdict in
It is undeniably true thai the board of trustees wire units favor.
willing to have a debt created against the corporation which they represented, and it is equally true that they did not authorize Booth to
It cannot be gainsaid,
create the debt on which the suit was brought.
however, that by their express and recorded action they did authorize
h to purchase certain equipment for the school, although in doing
of the amount of money on
so they limited him to the expenditure
hand ; and clearly, as an original proposition, he had no right to go beBut in authorizing Booth to
yond it. nor to create any debt at all.
funds on hand they conextent
of
the
the
to
the
purchase
equipment
When he went beyond that limit,
stituted him their agent that far.
he exceeded his authority, and could not primarily contract a debt
which, without their acquiescence, would be binding on the corporaIn such
It is a clear case of the agent exceeding his authority.
tion.
a case, in order to bind the principal, it must appear that he in some
If he did, he is liable; if he did
way ratified the unauthorized act.
not, he is in no way liable for the debt.
Section 3019 of the Civil Code declares that a ratification by the
principal relates back to the act ratified, and takes effect as if originally
authorized.
A ratification may be express, or implied from the acts
or silence of the principal, and a ratification once made cannot be revoked.
We accept the evidence of members of the board of trustees
who were sworn in this case as true, and as a matter of fact it must

plaintiff on
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a

be conceded that when the board

ascertained that Booth had exceeded
his authority, and purchased the desks and other equipment of the
school on a credit, they in words repudiated that action, and notified
plaintiff through its attorney that the goods bought were subject to its
order.
Therefore they were not silent, and the ratification of Booth's
contract cannot be declared in this case from the silence of the prinThe question, then, is narrowed to the inquiry whether the
cipal.
board of trustees ratified this contract of Booth by their acts.
It
was undoubtedly originally contemplated that the schoolroom should be
supplied with desks and other equipment according to the means in
the hands of the trustees.
It cannot be made a cause of difference in
the determination
of the question of liability that Booth took the
school for what he could make out of it
The school building and the
equipment which it contained were the property of the corporation,
and under the direct control of the trustees, and in turning over the
school building and the furniture therein to Booth the trustees of the
defendant corporation were but carrying out the object of the incorIt is conclusively shown
poration, which was to maintain a school.
that, while the trustees were unwilling to better equip the school building by incurring a debt, yet, after having learned that the desks, etc.,
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In

they continued

to

use

it

if

a

a

by

a

a

by

it

in

in

it

trustees from liability
their corporation.

in the

business of

of Wright v. Methodist Church, 72 .Minn. 7*. 74 X. \V.
pastor of
church purchased an organ for the use of the
church, and claimed that
was purchased
its authority.
This was
At the time of its receipt the trustees of the church did nol
denied.
know that
had been purchased, bul were told that the pa-tor had
ordered
particular occasion.
After ascertaining the fad of
the case
the

a

f
r

jj

it

it

by

a

1015,

in

it

the purchase, the trustees notified the plaintiff that the pastor had
no authority
from them to purchase the organ, but
was allowed
to remain
the church,
and was continually
used
therein.
The

of Minnesota,
passing on
nol originally authorized

these

fans, ruled

that,

to purchase the organ
under the facts its trustees subsequently ratified his
tieral rule
found stated
The
Mechem, Ag.
148.
§

church,

in

the

courl

pa

is

for

the

in

supreme

if
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which were placed in the school building for the use of the school
which they were appointed to maintain, had been purchased by Booth
on credit, they allowed such desks and other equipment to remain in
said school building, and be used by the president and scholars from
the time of such discovery up to the time of the trial of the case.
The trustees, then, are placed in this position : They did not authorize Booth to purchase this furniture on credit. As soon as they learned
he had done so, they notified the seller that Booth had no authority to
contract the debt for them, and that they would not be bound thereby.
and disclaimed title to the property.
Had they stopped here, and
caused this property to be taken from their building, or stored it unused there or elsewhere, their claim would have been perfectly sustained; but, after having disclaimed title, the fact remains that they
continued to use it for a year or more, having all the benefits of
and, notwithstanding their disclaimer, kept
for the use of the school.
must be held that such action ratified the purchase made by Booth.
not
sufficient answer to this proposition to say that this equipment
being used by Prof. Callaway, the successor of Booth.
This
so for the reason that Callaway was put there by the trustees, and was
furnished the school building and the furniture belonging to it. When
Booth left the building, he left therein this equipment, which the defendants claimed belonged to the plaintiff. Callaway was admitted by
their action, and permitted by them to use the furniture which was
their building, and this, having been bought
Booth
their name,
and placed
their building, they should,
some manner, have excepted such furniture from Callaway's control in carrying on the
school for them. They could not permit such use of
him as
part of the furniture of their school building without working
ratification of the purchase made
And, while
Booth.
disclaimer of
title and notification to the seller that the trustees of the school building had no claim to this furniture which was being used therein was
mad",
was not. alone, such
sufficient repudiation as would free the

1 18

Tin: RELATION

(Part

1

precedes a statement of the rule with the assertion that the
methods by which ratification may be effected arc as numerous and as
various as the complex dealings of human life. But he adds that: "I [e
who would avail himself of the advantages arising from the act of
If the
another in his behalf must also assume the responsibilities.
principal has knowingly appropriated and enjoyed the fruits and benefits of an agent's act. he will not afterwards he heard to say that the
( )ne who voluntarily accepts the proceeds of
act was unauthorized.
done
one
an act
assuming, though without authority, to be his
by
the
act, and takes it as his own, with all its burdens as
a. ratifies
well as all its benefits. He may not take the benefits and reject the
burdens, but he must cither accept them or reject them as a whole."
This court, in the case of Byrne v. Doughty, 13 Ga. 52, citing Story,
Ag. says : "To bind the principal, there is no necessity for a positive or
direct confirmation on his part of the act of the agent, but it may arise
by implication from the acts or proceedings of the principal in pais.
And for this purpose the acts and conduct of the principal
are construed favorably in favor of the agent.
Slight circumstances
and small matters will sometimes suffice to raise the presumption of
* * * Authority to do the act is presumed from subratification.
In the case of Hodnett v.
of
acts
assent and acquiescence."
sequent
Tatum, 9 Ga. 70, it was ruled that the principal cannot, of his own
mere authority, ratify the acts of his agent in part in regard to a particular transaction, and repudiate them as to the rest; and in the opinion, Judge Warner, referring to the facts in that case, said: "If he
[the principal] did not intend to ratify the act of his agent in receiving the Alabama money, he ought to have returned it within a reasonMcable time, and not have retained it upon his own arbitrary terms."
Cay, J., in the case of Ketchum v. Verdell, 42 Ga. 538, said : "If the
principal accepts the property knowing all the facts, that is a ratification of the agency." In Murray v. Walker, 44 Ga. 58, it was ruled that
"the taking of Confederate currency by the principal, and its use by
him, w ras a ratification of the act of the agent." To the same effect is
the ruling made in the case of Gilbert v. Dent, 46 Ga. 238.
The trustees of the defendant corporation were evidently unwilling to
create a debt, and did not intend to buy this furniture on credit, and
they had the right to refuse to do so if they wished ; but, when they
discovered that Booth had purchased the furniture on their account,
then was the time not simply to repudiate the action of Booth in words,
If, after such discovery, they had debut to repudiate it altogether.
clined to use the desks and other property sold, which, being in their
building as a part of the equipment, were being used by them through
Callaway, their agent, but had returned them or taken them out of theii
building after proper notification, their wishes would have been accomBut when, after the knowledge of Booth's purchase, they conplished.
tinued to use it by their agent and employe knowing that Booth claimed
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to have bought it for them, that use of it made it their property by
71
Its use by the school was their use.
ratification.
It must therefore, be ruled that, as this evidence of ratification and
use of the property was uncontradicted, the verdict rendered was contrary to the evidence in the case, and the court erred in overruling the
motion for a new trial. Judgment reversed.
S. School Furniture Co. v. School District, 56 Neb. 645, 77 N. W.
a suit for money paid to an agent of plaintiff for school furniture,
the court said: "'The defendant contends that the furniture company, with
full knowledge of the material facts, ratified and approved the act of its agent
in collecting the money due to it from the school district. We think this conThe plaintiff authorized Murtention is sustained by the undisputed proof.
In doing this
dock to deliver the furniture and set it up in the schoolroom.
it was necessary that he should pay freight charges, drayage, and other exWith the money obtained from the defendant he paid these charges,
penses.
His principal found no fault and made
and advised his principal of the fact.
It cheerfully acquiesced in this part of the transaction, and
no objection.
has not at any time offered to reimburse the defendant to the extent that the
Even at the trial
money collected was applied to its use and for its benefit.
it did not offer to credit the school district with the amount so applied. Having determined to sue for the full contract price of the furniture, it was certainly the plain duty of the furniture company to tender back to the defendant so much of the money paid to Murdock as had been necessarily expended
The retention of such
by him in performing the conditions of the contract.
money, while attempting to coerce payment of the entire sum for which the
furniture was sold, puts plaintiff in the incongruous attitude of holding fast
This
to the fruits of an agency while insisting that the agency never existed.
lie
it cannot do. A principal must adopt the acts of his agent as a whole,
will not be permitted to retain the part which is beneficial and reject that
:;'.» X. W. Ml: Manufacwhich is not. Rogers v. Hardware Co.. 24 Neb. <;.">."..
turing Co. v. Wagoner, 25 Neb. 439, 41 X. W. 2S7; Waterson v. Rogers, ill
Kan. 529. The plaintiff by its conduct clearly ratified the acts of Murdock so
of law,
far as they were advantageous to it, and that, in contemplation
amounted to a ratification of the entire transaction."
The Pennsylvania court, by Green, J., in Wheeler & Wilson Co. v. Aughey,
i II I'a. 398, 22 All. 667, liT Am. St. Rep. 638, put the case thus: "It is of no
avail to raise or (iiscii^s the question of the means of proof Of the agent's authority. The very essence of the rule is that the agent had no authority to
ih- representation, condition, or stipulation by means of which he obtained the property or right in action of which the principal seeks t<> avail
It is not because he had specific authority to hind his principal for
himself.
the purpose in question that the principal is bound, hut notwithstanding the
of the fruits of the
it is the enjoyment
had no such authority,
f.i.t thai
it
agent's action which charges the principal with responsibility for his act.
therefore, to Inquire whether there is the same degree of technical
as is
proof of the authority of the agent, in the matter under consideration,
required in ordinary cases where an affirmative liability is set up against a
principal by the acl of one who assumes to be his agent There the question
to the power of the assumed agent to Impose a legal liability upon an
Other person, and in all that class 'it cases it Lb entirely proper to hold that
Bui in this class of
of the agenl are no! sufficient
the men. declarations
Here the basis id' liability lor the ad
the question is entirely different.
of the agenl Is the tact that the principal has accepted tic
or declaration
Where that basis Is made to apbenefits of the agent's act or declaration.
Mr. Justice Share
pear by testimony, the legal consequence is established.
many instances in whicb
in ii,,- , :l ,• above cited, after enumerating
ims up the subject thus: •Many of these cases are
the doctrine w .i^ enforced,
put upon an implied authority, bm the more reasonable ground, as it seems to
that the part; having enjoyed ;• benefll musl take 11 cum onere.'"
71

In U.
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Action upon
FlNCH, J.

of

.Ww

York.

v.

(Parti

CONSTABLE.

L885.

99

X. Y. 309, 1 N. E. 884.)

for defendant.
which this action is founded was not
paid, its makers were liable, unless those of them who were sureties
became freed from their obligation by reason of some act which
The referee does not
changed their contract or imperiled their rights.
hud such payment as a fact, nor as an inference from the facts ascertained. Indeed, it is difficult to see how any such inference could have
Whatever may be true as to the want
been possible from the proof.
of authority to sell the note in the bank which received it for collection, it is quite certain that the transaction between the plaintiffs and
It
the collecting agent was a sale, or an entirely void proceeding.
into a payment in hostility to the expressed
could not be transformed
There was a
intentions of both parties who acted in the transfer.
sale, or an attempt at a sale, which utterly failed, hut never a payment ; and an erroneous supposition by Peters, the payee, as to the
fact which produced the money, traceable to his ignorance of the
truth, cannot alter the nature of that truth.
The note being, then, unpaid, is due from the makers to some one, and must be payable to Pea note.

If

Judgment

the note upon

ters or the plaintiff.
The only concern

of the defendants, if the rights of the sureties
have not been infringed, is to know to which of two parties they may
If they had paid it voluntarily to plaintiff, could
safely pay the debt.
ifter full knowledge of the situation, and with the plaintiff's
money in his pocket, and persistently retained, successfully sue upon
It is quite certain that he could not. He would be unit as owner?
able to produce the note, and could not force it from plaintiff's posn without return of the purchase money, and, while keeping that,
would be obliged to admit that he held it as a payment of the note or
consideration of it- sale, and either alternative would be fatal to his
The defendants thus can pay the debt which they
cause of action.
have not paid to the plaintiff, as its holder, with entire safety, and
without danger of being liable to Peters.
Why, then, should they not
pay it? If the transaction had been found to be, or shaped upon competent proof as, an advance by plaintiff to De Garmo, the maker, of
the money necessary to pay the note, the successful defense would
have been payment; but when nothing of the kind was either done or
intended, or found as a fact, and the note remains unpaid, why should
It is not claimed that the sureties directed or
not its maker pay it?
tion, or put the owner, whoever he might be, under
required i
Their contract was not changed. They proma duty to enforce it.
ised to pay to I'eters or hearer, and the plaintiff is the bearer, and
comes to them with that title, and in accord with their contract.
They
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agreed that the note might be sold when they made their contract negotiable. No right of theirs was violated, and they suffered no injury.
If they desired the note promptly sued, they could say so as well to
plaintiff as to Peters, or pay it and take their remedy against De
Garmo.
Their sole defense, therefore, was that which prevailed with the referee: That the bank had no authority to sell, and so plaintiff got no
title. Undoubtedly, Peters might have repudiated the act of his agent,
when he learned what it was.
The moment he became possessed of
that knowledge, he was bound in common honesty to return the money
paid him by mistake, or retain it as it was given to his agent. The
Jaw will not endure that he shall keep the product of the agent's act
and yet repudiate his authority.
Even in a case of fraudulent representations by the agent, never at all authorized or suspected by the
principal, a reception and retention of the proceeds may make the latter responsible for the fraud. National L. Ins. Co. v. Minch, 53 N.
Y. 144; Hathaway v. Johnson, 55 N. Y. 93, 14 Am. Rep. 186. No
wrong or violence is done to the rights of Peters by the process. His
agent obtained plaintiff's money by a pretended sale of the note in exIf, then, he
cess of the authority conferred,
and Peters knows it.
keeps the money, and avails himself of the fruits of the unauthorized
But he does not repudiate
act, he cannot be allowed to repudiate it.
or attempt to do so. He sets up no claim to the note, and says only
that he wanted the money and did not care how he got
that
sale or
whether by
payment. The fact, then, that the note was not
time he thought that
was, folalthough for
paid, and he knew
lowed by his continued retention of the money, his omission to demand
admits of no other interpretation than
the note, or assert any title to
all the more easily inferred because
ratification of the sale. 72

a

Is
a

it

it

72 Sec. also, Waterson
v. Rogers, 21 Kan. 529 (1879), in which
was salt
"Upon these facts we remark thai one who voluntarily
by Brewer, J.:
cepts the proceeds of .-in acl done by "in- assuming, though without authority,
as his own, with nil its inn-dens,
to in- Lis agent, ratifies the act, and takes
n<' may aol take the benefits and rejeel tin- burdens,
ms well us its benefits.
general proposii.iit be either accepts or rejects them as
whole.
This
tion, i<> which, of course, there may be exceptions ami limitations.
Bui -till
i- potenl in this case as showing (hat there was sonic testimony from which
jury mighl deduce
lie acted
ratification by bim of the ads of the wife
ami repudiated oothing of benefll t<> bimself.
knowingly,
Can he avoid tin'
burdens?
Counsel Bay thai Gallagher abandoned the farm, ami thai Rogers
it lei
compelled n> take
run down, ami thai such mere measure of
ratification of the unauthorized ad
protection ought nol to be construed as
that.
He took possession of
Bui his action was ool limited
of his wife.
tim bay which bad belonged to Gallagher, ami was given him by the arbitra
tow, .hmI fill
to in
tock. The cattle ami also the borses which be had
turned over t" Gallagher, ami which wire returned only in pursuance of the
arbitration, he keeps the possession of. Ami. in the letter which he wrote
mi receipt of the new-, he does nut deny his wife's authority, "i- propose to
repudiate
ntire action, hut only t" contest the paymenl of these notes.
tinulng the lease, or th
tracts
Nowhere due- he insist upon Gallagher's
he hid made with him, <»r offer an] objection to the termination
of these, and
i

<

ti

ii

t.
.

;i

it

it

a
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It made the money in his possession
his interest lay in that direction.
It is just
lawfully his. and took him wholly out of the controversy.
to the plaintiff, who parted with his money as purchaser, and upon the
It does no injustice to the sureties, for
faith and credit oi the note.
Circumstances
thcy have no equity to he discharged without payment.
might have occurred which would have entitled them to a release.
Possibly, if they had been lulled into a false security hy information
and a consequent belief that the note was paid, and due to the silence
and delay of the purchaser, the principal in the mean time becoming
But nothinsolvent, some just ground might exist for their discharge.
defense
is pleaded, and no
No such
ing <^\ the kind is in the case.
sale.
from
the
The evidence
of
any injury resulting
suggestion made
shows that Terwilliger, one of the sureties, was notified of a proposed
transfer, and not only did not object, hut promised to see his associates.
They say only that they never consented to a sale. They do not
that
they were not notified of an intended transfer ; and since they
say
make no complaint, either in the pleadings or the proof, that they have
been misled or harmed by the transaction treated as a sale, and ratified
Certainly, they
as such by Peters, there is no injustice done to them.
have no equity to compel the plaintiff, in hostility to his intention and
against his will, to pay their note, for which he was in no manner
bound.

We find no difficulty, therefore, in applying to the case the doctrine
of ratification.
Coykendall made the purchase before he had seen the
indorsements
note or the
upon it. Peters knew the whole truth, — at
least, when examined as a witness on the trial, — and, instead of repudiating the sale, said only that he got the money for his loan, "and
that was the end of it."
The cases cited by the respondent are not inconsistent with our view
of the transaction.
Some of them were founded upon statutes relating
and making certain transfers void because illegal.
to corporations,
Gillet v. Phillips, 13 N. Y. 114; Houghton v. McAuliffe, 26 How.
Prac. 270. In one of them the agent of the payee did not sell, or intend to sell, the note, and nothing was said which necessarily gave him
notice of a different intention on the part of the person taking the
note. Burr v. Smith, 21 Barb. 262. Beyond the cases cited, our attention has been incidentally drawn to one which tends in many reFuller v. Bennett,
spects to justify the contention of the respondents:
It is observable, however, that the ques55 Mich. 357, 21 N. W. 433.
tion of payment arose, and upon a very debatable state of facts ; and
also that the payee never knew that his note was not paid until five
years after the money was received, and when the situation of the parsrrender of the property back

it

t<>himself.
Now, it seems to us that in
matters there was testimony tending to Bhow a ratification.
We do not
was conclusive, or was not subject to
mean to In- understood n- ~;<%i u thai
explanation or contradiction; but we do hold that, if upon it the jury bad found
there was a ratification, we should not have felt warranted in setting aside
support."
tii<- verdict as entirely without
'_r
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Our
ties had been changed by the intervening death of the maker.
great respect for the learned judge who wrote the opinion has caused
us to give additional reflection to the views we have expressed, but
has not shaken our conviction that in this case the title of the plaintiff
to the note sued upon was good.
The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted; costs to
abide the event.

WILLIAMS
(Supreme

Court of Tennessee,

v.

STORM.

18G9.

46 Tenn.

[6 Cold.]

203.)
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George Andrews, J. Mrs. Storm, the defendant, was the equitable
owner of a farm in Roane county. With the purpose of cultivating
and improving the premises, she leased them to one Brinkman, and
also constituted him her agent, to make certain improvements upon the
estate, the nature and character of which improvements do not appear
in proof.
For the purpose of enabling Brinkman to carry on the
farm, and make the necessary improvements, Mrs. Storm gave him a
letter of credit, authorizing him to draw on one De Armond, to the
De Armond being unable, or un~
amount of three hundred dollars.
willing to furnish the money, Brinkman applied to W. S. McEwen,
who agreed, upon the personal guaranty of Brinkman, to furnish the
required credit, and did accordingly supply Brinkman with cash and
various articles for the use of the farm, to the amount of over three
Two hundred and fifty dollars of this amount, and
hundred dollars.
perhaps the whole, was afterwards repaid to McEwen by Mrs. Storm.
But Brinkman, after this time, requiring further supplies, and .McEwen being unwilling, in consequence of delay in the former payment,
to make further advances, Brinkman presented the letter of credit to
complainant, Williams, who, upon the credit of Mrs. Storm, gave to
Brinkman a letter of credit to McEwen, for the further amount of
It does not appear whether Williams was
three hundred dollars.
Upon the credit
aware of the previous advances made by McEwen.
of Williams, thus obtained, Brinkman procured from McEwen, cash
and other articles, to the amount of about three hundred and eighty
dollars, which were employed, as Brinkman testifies, in improvements
and expenses on Mrs. Storm's land, but in what manner does nol ap-

This amount has been repaid to McEwen by complainant.
Mrs. Storm re ided in Europe, and there is no evidence that she
had any knowledge of the transaction with Williams, till the filing of
complainant's bill. The bill in this cause, is filed by Williams, to compel payment by Mrs. Storm, of the amount thus advanced by him.
Upon the hearing, on pleadings and proof, the chancellor dism

pear.

the bill, and the complainanl

appi aled

to this court.

The letter of credil given bj Mrs. Storm to Brinkman, and addressed to De Arnu.nd, constituted no authority to Brinkman to pro-

UiAsv**-

l.">4

Tin: RELATION

(Parti

cur^ this loan by credit from Williams, and there is no proof whatever, that r.rinkman had any authority, as Mis. St'>nn*s agent, to hind
her in the transaction.
Bui it is claimed for complainant, that Mrs.
Storm, by her conduct, held Brinkman OUt t<> the world as her agent,
and thus rendered herself liable For any contracts he might make in
her name, and that, as the supplies procured through complainant's
credit were applied to her use and benefit, she is legally hound to pay
for them.
There is nothing to show that, in the present case, Mrs.
St. Mm held r.rinkman out to the world as her agent, duly authorized
to borrow
money, or to purchase property on credit in her name.
There is nothing in the agency proven to have existed, which requires

of such authority; and the simple fact, that she paid the
first incurred by Brinkman to McEwen, cannot be considered as
a binding admission on her part, of his authority to make similar contracts in her name in the future.
There is no proof that Williams knew of the former transaction
with McEwen.
So far as appears, he proceeded solely upon the letter
of credit to De Armond, which was exhihited to him, and upon his belief in the good faith of Brinkman, and the responsibility of Mrs.
Storm.
The authority of Brinkman extended only to the borrowing of the
sum of three hundred dollars, and that only upon his letter of credit
to De Armond. And even if that authority were held to extend to the
borrowing of that particular sum of McEwen, instead of De Armond,
it was then exhausted, and could not be extended into a general authority to borrow as many sums and of as many different persons as
The complainant had nohe might subsequently think fit to require.
tice of Brinkman' s want of authority; and though his case is a hard
one, he must be held to have loaned to him his credit at his peril.
The general rule is unquestioned, that, if an agent exceeds his authority in purchasing property, or otherwise making engagements in
the name of his principal, and the principal knowingly receives and retains the property, or accepts the benefit of the engagement made, he
thereby ratifies the contract made by his agent. But this rule only applies in cases where the principal has knowledge of the transaction,
and an opportunity to repudiate the acts of the assumed agent. 73
If an agent has, by acts and contracts, beyond the scope of his authority, and without the knowledge of his principal, purchased property or borrowed money in the name of his principal, and expended
the same in the care, preservation, or improvement of his principal's
estate ; and at the time when the transaction comes to the knowledge
of the principal, the property has been consumed, or expenditures
made in such manner that the property cannot be restored, or the conthe existence
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s'* B<
Bryant v. Moon-, L'<; Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec. 96 (184G).
If the principal baa Bold Hi.' property received from the agent before he has knowledge,
a failure to return it is no ratification.
Martin v. Hickman, 64 Ark. 217, 41
s. W. 852 (1897).
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1

-

a

ly

it,

Where the principal has
tract repudiated, the principal is not bound.
he
bound promptcontract,
or
ratify
the
to
to
repudiate
the option
party cannot so deal with
to do either the one or the other. But
an unauthorized person assuming to act as agent, as to leave the principal no option, and to compel him by force of the mere fact that the
Am.
transaction has been for his benefit, to ratify the contract.

it

;

is

;

;

Lead. Cases, 574.
It does not appear in this case, how the money obtained by Brinkman, upon the complainant's
what improvecredit, was expended
what expenses of the farm were defrayed or what
ments were made
property purchased by its means or whether any such property or improvements remain for the benefit of the defendant, or that the improvements and purchases were such as Brinkman was authorized by
obvious.
and while the hardship to the complainant
her to make
cannot be permitted that unauthorized persons shall make improvements in their own discretion, upon the estates of others, without the

it

;

a

It

a

is

The decree will

ST.

be affirmed.

LOUIS GU.YXIxr, ADVKKTISINO

(St Louis Court of Appeals,

Missouri,

CO. v.

WANAMAKER

LIB Mo. App. 270, 90 S. W. 737.)

[905.

for rentals for six months advertisements on billboards,
owned by plaintiff. The advertising contract had been made by one
Plaintiff claimed (1) that
Lurie, "selling agent" of defendants.
failLurie had not authority to advertise for defendant, defendant
letter written
plaintiff about the contract had rating to reply to
ified the same; and (2) that Lurie's authority was ample in any case.
From judgment for $300, defendant appeals.
favor of the plaintiff
verdict
The ground for
Goode,
ratified the con
had
was
that
defendanl
allowed by the instructions
instruction
treated the de
first
The
name.
its
Lurie
reasonable time after
fendant's failure to disclaim liability within
itself
ratification.
iving plaintiff's letter of November 20th as
was undisputed.
Hence
that instruction
Every fact hypothesised
verdict for the plaintiff. We
the charge was equivalent to dire* ting
in

omitted.

y

Part of the opinion

Is

a

in

a

in

a

in

a

1.

I.

7
'

a

by

by

if

Action

1
1
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it

knowledge of the owner, and when too late to repudiate the unauthorby payment of the exized action, call upon the owners to ratify
may or may not be, that the benefit accruing to the
penses incurred.
moral obligation to pay
defendant in this case, may impose upon her
but to hold that the
for these purchases, expenses and improvements
in the power of unauthorized
legal one, would place
obligation
persons, to improve the holders of property out of their estates.

v

Till'.

L56
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1

think the instruction wenl too far, In view of the fact that plaintiff
had already performed half the coritracl before it wrote the letter ami
could not have been induced by defendant's silence to render that
much oi the agreed service, and of the further fad that defendant's
silence did not induce the plaintiff to refrain from proceeding against
l.nrie personally while it mighl have collected the rent from him. The
silence ^i a principal, after receiving notice that his agent has assumed
act, may he a fact to be weighed on
to hind him by an unauthorized
the issue oi whether the principal ratified the act, or may raise a prethe consumption that he ratified it, according to circumstances.
troversy between the agent and the third party is completed before
the principal is notified, so that no detriment can result to the third
from the silence of the principal, his failure to repudiate the
act is evidence, to be considered with other facts in the case, that he
adopted it as his own, or ratified it. Union Gold Mining Co. v. Bank,
lo. 248, 262; Breed v. Bank, 4 Colo. 481, 507; Culver v. Ashley,
1 Am. Lead. Cas. (5th Ed.) p. 719, note;
Hortons v. Townes, 6 Leigh,
47, 60;
Bryant v. Moore, 26 Me. 84, 87, 45 Am. Dec. 96; Bates'
Corser v. Paul, 41 N.
s v. Best's Ex'rs, 13 B. Mon. 215, 218;
J 1. 24, 31, 77 Am. Dec. 753;
Philadelphia, etc., Ry. v. Cowell, 28 Pa.
And it will be conclusive evidence of ratifi329, 70 Am. Dec. 128.
Bank of Ky. v. Schuylm if not explicable on any other theory.
kill Dank, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas. 180, 267; Hart v. Dixon, 5 Lea, 336, 339.
But if the transaction is still in progress, and the silence of the principal after notice induces the party dealing with the agent to pursue
a course which would be detrimental to him, if the principal is not

a

is

a

a

is

a

it

is

;

it,

held bound, a ratification of the unauthorized act will be presumed,
his result will obtain when the person dealt with is induced tcy
alter in any way his position to his detriment, as by parting with mons
or property on the assumption that the agent's act was valid, or omitting to take steps against the agent, or otherwise to improve his position. Union Mining Co. v. Bank and Breed v. Bank, supra.
The result will obtain, too, when the principal accepts the benefit of what the
agent did. McLachlin v. Barker, 64 Mo. App. 511. The cases abound
in such remarks as that a principal must disavow the conduct of an
agent done in excess of authority, in a reasonable time after getting
notice of
on pain of being deemed to have assented to the conduct
and some decisions hold that the disavowal must be immediate.
But
the prevalent doctrine
reasonable time.
that
must occur in
These remarks are to be construed with reference to the facts before
and we think the true doctrine
the court
that
conclusive presumption of acquiescence
raised from
principal's silence only when
otherwise loss would fall on an innocent party. The contrary doctrine
would be arbitrary and irrational; and such rules of law should be
An examination of numerous cases has shown that in every
avoided.
instance wherein the presumption of ratification was raised because
of
principal's silence some change in the position of the parties con;

|
.'
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cerned occurred subsequent to notice to the principal which would have
resulted in injustice to the party dealt with by the agent if the principal had been excused on the score of want of authority in the agent.
We cite illustrative decisions on the point. Peck v. Ritchey, 66 Mo.
114; Teasdale v. McPike, 25 Mo. App. 341; Johnston v. Berry, 3
Hanks v. Drake, 49 Barb. 186; Hawkins v. Lange,
111. App. 256;
22 Minn. 557; Farwell v. Howard, 26 Iowa, 381 ; Cooper v. Schwartz,
Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. Co. v. Woolley, 12 Bush, 451;
40 Wis. 54;
Marshall v. Williams, 2 Biss. 255, Fed. Cas. No. 9,136; Woodward
v. Suydam, 11 Ohio, 360; Matthews v. Fuller, 123 Mass. 446; Fos-

ter v. Rockwell, 104 Mass. 167 ; Ruffner v. Hewitt, 7 W. Va. 585.
The real ground on which the principal is held liable under such
circumstances is that of estoppel, though it is often said that the prinTeascipal ratified what was done bv his agent by remaining silent.
dale v. McPike, 25 Mo. App. 341 ; Hoppe v. Saylor, 53 Mo. App. 4.
It is the volIn its genuine sense ratification depends on intention.
act or
"untary assumption, on full information, of an unauthorized
agreement by the party in whose behalf it was done or made. The
intention to ratify may be manifested by express words or by conduct.
Either may establish that the principal elected to adopt the act or
agreement as his own; and the election once made with knowledge
Besides a true ratification intenof the facts becomes irrevocable.
tionally made, the law recognizes a constructive one where none was
The latter sort of ratification is a legal presumption, raised
intended.
against the principal because he has behaved in such a way that the
party dealt with by the agent would be injured if the transaction was
repudiated.
It is really an equitable estoppel, and is regulated by the law of
The estoppel may arise from the fact that the principal
estoppel.
was silent when he ought to have declared his intention not to he
hound by the agent's act, provided, as said above, his silence leads
This is identhe party dealt with to alter his position for the worse.
tical with the principles governing estoppel By acquiescence in instances not involving the relation of principal and agent. The question often arises directly between an agent and his principal in casi
where the latter tries to hold the former responsible for acting with
In such litigation, if the principal does not promptly
out authority.
mdiate tin- transaction, hut waits until doing SO will cause loss to
the agent, or until it appears that the transaction will cause loi 5, inid of profit, to himself, he will be estopped to deny responsibility.
class of ca>es which frequently presenl the matter I'm- decision is
where a broker or commission merchanl has boughl or sold property
In .such instances the prinfor a principal contrary to instructions.
cipal is not permitted to remain silenl after notice in order to watch
th>
irkel and determine whether he will adopt or r<
pudiate the deal according as it may prove profitable or the reverse.

A

Teasdale

v.

Mel 'ike. supra.
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RELATION

(Part

1

ease it is certain the advertising to November 20th
done by plaintiff in reliance on defendant's failure to answer
ihe letter of that date; and hence defendant's silence is not ground
to estop it from denying liability for installments of rent which had
In other words, the presumption that it ratified
accrued previously.
with plaintiff ought not to he raised merely
made
the contract l.nrie
the contract.
But it is estopped to
when
silence
notilicdVof
from its
hoards
the
bulletin
rent
for
the
accruing subse
of
liability
disclaim
a
JMainlift"
reply to its letrequested
date
it
had
notice.'
to
the
quent
ter, and. in view of the fact tnat Lurie was conducting business in
In commercial
defendant's name, a reply should have been made.
affairs prompt answers to such notifications are rather strictly insisted
Plaintiff supposed it had a contract with defendant
on by the law.
Hence
and was furnishing the advertising service on that supposition.
the presumption is fair that, if defendant had repudiated the contract,

In

kas

the present

not

the service at once. The advertisingsales,
and was beneficial to
as well as
defendant's
tended to increase
A
in
its
continuance.
interested
was
defendant
Therefore
to Lurie.
similar
in
which
and
immediate
to
the
point,
as
like
this
case exactly
Bryce v. Clark (Com. PI.) 16 N. Y. Supp. 854.
rulings were made,
See, too, Cornelius v. Reiser (Com. PI.) 18 N. Y. Supp. 113.
In view of certain facts established by the proof, we have doubted
paydefendant's omitting to answer plaintiff's letter requesting
ment on the rent due for advertising, was evidence for the jury on
the question of an intentional ratification by defendant of the conIn other words, whether the facts of the present case permit
tract.
principal on receiving
the application of the rule that the silence of
of
evidence
excess
authority
in
notice of an act clone by his agent
not
with
dealt
prejudiced
by
the
third
party
of ratification when
70
the
whether
proof
on
silence.
This
depends
point
the principal's
against an intentional ratification of the contract with plaintiff was so
was ratified.
positive as to leave no room for the finding that
it,

is

it

It

is

is

a

a

if

75 The limitations upon the doctrine that silence is evidence of ratification
are elaborate^ discussed in Thompson v. Mfg. Co., GO W. Va. 42, 53 S. E. 5)08,
I.. R. A. (N. s.i :;n (1906), ante, p. 105.
The principle is well stated in Williams v. Merritt, li. 111. 573 (1860): "Long
acquiescence in an act done by an agent beyond his powers, without objection
,-ir the time, and which may be inferred from the silence of the principal when
conclusive presumption of the ratificainformed of the facts, will amount to
act. especially where such acquiscence is otherwise
tion Of an unauthorized
not to he accounted for, or such silence is either contrary to the duty of the
principal, or has
tendency to mislead the agent and involve innocent parWhere an agency
ties. This i- the doctrine where no agency in fact existed.
really existed, the presumption of the acquiescence of the principal is much
Livermore on
-•".. 256;
Story <>n Agency,
ger ami more cogent.
Agency, 44. But the reasons for this rule do not apply with equal force in
favor of the agent himself who has wrongfully committed the unauthorized
sih-me which would really amount to an implied ratification as to a
third person, [night not amounl to that in favor id' the agent. This is the
due to assurances from the agent, or to an effort to
true if inaction
avoid lose from the agent's act. Triggs v. Jones, 4G Minn. 277, 48 N. W. 1113

is

(1891).

1

S§

a

a

!-
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id—
&

JAY.

M. E.Y.
BY. CO. v.

Court of Alabama,

1880.

65

Ala.

113.)

in

.

J.

in

a

Action by Dr. Jay for surgical services in amputating the leg of one
Richardson, who had been injured by the cars while in defendants'
supervisor of dePlaintiff was called by one O'Brien,
employ.
Burnett, plainfendants' road, who had no authority to employ him.
tiff's attorney, wrote the president of the road, Daniel Tyler, and
eviTyler's reply was, over the defendants' objection, admitted
dence to show that he had knowledge of O'Brien's act and did not repudiate it. The letter said the writer had no knowledge of the plaintiff's claim, but when the superintendent of the road returned he would
Judgmenl for plaintiff.
submit the matter to him.
The letter of Daniel Tyler, president of the de
admitted as evidence
fendant railway company, was improperl)

by

in

ll

it

it

■
d

it

It

trial

It

bears no date.
does not
before the nisi prius court.
when
No
was
received.
evidence
was
nor
written,
appear when
was
which
letter
of
Burnett,
of
the
to
contents
to prove the
relevant
any such exti
reply; nor was
proposed to make
the dark
Without the light of other facts, we are left
ous evid( nee.
the

a

by

j

it

related to the sub eel matter of this particular
suit.
Prima facie, therefore, the letter was irrelevant, and the objec
tion to its admission should have been sustained.
The fir
the pr< skiing judge to the jury does not
charge given
ition of the law of agency and ratification.
embody an ac
full
has
be, than when' the principal
The corred rule
knowledge of the acts ,,f his agent, from which

as to whether or not

>

a

hi

a

t
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is certain that defendant was chagrined when it learned Lurie had
contracted in its name for the advertising, at once protested against
the contract, and, because of it and other instances of unsatisfactory
conduct, terminated business relations with him. But neither to Lurie
nor the plaintiff did defendant declare an intention not to be bound by
the agreement, and its attitude on that question was not made clear
by anything it said or did, perhaps was not determined at once, but
left open for further consideration and decision after legal advice
As
was taken. It was at least equivocal so far as the record shows.
no conclusion on this point is compelled by the evidence, we hold the
issue of intentional ratification was for the jury, and that defendant's
silence was a fact relevant to that issue. If the defendant at any time
purposely ratified the agreement, it could not disclaim liability thereafter. Andrews v. Ins. Co., 92 N. Y. 596; Brock v. Jones, 16 Tex.
* * *
-J 61 ; 1 Parsons, Contracts
(9th Ed.) p. 50, note (h).
the
to
the
case
failure
to
submit
jury, the judgment
For
properly
cause
remanded.
and
the
was reversed

*4KT
yu

haJ~
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1

benefit, he tnusl dissent, and give notice of his not/concurrence, within
time, or his assent ami ratification
will be presumed.
a reasonable
Brigham v. Peters, 1 Gray (Mass.) 147. ||
The first head-note in the case of Touch's Adm'r v. Henry, 27 Ala.
although
612, which holds, that, "it" an agent exceeds his authority,
it,
he
is
not
to
avoid
%t,
act;
obliged
the
ratifV
the principal
may
in
its
stateit,"
is
too
comprehensive
notice
that
he
to give
repudiates
It is true that md[e knowledge, on the part of the
ment of the law.
principal, of an agent's unauthorized action, will not npke silence, or/
non-interference,
in all cases amount to ratification.! But it wouk
in those cases where the party dealing with the agent is^iiMed_orj3rejj
or where
idiced (Smith v. Sheeley, 12 Wall. 358 [20 L. Ed. 43b])
ie usage of trade requires, or fair dealing demands, a p&mpt reply
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In alPsuch cases,
from the principal (Wharton on Agency, § 86).
the principal, if dissatisfied with the act of the agent, and fully informed of what has been done, must express his dissatisfaction within
2 Greenl. Ev. § 66.
a reasonable time.
The railway company received no direct benefit from the medical
The charge in
services rendered by Dr. Jay to one of its employes.
to
the
and
the exception
not
conform
above
principles,
does
question
to it must be sustained.
It is unnecessary to consider
Reversed and remanded. 76

the other points raised by the record.

76 The cases often fail to distinguish between ratification by silence and
estoppel.
Cf. Owens Pottery Co. v. Turnbull Co., 75 Conn. G28, 54 Atl. 1122
(1903); Metcalf v. Williams, 144 Mass. 452, 11 N. E. 700 (1887); Hall v.
Harper, 17 111. 82 (1855) ; Reid v. Alaska Packing Co., 47 Or. 215, 83 Pac. ir.9
(1905) ; Cooper v. Mulder, 74 Mich. 374, 41 N. W. 1084 (18S9).
Where the principal neither does nor says anything upon being informed of
the act of the alleged agent, he is bound, if at all, more properly upon the ground
Thompson v. Mfg. Co., GO W. Va. 42, 53 S. E. 908, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.)
..f i'<t..ppel.
If
Cal. 159, 43 Pac. 589 (1890).
(1906), ante, p. 105; Pope v. Armsby Co.,
there is no element of estoppel, mere silence does not amount to estoppel.
California Bank v. Sayre, 85 Cal. 102, 24 Pac. 713 (1890).
In Bredin v. Du Barry, 14 Serg. & R. 30 (1825), Gibson, J., says that the disavowal by the principal must be prompt, at the moment the fact that the
agent lias transcended
his authority comes to his knowledge.
The circumstances may be such as to demand immediate action; but the better rule rethe dissent to be expressed within a reasonable time, under the circuinthe particular case. Lyon v. Tarns, 11 Ark. 189 (1850), citing Story
on Ag< ncy.
It i< sometimes said that ratification cannot be inferred from mere silence.
Something more Is required — an affirmative act. Hatton v. Stewart, 70 Teuu.
This is certainly not the case in ratification by estoppel.
(2 Lea) 233 (1879).
v. Green, 40 Wis. 431, 438 (1876), in which Lyon, J., puts the
See Saveland
r thus:
"The rule as to what amounts to a ratification of an unauthorized act is elementary, and may he stated thus:
When a person assumes in
1 faith to ad as agenl for another in a given transaction, but acts withg
out authority, whether the relation of principal and agent does or does not
exist between them, the person in whose behalf the act was done, upon being
fully Informed thereof, must within a reasonable time disaffirm the act, at
where his silence might operate to the prejudice of innocent
Approved
parties, or he will be held to have ratified such unauthorized act."
in Beyn v. O'Hagen, 60 Mich. ir,o. L'<; X. \V. 861 (1886).
See, also, Robbins v.
Blanding, ^7 Minn. 246, 91 N. W. 844 H902).
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WHITLEY
(Supreme

Court of Georgia,

v.

JAMES

1904.

121

161

et al.

Ga. 521,

40

S.

E. 000.)

Equitable petition for the recovery of certain land, removal of cloud,
etc.
The petition alleged that defendant James, as agent of Gen.
Gordon to sell land for cash, had without authority sold on credit to
corporations of which he was president.
Plaintiff claimed under a
quitclaim from Gen. Gordon, and makes James and all the corporations
claiming under his deeds defendants.
The court below sustained demurrers to the petition as to all the corporations.
Plaintiff excepted.
Lamar, J. [After stating the facts:]
1. The petition alleges that
the unauthorized credit sale was made by the agent in 1889, that the
deed was recorded in the same year, and that the defendant corporations had been in possession from that date until April, 1903, when
the present suit was filed — a period of 14 years.
the original purchaser knew, or was charged with notice, that the agent was exceeding
his authority in making a sale on credit instead of for cash, this would
put the conveyance where it could be treated as void at the option of
the principal. Civ. Code 1895, § 3021.
Compare Loveless v. Fowler,
79 Ga. 135, 4 S. E. 103, 11 Am. St. Rep. 407; Lumpkin v. Wilson, 5
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If

Heisk. (Tenn.)

If,

555.

on the other hand, the sale is attacked because the agent of
the vendor was also president or agent of the purchaser, the effect of
the dual agency would authorize the principal to repudiate the transaction.
Civ. Code 1895, § 3010; Red Cypress Lumber Co. v. Perry,
118 Ga. 876, 45 S. E. 674; Moore v. Casey, 116 Ga. 28, 42 S. E. 258;
Story on Agency (8th Ed.) § 211.
3. But whether the attack is because of the dual agency, or of a
violation of the instructions, the sale was not absolutely void, so as
to be incapable of ratification.
The agent actually had the power to
sell.
There was at least an attempted execution of the power, and
the principal could waive the violation of instructions or the results of
the inconsistent positions.
The ratification, whether soon or late, was
the equivalent of an original command, and cured any defect in the
execution of the power.
The ratification must, of course, be with
knowledge of the material facts; nor would the principal be required
pudiate the act of his agent immediately upon the discovery that
there had been anything which rendered the sale voidable.
Bui if,
after knowledge of what the agent had done, the principal made no
2.

objection for an unreasonable
eration of law.

What

is a period
be a question

usually
cumstances of each
77 in

time,

ratification

would

result by op-

long enough to bring about such a result would
for the jury, depending upon the peculiar cirBut in proceedings to recover the land and

ill

Peck \. Rltchey, 86 Mo.
own peculiar

Good.Pb.A a.—

a

(1877), the court Bald that each case must
circumstances.
Dnder some drcumsl

i l

I
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sel aside the deed the pleadings of the principal may themselves allege
In the analenough to show a ratification results as matter <>f law.
ogous case of voidable sales to himself 1>\ an administrator, it has been
held that failure to repudiate for seven years will raise the presumpAdtion that the owner acquiesces in the irregular and voidable sales.
a
Civ.
Code
demurrer.
can
he
time
taken
lapse
of
such
of
by
vantage
1895, § >W7?; Griffin v. Stephens, 11" Ga. 139, 46 S. E. 66, and citations,
[f there he a good and sufficient explanation as to why the
principal did nol know of the transaction, or had been unable to discover it. or if there he an excuse for delay in bringing the suit, these

facts would have to he specially averred in order to .prevent the defendant from taking advantage of the acquiescence implied by nonaction for a long lapse of time.
'— ■
Whether, therefore, the statute of limitations be treated as a bar to
the remedy, or raising a presumption of payment, the demurrer was
properly sustained. The purchaser took possession in 1889. This was
itself some notice, and, when followed by continued possession under
a deed recorded for 14 years, with nothing to explain why the principal diid not know, or could not learn by the exercise of ordinary care,
of what had been done, the case was within, and not without, the rule.
The period was long enough to raise the presumption of acquiescence
in the act of the agent. Such acquiescence validated the deed.
The
The claim
validation conveyed the title completely to the purchaser.
for purchase money is barred, there being no averment of a written
or sealed promise to pay the purchase price. Hays v. Callaway, 58
Ga. 288 (2).
These conclusions make it unnecessary to consider the effect of the
recitals in the transfer or conveyance to Whitley.
They are strengthof the recital therein as to the "land
. however, by a consideration
old by James." This itself goes far to indicate a ratification of the
sale, but with a transfer of the principal's claim for what would be an
But while the question was argued, the record does not
accounting.
present any question as to whether, under Civ. Code 1895, § 3079, this
claim could he assigned, for James did not except to the judgment retaining him as a party defendant, and that dismissing the corporations
was proper.
Judgment affirmed.
the act of the ;iLr<nt would bind the principal, if he aid not immediately repudiate it. while other cases may be supposed where his silence for a week
See, also, Stearns v. Johnson, 19 Minn. 540 (Gil.
would not have that effect."
470)

(1873).

\
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KETCHEM
(Supreme

v.

pft

<

MARSLAXD.

Court of New York. Appellate Term. First Department.
Misc. Rep. 400, 42 N. Y. Supp. 7.)

IS

1S9G.

Action for the value of services as a dentist rendered by plaintiff
to defendant's infant daughter at the request of one Mrs. Beecher, in
whose custody the child had been temporarily placed by the parents.

Bischoit, J. 78

At the beginning of the year 1893 the plaintiff sent a bill to the defendant for these services, and received no answer, either in approval
or dissent; and, during the ensuing three years, or more, up to the
time of the commencement of this action, several communications of
his to the defendant, with regard to his claim, met with no better response. Was not a ratification to be inferred from such silence? 711
Clearly, the answer must be in the affirmative.
Mrs. Beecher was not
a mere intermeddler,
without shadow of right to bind the defendant,
such as might have justified his ignoring a claim based upon Iht assumed agency in his behalf.
She had been accorded the care and custody of his child, with certain implied duties to perform for the infant's well-being; and the procuring of certain necessaries, should circumstances require, was one of these duties.
'.ranted that the services performed by the plaintiff were not such
as the defendant became liable for, in the first instance, through the
agent's act merely, yet this was because the agent, being authorized to
contract for some services, was not authorized as to these.
She exed her actual powers, while clothed with some, and. hut for the
principal'[uenl assent, express or implied, he would not have
been hound.
Under

the circumstances
of the case, the defendant's subsequent
appeared from his failure to dissent during this extensive period
succeeding his knowledge of the facl .
He was bound to disavow
Mrs. Beecher'''. act within a reasonable time after notice (1 Am. v\
ni

6
I
1

*v

1

:»

i

g

■■>

n Part of Hi' 1 opinion is omitted,
"'•'ni.- extent t<>which mere silence may !"• evidence of ratification, <\<'N
ot the ad of
stranger, at least if be lias in
faith assumed t.. act ae
agent,
fullj discussed in Ladd v. Hlldebrant, 27 Wis. L36,
Am. Rep.
r>
i1^7<m. citing at length from Woodward,
.1.. in Philadelphia, W.
B. R. Co. v.
Cowell, 28 Pa. ::•':<;.70 Am. Dec. 128 (1867).
See, also, Robbing \. Blandlng, 87
•Minn. '_'!•;. !U N. W.
(1902).
Is
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[After discussing the authority of such an agent to
* *
*
act for the parent in case of immediate needs of the
child:]
Conceding, then, that Airs. Beecher's act in requesting the plaintiff to
perform the services in suit was in excess of her implied powers, yet,
having the care of the child, she had some powers, as agent, to bind
the defendant for actual necessaries ; and, with this in mind, we proceed to the further question in the case, that of the defendant's ratification of this originally unauthorized act.
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Eng. Enc. Law [2d Ed.] 1203, and cases collated in note 2); and
whether or not his delay was unreasonable was a question of fact (Id.
"Where an agency actually exists, the mere acquiescence of the
1205).
principal may well give rise to the presumption of an intentional ratification of the art."
Story, kg. § 256. "Where the relation of principal ami agent does in fact exist, although in the particular transaction the agent has exceeded his authority, an intention to ratify will
always he presumed from the silence of the principal who has received a letter informing him what has been done on his account."
1 l.iverm. A.g. 50.
The author lasl quoted does not incline to the view that a ratification should be implied from a party's silence after notice of an act
done on his account by a stranger who has totally assumed the agency,
hut adjudications are not wanting in support of it. "To say that silence is no evidence of it [ratification] is to say that there can be no
implied ratification of an unauthorized act, or, at least, to tie up the
Neither
possibility of ratification to the accident of prior relations.
A man who sees
reason nor authority justifies such a conclusion.
what has been done in his name and for his benefit, even by an intermeddler, has the same power to ratify and confirm it that he would
have to make a similar contract for himself; and, if the power to
ratify be conceded to him, the fact of ratification must be provable
Railroad Co. v. Cowell, 28 Pa. 329, 70 Am.
by the ordinary means."
Dec. 128. "Whether silence operates as presumptive proof of ratification of the act of a mere volunteer must depend upon the particular
If these circumstances are such that the
circumstances of the case.
inaction or silence of the party sought to be charged as principal would
be likely to cause injury to the person giving credit to and relying
upon such assumed agency, or to induce him to believe that such
agency did in fact exist, and to act upon such belief to his detriment,
then such silence or inaction may be considered as a ratification of the
Heyn v. O'Hagen, 60 Mich. 157, 26 N. W. 863. See, also,
agency."
Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 438 ; Triggs v. Jones. 46 Minn. 277, 48 N.
W. 1113; Kelly v. Phelps, 57 Wis. 425, 15 N. W. 385.
The rule as evolved by the adjudications is stated to be (1 Am. &
Eng. Enc. Law [2d Ed.] 1209) that, "although the relation of the parties as principal and agent is an important consideration, yet, in the
case of a mere stranger or volunteer, the silence of the alleged principal, when fully informed of the unauthorized act, is evidence of a
ratification, though far less strong," — citing Union Gold Min. Co. v.
Rocky Mountain Xat. Hank, 2 Colo. 248; Foster v. Rockwell, 104
Mass. 172; Harrod v. McDaniels, 126 Mass. 415; Ladd v. Hildebrant,
27 Wis. 135. 9 Am. Rep. 445.
In the case at bar we are not required to go so far as to decide that one
may become hound, upon a failure to disavow within a reasonable time,
for the act of a mere volunteer, assumed to be done in the former's
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name, since here the ratification attaches to an existing agency which
had been exceeded, and the reason upon which the rule as to implied
ratification is founded may readily be found existent in this case.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
^~ v
(d) By

Enforcing the Contract or Bringing Suit

LA GRANDE NAT. BANK
(Supreme
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Action on

Court of Oregon,

1895.

v.

BLUM.

27 Or. 215, 41 Pac.

,
659.)

promissory note, which plaintiff bank claimed was made//
by defendants in discharge of liability as indorsers of two notes of j
one Ramsey.
The jury found that the cashier of the bank had agreed.
with defendant to accept the note in question to secure performance on
Blum's part, either to collect and pay over the proceeds of the RamRamsey was
sey notes, or, if unable to do that, to return the notes.
The bank now
insolvent, and Blum returned the notes uncollected.
sues on the note made by Blum.
Bean, C. J. 80 It is contended that the court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in favor of plaintiff, at the close of the testimony, on the
ground that the evidence for the defendants showed that the agreement
set up in the answer was made with the cashier of plaintiff without its
It is unnecessary for us to enter into an examination of
authority.
the power, duty, and authority of the cashier of a bank, to ascertain
whether the alleged agreement or contract set up in the answer was
within the scope of his agency; for the plaintiff, by bringing this ac^y
a

jon on the note received by the cashier under such contract, has, so
ir as this proceeding is concerned, ratified the entire contract.
No rule of law is more fundamental than if the principal elects to
ra\ify any part of the unauthorized act of an agent he must ratify
the whole.
He cannot accept\hat part which is favorable to himself,
and repudiate the remainder.
As said by Mr. Justice Story: "The
principal cannot, of his own nere authority, ratify a transaction in
part, and repudiate it as to th* rest. He must either adopt the whole
or none."
And "from this maxim," says Chief
Story, Ag. § 250.
Smith,
rule
universal application that, where a
a
of
"results
Justice
contract has been entered into by one man as agent of another, the
it has been made 'cannot take the benefit of
m on whose behalf
The contract must be performed in its
it without bearing its burdens.
rity.'" Rudasill v. falls, 92 N. C. 222. Indeed, reason, as well
Mech. Ag. § 130; (
ithority, is all one way on this question.
W.
man v. Stark, 1 Or. L16; Eberts v. Selover, 44 Midi. 519, 7
McClure v. Briggs, 58 Vt. 82, 2 Atl. 5M, 56
225, 38 Am. Rep. 278;

\.

Am. Rep. S?7.
Xow, in this
in making

case,

if

the contract

it of the opinion

the cashier

with the
1b omitted.

d<

of

the bank exceeded his authority
fendants set up in the answer, and

:
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accepting the note in suit, the plaintiff was not bound thereby;
it was bound to take the contract
in its entirety or not to rccogi at all.
It cannot affirm that part of bis act which is of ad*
*
*
vantage to it. and repudiate the rest.
After ruling against plaintiff on certain matters of evidence and instructions l>\ the trial court, the court affirmed the judgment for dein

1 ut

fendant.

81

NICHOLS, SHEPHERD
(Supreme

Replevin.
Campb] i

of Michigan,

L886.

v.

SHAFFER.

C>.'5Mich. 509,

30 N.

W. 3S3.)

Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.
Plaintiff brought this suit to replevy
C. J.

a 10 horseengine, with truck and other appendages, claiming to hold it
a chattel mortgage given in April, 1883, upon this property, and
engine and a separator, to secure $1,390 in
upon a 17 horse-power
In
installments.
July, 1884, one Adams, an agent of plaintiff,
several
went to defendant to get the mortgaged property.
Shaffer at that
lime gave him up all the other property, but desired to keep this enThis was in fact left, and the rest taken away. At the same
gine.
time a portable saw-mill was turned over to Adams, and included in
All
as the old one.
a new chattel mortgage of the same conditions
the other property, including this saw-mill, was sold under the mortNo extension of time, or other legal consideration
gage security.
The whole dispute in the case
ed for the saw-mill mortgage.
arises upon whether this was merely an additional security, or whether
that the property now
the saw-mill was put in upon the consideration
The jury found for
nld be released from the mortgage.
the defendant.
If defendant and his witnesses told the truth, and the jury evidently
believed them, then there was no question but that the saw-mill was
intended to be a substitute for the engine which was released. Upon
this question the verdict is conclusive, if the other difficulties suggested
do not stand in the way.
The
The principal contest is upon the authority of Mr. Adams.
court told the jury he had no authority to make the exchange, unless
it was ratified, but left it to the jury to determine whether it was ratified or not. The several assignments of error all bear upon this question of ratification.
It a] 'pears from the record that one Worden, the collecting agent
«.f plaintiff, went in October, 1884, to Shaffer, and wanted this en-

power
under
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Court

& CO.

i..

an action against the agent to hold him accountable for his wrongful
igainsl the principal is nol necessarily a ratification of lii* acts, so as to
Barnsdall v. O'Day, 134 Fed.
affeel -;i third person's liability to the principal.
I
C. A. 278 (1905).
bi But
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and that Shaffer claimed
had been released
gine, and did not get
It also appears that
and this replevin suit was the sequel to this visit.
the saw-mill was sold on foreclosure, as well as the other property,
and appropriated for the benefit of plaintiff. There was considerable
testimony concerning the value of the various articles, and about the
dealings of the parties, which had some bearing on the probabilities.
was not admissible, and we think
was also
We see no reason why
proper to show the profession and assumptions of authority of the
These alone would not
various agents who appeared in the matter.
But
was of the utmost improve agency, and so the court held.
the saw-mill mortgage was
portance to know on what understanding
given.

a

The judgment

must be affirmed.

NYE
Court of Min

(Supreme

ta,

v.

SWAN.

LS92.

19

is

a

it

it,

if

sion.

Minn.

131, 52 N. W.

39.)

-

of the

at

that

lul(

ii

that
o]

it

question;

La

by

it

in

in

it

by

if

a

in

].h

This was an action to have <\(\-<\ from plaintiff to
Mitchell,
mortj
form an absolute conveyance, declared
defendants,
the court should find
and, as such, adjudged usurious and void, or,
paying the de
not void, thai the plaintiff be allowed to redeem
In their
iuts the amount which the court should find due thereon.
answer the defendants stood upon the ground that the deed was
found
Th
fact, as
form, an absolute conveyance.
was
follovt
the court and jury, were as
That in November, 1886, the plaintiff was the owner of the land
in
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it

We have no doubt that the court was correct in its various instructions to the effect that plaintiff could not avail itself of the saw-mill
for which
was made.
mortgage, and repudiate the consideration
release
the enAdams
to
have
been
the
of
Whatever may
authority
he did
that
what
can
no
doubt
first
there
be
from
the
mortgage,
gine
and represented in obtaining the saw-mill mortgage bound the plainIt thereby,
tiff,
plaintiff chose to keep and enforce that instrument.
and must be responsible for
at least, ratified his agency in taking
was obtained.
Any other doctrine would lead
the manner in which
It could not demand or recover the propto strange consequences.
erty involved in this suit without restoring what was taken by its agent
in lieu of it. Whether the corporate action had become irrevocable
or not before Gordon's visit in October, 1884, full notice was given
No attempt has been made
them, and its liability was thereafter fixed.
denial of
has
Plaintiff
put itself upon
to restore Shaffer's rights.
denials.
its
•_
has
found
them, and the jury
against
very simple one, and does nut call for mucrndiscusThe issue

tune one White was the agent of the defend

omitted.

L68

Tin:

relation

(Part

1

ants for the purpose of purchasing lands for them, and for no other
purpose, and was furnished by them with money to pay for such lands
as he might buy; that, assuming to art as the agent of defendants,

loaned $800 of this money to plaintiff under an agreement that
ho repaid within 100 days, with an additional .$100 for the
Use oi the $800 Eof thai period Of time, and at the same time as security for the loan took from plaintiff, and plaintiff executed, the
named in the instrudeed in question to defendants, the consideration
ment being $1,000.
This deed was executed, not as an absolute sale
and conveyance, hut merely as security.
White had no authority from
In the spring of
defendants to lend money for them to any one.
1887, defendants, having been informed that plaintiff claimed that the
deed was given merely as a mortgage, inquired of White as to the
facts, and were informed by him that plaintiff's claim was false; that
he had made an absolute purchase of the land from him, and had
Denever loaned him any money or taken the deed as a mortgage.
fendants, relying on White's statements, and believing them true, have
always claimed that the deed was an absolute conveyance, and treated
it as such, claiming that they were the owners of the land.
The court also found that White charged defendants $1,000 as the
purchase price of the land, and that "the defendants allowed and paid
the same to White before they, or either of them, had any notice or
knowledge that the plaintiff made any claim that the deed was given
as a mortgage or to secure a loan."
This finding is probably not important, but the part of it quoted is unsupported by any evidence.
There is the bare statement of one of the defendants that they paid
$1,000 for the land, but not a particle of evidence as to when or how
it was paid. So far as appears, White is still their agent, and his account as such unclosed, and, for anything that appears, the "payment"
referred to might have been a mere matter of bookkeeping by White's
charging defendants and crediting himself with $1,000.
Aside from this, we think that the findings were justified by the
evidence. The only one, the correctness of which defendants' counsel seriously disputes, is the one to the effect that the deed was executed as security for a loan of money, and not as an absolute sale and
conveyance of the land ; and this contention, as we understand him,
he makes, not upon the ground that the evidence was insufficient to
justify a finding that the actual agreement between White and plaintiff
was that the deed was to be merely security for the loan, but that
inasmuch as White had no authority to make loans and take mortgages
for defendants, but had authority to buy lands, and pay for them, and
take absolute conveyances, therefore the deed was an absolute sale
and conveyance of the land by plaintiff to defendants, and that the
defendants have a right to retain and hold it as such. It would seem
that to state such a proposition is to refute it. Plainly stated, it is
that if an agent, intrusted with money to buy land for his principal,
should, without authority, lend the money and take a mortgage as sehe
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it

is

a

it

a

a

it

a

wholly immaterial, at least in the absence of facts which would eqestop plaintiff from denying that
was an absolute conveyance.
No such state of facts exists here.
follows that the only
rights,
any, which defendants have under the deed are those of

if

It

it

uitably

mortgagees.

it

it.[

a

in it

2.

The plaintiff, however, claims that the defendants take
with the
taint of usury; that they have ratified the act of White
exacting
usury, by omitting to disavow the ccnitract within
reasonable time
after notice of plaintiff's claim, antl by retaining the contract, and
claiming title to the land under
But they never recognized
as
loan, and have never
mortgage, never treated the transaction as
received or claimed any usurious interest under it; but, on the conwas an absolute sale
that
trary, have always believed an
and conveyance of the land as
appeared on its face to be, and as
was.
their
serted that
We fail to see wherein they harVe ratified the act of White in barusurious rale of interest, or why. having failed in maingaining for
taining their claim that the tU'v<\ was an absolute one. they are not
entitled to have
stand as security for the amount of their funds acWhite. Had they placed the money in White's hands,
tually loaned
to be loaned at
legal rate of interest, and he had. without their authority or knowledge, exacted and included usurious interest, they
could have enforced the mortgage for the amount actually loaned, and
a

by

it

a

/

it

it

it

1

a

a
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a

if

it,

curity, the principal would have a right to change it into such a contract as the agent was authorized to make, and hold it as an absolute
conveyance of the land, although the other party never made any such
contract.
The only legal principle which counsel invokes in support of his
contention is the elementary one, that a person who deals with an
agent is bound to inquire as to the nature and extent of his authority,
and that the principal is only bound by the acts of the agent which
are within the scope of his authority, — a rule the correctness of which
no one will dispute, but which counsel has in this case wholly misHe has overlooked the equally elementary rule that, where
applied.
an agent has entered into an unauthorized
contract in behalf of his
principal, the latter cannot ratify a part of
and repudiate the remainder, but must either adopt the whole or none, and,
fortiori,
he
he must adopt
adopts
as made, and not as something entirely different.
There may be cases where the transaction includes several
things which are severable and independent of each other, some of
which are within and some beyond the authority of the agent, where
the principal has the right to adopt the former and repudiate the latter.
But in this case the transaction was an entirety, viz.,
mortgage to
secure
loan, and the defendants must either adopt
as
mortgage
or repudiate
entirely.
The fact that the instrument was in form
deed of conveyance,
such as White was authorized to take in the purchase of land,
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lawful interest, and an attempt to do so would not have amounted to
a ratification
of the act of the agent in exacting usury.
Jordan v.
(,
Humphrey, 31 Minn. -1 5. 18 X. \Y. 450.
So here while, as the deed

*

*

a

a

*

a

it

a

if

it,

at all,
mortgage, the defendants must adopt
so,
and
their
themselves
of
as
mortgage, yet
doing
availing
security tor the amount actually loaned, will not, of itself, amount
to
ratification of the act of White in exacting usury.
Because the court below refused to permit plaintiff to redeem and
reconveyance upon payment of the loan, with interest, the
cause was remanded, with directions to modify the judgment in

executed as

as

accordance with this opinion, allowing the plaintiff to redeem within such reasonable time as the court may fix, and, upon his failure to do so within that time, that he be barred of all equity in
the premises, and that the present deed stand and operate as an ahsolute conveyance. 83

Limitations

COOLEY
(Supreme

Court of New Jersey,

v.

PERRINE.
41

1879.

N.

J.

Law,

322,

32

Am. Rep.

210.)

it

*

*

a

a

it
is

is

is
a

a

a

a

a

*

J.

a

a

note for $75, given as part consideration on the sale of
Suit upon
horse to defendant.
To this action defendant set up as a defense
that the horse was warranted sound at the date of sale, and that he
was not sound at that time.
The horse was sold by one Woodward,
an agent, who was not authorized by Cooley to make any representations or warranties, nor did Cooley in his lifetime, nor his executors,
who brought this action, before the death of the horse, know of the
Upon exceptions to the instrucrepresentation made by Woodward.
tions and for failure to instruct, plaintiffs brought certiorari.
84
Dixon,
[After holding that under the circumstances of this
case Woodward had neither implied nor incidental authority to warhas been
rant the soundness of the horse:]
Sometimes
warwhether
the
based
intimated that
be
distinction might
upon
maintain
to
the
suit
plaintiff
against
were
set
by
up
agent
by
ranty
the principal, or by
defendant to resist the principal's suit for the
price, and that the attempt of the principal to collect the price, after
he has learned of the warranty,
ratification of it. On the idea that
the authority does not cover the warranty, and that the purchaser
not plain how he can
chargeable with knowledge of the authority,
withstand the vendor's claim on
contract
contract made, by alleging

is

(3

7

b« See, also, Shoninger v. Peabody, 57 Conn. 42, 17 Atl. 278, 14 Am. St. Iiep.
I'l.. 59 Conn. 588, 22 Atl. 437 (1890); Eberts v. Selover, 44 Mich.
88 (1889);
519,
N. W. 225, 38 Am. Rep. 278 (1880); Henderhen v. Cook, 6G Barb. 21
But cf. Peters v. Ballistier, 20 Mass.
(1866).
Pick.) 495 (1826); Gould v.
Blodgett, 63 N. II. 115 (1881).
on page 373.
Part of the opinion
i
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which he knew was not made. But if there be anything at all in the distinction, it must be confined to those cases where, when the principal
obtains knowledge of his agent's unauthorized warranty, the sale is in
fieri, or can be declared void and the parties restored to their original
What the principal does in pursuance of a bargain which he
position.
has authorized his agent to make, without knowledge that his agent'
has entered into an unwarranted contract, is not a ratification of such
contract.
Combs v. Scott, 12 Allen, 493; Smith v. Tracy, 36 X. Y.
79; Titus v. Phillips. 18 X. J. Eq. 541; Gulick v. Grover, 33 N. J.
Law, 463, 97 Am. Dec. 728.
And if. when he acquires knowledge, he cannot, in justice to himself, disavow the whole of his agent's contracts, he is entitled to stand
upon what he authorized, and repudiate the rest ; the purchaser, who
dealt with a special agent without noting the bounds of his power,
must suffer rather than the innocent principal. Bryant v. Moore, 26
Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec. 96. 85
ss in a similar case the Maine court said: "But if he had received the goods
without knowledge that they had been purchased at an advanced price, he,
would not be obliged to restore them, or pay such advanced price, if lie could
of it, repudiate the bargain without suffering loss. In
m>t. when Informed
such case he would not be in fault. The seller would he. and he should bear
Bryant v. .Moore 26 Me. 84, 45 Am. Doc. 96 (1846).
the loss."
Enforcing a contract of loan which an agent had a right to make is not a
ratification of his unlawful and unauthorized exaction of usury in making tin;
loan. Estevez v. Purdy, 66 N. V. 446 <iN7m.
See, also, Bank of St. Mary's v.
raider, :: Strob, hi:: (1849).
See, also. Wyckoff, Seaman & Benedict
v. Davis, ante, p. SO, and Wheeler
v. Northwestern Sleigh Co. (•'. <'.) 39 Fed. 347 (1889).
The receipt by a principal of the fruits of an unauthorized sale by an agent is not a ratification of
BUCh sale, even though the principal retains the money after learning of the
true state of affairs, if it appears that the principal had no knowledge of the
source of the money when it was received, and it was applied to settle an obligation of the agent which existed prior to the making of the unauthorized
Money having
contract.
Boharl v. Oberne, •".»',Kan. 284, 13 Pac. 388 (1887).
no earmark does not stand on the same ground as chattels.
Lime Rock Bank
v. Plimpton, IT Tick. 159, 28 Am. Dec. 286 (1835),
post. p. 803; Thacher v.
Pray, 113 Mass. 291, L8 Am. Rep. 180 (1873), supra, p. 117. As was said
"Money is a current fund, which any one, within B recenl Missouri case:
out notice, has a righl to receive in good faith in payment of a debt, withes; and the person so receivout inquiry into the source from which it c
ing it cannol be compelled to restore it to him who was the true owner.
T'.» X. v. 183, 35 Am. Rep. oil:
Stephens v. Board of Education,
Match v.
Bank, I IT \. Y. 184, n V E. i<>::: Justh v. Bank, 56 X. V. 478; Smith v.
Bank, n»7 Iowa, 620, 7^ x. \v. 238.
But it la said by plaintiff that defendant
received and kept the monej represented by the overdraft.
That fact does
defendant,
if
not create ;i liability agalnsl
oey due a principal from his
agent
by such agent by the unauthorized
Is obtained
use of the principal's
Dame, and paid over to the principal, who receives it in good faith, without
notice, be is uol liable to the party from whom the agent got the money. The
of now the agent obtained
ey after being Informed
fact that ho keeps the
it i
not a ratification.
Thacher v. Pray, 113 Mo s. 291, 18 Am. Rep. i v<i;
Baldwin v. Burrows, 17 x. v. 212; Gulick v. Grover, :::: v .1. Law, 163, '.'7
Am. Dec. 728; Bobart \. Oberne, 36 Kan. 284, 13 Pac. 388; Pennsylvania
Co.
-i 323, 29 Am Dec. 543;
v. Dandridge, 8 Qilli
Lime Rod Bank v. Plimpton,
17 Pick, 159, 28 Am. Dec. 286."
I a e v. Hammond
Packing Co., 105 Mo. App.
w. 732 (1904).
To '■ top the principal to deny a ratification, it must appear that, at the
time he accepted the proceeds of the jale, he knew- tie' source of the money
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These views arc not at all in conflict with the class of cases which
hold that the principal is responsible For the fraud or deceit of his
agent, committed in the course of his employment, for his employer's
benefit. Jeffrey v. Bigelow, 13 Wend. 518,28 Am. Dec. 476; Sandford v. Handy, 23 Wend. 260; Harwich v. Eng. Joint Stock Bank, L.
K. 2 Ex. 259j Machav v. Cm. Bank of N. Brunswich, L. R. 5 P. C.
394.

well founded upon the principle that, as every man
he honest in his dealings with others, so is he bound to
honest
employ
agents, whether they be general or special, and if in
his
business, and within the range of their authority, they
transacting
the consequences are legally chargeable to the employer,
be dishone>t,
Hern v. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289.
and not to a stranger.
In the present suit, I think that the unauthorized warranty, inferred
from the honest statement of the agent that the horse was all right,
not communicated to the vendor or his representatives until after the
horse was delivered to and had died in the possession of the vendee,
are

formed no defence to the claim for the price, and that the appellee's
prayer for instructions to the jury was justified by the facts and the
law, and should have been granted.
Its refusal was error, for which
the judgment should be reversed, with costs.
The cause may be remitted to the Common Pleas for a new trial.

V. Effect of Ratification

(A)

Retroactiveness

SOAMES
(Court of King's Bench,

1822.

v.
1

SPENCER.
Dowl. & R.

32, 24 Rev.

Rep. 631.)

J.,

Assumpsit on a contract for the sale of ninety tons of oil per ship
Naiad. Plea, the general issue, non-assumpsit.
At the trial, before
Abbott, C.
at the Guildhall sittings, after last term, the plaintiff had
a

verdict.

The case was this
Messrs. Soames and
were jointly interested in part of the cargo of
the arrival of the vessel, Soames, without the
of Tennant, sold the oil in question, in which
:

Tennant, the plaintiffs,
the ship Naiad. Before
knowledge or authority
they were jointly inter-

he received, or that when he learned the facts he failed to repudiate the un
contract of the agent.
Holm v. Bennett, 43 Neb. SOS, G2 N. W.
authorized

liit

(1895).

And the receipt from the agent of
chattel which belonged to the principal
procured by an unauthorized act of tbe agent, of which the principal was Ignorant when he so received it,
no ratification of the agent's act,
Union
even though the principal retains his chattel after he learns tbe facts.
Colo. 531 (1S72); Baldwin
Gold Mining Co. v. Rocky Mountain Nat. Bank,
Fertilizer Co. v. Thompson, 100 Ga. 480, 32 8. E. 591 (1S9S).
1

is

a
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clined to take the remainder of the plaintiff's share of the Naiad's
The prompt would expire on the 12th of Febcargo, but he declined.
ruary, and six or seven days before then, the defendants refused to be
The learned Judge charged the jury, under
bound by the contract.
these circumstances, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, and
they had a verdict accordingly, with liberty to the defendants to move
to enter a nonsuit if the Court should be of opinion, that the contract
declared upon was not binding.
Abbott, C. J. I am of opinion, that the verdict
The case turns upon the question, whether
right.
He was no party to
tract was ratified by Tennant.
in the result he
but
fact, afterwards repudiated
then
delivered."
be
must
the
oil
says _"then
is

is

it.

is

It

it

I

a

is

it

if

a

a

I

a

is

a

is

it

it,

in this case was
the original conit at first, and. in
and
assents to
understood by all
in the month of
This
binding contract.
to be
parties that
defendants, actthe
arrives,
then
and
oil
the
In
January
September.
not until the very lasl
ing upon the contract, take samples, and
about to expire, that they make any obmoment, when the prompt
The jury asked me/whether, in point of law, they might find
jection.
said, that in my opinion,
subsequent
verdict for the plaintiffs.
told
prior authority; and
lauivalent to
contract
ratification of
and
that
contract,
the
them, that
they thought Tennant did ratify
it,
was
defendants,
to
and
acceded
they
with the knowledge of the

is,

I

I.

I

a

[

is

by

1

'

not
then) to say, at any after time, that they were
to
the
jury.
the
left
case
the
way
The)
\That
the contract.
just conclusion.
think they came to
found for the plJhitiffs, and
withThe broker's note
am of the same opinion.
The original
written contract.
the statute of frauds, evidence of
Tennant subsequently
ell need not he in writing, and
auth
binding
became
assenting to
ratified the contract entered into

too

com

a

it,

it

by

if

a

in
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The
ested, to the defendants, through the medium of Lintot, a broker.
note,
the.'
broker's
by
the
signed
was
only evidence of the contract
this,
note.
time
after
the
Some
named
in
not
was
broker, but Tennant
Tennant, hearing of the contract, wrote to the defendants, apprizing
them that he was jointly interested in the oil with Soames, that the
contract had been entered into without his knowledge or authority,
and that he considered himself released from, and would not be bound
by it. A communication then took place between the defendants and
Tennant, who endeavored to prevail upon them to release him from the
contract, but they declined, saying they would hold him and the other
plaintiff to it. In consequence of this intimation, Tennant acquiesced,
All this took place in the
and said, the oil "then must be delivered."
arrived, each party convessel
month of September, 1819, before the
The
vessel arrived in Janucontract.
sidering himself bound by the
broker,
on the plaintiffs with
waited
Lintot,
the
ary. 1820, and then
whom
the samples were
defendants,
to
of
the
saw
one
samples. He
The broker asked him if he was indelivered, and by him accepted.
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THE
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i
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1

HoLROYD, J, Tn this case, according to the evidence, (here was a
subsequent ratification by Tennanl of the original contract, and, 1
think, that is sufficient to give it validity though originally made withllis subsequent ratification amounts to an original
out his authority,
authority; and the maxim of the law is: "Oninc actum ah agentis intentione est judicandum."
Rule iv fused.

MACLEAN
(Court

of Common Pleas,

182S.

v.

DUNN.

4 Bingham,

722,

E. C. L.

712.)

One Ebsworth, a London wool broker, sold for the account of plainRussian and German wool to defendant, and in turn bought from
defendants for plaintiff Spanish wool, giving bought and sold notes
therefor.
The notes were not signed by Dunn, but there was evidence
that he afterwards orally ratified the act of the other defendant, Watkins, in authorizing Ebsworth to make the contract.
Maclean now
and
for
for
not
the Russian
accepting
paying
brings special assumpsit
and German wool.
Verdict for plaintiff and defendant obtained a
rule nisi to enter a non-suit or have a new trial.
Best, C. J. 8G It has been argued, that the subsequent adoption of
the contract by Dunn will not take this case out of the operation of the
statute of frauds ; and it has been insisted, that the agent should have
his authority at the time the contract is entered into. If such had been
the intention of the legislature, it would have been expressed more
clearly ; but the statute only requires some note or memorandum in
writing, to be signed by the party to be charged, or his agent thereunto
lawfully authorized ; leaving us to the rules of common law, as to the
Now, in all other
mode in which the agent is to receive his authority.
cases, a subsequent sanction is considered the same thing in effect as
assent at the time. "Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato sequiparatur." And in my opinion, the subsequent sanction of a contract
signed by an agent, takes it out of the operation of the statute more
Where the authorsatisfactorily than an authority given beforehand.
ity is given beforehand, the party must trust to his agent; if it be
given subsequently to the contract, the party knows that all has been
done according to his wishes.
But in Kinnitz v. Surry, where the
broker, who signed the broker's note upon a sale of corn, was the seller's agent, Lord Ellenborough held, that if the buyer acted upon the
note, that was such an adoption of his agency as made his note sufficient within the statute of frauds ; and in Soames v. Spencer, 1 Dow.
& Ry. 32, where A. and B., being jointly interested in a quantity of
without the authority
oil, A. entered into a contract for the sale of
or knowledge of B., who, upon receiving information of the circumit,

tin
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stance, refused to be bound, but afterwards assented by parol, and
samples were delivered to the vendees, it was held, in an action against
the vendees, that B.'s subsequent ratification of the contract rendered
it binding, and that it was to be considered as a contract in writing
within the statute of frauds. That is an express decision on the point,
that under the statute of frauds the ratification of the principal re* * *
lates back to the time when the agent made the contract.

Rule discharged.

TOWN OF AXSOXIA
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(Supreme

Court of Errors of Connecticut,

v.

lSD-t.

COOPER.
64

Conn.

/

53G,

30

Atl.

7G0.)

Interpleader among the claimants of a fund paid into court by the
town of Ansonia for land taken for a school site.
To the answer and
claim of Henry Ailing, Elizabeth Downs demurred, and the court sustained the demurrer.
Chas. Cooper had owned the land.
On his
death he left it to his widow for life.
She sold the fee and gave a
On her death her four
warranty deed under which Ailing claimed.
sons divided the unused balance of the purchase price and the other
personal property left by their father, under a verbal agreement to acand settlement of their
cept such amounts as complete distribution
claims under his will. Three sons quitclaimed to Ailing.
The fourth
son, Alfred Cooper, after the beginning of these proceedings, assigned
his claims to Elizabeth Downs.
Andrews, C. J. 87 * * * The said Alfred Cooper knew when
he made said agreement and received said money that the amount he
received under and pursuant to the said agreement was the money
which the said Elizabeth Cooper received from the sale of the said
real estate conveyed by her, the said Elizabeth Cooper, as aforesaid.
and he had full knowledge that the said real estate had been sold and
conveyed by full warranty deed, and that the said Henry (".. Ailing
was then in the possession of -aid land, claiming title thereto by virtue
of the dvi:<\ which hail been given by the said Elizabeth Cooper as
aforesaid.

Tin

being admitted by the demurrer, must, for the purpi
of the present dis< ussion, he taken as proved and found by the court.
Charles Cooper, William Cooper, and Henry Cooper may he laid oul
of the case.
They have each released to Mr. Ailing. The rights of
Elizabeth Downs arc jusl the -.inn- as, and no greater than, the rights
.

of Alfred Cooper.

I fer assignment from him was since the commenceof the condemnation proceedings.
Before tin- Superior Court, the parties eemed to have discussed only
The court, in its memorandum of decision,
the question of estoppel.
placed it- conclusion on the ground that there was no estoppel.
The

ment

it of (lie opinion

is omitted.

in

L76

i:

kklation

(Parti

If
briefs in this court are largely made up of the same discussion.
that was the only question in the case, we might be led to agree with
There
I'.ut estoppel is not the doctrine of the case.
the Superior Court.
is another ground clearly set forth in the answer of Mr. Ailing, on
which it seems to us the answer should have been held sufficient and
And that ground is that Alfred Coopu has
the demurrer overruled.
The language ci the
ratified the sale of his land made Ivy his mother.
received said
brothers
answer is explicit : That Alfred Cooper and his
sum of money in lieu and in place of the real estate which had been
devised to them by their father, but had been sold by their mother,
and said parties intended, by the division of said money among them,
to ratify and confirm the sale of said real estate by the said Elizabeth
And the said Alfred Cooper knew when he received said
Cooper.
money that the amount which he received was the money which the
.said Elizabeth Cooper had received from the sale of the said real
estate, and he had full knowledge that the said real estate had been
:

it

a

it

a

Ratification means the adoption by
person, as binding upon himself,
as done for his
of an act done in such relations that he may claim
benefit, although done under such circumstances as would not bind
him, except for his subsequent assent, as where an act was done by
stranger having at the time no authority to act as his agent, or by an
The acceptance of the results of
agent not having adequate authority.
the act with an intent to ratify, and with full knowledge of all the
Ratification makes the conratification.
material circumstances,
the requisite power
would have been
tract, in all respects, what

if

is
it a

a

;

;

&

1

5

is

a

is,

it

it

It

relates back to the execution
was entered into.
had existed when
of the contract, and renders
obligatory from the outset. 88 The
on the one
party to the contract, and
party ratifying becomes
hand, entitled to all its benefits, and on the other,
bound by its
Am. Rep. 427; Edwards v.
terms.
Negley v. Lindsay, 67 Pa. 217,
And. Law Diet, in verb. StanC. 650-672
Mylne
Railroad Co.,
ton v. Railroad Co., 59 Conn. 285, 22 Atl. 300, 21 Am. St. Rep. 110.
as See, also, Johnson v. Smith, 21 Conn. G27 (1852), quoting from Story on
x. II. 129 (1870), ante, p. 125.
Agency,
244, and Grant v. B< ard, •"",(>
retrospective
"Subsequent
effect, and is equivalent to a
ratification has
prior command. To say that an agent entered into a contract without authority from his principal, ami that the principal subsequently ratified such contract, is in legal intendment and effect the equivalent of saying the agent was
duly authorized to make the contract.
Kraft v. Wilson, 104 Cal. xvii, 37 Pac.
a

g
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sold and conveyed by a full warranty deed.
then, the condition of things Mrs. Elizabeth Cooper, without
This
authority to do so, sold and undertook to convey land which belonged
to Alfred Cooper.
She received the full value of the land in money.
Her grantee entered into possession of the land conveyed, and claims
Alfred Cooper, knowing all these
to have
complete title thereto.
facts, and intending to ratify and confirm the sale of his said land, has
to his own use, and still keeps it.
received that money and applied

790 (1894).
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Alfred

Cooper, having ratified the sale of his land by his mother,
through his assignee, seeking to obtain the money in the
this court, is in the position of one who has verbally conconvey his land to another, has put that other into possesreceived his pay in full in money, and, while keeping the
money, is trying to get the price of his land the second time. It needs
no argument — or, rather, the statement of the case is the strongest
possible argument — to show that he ought not to succeed. And, as he
There
cannot succeed, so also his assignee, Elizabeth Downs, cannot.
is error. The demurrer should be overruled.
The other
The judgment sustaining the demurrer is reversed.
concurred.
judges
and now,
hands of
tracted to
sion, has

SHUENFELDT
C
(Circuitt Coju^jtof/the

v.

JVXKERMANN.

United States, Northern District of Iowa,

1884.

Shiras, J.

On the trial of this cause before a jury, it appeared that
uusiana doing
plaintiffs were wholesale liquor dealers, resiun
uomg busiding^ and
ness in Chicago, Illinois, and the defendants were druggists, residing
and doing business in Dubuque, Iowa.
The action was based upon
The defendacceptances of defendants, and upon an open account.
ants pleaded that the acceptances, as well as the account, were for
intoxicating liquors sold in violation of the statute of Iowa, commonly
known as the prohibitory liquor law.
On the part of the defendants
'
. •
it was claimed that the liquors were sold in pursuance of a contract
entered into between one Connors, an agent of plaintiffs, and the defendants, at Dubuque, Iowa, by which it was agreed that plaintiffs were
to furnish to defendants, from time to time, various kinds of liquors~**£^V
at certain prices, and put up in packages to suit the market.
On the
part of plaintiffs it was denied that Connors made any such agreement
and, further, that if he did he had no authority t<> make any contract
for plaintiffs, he being merely a traveling agent, with power to solicit
and orders, which were to be forwarded to Chicago for approval
or disapproval by plaintiffs.
The evidence showed that the liquors
were furnished by plaintiffs upon the orders of defendants, two of
which were given to Connors in person when at Dubuque, and the
the

wen- by letters directed to plaintiffs, the goods being delivi
railroad company at Chicago.
The COUli instructed the jury that if the agent, Connors, had an
in fart
fact make a
thority to make a completed a ntracl of sale, and did in
contrad :it Dubuque, under which the liquors in questionm were
ale wa
nished, then the
a violation
of the Statute of [owa,
not
•
that
were
the
questioned
liquors
intoxicating, and intended to be
used a
S<
d Nat. Bank v. Curren, 36 Iowa, 5?^;
erage.
GODD.PB.& A. — 11!

to the

(XM^t

trrr
.iy

*

f'"'"^

it

tii

f

1

h
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Pickett, 52 fowa, 467, 3 X. W. 514.
The jury was further
thai
the agent, Connors, merely procured or arranged for
from time to time
defendants, which
the forwarding oi orders
orders, when received
plaintiffs, were subjeel to their approval or
disapproval, and which they were under no obligation to till unless
sale made
Illinois.
approved, then the sale would be deemed to be
The court
See Tegler v. Shipman, 33 Iowa, 194, 11 Am. Rep. 118.
also ruled that
Connors, not having authority to make
completed
form enter
contract of sale on behalf of plaintiffs, nevertheless did
contract at Dubuque with defendants, whereby he assumed to
bind plaintiffs for the future delivery of liquors
quantities to be
fixed by defendants, which contract was not binding upon plaintiffs by
reason of the want of authority on the part of Connors, and the plaintiffs approved or ratified the contract- by forwarding the goods from
time to time to defendants as ordered by them, the act of affirmance
which gave binding force to the contract being done in Chicago, the
contract will be deemed to be made in Chicago, and being valid there
would he enforced in Iow a, unless
was shown that the sale was made
with intent to enable defendants to violate the laws of Iowa.
'Idie jury found
verdict for plaintiffs, and defendants move for
new trial, on the ground that there was error in the ruling of the court
upon the last point named.
"^On the part of the defendants
claimed that the act of ratification has relation back to the time, place, and circumstance when and
where the terms of the proposed contract were arranged between the
agent and the defendants, and supplied the authority then wanting,
thereby rendering the contract as binding as though the agent originalpossessed the authority to make it. In support of this proposition,
counsel cite the cases of Beidman v. Goodell, 56 Iowa, 592,
N. W.
900; Eadie v. Ashbaugh, 44 Iowa, 519; Lowry v. Harris, 12 Minn.
255 (Gil. 166); Hankins v. Baker, 46 N. Y. 670; Moss v. Rossie Lead
Co.,
Hill, 137; Forsyth v. Day, 46 Me. 176; and Story, Ag. 244 —
all of which recognize and enforce the general rule as given by Story,
"A ratification, also, when fairly made, will have the same effect
that
as an original authority has, to bind
principal, not only in regard to
the agent himself, hut in regard to third persons.
In short,
the act
treated throughout as
were originally authorized by the
principal, for the ratification relates back to the time of the inception
of the transaction, and has
complete retroactive efficacy." 89
That this
the general and the correct rule to be applied to cases requiring the construction and application of the contract to its subjectmatter, for the purpose of ascertaining and protecting the rights of
sustained by authorthe parties thereto, cannot be questioned, as
whether this
ities without number; but the point now presented
v.

a

it

is

it

a

if

*

*

is

is

it

is

a

it

is

*

a

:

§

5

9

ly

it

\v:is made, not as
Upon ratification the i>riii<ip;il takes the contract :is
mii-'ht nave been or ought to have heen made. Drennaii's Adm'r v. Walker,
21 Ark. 539 (I860);
Johnson v. Boover, T2 Iml. 395 (1880).
8»

it
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rule is properly applicable to the question involved in the instruction
given to the jury and excepted to by defendants.
In the case at bar
the court is not called upon to determine the rights of the parties as
defined by the terms of the contract itself.
The defendants are not
asserting, as against the plaintiffs, any rights or benefits conferred
upon them by the express provisions of the contract itself.
On the
contrary, their defense is that the contract is not binding upon them,
and never took effect, because it is, as they allege, illegal and void, in
that it was made in Iowa in violation of the statutes of this state.
The defendants, having received all the benefits conferred upon them
by the contract, are now seeking to defeat its enforcement, not upon
any question arising on the terms of the contract, but upon the ground
that, at the time and place the contract was made, it was invalid and
void.
Upon such an issue, is there any reason why the court shall
not ascertain the very facts of the case and decide accordingly? Is
there any reason why the plaintiffs are estopped from proving the
exact truth of the transaction?
The point of inquiry is. when and
where was the contract of sale entered into? "A contract is an agreement in which a party undertakes to do, or not to do, a particular
thing." Sturges v. Crowninshield. 4 Wheat. 197, 4 L. Ed. 529. A
contract does not become such until the minds of the contracting parties meet.
When and where did the plaintiffs agree to sell the liquors in question to the defendants?
Connors certainly did not make or complete
a contract
with defendants, for it is admitted, in the aspect of the
case now under consideration,
that he had no authority to make a
contract or to bind plaintiffs.
The Htmosl that can be said is that
he, not having authority to make a contract, undertook to agree upon
the terms of sale, which did not. however, bind plaintiffs until they
had given their assent thereto.
The contract was made when plaintills, by approval, acceptance, or ratification, assented thereto. Then,
in fact, for the first time, did the minds of the contracting parties
meet, and thereby render binding and obligatory
that which before
. only a proposition
The rule is well sel
for a contract.
tied that where orders are given for the purchase of goods to an agent
who has not authority to sell, but which ate forwarded to the principal for his approval, the contract is deemed to be made at the place

of approval.
Tegler v. Shipman, 33 Iowa, 194, 11 Am. Rep. 118;
Taylor v. Pickett, 52 h.wa, 469, 3 X. W. 514. The principle recog
nized in tl
applicable to the question presented in the case
under consideration, and no good reason is perceived for making a dis
tinction in the rule to be applied.
The same doctrine is enfor< ed in
contract
ent n d infr
Sunday, where, by the law of the state, su< h a contracl would be void.
A ratification thereof on a week-day is held good. Thus, in Han
v. Colton, 31
Iowa, 16, the supreme court of Iowa cite approving!)
the nde given in St
nt. § 619, "that any ratification of a c<mtract
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on a week day, such as a new promise to pay, a refusal to rescind on
demand made, a partial payment, and the like, would render the conIf the ratificatract binding, though originally made on Sunday."
tion of a contract must, under all circumstances, he held to revert
back to the time and place of its inception, and only that effect can he
given to it, it would follow that a Sunday contract could not he ratified
on a week-day. because, if that were the rule, the ratification must be
held to have taken effect at the time the original contract was entered
into, and a ratification taking effect on Sunday would be open to the
The ratification
same objection that invalidated the original contract.
is held good, however, because it takes effect on a week-day, and the
courts recognize that fact, and, in consequence thereof, give effect to
the contract originally void.
The true rule is that wdien the question involves the validity of the
contract, as such, the court may consider the very time and place where
In the case
and when the act was done that gave life to the contract.
at bar this act took place in Chicago, and the contract mytst be held to
have been made at that place, and not in Dubuque,Consequently,
there was no error in the instructions given to the jury upon this point,
and the motion for new trial must be overruled.

rv

GRAHAM
(Supreme

Court of Georgia,

v.

WILLIAMS,

1901.

114

Ga. 716, 40 S. E. 790.)

Simmons, C. J. An equitable petition was filed by Graham against
Williams and others. It alleged that he had title to a certain lot of land
in Appling county, and that the defendants, claiming the land under
some pretended title which they had failed to record, had entered upon
the land, and committed trespass by cutting timber and boxing the
trees for turpentine.
The petition set out a chain of title, and alleged
that the plaintiff and defendants claimed under a named common grantor.
The defendants admitted that they claimed under the common
grantor named in the petition, and alleged that they had title to the
land.
The petition alleged that the plaintiff's immediate grantor was
The plainone Einstein, who conveyed the land to plaintiff in 1892.
tiff prayed for an injunction to restrain the defendants from committing any further trespass, for a cancellation of the defendants' deeds,
and for damages for the trespass.
At the trial of the case he introduced in evidence deeds commencing
with that from the common grantor, and closed his evidence with a
deed purporting to have been made by an attorney in fact of Einstein,
plaintiff's immediate grantor, and a deed from Einstein himself to the
plaintiff, made and executed after the commencement of the suit. In
this last deed Einstein, after reciting, in substance, that the power of
attorney given his attorney in fact was not sufficiently
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in its terms to authorize the attorney in fact to sell and convey this
tract of land fully ratified and confirmed the deed made by the said
The record does not disattorney, and conveyed the land to Graham.
close that Graham was, or ever had been, in possession of the land.
At the close of the plaintiff's evidence the court, on motion, granted a
nonsuit upon the ground that the evidence showed that at the commencement of the action by the plaintiff he did not have sufficient title
Graham excepted, and brought the case here
to authorize a recovery.
for review.
1. Under the above facts the sole question to be determined is whether the deed of ratification made by Einstein after the commencement
of the suit related back to the execution of the deed by the attorney
in fact, so as to authorize the plaintiff to recover against the defendants. It was contended in the brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error
that the ratification by Einstein of the act of his agent related back to
the time of the execution and delivery of the agent's deed to the plaintiff, although the power of attorney given the agent did not authorize
him to convey this land. There is no doubt that the contention of the
plaintiff's counsel embodies a rule which is generally true. Generally
the ratification of an unauthorized act by an agent relates back and
becomes the act of the principal as of the time when the unauthorized
While this is generally true, there is an exception
act was performed.
to the rule, which is that such a ratification does not so relate back as
to affect the rights of other parties which have intervened and accrued
between the time of the unauthorized act and that of the ratification.
Mechem, Ag. § 168; Story, Ag. (9th Ed.) § 245; Whart. Ag. § 77:
Evan, v. Coleman, 101 Ga. 152, 28 S. E. 645. These authorities, and
the decisions which they cite, all hold that, when rights of third parties have intervened between the unauthorized act and its ratification,
If such
the latter does not relate back so as to affect those rights.
were not the rule, Einstein might have conveyed this land to a third
deed by his agent, and there) subsequently to the unauthorized
after, by ratifying and confirming the agent's act, defeated the rights
of the person to whom he had himself conveyed the land.
2. Having established that there is an exception of this nature to the
ral rule, it remains only to determine whether the defendants had
in the presenl case acquired such rights as would come within the exIn the first place, it is a well-established rule that a plaintiff
ception.
must recoV^r upon facts as they existed at the time of the commence
If
ment of the action.] Those facts constitute his cause of action.
he
suit,
after
the
of
the
commencement
additional
new and
tacts arise
If the facts upon
cannot rely Upon th« in a -round for a recovery.
which his suit is predicated are insufficient to authorize a recovery by
him, the defendant^ have a legal right to ask the court for a nonsuit,

In the
and. under the law, the court would be compelled to grant it.
t case the plaintiff virtually admitted, by putting in evidence (Indeed

of ratification,

that his title was not sufficient,

at

the

time suit

/"^
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was brought, to have sustained a recovery; for the deed of ratification
in substance, that the power of attorney made by Einstein to
his agent was not broad enough to authorize the agent to convey the
states,

had the right, under the fans as they stood at
They had the right
to have a nonsuit.
to have the case tried upon the facts as they existed at the time of the
The plaintiff had no right to interject
commencement oi the suit.
what might he called a new party, Einstein, and a new title originating
after the commencement of the suit.
In the case of Wittenbrock v. Bellmer, 57 Cal. 12. it appeared that
the president of a building and loan association had, without authority,
transferred a note and mortgage to Wittenhrock, who commenced proceedings to foreclose the mortgage. After the action had been pending
for several months, the trustees of the association ratified the previous
The court said: "We are
action <>i its president in the premises.
unable to discover any principle upon which the defendant's rights could
be affected by such ratification.
Conceding that at the date of the commencement of the action the plaintiff had no cause of action, it does
n<>t seem to us that he could maintain the action upon a cause of action
The case was at issue,
subsequently acquired against the defendant.
date of the ratificaif
had
to
the
been
tried
at
time
prior
and.
it
any
Could a strantion, the judgment must have been for the defendant.
ger to the action step in at any time before the trial, and deprive the
defendant of that right by placing in the hands of his adversary an
instrument upon which he might have maintained an action, or one
which he alleged that he had, but in fact did not have, when he commenced the action?
Clearly not. If a party has no cause of action
at the time of the institution of his action, he cannot maintain it by
filing a supplemental complaint founded upon matters which have
Similar rulings were made by the same court
subsequently occurred."
in Taylor v. Robinson,
14 Cal. 396, and McCracken v. City of San
Francisco, 16 Cal. 624. In 61 Am. Dec. 88, Mr. Freeman, in his notes
to Persons v. McKibben, 5 Ind. 261, in which the ruling was contrary
to that made in Wittenhrock v. Bellmer, cites the latter case, and says
* * * is the better dethat "the ruling of the California case
land.

The defendants

m."

by

is

a

a

a

a

if

(s.

The same view of the law was taken by the supreme court of the
United States in Parmelee v. Simpson, 5 Wall. 86, 18 L. Ed. 542, and
in Cook v. Tullis, 18 Wall. 338, 21 L. Ed. 933.
In the latter case WitIn the notes to Atlee v.
tenhrock v. Bellmer is cited with approval.
c. 69 Wis. 43, 33
Bartholomew
(Wis.) 5 Am. St. Rep. 103, 114
was said: "As
X. W. 110),
comgeneral rule,
party has
suit
commenced, he cannot
plete cause of action or defense when
his adversary, or some other
be deprived thereof, pendente lite,
party, ratifying some act or contract which at the commencement of
the action was without any binding force for want of such ratificait
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tion."

Pollock v. Cohen, 32 Ohio St. 514; Fiske v. Holmes,
Wood v. McCain, 7 Ala. 806, 42 Am. Dec. 612.

See, also,

Me. 441

41

183

;

shown that ratification does not so relate back as to affect
rights of third persons, and that these defendants acquired rights before the ratification pendente lite, we are of opinion
u0
Judgment affirmed.
that the judge did not err in granting a nonsuit.

""""■Having

the intervening

All

the Justices concurring.

(B) Revocability

PERRY
(Supreme

v.

HUDSOX.

Court of Georgia,

10

1851.

Ga. 362.)

Action by Oliver H. Perry to recover money paid

as security

for

Plea, gendefendant under judgment in Wilcox county.
refused
court
The
defendant.
Verdict for
eral issue and payment.
for
exceptions
these
now
assigns
and
Plaintiff excepted
a new trial.
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Alabama.

error.

The plaintiff in error insists upon two of the grounds
bill of exceptions, and our judgment will be restrictin
the
taken
only,
ed thereto.
the evidence of
[1.] First, that the Court erred in admitting
It appears
Theresa Killabren, a witness offered by the defendant.
from the record, that Melton, as the agent of Hudson, the defendant,
went to the state of Alabama, and instituted three actions of trover in
the name of Hudson, to recover sundry slaves. Being a non-resident,
suits,
he was required to give security for the costs of the respective
in
the
instituted
were
suits
the
his
security;
and the plaintiff became
dismissed,
thereof
and
the
costs
were
subsequently
name of Hudson;
paid by Perry, who now brings suit against Hudson, to recover the
W'akxkk. J.

amount of costs so paid.
Jt appears that after the suits had been instituted by Melton, as the
agent of I Eudson, in the name of the tatter, he went to Alabama, assisted in the prosecution of the suits, and continued the same twice on his
The continuance of the causes on the affidavit <>f Hudson,
affidavit.
the plaintiff therein, is not only shewn by the records of the Court in

suits were pending, but is also shewn by the testimony of
the suits.
fames T. [ohnson, Esq., the attorney, who conducted
that
Hudson rat
the
evidence
mosl conclusive
Here, then, we have
suits,
tinwhatever
may have
Inin
instituting
agenl
ified the acl of
such
t<>
and
ratification
him.
delegated
by
been the original authority
made the act bis own, and bound bun as a party plaintiff, for the
When
1 Livermore on \.gency,44.
Its of the suits thus instituted.
the ad
of his agent, such adoptive authority
adopt-,
the principal

which

the

?ee especially
<'oben, cited supra.

Wood

v.

McCain,

Taylor

v.

Robinson,

and

PollocB

v.
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relate- back to the time of the transaction, and is deemed in law the
Lawrence v.
same to all purposes, as if it had been given hefore.

Taylor,

the

5

Hill,

113.

a

is

is

if

it

it,

Upon this state oi facts, 1 [udson attempted to shew that the suits were
instituted in Alabama, by Melton, his agent, without his authority, and
therefore he was not liable to pay the costs of the same, and for that
This evidence
purpose the testimony of Killabren was introduced.
was inadmissible, in our judgment, to destroy the effect of his own
conduct, ratifying the institution of the suits as before stated, by proving the private understanding between himself and Melton in relation
to the suits, prior to the time it was shewn he had ratified the institution of them by continuing them, and aiding and assisting in their
The suits were instituted in his name, and if done withprosecution.
Why did he conout his authority, why did he not dismiss them?
tinue them twice, and aid in the prosecution of them?
[2.] Chancellor Kent states the true doctrine in relation to this
question, when he says : "It is a very clear and salutary rule in relation to agencies, that where the principal, with knowledge of all the
facts, adopts or acquiesces in the acts done under an assumed agency,
he cannot be heard afterwards, to impeach them, under the pretence
that they were done without authority, or even contrary to instruc2 Kent's Com. 616.
tions."
The defendant having ratified the institution of the suits in Alabama, after a full knowledge that the same had
been done by Melton, in his name, he cannot now be heard, to repudiate the act, under the pretence that the suits were instituted without his authority, or contrary to his instructions.
The second objection is to the latter part of the charge of the Court
to the jury.
[3.] The Court in the first part of its charge to the jury, stated the
with clearness
principles of the law applicable to the case before
and precision.
But in that portion of its charge, in which
instructed
the jury "that
they believed that Hudson did not order the suits, nor
-ul frequently adopt them, but that by an agreement with Melton, permitted Melton to use his name only, at Melton's own costs, then, they
should find for the defendant," we think there
error.
not
There
particle of evidence in the record, that we can discover, going to shew that Hudson did not adopt and ratify the act of
Melton in instituting the suits, but on the contrary, the evidence is,
that he did adopt and ratify the institution of them, by continuing
them twice on his own affidavit, and assist in the direction and prosecution of them. This evidence of the plaintiff was not impeached or controverted in any manner whatever, as we can find in the record; conwas error to instruct the jury in regard to an assumed
sequently,
state of facts which did not exist; for there was no evidence before
it
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of ratification of the authority of Melton to institute the
suits by Hudson, were not controverted at the trial; indeed, the fact
that he continued the causes twice on his affidavit, appeared of record.
acts
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them, which would authorize the belief that Hudson did not subsequently adopt and ratify the suits, after they had been instituted in
the name of Melton ; but the whole of the evidence in relation to that
point, was the other way, and this was the controlling question in the
The whole of the latter part of the charge, in our judgment,
case.
destroyed the legal effect of the first portion of the charge, which
stated the law correctly, and was based upon the evidence of the adopIn Paschal v. Dation and ratification of the suits by the defendant.
vis, 3 Ga. 256, we held it to be error in the Court to charge the jury
upon an assumed state of facts, which had not been proved, and have
re-affirmed that principle in subsequent cases.
Let the judgment of the Court below be reversed.

COFFIN

GEPHART.

Court of Iowa,

1S65.

18

Iowa,

256.)

Replevin for a bull. The animal was left by his owner, the plaintiff, with his tenant, who, after treating him as his own for some time,
Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
sold him to defendant.
Cole, J. 91 I. There appears to have been no controversy between
of the property by the plain+he parties, as to the former ownership
tiff; but the defendants claim that plaintiff, after a full knowledge of

it

a

it,

the sale by his tenant, to the defendant Gephart, acquiesced in and
ratified the sale, and looked to his tenant for pay for the property.
There was evidence introduced, tending to show these facts.
The defendants asked the court to instruct the jury that, "if any
person, being in the lawful possession, sells the personal property of
and the owner subsequently, and with
another without authority,
knowledge of all the circumstances of the sale, acquiesces in, and ratshort time, he becomes thereby bound by
ifies
although but for
to suit his convenience."
the sale, and cannot afterwards repudiate
This instruction, with others of like import, was refused, and such reis

assigned as error.
We think this instruction

fusal

i

•

;

*

*

*

&

1

4

a

02
and should
embodies the law of the case.
Pars, on Contr. 45, 46, and note
have been given.
(3d Ed.); Smith
Durn.
v. Ifodson,
East, 126 130; Therold v. Smith, 11 Modern,
Iowa, 242.
Reversed.
71 Mathews v. Gilliss,

Part of tlio opinion is omitted.

v

1

it

:

0.

»= Accord
10;
0. A. rir.o (1898), puprn, p.
Sanders v. Peck, B7 Fed. 81, BO
Rowland v. Barnes, 81 N. 0. 284 (1879); Brock v. Jones, 18 Tex. 481 (1866);
matters not thai prln
W. 812 (1901).
Hunter v. Cobe, B4 Mum. L87, 87
His disapproval be may at any time countermand
cip.-ii ;it tirst disapproved.
ratify. Woodward v. Harlow, 28 vt. 838 (1856).
and

bj

But if the principal repudiate the contract of the agent, he cannot speculate
Mio rise or rail in ralue, and after an unreasonable
shall
time ratif; it. if
appear advantageous to him.
Wilkinson v. Harwell, L8 Ala. 860 (1848).
oo

it
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(Supreme
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(C)

Ratification
Appeal

(Supreme

Exceptions
as to sheriff's

to the

as

to

(rartl
Agent

of BERGER.

Courl of Pennsylvania,
decree of the Court

L880.

96

confirming

Pa.

443.)

auditor's

report

sale of 1 [oig's real estate.

agreed to purchase of Hoig a tract of land,
the bargain to be consummated when the encumbrances were removed.
They met a number of creditors at the prothonotary's office, who released all Hoig's real estate from the lien of their judgments except
one tract; and Marsh agreed that Merger's judgment should have

Trunkey, J.

Thomas

Swift was acting as agent
in the order of lien to his own.
for Berger and refused to release Berger's judgment unless such
prioritv was given, and signed the release upon assurance that Marsh
The agreement to give preference is in writing ; the induceso agreed.

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:47 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

preference

is proved by oral testimony, and the fact is
ment or consideration
found by the auditor.
It is conceded that each creditor is bound by his release, on the faith
But
of which Thomas took the land and paid the purchase-money.
is
nudum
pacMarsh claims that his contract to give Berger priority
tum, because Swift had no authority to release; and also because he
recived no consideration for the postponement.
Upon the act of Swift, as agent for Berger, Thomas paid the purIf Swift's act was authorized by the principal,
chase-money to Hoig.
he was not personally liable; but if he had no authority or exceeded
responsible to
the authority delegated to him, he became personally
Thomas for the validity of the release. Where an agent has no au-

thority and undertakes to act for the principal, he will be personally
responsible therefor to the person with whom he is dealing for or on
account of his principal ; for by holding himself out as having au-

to act he draws the other party into a reciprocal engagement.
Whatever was done by Swift as agent is valid if subsequently ratified
A great jurist said, no maxim is better settled in reason
by Berger.
that a subsequent ratification has a retrospective effect,
law
than
and
and is equivalent to a prior command.
The general rule is, that the subsequent assent of the principal to
his agent's conduct renders the principal liable on contracts made in
violation of the principal's orders, or even where there has been no
thority

previous retainer or employment; and this assent may be inferred from
acts of the principal.
Berger has pursued the land excepted from the
release; he claims the money by virtue of Marsh's agreement; he excepted to the auditor's report, and has appealed to this court, insisting
No stronger evidence of
upon the enforcement of that agreement.
was his agent in fact for
But
Swift
to
be
ought
required.
ratification
- me purposes, and though informed of his agent's act, he did not dis-
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and therefore he made the agent's act his own.
Bredin v.
R. 27. We discover nothing in this case to take
Dubarry, 14 Serg.
out of the operation of general and familiar rules relative to ratification by
principal of what has been done in his name by one acting'
as his agent.
In general, the ratification of contract originally made
by one without authority, will relieve the agent from all responsibility
the contract purports to be made by him merely as agent, although

if

a

a

it

&

avow

if

;

it

it

a

a

a

a

it

it

a

if

a

if

if

if

is

is

if

is

It

a

is

a

a

a

in

by

It

i-

is

in

is

in

It

" «~

la

j

la

it

must appear that the third person
To relieve the n-'i'iii
In do wnorse
than be would bare occupied bad the agent acted under prior authority. The agent In general
not bound to give third persona notice of the rat
Ideation.
Sheffield v. Ladue, 16 Minn. 888 M,n. 346), n» Am. Rep. 146.
ii
i<
«i
i
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;

is

;

a

a

a

without such ratification, he would be liable to the other party and
also in some cases to the principal. 93
The facts in this case clearly show
contract which could be apIf the contract were void, no
proved by Berger and made his own.
subsequent act would ratify it; the rule has exceptions.
Where
contract has been made by
person with one as agent who has no authority, the parties do not always stand on equal terms since the principal may elect to ratify the act or disavow it.
not the only
This
case where one contracting party may be bound before the other
for
instance, one who makes an executory contract with an infant
liable thereon, though the infant may renounce or confirm when he
arrives at majority; and
married woman may hold
party to performance of an agreement with her. though
could not be enforced
against her. Thomas properly acted upon the release had
not been
ratified he would have remedy,
compelled to pay Merger's judgment,
against Swift; the ratification has the same effect as original authority,
and Berger
bound while Swift
not answerable at all.
Now, the
rights of the parties are to be considered as
Berger himself originally released and made the agreement with .Marsh.
The consideration, in part
not entirely, for Merger's release, was
.Marsh's agreement to postpone the lien of his judgment on the reThis was sufficient
maining farm of Hoig.
the release conferred
slight benefit on Marsh or
third person; or
Berger suffered the
least injury or inconvenience without benefiting any person.
But
was
benefit to Hoig and Thomas, and
was
giving up of
right
immaterial that Marsh received no benefit,
by Berger.
he probenefit to another, or caused the appellant to part with
cured
legal
Mutual promises are
sufficient consideration
right.
for each other;
Marsh and Thomas enjoy all which Berger gave and Marsh
bound
his contemporaneous promi
was pressed
argument that the appellee's judgment has the
This
not apparent.
He contracted thai
equity.
stronger claim
his legal right of priority should be postponed
favor of the appellant,
lie himself wrote and signed the contract, ami there
not the
slightest evidence of fraud or imposition.
manifest that for some
cause he was generous to Hoig and wished the sale to Thomas con-

THE

L88
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summated, to which end he made the agreement; bul there is nothing
in thai calling for its rescission.
Decree reversed and it is now considered and decreed that the judgment of Peter Berger is entitled to preference in the order of lien to the
judgment of C. R. Marsh, and that the fund be appropriated accordCosts of this appeal to be paid by the appellee.
ingly.

UXGENFELDER
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(Supreme

Court of Missouri,

1S95.

v.

LESCHEN.

134

Mo. 55, 34 S. W. 1089.)

Action to recover from an agent $5,009, the alleged difference between the value of certain real estate and the price at which defendant
Defendant without written authority from the
sold it 'to plaintiff.
owner contracted that the latter would convey to plaintiff the land in
Defendant was
question by warranty deed free from incumbrances.
willing to return to plaintiff $500 earnest money paid by him, with inFrom judgment for $517.75 in his favor, plaintiff
terest thereon.
appeals.
94

*

*

*

There is perhaps no principle of law better established than that, where an agent undertakes to bind a principal when he has no power to do so, he thereby renders himself personally responsible ; and the fact that he, in so doing, may have acted
in the utmost good faith, and honestly believed that he had such power, makes no difference.
Smout v. Ilbery, 10 Mees. & W. 1 ; Wright
The
v. Baldwin, 51 Mo. 269; Gestring v. Fisher, 46 Mo. App. 603.
case last cited was an action for damages against the defendants, who
had, without authority, sold plaintiff a lot in the city of St. Louis, and,
Burgess,

J.

by a written contract executed in the name of Bridge (the supposed
owner of the property) by Fisher & Co., agents, promised to make a
Rombauer, P. J., in speaking for the court said : "But
perfect title.
a contract of a real-estate agent in selling property intrusted to him
for that purpose is peculiar.
In absence of an express agreement to
the contrary, he does not undertake to bind all claimants of the title,
nor that he will sell an unincumbered, fee-simple title, but only that
Whether the sale be finally
he will sell such title as his principal has.
consummated depends generally upon the further question whether his
principal has a perfect title, or, if not, whether the vendee is satisfied
The agent, by his agreement to negotiate a
with an imperfect title.
sale, assumes no obligation in reference to the title, unless it was made
a part of his duty to have the title examined before attempting to effect
*
* or unless he warrants the title to the vendee."
a sale,
W'e do not understand that defendant, by the terms of the contract
now under consideration, undertook to warrant the title to be in Mrs.
'■■>
Part <>fthe opinion

is omitted.
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it

p.

.

is a

i->

is

in

a

in

is

/

if

ill

Tiekemeier, but that the extent of his undertaking was that she would
do so. This seems clear from the provision in the contract by which
it is agreed by and between the parties thereto that the title to the
property will be conveyed by warranty, and perfect and free from all
There is nothing in the contract which can
liens and incumbrances.
be fairly construed as a promise or agreement on the part of defendant to warrant the title, or that Airs. Tiekemeier had the title in fee
at the time the contract was entered into. He only contracted to sell,
for her, her interest in the land ; that she would make a warranty deed
thereto, — and as, in doing this, he acted without authority from her,
he should be held to respond in damages to the purchaser, unless the
contract was subsequently, and before the expiration of the time within which the deed was to be delivered, ratified by her.
In Story, Ag. § 251, it is said: "Where a contract which has been
originally made by the agent without authority is afterwards ratified
will, in general, relieve the agent
by the principal, that ratification
from all responsibility on the contract, if it purports to be executed by
him merely as an agent, although, without such ratification, he would
or
be liable to the other contracting
party for his misrepresentation
Thus, if a person should, in his own name, but
mistake of authority.
in the character of agent of the owner, sign a written agreement for
the sale of an estate, without any authority from the owner, and the
latter should afterwards sign the same agreement, and declare thereon
that he sanctioned and approved the agent's having signed it in his behalf, the agent will no longer be personally liable on the contract, but
his principal only will be liable, although the agent, without such ratification, might have been liable thereon."
Roby v. Cossitt, 78 111. 638.
I he ratification
makes the instrument binding on the principal, to
intents and purposes, as
originally authorized by him; and the
agent will not, under such circumstances, be personally liable, unless
created by the instrument.
Bray v. Gunn, 53
his person] liability
Ga. 144. .While the authorities are somewhat
conflict as to whether
or not the act of
person who assumes to represent as agent, without
done, may he sub/
whose name the act'
the
authority Vrom
person
that
weight
decided
may be,
the
ratified
such
person,
sequently
by
when done with
full knowledge of all the facts, and the evidence of
such knowledge
Hank v. Ga; 63 Mo. 33, 21 Am. Rep. 430,
clear.
supra,
95, and authorities cited; I'-le^s v. |enkins, 12'' Mo. 647, 31
S.

W.

938,

jupra, p. 135.
with

full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances attending the execution of the contract, seems t<> have done
her coneverything that was necessary to ratify tin- same and make
foi
tract.
of the deed <>f trusl given
She not <»nly procured
her deceased husband, and tendered to plaintiff
deed to the propsale,
such
hut
-he
from
at
the
procured from the heirs
erty
purchaser
of her husband quitclaim deeds, at the request of plaintiff, and. toherself, ten
deed of general warrant;
gether with
a

it

a

Mrs. Tiekemeier,

by

d

a

a

by
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them to plaintiff, and thus, by unequivocal acts, ratified the contract
of sale made by defendant.
It is true thai defendant had not obtained
a A(\\\ for the property under the truster's
sale, but that fact did not
in any way affect the ratification of the contract of sale 1>\ her.
Mrs.
fee
riekemeier being unable to pass the title in
to the property, and
plaintiff having declined to accept such title as she could convey, he
was only entitled to recover from defendant the amount paid by him
imesl money, and interest thereon, and the court correctly so
ruled.
We accordingly affirm the judgGestring v. Fisher, supra.
ment.

TRIGGS
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(Supreme

Court of Minnesota,

v.

1891.

JONES.
40

Minn.

277.

48 N. W. 111.°,).

Action by Triggs against his agent Jones (impleaded with William
O. Cook and Wilton George) asking for the cancellation of deeds from
Triggs to Cook of land in Duluth, and for such other relief as might
he just and equitable.
It appeared that Cook owned a patent, half of
which he offered to transfer to Jones if he would promote a corporation for its manufacture.
Jones induced Triggs to subscrihe for $15,000 of stock and to convey the Duluth land in payment.
Triggs sent
the deed to Jones, as he claimed, to be held in escrow till the corporation should be formed.
Jones at once delivered it to Cook, who conThe corporation was never
veyed to George, an innocent purchaser.
formed.
Appeal from judgment for $15,000, with interest, against

Jones.
MiTCHEiX,

05

[After disposing of certain questions of procedure,
* * * The remaining,
and damages:]
and really the
only important question in the case is as to the alleged ratification by
plaintiff of the act of Jones in delivering the deed.
It is claimed that,
after knowledge of the facts, plaintiff ratified Jones' act, and that such
ratification operated the same as original authority, and absolved Jones
from all liability, even if the delivery of the deed was unauthorized
when made. The court finds that Jones immediately informed plaintiff (by letter dated August 8, 1887) that he had delivered the deed to
. and that plaintiff did not at once repudiate the act, and never
prior to the commencement of this action notified Cook that he repudiated, hut left the deed in the possession of Cook, and joined with
[one- in taking the preliminary steps in the formation of the contemplated corporation, in which it had been agreed that plaintiff was to
receive stock as already stated.
It was because of this delay to
promptly repudiate the act of Jones that the court refused to grant
plaintiff relief against defendant George, who was an innocent purchaser.
But while the facts found may be evidence of a ratification,
evidence,

rt

J.

of the opinion

is omitted.
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they do not, as a matter of law, amount to that, at least in favor of
Jones, the party who committed the unauthorized act.
It is, however, assigned as error that the court failed to find that
plaintiff had ratified the delivery of the deed.
It is impracticable to
state, or even discuss, the evidence at length. A careful perusal of it
satisfies us that, while plaintiff was informed by letter as early as
August, 1887, that the deed had been delivered, yet this information
was accompanied and frequently followed by statements and assurances from Jones to the effect that the original arrangement was being or would be carried out, so that he would get his stock as had been
agreed, and that Cook would return the deed or reconvey the property if he (plaintiff) desired, etc., which were calculated to keep plaintiff quiet, and allay any possible fears on his part ; and that, influenced
he made no express

repudiation

discovered

that the whole scheme had fallen through, and would never
he brought this action to recover either the land or
damages.
At least, the evidence is such that it would have justified
the court in taking this view of the facts.
There is no" doubt that the general rule is that, by a ratification of
an unauthorized
act, the principal absolves the agent from all responsibility for loss or damage growing out of the unauthorized transaction, and that thenceforward the principal assumes the responsibility
of the transaction, with all its advantages and all its burdens.
Neither
is there any question but that, where the rights and obligations
of
third persons may depend on his election, the principal is bound to act
anil give notice of his repudiation or disaffirmance of the unauthorized
act at once, or at least within a reasonable time after knowledge of
the act. and, if In- docs not so dissent, his .silence will afford conclusive
evidence of his approval.
Such a rule is necessary to protect the
If the principal,
rights of third parties who nave dealt with the agent.
after knowledge, remains entirely passive, it is hut just, when the pro■I of third parties require
to presume that what, upon knowledge, he has failed to repudiate, he has tacitly continued.
But
rule do not apply with equal
apparent that the reasons for such
favor of the a.-ent himself, who has wrongfully committed the
force
unauthorized act. Consequently mere passive inaction or silence, which
would an ion nt to an Implied ratification
favor of third parties, mud
not amounl to thai
favor of the agent,
as to ab olve him from
liability to his principal
ulting from the unau'ill-,
thorized
such inaction or failure to immediately dis-

if

fi
i

is

it

o

in

in

in

a

it

it,

be consummated,

■
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and induced by these considerations,

of Jones' act, but let matters rest, hoping and expecting that the deal
would still be consummated according to agreement, and he get the
stock to which he would be entitled; and that with this hope and expectation, and at the instance of Jones, in whom he seemed still to
have implicit confidence, he sent a proxy to one Mahle, authorizing
him to subscribe for stock in his name, and to vote it for officers of
the company at the meeting for organization; but that finally having

(Parti

THH RELATION

11*12

affirfn was induced by the assurances or persuasion of the agent himself. A
\or in this rase does the affirmative action of the plaintiff, after
knowledge oi the deliver) of the deed, in taking part in the preliminary steps for the organization of the contemplated stock company, of
act.
Such steps
itself amount to a ratification of the unauthorized
the
between
parties,
were right in the line of the original agreement
action
such
Induced,
as
it
into
effect.
and were designed to cany

probably was. by the assurances of Jones that the enterprise would
still go on, and plaintiff get his stock, it really amounted to nothing
more than an effort on plaintiff's part, after knowledge of Jones' deviation from his instructions, to avoid loss thereby, which is not- such

will relieve the agent. Mechem, Ag. § 173. Upon
Jones' act was without original authority, the burden was
upon him to show such a subsequent ratification as would relieve him
from liability.
The court has not found any such ratification, and, in our opinion,
under the evidence, he was justified in finding, as he in effect does,
that there was none. Order affirmed.

a

ratification
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proof

as

that

SCHANZ
(Supreme

Court of New York,

Appeal from judgment

v.

MARTIN.

Appellate Term,
Y. Supp. 997.)

1902.

37

Misc.

492,

75

N.

of the Municipal Court of the City of New

York for plaintiffs.
Giegericii, J.f The

defendant was a salesman of the plaintiffs, and,
without authority, collected from one of their customers the price
of two suits of clothes. They brought an action against the customer,
but, upon discovering that the defendant had collected for the suits,
discontinued that action, and began this one against the defendant
The appellant challenges the
for conversion, and obtained judgment.
judgment, on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to show (as is requisite to the maintenance of an action for conversion) either ownership of the money or an immediate right to its possession.
The appellant seems to concede that an action for money had and
received would lie, on the theory that by bringing such an action the
act, thereby implaintiffs would ratify the otherwise unauthorized
posing upon the defendant an obligation, based on the theory of a
Keener, Quasi Cont. 167.
quasi contract, to turn over the money.
No reason Is obvious, however, wdiy an action for conversion will not
lie as well. The discontinuance of the suit against the customer, and
the institution of a suit of any character
t T';irt of the opinion

is omitted.

against the defendant,

would
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be a ratification of the act of collecting, and a retroactive authorization to the defendant to collect. 96 "A subsequent ratification is equivalent to an original command."
Doty v. Wilson, 14 Johns. 379, 3S2 ;
Hamlin v. Sears, 82 N. Y. 327, 331. Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur
et mandato priori aequiparatur.
Brown, Leg. Max. 781 ; Story, Ag
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But it does not necessarily follow that there would be an authorization to retain, as well as to collect, the money.
An agent may be
authorized both to collect and to retain money, and mingle it with his
own or other money, in which event there are numerous authorities
that he is not liable for conversion.
Walter v. Bennett, 16 N. Y. 250;
Conaughty v. Nichols, 42 N. Y. 83 ; Vandelle v. Rohan, 36 Misc. 239,
73 N. Y. Supp. 285.
Or he may be authorized to collect a single
claim and to deliver to his principal the identical money received, in
which case he is liable for conversion.
See Farrelly v. Hubbard, 148
N. Y. 592, 43 N. E. 65 ; Donohue v. Henry, 4 E. D. Smith, 162. The
former is the usual situation where an agent has authority to make
collections generally, or to make more than one collection, but where
such authority is confined to a single case, as here, it is plain that
there is not merely a debt owing from the agent to the principal, but

an obligation

to pay over the identical

money.

The case of Farrelly v. Hubbard, supra, is quite in point.
The
court there said (148 N. Y. 594, 595, 43 N. E. 66) : "The plaintiff
assigned to the defendant, by an instrument in writing, the wages or
salary due him from the New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad
Company (in whose employ he then was), for the month of December, 1886, constituting him his attorney to collect and receipt for it.
* * *
The language of the contract of assignment, already quoted,
is perfectly clear, and shows that the defendant in the action in justice's court was acting solely as the servant of the defendant in this
action, and it was his duty to have immediately carried the money or
check to his assignee, and, not doing so, he became liable for conversion upon failure to pay over on demand."
In Donohue v. Henry, supra, it was said (page 163): "It is objected
that trover will not lie for this item of money. That is true when the
has gone into the defendant's possession with the plaintiff's
and permitted to be mixed up with his own money; but where
money is received from a third person, the party to whom the money
fed has a right to insist upon receiving the identical money so
collected, and if not delivered on request may maintain a possessory
* *
*
action therefor."
The appellant's claim that the plaintiffs are bound by what he calls
their election to SUe the customer, rather than him, takes no account
money
;

.

■ where an agent without
authority t «••■!<horses In payment of a
due bis principal, the court held the principal mil hi ratify and recover the
I
.!
v. Bherin, <; s. i>. 82, <;<»N. \V. L46 (1894).
Hormann
QonD.Pa & a — 13

Tin-

L94

relation

(Parti

principle that there can be no election without knowledge of
facts.
It was not until the trial of the action against the customer that the plaintiffs first learned that the bill had been paid to
The judgthe defendant, and of their consequent right against him.
ment should be affirmed, with costs.

of

the

the

SI1KIM1KRD
(Supreme Court of Michigan, 1S01.

v.

GIBBS.
85 Mich.

85, 48 N. W. 179.)

Affirmed.
Defendant brings error.
Plaintiff brought suit in justice court upon the following
Ninety
St. Louis, Mich., Nov. 27, 1883.
promissory note: "$50.00.
days after date, for value received, I promise to pay to the order of
William D. Gibbs fifty dollars at the banking-house of Darragh & Co.,
St. Louis, Mich., with ten per cent, interest after due. Truman Gibbs."
The note was duly indorsed by William D. Gibbs. Plaintiff recovered
judgment, from which the defendant appealed to the circuit court for
The circuit judge directed a verdict for the
the county of Isabella.
full
amount
of the note and interest.
for
the
plaintiff
The defense was that there was no consideration for the note. The
Assumpsit.
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Morse,

1.

defendant, to make out his case, introduced testimony tending to show
that the note was given in consideration of the plaintiff's assisting him
in purchasing a certain piece of land of one Thompson. The plaintiff had business relations with Thompson, and told defendant that he
could, by reason of such business relations, purchase the land much
cheaper than defendant could, enough so that he could afford to pay
him $50 for his services and influence in buying the land. Upon these
from plaintiff that he could
representations, and the understanding
get the land of Thompson for $400, defendant turned over to plaintiff
a note for $400 against third parties, not yet due, and received from
plaintiff an order to Thompson to give defendant a deed of the land,
and charge the purchase price, $400, to plaintiff. Defendant took the
Before he showed the order to
order, and went to see Thompson.
Thompson defendant asked him how much he wanted for the land,
Defendant, however, preand Thompson told him he held it at $400.
sented the order of plaintiff to Thompson, and received his deed upon
He said nothing to plaintiff about any dissatisfaction with his barit.
gain or his arrangement with plaintiff until after the note became due,
when he refused to pay it.
The testimony on the part of the plaintiff showed a different state
of facts, but in our view of the case it is not necessary to set it out.
The circuit judge held that it was the duty of defendant, when he
found out from Thompson, before he presented the order of the plaintiff, that he could himself purchase the land for $400, to have repudiated his bargain with plaintiff, and tendered him back his order, and
But failing to do this, and using the order of
demanded his notes.

J
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the plaintiff as so much money with which to purchase the land, he
acted upon and ratified his agreement with plaintiff with full knowledge of all the facts in the case, and could not afterwards repudiate it. 97
The circuit judge was clearly right in his ruling, and the judgment
will be affirmed, with costs.

(D) As

OYERBY
(Supreme

to

the

v.

Court of Louisiana,

Principal

OVERBY.
1S66.

IS La. Ann.

54G.)

Hyman, C. J. In the year 1863, one of plaintiff's brothers brought
of plaintiff's cotton and stored it at Air. Billings' plantation, in
the parish of Morehouse.
Plaintiff, who resided in Kentucky, came to this state, and, when
about to return to that state, he left the cotton in charge of his brother,
E. P. Gverby, to do with it as if it was his own.
In the year 1864, the cotton-burners of the Confederate States visited the said parish, and commenced their work of destruction.
E. P. Overby, desirous of saving his brother's cotton from being
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a lot

burned,

applied to several persons to get them to remove and conthe same from the burner-, offering a half of the cotton that
might be saved by removal and concealment, to any person who would
This proposition, refused by
undertake to remove and conceal it.
several, was accepted by William R. Ward, who removed, concealed
and saved one hundred and seventeen bales of the cotton, and E. P.
rby gave him (Ward) 58 ] - bale- of same.
Plaintiff in this case sued Ward to recover of him the 58V£ I
of cotton, or their value. One of the defences set up by Ward in his
answer i-, that the agent, E. P. ( >verby, had authority to make the contract, and that plaintiff had ratified the acts of the agent.
The trial
Plainof the case resulted in a verdict and judgment for defendant.
ceal

tiff

has

appealed.

plaintiff's coming again into this state, he was informed, on
inquiry, that his brother, !■"..P. < Iverby, had saved some of his (plainOn

principal of a tori cannot relieve the tori Feasor of
persons wronged.
The fad thai he nets for another, by
or subsequently conferred, cannol absolve the agenl from
Wrighl v. Baton, 7 wis. 595 (1850);
person wronged.
Richardson v. Kimball, 28 Me. 163 (1848); Permlnter v. Kelly, L8 Ala. Tic.
.-,1 Am. Dec. 177 (1851); Burnap v. Marsh,
Josselyn \. Mc
13 111.635(1852);
ven when the agenl acts In
And this la tr
Alllster, 22 Mich. •"■"«»(1871).
U of :i third person to his principal, sup
good faith, us when he -ends the g
•
them to belong to hie principal. Stephens v. dwell, I Maule & Selwyn,
'_•.".'.>
Such ratification will, however, relieve the agenl of tori liability
(1815).
The latter Deed nut ratify; hut. if be does, he waives the
to the principal.
wrong committed by the agent, and can bold him only us for an authorized
ad
Judah v. Trustees of Vlncennes University, 16 Ind. 56 (1861) ; Szymanskl
in. Ann. '.hi. Q6 Am. Dec. 382 (18G
v. n.
Eiatlflcatlon by
Liability to the third
anthi rity previously
liability ti> the
hi

a

(Parti
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lie replied,
tiff's) cotton, by giving one half for removing the other.
on receiving this in formal ion, that whatever his brother had done
would be satisfactory to him.
His not dissenting, but rather assenting, to what had been done by
his agent, ratified the contract that his agent had made with Ward.
A ratification by the principal, of a contract made by his agent, not
authorized to make such contract, binds the principal, as fully as if
Civil Code,
the agent had been empowered to make the contract.
No. 2990.

08

Judgment affirmed, plaintiff to pay costs.

GOSS
(Supreme

v.

Court of Minnesota,

STEVENS.
1884.

32

Minn.

472, 21 N.

W.

549.)

Dickinson, J.

The plaintiffs seek to recover a stipulated compenfor their services, as agents of the defendant, in selling real
At the trial, upon the plaintiff's case being
property of the latter.
closed, the court dismissed the action.
The appeal is from an order
refusing a new trial.
It appeared upon the trial that the defendant, by a written memorandum, authorized the plaintiffs to sell for him a certain tract of land
upon terms, as to price and manner of payment, particularly set forth ;
and promised, upon sale of the property, to pay plaintiffs a stated comThe evidence went to show that after this authorization the
mission.
plaintiffs agreed with certain parties (Avery and Walters) for the
sale of the property to them, upon terms materially different from
those prescribed by the defendant; and that the plaintiffs, as agents,
executed with the purchasers a writing embodying a statement of the
contract of sale, and a specific agreement, on the part of Avery and
Walters, to purchase the property on the terms stated therein. In the
body of this instrument the plaintiffs are recited to have made the sale
"as authorized agents," and to their signature are added the words,
"Agents of L. H. Stevens." The plaintiffs having proved the execution
of this contract, and having offered evidence going to show that the
offered the contract in evidence.
defendant had ratified
This was
it,

rejected.

a

08 "That the effect of ratification as to the principal is to hind him hy the
act, whether it be for his detriment or his advantage, and whether it be
tort or a contract, to the same extent as by, and with all the
founded on
consequences that follow from, the same act done by his previous authority,"
is held by Tindal, C. J., in Wilson v. Tumman, ante. p. 85.
See, also, Brock
Hunter v. Cobe, 84 Minn. 1S7, 87 N. W. 612
v. Joins. L6 Tex. 461 (1856);
(1901); Lee v. Fontaine, L0 Ala. 755, 44 Am. Dec. 505 (1846); Walker v. Walker,
II. Lsl . (Tenn.) 125 (1871). And, in general, it matters not whether the agent
used his name, or that of his principal, so long as the bargain as carried out
Campbell, J., in Stansell v. Leavitt, 51 Mich.
was ratified by the principal.
536, 1G N. W. 892 (1883).

5
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We think the court erred." There was abundant evidence to entitle
the plaintiffs to go to the jury upon the question of ratification, going
to show that the defendant, after he had been advised as to the terms
of the contract which had been made by his agents in his behalf, acquiesced in and confirmed their acts.
Since the agents might have been
orally authorized to make the sale (Brown v. Eaton, 21 Minn. 409;
Dickerman v. Ashton, 21 Minn. 538), their unauthorized acts done in
defendant's behalf might be ratified in any manner expressing his asIt was not necessary that the ratification be in writing.
sent thereto.
Brown v. Eaton, 21 Minn. 409, 410. Ratification of the unauthorized
sale would relate back to the acts of the agent and be equivalent to
Stewart v. Mather, 32 Wis. 344; Nesbitt v. Helser,
prior authority.
49 Mo. 383.
This contract, if ratified by the defendant so as to cure the variance
from the prescribed terms of sale, would have been prima facie proof
of the plaintiffs' right to recover. It bound the purchasers to take the
property upon the terms stated, and this constituted a sale of the property within the meaning of the agreement between the plaintiffs and
the defendant.
Goss v. Broom, 31 Minn. 484, 18 N. W. 290; Rice v.
Mayo, 107 Mass. 550. The contract bears upon its face the character
of a contract between the plaintiffs' principal, executed through them
as agents, and the purchasers.
In an action upon the contract parol
evidence would be admissible, if any proof was necessary, to disclose
the defendant as the principal in whose behalf the contract was made.
Rowell v. Oleson, 32 Minn. 288, 20 N. W. 227, and cases cited. Having bound the parties by an authorized contract, any inability or refusal of the principal to consummate the contract which he had authorized should not affect the agents' right to compensation.
Mooney
v. Elder, 56 N. Y. 238; Delaplaine v. Turnley, 44 Wis. 31 ; Phelan v.
Gardner, 43 Cal. 306; Nesbitt v. Helser, 49 Mo. 383.
The order refusing a new trial is reversed, and a new trial awarded.

DEMPSY
(Supreme

Judicial

Court

v.

CHAMBERS.

of Massachusetts,

L8 L. R. A. 219, 26 Am.

1891

164 Mass.

si. Rep.

830, 2R N.

E.

270,

249.)

Holmes, J.

This is an action of tort to recover damages for the
of a plate-glass window.
The glass was broken by the
ligence of one McCullock while delivering some coal which had hern
ordered of the defendant by the plaintiff. It is found as a fact that
McCullock was not thi
int's servant when he broke the window,
hut that the "delivery of the coal by |him| was ratified by the <lc-

breaking

U .-i

•• After ratification, the principal cannot bold the
ur<ni for n<>t performing
He ratified the act at
the ad as he was authorized.
was done, and rel<
from, hie authority,
the agent from liability for disobedience to, or departure
Mm. ]«;:;

,

J7

|

.
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nude McCullock in law the agent
Pendant, and that such ratification
and servant of the defendant in the delivery of the coal."
On this
finding the court ruled "'that the defendant, by his ratification of the
delivery of the coal by McCullock, became responsible for his negHie defendanl excepted to this
ligence in the delivery <>i the coal." 1
ruling, and to nothing else.
We must assume that the finding was warranted by the evidence, a majority of the court being of the opinion
that the bill of exceptions dues not purport to set forth all the evidence on which the finding was made. Therefore the only question before us is as to the correctness of the ruling just stated.
If we were contriving a new code to-day we might hesitate to say
that a man could make himself a party to a bare tort in any case mereBut we are not at
ly by assenting to it after it had been committed.
liberty to refuse to carry out to its consequences any principle which
we believe to have been part of the common law simply because the
grounds of policy on which it must be justified seem to us to be hard
to find, and probably to have belonged to a different state of society.
It is hard to explain why a master is liable to the extent that he is
for the negligent acts of one who at the time really is his servant, actProbably master and
ing within the general scope of his employment.
servant are "feigned to be all one person" by a fiction which is an echo
of the patria potestas and of the English frankpledge.
Byington v.
Simpson, 134 Mass. 169, 170, 45 Am. Rep. 314; Fitzh. Abr. "Corone,"
Possibly the doctrine of ratification is another aspect of the
pi. 428.
same tradition.
The requirement that the act should be done in the
New England Dredging
name of the ratifying party looks that way.
Co. v. Rockport Granite Co., 149 Mass. 381, 382, 21 N. E. 947; Fuller
& Trimwell's Case, 2 Leon. 215, 216; Sext. Dec. 5, 12; De Reg. Jur.
Reg. 9; D. 43, 26, 13; D. 43, 16, 1, § 14, gloss., and cases next cited.
The earliest instances of liability by way of ratification in the English law, so far as we have noticed, were where a man retained propY. B. 30 Edw. I.
erty acquired through the wrongful act of another.
128 (Roll's Ed.;) 38 Lib. Ass. 223, pi. 9; S. C. 38 Edw. III. 18; 12
Edw. IV. 9, pi. 23; Plowd. 8 ad fin. 27, 31. See Bract. 158b, 159a,
lint in these cases the defendant's assent was treated as relat171b.
ing back to the original act, and at an early date the doctrine of relation was carried so far as to hold that, where a trespass would have

1

a

ii

a

i7

S.

1

--r
*■
i);

ioo Acceptance, with knowledge of the circu instances, of the fruits of an act
committed an assault, makes the principal Hain performing which the .-1
Avakian v. Noble, L23 Cal.
ir the tort, and liable in punitive damages.
Bui not it tin' principal, when accepting the avails,
216, 53 Pac. 559 (1898).
had no knowledge of the culpable acl of the agent. Marsh v. Joseph, [1897]
558, 15 W. It. 209.
Ch. 213, 66 L. J. Ch. 128, 75 L. T. Rep. N.
Nor if the
Moore v. Rogers, 51 N. C.
tort was not done for the benefit of the principal.
trespasser and
(1859), quoting Lord Coke:
"He that receiveth
Jones) l:
is dune is no trespasser, unless the trespass was
trespass after
agreeth to
done to his use or for his benefit, and then his agreemenl subsequent amountfor in th.it omnia ratihabitio retrotrahitur, et maneth to a commandment;
aequiparatur."
Inst. 317; Broom's Legal Maxims, 383.
(6

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:47 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

L98

Ch. 4)

CREATION

OF TOE

RELATION

199

been justified if it had been done by the authority by which it purported to have been done, a subsequent ratification might also justify it.
Y. B. 7 Hen. IV. 34, pi. 1. This decision is qualified in Fitzh. Abr.
"Bayllye," pi. 4, and doubted in Brooke, Abr. "Trespass," pi. 86, but
it has been followed and approved so continuously and in so many
later cases that it would be hard to deny that the common law was
as there stated by Chief Justice Gascoigne.
Godb. 109, 110, pi. 129;

Leon. 196, pi. 246 ; Hull v. Pickersgill, 1 Brod. & B. 282 ; Muskett
v. Drummond, 10 Barn. & C. 153, 157; Buron v. Denman, 2 Exch. 167,
178; Secretary of State v. Sahaba, 13 Moore, P. C. 22, 86; Cheetham
v. Mayor, etc., L. R. 10 C. P. 249; Wiggins v. U. S., 3 Ct. CI. 412.
If we assume that an alleged principal, by adopting an act which was
unlawful when done can make it lawful, it follows that he adopts it
at his peril, and is liable if it should turn out that his previous command would not have justified the act. It never has been doubted that
a man's subsequent agreement to a trespass done in his name and for
his benefit amounts to a command so far as to make him answerable.
The ratihabitio mandato comparatur of the Roman lawyers and the
earlier cases (D. 46, 3, 12, § 4; D. 43, 16, 1, § 14; Y. B. 30 Edw. I.
128) has been changed to the dogma aequiparatur ever since the days
of Lord Coke. 4 Inst. 317. See Brooke, Abr. "Trespass," pi. 113, Co.
Litt. 207a; Wing. Max. 124; Com. Dig. "Trespass," C. 1; Railway
Co. v. Broom, 6 Exch. 314, 326, 327, and cases hereafter cited.
Doubts have been expressed, which we need not consider, whether
this doctrine applied to a case of a bare personal tort. Adams v. Freeman, 9 Johns. 117, 118; Anderson and Warberton, JJ., in Bishop v.
If a man assaulted another in the street
Montague, Cro. Eliz. S24.
out of his own head, it would seem rather strong to say that if he
merely called himself my servant, and I afterwards assented, without
more, our mere words would make me a party to the assault, although
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in >uch cases the canon law excommunicated the principal if the asPerhaps the application
Sext. Dec. 5, 11, 23.
sault was upon a clerk.
of the doctrine would he avoided on the ground lliat the facts did not
show an act done for the defendant's benefit, (Wilson v. Barker, 1
Xev. & M. 409, 4 Barn. & Adol. 614; Smith v. Lozo. 42 Mich. 6, 3
X. \Y. 227;) as in other cases it has been on the ground that they did
not amount to such a ratification a- was necessary, (Tinker v. Jerris,
7? Me. 1st; Hyde v. Cooper, 26 Vt. 552.)
I'm the language generally \ua] by judges ami text writers, and
such decisions as we have been able to find, is broad enough to cover
is established.
Peril
e like the present, when the ratification
Georgetown, 7 Gray, lot; Bishopv. Montague, Cro. Eliz. 824; Sander. Baker, 2 W. 111. 832, 3 Wils. 309; Barker v. Braham, 2 W. Bl.
868, 5 Wils. 368; Badkiti v. Powell, Coup. 476, 479; Wilson v.
Tumman, 6 Man. & G. 236, 212: hems v. Read, 13 Mees. & W. 834;
;, v. Denman, 2 Exch. 167, 188; Bird v. Brown, 4 Exch. -
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Railway Co. v. Broom, 6 Exch. 314, 326, 327 J Roc v. Railway Co., 7
Exch. 36, 42, 43: Ancona v. Marks. 7 Hurl. & N. 686, 695; Condit v.
Baldwin, 21 X. Y. 219, 225, 78 \m. 1 W. 137; Exum v. Brister, 35
Miss. 391; Railway Co. v. Donahoe, 56 Tex. 162; Murray v. LoveSee Lovcjoy v. Murray,
joy, 2 Cliff. 191, 195, Fed. Cas. No. 9,963.
3 Wall. 1, 9, 18 L. Ed. 129; Story, Ag. §§ 455, 456.
The question remains whether the ratification is established. As we
understand the bill of exceptions, McCullock took on himself to deliver the defendant's coal for his benefit, and as his servant, and the
The ratdefendant afterwards assented to McCullock's assumption.
ification was not directed specifically to McCullock's trespass, and that
act was not for the defendant's benefit, if taken by itself, but it was so
connected with McCullock's employment that the defendant would
have been liable as master if McCullock really had been his servant
\\ hen delivering the coal. We have found hardly anything in the books
dealing with the precise case, but we are of opinion that consistency
with the whole course of authority requires us to hold that the defendant's ratification of the employment established the relation of
master and servant from the beginning, with all its incidents, includSee Coomes v.
ing the anomalous liability for his negligent acts.
Houghton. 102 Mass. 211, 213, 214; Cooley, Torts, 128, 129.
The ratification goes to the relation, and establishes it ab initio. The
relation existing, the master is answerable for torts which he has not
ratified specifically, just as he is for those which he has not commanded, and as he may be for those which he has expressly forbidden.
In
servants
if
Lane,
Case,
that
as
90,
it was agreed
strs.igers,
Gibson's
to Gibson, but without his precedent appointment, had seized goods by
color of his office, and afterwards had misused the goods, and Gibson
ratified the seizure, he thereby became a trespasser ab initio, although
not privy to the misusing which made him so ; and this proposition is
stated as law in Com. Dig. "Trespass," C. 1 ; Elder v. Bemis, 2 Mete.
(Mass.) 599, 605. In Coomes v. Houghton, 102 Mass. 211, the alleged
servant did not profess to act as servant to the defendant, and the
decision was that a subsequent payment for his work by the defendant
would not make him one.
For these reasons, in the opinion of a majority of the court, the exExceptions overruled.
ceptions must be overruled.
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TRUST CO.

v.

MEMPHIS

(Circuit Court of the United States, W. D. Tennessee,

& C. R. CO.

1897.

83

Fed.

870.)

Lurton, Circuit Judge.
This is a bill under which it is sought
to foreclose a mortgage styled the "first consolidated mortgage'' of
It was intended that
the Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company.
two older series of bonds would be retired by bonds secured hereIn part this has been done, though not altogether. It is thereunder.
fore sought to sell subject to the lien of the senior outstanding mortThis consolidated mortgage was made August 20, 1877, to
gages.
secure an issue of bonds aggregating $4,700,000. Of these only $2,264,000 have been actually issued. The remainder are in the hands
of the trustee, and held for the purpose of taking up outstanding first
These consolidated bonds mature Janand second mortgage bonds.
uary 1, 1915, and have annexed coupons for interest, payable each
The case comes on now to be heard upon
recurring six months.
and
proof, and a final decree of foreclosure is sought,
the pleadings
The right to such a decree is prediboth for principal and interest.
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cated upon a default in the payment of interest accruing
January 1, 1894, July 1, 1894, January 1, 1895, and July

July
1,

1,

1895;

1893,

this

bill having been filed August 2, 1895.
The bill particularly alleges that demand had been made for the
payment of the interest accruing July 1, 1893, and that payment was
refused ; that this default continued for more than 60 days after such
demand ; that thereupon holders of more than one-third in value of
the outstanding bonds had, by an instrument in writing, filed with
the trustee, elected that the principal of the said bonds should immediately become payable, and requiring the trustee to foreclose the mortgage.

*

*

*

The principal objection urged against a decree of foreclosure for
the principal of the mortgage debt turns upon the authority of one
D. Willis James to sign the declaration of maturity for his wife, who
owned four bonds of $1,000 each, and for two brothers, each owning
Mr. James signed the names of his
twenty bonds of $1,000 each.
The defendants say that
wife and brothers by himself as attorney.
of the said
he was not the "attorney in fact then to duly authorized"
signers, and that, if these names be eliminated, a valid election by
One-third in value of all outstanding bonds has not been declared.
It dearly appears that Mr. James had a general parol authority from
his wife and brothers to art for them as he deemed besl in n
But it is also
to the management and disposition of these securities.
admitted that he had no written letter of attorney particularly au-

ioi

i»;irt of the opinion

is omitted.
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act.
That these persons owned the bonds
are
which
their
names
for
signed is sufficiently made ou1 by the general statement to that effect in Mr. James' deposition.
Being wholly
undisputed, we see no reason for inquiring into the source of his information.
After the filing o\ this bill, these persons, in writing, formally confirmed and ratified the act of D. Willis Janus in making the declaraIf the legal effect of this ratification of maturity now in question.
tion is to put the assent in same position as if he had had authority to
Ao the act when done, there is no necessity for considering the question at the bar as to the meaning of the provision in the mortgage
touching the election of holders of bonds through "attorneys in fact
The general doctrine in respect of the ratthereto duly authorized."
ification of the acts of one assuming without authority to act for
another is that a subsequent "ratification operates upon the act ratified precisely as though the authority to do the act had been previously
given."
Cook v. Tullis, 8 Wall. 338, 21 L, Ed. 933. "In short," says
as if it were originally
"the act is treated throughout
Story,
Justice
authorized by the principal, for the ratification relates back to the time
of the inception of the transaction, and has a complete retroactive
efficacy, or, as the maxim expresses
'Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahiiuiy "

it,

is

it

:

is

&

5

2

is

a

a

if

by

is

it

t

a

it

it

is

if

6

&

is

§

244.
Story, Ag.
The principle
clearly stated in the wcll-conjfeidered case of Wilson
"An act done for anMan.
G. 236, where
v. Tumman,
said}
other by a person not assuming to act for himself, but for such other
person, though without any precedent authority whatever, becomes
In such case
subsequently ratified by him.
the act of the principal,
be for his detriment or
the principal
bound by the act, whether
be founded on
advantage, and whether
tQrt or on contract, to the
same extent, and with all the same consequences, which follow from
the same act done by his previous authority."
Counsel for defendants seek to take this case without the general
of ratification by an application of the not very clear statement
limitation found in section 246 of Story on Agency, where
of
the retrospective consesaid that third persons will not be bound
auquences of ratification "if the act done by such person would,
thorized, create
right to have some act or duty performed by a third
person, so as to subject him to damages or losses for the nonperformright or an estate already
ance of that act or duty, or would defeat
This limitation
evidently deduced from such
vested in the latter."
East, 491,
Exch. 167, Right v. Cuthell,
cases as Buron v. Denman,
These were cases of noC. 626.
and Mann v. Walters, 10 Barn.
tices given of the determination of leases by unauthorized persons asThat Judge Story bases his text
suming to be agents of the landlord.
not only evident from the cases cited in
upon that class of cases
the notes to the text, but from the stronger fact that he illustrates
the meaning of an otherwise cloudy statement by the illustration
a
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;
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is
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I
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it
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is

it

is

in

a

e

a

a

Strange, 1128.
The distinction between the class of cases last cited and those of
to terminate
lease
very refined, and, as observed by Judge
note to section 246 of his work on Agency, "stands upon
Story in
Judge Story, in his text,
ning not very satisfactory or clear."
the latter case "the
states the supposed distinction to be this: that
not to depend upon the validity of the entry at
third person's act
made."
And so, he adds: "The rule, 'onmis rat
the time when
priori aequiparatur,' seems applicable
et
mandate
retrotrahitur
habitio
to oponly to cases where the conduct of the parties on whom
crate, not being referable to any agreement, cannot,
the meantime.
ratification or not."
depend on the fact whether there be
with <\v\<
make
say
Counsel for defendants do not- and
proper application of Judge Story's deduction from tin- leasehold
They say, in their printed argument, this: "The underlying
A. has acted a- the agent of B., and
perfectly plain.
principle
.lone,
and
taken
the
art
C. thereupon
has ratified
advantage of
the
ami
act
C.
have both
such
agency,
recognizing
upon
his suit, recognizing
(the one by the ratification of, and the other
from denying it.
But
Stopped themselves mutually

B.

it,

if

■

by

B.

B.

if

is

If

a
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it,

"Thus, if a lease contains a condition that it may be determined by
either party upon six months' notice, such notice, given by an unauthorized person for the landlord, although subsequently ratified and
adopted by the latter, will not be a valid notice to determine the lease."
The ground upon which such cases have been put is that stated in
the subsequent part of the section from which I have been quoting,
namely, that a notice to defeat an estate should be such a one as that
the tenant can safely act upon at the time he receives
"so that he
may deliver up the possession at the end of six months, without being
The
liable to further claims in respect to the remainder of the term."
cases upon this subject have not been uniform.
To this Judge Story
In Roe v. Pierce, Camp. 96,
footnote.
verbal
calls attention in
steward of
held
and
notice to quit, by
was
ratified
corporation,
and
suit founded on the notice
binding by the corporation bringing
in Goodtitle v. Woodward,
Barn.
Aid. 689, the decision
put
upon ground quite antagonistic to the cases first cited. If such cases
must
as Buron v. Denman and others cited above are supportable,
be upon the ground that the tenant ought not to be subjected to the
hazard of going out and remaining liable thereafter because the landlord elected to repudiate the notice given in his name. If not rested
wholly upon this narrow ground, they are in seeming conflict with an
claim, or to avoid
older line of cases holding that an entry to make
broken,
for
condition
made
fine, or
person assuming to be
by
the agent of the principal entitled to such claim or entry, would justify an action upon such acts by the principal upon the ground that
would supply the want of an original
his subsequent ratification
245
Co. Litt. 258
Fitchet v. Adams,
authority.
Story, Ag.
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A.,

(Part

1

being the agent of B., undertake to art for him so as to allow
attempt to
acquire a right against C, ami B., b\ ratification,
acquire such right as one arising at the time A. acted, and dating
hack to such time, such ratification is unavailing over C.'s ohjection.
There is no mutuality in the estoppel. Until B. ratified, he was not
bound, and, C. haying done no act to consent to the ratification and
recognition of the unauthorized agency against C. in invito, the agency
cannot exist except from the time the authority was actually given.
It is not the case of a party being bound by the ratification of an
agency, but of a party seeking by his own act of ratification to bind

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:47 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

If

not

to

A similar case would be where a plaintiff recognized
the other party.
agent as such agent, while dea person who was not defendant's
and
ratify, and who sought to bind defendant refused to recognize
fendant by the acts of such unauthorized agent because plaintiff had
This, of course, is absurd, but it is the reductio ad
ratified his acts.
absurdum of complainant's position in this case."
But that the effect of ratification is to bind the other contracting
party is the very consequence of the retrospective effect of ratification.
The books are full of cases in which the third party was held
Were this not so, the act of "ratbound by a subsequent ratification.
ification would not be dragged back, as it were, and made equipollent
to a prior command," as the matter is put by Baron Martin in Brook
"Thus," Judge Story says, "the effect of
v. Hook, L. R. 6 Exch. 96.
ratification is not only to bi\id the principal as to his agent, but as to
the third party, £pd give the ordinary rights and remedies both for
and against him.'Y Story, Ag. § 245.
In Wharton onj. Agency it is said : "The third party contracting is
bound from the time of the institution of the contract, and not merely
The principal, by the act of ratification,
from that of the ratification.
puts himself in his agent's place. From this it follows that the ratification acts retrospectively,
and nowhere is this more unhesitatingly
But," adds Prof. Wharton, "acexpressed than in the Roman law.
cepting this principle as unquestioned, we must limit its application
The
to the relations of the principal to the contracting third party.
third party is precluded from contesting the right of the principal to
Whart. Ag. §§
go back to the original inception of the contract."
76,

77.

In the Law of Contracts, by Leake, at page 391, it is stated that:
"The principal may also claim the benefit of a contract professedly
made on his behalf, and though it was made without his knowledge."
A few illustrations from leading cases may serve to show how the
Where conretrospective effect of ratification has found application.
tracts were made in the name of the state, but without authority, a
subsequent ratification was held to bind the third party in suits upon
Ohio v. Buttles' Ex'r, 3 Ohio St. 309; Wisconsin v.
the contract.
Torinus, 26 Minn. 1, 49 N. W. 259, 37 Am. Rep. 395; Iowa v. Shaw,
28 Iowa, 67. Where insurance was effected by an unauthorized agent
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upon the interest of the plaintiff in a ship, it was held that the ratification of this act after the loss of the ship was operative, and made
the contract binding upon the insurer.
Hagedorn v. Oliverson, 2
Maule & S. 485. Where an offer of sale,, made by C, was accepted
by B. for A., it was held that by ratifying the act of B., though after
the offer had been withdrawn, the contract was validated as of the
date of the original acceptance, and that the intermediate withdrawal
was ineffective, and C. bound by the contract.
Bolton v. Lambert.
41 Ch. Div. 295.
This case was followed in Re Portuguese Consolidated Copper Alines, 45 Ch. Div. 16. In the case last cited certain
shares in the corporation had been subscribed for, and allotments
made, in the name of the corporation, by a board having no authority.
Subsequently these allotments were ratified by the corporation acting
It was held that the subscribers were
by a legal board of directors.
bound, although they, before ratification,
had withdrawn their subThat Mr. James' principals did not ratify his act until
scriptions.
after this bill was filed seems of no importance if the ratification is
to be given a retrospective effect.
Where a bill was indorsed to one
Ancona, and a suit brought in his name as plaintiff by one assuming
to be his agent, it was held that Ancona's ratification,
after suit
brought, of what had been done before, was equivalent to a prior authority. Ancona v. Marks, 7 Hurl. & N. 686.
These cases abundantly illustrate what is meant by the ratification
being equivalent to a prior command, and serve to show that the effect is not only to bind the principal ratifying the act, but also the
other contracting party.
There are exceptions to this rule, such as
have been mentioned by both Story and Wharton, namely; it will not I
be permitted to defeat an estate /tested in the third party, as in Lyell
v. Kennedy, 18 Q. B. Div. 796 and it will not be suffered to affect /
innocent strangers who Nave acquired intervening rights by levy, at-J
tachment, or otherwise. /Wood v. McCain, 7 Ala. 806, 42 Am. 1 U H\
612; Whart. Ag. §§ 77/79; Taylor v. Robinson, 14 Cal. 396.
Certainly neither the railroad company nor the junior mortgagee have
quired any intervening rights to be affected by ratification, and it is
not pretended that its effect will be to defeat any vested estate.
Neither can it be said that the conduct of the railroad company, on whom
ratification is to operate, depended in the meantime on whether there
would be ratification or not. The holders of these bunds had an
That
tion to mature the principal according as they should deem best.
option arose out of the defaull of the railroad company in respect of
Winn that default was suffered to continue for 60 days
after demand, the option arose, ami could only be cut off by payment
declaration of maturity.
The coupon in respect to which the original bill made a definite
<-nt of demand was paid, but
not until after the declaration
of maturity, which declaration operated, when filed with the tie
it follows, then fore, that payment of that
to mature the principal,

J
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coupon

(Parti

for the whole debt was due and unL893.
Between the filing of the inthe debtor company
the time of ratification
The instrumenl
no loss, risk, or danger.
one authorized to act for those whose names
clearly in the interest of those for whom he

did not defeat the suit,

paid, except the

coupon of July,

strument of maturity and
did nothing, and incurred
purported to be signed by
It was an act
he signed.
assumed to act, and its ratification could not possibly work a surprise.
It was only a matter of evidence whether James had authority to
sign tor his wife and brothers, and "proof of subsequent ratification
is sufficient, and dispenses with proof of prior authority, though the
Leake,
prior authority is required to he in writing or under seal."'
Cont. pp. 388-391 : Tupper v. Foulkes, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 797; Bolton

41 Ch. Div. 295.
nmenting on the conflict we have referred to in an earlier part
of this opinion. Prof. Wharton says, at section 80 of his Commentaries
If ratification
on Agency: "The true distinction seems to be this:
on part of principal was an act to be anticipated as morally certain
is no surby parties having adverse interests, then the ratification
prise to them, and cannot mislead them, and they are bound to treat
act as one which is to be authorized."!
the original unauthorized
Applying this to the defendants, they must be regarded as bound
by the ratification which, in view of the relationship borne bf D. Willis James to those he assumed to represent, and the obvious interest
they have in ratifying what he did, can be no surprise to them. In
this view of the case, it becomes unnecessary to say whether this bill
might be maintained as a hill to foreclose for interest alone, or how
it might be maintained as a bill filed under the discretion of the trustee.
Ratification operating as an original command, the bill is well filed,
and a decree of foreclosure may be drawn, unless within a short time
the defendant company shall discharge both principal and interest
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Kelley v. Munson, 7 Mass. .lift, 5 Am. Dec. 47 (1811).
Dodge
Wis. 630 (1861), is the leading case Cor the doctrine that ratia subsequent
on by ilii- principal will not bind the third person without
• in by him, because of want of mutuality.
The principal before ratification being free to repudiate or to assent, the third person must be equally free,
and cannot i»- bound by the unilateral act of the principal alone.
In England it has 1 n held that the maxim of ratification holds. By ratification the agreemenl relates back and Is the same as though it bad been
Bolton Partpreviously authorized, binding principal and third person alike.
i ers v. Lambert, 58 I.. J. Ch. 425, 41 Ch. D. 295, GO L. T. Rep. 685, :57 W. It.
102

Accord:

v. Elopkins,

n

p;l (1888).
In McClintock

v. South Penn Oil Co.. 146 Pa. 144, 23 Atl. 211, 28 Am. St.
The Wis785 (1892), a more equitable and practical rule was laid down.
In any contract there
consin <as<- presses ton far the doctrine of mutuality.
must be an Interval between oiler ;md acceptance when one party is bound
and the other i^ free. The English rule presses the maxim too far. RatificaSubstantia]
tion is not always the same in effed as a previous authorization.
J 11- ; i »-.- is done both parties if the third person may, mi to the time of ratifica[f he lias not withdrawn.
tion, i ''it nor after, withdraw from his agreement,
and the principal ratifies, the parties will then occupy the same position as
fchougb

there

had

been

previous

authority.

There are logical

difficulties in

ITo

ts:

ore v. Stone ,
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one Scarlett, ^c^r. h°d employed -ntf. to "buy
nd and had wid him 8 commission for his services
the purchase price and receiving
ter ikying
contract for a deed unon P r yment of the bel.L- >ter
ndor sent deed to ntf. to be delivered to Sc°rlet
on such uayt . Lle^nwhile ntf. h«d bought some thou
nds of ^cres of l*nd at tax s^le, including the
this fact,
ad in question, but he h^d not noticed
fl did not mention
to 3c°rlet when he delivered
om

e

i

it

deed,

rt:

ThHtf^gency w»s termin c ted here when

ntf.

livered to Scarlet the contract for conveyance
the l*nd unon receipt of >.the nurch^se money,
6
the j>* nent of the fees for the service merforfl.

3

i

*d

performed

the business

for which

the

constituted, ^nd by or>er r tion of
f termin r ted . Holding the deed to
3#liTerefl "o Scarlet did not revive the ? rency,
-ere v 'red by ilveret, not Scarlet. Ptf.
Llty of any fr-^ud %e in failing to disci
r
t r x ^urch^se. They owed no duty
e the f ct of the
c
v

e. c.
*en
h*d
v e Fgenoy w r
17 t

c~rlet

to ro do.
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CHAPTER V
TERMINATION

SECTIOX

1.— BY

OF THE RELATION

ACT OF THE PARTIES

purpose
I. By Accomplishment of the Purpose

MOORE

Court of Iowa,

(Supreme

STONE.
1ST5.

40

Iowa,

259.)

Action to recover certain

land which Moore claimed under a tax
and Stone hy conveyance from one Scarlett.
Scarlett had emed Moore to purchase the land and had paid him a commission
for
his services, after paying one-half the purchase price and receiving a
contract for a deed upon payment of the balance.
Later the vendor
sent the deed to Moore to be delivered to Scarlett upon payment of
the balance.
Meantime
Moore had purchased some thousands of
acres of land at tax sale, including the land in question, but he had
not noticed this fact, and of course did not mention it to Scarlett when
later he delivered the deed.
Defendant claimed .Moore was his agent,
and could not set up this deed against his principal. Decree for defendants.
.Miller, C. J. 1 [After stating the facts :] * * * Upon these
it is quite clear that the agency of the plaintiff, or of Moore &
Mclntire, for the purchase of the land for Scarlett, terminated at the
time they delivered to him the written contract for a conveyance of the
land on the receipt of the one-half of the purchase money, and the
payment of their fees for the services performed.
When this was
mplished .Moore & Mclntire had done all that they, or the plaintiff, had been employed to do. They had made the purchase as Scarlett
had desired them to do, delivered to him the written contract sent to
deed,

386

(191

L).

any solution of tiiis anomalous act, but practically tins solution seems y.-nis
ci' Cent Law J. 838.
factory.
For b valuable discussion of the various rules,
•• of Kline Bros. & Co. v. Royal ins.
Co. (•'. <'i 192 Fed 378'

I

Lea) 38
pinion

i

(1

n

son, 69 Tenn.
Pari of

\

L<

ii

ft the principal does not deny the authority of an agent to ad for him,
will not, in general, lie In the mouth of any third persons to call In question
the power of the agent
Scot! v. Detroit
Foung .Men's Society's
Doug. 119 (1843); Rogers v. Kneeland, 10 Wend. 218 (1833): Leonard
\la
1
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is

it

is

&

&

Melntire, for the purpose
by Everett to the banking house of Moore
oi being delivered upon payment of the balance of the purchase money,
did not operate to revive the prior agency for the purchase of the land.
Melntire acted for and as agents of the
In this transaction Moore
There
no evidence that Scarlett procured the
grantor in the deed.
plaintiff, or his firm, to obtain the deed for him. On the contrary

a

if

a

it

is

&

is

It

&

Melntire for the purpose of collecting
was sent by Everett to Moore
the balance of the purchase money then due. They performed that
service for Everett, and received their compensation from him.
equally clear that the plaintiff was not guilty of any fraud, in
Melntire.
failing to disclose the fact of the tax purchase by Moore
Their relations were not such as required such disclosure to be made,
especially when
affirmatively shown that they had no actual knowledge that they held the certificate of purchase at the time they delivered the deed to Scarlett.
The decree of the court below will be reversed, and
decree entered
he so elects, or the cause will be remanded
for plaintiff in this court
decree to be entered in conformity with this opinion by the disfor
trict court.
Reversed.
purchaser upon the terms
When an agent employer! to sell land has fonnfl
fixed by the principal lie has fully performed his agency, and
is at an end.
!!«• i~ then at Uberty '" become the agent of the purchaser
to see that the
The purpose of the agency having been Culroperly prepared.
papers are
Ipso facto terminated.
. the relation
Shorl v. Millard, 68 111. 292 (1873).
An acl done by the agent after the full accomplishment
of the agency purwithout authority.
The accomplishment
of the purpose terwrong comTuite v. Wakelee, 19 Cal. 692 (1862).
For
tes the agei cy.
mitted by the agent after he has performed his employment the principal is
Kingan
not liable, for the relation of principal and agenl no longer exists.
pp. 80, 37 N. E. U3 (1894), ante, p.
Co. v. Silvers. L3 tnd.
6.

A

&

a

Is

i

it.

a

2
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It

it,

a

&

by

in

§

2

by

id

it.

This
them for Scarlett, received the firsl payment as per agreement.
reso
himself
Scarlett
undertaken.'
had
the
services
completed
they
for when these things were done he inquired how much they
garded
charged him for their services, and oil being informed as to the amount
They had performed the business for which the
the same.
operation of law the agency was
agency had been constituted, and
Kent's
499, and eases cited;
terminated.
See Story on Agency,
July, 18(38. The purchase
This was
Com. *643, and cases cited.
Melntire was not made until OcMoore
oi the land at tax sale
At that time they were as free to purchase the
tober of that year.
Their agency no longer existed; they had
same as any other persons.
good title for Scarlett, nor to examine the
not undertaken to procure
in another county from where the
The
situated
land
was
title for him.
resided;
to
them about the title, and they
was
said
plaintiff
nothing
since
he resided near the land and
Scarlett,
that
well
suppose
might
had examined or procured some one to examine the
desired to buy
records, in the county where the lands were situated.
also quite clear that the fact that the deed to Scarlett was sent

r bury

ct r

▼.

t

rjie_t .

:

Def. here by certain articles of agreemen
ppointed i^tf. his sole ^gent and atty. to renresqi hla interests in the production of n n extr^v^g
under en agreement with one Rice, dated
16. 189?, °nd to collect and receitferoy^ltie
or def., for which -ntf. was to be p c id 8% of the
Lim def. w^s
entitled to under terms of agreement
ith Rice. This agreement w^s for three ye°rs,
fid before the exDir^tion
thereof w«.a extended for
nro more. ?tf. claims
th»t this extension o-oer^t3
to extend the agreement between her G nd def. fo
li£e period, and this suit is brought to recover
Dmmission which would h^ve accrued had -ntf's. con
r c ct been in force,
r~

c
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ptf.

and def. here never .net res
acting the extended term, »nd it could not h°ve
sen within their contempl°tion «t the time, becise it c c me into existence long after the power
»s given, r nd ^s the result of p new underst^ndwith which the -ntf. h°s no concern. But whe.

ler

the

prreement

Irtemtnt

ptf.

f

nower comprehended the -extended
yx
ot , the def., by the nature of the
h*d r right to revoke it at ^ny time.
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BARNET.

Court of New York, Appellate Term, First Department,
Misc. Rep. 3S6, 40 N. Y. Supp. 76.)

1S96.

17

McAdam, J. The action was to recover for services alleged to
have been rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant under what upon
their face are entitled "Articles of Agreement,'' made and entered
into August 3, 1892.
By these so-called "Articles," the defendant
appoints the plaintiff his sole agent and attorney to represent his interests in the production and representation of an extravaganza called
"1492," under an agreement between the defendant and one Edward
E. Rice, dated July 26, 1892, and to collect and receive the royalties
thereunder.
For the services to be rendered, the defendant agrees to
pay the plaintiff 8 per cent, of the sum or sums which the defendant
The last-mentioned
may be entitled to under the agreement with Rice.
26,
thus terminating,
1892,
was
for
three
from
July
years
agreement
On July 20, 1893, the contract between
by its terms, July 26, 1895.
the defendant and Rice was extended for two years from July 26,
1895 ; and the plaintiff claims that such extension operated to extend
the agreement between her and the defendant for a like period.
It is conceded that the defendant paid the plaintiff all the commissions earned under the so-called "articles" during the lifetime of the
first agreement between the defendant and Rice.
The suit was really
to recover the commissions which would have accrued from August
3, 1895, to January 11, 1896, if the plaintiff's agreement had embraced
that period.
But it did not cover that period.
It contemplated, at
most, the existence of the agreement between the defendant and Rice
to which it particularly refers, and terminated by "efflux of time and
of the condition" (Dunl. Paley, Ag. 184) ; or, in other
performance
words, by the expiration of the period during which it was to exist and
to have effect (Story, Ag. § 4S0). I The minds of the plaintiff and defendant never met respecting the extended term, and it could not have
been within their contemplation at the time, because it came into existence long after the power was given, and as the result of a new untanding, with which the plaintiff has no concern.
But, apart from this, the power seems one capable^ of revocation at
A letter of attorney depenffs, from it> nature,
any time by the donor.
on the will of the person making it. ami may, in general, be recalled
will; yet if he binds himself fur a consideration in terms or by
the nature of his contract, not to change his will, or if the power be
ed with an interest, die law will not permit him to change
Wheat, at page 202,
Hunt v. Rousmanfer's
Ed. 589;

L.

5

8

,

it.

at his

'.I'i-.A-

in

tl

a. — 14

;i

§

To make the power irrevocable, there must he an
Story, Ag.
463.
interest
the subvert of
elf, and not
mere interest
the result of the execGtion of the authority, such a- arises from
in
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Mansfield v. Mansfield, 6 Conn.
ition for executing the power.
lo Am. Dec. 76; 1 Am. & Stag. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1216; Stier
v. [nsurance Co., 58 Fed. 843; Missouri v. Walker. 125 U. S. 339, 8
Sup. Ct. 929, 31 I.. 1-M. 7<>'>. S<> that, whether the plaintiff's power
559,

it
is

in

is

by

it,

comprehended the extended agreement or not, the defendant had a
and effectually exercised the privilege before the
right to revoke
the plaintiff.
claimed
period for which compensation
The "Articles of Agreement" Upon which the plaintiff sues express
no manner obligates herself to
no consideration, and the plaintiff
to be inferred from
serve thereunder for any specified time, unless
the mere fact that the contract under which she was to collect the
Even indulging this inference,
royalties extended to July 26, 1895.
is

is

not the
the most favorable the plaintiff can demand, there
ground for holding that her obligation extended beyond that
her duties ended at that time, so did the obligations of the
period.
defendant, and there
which the alleged right of acis^io theory upon
the plaintiff's rights attached to the extention can be sustained.
sion granted, they \vo\m\ continue to attach to every extension thereafter made, and cease^only when the defendant and Rice severed their
relations.
in fact founded
The action, though in form for services rendered,
In
on readiness to perform, and in the nature of wrongful discharge.
apparent that the comwhatever light the matter may be viewed,
plaint was properly dismissed, and, as a- necessary sequence, the judgment must be affirmed.
which

by

(

(A) In
BURKE

("Kansas City Court of Appeals.

is

it

is

JIf

II. Revocation

the Principal

General

v.

PRIEST.

Missouri,

1802.

50

Mo.

App,

310.)

if

4

is

Smith, P. J.\.\ The principle te /rudimentary that as between prinrevocable at any time
cipal and agent ^he authority ofNJthe latter
not coupled with an interest.
|The authority of the agent to represent the principal depends upon the will and license of the principal.
1,

•

made one Fischer fthe""agent of plaintiffs until October
Sureties wore therefore held/liable for accounting by the ageut for
before that dale. Put not for business intrusted to him after
transactions
Authority to an agenl to
that time. Gundlaeh v. Fischer, 59/111. 171' (1871).
receive produce before the first rise of the Ohio river carries no authority
Blackf. 469 (1831).
alter the first rise. Longworth v. Convrell,
to receive
And when the agency is at will no rights can prow out of it after it has been
Willcox
Gibbs Sewing Machine Co. v. Ewing,
terminated by either party.
HI r. S. 627, 12 Sup. «'t. 94, :\r, L. Ed. 882 (1891); Rhodes v. Forwood, 47
App. Cas. 256, :;i l. T. 890, 24 W. R. L078 (1876).
I.. .1. Ex. :;'.)';.
Rochester v. Whitehouse, 15 N. H. 468 (1844). quoting story on
Accord:

Ail agreement

1

2

&

it

1

1867.

y.

§

4
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If

slightest-'

4G.°,.

its

( 'ijjboW
:

Here the clefs.

doctors, entered into

a

rol contract with ptf., f lwwyer, whereby it ws
rreed th c t fhsiP ^cct. books should be turned ove]
hia for t' e ^vir-nose of narking collections there-

i

for

in

s

The evidence does no1
employment w»a fixed for *ny

cert- in commission.

th t the

.ow

c

t

ptf's-

iriod of duration. Defs. refused to turn over the:
set. books; ptfbringfl this action.
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irt

:

^pys down the rule th c t *s between -orinci
and/agt. the authority of the l°tter m»y be
voked/at his will at any time and with or with.t reason therefor, except where the ^gt's. »uth.
i couoled
with an interest. The excerstiosr: to the
ove rule is where the r>ower is given «s c r>p rt
p

l

security or for

v c lu°ble consideration , or
iere the -power is cout>led with an interest, which
iterest must be in the subject matter on which th<
>wer is to be exercised.
This c n se comes under thi
'

a

mer^l

rule.

c

VERDICT

FOR

DEFS.
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It is the act of the principal which creates the authority; it is for his
benefit and to subserve his purposes that it is called into being; and,
unless the agent has acquired with the authority an interest in the
subject-matter, it is\in the principal's interest alone that the authority
is" to be exercised.
The agent has no right to insist upon a further
J
CVexecution of the authority if the principal desires it to terminate.
It is a general rule that as betw&erj^arincipal and agent the authority
/ of the latter may be revoked by the former at his will at any time
/ and with or without reason therefor, except where the agent's authority is coupled with an interest. /Mechem on Agency, § 204 ; State
.nfei 8 Wheat.
ex rel. Walker v. Walker, 88 Mo. 2f9; Hunt v. Rousman/er,
201, 5 L. Ed. 589, post, p. 274.
The exceptions to the general fule just s' ted is wh^re the power
N
or
is given as a part of a secuptyor for a v luable consideration,
Hut the interest in such
where the power is coupledwith an interest
mich the power is to be
cases is an /Interest in theiStuVject-matter on
duced bv the exercise of
exercised./ An interest inVnat which is
the powerlis not sufficient. KThe power p*ust be engrafted on a
est in the property on whiih the power is to be exercised, and
interest in the money derived from the exercise of the power
v. Rousmanier,
supra ^Barr v. Schroeder, 32 Cal. 609 ; Coffin
dis, 46 Pa. 431 ; Blackstone v. Buttermore, 53 Pa. 266, po^tC p
And so it has been held that a power to collect money/and receive
property and to sell and convey the property of the principal, the agent
to receive one-half of the net proceeds as compensation, is not a power
Hartley's Appeal, 53 Pa.
coupled with an interest and is revocable.
212, 91 Am. Dec. 207, post, p. 226.
In this case, the defendants who had lately been copartners, engaged in the practice of medicine, entered into a parol contract with
plaintiff who was an attorney, whereby it was agreed that the defendants would turn over to plaintiff their books of account for collection
and adjustment, and for which the former would pay the latter as
a compensation
for his services ten per cent, on all sums collected,
and five per cent, on all accounts adjusted by note. The defendants
to deliver their books of account to plaintiff, and so did not
revised
This the defendants could do, and on account
ajfrry out the contract.
which the plaintiff has no legal ground of complaint.
of course, where the principal has the power to revoke thc\uthor
of the agent, he may, nevertheless, subject himself to
clai\i for
he exercise such power contrary to his agreement.
lamages
The evidence does n< show that the plaintiff's employment w.o/ fixed
The written admission of oii>r of the
fdK^any period of duration.
slants offered
plaintiff showed no more* than that
evidence
plaintiff was to "try and have all notes and accounts adjusted in
een month-."
The duration of tin- contract was contingent and un
might have been performed
in.
plaintiff
month
week,
a

a

in

by

by

It

in

>t

if

a

[tv
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1

or year. So it has been held that an appointment of an agent to do
certain Lets during a given period does not, of itself, amount to an
agreement that he should be permitted to continue to act during that
In any view which we have been
Mechem on Ag\, § 211.
period.
able to take of the ease, we are unable to find that the court below
erred in sustaining the demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence.
It follows, therefore, that the judgment will be affirmed. All concur.

BROOKSHIRE

VONCANNON.

Court of North Carolina,

1845.

28 N. C. [6

Ired.]

231.)

Defendant in right of his wife, and plaintiff in his own right, were
entitled to a share of the personal estate of one Clark who had died
intestate in Alabama.
Defendant by power of attorney authorized
plaintiff to receive his share of the estate and bring it home. Plaintiff made one trip which resulted in nothing, whereupon defendant reHe made a second trip, and now seeks, accordvoked his authority.
ing to the terms of the power of attorney, to recover one-sixth of
The court
his expenses and ten per cent, for his time and trouble.
charged

that

such

agreement

to

pay made

the power

irrevocable.

it

a

a

is

it

if

it.]

;

is

I

it

;

it,

Judgment for plaintiff for more than one-sixth of his expenses on the
first trip, and defendant appeals.
Daniel, J. The charge of the judge was, as we understand
in
conformity to the prayer of the plaintiff's Counsel and, received in
A power of attorney, or
that light, we think that
was erroneous.
in general revocable from ks nature
other authority,
and the power
of revoking an authority may be exercised at any moment before the
actual execution of
be true
Paley on Agency, 184, 185. Even
at law, that
part of
power, /vmich
security for money, or coupled
with an interest, cannot be revoked, yet the doctrine has no application
to this case.
The plaintiff, neither when the power was given to him,
nor when the defendant contended that
was revoked, had any interest in the distributive share of the defendant.
If he did the labor,
he was then to be compensated

;

as above mentioned
but there was no
obligation on the plaintiff to go to the West for the property, and
when the defendant insisted, that he had made the revocation, the
plaintiff had never received any of the said property.
We think that
there must be
new trial.
Per Curiam. Judgment reversed, and venire de novo.
a

-

'

/
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v.

Court of Iowa,

GARDNER.
1862.

14

Iowa,

326.)

Suit to set aside certain deeds made by Alexander MacGregor, as
attorney of James MacGregor, to George D. and Egbert Gardner.
James claimed that the lands conveyed were purchased with his money
and for his use, and the deeds were without consideration and for a
fraudulent purpose. He prays that the same may be canceled and deAlexander claims that the lands were purchased for his
clared void.
use, the titles being in James because Alexander was then involved
and could not hold property in his own name, that $2,000 of the purchase money was a trust fund belonging to his wife and children, and
that he deeded the lands under an irrevocable power of attorney to
Decree for
the Gardners to be held in trust for these beneficiaries.
plaintiff.

* * * The mere fact that the power of attorney
irrevocable
does not prohibit its revocation, nor does
is itself declared
it establish the fact that the person making the same yields all right
or claim to the property authorized to be sold, or that the person upon
whom such power is conferred has the right to sell and dispose of the
property entrusted to his care, without consideration, oc' without being
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Baldwin, J. 5

held accountable for the faithful dischsfrge of his.trustl "The general
rule is," says Story on Agency, par. 476, "that the Wincipal may revoke
the authority of his agent at his mene pleasure. /But Vtbis is open to
some exceptions, which, however, are entirely ^/consistent with the
One exception is-"
reason upon which the general rule is foundraV
when the principal has expressly stipulated iWat the authority shall be
Both of
irrevocable and the agent has an interesfin its execution.
these circumstances must concur, for although in its terms an authority
may be expressly declared to be irrevocable, yet if the agent has no
interest in its execution, and there is no valid consideration, it is treated
in law to be revocable, upon the
general principle that he who alone lias an interest in the execution of
as a mere nude pact and is deemeW

J

to control it."
the
word "irrevocable" alone is not evidence that the _*-—
flThe use of
is
an interest ; if so, it woulj! not be necessary
coupled
with
pjbwc-r
that both of these circumstances should concur. /The powers of attorney miller winch these deeds were made reayas follows: "Know
all men by these presents, thai I. James Mg^&regor, Jr., &c, being
seized in fee of certain land- in the county of Clayton, Iowa, have
*
* *
nominated, constituted and appointed Alex. MacGregor
my
true and lawful attorney, irrevocable, for me, and my name to lease,

ar/act

■The
1 tu

is also entitled

portion! of the opinion dealing with the contention
Accord: Walker
Lowe, J., dl ented.
omitted.

'1-77;.

thai there was a
Denison, 86 111.

v.

7*

to\l.

M
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*
* *
to such person or persons, upon
devise and sell said lands
*
*
*
as he may see fit."
prices
and
for
such
such terms.
The word "irrevocable" signifies, not to be recalled or revoked.
Therefore, when used in the above connection it shows, that it was
thereby conferred,
that the authority
the intention of the principal
It cannot however, he inferred from its use
should not be recalled.
that the agenl was thereby invested with any greater power of disposition or authority in relation to the property to be sold, than if this
But it is not the policy of the law to deny to
word had been omitted.
the right to revoke such
the person making such bowers irrevocable
the fixed design of the
fact
that
it
Vas
authority, notwithstanding: the
made,
if,
however,
the power is
when
were
so
^U^
they
to
parties
interest,
execution, it
its
in
is
or
interested
the
agent
coupled with an
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A*

shall not be revoked.
Conceding, therefore, that the power i/by its terms made irrevocable,
its execution, the law declares
and when the agent has an interest
that it then cannot be revoked, this fact still does not of itself give
the agent anv power to dispose of the property, except in the manner
The ai/thority is continuous, but in other
directed by the principal.
respects the sarueas if revocable. J If the agent therefore exceeds his
authority or abuses the trust reposed, ecptity will afford the principal
the proper relief. ^Alexander had no authority conferred upon him to
He was required to act
-e of the laikls without consideration.
and
granting that he had an infor the best interjst of the principal,
conferred,
he could not dispose
of
the
authority
terest in the exec/tion
manner as the title
a
sale,
such
the
in
he
had
which
of the property of
that a purchase by
is,
rule
of
for
the
benefit,
equity
his
inure
to
would
or
sale,
in which he rephas
which
the
of
he
of
the
property
an agent
•\ sents am ither, whether he has an interest in it or not, per interpositam
* * *
personam, carries fraud on the face of it.
Decree as to the deeds affirmed.

p

BLACKSTONE

v.

BUTTERMORE.

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

1867.

5:5 Pa.

2GG.)

Buttermore, being the owner of the land
Ejectment by Blackstone.
in question, gave to one Davidson a power of attorney to sell it for
XX) on stated terms, concluding: "And I hereby ratify and confirm
whatever contract he may make in accordance with the above authority,
This authority is irrevocable
and hereby hind myself for its execution.
Davidson on April 19 contracted with
re the 1st of May next."
Blackstone for the sale of the land. There was evidence that Butter-

more had meantime revoked the power, and that Blackstone had notice
Verdict for deof the revocation he fore contracting with Davidson.
fendant, and plaintiff brings error.
AGNEW, J. We have decided the substantial point in this case at

'A^s-

I

A
Ch. 5)

TERMINATION

OF

THE RELATION

***>CU,

215

the present term upon t le appeal of Hartley & Minor from the Orphans' Court of Greene county, opinion by Thompson, J. 53 Pa. 212,
91 Am. Dec. 207, post, p. 226.
»V power of attorney constituting a mere agency is always revocable. V
is only when coupled with an interest in the thing itself or the estate
which is the subject of the power, it is deemed to be irrevocable, as
where it is a security for money advanced or is to be used as a means
of effectuating a purpose necessary to protect the rights of the agent
or others. A mere power like a will is in its very nature revocable
when it concerns the interest of the principal alone, and in such case
even atf express declaration of irrevocability will not prevent revocay^
6
tion. I An interest in the proceeds to arise as mere compensation for,
/the service of executing the power will not make the power irrevocable/-'
Therefore, it has been held that a mere employment to transact tire
/ I business of the principal is not irrevocable without an express covenant''
founded on sufficient consideration, notwithstanding
the compensation
of the agent is to result Vrom the business to be perforrafed and to be
measured by its extent. I Coffin v. Landis, 46 Pa. 426c
In order to
make an agreement for irrevocability contained in a power to transact
business for the benefh/of the principal binding on him, there must be
a consideration
for it independent pf the compensation to be rendere
for the services to be performed
In this case the object of the principal was to make sale solely for
his own benefit.
The agreement to give his agent a certain sum and
portion of the proceeds waa^merely to carry out his purpose to sell.
But what obligation was there upon him to sell, or what other interest
beside his own was to be secured by the sale?
Surely his determination to sell for his own ends alone was revocable.
If the reasons ienr
making a sale had ceased to exist, or he should find a sale injurious to
his interest, who had a right to say he should not change his mind ? .The
interest of the agent was only
his compensation for selling, (and
without a sale this is not earned. A revocation could not injure him.
If he had expended money, time
labor, or all, upon the business in-

\

'/ *<

If

-
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trusted to him, the power itself
a request to do so, and on a revocation would leave the principal liable to him on his implied assumpsit.
But it would be the height of injustice if the power should be
held to be irrevocable merely to secure the agent for his outlay or h
services rendered before a sale. The following authorities are referne'd
to: Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 174, 5 L. Ed. 589; Story on Agency,
463,

§§

464, 465,

Contracts,

:
.

Watts &S. 20.
The judgment
■Thai
does

not

Bennett
A In. 372

468,

''; Irwin

476,
v.

177:

Paley on Vgency, 155; 1 Parson
3 Watts,
3?7 ; Smyth v. Craig,

Workman,

is therefore

3

affirmed.

a power of attorney
la In terms made "exclusive" or "Irrevocable
prevenl the principal from revoking it ai bis own pleasure.
Kolb v.
667, 21 Smith. 233 (1896); Chambers
Land Co., 7 1 Mi
v. Seay, T.'i
(1882).

'
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(B) Power

Given

for

a Consideration,

WALSH

v.

or as Security

WHITCOMB.

(Nisi Priiis, King's Bench,

iT'.iT.

2 Espinasse,

565.)

to recover money for work done by Walsh, a tailor.
Assumpsit
Defense that Walsh having become insolvent had executed a power
of attorney to one Barker, together with a general assignment by deed,
authorizing him to receive all debts due Walsh and give proper receipts; also to appoint a substitute to act in his room for the same
Barker appointed Hindley, who received from Whitcomb
purposes.
Plaintiff claimed to have
the debt in question, giving him a receipt.
the
revoked the power to Barker by
appointment of another agent.
Kkxyon.
in cases of powers of attoris
a
difference
There
Lord
nev ; in general tifey are revocable from their nature ; but there are
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these exceptions : \Where a power of attorney is part of a security for
money, there it is not revocable; where a power of attorney was made
to lew tine, as part of a security, it was held not to be revocable; the
principle is applicable to every case where a power of attorney is necessary to effectuate any security ; such is not revocable. / In the present case Walsh assigned all his effects, &c., over to Ba/cer, to whom,
amongst others, he was indebted ; the power of attorney was made
to Barker to call in the debts for the benefit of j^re creditors ; it was
It was therepart of the security for the payment of the creditors.
fore by law not revocable ; and the payment by the defendant is good.

The jury found

a

verdict for the defendant.

PARKE
(Supreme

Court of California,

v.

FRANK.

1888.

75 Cal. 364, 17 Pac.

427.)

Action for damages for breach of a contract of agency. Berry and
manufactured
by
were agents in California for machinery
Frank. They sold the agency to Parke and Lacy on the condition
He did approve, whereupon Parke and
that Frank would approve.
Lacy paid Berry and Place $2,400 for the agency. There was trouble
in drawing an agency agreement between Frank and plaintiffs, and
Frank took away the California agency, giving it to Gregory & Co.
From judgment for plaintiffs defendant appeals.
McKixstry, J. 7 The main contention of the appellant in the
court below was that the contract of agency, not being for any definite
Appellant claims
term, was revocable at the will of the principal.
that the rulings of the superior court alleged to be erroneous are
exemplified by the portion of its charge to the jury which reads:
Place

'

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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* * * Where
period of time was mentioned.
employment is
proved, and no time is specified, the law presumes it shall last and
endure for a reasonable time.
What would be a reasonable time is
a question for you to determine;" and by the refusal of the court,
on request of defendant, to charge : "If the jury believe, from the
evidence, that no definite time was agreed upon between plaintiffs and
defendant for the contract of agency to endure, then said contract
"
could be terminated by either party thereto, at his option, at any time
The Civil Code provides : "Unless the power of an agent is coupled with an interest in the subject of the agency, it is terminated, as

"No

to every person having notice thereof, by its revocation by the prinSection 2356.
The interest which can protect a power after
the death of the person who creates it must be an interest in the thing
itself, and not an interest in that which is produced by the exercise
of the power. Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 174, 5 L. Ed. 589. It
may be conceded that, by the section of the Civil Code, a revocation
by the principal terminates the agency in every case where his death
and that the plaintiffs herein had no such interestVan the
terminates
subject of the agency as rendered the agency irrevocable.
flSTevertheless, if, for
valuable consideration,
the defendant agreed not
reasonable time, and in view of
to revoke the agency for
the^circumstances and nature of the contract
reasonable time couR^be ascertained, he had no legal right to revoke
during such time, w Although
letter of attorney depends, from its nature, on the will of/4he person
and may, in general, be recalled at his will, yst
he binds,
making
consideration, in terms, or by the nature m his contract,
himself for
not to change his will, the law will not permit him to change it."
Wheat. 203,
Hunt v. Rousmanier,
L. Ed. 589. In such case,
he fails to comply with his contract, he becomes liable to the agent
as such.
should be conceded that, under the Code, the
Even if, however,
power, at his option, in every
principal retains the right to revoke
not vested with an interest in the sub jut
case where the agent
of the agency, this would not render illegal
collateral agreement
consideration, not to exerwhereby the principal should agree, for
definite period, or for
reasonable time ascer
cise the power for
the agency
revoked
tainable.
/in case of such an agreement,

'*

it

a

a

a

\\

I

K

*+.

is

by

a

if

8

a

a

a

is

a

it

5

8

a

it

it,

a

•"•

8

i-

La

&

•

a

L

a

h

'J

2

a

L.

Is

b

:i

"An Mp'Hc.v ere;itc<i upon
valuable consideration,
security,
or as
uol
tn be confused with
power coupled with as Interest.
Bonne; v. Smith, IT
Exploration '<>. v. Strong, 91 Minn. 84, 97
ill. 581 (1866); Buffalo Land
.v. w. r>7.">(1003).
revoked by the death of the principal, the
The former
n<>t. Hunt v. Rousmanier,
I.. Ed. •>'.» (1823), post,
Wheat 174,
latter
'-ii. The two are often -i">k<'n of aa though they were Identical.
Car.1. Ch. 002,
T. 46 (1806), in which Lindley,
Ch. 843, ::.
mlchael'a Case, 66
I.. .1.. quotes from Clerk v. Laurie,
N. 100 (1867).
"Whal is meanl by
iin authority coupled with an Interesl being Irrevocable
is tiiis thai where
;in agreement is entered Into on
whereby an author
sufficient consideration,
Ity is given for the purpose of receiving some benefit tn the donee of ill" au
thority, Buch an authority is Irrevocable."
in Barr v. Schroeder, 32 Cal. 800
(1867), the court holds that, though the power be aol coupled with an Interest,

p.
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l(Tart 1

thereby deprived "of authority further
and the a-cnt
reason of the
damages
such, the principal
liable
whether, therefore,
breach of his promise' not to recall the agency.
be considered that the defendant violated his contract by refusing
by revoking the
to make consignments to the plaintiffs, or violated
And in each ease
agency, he would be liable upon proper pleadj/g.
the rule oi damages would be the same, that is, the plaintiffs would
damages sustained
be entitled to recover the direct or approximate
of the agency.
of
benefits
them
the
^i
defendant's depriving
by reason
instruction
to
in
the
refusing
give
err
below
did
not
court
The
tenddefendant,
evidence
all
instruction
because
that
ignores
asked
But
ing to show that the defendant agreed not to revoke the agency.
given, while abstractly correct, suggests that, indethe instruction
„ident of any express promise or implied promise arising out of the
nature of the contract, the defendant had no legal right to put an end
in

is

as

by

is

I

,.,:■

act

by

it

u

i

:he

al,

J

*

is

a

a

—

\

—

L-d

Jm

C

A

r

HAW
(C) Power

MONTA&feE^Ii^fefe^:
(Supreme

1S97.

15

Ut^b, 318,

49

Pac

*

*

*

a

a

J.9

W

Court of Utah,

Action to quiet title to 20 acres of land which Montague claimed
quitclaim deed from Adolph Ilankammer, by Jos. C. HeminMcCarroll offered in evidence an earlier deed
in fact.
attorney
gray,
The
from Hankammer to one Ryan, who conveyed to defendant.
The
revocation of Hemingray's power of attorney.
deed contained
land had been patented by Hankammer under act of Congress grantFrom judgment for plaining additional land to soldiers and sailors.
tiff defendant appeals.
Mixer,
Adolph Hankammer, owning the right to
under

f

^nter land under section 2306, Rev. St., made an irrevocable
to Hemingray to enter upon and take possession
<A attorney

power

of the

it

is given as security for the payment of money, whether it be expressin the agreement, or the intent be shown by the nature of the eontract, ili'' principal will not be permitted to revoke it, either directly or indirectly, except upon payment of the money intended to be secured.
security so created would be
party to render Ineffectual
To* permit
Evans v. Fearne, 16 Ala.
against the clearesl principles of equity and justice.
477.
50 Am. Dec. 197 (1849), quoting Story on Agency,
Part of the opinion is omitted.

still, if

?

•

§

a
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agency until the expiration of a "reasonable time."
the
[The court held that, even though under the California Code
neverconsideration could be revoked, the principal
agency for
theless liable in damages by reason of his breach of his promise not
new trial beReversed and remanded for
to recall the agency.]
of
amount
the
damages.
cause of error in fixing the
to the
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^
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a

is

it,

is

it

is

a

it

it

is

is

is

is

in

it

land in question, and in consideration
of five dollars, paid by the
attorney, he was irrevocably
vested with power to grant, bargain,
sell, lease, convey, and confirm the same to the purchaser, and deliver
a deed of conveyance thereof.
Hankammer forever renounced all
right in, and to revoke, any of said powers, or to appoint any other
person to execute the same, and forever renounced all right on his
part to do what the attorney was authorized to do, and released to the
attorney all claims to any of the proceeds of sale, and ratified the
acts of the attorney as absolute, both in conveying and retaining the
proceeds of the sale of the land.
This power of attorney not only
carried with it an assignment of the interest of Hankammer in the land
to Hemingray, but vested in him the legal right to convey the title.
It was a power coupled with an interest. It was valid as against
Hankammer, his heirs, assigns, and grantees.
The proceeds of the
sale of the land were vested in the attorney, and renounced by the
In consideration of five dollars, paid to Hankammer by
principal.
Hemingray, Hankammer expressly renounced not only the proceeds
of the sale of the land, but all power and authority over the property, expressly confirming what should be done by the attorney, and
made the act irrevocable.
This power was irrevocably vested in the
The power was exercised when the convex attorney until exercised.
ance was made to the plaintiff. By that act and deed all right, title,
and interest in the property was vested in Montague.
The conveyance
by Hankammer to the defendant's predecessor in interest, as well as
the attempted revocation of the power of attorney to Hemingray, were
inoperative and ineffectual either to pass the title or revoke the power.
Hankammer had parted with his interest before he executed the deed
to Ryan, through whom the defendant obtained title, and he had no
v
power to revoke the authority embraced in the power of attorney.
While a power of attorney, by its terms, may be expressly declared
to be irrevocable, yet if the agent has no interest in its execution, and
there is no valid consideration for
treated as
mere nude pact,
and
deemed
law to be revocable, upon the general principle that
he alone who has an interest in the execution of an act
also entitled to control it. But, where the power
coupled with an ini
or where
giver, for
valuable consideration,
unless there
in
shall be revocable,
express stipulation that
from its character,
in contemplation of law, irrevocable, whether terms expressly making

It

a

it

in

tly

3,

!

S.

5

1. 8

11 !

§§

a

contract,

'

the

i

so are

':

of

!

In this case the power became
or not.
part
coupled with
valid consideration.
therefore became irrevocable, and the attempted revocation, as well as the deeds
to those through whom defendant derived his title, are wholly insufficient to vesl any title in the defendant.
Mechem, Ag.
205,
177;
Hunt v. Rousmanier's
Story,
Adm'rs,
Wheat. 171.
Barnes v. Poirier, 12 C. C. A.
14; Web ter v.
Luther, 163 U.
331, 16 Sup. Ct.
I.. Ed. 179.
The courl
thai the legal title to the propi

it
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This conclusion being reached, it is unerrors.
The judgment of the district
other
any
necessary
court is affirmed, with costs.
was

in

vested

to

the

plaintiff.

discuss

TERWILLIGPR
(Court

01 Appeals

v.

ONTARIO,

of New York.

L896.

C. & S. R. CO.

L49 N.

Y.

86, 43 N.

E.

432.)
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Action for the price of 1,224 railroad ties cut on plaintiff's land and
sold to defendant.
The latter claimed plaintiff had authorized one
Wheeler to sell the ties and receive the pay therefor, and that it
Plaintiff denied Wheeler's authority. Aphad paid \\ heeler in full.
peal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff.
ANDREWS, C. J. 10 The principal question on this appeal arises on
the exception by the defendant to the refusal of the referee to make
any finding upon the question whether the plaintiff, in the summer
of 1889, authorized Wheeler to sell the ties to the defendant, and
apply the proceeds of the sale in payment for the timber which had
been cut by the plaintiff, without authority, from Wheeler's lands.
The evidence upon this question was conflicting. The defense rested
substantially upon the assertion that such authority was given ; that
it was executed by a sale and delivery of the ties thereunder by
Wheeler to the defendant ; and that, the defendant having subseThe requently paid Wheeler therefor, the debt was discharged.
r
fusal of the referee to pass upon the question of W heeler's original
authority was put upon the ground that, assuming it to have been

revoked by 'the act of the plaintiff in
given, it was subsequently
himself selling and delivering the ties to the defendant.
It became,
therefore, as the referee held, an immaterial issue, which, if found
in favor of the defendant, would not affect the result, since, by the
general rule, an authority once given, if revoked before execution,
except

where

an element

of estoppel

intervenes,

is the same as to

third persons as though it had never existed.
The primary question presented by this ruling of the referee involves an inquiry into the nature of the authority given by the plaintiff to Wheeler. It is to be conceded, for the purpose of this appeal,
that Wheeler possessed the authority which the evidence on the
part of the defendant

tended to establish,

and that it was conferred

for the purposes which, by direct evidence or by fair inference, can
be collected from the evidence most favorable to the defendant.
If
the authority conferred on Wheeler was a mere naked authority, by
which we understand
an authority in the execution of which the
agent has no other interest than that which springs from his employment as agent and his right to earn his compensation, then, according to the general rule, it was, while executory, revocable at any
io Part of the opinion

is omitted.
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time, at the pleasure of the plaintiff. In case of a naked power, the
authority of the agent, derivative, and not original, ceases when the
principal, for whatever reason, withdraws the delegation, and terThere is a qualification of the rule where the
minates the agency.
has
entered
upon the execution of the authority before revoagent
cation, and has so bound himself that a retraction of the authority

would subject him to liability. In such cases the principal cannot
revoke the authority as to the part of the transaction remaining
unexecuted, at least not without indemnifying the agent. Gelpcke v.
Quentell, 74 N. Y. 599; Hodgson v. Anderson, 3 Barn. & C. 842;
Blasco v. Fletcher, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 147; Goodwin v. Bowden, 54
Me. 424.
But an authority may be irrevocable by reason of its purpose and
The cases of an authority
'the circumstances attending its creation.
What constitutes an
kcoupled with an interest are of this character.
authority coupled with an interest was\ considered in one of the masted v judgments of Chief Justice Marshall, in Hunt v. Rousmanier,
8 Wheat. 174, 5 L. Ed. 589, post, p. 274.) In that case the owner of an
interest in a certain vessel, then at sea, X.6 secure a loan of money, executed to the lender contemporaneously with the loan a power of attorney authorizing him to sell the borrower's interest in the vessel, which
power, by its terms, was to become void on payment of the loan.
The borrower died before payment, and the question was presented
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It was decided that
his death operated to revoke the power.
death
of
the grantor. \ The general
the power was revoked by the
in
the name of the principal,
must
be
exercised
doctrine that a power
death,
But the
was
held
be applicable.
his
to
and does not survive
whether

of the question, proceeded to consider the exin
cases where the power was coupled with an
the
rule
ception to
In a luminous
interest, and to define the meaning of that phrase.
the
of
confined
the
scope
the
chief
exception to
justice
statement
where,
was
vested
there
in the d
with
the
together
power,
cases
of
the
as distinin
the
power,
interest
subject
or
right,
estate,
an
when
excrof
the
the
power
in
proceeds
interest
an
from
guished

court, in the decision

;d that the power
would not
In the former case h<
extinguished by the death of the creator of the power, becau

Cised.
be

to the estate of the donee in the subject of the power, and
Capable of execution in his own name after the death of the
principal, unlike cases where the power was unconnected with any
interest in the thing itself, and the only interest was in the execution
The distinction between the cases of a power given
of the power.
for the purpose of security and a power given for the same pur]

attached

ms technical; bul
hut supplemented by a transfer of an intei
'
the substance and effectuates
in the latter case it at lea
the intent, while it obviates in the particular case the general doctrine
of the power.
that a power is determined by the death of th<

f

tiik relation
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In Watson v. King, 4 Camp. 273; Lord EUenborough, in a case
very similar to thai of I luni v. Rousmanier, also held thai a power oi
attorney to a creditor to sell a vessel was revoked by the death of
the principal, and upon the same ground, namely, that it could not
The same point was ruled in
thereafter be executed in his name.
equity in Lepard v. Vernon, - Ves. & B. 51, where it was held that
for the pura power given to a creditor to receive a debt, expressl)
claim,
however,
by any as
unaccompanied,
of liquidating the
of
the
principal.
signment of the debt, was revoked by the death
Knapp v. Alvord, 10 Paige, 205, 40 Am. Dec. 241, is an illustration
There a power of attorney to
of a power coupled with an interest.

sell a stock of goods and apply the proceeds upon liabilities incurred
and to be incurred by the donee of the power was given, accompanied
by the possession of the goods, and it was held that it was not revoked by the death of the principal, because it was a power coupled
The fact that the possession of the goods accomwith an interest.
Testapanied the power was the controlling point in the decision.
of
death
the
survive
nature,
necessarily
their
from
mentary powers,
the
some
estate
by
given
accompany
usually
They
the testator.
will to the donee of the power, or are regarded as trusts, which, if

xepted, the donee is in conscience bound to execute. See Franklin
Osgood, 14 Johns. 527.
There are other familiar cases of irrevocable powers, because
:oupled with an interest, such as powers of sale accompanying mortgages, or powers to do other acts affecting real or personakproperty,
to make effectual an interest or right in the subject of ttye power
11
, Powers
vested in the donee, and to which the power is auxiliary.
of this character are neither revocable by the grantor of tMe. power,
nor are they revoked by his death. Bergen v. Bennett, 1 Gaines,
Marshall's definition of a
Chief
Cas. 1, 2 Am. Dec. 281.
Justice
power coupled with an interest has/been generally accepted in this

country, but in some cases his classification has not been accurately
See Hutchins v. Hebbard, 34 N. Y. 24. Indeed, the Engobserved.
ish courts gave a wider meaning to the phrase than in the close
In Watson v. King, supra,
definition of Chief Justice Marshall.
Lord EUenborough speaks of the pow-er in that case as a power
coupled with an interest, and in Smart v. /andars, 5 C. B. 895,
Wilde, C. J., referring to the authorities, said: "The result seems to
be that, where an agreement is entered into on a sufficient considera-*
tion, whereby an authority is given for the purpose of securing some
benefit to the donee of the authority, such an authority is irrevocable,
This is what is usually meant by an authority coupled with an ii

ii

A power coupled with an Interest is created when a landlord, having an
Interest In certain crops, and being Indebted to the tenant. authoriz^Q the
Such a power cannoi be retenant to sell the crops and reimburse himself.
Big Four Wilmington Coal Co. v. Wren, 11") 111. App.
voked by the landlord.
S31

(1904).
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:

it,

terest."
The distinction between the English and American cases is
rather in words than substance.
Upon the same facts the decisions
in both judicatures are the same. Both in Hunt v. Rousmanier and
Watson v. King the death of the principal was held to revoke the
power, although in one case it was regarded as a power coupled with
an interest, and in the other that it was not.
But there are classes of powers which are irrevocable by the act
of the principal, although they do not come within Chief Justice
[Marshall's definition of powers coupled with an interest.
This is
clearly recognized by that eminent judge in the case to which reference has been made. After stating the general rule that a power may
at any time be revoked by the party conferring
he says
"But this
general rule, which results from the nature of the act, has sustained
some modification. Where
letter of attorney forms part of
contract, and
security for money, or for the performance
of any act
is

a

;"

it

uses similar language.

is

(2

a

is

is

it

if

is

it

it

is

it

He says
[power of attorney] constitutes

a

it

Kent, Comm. 644): "But where
part of
security for money, or
necessary to give effect to such security, or where
given for
valuable consideration,
not revocable
by the party himself,
though
necessarily revoked by his death."
And Story, in his
work on Bailment (section 209), says: "But
given as part of
by

a

a

is

is

*

*

a

it

if

by

*

&

2

it

a

a

if

letter of attorney
security, as
given to collect
debt as
security for money advance'!,
irrevocable
the party."
This
doctrine has support in adjudged cases. Hunt v. Rousmanier, supra;
Walsh v. Whitcomb,
Esp. 566; Gaussen v. Morton, 10 Barn.
C.
731; Hutchins v. Hebbard, supra; Wilde, C. J., Smart v. Sandars,
supra; Raymond v. Squire, 11 Johns. 47.
The oral authority given
the plaintiff to Wheeler to sell the
tics (which must here- be assumed),
were
naked power, was

the

'.

a

(if

2

v

<

agreemenl

had

not

been so far executed

as to subject

him to

/

in

it

at the time of the alleged revocation
that the
had been lost.
right to revoke
The verbal contract, which before
that time had been entered into between Wheeler and the defendant
for the sale of the ties, was not binding upon either party.
The
contract was for the sale of chattels exceeding $50
value, and, while
the terms of the sale were definitely fixed, there was neither writing,
delivery, nor part payment, SO as to take the contract OUl of the
statute.
The plaintiff was not bound to complete the sale (Farmer
Robinson,
note; Reed v. Latham, 40 Conn. 452),
and as between himself and Wheeler he could revoke the authority
of the latter
mere naked pouen. since the contract entered into

by
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if

is

it

is

which
deemed valuable,
generally made irrevocable in terms,
or,
not so,
deemed irrevocable in law
and he proceeds to state
that the power to sell the vessel by Rousmanier in that case could
not have been revoked by him during his life, but, not being
power coupled with an interest,
was revoked by his death.
Kent
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any liability. Tf the authority to Wheeler was irrevocable, it was because of the nature, consideration, and purpose for which the agency
Unless there was a consideration for the authority
was constituted.
conferred on Wheeler to sell the ties and apply the proceeds on his
claim, it is plain that it was not irrevocable.
Raleigh v. Atkinson,
into
Without
particulars, it is sufficient to
going
6 Mees. & W. 670.
of the defendant would, in
the
part
on
say that the evidence given
our opinion, justify an inference that Wheeler accepted the arrangement proposed by the plaintiff, and forbore the pursuit of his lumber
or its proceeds, in reliance upon the authority given him by the

plaintiff to sell the ties, and apply the proceeds on his claim.
The position of an agent holding an irrevocable power for the sale
of chattel-, not connected with possession of the property or any interest in the nature of a title, general or special, in the subject of the
The power usually given as a security has some
power, is peculiar.
analogy to a pledge or lien, although distinct from either. It bears a
closer resemblance to the hypothecation of the Roman law, where,
by force of the contract, without any transfer of possession, a right
attaches to the property in the person to whom the hypothecation
the attorney,
But unlike the case of an hypothecation,
is made.
where no estate or possession passes with the power, has only a
contract right. The fact that possession does not go with the power
subjects the holder of the power to the risk that the purpose of the
power may be frustrated by a transfer by the owner of the chattels
to a purchaser in good faith for value without notice.
It will be for the court or jury on a new trial to determine, upon
within
the facts found, whether there was any valid consideration
the law applicable to executory contracts to uphold the authority. If
such consideration existed, then we are of the opinion that the authority was irrevocable, and that the payment by the defendant to
Wheeler, under the contract made with him, was binding upon the
plaintiff. In our opinion, the referee erred in refusing to find upon
the question of authority in Wheeler to sell the ties and apply the
If no such authority existed, there is no deproceeds on his claim.
If
it was given, but was not based upon any
fense to the action.
deems sufficient to uphold an executory
law
which
the
consideration
contract, then we are of opinion that it was revocable, and that it was
a question of fact upon the evidence whether there was an actual
revocation before the defendant paid Wheeler.
The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered.
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Suit to quiet title to three mining claims located by Burns, who
sold one-fourth interest to one Duncan. On March 9, 1903, Burns
and Duncan contracted for the sale of the claims with Kaufman, as
trustee.
Taylor bases his claim on an agreement made with Burns
March 26, 1901. Judgment for defendants.
Sloan, J. 12 [After stating the facts:] * * * Taking the instrument as a whole, it appears that it was intended merely as a
power of attorney authorizing Taylor to effect a sale of the mines,
upon the terms mentioned, as the agent of Burns. Nor is this power
of attorney one which, in legal effect, can be construed as being
coupled with an interest in the mining claims, so that it could not
be revoked.
There is nothing in the instrument which evidences an
intention that Taylor should acquire an interest in the premises pending a sale of the same.. Mention of future labor as part consideration
is of no avail as conferring an interest, for it fails to bind Taylor to

perform any work ; nor does it state by whom this labor was to be
performed, when it was to be done, or of what it should consist.
It
is not even provided that Taylor should have any right of possession
during the pendency of the sale, or should pay any of the expense
of the annual labor required by law.
Manifestly the only interest
which Taylor acquired under the agreement was the contingent one
of sharing in the proceeds of the sale in case he should effect it. The
interest which will render the power of attorney irrevocable must
be in the subject of the power, and not pertain to the power itself.
As we have said, there is nothing in the instrument, taken as a
whole, which gave Taylor any interest in the mining claims.
He did
not have the right of possession.
I lis sole interest
related to the
consideration or proceeds to be derived from tin- sale. Mis power
or agency was not, therefore, in legal contemplation,
one coupled
wiih

In the case of Trickey v. Crowe, X Ariz. 176, 71 Pac,
this court declared, in speaking of a power of attorney coupled
with an interest, that by "such interesl is not meant an interest in that
- of power, lmi it must be an inwhich is produced 1>\ ill'
I in tlie property
on which the power is to operate"; and fur
ther, thatr'the authority
sell on commission
is not an authority
coupled ulili an inter
We hold, therefore, thatlhc agreement did nol confer am title t

/

an interest.

i\

'" Another portion ofthU opinion Is found on p. L2.
agency, is a power
by an Irrevocable
\ pledge of property, accompanied
coupled with .-in Interest.
Miner \. Home Ins. <<>■,71 N. .1. Law, I7."», 58 Ail.
98 (11)04).

Uodo.Pb.& a.— I.j
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or estate in the mines in question upon Taylor, and thai the findings
ami decree of the trial court arc correct.
The judgment will be affirmed.

Appeal
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Hannah

of

HARTLEY

Court of Pennsylvania,

(Supreme

D.

Gallion

on

June

30,

1866.

et

"»•">
Pa.

al.
-\-2. !>1 Am. Dor.

1866, appointed

207.)

Hartley and Minor

attorneys to collect and receive all money and property coming to her
as heir <<i John Douglass.
July 20, 1866, she gave another power to
September 29,
one Howland in which she revoked the former power.
L866, Hartley and Minor petitioned the Orphans' Court for a citation
of Douglass to settle his account. The petition
to the administrator
was dismissed, and Hartley and Minor appeal.
Thompson, J. There was no error committed by the court below
in holding the power of attorney of Hannah Gallion to the appellants
to be revocable.
It was an ordinary agency, constituted by letter of
attorney, to act for her to enforce a settlement of his accounts by the
administrator of her father's estate, in which she was interested, and
to collect any moneys or property that might belong, or be coming to
her. For these services the attorneys were to have one-half of the net
proceeds of what they might receive or recover for her. 14 The plaintiffs in error suppose that this clause rendered the power irrevocable
by their principal, under the idea that it wras a power coupled with an
interest.
This was a mistake, as all the authorities show. To impart
an irrevocable
quality to a power of attorney in the absence of any
express stipulation, and as the result of legal principles alone, there
must co-exist with the power an interest in the thing or estate to be
disposed of or managed under the power.
An instance of frequent occurrence in practice may be given of the
assignment of vessels at sea, with a power to sell for the benefit of the
holder of the power, or of anybody else who may have advanced money
and who it was agreed should he secured in that way.
So where
security has been transferred with a power to sell, and generally, I
presume, in all cases of property pledged for the security of money
where there is an accompanying authority to sell to reimburse the
In Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 174, 5 L. Ed.
lender or creditor.
589, this doctrine is clearly and fully elucidated in the opinion of Marshall. C. J. In Bancrofl v. Ashhurst, 2 Grant Cas. 513, a case tried at
Xisi I'rius before me, at which my brethren sat as adsessors, there is
of the question herein involved, and all the
a pretty full examination
and
the conclusion is fully in accordance with
authorities referred to,
and
sustains
Rousmanier,
v.
the above view of a power coupled
Hunt
with an interest.
i* Authority

to Bell property and take as compensation a per cent of the
State ex rel. Walker v. Walker, 88 M<>. -!7'-» (18S5);
is revocable.
Marbury v. Barnet, IT Misc. Rep. 386, in N. v. Supp. 7*; (1896).

proceeds

OAL_/ L .;li

Ch.5)

'
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T&ff***
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the case in hand the po\#er and the interest could not co-exist.
the appellants would have would be in the net proceeds /
collected under the power, and the exercise of the power to collect the
proceeds would ipso facto extinguish it entirely, or so far as exercised.
Hence the appellants' interest would properly begin when the power
ended. This distinction is noticed in Hunt v. Rousmanier ; but neither
by this test, nor any other, was the power of attorney in question irrevocable, and this judgment must be affirmed.
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(Circuit Court of Appeals

v.

and Right to Revoke

NATIONAL

S. S. CO.

of United States, Second Circuit, 1808.
30 C. C. A. 593.)

87 Fed.

1G7.

Judgment for defendant and plaintiff sued out this writ of error.
Before Wallace, LacombE, and Shipman, Circuit Judges.
This is an action to recover damages for breach
Per Curiam.
The plaintiff was the sole witness, and the only contract
of contract.
with defendant

which his testimony tended to establish was one made
whereby defendant employed him as its agent to sell tickets
on commission, with no limitation as to time or provision requiring
notice of termination.
After he had continued in such employment
In the
about nine year-, defendant abruptly terminated the contract.
absence of any provision requiring notice as a condition precedent to
termination, or of any clause fixing a term of employment, defendant
was entitled to dismiss its agent at pleasure, without thereby giving
plaintiff a cause of action for damages sustained by reason of such discharge. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
in

1867,

HOOVER
(Supreme

Conrf

v.

PERKINS WINDMILL

of Minnesota,

i^ v '.>. n

Minn.

&
143,

AX1- CO.

a

N.

w

<>a

fo>6.)

Plaintiff appeals.
for defendant.
J. In January, 1886, the plaintiff and the defendant
entered into a written contract, by the terms of which the plaintiff
for the sale of windmills in the
me the agenl of the defendant,
It is unm
to state with particularity all
state of Minnesota.
Judgment

Dickinson',

It may be said generally, however,
provisions of the contract.
i"
be
mills
wereto
the plaintiff al an agreed schedule
shipped
thai the
He was to bear all the expense incident to keeping and selling
price.
them, and to remit the proceeds of all -ales to the defendant, himself
The defendant
guarantying the paymenl of all notes taken upon sales.
was to return to the |>lainhll all notes, cash, and dl '
the
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had realized therefrom the schedule price of the mills shipped
and when the defendant should have "collected for
all of the goods as above, and the aforesaid notes shall he paid for
each year's business, then they shall pay to the party of the second
part [plaintiff] three dollars for each windmill sold that year, to pay
him for the risk in securing the payment of said notes and accounts."
There was nothing in the contract relative to the time during which
it should continue in force, unless some inference is to be drawn from
In June, 1887, in
the language which we have recited and italicised.
the course of the settlement of some matters growing out of the above
contract, the parties entered into a further agreement in writing, in
which, among other things, it was agreed that the business between
them should "he continued" under the previously executed contract;
it being further agreed that the parties should examine, compare, and
cluck up accounts between them "during the month of January of each
\ ear, and as much oftener as either of the parties may desire during
the continuance of the business under said existing agency contract."
On the 6th of August, 1887, the defendant declined to further perform the contract. This action was then commenced to recover damages, upon the ground that the defendant had broken the contract.
The question is thus presented, wdiether the defendant had a right
then to terminate the contract.
The answer to this depends upon
the construction of the agreements of the parties.
they made no
provision as to the period during which the agency should continue,
and if no agreement in that respect can be implied from the nature
of the business, then either party had the right to terminate the contract at will. We cannot construe the provisions which we have recited from the written instruments as being intended to express the
agreement that the contract should continue in force for a year or
for any definite time. That was not the apparent purpose of the parties.
It would rather seem from the whole instruments, in which
there is no express provision as to how long the agency should continue, that the parties contemplated no definite period.
It would
remain in force until one or both of the parties should elect to terminate it. It might, of course, continue in force for years. However
long the parties might maintain these relations, it was natural, and
in accordance with the habits of business men, to have at least yearly
These provisions, upon which the plainaccountings and settlements.
till relies as showing an agreement to continue the business from year
to year, we think, amount to no more than agreements for yearly accountings so long as the relation established by the contract shall continue. They do not import an agreement that such relations shall continue for any definite period.
There is nothing in the nature of the
business to which this contract relates which can affect its constructicn, in the particular under consideration.
There is no more apparent reason for construing the agreement as one for a yearly agency,
to continue from year to year, than there would have been if the busi-

after

to the
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tr

ness had been the buying or selling of horses. The defendant having
the legal right to terminate the contract at will, it is unnecessary
to consider whether the circumstances inducing its action would otherwise have justified it or not.
The other questions presented in the case are immaterial, in view
Order affirmed. 16
of the decision above expressed.

GLOVER
(Supreme

Court of Missouri,

v.

HENDERSON.

120 Mo. 367,
Rep. 695.)

1S94.

25

S.

W.

175,

41

Am.

St.

Action for services rendered and expenses incurred ir. selling for
defendant lots adjoining Kansas City. A plat of 30 acres was divided
into lots, which plaintiff was given the exclusive right to sell on a
he sold out in one year he was to have a $1,500
given commission.
bonus.
He was to bear all expenses of advertising and selling, but
was to be reimbursed from the sales for the expenses of laying out
the plat. He entered upon the business with zeal, and in five months
had sold 4,000 of the 7,000 front feet for $44,732!
A difference then
arose between plaintiff and defendant, which led to the discharge of
plaintiff. The jury allowed plaintiff $4,000 as the reasonable value of
his services and the reasonable and necessary outlay.
Black, P. J. 16 * * * 1. The first question is whether this
action is quantum meruit, for services rendered and reasonable expenses incurred, as claimed by the plaintiff, or whether it is an action for damages for breach of contract.
That the petition declares
It is true the
upon quantum meruit we think there can be no doubt.
petition sets out the contract of employment, and shows that services
were rendered and moneys expended in the execution of it ; but it
proceeds to aver that defendant wrongfully discharged the plaint ill,
and then states the value of the services rendered and moneys exHad
pended, and prays judgment therefor, less the amount received.
the plaintiff declared for the value of his services, saying nothing
about the contract, and to this the defendant had answered by setand the
ting up the special contract according to his version of
setting out the contract according to his theplaintiff had replied
and alleged that the defendant wrongfully revoked the
ory of
because
of which he demanded the value of bis services up
agency,
substance,
to the dale of his discharge, the issues would have been,
.line thai they arc under the present pleadings.
the
of our Code thai the plaintiff tnusl state the facts constituting his
If he proposes to treat the contract as rescinded,
cause of action.
it,

by

ti

is in

It

it,

16

Part of the opinion

is omitted.

J.

L.

17

ib Accord:
Bradlee v. Southern Coasl Lumber Co., L93 Mass. 878, 79 v E.
App. Ca
(1907); Rhodes v. Forwood,
Exch 896, 84 I.. T.
266,
Bep. \. s. 890, -1 Wkiy. Rep. L078 (1876).

777
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and recover for the value of services rendered, as he may '1" under
certain circumstances, there is no reason why he may not set oul the
contract, the rendition of services thereunder, the wrongful termination of the contract by the defendant; and thru declare for the value
nt" the services rendered.
Mich is the plaintiff's petition in this case,
and it is clearly a declaration upon quantum meruit.
Ehrlich v. Insurance Co., 88 Mo. 249.
2. The contract
in question was one of agency, so that wc are
brought to the question whether defendant, having revoked the agency,
ible to the plaintiff for the value of services rendered and expenses
There is and can be no claim
incurred up to the date of revocation.
made in this case that plaintiff had conferred upon him a power couAnd. as he had no interest in the suhject-matter
pled with an interest.
of the agency, the principal had the power, and, in a qualified sense,
State v. Walker, 88 Mo.
the right, to revoke the agency at his will.
204.^
27<>: Mechem, Ag. §
to the agent for
Hut the question of the liability of the principal
from
the power, or
is
another
and
a
thing
rendered
different
services
Contracts of agency are numereven right, to terminate the agency.
ous, and widely variant in their objects, purposes, and terms; so that
the question of compensation of the agent, when the agency has been
revoked by the principal, will depend upon a variety of circumstances.
It i- laid down by a recent text writer that "the mere fact that an agent
is employed to perform a certain act will not, of itself, amount to an
undertaking on the part of the principal that the agent shall be permitted to complete the act at all events, and the principal may fairly,
and in good faith, revoke the agency, without liability, at any time
But "where an agent is employed to perform an
before performance."
which
involves expenditure of labor and money before it is posact
sible to accomplish the desired object, after the agent has in good
faith incurred expense and expended time and labor, but before he has
had a reasonable opportunity to avail himself of the results of this
preliminary effort, it could not be permitted that the principal should
then terminate the agency, and take advantage of the agent's services,
Mechem, Ag. § 620.
without rendering any compensation therefor."
This i> good sense, and, we believe, good law.
But there is still another well-settled and more specific rule, which
will determine this branch of this case, and that is this: Where there
employment for a definite period of time, expressed or implied,
and the agent i- discharged without cause before the expiration of that
period, the principal will be liable to the agent, the same as in case of
,\ of any other contract;
and in such cases the agent may elect
rescinded, and bring an action to recover the
to treat the contrai I
Mechem, Ag. §§ 614, 621;
value of In- services and money expended.
Co.,
249;
v. Ilartman, 63 Pa. 97.
Mo.
Kirk
88
Ehrlich v. Insurance
defendant,
as found by
and
the
between
the
The contract
plaintiff
that
the agency
to
effect
no
the
contains
stipulation
express
the jury,
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arises an implied agreement that he should have one year in which
to sell the lots. Although a contract, on its face and by its terms, appears to be obligatory on one party only, yet, if it was the manifest
intention of the parties that there should be a correlative obligation
on the other party, the law will imply such obligation.
Lewis v. Insurance Co., 61 Mo. 534.
But as said in Churchward v. Queen, L.
R. 1 Q. B., at page 194, where a contract is silent the court or jury
called upon to infer an obligation on the other side which does not
appear in the terms of the contract must take great care that they do
not make the contract speak contrary to what was the intention of
the parties.
The question, after all, is one of intention, to be gathered
from the tenor and all the terms of the contract, considered in the light
of the subject-matter of which the contract treats.
The subject of the agency in question was one whole addition, consisting of 2S0 lots, and the plaintiff was to have the exclusive right
to sell all of them. It is plain to be seen that the $1,500 was an inducement to plaintiff to accept the agency. It was a part, and a considerable part, of the compensation which he was to receive.
It is
true this part of the consideration was conditional, that is to say, upon
the fact that he sold the lots within one year, but the very condition
His right
shows that he was to have a year in which to perform it.
to have a year in which to sell the lots is clearly implied, and this
implied part of the agreement is as certain and definite as if it had
This conclusion seems to us irresistibeen stated in so many words.
ble. Nor was it necessary to submit this question to the jury, for the
jury found that the plaintiff was to have an additional compensation
1,500 if he sold out the lots within oik- year.
The clear intendment and construction of this language is that he was to have a year
in whirh to sell OUl the addition.
But it is -aid the plaintiff testified thai he reserved the right to quit
the work at any time, and hence the defendant had the corresponding
the agreement
right to terminate the agency at will, notwithstanding
The plaintiff testified that he did not bind him
concerning the SI
self to sell the addition for $80,000 within our year, or to pay
forlie states at one place in the lengthy
feiture
he failed to sell it.
examination thai he did nol bind him elf to devote the entire year to
the -ale of Round Top. and could have i|iht at any time, bul he was
another place he says he was bound to
man.
not that land of
give liis tune and attention to the sale of the land, and to try to Sell

He evidently

\t

a

if

to make
reasonable efforl to sell the
implied in the term of the agreement found
the jnr\ to have been made
these parties,
equally true that
he was not bound, at all events, t" continue his efforts during the en
tire year.
does not follow that the defendant had the right
Bui

by

a

undertook

is

it

by

luch

is

it.

it

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

should continue for one year, but it contains the stipulation that the
plaintiff should have an additional compensation of $1,500, if he sold
the lots within one year; and the question, then, is whether there
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Says
to revoke the agency, withoul cause, al any time during the year.
"It is, in many cases, difficull to determine whether the
Mechem:

parties have made a definite agreement for a fixed term or not. It is
not indispensable that they should, in the first instance, be both bound
It may lawfully be made to resl in either party
he same period.
to determine, at his option, that the agreement shall be one for a certain time."
Mechem, A.g. § 211.
Such questions as this must he considered in the light of the nature
and object of the agency, and the agreement which the parties have
made.
The defendant was anxious to dispose of the addition, and
scheme devised to sell it was problematical and doubtful. The
defendant agreed, as we have seen, to give the plaintiff one year in
which to earn, if he could, the extra $1,500; and this agreement as
to time is not void or unlawful because the plaintiff had the right, at
ption, to abandon the contract before the expiration of the year.
The fact that plaintiff had such right or option gave the defendant
no right to terminate the agency before the expiration of the year,
so long as the plaintiff was making diligent efforts to sell the lots.
3. As the plaintiff can maintain this action to recover the value of
his services and the reasonable expenses incurred by him, it follows
that he had the right to produce evidence showing the value of such
services.
Evidence of what is usually charged for similar services
And it was also competent to show,
at the same place was admissible.
who
with
were
the value of like services, what,
acquainted
by persons

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

the

in their opinion, the services of the plaintiff were worth. The witnesses called by the plaintiff for this purpose were real-estate agents,
and their evidence shows that they were fairly acquainted with the
value of like services. The fact that commissions in like cases are generally regulated by contract, and the further fact that these lots were
sold under what is called a "unique and unusual plan," did not affect the competency of the evidence of these witnesses as to the value

of the services rendered by the plaintiff. And it was also competent
to show what commissions had been paid in the same locality for
The differences between the plans adopted
selling other additions.
in making such other sales and the sales in question would be a matter for the jury to consider, but such differences do not affect the comThere was no error in the admission of
petency of the evidence.
evidence on this subject.
4. It follows, also, from what has been said, that the measure of
the plaintiff's damages was the reasonable value of the services rendered, and the moneys fairly expended in performing such services.
The in-tructions as to damages proceed on this theory, and there is
* * *
no error in them.
Judgment affirmed.
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Action by Geo. H. Stier against the Imperial Life Insurance Company, of Detroit, Michigan, to recover damages for breach of contract.
To the report of a referee both parties except.
Philips, District Judge. 17 [After stating the facts:] It is more
important than usual, in the consideration of this case, to keep in mind
the character of the action and the state of the pleadings.
The action
throughout is predicated upon a contract, and proceeds for breaches
thereof.
The contract is set out in substance, and it is then averred
that the plaintiff kept and performed the same on his part, and that the
defendant broke and failed to keep the same.
The petition alleges that
the contract was to continue in force until the same was terminated by
the neglect or refusal on the part of plaintiff to account for moneys
belonging to defendant by the terms and conditions of the contract, or
until there was dishonesty or noncompliance with the rules and in* * *
structions of said contract on the part of the plaintiff.
The breaches of the contract assigned are that in 1891 the defendant refused and ceased to issue any natural renewable term policies,
etc.. and refused to permit plaintiff to solicit or take any applications
for the policies mentioned in the contract, and made an entire change
in the kind of policies issued, and substituted new and different policies therefor, which substituted policies were not so advantageous to
plaintiff as those provided for; and afterwards made no effort to collect the renewal premiums on policies issued under applications taken
by defendant, but used every means to discourage, and did discourage,
parties holding such policies from paying renewal premiums, thereby
depriving plaintiff of his commissions, etc.
It is to be observed that
it is nowhere averred that defendant discharged the plaintiff from bis
y, nor is it averred that the plaintiff secured an average of $20,000 insurance per month for three consecutive months, as provided by
the contract.
The answer, after tendering the general issue, avers that the plaintiff discontinued acting under said contract long prior to the institution of the suit, without notice to defendant, and engaged in soliciting
insurance for another insurance company, a rival in business to the
*
*
*
ndant.
[f the plaintiff discontinued acting under said contract, and engaged
in soliciting insurance f<*v another rival insurance company of the 'If
fendant, and "lie voluntarily abandoned the further performance of
said contracl on his part, and by mutual consenl said contracl was
annulled and surrendered," it i- nol perceived that there i^ any foundation for the finding <>t"tin- n fere< thai defendant could not terminate
the contracl at ita pleasure.
Nor am I sati tied, a, a matter of law,
i" Part

<>rtin- opinion

La omitted.
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did not have the power to terminate the agency. In the
of employment for a definite period of time,
the agency is one at will, determinable at the pleasure of the principal,
unless the agency is coupled with an interest in the subject-matter.
thai defendant

absence

of

an agreement

This

is fundamental.
Mechem on Vgencj (section 204) says: "The authority of the agent
to represent the principal depends upon the will and license of the lat*
*
*
It is the aet of the principal which creates the authority;
ter.
interest
in
an
and unless the agent has acquired, with the authority,
the subject-matter, it is in the principal's interest alone that the authori*
* *
It is the general rule of law, therefore,
ty is to he exercised.
that

as between the "agent and his principal

may he revoked by the
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giving reason therefor,

principal

at his

the authority

of

the agent

at any time, with or without
is
cases where the authority

will

except in those
coupled with a sufficient interest in the agent; and this is true, even
though the authority be in express terms deelared to be exclusive or
But, though the principal has the power thus to revoke
irrevocable.
the authority, he may subject himself to a claim for damages if he exercises it contrary to his express or implied agreement in the matter."
Chief Justice Marshall, in Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat, 203, 5 L.
Ed. 589, with charaeteristic aptness defines a power coupled with an
interest. He says : "What is meant by the expression 'a power coupled
witli an interest'?
Is it an interest in the subject on which the power
is to be exercised, or is it an interest in that which is produced by the
exercise of the power? We hold it to be clear that the interest which
* * * must be an interest in the thing itself.
can protect a power
In other words, the power must be ingrafted on an estate in the thing.
The words themselves seem to import this meaning. A power coupled
with an interest is a power which accompanies or is connected with an

The power and the interest are united in the same person.
interest.
But, if we are to understand, by the word 'interest,' an interest in that
which is to be produced by the exercise of the power, then they are
never united."
Clearly, therefore, the plaintiff had no such interest in the subjectmatter of the contract as would take away the customary option of the
principal to terminate the agency. But it is claimed by the plaintiff, on
account of article 18 of the contract in question, that the implication
that the power of dismissal is denied, except for the causes therein
specified. This article is as follows: "This contract may be terminated
upon the neglect or refusal of the said George H. Stier to account for
all moneys belonging to the company according to rule 7, or for dishonesty, or for noncompliance with any of the foregoing rules and
instructions."
The case of Newcomb against this same company (51 Fed. 725) is
I should feel great emrelied upon in support of this construction.
barrassment to oppose my unsupported opinion against any considerate
conclusion reached by the learned judge who delivered that opinion.

TERMINATION

OF

THE RELATION

2.')5

It is to be kept in mind, to a proper understanding of the Xewcomb
Case, that the action there was for a quantum meruit, and that the
facts alleged were in many respects quite different from these under
consideration, and the questions passed upon arose upon demurrer to
the petition.
I am unable to perceive that the provision that the contract might be
terminated upon certain specified grounds enforces the conclusion that
it was intended thereby to prolong the existence of the agency inA
definitely, or so long as the agent did none of the specified delicts.
not dissimilar question arose in Sewing Machine Co. v. Ewing, 141
3. 627. 12 Sup. Ct. 94, 35 L. Ed. 882. where it was held that an
agency contract containing the provision that a "violation of the spirit
of this agreement shall be sufficient cause for its abrogation'' does not
imply that it could only be abrogated for sufficient cause. Mr. Justice
Harlan said of this (page 636. 141 I*. S., and page 97, 12 Sup. Ct.):
"This clause, it may be suggested, was entirely unnecessary if the
parties retained the right to abrogate the contract after 1875 at pleasure, and implies that it could be abrogated only for sufficient cause, of
which, in case of suit, the jury, under the guidance of the court as to
the law, must judge, in the light of all the circumstances.
We cannot
concur in this view.
The clause referred to is not equivalent to a
specific provision declaring affirmatively that the contract should continue in force for a given number of years, or without a limit as to
time, unless abrogated by one or the other party for sufficient cause. It
was inserted by way of caution, to indicate that the parties were bound
to observe equally the spirit and letter of the agreement while it was
in force."
It

to me that the proper meaning of article 18 is that, for any
the right arose absolutely to the principal
t<> terminate
the contract without any liability, leaving the right untouched to exercise the power of discontinuance subject to a liability
The general rule of law is that such
under a quantum meruit action.
contracts are revocable at pleasure "unless the power to revoke is
Mechem, \.L,r . §§ 20'). 210.
restrained by express stipulation."
This
rule is aptly put in Coffin v. I. audi-. 46 Pa. 431. 432.
The court say:
"The true question i-. what was the contract?
To what did the parties
bind each other ? We .'tie nol at liberty to make contracts for them, Or to
to incorporate.
add any stipulation which they have not seen
We
cannot give
mere expectation the sanction or binding force of
covThere
nothing said
enant.
regard to the time during
which the agreement should continue, and nothing
its language to
define the duration of the service of plaintiff or his employment
the
defendant.
This tin- contracting parties appear to have left oul of
consideration, or at least failed to make
sub eel of covenanl obbe
neither
to
willing
that
was
bind himself for any
may
ligation.
evident, then, that were we so to condefinite period.
strue tii<- agreemenl a- to hold
obligatory upon the one party to emseems

a

in

is

it

It

*

*

*

j

a

it

by

in

is

*

*

*

a

tit

of the designated derelicts,

It
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ploy, and upon the other to serve, during any period, we should be in
er of imposing liabilities
which both panics absolutely avoided
And, if it be admitted that neither of the parlies contemassuming.
plated a severance of the relation affirmed by the contract at the will
of the other party, it does net follow that we are at liberty to treat the
neiit as continuing a covenanl against him.
That would he to
make an expectation of results equivalent to a binding acknowledgment that they should follow."
The case <<i [nsurance Co.. v. Williams, 91 N. C. 69, 49 Am. St. Rep.
Williams was
637, pertinently illustrates the application of this rule.
On first-year payments he was
appointed agent to solicit insurance.
The
to receive a given per cent., and on renewals a given per cent.
agent prosecuted his agency to a considerable extent, when the company, unable to successfully conduct its husiness, sold out and assigned
many policies to another insurance company, and renewals were effected, through another agency, on some of the policies taken by WilAlliams.
For these renewals he sought to recover compensation.
was
here,
in
the
case
that
the
agent
though it might have been there, as
induced to accept the agency in reliance on the expectancy of profits
from the renewals, the court held that the company, in the ahsence of
any express provision to the contrary in the contract, had the right to
terminate the contract in the manner it did; that the agent had no such
interest associated with the business as entitled him to a continuance of
the agreement against the will of the principal. "The right to compensation is associated with a continuance of services, and the com* * * Although
pensation is the agreed measure of their value.
renewals are the consequence of the original contract of insurance, and
in this particular beneficial to the company, yet the full compensation
given and accepted for this service is the twenty-five per centum on
the sum received, provided in the contract which creates the agency and
regulates its terms."
While the contract here provides that the agent may be entitled to
commission on renewal premiums, notwithstanding the termination of
the agency for any cause save dishonesty, yet it is on the express condition that the agent has secured $1,000,000 of policies in force; hut
there is no claim made that he had secured this amount.
The principal difference between the case supra and this is that Williams sought
to recover his commission on cases actually renewed, but by another
agent, while this plaintiff seeks to recover damages on the theory that
his interest would have been equal to $1,200 a year for three years,
had the company diligently striven to effect such renewals.
It is a
difference, it seems to me, without a legal distinction.
There must he, in the absence of a clear provision to the contrary,
If, as against the printhe element of mutuality in such a contract.
the agent had the right to insist on a continuation
of the agency
so long as he did none of the prescribed acts in article 18, the correlative right of the principal must obtain to hold the agent to perpetual
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service, or so long as he was faithful ; and thus it would result that,
nolens volens, the employment could be made perpetual.
It is quite
evident from the second paragraph of the opinion in the Newcomb
Case, supra, that the learned judge had in mind the recognized distinction between the reserved power to discharge and the right and
wrong of a discharge, where the remedy is not in an action ex contractu for the discharge, but a quantum meruit action predicated upon
its injurious exercise.
In the latter instance the suit is not founded on
the breach of the contract, as such, but is an action of assumpsit for
a quantum meruit, in which the contract may be put in evidence, and
will control the maximum of recovery.
Mansur v. Botts, 80 Mo. 654.
655, and citations.
Keeping this distinction in view, the vice is apparent in the rinding of the referee that the defendant broke its contract
with the plaintiff in not permitting him to continue the prosecution of
his work in taking insurance on the natural premium plan, or in disof that system by its determination to
couraging the prosecution
* * *
specially prosecute the level premium policies.
The motion for a new trial is denied.

ATKIN
(Court of King's Bench,

1830.

v.

ACTON.

4 Car.

&

P.

208,

19

E. C. L.

478.)

A

clerk and traveller, hired by the year, attempted to take improper
liberties with his employer's housemaid.
The employer discharged
him, and said he would pay him the wages already earned.
Plaintiff
refused this, and sues in assumpsit for £130 wages under the contract
of hiring. Plea: General issue, a set-off, and a tender of £14.

Lord Tkxtkkdkx, C. J. Assuming that the effect of the agreement is that it creates a hiring for a year, yet. if the plaintiff misconducted himself ls in the way described, the defendant had a right to
discharge him, and was not compellable, according to my judgment, to
pay him any money at all; at all events, he was not liable t<> pay him
any more than for the time during which he actually served, which will
Drunkenness on 111«- part of the agent may be n sufficient cause for die
charge of the agent if it does or might have an Injurious effect on the business
of thi' principal, thougb not otherwise.
Denman, • '. .1.. m wise v. Wilson,
Carr <v Klrwyn, 662, IT E. « '. I.. 662 (1845); Gonsolls \. Gearhart, :;i Mo. 585
i'i graceful conduct >>fan agent in associating with n woman of ill
(1861).
repute, which would naturally reded discredit on the principal, and be in
jurlous to iiis business Interest, constitutes ample legal ground for the
charge of the agent Gould v Magnolia
Metal <'".. l:<»7 ill. 172, <;:» X. B. 896
(1904), affirming
His 111. App. 203 (1903).
i' ibedience of Instructions i- ground for discharge.
Dodge v. Reynolds,
1::.". Mich. 692, 98 N. W. t::7 (1904).
hi
ng in a rival business bj
the agent, even though it does nol cause iii- principal any injury.
I
v Meyer, 12 Wl
311, i'i Am. Rep. n"> ii v T7i.
See, also, Singer
v. M
mlck, 1 Watts & 8. 265 (1842), in which an b
partnership ;it the dlre<
TinHon of one partner changed the books to the detriment of the other.
court found this justified his discharge.
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Specific Performance

)

(/;'

MAIR
(Court

of Chancery,

L865.

v.

of

is

erdict lor the defendant.

Agency

the

HIMALAYA TEA

L. R.

1

\

It

I

it

it,

bring it round to the demand on the counts for work and labour.
\\ uli respect to the tender, it appears i<> me that it has been proved.
The plaintiff refused to take the money offered, and as the sum was
quite sufficient, bethink
mentioned, and he would not accept
cause his objection was not, that the sum put before him was not the
precise amount offered, hut his answer shows that he was not willing
therefore was not necessary for the deto take the money at all.
fendant to get the sovereign changed so as to offer the precise sum.

Eq. 411, 11

Jur.

CO.

N. S. 1013. 14 W. R. 165.)

&

a

&

A

forced

in equity.

19

Johnson

v.

The Shrewsbury

&

a

by

is

a

I

them from acting upon his resignation, or alternatively from suing for
payment upon the shares accepted by him.
cannot see my way to granting the
Sir W. Page Wood, V. C.
court of
plaintiff the relief asked, the whole matter being one for
taken that the plaintiff shall not
law to deal with, so long as care
in the proceedings at law by his voluntary resignation.
be prejudiced
The contract between the plaintiff and the company must be regulated
the articles of association only, on the faith of which other persons
have incurred their liability, and the Court cannot enter into any
Even assuming, in favour of
arrangements antecedent to the articles.
him
to the articles that he was
the plaintiff, the construction given by
irremovable,
of
authority
general meeting, or that
the
except by
to be
his being retained as
on
conditional
was
of
shares
bis acceptance
agent, the Court cannot act in his favour, as the duties of an agent are
in the nature of personal service, and as such incapable of being en-

Birmingham Rail-

not

;i

&

'J.

will
7

&

i
.

;i

acceptable to
merely trusted, but personally
not force upon the principal an objectionable
(oil.
v.
Pickering v. Bishop of Ely,
agent no matter how able be may be.
partnerJur. 1T'.>(1843). When tin- principal is
c. 249, 12 I.. .1. Ch. 271,
Singer v. McCormick,
ship the agent should ho acceptable to both partners.
enforced, for thai
W;itt~
s. 265 (1842).
Nor will agency be specifically
would !"■ to assert thai the principal may not revoke the authority of the
19 An agenl should be
principal, and the courts

\
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&

-Mair
Co. had for many years been in business in London and Calcutta, and organized the Himalaya Tea Company for the cultivation
of tea.
prospectus was issued stating the object of the company
large
Co. as agents. The latter took
and the appointment of Mair
Mair
later,
induced
number of shares. The directors, three years
Co. to resign as agents upon assurance of relief of all payments on
account of the shares subscribed. They then appointed new agents, but
He files his
sued .Mair for the amount due on his shares and interest.
hill for relief by way of an accounting, and by injunction to restrain
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way Company, 3 D. M. & G. 914, etc. The plaintiff will have his cross
action in respect of the contract: and as he cannot be relieved bv this
Court, there will be no order upon the present motion.
As, however,
the plaintiff has some reason for saying that his resignation was given
under the impression that he would be thereupon relieved from all
liability, the defendants must undertake not to set up in any proceedings at law the alleged resignation of the plaintiff.

(F) Rccoirry of
JACOBS
(Supreme

Damages
v.

by flic Agent

WARFIELD.

Court of Louisiana,

1871.

23

La. Aim.

395.)

The defendant has appealed from the judgment condemning her to pay the plaintiff $2610 for violating the contract which
she made with him on the sixth day of ( )ctober, 1865, and for money
advanced by him for her benefit under said contract.
In this contract the plaintiff was employed as an agent to superintend all the business of the defendant in the parish of St. John the
Baptist, in relation to certain wild lands which the defendant owned in
said parish; and he was specially authorized to take charge of and exercise general control over said property ; to prevent the commission of
trespass or wastes upon said land-, and to appear in court to prosecute
and defend all suit- in reference thereto, as occasion might require
"with the distinct understanding that no other charge shall he made b)
.id Jacobs for his services in taking charge of the said lands and
removing therefrom all trespassers, than one-fourth interest in the rev
enue derived from the sale of wood and timber cut therefrom by said
Jacobs and his employes, as herein expressed, which shall he a full
and adequate remuneration and compensation for all services that he,
said Jacobs, may render the said Mrs. Warfield under and by virtue
of this procuration."
It was further Stipulated that the said agenl was not to institute pro
ceedings against any trespasser without firsl obtaining the written consent of the d( fendant ; and. also, that the said Jacobs was in no w i
disturb or interfere with such persons a- mighl have the written sanction of Mrs. Warfield to be on said lands and cut and sell timber there
from.

There was no period
Jacobs was employed,

fi
l

ed in thi acl as the term for which the said
nder this contract we think the defendant had

Elwell v. Coon (N. J. Co.) 16 \ti. 680 (1900).
Moreover to specifically
enforc<
the contract against the principal would be Inequitable, becau e
i 11 mutuality.
The Courts cannot compel performance by the agent, and there-

agent
1_'

fore will nol decree specific performance
by the principal.
This rem.
onlj when the court a
available
nforce the contract <>n both sides, so
thai the wii"i<' agreement can be carried Into effect according t<> it- terms.
Mum. 526, it \. \\ . 1030 (1800).
Alworth v. Seymour,
12
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right to discharge her

agent

and employe*

whenever

she

saw fit to

do so.

From the evidence we are satisfied that the plaintiff did not comply
with his contract, and the defendant had good eanse to discharge him.
His demand for damages for breach of contract must, therefore, fail.
It appears, however, that the plaintiff paid ten dollars to an attorney
ami twenty-five dollars costs in a suit for the benefit of the defendant,
and we think he was justifiable in doing so under the act of procuration.
For these sums he should have judgment. 20 The demand for
the other sums which the plaintiff claims to have paid for the defendant pursuant to the contract is not supported by the evidence.
It is therefore ordered that the judgment herein be reduced to
thirty-five dollars, and as thus amended that it he affirmed. It is furRehearing
ther ordered that the plaintiff pay costs of this appeal.
refused.
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BLUMENTHAL
(Supreme

Court of California,

v.

1891.

GOODALU.
89

Cal.

251,

26

Pac.

90G.)

Action to recover commissions claimed to have been earned by one
Oesterreicher,
a real estate agent, under authority from defendant
to sell certain blocks for $1,500 each, on which he was to have a commission of $100 for each block, "This contract to be in force for ten
On the same day the agent agreed orally
days from date hereof."
with one Fulder for the sale of the blocks at the price named, but,
he failing to put the agreement in writing, the agent afterward made
a written agreement with Von Rhein & Co.
Next day defendant revoked the authority, claiming it had been procured by misstatements
by the agent. The court found there had been no fraud or misrepresentations by the agent. The latter assigned his claim to plaintiff.
Motion for new trial denied.
Plaintiff
Judgment for defendant.
appeals from the judgment and order.
Garoutte, J. 21 [After stating the facts :] * * * It is a general principle of law that, as between the principal and the agent,
the authority of the agent is revocable at any time, if not coupled with
an interest, and this principle is recognized by section 2356 of the
Civil Code. Mechem, upon the Law of Agency (section 209), says :
"But this power to revoke is not to be confounded with the right to
" [f the agent has In good faith
incurred expenses, and expended time and
labor in the matter, or agency, the principal will not be permitted to terminate
the results of the agent's services without compensating
It and appropriate
Royal Remedy and Extracl Co. v. Gregory Grocery Co., 90 Mo.
him therefor.
App. 53 (1901); Green v. Cole, 103 Mo. 70. 15 S. W. .'517 (1890); S. C, 24 S.
w. 1058 (1894). Bui if his compensation depends upon success, and the agency
has been rightfully and in good faith revoked before he fulfills the agreement,
- do right to compensation.
Milligan v. Owen, 123 Iowa, 2S5, 98 N. W.
792 (1904).
23 Part of

the opinion

Is omitted.
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Much uncertainty has crept into the books and decisions from
failure to discriminate clearly between them. * * * As has
been seen, the relation of the agent to his principal is founded in a
It is essentially a
greater or less degree upon trust and confidence.
If, then, for any reason, the principal determines
personal relation.
that he no longer desires or is able to trust and confide in the a
it is contrary to the policy of the law to undertake to compel him
* * * But it by no means follows that, though possessto do so.
ing the power, the principal has the right to exercise it without liability, regardless of his contracts in the matter. 22 It is entirely consistent with the existence of the power that the principal may agree
and for the violation
that for a definite period he will not exercise
as much liable as for the breach
of such an agreement the principal
In section 615 the author says: "In using the
of any other contract."
will be understood
expressions rightfully and wrongfully revoked,
not involved,
that the question of the principal's power to revoke
but whether by express or implied agreement, having undertaken not
in violation of
to exercise that power, he has, nevertheless, exercised
"
Thus if, after
brothe agreement."
Section 620 reads
ker employed to sell property had in good faith expended money and
labor in advertising for and finding
purchaser, and was in the midst
of negotiations which were evidently and plainly approaching to success, the seller should revoke the authority with the purpose of availing himself of the broker's efforts, and avoiding the payment of his
revoke.

it

a

*

*

*

:

a

could

by

by

v

by

a

a

it

in

a

it it

not be claimed that the agent had no remedy.
might well be said that there was an implied contract
reasonable time for
on the part of the principal to allow the agent
performance, that full performance was wrongfully prevented by the
principal's own acts, and that the agent had earned his commission."
In the case of Lane v. Albright, 49 Ind. 279, where the owner of
the real estate sold
making
pending the negotiations of the agent
sale, and prior to the expiration of the time given by the owner to
the agent, and where the agent within the time given did find
purchaser, the court says: "The appellant performed all that he was rented
the appellee from
the contract to do, and
quired
The appellee disabled himself from carrying out
selling the land.
commissions,
In these cases

the appellant."
"The fad that the apof sale made
authorized appellant to sell his land did nol deprive himbut he could not thereby avoid his liaself of the power of selling
In Hawley v. Smith, 45 Ind. 183, upon full conbility to appellant."
that, where the performsideration the court dei ided that the rule
one party
the act of the other, the party not
ance
prevented
the contract
had

sum as

will fully compensate

\

5

8.

Nip distinction between the power and the righl t<> revoke
sized in Kilpatrlck v. Wiley. 197 Mo. 128, '■*■< W. 213 (1906);
M
Watl
lormtck.
(18 12).
-16

emphaBin

is

h

by

dam

u

should recover

in

in fault

is

by

is

it,

pellee

l
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him for the injury which he lias sustained by reason of the non-perTo the same effect is Story, Ag. § 466.
formance of the contract.
In the case at bar it may be conceded that the agent had not entirely carried out his contract at the time the defendant revoked his
authority, hut upon the l°th day of July, and within the limit of time
fixed by the contract, he did produce the purchaser, with his money
in his hand, demanding a iWct.\.
The court found that the plaintiff
entered into this contract in good faith, and that the writing was unThe record discloses that the agent was most
tainted with fraud.
active in his efforts to find a purchaser; indeed, the real reasons of
defendant's revocation of the agency appear to he that the agent was
too active, as he had found two purchasers for the property instead
of one.
The case of Brown v. Pforr, 38 Cal. 553, would seem to
indicate upon a cursory examination, views hostile to the principles
expressed in the authorities cited in this opinion, but, upon examinaThe
tion of that case, it can readily be seen that no hostility exists.
contract in that case does not expressly stipulate that it shall remain
in force 30 days, and the opinion of Justice Sanderson clearly intimates that, if there had been a provision in the contract that it should
remain in force for such length of time, the defendant would not have
and escape without making
been permitted to prevent performance,
compensation to the agent.
The remaining cases cited by respondent upon this question add no
The defendant expressly agreed that his conmerit to his contention.
tract with the agent should remain in force for the period of 10 days.
The act of the agent in finding a purchaser required time and labor
for its completion, and within three days of the execution of the contract, and prior to its revocation, he had placed the matter in the position that success was practically certain and immediate, and it would
he the height of injustice to permit the principal then to withdraw the
authority and terminate the agency as against an express provision of
the contract, and perchance reap the benefit of the agent's labors,
This would be to
without being liable to him for his commissions.
make the contract an unconscionable one, and would offer a premium
for fraud by enabling one of the parties to take advantage of his own
wrong, and secure the labor of the other without remuneration.
Let the judgment and order be reversed, and the cause remanded,
with direction
as prayed

for.

to the court below to enter judgment

for the plaintiff
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(G) Manner of Revocation

CLARK
(Supreme
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WordivX,

v.

Court of .Judicature

^-/t<_

MULLEXIX.
of Indiana,

1858.

11

Tnd. 532.)

J. 23 Bill

in chancery, filed under the old practice, by the
appellee against the appellant, for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of land.
The cause was tried since the code took
effect, but there was a motion for a new trial, on the finding of the
Court for the plaintiff helow, which was overruled, and exception
taken, the bill of exceptions setting out the evidence.
The bill avers that in May, 1848, the plaintiff purchased of the
defendant, Xancy Clark, a certain piece of land therein described for
the sum of $400, to be paid in four equal payments, on the 25th of
December, of the years 1848, 1849, 1850, and 1851, with interest from
the 1st of May. 1848; that he executed to the defendant four notes
for the purchase-money, as above specified, and was put, by her, in
possession of the land, and has made valuable and lasting improvements thereon ; that he has paid to the defendant the purchase-money,
and demanded a deed, which she refuses to execute.
The facts charged in the bill are denied under oath.
The Court, on its finding, decreed specific performance.
It appears from the evidence that the defendant, who resided in
Kentucky, by her letters to one John Alice, of Indiana, authorized him
to sell the land in controversy ; and that in pursuance of such authority, said Allee, as agent of the defendant, sold the land to the
plaintiff, and put him in possession thereof, and also took from the
plaintiff the notes above specified for the purchase-money, which notes
retained in the possession of Allee until they were paid to him
Soon after the land was sold, Allee
by the plaintiff, and taken up.
received letters from the defendant ratifying and confirming the sale.
This was in 1848.
Afterwards, the defendant became dissatisfied with the sale thus
made, on the alleged ground that it had been sold for less than its
value, and sought to repudiate it.
On the 24lh of September, 1850,
she executed to Henry II. Clark, a power of attorney, whereby she
and empowered him to sell and convey the land in conand all rents or claims
and to receive tin- purchase-money,
About the 1st of October. 1850,
of Indiana.
due her in tl
said Henry II. Clark, having with him the power of attorney, came to
the county of Putnam, and had an interview with the plaintiff in
The plaintiff and said Henry II. Clark went
relation to the land.
In the langu
aid Allee the plaintiff's witi
id Allee.

authorized

Cut

<.f Die opinion

Is omitted.

(Part

1

I

•_'
1

Tin: RELATION

company with the complainTT. Clark came to my house
ind said his sister (the defendant) was dissatisfied with the trade,
and gave notice to the complainant that she wanted the land, and exappears that after
hibited bis power of attorney from defendant."
was agreed that
between the plaintiff and Allee,
some consultation
the power of attorney should he submitted to some lawyer of Greencastle, and accordingly the whole matter was submitted to Judge Far-

it

It

in

"Henry

as the agent of the defendant), the payment of the purchasepayment to the defendant?
money by the plaintiff to said Allee, was
was not. The authority of Allee
We are clearly of opinion that
and
ended, and
revoked
payment to him
in the matter was clearly
to receive
not
authorized
was
that
he
had
notice
after the plaintiff
was
concerned.
the
far
as
defendant
so
was
nullity,
said that an authority may be
474,
In Story on Agency,
revoked by
"direct and formal declaration publicly made known, or

is

a

§

it

a

it,

a

it

a

Henry,

a

if

a

a

it

;

or
may be implied from cirby an informal writing, or by parol
revocacumstances. What circumstances will or will not amount to
revocation by implication, cannot be stated with
tion, or to notice of
But there are some acts which admit of little
any definite certainty.
the principal appoints another
or no doubt. Thus, for example,
person to do the same act, this will ordinarily be construed to be

is

it

if

it

It

a

revocation of the power of the former agent."
Here, before the purchase-money was paid to Allee, the defendant
had executed
power to Henry H. Clark, by which she not only authorized him to sell and convey the land, but to receive the purchasemoney and all claims due her in the state of Indiana, and of this fact
useless to say that the defendant's
the plaintiff had full notice.
leaving of the notes in the possession of Allee, impliedly gave the
plaintiff the right to pay the money to him. The plaintiff knew that
the defendant wished to avoid the contract, and did not wish to receive
at all. There could be no implied authority, under
the money upon
such circumstances, for Allee to receive the money, and his express
he had previously
The revocahad any, was revoked.
authority,
of
Allee's
tion
authority would not, of course, affect the validity of
took away his
sale made by him previous to the revocation, but

a
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it

it

a

lev for his opinion.
On the same evening after consulting Judge Farlev, the complainant agreed to set aside the contract, and give $500
for the land.
At the time of this transaction none of the principal had been pail
portion of
and perhaps but
on the notes for the purchase-money,
The principal and interest due on the notes were afterthe interest.
appears
wards paid by complainant to said Allee, but no part of
appear that she
ever to have been paid to the defendant, nor does
has ever received anything upon the land.
The question arises whether, upon the foregoing facts (admitting
the original contract to be valid and binding, and not set aside and
canceled by the subsequent agreement between the plaintiff and said
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as the agent of the defendant, either in receiving
the purchase-money, or otherwise executing the contract.
The payment of the purchase-money to Allee, under the circumstances, not being a payment to the defendant, and this being all the
payment made, there was a failure to make out the case so far as this
essential particular is concerned, and on this ground a new trial should
* * *
have been granted.
Judgment reversed, with costs. Cause remanded for a new trial.

right to act further

BROOKSHIRE
(Supreme

Court of North Carolina,

v.

BROOKSHIRE.

1847.

30

N. C.

[8

Ired.]

74,

47 Am.
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Dec. 341.)

Plaintiff was appointed by deed of defendant and others as agent
to go to Alabama to settle the estate of their brother and bring
back to each his share. After one trip the defendant by parol revoked
Plaintiff made a second trip and now sues defendant
the authority.
for his share of the expenses.
Nash, J. 24 It is not denied by the plaintiff, that, in this case, it
was within the power of the defendant to put an end to his agency,
by revoking his authority. Indeed, this is a doctrine, so consonant
with justice and common sense, that it requires no reasoning to
prove it. But he contends, that it is a maxim of the common law,
that every instrument must be revoked by one of equal dignity. It
is true an instrument under seal cannot be released or discharged
by an instrument not under seal or by parol, but we do not consider
the rule as applicable to the revocation of powers of attorney, esThe authority of
pecially to such an one as we are now considering.
an agent is conferred at the mere will of his principal and is to be
executed for his benefit ; the principal, therefore, has the right to
put an end to the agency whenever he pleases, and the agent has
no right to insist upon acting, when the confidence at first reposed in
him is withdrawn.
In this case, it was not necessary to enable the plaintiff to execute
his agency, that his power should be under seal; one by parol, or by
writing of any kind, would have been sufficient; it certainly cannot

Mr. Story,
require more form to revoke the power than to create it.
in his treatise on Agency (page 606), lays it down that the revocation of a power may be, by a direct and formal declaration publicly
made known, or by an informal writing, or by parol; or it may lie
and lie nowhere intimates, nor do any
implied from circumstances,
of the authorities we have looked into, that when the power is created by deed, it must
2*

Pari "i

i in- opinion

1m-

revoked

is omitted.

by deed.

And,

as was before

re-
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(Tart

1

of the connection between the principal and the
It is stated, by Mr.
to be at war with such a principle.
same page, thai an agency ni.i\ be revoked by implicaTims, if
the text writers lay .town the same doctrine.
another agent is appointed to execute powers, previously entrusted
to some other person, it is a revocation, in general, of the power of
the latter.
For this proposition, Mr. Story cites Copeland v. The
In that case, it was
Mercantile Insurance Company, <> hick. 198.
decided that a power, given to one Pedrick to sell the interest of
marked, the
seems
Story, in the
tion, and all

nature
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rineipal in a vessel, was revoked by a subsequent letter of intion to him and the master, to sell.
A.S then, an agent may he appointed by parol, and as the appointment of a subsequent agent supersedes and revokes the powers previously granted to another, it follows, that the power of the latter,
though created by (\cqi\, may be revoked by the principal, by parol.
But the case in Pickering goes further. The case does not state, in
so many words, that the power granted to Pedrick, was under seal,
but the facts set forth in the case, show, that was the fact; and, if
This is the only point raised,
so, is a direct authority in this case.
* * *
in the plaintiff's bill of exceptions, as to the Judge's charge.
Judgment affirmed.

DAVOL
remo Judicial

v.

QUIMBY.

Court of Massachusetts.

1865.

93 Mass.

[11

Allen]

20S.)

The defence was payment to the plaindenied by the plaintiff.
was
whose
agency
agent
court,
before Wilkinson, J., it appeared
in
the
superior
At the trial
that the plaintiff ordered one Keach to collect the debt of the defendant, and, after paying to one Howe a sum due to him from the plaintiff, to remit the balance to the plaintiff. A creditor of Keach, ascertaining that the latter had demanded the money of the defendant,
Contract, to recover wages.

tiff's

;

and supposing

it to be his own

debt, commenced

a trustee

process

The plaintiff
against Keach, summoning the defendant as trustee.
Howe to settle the trustee process "the best way
then authorized
he could." receive the money due from the defendant, apply so much
thereof as was necessary in payment of the sum due from the plaintiff to Howe, and pay the balance to the plaintiff. Afterwards the
defendant received notice from an attorney at law, demanding the
money for and on account of the plaintiff. After this, the defendant
paid the money to Howe. The plaintiff did not notify Howe of any
withdrawal of his authority.
The plaintiff's counsel requested the court to instruct the jury that
if the defendant had notice to pay the attorney of the plaintiff, he
: not be justified in paying the money to Howe after such notice
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from the plaintiff, and if he did so he did it at his own risk, and did
not discharge himself from liability to the plaintiff.
The judge refused so to rule, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant;
and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.
Bigelow, C. J. The instruction asked for by the defendant was
It appeared distinctly from the evidence that the
rightly refused.
plaintiff authorized Howe to receive the money from the defendant ;
but it was not shown that this authority was subsequently revoked.
The mere fact that the plaintiff also authorized another person to
receive the same money did not prove a revocation. There may be
two persons appointed to exercise the same power as agents for
a principal. 25 If there is nothing in the nature of the agency to render an authority in one person inconsistent with a like authority in
another, both may well be authorized, and the acts of either or both,
within the scope of the agency, will be valid and binding on the principal. So it was in the case at bar. The defendant paid to one agent
of whose authority he had had notice.
This authority was not revoked by the notice given to the defendant that the plaintiff had also
appointed another agent with similar authority. There was no other
evidence of revocation.
Exceptions overruled.

KELLY

v.

(Court of Chancery of New Jersey,

BRENNAN.
1897.

55 N.

J.

Eq. 423, 37 Atl. 137.)

Bill for specific performance of a contract claimed to have been
made by defendant by her agent David Giltinan.
Grey, V. C.-' ; There are two questions of fact in this case on which
the several parties are at variance, the settlement of which will deterThe complainant asserts that she became the equitmine their rights.
able purchaser of the lot in question by a memorandum of sale obtained from Mr. Giltinan, the authorized
agent of the defendant,
of a second agent to perform the same duties as t<>the
The appointmenl
and revoke
same contrael may, however, supersede the previous appointmenl
Williamson v. Richardson, Fed. ('as. No. 17.the authority of the flrsl agent.
7.->t (1867).

ir two agents are employed separately t<>sell the same property, thougb either may dispose <>!'it until a Bale, yel if a sale is effected by one, thai will,
of course, terminate
the power of the other.
Hatch v. Coddlngton,
95 0.
s. 18,24 L. Ed. 339 (1877) ; Ahern v. Baker, 34 Minn. 98, 24 N. W. ::n (1885);
of t\\" .mint agents revokes a previous app. L'Tt.
The appointmenl
i them as a several agent
pointmenl of "i
Copeland v. Mercantile ins.
a power of attorney will m>i be revoked bj tin- gh
Co., 6 Pick. 198 (1828).
with
Ing of some other instrument
(a deed of trust) which Is ooi Inconsistent
tin- continuance of the power.
French v. Townes, in Qrat. 513 (1853).
Nor
suit to collect a debt) which an- enby other acta of the principal (bringing
tirely consistent with an Intent t" continue tin- agency.
Walker v. Barrington, 28 Vt 781 11856).
Part of the opinion is omitted.

2
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She also alleges thai the defendant Crosby know she
had obtained this contract, and, in order to cheat her of her bargain,
afterwards entered into a subsequent contract with Mrs. Brennan
The complainant prays that the specific performance of her
herself.
contract obtained through the agent may be decreed.
As to the first point, the dispute turns upon the assertion on the

Mrs. Brennan.

of Mr. Giltinan's authority to bind Mrs.
part of the complainant
sale, and a denial by the defendant Mrs.
of
contract
a
Brennan by
The original employment of
such
had
power.
that
he
any
Brennan
Mr. Gilfinan was in writing, and made him Mrs. Brennan's agent
as
She subsequently,
11 the property, fixing- his commission.
Mr. Giltinan testifies, became disquieted (whether reasonably or not

and caused the words, "subject to my apin the written memorandum employing him.
Mr. Ferris, Mrs. Brennan's attorney, who attended to this change,
says it was done about the middle of July. Shortly after this, about
the middle of August, she, by her attorney, withdrew this paper altoMr. Giltinan continued to receive offers
gether from Mr. Giltinan.
and to discuss the sale of the property with Mrs. Brennan for some
time after the withdrawal, reporting offers, which were not accepted.
But, if it be assumed that Mrs. Brennan allowed Mr. Giltinan to
retain any authority to sell, the real question on this branch of the
case is, what was the character of that authority at the time he contracted with Kelly? That it was originally in writing and unlimited
The reason for
That it was modified is also undisputed.
all agree.
the insertion of the words, "subject to my approval," was stated by
Mr. Giltinan himself to be the annoyance which Mrs. Brennan sufof parties in Atlantic City "as
fered because of the representations
to the danger she was in by my having full power of attorney to-do
This makes it obvious that Mrs.
as I pleased with her property."
Mr.
allow
to
Giltinan an absolute power to
was
Brennan
unwilling
make a sale of her lands, and that the limitation requiring her approval was necessary to satisfy her mind. By the change, this written authority was so restrained that if Mr. Giltinan undertook to sell
as Mrs. Brennan's agent he was thereafter obliged to subject his acAfter this- he testified that the same reasons
tion to her approval.
of
Mr. Ferris (Mrs. Brennan's attorney), when
call
second
the
led to
the
took
latter
away
paper, now one of limited authority only.
the
Mrs. Brennan is thus shown to have been unwilling that Mr. Giltinan should exercise the authority of an agent, even subject to her
Mr. Giltinan claims that the taking away of the paper auapproval.
thority was a withdrawal only of the Atlantic and Iowa avenue lot,
and not of the California and Pacific avenue lot, now in question.
But the paper, as charged by Mrs. Brennan, authorized him to sell
both these tracts subject to Mrs. Brennan's approval, one no more
When it was taken away by Mr. Ferris
and no less than the other.
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Mr. Giltinan testifies that Ferris
(Mrs. Brennan's representative),
"made no comments and no remarks, and told me nothing in regard
I think it must be
to any change of sentiments or instructions."
taken that the withdrawal of this paper, which Mr. Giltinan defines
in its original form to have been a full power of attorney, made an
end of Mr. Giltinan's authority to sell any of the land described in
it.
The demand by the principal for the absolute delivery of her letter of attorney, and its surrender by the agent, must be held to be
a revocation.
But even if this taking away of the written authority
is held not to have removed the California and Pacific avenue lot
from Mr. Giltinan's control, whatever power he retained under it
must certainly have been subject to her approval under the previous
modification. * * *
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There is no dispute between the parties as to the order of time
in which the events narrated happened.
Irrespective of questions as
to the existence or extent of Mr. Giltinan's authority to act as agent
of Mrs. Brennan in the premises, and to bind her, without her previous approval, by

a contract to sell, it appears that Mrs. Brennan
herself entered into a contract with Crosby to sell him the
property, and had accepted $500 payment on account of the purchase
money, before Giltinan, acting as her agent, had made any agreement whatever with Mr. Kelly, or had even heard from him that he
was willing to pay the full price.
The letters and telegrams and
checks produced support the statement that the sale by Mrs. Brennan

had

to Crosby's agent preceded the sale by Giltinan to Kelly beyond any
doubt whatever.

When Mrs. Brennan, the principal, contracted with Crosby, that
act of itself stripped her agent, if she had one, of all power to make
another contract in derogation of that entered into by his principal.
The agent could have no greater authority than the principal, and,
the latter having disposed of the subject-matter
of the agency, the
power of the agent to act any further in the premises was at once
ended. When Giltinan, as agent for Mrs. Brennan, undertook to deal
with Kelly, the lol had already been sold by Mrs. Brennan, and partly
paid for, and consequently this later transaction was of no force.

The complainant's charge againsl the defendant Crosby is that he,
knowing of the complainant's previous purchase, entered into a pretended contract on the following day to buy the property from Mrs.
Brennan; and her prayer is that her contract with Mrs. Brennan,
obtained as set out in the hill from Mr. Giltinan, may be specifically
enforced by a conveyance, etc., upon payment of price, etc., mortgage made, etc.
Crosby deni<
barge by his answer, and sets
uj) his own agreemenl mad.' with Mrs. Brennan by his agent Devine
as prior in point of time, and without notice of any agreement
of
complainant.
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1

Flic issue presented between these parties is, thai, simply and only
Crosby, after complainant had obtained her agreement, and
having knowledge of this fact, secured another Erom Mrs. Brennan
in favor of himself.
The complainant thus bases her whole complaint
againsl Crosby solely upon her alleged priority in securing her own
contract.
The review of the evidence above given shows that the
agreement which Devine, Crosby's agent, procured Eor him in Philadelphia was in tact made before the contract between Kelly and Mr.
Giltinan in Atlantic City, though on the same daw The supplemental
and fuller agreement with Crosby was signed by him on the same
day in Atlantic City, and perfected on the following Monday in PhilaIt is also shown that the Kelly contract,
delphia by Mrs. Brennan.
by reason of the lack of authority of Mr. Giltinan at the time of
making it to bind Mrs. Brennan, is of no force to enable the complainant to maintain her bill and entitle her to the relief she asks
against either defendant.
I will advise a decree dismissing- the complainant's bill, with costs.
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whether

GILBERT
(Supreme

v.

HOLMES.

Court of Illinois,

1871.

G4

111. 548.)

Bill by Holmes to foreclose an instrument in the nature of a mortgage on account of a condition broken and forfeiture of the estate, and
to redeem what was alleged to be a senior mortgage.
One Preschbaker, the owner of the lands in question, in 1850 gave an absolute
deed of them to Feaman and Gilbert, and received back a bond for
the reconveyance of the land upon his paying to them, within 2 years,
$3,000.
Preschbaker
The deed and bond were at once recorded.
In 1858 Holmes seabandoned the lands and went to California.
cured from Preschbaker a letter of attorney authorizing him to redeem
the lands, by suit or otherwise, in Preschbaker's
name, the latter giving
bond in penalty of $5,000 to convey to Holmes one-half of all lands
The same
he might recover.
These instruments were not recorded.
year Holmes began suit, which was decided adversely to him in the
Circuit Court. Holmes said nothing as to an appeal or suing out a
writ of error. In 1861 one Morrison bought the lands, and in 1863
Holmes prosecuted a writ of error to the above decree out of the
Supreme Court, wherein the decree of the Circuit Court was reversed
on the ground that Preschbaker's
deed, being intended as security,
In January, 1864, Holmes promust be regarded as a mortgage.
cured from Preschbaker the instrument on which this suit is brought,
viz., a conveyance of the lands subject to become void if Preschbaker
In September, 1864,
should keep his original agreement with Holmes.
Preschbaker for $2,500 quitclaimed the lands to Gilbert, and authorized
Gilbert to dismiss the suit instituted by Holmes in Preschbaker's name.
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The suit was dismissed, and Holmes now files this suit in his own name.
McAllister, J. 27 [After stating the facts and holding that
Holmes's power of attorney and mortgage so called were merely cham* * * But there is still another view, which,
pertous contracts:]
if we are correct in regard to it, will show that, upon strict principles
of law, there is no foundation for his suit.
It is an indispensable prerequisite to the right of Holmes to a foreclosure under his deed in the nature of a mortgage, as his counsel
characterizes the instrument, that there should be a breach of condition, which would operate to work a forfeiture and make the estate
This proposition, we apprehend, cannot be successfully controverted.
Then, upon any fair construction of the terms contained in the condition, what would constitute such a breach?
The covenant, the performance of which that instrument was intended to secure, was, that Preschbaker would convey by valid deed to
Holmes one-half of all of said lands, which Holmes might redeem or
recover to Preschbaker by virtue of the power of attorney, when the
same should be so redeemed or recovered.
I ntil Holmes exercised the power given by the letter of attorney,
and by its exercise redeemed or recovered some portion of the lands
to Preschbaker, the latter was under no duty or obligation to convey
to the former, for, until then, Holmes was entitled to no interest in
the lands.

it,

There is no ground for the pretense that Holmes, at the time he commenced suit for foreclosure, had redeemed or recovered any portion
of the land by virtue of the power of attorney or otherwise.
There was no covenant or stipulation contained in any of the instruments given by Preschbaker to Holmes that the power should be
If, therefore, there was nothing in its nature which
irrevocable.
would render it irrevocable, Preschbaker was at liberty to revoke it
at his will and pleasure, and if so, the exercise of that right could not
constitute a breach of the condition contained in the deed of January
6, 181
The letter of attorney was not given to secure money loaned, and
was not. by its term-, irrevocable, or made so by the terms of either
of the other writings.
It was not a power coupled with an interest;

is

a

in

I

ise, by
and the contemporaneous agreement,
tolmes was simply
tin- proceeds arising from the execution of the
to have an interest
power.
The case of Bonney v. Smith, 17 111. 531,
direct authority For

of

pinion

i--

':>

t!

i

by

6,

by

holding the power, in the case at bar, to be revocable at the will of the
tin- deed of January
principal.
Nor was this quality changed
That was given merel) to secure the performance
1864.
Preschbaker of the original bargain to convey one half the lands which
rt
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absolute.

omitted.
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(Part

1

Holmes mighl redeem or recover, to the former, by virtue of the letter of attorney, leaving it to the volition oi Holmes to aet under the
By this writing no new
power, ami oi Preschbaker to continue it.
terms were a. hied to the original bargain; the power was not annexed
It was not
to the otate. nor was the estate auxiliary to its exercise.
and it remained the same
a power coupled with an interest before,
after that deed was made.
in Holmes to do
It was originally a mere common law authority
certain acts for and in the name of his principal, and the i\w\, without superadding any new terms, is given solely with reference to this
listing transaction, and to secure to Holmes the fruits arising
from the exercise of the power, if he should choose to exercise it.
The exercise of the power hy him was an indispensable condition
precedent to the estate ever becoming absolute in him.
With these several instruments before him, would any good lawyer
contend that Holmes could exercise the power conferred by that
letter of attorney in his own name, or that he had an interest which
he could convey to a third person, and the assignee exercise the power
in his own name? Yet all these consequences would follow, if Holmes
had a power coupled with an interest, as that term is understood from
tlte hooks.
Strother v. Law, 54 111. 413.
"A power, coupled with an interest, must create an interest in the
thing itself upon which the power is to operate. The power and estate
must be united, or be co-existent, and this class of powers survive the
Bonney
principal, and may be executed in the name of the attorney."
v. Smith, supra, and authorities there cited.
By the express terms of the condition, the lands must have been
recovered to Preschbaker before he was under any obligation to convey any part to Holmes, and everything was to be done in Preschbaker 's name.
What is there in the terms, or legal effect of these writings, between
Preschbaker, the principal, and Holmes, the agent, to tie the hands of
the principal so as to prevent him from parting with the subject-matter of the agency ?
Counsel for Holmes has failed to point out anything, and we can
That being the case, then, when Preschperceive nothing of the kind.
baker, as principal, assumed to act in that behalf, and sold and conveyed his equity of redemption to Gilbert for a valuable consideration,
thus parting with all his right in or control over the subject-matter of
the agency, this was such a termination of his own authority, as, by
operation of law, terminated that of the agent also.
This doctrine is also forcibly stated by Story, in his work on Agency,
: "A revocation, by operation of law, may be, by a change of con481
§
dition, or of state, producing an incapacity of either party.
This proceeds upon a general rule of law, that the derivative authority expires
with the original authority from which it proceeds.
The power of
constituting an agent is founded upon the right of the principal to do
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the business himself; and when that right ceases, the right of creating an appointment, or continuing the appointment of an agent already
made, for the same purpose, must cease also. In short, the derivative
authority can not, generally, mount higher, or exist longer, than the

a

;

a

a

a

it

Decree reversed.

of

(H) Notice
.

v.

(Court of King's Bench

at

Nisi

the

Revocation

HARRISON.
Prlus,

L699.

28
12

Modern,

34G.)

A

it,

a

if

in

a

is

servant had power to draw bills of exchange in his master's
turned out of the service.
name, and afterwards
Hon, Chief Justice, if he draw
so little time after thai
bill
he
out
of service, or
notice
of
his
take
being
world
cannot
the
so
secret
that
the
service,
thai
bul
kepi
his
of
were
long time oul
the bill in those cases shall hind the
world cannot take notice of
mast

r.

i

1
1
**
-

it

S

Id

Morgan v. Stell,
Bin. 305 (1812)
This case was Quoted with approval
\v:;s held thai
to notice applies t<>sales of land
same rule
In which
No
Holl and the civil law (Pothler on Obligations,
by an agenl thai Lord
18) applied to the sale ol pei sonal effi
,
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a

a

;

a

it

is

is

a

is,

original authority."
that the conveyance in the nature of
A summary of this view
suit to
virtually
the foundation of this suit, and
mortgage
foreclose that mortgage and redeem from an alleged prior one that,
breach of the condition —
in order to such foreclosure, there must be
breach could
forfeiture of the estate to the mortgagee that such
in mortaction
redeemed,
or,
by
only occur after the mortgagee had
thereof,
to the
portion
lands,
or
some
gagor's name, recovered the
the
that
power
thereby
attorney;
of
the
virtue
of
power
mortgagor by
given was not coupled with an interest, nor was the principal restrained, by anything in the writings, from doing the business himself,
or disposing of the subject-matter of the agency, or, in other words,
from revoking the power; that, by the sale and conveyance of the
lands, the subject-matter of the agency, the principal terminated his
own authority or control over it; that such exercise and termination
legal right in the prinof his own authority being but the exercise of
good title to Gilbert as against Holmes, the agent, and
cipal,
gave
revocation of the derivative authority of the latter, so
operated as
that there was no breach of the condition contained in the so-called
mortgage, and consequently, no forfeiture of the estate to Holmes.
We are, therefore, of opinion that the decree of the circuit court
should be reversed and the bill dismissed.
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(Supreme

Court

'MIS

of Judicature

RELATION

(Part

1

ads.
of New York, L839.

10 Wend.

641.)

by defendant to set aside report of referees, on the ground
neither a replication to a plea of payment, or a notice 0/ hearing
had been served. The defendant, who is an attorney, defends in person.
Pending the suit he appointed a new law agent in Albany, without notice to the first agent that Ins services were no longer required.
The plaintiff's attorne) not being informed of the change, continued
of the
to serve papers on the old agent, who being also ignorant
others,
usual,
and
as
among
change, received and forwarded papers

Motion
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that

These pateceived the replication and notice of hearing in question.
defendant.
the
reach
not
did
per-, though forwarded
Bronson, I. Parties are not bound to search the agency book
When these proceedings were comevery time they serve a paper.
menced. Mr. Dean was the defendant's law agent, and the plaintiff's
attorney was regular in continuing to serve papers upon him, so long
If the defendant had advised Mr. Dean that
as he acted as agent.
he had appointed a new agent and no longer desired his services, Mr.
Dean would not have received the papers, and would have told the
plaintiff's attorney of the change. The accident which has happened
But he swears to merits,
is chargeable to the defendant's own neglect.
and must be relieved on payment of costs.
Ordered accordingly.

BURCH
(Supreme

v.

AMERICUS GROCERY CO.

Court of Georgia,

1906.

125

Ga. 153,

53

S.

E.

1008.)

Evans, J.
The Americus Grocery Company sued J. B. Burch
The only item in
for a balance alleged to be due on open account.
dispute was one of May 8, 1903, for a certain quantity of tobacco.
The defendant contended that this item was purchased by his clerk.
Mike Burch, after he had left his employment, and that he neither
On
authorized nor ratified the purchase nor received the tobacco.
the
general
the other hand, the plaintiff insisted that Mike Burch was
agent of the defendant in the management of his store, and as such,
on previous occasions, had ordered goods of plaintiff on defendant's
account, and that the plaintiff, without notice that Mike Burch was
29

no longer employed by the defendant, took the order in the defendant's name and shipped the goods to the defendant, as was usual in
On the trial it appeared that the defendant opthe past transactions.
erated a sawmill and in connection therewith conducted a store or comThe commissary was in the charge of Mike Burch, who
missary.
purchased all the merchandise therein sold and managed the business.
29

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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On former occasions, the plaintiff had sold merchandise to the defendant upon the order of his agent, Mike Burch.
When the merchandise, to recover the price of which the present
action was brought, was ordered of the plaintiff by Mike Burch, he
was not in the employment of the defendant, and had not been for
two months past.
Neither the plaintiff company nor its "drummer"
was aware at the time of receiving the order that Mike Burch was no
The plaintiff's salesman called
longer in the service of the defendant.
at the commissary of the defendant and asked for Mike Burch, as
he had always done, and was informed that Mike Burch was about
three miles away, superintending
the putting down of a sawmill.
There he found him and took the order for the merchandise.
It was
shipped to the defendant and the bill of lading was mailed to him.
The defendant testified that the goods were never received by him, but
were taken possession of by Mike Burch without his knowledge, and
that he never received the bill of lading for the goods.
Upon these
facts the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the value
of the goods, which verdict the trial judge refused to set aside on
motion for a new trial.
1. In the management of the business of the commissary, the agent,
Mike Burch, had general powers.
Relatively to this business, he was
the general agent of the defendant in the purchase of merchandise.
"Whenever a general agency has been established for any purpose, all
persons who have dealt with such agent, or who have known of the
agency and are apt to deal with him, have a right to presume that such
authority will continue until it is shown to have been terminated in
one way or another; and they also have a right to anticipate that
if the principal revokes such authority, they will be given due notice
thereof.
It is a general rule of law. therefore, upon which there seems
to be no conflict of authorities, that all acts of a general agent within
the scope of his authority, as respects third persons, will be binding
on the principal, even though dune after revocation, unless notice
of such revocation has been given to those persons who have had dealings with and who are apt to have other dealings with the agent upon
,: "
1 Clark- & Skyles on Agency,
the strength of his former authority."
»o Accord:
insurance Co.
Claflln v. Lenbeim, 66 N. v.

v. McCain,
96 0. s. 84, 24 L. Ed. 653 (1877);
McNellly v. Continental
301 (1876);
Life It ,
Co., 66 N. V. 23 (1876), cited in Stevens v. Schroeder,
10 App. Div. 590, 58
X. V. Supp. 52 (1899); Ulrlcb v. McCormick,
66 Ind. 243 (1879).
Notifying the agent, but leaving In his bands a written power, will no!
protect the principal as to third persons relying on the power and having no
Beard v. Kirk, n x. II. ::!it (1840).
notice of Hm- revocation.
And the same
result follows when the agent h.^ bad general employment.
Tier v. Lamp1
in WilliamB \. Birheck,
son, 36 vi. IT .". B2 Am. Dec. 634 (1862).
Hoffman,
(1840), may !"• found ;i useful Burvey of the curly cases, especially
Ch. •':•">'.»
■
< sufficient notice, from which
as to what constitutes
the Court deduces the

rule thai c\.t.\ case must stand on Its peculiar facta t" show whether the
third person knew of the revocation, and "whatever i- sufficient t>' put bim
upon inquiry Is equivalent n> :i <■
r 11.*11 notice."
in Perrlne v. Jermyn, 163 Pa. i;»7. 30 Atl. 202 (1894), It is said that no
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256
§

173
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(Tart

1

This rule was stated and applied in Thompson v. Douglass,

The obligation resting upon the principal of giving notice of the
tion of the authority conferred upon his agenl has been analoto the duty which the law imposes upon the members of a part-

nership to give due notice of its dissolution to creditors and the pubClatlin v. Lenheim, 66 N. Y. 301 ; 1 Parsons on Contracts
Where there is no attempt at all to comand citations.
72.
I'd.)
(9th
ply with this duty, a retiring partner is to be held liable for the debts
oi the partnership, created after he ceased to be a member thereof,
unless ho shows that notice of his retirement had been brought home
Ewing v.
to the persons who suhsequently became its creditors.
434, and
48
E.
Ga.
S.
1064,
120
Ruohs,
v.
Trippe. 73 Ga. 776; Pyron
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he at large.'

cit. Actual notice alone will affect creditors of the firm. Askew v. Silman. 95 Ga. 678, 22 S. E. 573; Camp v. Southern Banking Co., 97
And like notice must be shown before one
Ga. 582, 25 S. E. 362.
who has revoked the authority conferred upon his general agent will
be at liberty, relatively to persons who have dealt with such agent upon
the faith of his authority as recognized by his principal in the past,
to repudiate a contract made in behalf of the principal by the agent
Braswell v. Insurance Co., 75
after his authority has been revoked.
X. C. 8; 1 Parsons on Contracts (9th Ed.) 71. The term "actual notice" is intended to be understood in its strictly legal, technical sense,
and is not to be confounded with actual knowledge, which, as was
pointed out in Clarke v. Ingram, 107 Ga. 570, 33 S. E. 802, is by no
means a synonymous or interchangeable term. "Notice is actual when
one either has knowledge of a fact or is conscious of having the means

It may be either "exalthough he may not use them."
communicated by
notice";
notice
"implied
or
notice,"
simply
press
direct and positive information from persons cognizant of the fact, or
notice such as "arises when the party to be charged is shown to have
had knowledge of such facts and circumstances as would lead him,
by the exercise of due diligence, to a knowledge of the principal fact."

of knowledge,

Id.

571.

the present case no express notice was shown, and the controlling
issue was whether or not the plaintiff had "implied notice" that there
had been a revocation of the agency, within the meaning of Civ. Code
:
. § 3933, which declares that: "Notice sufficient to excite attention and put a party on inquiry is notice of everything to which it is
afterwards found such inquiry might have led. Ignorance of a fact,

In

tice of the revocation of an agency may be shown by written or oral comand a course of dealing incomto the agent, or by circumstances
municatioii
patible with the want of it. If the evidence is conflicting the jury must decide.
In a special agency, under authority to do a single act, no notice of revocation is necessary, and a revocation will be implied from a disposition of the
Donnan v. Adams, 30 Tex. Civ. App. G15, 71
of the agency.
subject-matter
8. W. 580 (1902).
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a

by

E.

(
>7

in

a

a

a

;

if

it

is

it

is

a

it

a

it,

due to negligence, is equivalent to knowledge in fixing the rights of
The only circumstance upon which the defendant could rely
parties."
as suggesting the necessity of making inquiry whether the agency had
been terminated was that the order for the goods was given to the
plaintiff's salesman three miles from the defendant's store, where the
The defendant was engaged in the sawagent had been employed.
mill business, and his '"commissary" was run in connection with that
business, as an adjunct to
and not as
wholly independent enterWhen the order for the goods was taken, Mike Burch, who
prise.
still assumed to act as the defendant's agent, was superintending the
sawmill.
erection of
That
did not belong to the defendant or was
not to be used in connection with his business was not self-apparent,
nor was the fact that Mike Burch was not at the time engaged in
his customary duties at the commissary calculated to put the plaintiff's
salesman on notice that he had left the service of the defendant.
Moreover, the salesman had first driven by the store of the defendant and inquired for Mike Burch, who had theretofore been in
charge of it. Instead of being notified that Mike Burch was no longer
in the defendant's employ, the salesman was told where Mike Burch
could be found.
Under these circumstances
not strange that the
salesman should assume that the employes at the store of the defendant understood that he had called on business, as theretofore, and
wished to see the defendant's representative, nor
remarkable that,
after being informed as to his whereabouts but given no intimation
that he was no longer the defendant's agent, the drummer should entertain no doubt as to the continuance of the general agency. The
jury, after considering all the facts and circumstances brought to
light at the trial, found against the contention of the defendant that
due caution and prudence on the part of the plaintiff's drummer ought
to have suggested to him the propriety of making inquiry,
he did
not divine the truth.
The burden of proof was upon the defendant to establish his defense that the plaintiff was affected with implied notice.
McLean v.
Camak, 97 Ga. 812, 813, 25 S. E. 493
English-Am. Loan Co. v. Hiers,
The plaintiff being
112 Ga. 823, 38 S. E. 103.
creditor of the defendant and having had numerous business transactions with his acformal notification from him
credited agent was entitled in receive
of the termination of the agency, or the legal equivalent <>f such
The plaintiff could not in good faith remain passiv<
notification.
hi- legal duty t<> take active measun
long as the defendant failed
v.
362.
to impart notice.
Ga. 586, -'5 S.
Camp
Banking Co.,
the act of
"If one of two innocent parties must suffer
third
in
tuning to ad a- an agent of one of them, "lie who put
power of such third party to do the wrongful act musl suffer the
who would he
lather than the oilier inn
victim with
Tl
out any fault on
Blaisdell v. Bohr, 77 Ga. 382.
'

I

-17

a

ty

the

I
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r< lU rt

v.

of Wisconsin,

*

*

*

it

a

a

KELLY

PHELPS.

1883.

57

Wis.

425,

15 N.

W.

3S5.)

J.

a

Action by an agent for commissions on sales of wood for the prinThe first commission to the agent was modified by later letcipal.
ters, and defendant testified that on March 31st he revoked the auwritten conThis plaintiff denies. On April 11th he made
thority.
tract for the sale of the last of the wood.
Lyon,
The authority to the plaintiff to sell the defendant's

is

if

&

it
is

it

is

is

It

is

found in the letter of the defendant of February 13th, the
The testimony tends
price being modified by the letter of March 2d.
to show that plaintiff made contracts for the sale of 500 cords before
any further modification of plaintiff's authority was attempted.
contended on behalf of the defendant that the letter of March 26th
required the plaintiff to sell all of the wood in one lot, and consequently deprived him of authority to dispose of the same in parcels.
could have no effect upon sales made before that letso,
that
claimed that
ter was received. The previous letters, under wdiich
Co. and Billings, contained no such
the 500 cords were sold to Case
he made those sales,
riction upon the power of the plaintiff, and
But we do not
entitled to his commission thereon.
as he claims, he
wood

If
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is

a

a

it

J.,

fendant was admittedly at fault, having failed to take any steps to
give notice to the plaintiff, whereas the plaintiff had not omitted to
perform any legal duty owing to the defendant, and the plaintiff's
drummer admittedl) acted in entire good faith.
The jury took the view that the plaintiff should not be called on
"In this there is no hardship upon the defendant,"
to suffer the loss.
in Claflin v. Lenheim, supra, who
as was pointed out by Rapallo,
was
the defendant's duty, "after he had accredited his
added that
for
series of years as authorized to deal in his name and on
brother
when lie terminated that authority, to notify all
his responsibility,
parties who had been in the habit of dealing with his agent, as the
This was an act easily perplaintiffs had been to his knowledge.
formed, and would have been
perfect protection to him and prevented the plaintiffs from being deceived.
Justice to parties dealing
with agents requires that the rule requiring notice in such cases should
not be departed from on slight grounds, or dubious or equivocal cirIf notice was not in fact
cumstances substituted in place of notice.
attributable to his neggiven, and loss happens to the defendant,
The verdict of the
most usual and necessary precaution."
lect of
jury appears to be in accord both with the strict law and the common
should not be set aside unless the court
iustice of the case, and
below committed some error which was obviously calculated to bring
result which would not otherwise have been probable.
about
Judgment affirmed.
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think the letter of March 26th admits of the construction contended
for. We think the fair and reasonable construction of it is that the
dry and green wood should be sold together in such proportions that
The dry
the whole of the wood should be sold at the specified prices.
wood being the most valuable and finding a readier sale, would, if
This, we think, is
sold with it, facilitate the sale of the green wood.
the plain and obvious meaning of the letter of March 26th.
If the plaintiff produced customers ready and willing to purchase
the wood at the specified prices before revocation of his authority, he
is entitled to his commissions on the amount those customers would
To
have taken, although the defendant refused to deliver the wood.
entitle him to his commission we do not think it essential that the
plaintiff should have entered into written contracts for the defendant
with such customers in order to bind them under the statute of frauds.
It is sufficient if the customers were ready and willing to perform their
verbal contract with the plaintiff to purchase the wood.
It was substantially so held in the late case of O'Connor v. Semple, 57 Wis.
243, 15 N. W. 136.
Thus far our views seem to accord with those of the learned circuit
But he gave one injudge, expressed in his instructions to the jury.
struction which we think erroneous.
It is in these words: "If the
defendant revoked the agency of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff, notwithstanding such revocation, went on and completed the sale of the
wood, and immediately thereafter notified the defendant thereof, the
defendant was bound to give the plaintiff notice of his dissent within
a reasonable time thereafter; otherwise he must be held to have acquiesced in and ratified the acts of the plaintiff, and will be liable for
his commissions.
Such dissent on the part of the defendant must
have been clear and positive." This instruction applies the rule of
law which binds the principal, in certain ca
a third person for
the acts of a former agent, whi
cy has been revoked, to a conbetween the principal and such former agent. 8J
If. ■.lin-:
ation, the former agent enter into a contract for the principal,
within the scope of his original authority, with one who had dealt with
the agent as such before the revocation, and who makes the contract
in good faith, without notice of the revocation, the principal
will he
hound to such third party, or at least he will he hound unless he
promptly repudiates the act of his former agent. The rule i
in Jonee v. Hodgklns,
63 Me.
184 (1872),
Story on Agency, >; 170, is
quoted to tin- effecl thai :>- to the agenl the revocation takes effect i
i the
time when it is made known to him; ;is in third persons when it i- made
them,
it' known to
known i"
asl bis principal hi- rights*
are gone, though in- may still ;is to third persons who are Ignoraul of the
revocation bind both blmself and ii is principal. This statemenl Is approved
in Capen v. Pacific Mutual ins. i
i v .1. Law, 67, »;i Am. Dec.
112
■ > (1852).
v. si. Louis Marine Ry. & Dock <'■>..17 Mi
(1855), and Lamothe
The revocation i operative from the time whin it becomes known to the
agent;
by mall, not from the time of the dispatch ol th<
If notlci
ter, bul i'
'ii't by the agent. Robertson v. Cloud, 17 Miss. 208 (1S72).
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1

the good faith of the person so dealing with the former
holds
the principal
to liability or to the duty of prompt
agent, and
action, because he had given credit to his agent by appointing him, and
thus put it in the power of the latter to commit the fraud.
l'ut when it comes to a transaction between the principal and the
former agent, the reason of the rule utterly fails, and the rule has
no application.
Should a stranger, without authority, assume to act
as the agent of another, it would he intolerable if such other would
lie hound to compensate the interloper for his services unless he gave
the latter "notice of his dissent within a reasonable time thereafter."
The law imposes no such obligation upon business men in respect to
the dethose who, without authority, interfere in their affairs.
fendant revoke the authority of the plaintiff to sell wood for him, such
revocation was a perpetual notice to the plaintiff that he dissented
from each and every act of assumed agency, and as to him no other
The jury may have found the revocanotice of dissent is required.
the plaintiff would be entitled
tion, and still, under the instruction,
to recover commissions on the wood thereafter sold, because the deThis is error.
fendant did not dissent when notified of the sale.
We think the record discloses another error, also fatal to the judgment. The plaintiff testified to an express contract that his commission on sales should be 5 per cent. This was substantially denied by
the jury believed the testimony of defendant, the
the defendant.
In this aspect of the case the derecovery would be quantum meruit.
fendant offered competent testimony of the customary commissions in
procuring sales of wood. The testimony was rejected. It should have
been admitted, to enable the jury to determine the amount of the

tircly upon
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If

If

recovery in case they found there was no express agreement as to
commissions.
Other errors are assigned and have been argued by the respective
counsel. It is not deemed necessary to consider them. The judgment
of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause will be remanded for
a new

trial.

III.

Abandonment by the Agent

(A) Power
ELSEE
(Court of King's Bench,

1793.

v.

to Renounce

GATWARD.
5

Term R.

143,

101

Eng. Repr.

82.)

This was an action upon the case. The first count in the declaration
stated that the plaintiffs on the 29th of August 1791 were about to
build a warehouse &c. and to rebuild and repair certain parts of a
dwelling house and stables &c. and were desirous of having the warehouse completely tiled and covered in, and the front of the dwelling

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Ch. 5)

TERMINATION

OF

THE RELATION

2G1

house rebuilt, on or before the first of November then next, and also
of having the bricklayers' and carpenters' works of the warehouse
completely finished on or before the first of December, and the whole
of the remaining repairs finished on or before the 25th December
then next, and thereupon the plaintiffs on the 29th of August 1791 at
the special instance and request of the defendant, who was a builder,
and had full notice of the premises, retained and employed the defendant to do and perform all and singular the bricklayers' and carpenters' works which should be requisite on the occasion aforesaid
within the several times herein before mentioned for the completion
thereof respectively; and although the defendant afterwards accepted
of such retainer and employment upon the terms aforesaid, and could
and ought to have completed all such bricklayers' and carpenters'
works within the said respective times, yet the defendant contriving to
injure the plaintiffs &c. did not, nor would, completely tile or otherwise
cover in the said warehouse &c. on or before the said first of November, nor did nor would finish the bricklayers' and carpenters' works
of the warehouse on or before the said 1st day of December, and the
whole of the remaining repairs on or before the said 25th of December
&c. but on the contrary permitted the said warehouse to continue untiled and uncovered &c. in consequence of which said neglect of the defendant the walls of the said premises were greatly sapped and rotted,
and the ceilings damaged and spoiled, and the plaintiffs were obliged to
continue tenants of another warehouse and stables &c. and were thereby put to additional expence &c. The second count stated that the
plaintiffs on the 29th of August 1791, being possessed of divers old
materials of buildings, retained and employed the defendant at his
instance and request to do and perform certain bricklayers' and carpenters' works upon divers buildings and premises of them the plaintiffs, and to use and apply in and about those works all such parts of
the old materials as were fit and proper for that purpose, and that
although divers parts of the said old materials were fit and proper to
have been used and applied in and about the said works, yet the defendant, contriving to injure the plaintiffs in this behalf, and to enhance the expence of the bricklayers' and carpenters' works, did not
nor would use and apply in and about the said works such parts of
the old materials as were fit Sec. but refused so to do, and wrongfully
and injuriously used and applied in and about the same works other
new and expen ive mat< i ials in the stead of such old materials as were
fit and proper for the same pui
vhereby the plaintiffs were put
to an uni
ry expence &c. and the old materials became whollj
n ele c.
There was a third count in trover for the old materials.
The defendant demurred to the two firsl counts; alleging for ca
that, notwithstanding
the whole of the suppo ed causes of action in
those counts were in the nature of a nonfeazance, and consisted in the
of certain matters and things in those counts men
non-performance
d as having been omitted to 1"' done by the defendant, it was nol

'ii

_»'.!»

11:
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I

a

it

a

it,

a

in

4,

2

it

is

;

a

is,

two counts demurred to.
Lord Ki:\Yo\. Ch. J. If this had been an action of assumpsit, it
could not have been supported for want of a consideration ; it would
And if both the counts be not good, the
have been nudum pactum.
Now I do not think that the first
defendant is entitled to judgment.
It states that the defendant,
count in the declaration is good in law.
who is a carpenter, was retained by the plaintiffs to build and to repair certain houses ; but it is not stated that be was to receive any
leration, or that be entered upon his work. No consideration resuits from his situation as a carpenter, nor from the undertaking : nor
i- he hound to perform all the work that is tendered to him ; and therefalsethat the defendant has merely told
the amount of this
hood, and has not performed his promise but for his non-performance
warranted by Lord Holt's
This
of
no action can be supported.
Ld. Raym. 919, where recognizing the
opinion in Coggs v. Bernard,
11 II.
33, he said — "There the action was brought against
house withcarpenter, for that he had undertaken to build the plaintiff
time, and had not done
and
was adjudged the action
in such

I

is

a

a

;

if

ly

I

think may safely rely, especialwould not lie." And on this opinion
as the justice of the case will not be altered by the form of the acno technical
case, there
tion for
assumpsit will not lie in such
In
for
an
action
as
tort.
that case
such
will
support
reasoning that
'ov, ell. J., said — "An action will not lie for not doing the thing for want
the bailee will take the goods into
of
sufficient consideration; but
i.i- custody, he shrill he answerable for them for the taking of the goods
'.us custody
his own act."
Lord Holt there put several cases
to establish this position, which will reconcile the cases now cited on the
T. R. 274, the defendant
part of the plaintiffs. In Brown v. Dixon,
1

is

;

a

if

I

is

very distinguisheceived the dog into his possession. This case
able from those of common carriers and porters, from whose situations
duties result; they are bound by law to carry goods delivered
recompence but no such duty
to them, and are by law entitled to
not hound, as such, to
ion of
carpenter; he
results from
appears to me, therebrought to him.
perform all the work that
that the first count cannot he upported, there being no consid;

is

It

is

tl

a

a

in

:
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stated in either of those counts, nor did it thereby appear thai the defendant by any promise undertaking contract or agreemenl was hound
to the performance
of those several matters or things &c. That, although the several supposed causes of action in those counts were
led upon implied contracts in law, no sufficient ground or considThat
eration to raise or support such implied contracts was stated.
there was not staled, nor did it appear, in those counts that there was
any promise or contract on the part of the defendant, upon which the
And that those counts did not
breaches in those count- could operate.
defendant &C.
The parlies
the
contain any cause of action against
on
the count
for
defendant
the
when
a
went to trial,
verdict was given
in trover, and conditional damages assessed for the plaintiffs on the
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eration expressly stated, nor any consideration resulting from the defendant's employment as a carpenter; though, had the defendant performed the work, he might have recovered a satisfaction on a quantum
meruit.
Upon the authority of Coggs v. Bernard, and the cases there
noticed, not contradicted by any other decision, I think that the first
count for nonfeazance is bad, but that the second count may be supIt is there stated that the defendant entered upon his employported.
ment, and that he did not do that which he ought to have performed
In that count it is stated that he underaccording to his retainer.
took to use the old materials, that in fact he did not use those, but substituted new ones in their stead, thereby enhancing the expence to the
plaintiffs. This comes within the case mentioned by Lord Holt in
Coggs v. Bernard, speaking of the same case in the year-books, "but
there the question is put to the Court, what if he had built the house
unskillfully : and it was agreed in that case an action would have lain :"
for though the defendant could not have been compelled to build this
house, and to use the old materials, yet having entered upon the contract, he was bound to perform it; and not having performed it in the
manner proposed, an action lies against him. 32

SECURITY TRUST
(Supreme

&

LIFE INS.

Court of Wisconsin,

1900.

129

CO. v.
Wis.

ELLSWORTH.

349,

109

Action to foreclose

N. W. 125.)

a mortgage given to secure a note, made as part
between plaintiff company and defendant, by which defendant became the general agenl of plaintiff company.
The note was
to be paid out of commissions and renewals to be earned by the agents,
and represented money advanced to the agent and used by him to
build up the business.
Not being successful he resigned, and this suit
is now brought to collect the note.
Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals.
Kt.kwix, J. 33 [After holding that the agreement was that the
mortgage debt should he paid out of renewals only, and that no de* * 2. It is fur*
mand was to he made in excess of renewals:]
ther contended by counsel i'>v respondenl thai the withdrawal from the
agency of Henry Ellsworth and hi- son inn it oul of their power t<>
pay the debt provided in tin- contract, hence the debt became payable
in the usual way. This involves tin- question of the right of the agenl
to resign, and whether or nol if such right existed it was reasonably
ised.
Both contracts of agency are silent as t,> the time they
should remain in force, and both recognize the right of resignation by
providing, "in case of the resignation or removal of the said agents,
the said company may, and it is hereby authorized and empowered to

of

a contract

82Tin' opinions
I'

of Aahhurel and Grose,
opinion i
Itted.

JJ.,

are omitted.

THl
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1

such subordinate agents any commissions or oilier remuneration
which said agents shall have agreed to pay such subordinate agents
and to offset against all claims under this contract such commissions or
The general rule is that where there is
other remuneration so paid."
no express or implied covenant to the contrary, the agent may resign

pay

at any time.

34

Median

on Agency,

§

233.

J., summarized
m in Duffield v. Michaels
(0. 0.) 97 Fed. 825 (1899) Jackson,
the rule: "It is a well settled principle of law that an agent may withdraw
from the service of his principal at tils pleasure, though he might bo liable
in some Instances to damages for the violation of a contract. If any existed.
* But it is an equally well settled principle of
*
*
Bish. Cont par. 1050.
law that an agenl may on account of tbe principal's wrongful conduct be
Cody v.
justified in abandoning ins contract and repudiating the agency."
Raynaud, i Colo. 272 (1871); Bishop v. Ranney, 59 Vt. 316, 7 Atl. 820 (1887);
Newcoiub v. Iusurauce Co. (C. C.)
t Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 1110;
51 Fed.
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In f.
Districl

725 (1892).
S. v. .larvis.

12Ware (Dav. 274) 278, Fed. Cas. No.
Judge, thus puts the law: "There is no doubt,

15,468
as a

(1846),

m
Ware,

general rule,
printhat the appointment of an agent may at any time be revoked by the
cipal without giving a reason for it. because it is the right of every man to
employ such agents as he sees fit. The agent also has the same general right
to renounce the agency at his own will; for it is an engagement at the will
But the contract of agency, or mandate, involves mutual
of both parties.
obligations between the parties; and these commence, if not as soon as the
appointment is made, at least as soon as the agent or mandatary commences
If he has entered on the business, even if he
the execution of the agency.
he will be enprosperously
what he has undertaken,
does not accomplish
titled, from his principal, to an indemnity for his expenses and services, if
the failure does not arise from his own fault. Dom. Lois Civiles, liv. 1, tit.
After he has engaged in the business of the agency, the
15, g 12. Nos. 1, 2.
principal may at any time revoke his powers and dismiss him from his service.
But if his power is thus revoked, the principal will be responsible to
him for any engagements he may have entered into, and any liabilities he
may have incurred in good faith, in the proper business of the agency, before
Id. § 4, No. 1. And so the agent, after
he had notice of the revocation.
But then this must be
entering on the business, may renounce the agency.
done in good faith, and be preceded by reasonable notice, or the agent will
be liable to the principal for any loss that may result to him from this cause.
The agent cannot withdraw himself from his engagement wantonly, and without reasonable cause, without rendering himself responsible for the consequences.
Id. Nos. 3, 4; Poth. Mandat. No. 44; Dig. 17, 1, 22, § 11, Id. 1,
an agency, he will not merely ren27, § 12. And when a man has undertaken
der himself liable for damages to his principal, if he renounces the agency
without notice and without just cause, but a court of equity will go further.
If an agent is employed to make a purchase, and, finding the speculation
likely to prove profitable, he renounces the agency and purchases for himself,
equity will hold him a trustee for the principal, and give him the benefit of
1
without putting him to an action for damages.
the purchase directly,
It may be true that in our jurisprudence a precise
. J-:«i. Jur. § 316.
■
riiy may not be found for all these propositions among the adjudged
But tiiey rest on such clear grounds of justice and good faith, that
they may be well taken for granted without the authority of a direct de: (Story, Ag. g 467), and they all stand approved by the authorities of
They all How from a great principle of social justice. A
!i law.
cause, retract or annul his
man cannot, wantonly and without reasonable
own acts and change his purpose, when others, in the ordinary course of
business and in good faith, have acquired an interest in them, to the injury
himself liable to repair such injury. The
CD persons, without rendering
greatest of the Roman jurisconsults reduced the rule to a short and pithy
Dig. 50, 17,
ma-rim : No man can change his will to the injury of another.
It is applied
"Nemo potest mutari consilium suum in alterius injuriam.'
75.
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It is claimed, however, by counsel for respondent that there was an
implied covenant on the part of the agents that they should not resign,
and it is insisted that this covenant arises not only out of the fact of
the existence of the indebtedness and the obligation to pay
but as
well out of the agreement on the part of the debtor implied in all such
cases not to voluntarily put an end to the conditions upon which his
of value to the creditor.
This branch of counsel's conagreement
tention, therefore, rests upon the assumption of implied covenant.
Conceding for the sake of argument that the law would impose some
obligation upon the agents not to unreasonably abandon their underthe law
reasonable construction.
taking, still such rule must have
would not
covenant for the continuance of the agency,
implied
extend beyond such time as was reasonably necessary to make an effort
Clearly, there
to successfully accomplish the purpose of the agency.
a

it

a

If

of Colorado,

(Court of Appeals

it

1S91.

v.
1

CANNON COAL CO.

*

TAGGART.
App.

Colo.

60,

27 Pac.

238.)

Defense of
Action by Taggart for $272.80, loaned the company.
denials, and counterclaim for damages due to Taggart's breach of the
contract to sell appellant's coal.
Exceptions to instructions of the
trial court.

a

|

a

t

I

^ri
\
i

I

I

I

a

in some cases where no previous engagements exist between the parties, but
it.- application is peculiarly stringent
when mutual obligations by conn-act do
exist,
'if agree with
mechanic,' says Pothier, 'to build men house, and
after the agreement
change my purpose and determine not to build,
maj
n-_r him notice of the change of my will; but
dissolve the engagement by
if before the notice lie has purchased materials for the work and engaged workmen,
shall be bound to Indemnify him for the loss he sustains by the change
of my purpose.'
Louage, No. WO; 19 Duvergier,
Contra
de
Droit Civil
Francais,
If this was case between two private persons, the case
370.
particulars from the present.
put
by Pothier would differ in no essential
J'.otb are contracts of hiring;
salaried agent or mandafor the contract with
tary
essentially
contraci of hiring, though in some respects distinguishaid. tit.
ble from the common contraci
for the hire of labor,
c. •".. The
8,

a

is

was
defendant
salaried agent, and he had. for the sole purpose of th<
and for the sole benefit of hi> principal, hired an office.
He held, ae
all agents do, the appointment
at the will of the principal, and be is disnotice, while under this liability for rent,
if the engage
missed without
to the tern
incut of \\\< offt
able and proper and in good
faith, under the circumstances, the justice of the case appears to me so clear,
that the very Btatemei
of the fact
carries with
the answer, and (hat con
principles of law."
to the well established
O.
see. also, Hitchcock
L8 Ohio Clr. Ot EL 808, at page 818,
v. Kelley,
C. D. lbO.
4

it

t

■

a
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*

*

it

ly

was no implied covenant that the agency should be continued indefinitewere otherwise,
when the continuance of
proved fruitless. If
the agents might be compelled to indefinitely continue the agency without profit to themselves or their principal.
Reversed and remanded.
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Bissell,

(Part

1

J."

it

in

a

it,

The right construction of the contract into which
The interpretathis appeal.
the parties entered will determine
\<.^\
to the giving of the instructions put on it by the trial court
It
it
which
are
was a contract for the sale
tions
complained of.
at the time of the bargain,
in
not
existence
property
of personal
to
it would be necessary
vendor,
the
and to be produced
by
decide whether such a sale carried with it an implied warranty that
The nisi prius court so regarded
the goods sold were merchantable.
merchantable quality,
and told the jury that the coal must be of
ami, should they find otherwise,
would justify the defendant
refusing to receive the coal tendered. The matter was not put on the

it

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

it

a

it

to pay for what he might
ects, chiefly relating to the obligation
In the absence of an obligation
contract of sale.
was like
order,
lacked
to order, take, or purchase any amount, definite or indefinite,
The
comof
sale.
contract
an element which always accompanies
the
send,
to
Taggart
which
might
fill
orders
to
any
pany was obliged
extent of their output, at so much per ton. The correlative promise
by Taggart was in reality the assumption of an agency to dispose,
The
as far as he might be able, of what the company might produce.
pith of the agreement, which was of advantage to the coal company,
trade for their coal, which Taggart
was the contract to work up
ied.
His compensation was in the price at which he was permitted to buy. Any breach of this agreement by Taggart without
liability enforceable
legal excuse would necessarily subject him to

by action.
The time specified in the contract for the duration of the agency
general thing, an agent may at
not essential to the liability. As
in good faith,
he must do
but
his
renounce
time
employment,
any
When once he has
and in such fashion as not to injure his principal.
without reasonable
entered on his employment, he may not renounce
cause; and, failing in this, he will render himself liable for the conU. S. v.
Lans.
478
White v. Smith,
Story, Ag.
sequences.
Ware (Dav., 274) 278, Fed. Cas. No. 15,468; Elsee v. GatJarvis,
that he shall continue
Term R. 143. When the agreement
ward,
is

5

rt

Pa

"f

the opinion

is omitted.

5
;

6

;

2

§

it

it

a

is
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a

it

it

by

a

a

a

a

right to terminate the agency, which was created by the
breach of its terms by the principal, but on
agreement, because of
sale,
This was wholly
and
rejection of the goods.
the theory of
were under,
the
which
parties
unwarranted
by the legal obligations
misled
the
have
jury.
must
and
made,
was
case
as
and
the
be said
In no sense which permits the application of that rule can
There was no sale
that the contract was one of purchase and sale.
of
specific quantity of coal, or of the output of the mine. Taggart
thousand tons
ton of coal. He might buy
was not bound to buy
What he ordered he
month, all that the mine produced, or none.
was bound to receive, and pay for at the price agreed on. In some
of
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for a definite period, and he commences to do what he has promised,
fortiori will he be liable to respond in damages if he break his en* * *
gagement without legal excuse.
a

Reversed.

y#J<.
(B)

Remedies

for

Abandonment

WM. ROGERS MFG. CO.

v.

the

Agent

ROGERS.

Court of Errors of Connecticut, 1S90.
5S Conn.
7 L. R. A. 77'.i. 18 Am. St. Rep. 27S.)

356,

20

Atl.

407.

Injunction to restrain defendant from leaving employment of plaintiffs, or engaging in otber business in violation of a contract to act
for 25 years as agent and manager of plaintiff's business. It is averred that defendant is now, after 14 years, negotiating with other persons, competitors of plaintiffs, to leave the employ of plaintiffs, and
to give to these rivals his services, and the use of his name on the
stamp of silver plated ware to be made by such rivals.
Andrews, C. J. Contracts for personal service are matters for
courts of law, and equity will not undertake a specific performance.
2 Kent, Comm. 258, note b ; Hamblin v. Dinneford, 2 Edw. Ch. 529 ;
Sanquirico v. Benedetti, 1 Barb. 315; Iiaight v. Badgeley, 15 Barb.
499; De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige, 264.
A specific performance
in such cases is said to be impossible because obedience to the decree
cannot be compelled by the ordinary processes of the court. 30 Contracts for personal acts have been regarded as the most familiar illustrations of this doctrine, since the court cannot in any direct manner
The courts in this country
compel the party to render the service.
infracts Involving the performance <>fa continuous and protracted series "f acts, "i' of acts demanding the ex< rcise <>rIndividual skill, taste, talent
or discretion, are of necessity Incapable of judicial supervision.
For in-each
b agreements the remedy Is t . . he sought in an action ai law.
Thiebaud
v. Union Furniture Co., L43 End. 340,
l_' N. E. 711 (1895); Arthur v. Oakes,
•;:; Fed 318, 11 <'. c. a. 209, 25 I.. R. A.
To enforce a contract
(1894).
in re Mary Clark,
for personal services would result in a Btate of slavery,
ill',
1 Blackf.
il' Am. lie.-. 213 (1821). To attempt to enforce a contract demanding personal confidence would make that confidence Impossible.
Bourget
v. Monroe, 58 Mich. 563, -'< V w. .mi (1885).
An early ami Interesting case
is De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti,
in this country
1 Paige, Ch. 264, 25 Am. Dec.
532 (1833), in which Chancellor Wblworth lias humorously
Bet forth the pow
of the law in realize n
Id adage thai a bird that can sing ami
will m>t must be made in sing!
He doubted thai any officer of tin' c
•(
had that perfect knowledge of tin' Italian language, or that exquisite m'hm
t" enjoj with a proper zest the i"'
bility in the auricular nerve,
collar beauties of the Italian opera.
He also doubted the effect of coercion
upon defendant's singing especially in the livelier airs, though admitting thai
fear "f that dismal cage, the debtor's prison, would deepen bis seriousness in
Kdw, Ch.
o, Hamblin
iver pari- i.r tin- drama
\. Dinneford,
chell, L67 Ala. 17.'.. ."-•_'South,
in
in Am. St. Rep. 52 (1910),
an extended note on the whole
i

■

i:

M

Is

1

It

'_'

ill

i
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and in England formerly held that they could not negatively enforce
the specific performance of such contracts by means of an injunction
Marble Co. v.
3 Wait, A.ct. & Def. 754;
lining their violation.
4 Gill, 487,
Marshall,
v.
Burton
955;
19
LO
Wall.
L.
Ed.
340,
Ripley,
45 Am. Pee. 171 ; IV Pol v. Sohlke, 30 N. Y. Super. Ct. 280; Kemble v. Kean, 6 Sim. 333; Baldwin v. Society, 9 Sim. 393; Fothergill
v.

Rowland, I.. R. 17 Eq. 132.
The courts in both countries have, however, receded somewhat from

latter conclusion, and it is now held that where a contract stipulates for special, unique, or extraordinary personal services or acts,
or where the services to be rendered are purely intellectual, or are
peculiar and individual in their character, the court will grant an
But where the services
injunction in aid of a specific performance.
or individual, the
mechanical,
or
are
not
peculiar
material
or
are
The
reason seems to
for
action
damages.
his
to
be
left
will
party
the

of the former class are of such a nature as to preclude the possibility of giving the injured party adequate compensation in damages, while the loss of services of the latter class can be
adequately compensated by an action for damages. 2 Story, Eq. Jur.
Cali3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1343;
3 Wait, Act. & Def. 754;
§ 958a;
Sewing
201
Singer
53
Cal.
;
fornia Bank v. Fresno Canal, etc., Co.,
hine Co. v. Union Button Hole Co., Holmes, 253, Fed. Cas. No.
12,904; Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 604; Railroad Co.
Montague v. Flockton, L. R.
v. Wythes,
5 De Gex, M. & G. 880;
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be that services

Eq. 189.
The contract between the defendant and the plaintiffs is made a
The services which the defendant was to perpart of the complaint.
form for the plaintiffs are not specified therein, otherwise than that
16

they were to be such as should be devolved upon him by the general
manager; "it being understood that such duties may include traveling
for said companies whenever, in the judgment of said general agent,
the interests of the business will be thereby promoted;" and also
"including such duties as traveling for said companies as said general
agent may devolve upon him, including also any duties as secretary
or other officer of either or both of said companies as said companies
These services, while they may
may desire to have him perform."
not be material and mechanical, are certainly not purely intellectual,
nor are they special, or unique, or extraordinary; nor are they so
or individual that they could not be performed by any person
If this was all there was
-dinary intelligence and fair learning.
in the contract it would be almost too plain for argument that the
plaintiffs should not have an injunction.
The plaintiffs, however, insist that the negative part of the contract, by which the defendant stipulated and agreed that he would not

peculiar

his name to be employed in any manner in any
cutlery, flatware or hollow-ware business, either as
a manufacturer or seller, fully entitles them to an injunction against

be engaged in or allow

other

hardware,
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They aver in the complaint, on information and belief,
its violation.
that the defendant is planning with certain of their competitors to
engage with them in business, with the intent and purpose of allowing
his name to be used or employed in connection with such business
as a stamp on the ware manufactured ; and they say such use would
the plaintiffs owned the
do them great and irreparable injury.
name of the defendant as a trade-mark, they could have no difficulty
in protecting their ownership; but they make no such claim, and all
arguments or analogies drawn from the law of trade-marks may be
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If

laid wholly out of the case.
There is no averment in the complaint that the plaintiffs are entitled to use, or that in fact they do use, the name of the defendant as
nor any averment
a stamp on the goods of their own manufacture,
that such use, if it exists, is of any value to them. So far as the court
name on such goods as the plaintiffs
is informed, the defendant's
manufacture is of no more value than the names of Smith or Stiles
or John Doe. There is nothing from which the court can see that
the use of the defendant's name by the plaintiffs is of any value to
them, or that its use as a stamp by their competitors would do them
any injury other than such as might grow out of a lawful business
rivalry.
by reason of extraneous facts the name of the defendant
some
have
does
special and peculiar value as a stamp on their goods,
by their rivals would
or its use as a stamp on goods manufactured
do them some special injury, such facts ought to have been set out
In the absence of any alleso that the court might pass upon them.

If

gation of such facts we must assume that none exist.
The plaintiffs also aver that the defendant intends to make known
to their rivals the knowledge of their business, of their customers, etc..
But here they have not
which he has obtained while, in their employ.
that would require
rule
shown facts which bring the case within any
secrets which he
business
an employe to be enjoined from disclosing
he has conwhich
and
his
employment,
has learned in the course of
Norfolk,
452,
96 Am.
98
Mass.
v.
Peabody
tracted not to divulge.
Dec. 664.

There is no error in the judgment of the superior court.

judges concurred.

HARLOW
(Supreme

v.

The other

,-^tt

OREGONIAN PUB. CO.

Courl of Oregon,

L904.

15 Or.

520,

7^ Pac.

737.)

Action by Harlow, as successor to the rights of one Southworth,
by injunction to restrain defendants from refusing to carrj out a
contract, making Southworth the subscription
agenl in certain ter
ritory of the defendant's paper. Suit dismissed.
,\, J. l. Assuming, for the purposes of the opinion, thai
Southworth under the
d to the t
plaintiffs have legally

the relation
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original contract, and stand in his place- and stead, entitled to all
rights and prh ileges given him by its terms, and thai it embraces all
territory claimed by them, then- are two reasons why this suit could

the
the
not

he maintained
after the repudiation of the entire contract by the Av
fendants, and the service on the plaintiffs id' notice to that effect in
June. 1902: First, the plaintiffs, if they are entitled to any relief at all,
have a full and complete remedy at law ; and, second, the remedy hy inIt could not be invoked
junction or specific performance is nol mutual.
by the defendants against the plaintiffs, as the contract is not, and never was. capable of being specifically enforced or enjoined at the suit of
The contract between
Pittock or the defendant publishing company.
Pittock and Southworth created substantially the relation of employer
and employe, and this relation continued as to those who succeeded
to Southworth's interest.
By its terms, Southworth (whom we shall
hereafter assume includes parties who have legally succeeded to his
rights), was to carry and deliver the paper to all paying subscribers
within the designated territory, to endeavor to increase its circulation, to collect subscriptions therefor, and to pay weekly for all papers
he took from the office, receiving as a compensation
for "his labor"
a certain proportion of the subscription price of the paper.
This re-

lationship was to continue until one party or the other considered a
In that event, if the parties were unable
"separation necessary."
to agree upon "a proper method of doing so," each was to appoint
one arbitrator, who, if they could not agree, should choose another,
whose decision

should be final.

There may be room for controversy as to the intent and meaning
of the arbitration clause, but it seems to us that it was intended, in
case either party should desire to terminate the contract, to provide
a simple and inexpensive
method or means by which its value to the
other could be determined, and the amount to be paid, if any, by the
one desiring the separation, ascertained.
The contract was undoubtedly thought to be advantageous to both parties at the time it was
made.
Southworth paid $350 for the sole right to carry and deliver
the papers, and to receive as a compensation therefor a certain portion of the subscription price.
This he supposed to be a valuable
right, and one which would increase largely in value, according to
his industry and diligence in extending the circulation of the paper,
and the character

of the services which

he should

render

to its pa-

trons. Pittock, on the other hand, was contracting for the future
circulation of his paper, and the collection of subscriptions therefor
in the given territory, and this he undoubtedly believed to be of value
It was to protect these rights, and to prevent the terto the paper.
mination of the contract by either without making compensation to
This, it appears
the other, that the arbitration clause was inserted.
to us, is its true intent and meaning.
We cannot think, however, that the agreement

contemplated

that
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the personal relationship between the parties should necessarily continue, against the will of either, until the amount of compensation
should be ascertained in the manner therein provided.
Either party
could terminate the contract when he considered it necessary, but, if
the parties were unable to agree as to the amount of compensation
to be paid by one to the other on account of such separation, they
were to submit that matter to arbitration, but not the right to terminate the contract.
The provision as to the duration of the contract, and the method to be employed in separation, or for determining the value in case separation should be deemed necessary, did not
prevent either party from dissolving the relation between them at any
time, subject to liability to the other for such damages as he may
have sustained if it was not done in the manner provided.
The contract created such a relationship of trust and confidence between the
parties that a court of equity will not compel a continuation thereof
against the will of either, but will leave the injured party to his relief
at law. The contract, by its terms, was subject to termination at any

time; the party desiring the termination, however, to pay its value to
the other.
If the termination or separation took place in the manner
provided, the value or amount to be paid would be ascertained and
determined by arbitrators.
If not, the party guilty of the breach
would be liable in an action at law for damages, the same as for
the breach of any other contract.
2. It follows, therefore, that whether the action of the defendant corporation in repudiating the contract and notifying the plaintiffs that
it would no longer be bound thereby be deemed a separation within
its terms, or a breach thereof, the effect was to terminate the contract; and the only question between the parties remaining for adis the amount, if any, to be paid by the defendants to the
plaintiffs on account of such separation or breach.
That question
is not cognizable by a court of equity.
An injunction to restrain the
breach of a personal contract, or one relating to personal property,
or a mandatory injunction to compel specific performance of such a
contract, will not be granted when thi
ry of damages at lawjustment

would

impending injury.
Chicago & A. R.
& W. R. Co. (C. C.) 24 Fed. 516;
Richmond v. Dubuque & Sioux City R. Co., 33 Iowa, 423; Porl
Clinton R. Co. v. Cleveland & Toledo R. Co., 13 Ohio St. 545; 26
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 17.
Indeed, the basis of equitable
interference in cas< - ol p<
rformance is a want of an adequate
Mr. Waterm
'A courl of equity will nol
ly at law.
grant relief where the complaining party will not be deprived of any
legal right by withholding it, unless he can show clearly that he is
Co.

v.

adequately redr
New York, Lak«

entitled to the

n!

Erie

t.

If the plaintiff has an adequate remedy
there."
Waterman, Sp
§ 9.
ory, Mr, Fry, and Mr. Pome-

his redress
The same rule is laid down b)
at law,

he must seek

THE

272

roy.

Story, Equity (10th Ed.)
c. Per. (2d Ed.) §24.

1

(Parti

RELATION
§ 716;

Fry,

Spec. Per. § 12;

Pome-

of

it

a

is

by

it

it

it

a

in

a

it.

court
equity will not
that
rebecause
suit
of the contract
specific performance
decree
but
defendants,
the
of
quires varied and continuous acts on the part
will enjoin the defendants from violating the contract
is argued that
delivering papers, or causing them to be sold and delivered, within the territory embraced in plaintiffs' contract, until such time as the
its
defendants take the proper steps provided in the contract for
rather
negative
remedy
the
su^-ested
Although
termination.
decree for the performance of the
is. in effect,
than affirmative
as we understand

It is admitted,

Enjoining the defendants from delivering papers or caussold and delivered in the disputed territory would
to
the contract, and require them to furnish the
enforce
practically
A prohibition preventing
to be so delivered.
the
plaintiffs
to
papers
violation of the contract by the defendants would in this case as
order to that
as an affirmative
effectually compel its performance

a

i.e

contract.
ing them

a

it

it

it

a

a

1

&

a

is

a

it

a

court of equity cannot
The leading case holding that, although
personal service contract,
compel the specific performance of
that of
violation of the negative provisions thereof,
may enjoin
In that case the defendG. 604.
De Gex, M.
Luinley v. Wagner,
definite time,
ant had agreed with plaintiff to sing at his theater for
She threatened to sing at another theater
and not to sing elsewhere.
In
suit to enjoin her from so doing,
in violation of her contract.
could not enforce the affirmative part of the
the court held that
could not compel the defendant to sing, but
contract, because
could and would enjoin and restrain her from singing elsewhere.
In this case the contract was for definite, fixed time, and plaintiff's
remedy at law was manifestly inadequate, because the damages which
would accrue to him by a violation of the contract by the defendant
is

true of
The same
not be ascertained with any certainty.
253,
Holmes,
Co.,
Buttonhole
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Union
Co.,
Co.
v.
Siegel-Cooper
Fed. Cas. No. 12,904; Standard Fashion
749;
Am.
854,
Rep.
68
St.
A.
408,
R.
43 L.
157 X. Y. 60, 51 N. E.
Burlington v. Burlington Water Co., 86 Iowa, 266, 53 N. W. 246;
and other cases cited by the plaintiffs.
■
We are therefore of the opinion that plaintiffs cannot maintain this
suit, for the reasons stated. There is, however, another objection to
the enforcement of the contract in equity at the suit of the plaintiffs,
because the remedy
not mutual, and defendants could
and that
fundamental rule of
not compel the plaintiffs to perform. 37 It
a

is

is

is

4.

could

is held in Stanton v. Singleton, 126 Cal.
citing many cases; Cort v. Las
r,7,:\. 17 Am. St. Rep. Tlit; (1889).
negative specific performance
is held in Welty v. Ja<-o) s,
That injunction
624, 49 N. E. 723, 40 L. E. A. 98 (1898), quoting Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp.
must lie mutual

146, iT I.. E. A. :;:;[ (1899),
I.. El. A.
221, 22 Pac. 1654,
6

59 Pac.
. 1- Or.

La

That

I.

r
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equity that when, from the nature of the contract, it is incapable of
being enforced against one party, that party is rendered equally incapable of enforcing it against the other, though its execution in the
latter way might in itself be free from the difficulty attending its execution in the former. Unless a court of equity can execute the contract on both sides, it will generally not interpose in behalf of either
To compel one to perform specifically, and send the other to
party.
a court of law to recover damages, would be in violation of the es-

Pomeroy, Spec. Per. (2d Ed.) § 165 ;
principles of equity.
Fry, Spec. Per. § 286 ; Waterman, Spec. Per. § 198 ; Marble Co. v.
Ripley, 10 Wall. 339, 19 L. Ed. 955 ; Richmond v. Dubuque & Sioux
City R. Co., 33 Iowa, 423 ; Tyson v. Watts, 1 Md. Ch. 13 ; Hoover
Valley R. Co. v. Dunlop, 86
v. Calhoun, 16 Grat. 109; Shenandoah
Va. 346, 10 S. E. 239 ; 26 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 28.
Now, as we have already stated, among the stipulations in the
contract for performance by Southworth are that he shall carry the
paper faithfully and carefully to every paying subscriber in the district; that he will endeavor on all occasions to increase the circulation, and will procure as much advertising patronage as possible;
that he will be responsible and pay weekly for all papers taken from
the office; and that he will comply with all rules and regulations
that the proprietor of the paper may see fit to adopt from time to
These provisions call for the
time, not inconsistent with his contract.
acts on the part of Southand
continuous
of varied
performance
worth, requiring skill, energy, experience, judgment, and integrity.
It will not be contended, we think, that a court of equity can or will
decree the specific performance of such a contract, because the enforcement of its decree would require such constant superintendence
as to make judicial control a matter of extreme difficulty, if not an
impossibility. See authorities last cited.
For these reasons, the decree of the court below should be affirmed,

and it is so ordered.

injunction may merely
1341.
Thai may i><'tin' effect, bul oof "f necessity,
prevent a wrong not capable of other adequate remedy, without resulting in
of the contract, ami so lie justified even when the courts could
performance
not specifically
Standard
Fashion Co. v. Siegel-Cooper
enforce the agency.
._■ Mi c. Rep. 624, 50 N. Y. Supp. L056 (1898), which held this was not
in L57 N.
a proper
case for Injunction, ami was on this point overruled
V. 60, .-,t \. i:. 408, 88 Am. st. Rep. 7.".:: (1898), t". L. R. a. 854, with monoespecially applicable when one party has already pergraphic note. Thi
I
formed.
The remedy will then no longer lack- mutuality. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Union Buttonhole <'".. Holmes, 253, Fed. <'as. No. 12,904 (1873), a
an agenl who has signed a coni Injunction to restrain
leading ca
trad that his services are unique, Bee Kupfersmith v. Hopper, 122 App. Div.
Te ke \. Dlttberner, 70 Neb. 544, s N. \Y.
.".I. 106 X. V. Supp. T'.»7 (1907);
id., ''."> Neb. 167, '.'I N. W. L81, 101 Am.
57, 113 Am. St. Rep. 802 (1903);
st. Rep. <'.i (1902);
Daly v. smith, lit How. Prac. •"><»
(1874), containing an
elaborate review "f the authorll les.
'.'

|

i
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SECTION 2.— BY OPERATION

i

OF LAW

I. In General

AHERN
(Supreme

Court

of Minnesota,

v.

BAKER.

L885.

34 .Minn. OS. 24 N.

W.

341.)

Vanderburgh, J.

The defendant, on the ninth day of September,
specially authorized one Wheeler, as his agent, to sell the real
properly in controversy, and to execute a contract for the sale of the
same. He in like manner on the same day empowered one Fairchild
to sell the same land; the authority of the agent in each instance
On the same day,
being limited to the particular transaction named.
Wheeler effected a sale of the land, which was consummated by a
c< mveyance.
Subsequently, on the tenth day of September, Fairchild,
;:- agent for defendant, and having no notice of the previous sale
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1SS4.

made by Wheeler, also contracted to sell the same land to this plaintiff, who, upon defendant's refusal to perform on his part, brings
this action for damages for breach of the contract.
This is a case of special agency, and there is nothing in the case going
to show that the plaintiff (defendant?) would be estopped from setting
up a revocation of the agency prior to the sale by Fairchild. A revocation may be shown by the death of the principal, the destruction of
the subject-matter, or the determination of his estate by a sale, as well
as by express notice.
The plaintiff (defendant?) had a right to employ
several agents, and the act of one in making a sale would preclude
the others without any notice, unless the nature of his contract with
them required it. In dealing with the agent the plaintiff took the risk
of the revocation of his agency. 1 Pars. Cont. *71.
Order affirmed, and case remanded.

II.
HUNT
(Supreme

Court

v.

By Death

ROUSMANIER'S ADM'RS.

of the United

States, 1823.

8

Wheat.

174,

5

L. Ed.

589.)

Bill to compel defendants to join in the sale of the brig Nereus
and the schooner Industry.
In the bill Hunt set forth that Rousmanier applied to him for a loan of $1,450, offering as security a bill
Counsel
of sale, or a mortgage of his interest in the brig Nereus.
was consulted, and he advised that a power of attorney to sell the
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ships in case of default was as effectual as, and simpler than, a mortgage, since it avoided any change in the papers of the vessels, or
need to take possession of them when they came into port. The
loan was made and such a power of attorney was made out to Hunt.
On a later loan of S700, a similar power to sell the Industry was ex-

Marshall^^C-J^, delivered the opinion of the court. The counsel
for the appellant objects to the decree of the circuit court on two
He contends, 1. That this power of attorney does, by its
grounds.
own operation, entitle the plaintiff, for the satisfaction of his debt, to
the interest of Rousmanier in the Xereus and the Industry. 2. Or, if
this be not so, that a court of chancery will, the conveyance being defective, lend its aid to carry the contract into execution, according t<i
the intention of the parties. 38
1. YVe will consider the effect of the power of attorney.
This instrument contains no words of conveyance or of assignment, but is a
simple power to sell and convey. As the power of oue man to act for
another depends on the will and license of that oth^r, the power ceases when the will, or this permission, is withdrawn. iThe general rule,
therefore, is, that a letter of attorney may. at any trVie, be revoked by
the party whoinakes it; and is revoked by his death. - Hut this general
rule, which r/sults from the nature of the act, hJs sustained some
modification. I Where a letter of attorney forms a/part of a contract,
and is a securMy for money, or for the performance of any act which

deemed valuable, it is generally
if not so, is deemed irrevocable in
letter of attorney depends, from itson making
and may, in general,
lie binds himself, for
consideration,
his contract, not to change his will,
is

made irrevocable,
in terms, or
2 Esp. 565.
law.
Although a
nature, on the will of the per-

if

by

in

a

it,

recalled at his will; yet,
terms, or
the nature of
the law will not permit him to
could hot, during his life,
any
be

it by

Rousmanier, therefore,
change it.
of his own. have revoked this/letter of attorney.
But does
retain its efficacy after his death? We think it^tpes not.
We think
well settled, that
power of attorney, though ■revocable during the
a

it

act

and

on

the manner

It

in

by

that the substitute acts
virtue of the
existing at the time the act
performed;
which he mu
ite his authority, as stated
In thai case,
»ke, 766.
was resolved, thai
it

is

of his principal,

in Combe

<>r whether
■•The consideration
pa rtles
omitted.

of the

1

is in

the presumption,

by

on

in

founded
authority

a

in

a

I.

is

by

his death.
life of the party, becomes extinct
This principle
Littleton (sectioniro),
erted
Lord Coke,
his commentary on thai section (52b), and
Willes' Reports (105,
The legal reason of the rule
note, and 56:
plain one.
seems

It
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ecuted. Rousmanier died insolvent, and defendants forbade Hunt to
sell the vessels.
Defendant's demurrer being sustained, plaintiff appeals.

the court would

give effect

to

the Intention
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"when any has authority, as attorney, to do any act, he ought to do it
The reason of this resolution
in his name who gave the authority."
The title can, regularly, pass out of the person in whom it
is obvious.
is vested, only 1>\ a conveyance in his own name; and this cannot be
executed by another for him, when it could not, in law, he executed
A conveyance in the name of a person, who was dead at
by himself.
the time, would he a manifest absurdity.
This general doctrine, that a power must he executed in the name
of a person who gives it. a doctrine founded on the nature of the
Its usual
transaction, is most usually engrafted in the power itself.
is,
shall
do
which
he
is
to
empowered
that
substitute
that
the
language
do. in the name of his principal. He is put in the place and stead of
his principal, and is to act in his name. This accustomed form is obHunt is constituted the
served in the instrument under consideration.
attorney, and is authorized to make, and execute, a regular bill of sale,
Now, as an authority must be pursued, in
in the name of Rousmanier.
order to make the act of the substitute the act of the principal, it is
necessary, that this bill of sale should be in the name of Rousmanier;
and it would be a gross absurdity, that a deed should purport to be
executed by him, even by attorney, after his death ; for, the attorney is
in the place of the principal, capable of doing that alone which the

is

it,

it it,

principal might do.
This general rule, that a power ceases with the life of the person
If a power be coupled with an "inadmits of one exception.
giving
and may be executed after his
survives the person giving
terest,^
laid down too positively in the books to
death. As this proposition

is
it

is

a

is

is

if

is

a

it,

a

it

is

is

it

it is

meant by the
becomes necessary to inquire, what
an interest in
expression, "a power coupled with an interest?" Is
an interest
the subject on which the power
to be exercised? or
in that which
produced by the exercise of the power? We hold
to be clear, that the interest which can protect
power, after the death
In
of
must be an interest in the thing itself.
person who creates
other words, the power must be engrafted on an estate in the thing.
The words themselves would seem to import this meaning. "A power
concoupled with an interest,"
power which accompanies, or
nected with, an interest.
The power and the interest are united in
the same person.
But
we are to understand by the word "interest,"
an interest in that which
to be produced by the exercise of the power, then they are never united.
The power, to produce the interest,
must be exercised, and by its exercise,
The power
extinguished.
ceases, when the interest commences, and therefore, cannot, in accurate
law language, be said to be "coupled" with it.
But the substantial basis of the opinion of the court on this point,
found in the legal reason of the principle.
The interest or title in
the thing being vested in the person who gives the power, remains in
him, unless
be conveyed with the power, and can pass out of him
regular act in his own name. The act of the substitute, thereonly by

be controverted,

a

it

is
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the circumstance^

death of the testator.

of attorney, though irrevocable hv
his death,
not aff<
extinguished
testamentary powers are executed after tinpower
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The general rule, that
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is

it,

fore, which, in such a case, is the act of the principal, to be legally
effectual, must be in his name, must be such an act as the principal
himself would be capable of performing, and which would be valid, if
performed by him. Such a power necessarily ceases with the life of
the person making it. But if the interest, or estate, passes with the
power, and vests in the person by whom the power is to be exercised,
such person acts in his own name. The estate, being in him, passes
from him, by a conveyance in his own name. He is no longer a substitute, acting in the place and name of another, but is a principal, acting in his own name, in pursuance of powers which limit his estate.
The legal reason which limits a power to the life of the person giving
exists no longer, and the rule ceases with the reason on which
founded.
The intention of the instrument may be effected without
violating any legal principle.
This idea may be in some degree illustrated by examples of cases
clear, and which are incompatible with any other
in which the law
If the word
exposition of the term ''power coupled with an interest."
"interest," thus used, indicated
title to the proceeds of the sale, and
not
title to the thing to be sold, then
power to A., to sell for his
own benefit, would be
power coupled with an interest; but
power
to A., to sell for the benefit of B., would be
naked power, which
could be executed only in the life of the person who gave it.
Yet,
for this distinction, no legal reason can be assigned. Nor
there any
reason for
in justice; for,
power to A., to sell for the benefit of
B., may be as much
part of the contract on which B. advances his
the power had been made to himself.
If this were the
money, as
true exposition of the term, then
power to A., to sell for the use of
B., inserted in
conveyance to A., of the thing to be sold, would not
be
power coupled with an interest, and, consequently, could not be
exercised, after the death of the person making
while
power to
A., to sell and pay
debt to himself, though not accompanied with
any conveyance which might vest the title in him, would enable him
to make the conveyance, and to pass
title not in him, even after the
vivifying principle of the power had become extinct. But every day's
not as the first case put would
experience teaches us, that the law
suppose. We know, that
power to A., to sell for the benefit of B.,
engrafted on an estate conveyed to A., may he exercised at any time,
and
not affected
the death of the person who created it.
then,
power coupled with an interest, although the person to whom
its exercise.
His power
given had no interesl
coupled with
an interest
the thing, which enables him to (••.(.nle
iii his own
name, and
therefore, not dependent on the life of the person who

testamentary

disposition
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a will to he eonsidered as a conveyance,
gives it an operation which is not allowed to deeds which have
An
their effect during the life of the person who executes them.
time,
a
or on
future
estate given by will may take effect at a future
The power
contingency, and in the meantime, descends to the heir.
is, necessarily, to he executed after the death of the person who makes
It is the intention, that it shall be
it. and cannot exist during his life.
executed after his death. The conveyance made by the person to whom
holds
it is given, takes effect by virtue of the will, and the purchaser
his title under it. Every case of a power given in a will, is considered
in a court of chancery as a trust for the benefit of the person for
whose use the power is made, and as a devise or bequest to that person.
It is. then, deemed perfectly clear, that the power given in this
case, is a naked power, not coupled with an interest, which, though
* * *
irrevocable by Rousmanier himself, expired on his death.
Reversed and remanded for the second consideration.

of property, not only permits
but

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

liqOju
WINDSOR SAVINGS BANK.

DAVIS

v.

(Supreme

Court of Vermont,

1874.

40

Vt.

72S.)

Assumpsit for money deposited in July, 1865, by the sister of plaintiffs' intestate, in defendant's bank in the name of the intestate. She
Meantime, in October, 1865,
drew out the money in December, 1865.
The court expressed the view that if
her brother died in Panama.
the bank paid the money in good faith, and in ignorance of his death,
it would not be affected by his death as a revocation of his sister's
Plaintiff excepted.
agency. Judgment was directed for defendant.
Pikki'oixt, Ch. J. The only question presented by the bill of
exceptions is. whether the defendant bank was justified in paying the
money which it held to the credit of the deceased, to Mrs. Dudley,
his sister, who deposited the money in the hank as his agent, such payment being made after the revocation of her agency by the death of
her principal, said bank having no knowledge of such death, and paid
That the death of the principal terminates
the money in good faith.
the agency, all the authorities agree ; but the effect of such death upon
the acts of those who in good faith deal with the agent without knowledge of the death, is a subject upon which there is some diversity of
But the weight of authority seems to be decidedly in favor of
decision.
the principle, that the death of the principal instantly terminates the
power of the agent, and that all dealings with the agent subsequent*'
to that event, are void and of no effect, even though the parties were
39
I
ignorant of that fact.
b Accord:
Vance v. AAderson, 39 towa, 126 (1874), citing many authorities and Quoting from Harper v. Little, - Greenl. n. 11 Am. !»<'<•.25 (1822),
and Lewis v. Kerr, 17 Iowa, T.'{ <is<;4). The harshness and incongruity of
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DEWEKSH
Nenraska,

1898.

whereby
J.000 on September
per cent, per annum.

MITF.

57 nvi>.

SI.

Rep.

it.

77 X. W.

Ml,

42

L. Ji. A.

789,

188.)

Muff executed
note,
the
sum
of James
Jones
of the same year, with interest thereon at
The payee resided
England, but the note
1892,

Catherine

to the order

in

1
I

to pay

a

On July

she promised

1,

Nt>«vAL,

J.

7:: Am.

v.

E.

(Supreme

Court "f

7

A

In

a

Is

J.

l,

t>
■
«

cases.
B. 784, 36

(

manj

\.

&

recognized

L39 N. V. 284, .".i
^
52 Miss
353
*
i

rule

Wilson,

In

'". v.
See Farmers' Loan
Trusi
Am. si. Rep. 696 (1893); Clayton v.
.
The death of the principal
Merrett,
fact equally
law
within the knowledge of nil the parties, and all are equally charged
with knowing it.
W.
12 L.
Smoul v. Ilbery, L0 M.
Ex. 357 (1842),

this

la
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Kent lays down the rule, that "the authority of an agent determines
by the death of his principal.
By the civil law, the acts of an agent done
bona fide after the death of the principal, and before notice of his death,
are valid and binding on his representatives.
But this equitable principle does not prevail in the English law, and the death of the principal
is an instantaneous revocation of the authority of the agent, unless the
2 Kent Com. 646.
power be coupled with an interest."
Story lays
down the same doctrine, and says : "As the act of the agent must, if
done at all, be done in the name of the principal, it is impossible that it
can properly be done, since a dead man can do no act, and we have already seen that every authority executed for another person, presupposes that the party could at the time, by his personal execution of
have made the act valid
and numerous authorities, both English and
American, are referred to in support of the position.
This principle
was expressly held in Bank v. Estate of Leavenworth, 28 Yt. 209, and
also in Mich. Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth, 30 Vt. 11. In the latter case,
Judge Bennett, in delivering the opinion, says "Though
may be true
that when
revoked by the act of the party, notice may be
power
necessary, yet when revoked by his death, the revocation at once takes
effect; and
an act
subsequently done under the power, though
without notice of the death of the party, the act
void." Many other
cases might be referred to in support of the rule, but
do not deem
necessary.
A different doctrine was held in Cassiday v. McKenzie,
Watts
S. 282, 39 Am. Dec. 76 but as
said in
note in
Kent Com. 873,
"It
substituting the rule of the civil for the rule of the common
law." Indeed
difficult to see how there can be an agent when there
The question whether in this case there was an interno principal.
est coupled with the agency, and some other questions that were discussed in the argument, <1<>not arise upon the exceptions as made up.
idgment reversed; and cause remanded.
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was delivered to him personally at Crete, Neb., at which time he stated
in substance, to Mrs. Muff, in the presence of one J. H. Gruben, her
business manager, that he would probably sell the note to C. C. Burr,
of Lincoln, as he (Jones) was going to England, and desired to take
the money with him, and that the maker should pay the note to Mr.
Burr. The latter had been, and then was, the agent of Mr. Jones.
ad of selling the note, the payee, soon after it was given, indorsed
the same in blank, and delivered the instrument to Mr. Burr, for collection. ( hi September 19, 1892, Mrs. Muff paid $1,000 on the note to
Mr. Burr; and on November 11, 1892, she paid him the balance due;

and the instrument was at the time delivered to her, indorsed, "Paid
Nov. 11th, l >2. C. C. Burr."
( )n October 16, 1892, James E. Jones died, leaving a will ; and Jacob
Bigler was duly appointed executor of his estate, and qualified as such.
The executor repudiates the payment made to Mr. Burr on November
11th. claiming that the latter's authority to collect the note had been
previously revoked by the death of Mr. Jones; and this action was
brought to recover from Mrs. Muff the amount of said payment, as
the balance alleged to be due on the note. The jury returned a verdict
for the defendant, under a peremptory instruction of the court so to
do; and error has been prosecuted from the judgment entered thereon.
After the filing of the record in this court, Jacob Bigler died; and the
action was revived in the name of Jasper C. Deweese, as executor de
bonis non of the estate of James E. Jones, deceased.
It is disclosed that Mrs. Muff paid the amount due on the note to
Mr. Burr in good faith, without any notice or knowledge whatsoever
that he was not the owner of the paper, or that Mr. Jones, the payee,
was dead. It is insisted that the court erred in directing a verdict for
the defendant, because the death of Jones revoked the authority or
power of Mr. Burr to receive from the maker payment of the obligation, although she was unaware of the death of the payee. Undoubtedly, the rule is that the death of a principal instantly terminates the
But it by no means follows that all dealings with the agent
agency.
Where, in good faith, one deals with
thereafter are absolutely void.
an agent within his apparent authority, in ignorance of the death of
the principal, the heirs and representatives of the latter may be bound,
in case the act to be done is not required to be performed in the name
There is a sharp conflict in the authorities on the
of the principal.
question, but it is believed that the better reasoned cases sustain the
proposition stated, among which are the following: Ish v. Crane, 8
Ohio St. 520; Id., 13 Ohio St. 574; Cassiday v. McKenzie, 4 Watts &
S. 282, 39 Am. Dec. 76; 40 Davis v. Lane, 10 N. H. 156; Dick v. Page,
cases for this view are Cassiday v. McKenzie, 4 Watts &
Dec. 76 (1842), and Ish v. Crane, 8 Ohio St. 520 (1858), Id.,
13 Ohio St. 574 (1862), in the latter of which is an exhaustive
review of the
authorities. The court distinguishes between a deed, which must be made
in the name of the principal, and acts in pais by the agent.
He denies the
.■The

leading
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234, 57 Am. Dec. 267; Moore v. Hall. 4S Mich. 143, 11 X. W.
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 1224.
We quote the following apposite language from the opinion in Ish
v. Crane, 8 Ohio St. 520: "Now, upon what principle does the obligation, imposed by the acts of the agent after his authority has terminated, really rest?
It seems to me the true answer is, public policy. The
great and practical purposes and interests of trade and commerce, and
the imperious necessity of confidence in the social and commercial
relations of men, require that an agency, when constituted, should con17

Mo.
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844;

1

tinue to be duly accredited.
To secure this confidence, and consequent
facility and aid to the purposes and interests of commerce, it is admitted that an agency, in cases of actual revocation, is still to be regarded
as continuing, in such cases as the present, towards third persons, until actual or implied notice of the revocation.
And I admit that I can
perceive no reason why the rule should be held differently in cases of
revocation by mere operation of law.
It seems to me that in all such
cases the party who has by his own conduct purposely
invited confidence and credit to be reposed in another as his agent, and has thereby induced another to deal with him in good faith, as such agent, neither such party nor his representatives ought to be permitted, in law,
to gainsay the commission of credit and confidence so given to him by
the principal.
And I think the authorities go to that extent.
See
Pickard v. Sears, 6 Adol. & E. 469.
"The extensive relations of commerce are ofter remote as well as
intimate.
The application of this doctrine must include factors, foreign as well as domestic, commission merchants, consignees, and supercargoes, and other agents remote from their principal, and who are
required for long periods of time, not unfrequently, by their principal,
to transact business of immense importance, without a possibility of
knowing perhaps even the probable continuance of the life of the principal.
It must not unfrequently happen that valuable cargoes are sold
and purchased in foreign countries by the agent, in obedience to his
instructions from his principal, after and without knowledge of his
death.
And so, too, cases are constantly occurring of money being
collected and paid by agents, under instructions of the principal, after
and without knowledge of his death. In all these cases, there is certainly every reason for holding valid and binding the acts so done by
the agency which the principal had. in his life, constituted and ordered,
that there would be to hold valid thi
f One who had ceased to hi'
hi agent, by revocation of his power, but without notice to the one
trusting him as agent."
whal the principal could ool do if he
,•
;..;
,..
i.
u. i
of requiring the
heirs andi representato the burdens
caused by the acts of the
principal, for which he would have t" assume responsibility wire he alive.
n Wis.
The soundness of this reasoning Is recognized In Lenz v. Brown,
\. Leath, 10 Heisk. 166 (1872).
172 (1876),
and In Murdock
But compare
i;
i
2 Humph. 350, ::t km. Dec. 560 (1841).

power of death to do for revocation
;.
,
... ,i
. .. ,i
Insists on
were alive,. and
the equity
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In the case at bar it was not necessary for the agent, Mr. Burr, to
do
collect or receive the money in the name of Mr. Jones, nor did he
cirthe
under
money
the
in
was
justified
defendanl
The
so.
paying
cumstances disclosed by the evidence. The note was properly indorsed
Mr. Burr.
by the payee in blank, and it was at the time in possession of
held
for colwas
Payment to him, without knowledge that the note
v.
Davis
deht.
dead,
the
discharged
lection, or that the owner was
190;
Law,
Edwards
Association, 20 La. Ann. 24; 18 Am. & Eng. Enc.
C. 598; Loomis v, Downs, 26 111. App. 257; Stoddard v.
v. Parks, 60
Burton, 41 [owa, 582; Boyd v. Corbitt, 37 Mich. 52; Moore v.
In the case last cited, a negoHall, 48 Mich. 143, 11 X. W. 844.
and delivered to an agent for
the
payee,
was
indorsed
by
tiable note
It was held that the audied.
the
payee
Subsequently
collection.

\.

A verdict for the defendthority to collect was not thereby revoked.
ant was properly directed in the case at bar.
The conclusion reached obviates an examination of the instructions
The judgment is
tendered by the plaintiff, and refused by the court.
—•
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affirmed.

III.

By Insanity, Bankruptcy, etc.

DAVIS
i Superior

/

Court of Judicature

v.

LANE.

of New Hampshire,

1839.

10

N.

II.

156.)

See ante, p. 23, on which will be found the facts, and another por-

tion of the opinion.

* * *
But it would be preposterous, where the
C. J.
power is in its nature revocable, to hold that the principal was, in contemplation of law, present, making a contract, or acknowledging a
deed, when he was in fact lying insensible upon his death bed, and this
The
fact well known to those who undertook to act with and for him.
existence
the
act done by the agent, under a revocable power, implies
— he
of volition on the part of the principal. He makes the contract
of
instrumentality
active
more
does the act. It is done through the

Parker,

another, but the latter represents his person, and uses his name.
Farther — Upon the constitution of an agent or attorney to act for
another, where the authority is not coupled with an interest, and not
there exists, at all times, a right of supervision in the
irrevocable,
and
power to terminate the authority of the agent at the
principal,
of
the
principal. The law secures to the principal the right
pleasure
long he will be represented by the agent, and suffer
how
judging
of
So long as, having the power, he does not
him to act in his name.

exercise the will to revoke, the authority continues.
When, then, an act of Providence deprives the principal of the
authority
power to exercise any judgment or will on the subject, the
being;
time
the
for
of the agent to act should thereby be suspended
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otherwise the right of the agent would be continued beyond the period
when all evidence that the principal chose to continue the authority
had ceased ; for after the principal was deprived of the power to exercise any will upon the subject, there could be no assent, or acquiescence, or evidence of any kind to show that he consented that the
agency should continue to exist. And, moreover, a confirmed insanity
would render wholly irrevocable an authority, which, by the original
nature of its constitution, it was to be in the power of the principal at
■v--any time to revoke.
It is for these reasons that we are of opinion that the insanity of the
/ principal, or his incapacity
to exercise any volition upon the subject,
I
by reason of an entire loss of mental power, operates as a revocation,
' or suspension for the time being, of the authority of an agent acting
under a revocable power.
If, on the recovery of the principal, he
manifests no will to terminate the authority, it may be considered as
a mere suspension.
And his assent to acts done during the suspension may be inferred from his forbearing to express dissent when
1 Livermore on Agency, 300, Cairness v.
they came to his knowledge.
Bleecker.
The act of the agent, in the execution of the power, however, may
not in all cases be avoided on account of the incapacity.
If the principal has enabled the agent to hold himself out as having authority,
by a written letter of attorney, or by a previous employment, and the
incapacity of the principal is not known to those who deal with the
agent, within the scope of the authority he appears to possess, the
transactions may be held valid, and binding upon the principal. Such
case forms an exception to the rule, and the principal and those claiming under him may be precluded from setting up his insanity as a revocation, because he had given the agent power to hold himself out as
having authority, and because the other party had acted upon the
and in ignorance of any termination of it. They would be
faith of
the case of an express revocation, which was unknown
precluded
L,ivermore <>n Agency, 310;
to the other party.
1).
K. 215.
Salte v. Field; Harper v. Little,
Greenl. 18, 11 Am. Dec. 25. And
revocation by operation of law, on account of the insanity of the principal, cannot have
greater effect than the express revocation of the
part\ himself. But this case
not of that character.
Here there was
full knowledge of the situation of the plaintiff's intestate,
Prescott,
_ w hen he received the note.
The principle that insanity operates as
revocation cannot apply
where the power
can
coupled with an interest, so that
in the name of the agent
for such case does nol presuppose any
volition of the principal at the time, or require any act to be done
his death.
his name, and
not revoked
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terms or nature irrevocable; and which seems to be regarded in England as a rower coupled with an interesl (10 Barn. & Crcs. 731; 4
Camp. 272), may be a question of more doubt ([Hunt v. Ennis] 2
Mason, _M ()
Such a power could not be re[Fed. Cas. No. 6,889]).
voked by the principal, if his sanity was continued (2 Livermore, 308),
and any volition of his could nol alter the case. Some of the reasons,
therefore, which have been adverted to, would not exist in a case of

if

in

in

if

it,

that character.
But a power of that kind is to be executed in the
name of the principal : and it was held, in 1 hint v. Rousmanier's Adm'rs
[8 Wheat. 174, 5 h. Ed. 589, ante, p. 275], before cited, that the death
for the reason that after
o\ the principal operates as a revocation of
he himself performed
that event no act can be done in his name, as
it. This reason would not exist where he was still living; and persuch case be precluded from setting up
haps he and others might
avoidance of the act, on the ground that he would have
his insanity
sane, and had therefore no right to insist
had no right to interfere,
is, *

*

a

it,

is 8

a

a

;

is

if

a

a

a

it

a

a

4i The bankruptcy of
principal will not revoke
power coupled with an
Dickinson v. Central Nat. Bank, 129 Mass. 279, 37 Am. Rep. 351
interest.
Markwick v. Hardingwill terminate an ordinary agency.
(1880), though
The death of one
ham, 15 Ch. D. 339, 43 L. T. 647, 29 W. R. 361 (1SS0).
principal. Long v.
partner, or joint owner, terminates an agency for such
And so ordiThayer, 150 D. S. 520, 14 Sup. Ct. 189, 37 L. Ed. 1167 (1S93).
partnership. Schlater v. Winpenny, 75 Pa.
narily does the dissolution of
T. nt
firm name, with no change in the indimere change in
321 (1874).
viduals, or their interests, will have no effect.
The confidence reposed reBillingsley v. Dawson, 27 Iowa, 210 (1869).
mains as before.
so as to terminate an agency when the
War interrupts communication
principal and agent reside on opposite sides of the hostile lines.
Insurance
But see, contra, Sands v.
Co. v. Davis, 95 U.
125, 24 L. Ed. 453 (1877).
This is not so,
X. Y. Life Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 626, 10 Am. Rep. 535 (1872).
however, in cases where no intercommunication is necessary, and where no
business intercourse is required, especially if the agent acts only for the
purpose of preserving
the property of the principal (Lyon v. Kent, 45 Ala.
656; Williams v. Paine, 169 U. S. 55, 18 Sup. Ct. 279, 42 L. Ed. 658 [1898]),
Ct. CI. 340
by investing it in the hostile country (Stoddart v. TJ. S.,
6

S.

a
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*

1

insanity as an objection.*
that the wife of the intestate
The result of the view we have taken
to
of
this note to Prescott, and
dispose
had at the time no authority
to receive the money.
and
had
no
title
to
right
no
that he acquired
former case, in this suit, that
payment
We have already held, on
to him by the defendant, under such circumstances, could not operate
N. H. 224. The instructions
to discharge the note. Davis v. Lane,
no agreement in the case by
but there
to the jury were erroneous
which we are authorized to enter judgment for the plaintiff, and the
new
action must, therefore, be transferred to the common pleas, for
there
trial,
any thing further in controversy between the parties.
On his

[1870]).
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SECTION 3.— EFFECT OF TERMINATION
GUNTER
(Supreme

Court of Alabama,

188S.

v.
87

STUART.
Ala.
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Rep. 21.)

196,

6

South.

266,

13

Am.

St.

Action on account against Gunter and others, late partners, for
The partnership was dissolved
goods furnished for their steamboats.
on October 5, 1885. The court below refused to charge that if McKee
had ceased to be their agent, or if the partnership had been dissolved
before McKee indorsed the accounts as correct, then defendants cannot be bound.
Stone, C. J. Part of Stuart's evidence, on which he relied for
recovery against the steamboat company, the appellants, consisted in
certain stated accounts, certified to be correct by one McKee, styling
himself "clerk." These certificates, several of them, bear date in October, 1885, and some of the items appear to be later than this. There
was testimony tending to show that McKee ceased to be clerk or
agent of appellants about June 1, 1885, and that he was not afterwards
in their employment.
It is too clear to admit of argument that after McKee ceased to be
clerk and agent of appellants he could neither do any act, state an account, or make an admission, that would bind them. While the relation of principal and agent exists, the agent can bind his principal by
any act done within the scope of his authority, and by any admission
with and explanatory of the act of agency so
made contemporaneous
done (3 Brick. Dig. p. 25, §§ 107, 108) ; and it may be that, acting
as clerk of the boat, it was within the purview of his duties to make
All these powers, howpurchases for the boat, and to state accounts.
ever, would necessarily terminate when his connection with the boat
4To obtain, after that time, any information he might
was severed.
possess, he must needs have been made a witness.
Charges 2 and 3 asked by appellants ought to have been given.
Reversed and remanded.

u Though ;i discharged agenl may perhaps t<» a limited extent, close up
transactions
entered Into through bim (Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Stickily. Fed. Cas. No. 1,667, Brunner, Col. <';i^. 543 [1845]), still this power is
<;i iowa,
v. Crimes.
370, -'<» N. \v.
narrow and unusual (Baudoulne
IT'', [1884]),
□ which third persons nave not
and Is usually confined to
had Hi'- notice of tin- revocation which the principal is bound to give (Easton's
Adm's v. Ellis, 1 Handy, 7<>[1854]).
As i etween 11•*- agenl and the principal, after an effectual termination of the
agency the agenl is deprived of all power to act, and therefore *-;«11 acquire
agalnsl the principal by .-my subsequent attempt to exercise the
no rights
in re Overweg; Haas v. Durant, [ i *.mm») i Ch. 209, 81
powers of bl agency,
I.. T. 776, 69 i.. J. Mi. 255; Soule v. Dougherty, ui Vt. 92 (1852).
B3 sucb
himself to liability.
McEwen v. Kerfoot, 87 111. 530
be only subjects
(1865).

PART

,
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CHAPTER I
NATURE AND EXTENT

SECTION

1.—

IN GENERAL

(Supreme

Court of Minnesota,

189S.

v.

HULL.
71

Minn.

430,

74 N.

W.

1G3.)

Plaintiff was a customer of the Vermont National Bank of Brattleboro. and requested the bank to loan $1,200 for her on Western real
estate security.
The bank made the loan, through A. F. & L. E. Keller, of Minneapolis, to defendant Hull, who executed a mortgage on
the land in question to secure the payment of the note which he executed, payable in five years, according to ten coupon notes of even
date, attached to the principal note and payable, one on January 1st,
After recording the mortgage,
and one on July 1st, of each year.
with the note and coupons, to the bank,
the Kelleys transmitted
which delivered them to plaintiff, who has ever since retained them,
except as she has detached and delivered to the bank for collection
the coupons as they matured.
She did not know of the Kelleys, exit,

1,

cept as she saw their names printed on the margins of the notes. The
custom of the bank was to send these coupons to the Kelleys, who
would collect and remit the proceeds to the bank, which then placed
the amounts to the credit of plaintiff's account.
1893,
1892, and January
Hull defaulted in payments due July
but the Kelleys did not report this, and advanced the amounts out
of their own funds.
They placed these coupons in the hands of an
in at $1,attorney to foreclose the mortgage, and A. F. Kelley bid
There was no redemption, and in November, 1894, A. F. Kelley
400.
conveyed the land to the defendant Wells for $1,750, and appropriWells seems to have bought in good
ated the money to his own use.
neither
nor
bank knew of the pretended forethe
and
faith,
plaintiff
closure until the Kelleys failed in 1896, for the Kelleys had kept up
it

1,
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it,

the coupon payments.
Plaintiff, upon ascertaining the facts, promptly
repudiated the attempted foreclosure
and commenced this action.
From orders denying her motions to amend pleadings and for a newtrial, she appeals.
Mitciikij., J. 1 * * * There is a mass of evidence tending to
show that it was the custom of the Kelleys to advance money to pay
interest on loans placed by them for others, and then foreclose the
mortgages, bid the land in, in their own names, and sell it if not redeemed.
But there is not a particle of evidence that plaintiff had
any knowledge of such a custom, and, there being nothing in the facts
making it her duty to know
we dismiss the evidence as to the Kelleys' custom with the simple statement that
wholly irrelevant and
immaterial.

if

is

in

in his memorandum,

it

in

is

equally axiomatic
also depends Upon the
latter will be bound
the ait- of
the authority,
actual or apparent,

It

formance.

an agent

by

of

agent
Part

f>f tin' opinion

is omitted.

that the extent of
will of the principal,
the former onl) to

which

the

p<
r

by

a

in

;

by

is

It

is

a

a

it

placed his decision squarely on the ground that,
in placing the coupons in the hands of the bank for collection, she
authorized
and such subagents as
might employ to use the usual
and customary methods of enforcing payment;
and, as the coupons
were secured by
power of sale, the foreclomortgage containing
sure of the mortgage under the power
the usual and customary
method of enforcing payment.
axiomatic
the law of agency that no one can become the
the will of the principal, either express or
agent of another excepl
that an agenl cannol creimplied from the particular circumstances
particular acl merely
ate
himself an authority to do
it-

'
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We have not overlooked the fact that the Vermont bank had.
through the Kelleys, made one or two other loans for the plaintiff
under similar authority, the securities for which were delivered and
retained by her, and the principal and interest as they matured collected through the bank.
But there
nothing in these transactions
which at all affects the present one, or at all tends to enlarge or change
the authority, either express or implied, of the bank or the Kelleys
the matter now under consideration.
The case
entirely free from
any element of estoppel by conduct, or of apparent, as distinguished
from actual, authority, or of ratification.
The defendant Wells must stand exclusively upon the proposition
that the act of the plaintiff in delivering or transmitting these interest
coupons (she herself retaining the mortgage and principal note) to
another, with authority to collect the same, gave such other person
implied authority to foreclose the mortgage
the coupons were not
paid. The learned trial judge saw clearly that this was so. and hence,

authority
and that the
the extent of
he has conferred
upon the

THE

288

w PHOBITT

(Part

2

by in

a

is

it

a

it

a

in

a

it

is

a

a

is

It

ity

it,

n

t
1
!*

is,

the law of agency, that
course,
fundamental principle
with
implication, the authorof
carries
power
every delegation
to do all those things which arc reasonably necessary and proper
to carry into effect the main power conferred, and which arc not forbidden.
But the doctrine of implied authority goes no further than
also true that where the principal confers upon his agent
this.
kind, or empowers him to transact husiness of
oi
an authority
nature, in reference to which there
and publicly
well-defined
the presumption of the law, in the absence of anyknown usage,
contrary intent, that the authority was conferred
thing to indicate
contemplation of the usage; and therefore third persons who deal
right to presume that the agent
with the agenl in good faith have
ha- been clothed with all the powers with which, according to such
But,
usage in that particular business, similar agents are clothed.
must be known to the prinin order to give the usage this effect,
length of time, and become so widely
cipal, or have existed for such
in view
known, as to warrant the presumption that the principal had
It

the agent.
the doctrine of implied
invoked under either of these principles.

time he appointed

be successfully

case,

power cannot
2

On the facts of this

If

an agent

In another case in which one Aldrich, who at the request of the Central
loan from Daniel Steele to Snyder, had
Trusl Company had negotiated
afterwards received money to apply upon the note, the question of his authority to it reive such payments so as to charge Steele as his principal became the
pivotal question.
Lester v. Snyder, 12 Colo. App. 351, 55 Pac. 613 (1898):
jury for advisory purposes, and submitted
"Upon the trial the court called
was found in favor of plaintiff's contention.
to it this question of agency, and
There was no evidence adduced showing or tending to show that Aldrich or
the securities company was appointed by Steele as his agent, or authorized
The questions, then,
by him to collect or receive any payments of this loan.
to lie determined are whether or not the acts of Steele in connection with
those of the securities company and Aldrich were such as to create an implied
agency, and to estop Steele from pleading that he was not. Under the circumstances of this ease, we think that the court erred in submitting the question
jury. The facts which it is claimed created the agency in this
of agency t"
case were undisputed, and it therefore became a question of law solely for
There was no dispute nor
the court to determine upon the conceded facts.
105.
Mechem, Ag.
conflicl of evidence for the jury to weigh and determine.
As th" jury in tins case was called for advisory purposes only, however, and
its verdicl could be disregarded by the court if it so desired, this of itself
If the facts
would not be sufficient to justify the reversal of the judgment.
were sufficient in law to create an agency, the judgment must be sustained,
notwithstanding the question should not have been submitted to the jury. In
the determination of the question as to whether or not an agency existed in
ami well-estabtie- circumstances of this case there are certain fundamental
lished principles bearing upon the doctrine of agency which must be borne
They are thus tersely and aptly stated by Mr. Mechem: 'Among
in mii.d.
§

a

it

a

a

2

a

a

as has been -ecu, that the law indulges in no bare presumptions
that .-in agency e.xists, — it must he proved or presumed from facts; that the
agent cannot establish his own authority, either by his representations
or
umiiig to exercise it; thai the authority cannot he established by mere
general authority is not an unlimrumor or general reputation; that even
ited one, and that every authority must find its ultimate source in sonic act
of the principal.
Persons dealing with an assumed agent, therefore, whether
general or
special one, are bound at their peril to
the assumed agency he
tain, not only the fact of the agency, but the extent of the authority;
;!
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to whom an interest coupon is sent for collection (while his principal
retains in his own possession the collateral mortgage and principal
note not yet due) has implied power to foreclose the mortgage, the
sooner men know it the better.
We apprehend the announcement of
any such doctrine would take both the legal profession and business
men by surprise.
It may be that the power to collect would carry
with it power to sue on the coupon. But the foreclosure of the security which the principal may have is an entirely different matter.
The mortgage and the evidence of the debt are separate instruments,
and afford independent remedies. The creditor may commence a personal action on the note or other evidence of the debt, or he may
proceed to realize on his security ; and the pursuit of one remedy is
no bar to the other. The right to foreclose is not waived or impaired
A creditor might desire
by the recovery of judgment upon the debt.
to sue on the debt, but not to foreclose his security, and vice versa.
He might be willing to intrust an agent with the collection of an interest coupon, but unwilling to intrust him with the foreclosure
of
a collateral
mortgage, which might result in sacrificing his security
for the whole debt. As suggested in appellant's brief, suppose the
plaintiff, instead of a mortgage on real estate, had held, as security,
elevator receipts for grain, and had transmitted these interest coupons
to an agent for collection, she retaining the receipts for the grain ;
would it be claimed that the agent would have implied authority to
sell the grain?
The fact that in this case the mortgage was on real
property, and on record, does not alter the principle.
and, in case either is controverted, the burden of proof is upon them to establish it.'
Applying these principles, it is clear that, in whatever light the
acts Of the parties may be viewed, there was an entire failure to establish any
authority or agency, either express or implied, on the part of Aldrich or the
securities company, to receive payment of the principal, or any part of it. of
the Snyder loan.
Mr. Steele was at all times in possession of all of the se
rarities representing the Loan, and at no time dees it appear from the evld
ie
thai he ever Intrusted them, or any of them, to Aldrich or the securities i
pany, or even to the Central Trust C
pany.
We may concede
although even
thai is not established by the evidence
thai Aldrich was the agent of Steele
to colled the Interest, but that would nol authorize him to colled the prindpal, and payment to him of such prindpal would n<>t discharge the liability
of the maker t«» the payee.
Mechem, Ag, s 379; Smith v. ETJdd, 68 N. v. 130,
'S\ Am. Rep. i.">7. We might even go further, and admit it to have been shown
by the evidence
which it was not
that Aldrich was, under the drcumstances
of the ease, the general agent of Steele, authorized to receive the payment of
the prindpal when due; i. ut even then he would have no authority to receive
payment before maturity, se as t" bind the payee,
it will be remembered
that the prindpal of Oils note under the extension agreement did not mature
until August l. 1897, and the pretended payments to Aldrich were received
by him about the beginning of the year 1896, more than 18 months prior i"
maturltj . and while he wa not In
a of a single
i urity, eithi
t trust, the note, the extension agreement, or the Interest coupon u
The party who makes payment under such drc
itances as these must do -"
at bis peril."
In inn v. Helton, 80 Ala. 528, i South. 840 (1886), the court held that, while
tims,. clrci
the authority as agent may be proved by circumstances,
In semi- way, directly or Indirectly, be con
ted with the prindpal.
d.Pb.4 a.
19
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Whether, had the principal note been duo, and been transmitted
for collection, the agenl would have had implied authority to fore-
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close, is a question not before US, and which nerd not now be considered. Inn very clearly, where an interest coupon on a principal note
not yet due is sent to an agent
for collection (that being the extent
oi his express authority), the principal retaining the principal note and
collateral mortgage, the implied authority of the agent is limited to a
t to such remedies as may he pursued on the coupon, irrespective
of the collateral mortgage. It may he, as suggested by the trial court,
that foreclosure is the usual way of collecting debts secured by mortIf so, it must be because the personal pecuniary irresponsibility
gage.
of the mortgagors renders it the only effective method.
But that is
a very different
thing from holding that an agent employed merely
to collect a coupon for interest on a principal note not yet due has
implied authority to foreclose a mortgage which his principal holds
as security for the entire debt.
There is no proof of any such usage
But,
in that business, unless the practice of the Kelleys proves it.
fortunately, the business methods of the Kelleys are not sufficient to
establish a general custom or usage with reference to which other people are presumed to contract.
It is suggested that, under the registry laws, Wells is protected as
a bona fide purchaser, for value, because Kelley's title appeared perThis claim might be urged with equal force if one
fect of record.
of the deeds in the chain of title had been forged.
This case illustrates the fact that our system of registration will not always protect
This may
those who purchase in reliance upon the public records.
be partly owing to defects in the system, and in part owing to causes
that are remediless under any system. The defect which was the principal cause of trouble in this case was remedied, in part at least, by
Gen. Laws 1897, c. 262, which requires the authority of an attorney to
foreclose a mortgage under a power to be in writing and recorded.
The suggestion that the Kelleys had authority to foreclose, because the
mortgage provided that it might be foreclosed by the mortgagee, her
If the per"attorney or agent," is not entitled to extended notice.
son assuming to foreclose had no authority to do so, he was not the
The defendant Wells
agent of the mortgagee for any such purpose.
is unfortunately the victim of the fraud and dishonesty of the Kelleys, but this is no reason why the plaintiff should be deprived of her
mortgage.

Order reversed.

"7
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BEAUMONT.

v.

Court of Alabama,

1SS0.

6S

Ala.

204.)

SomErvillE, J. This is an action of detinue, brought for the recovery of a piano, which was hired by the appellant, Cummins, to one
The conMrs. Phillips, and by her sold to the appellee, Beaumont.
tract was in writing, and from its terms was a mere bailment, and
The intention of the parties, as expressed in
not a conditional sale.
hire,
for
is
this letting
evidently to repudiate expressly the idea of a
Mrs. Phillips was, at the same time, constituted by Cummins
sale.
J
as his agent to sell pianos and organs ; and the authority was also
in writing. She was to receive commissions on all sales of them, and-i ,- /
"to make all orders for the same to said Cummins" ; and it was further provided, that "the instruments [were] to be sent direct from the
factory." The appellee, Beaumont, purchased the piano in question
from Mrs. Phillips, paying her three hundred dollars cash for it, and
without any notice of the limited agency, or her want of authority
She
to sell ; and she failed to pay over the money to the appellant.
had made no other sales to any one. except of one organ ; and this
sale was known to Beaumont, when he purchased.
We think the principle must control here, that one who deals with
an ngent, is bound always, at his peril, to ascertain the extent of hisA
Powell's Adm'r v. Henry, 27 Ala. 612; 1 Brick. Dig. p. 55,
authority.
The
35.
appellee, when he made the purchase in question, was re§
quired to know the status of the personal property sued for in this
action, and the written limitations upon the agent's authority to deal
with it. Its sale by Mrs. Phillips was an unauthorized conversion, and
The contract of letting for hire
conferred no title on the purchaser.
expressly took it out of the operation of the oilier agreement authorThe
izing sales of pianos and organs on certain stipulated conditions.
exercise of proper diligence, by inquiry, might have led to this knowlFurthermore, it was clearly contemplated, by the contract of
for
y, that the agenl was "to make all orders" to the principal
such instruments as might he -old, and tli/it they were to he shi|
"dinct from the factory" b) the principal. J A knowledge of the agencj
in law, a knowledge of the contents ofjthis writing; for "the vital
principle of the law of agency lies in the legal identity of the agenl
and a principal
and the principal, created by their mutual consent;"
is not bound by the acts of hi- agent, who transcends the scope of
his authority. \

1

Greenl.

Kv.

§

59.

;

And

such

powers of attorney are

8

'-'

Hambro

.1

[19031,
v. Burnand
K. B. 399,
Com. Cas. 252, 72 L.
L9 T. r.. R, 684, 51 Wkly. Rep, 652, reversed on other grounds in
k. B. 669, 90
I'.. 10,
Com. Cas. 251, 73
T. Rep. (N
[1904]
398, 52 Wkly. Rep. 583, one B., an underwriter, was the agent
803, 20 T.
of other underwriters to underwrite policies in their names and on their be
jinir
Purporting to ad ae such agent, be underwrote
policy, guaranty
paymenl to plaintiffs by
certain company of certain advances
by plain

L.

.1

L

r

:i

1
1
>
.1
l•
•*

;i

i:

i.

K

!»

626,
2

in

In.

B
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2

so as to preclude all auto a strict construction,
expressly given, or necessarily to he inferred. Dearing
v. Reynolds, 12 Ala. 252;
v. Lightfoot, 16 Ala. 28;
Scarborough
Fisher v. Campbell, 9 Port. -MO.
The circuit court erred in the charge given; and the judgment is
reversed, and the cause remanded.

ordinarily subjected
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m>t

in
interested
B. knew the Company was insecure, but was personally
tiff.
The company failed to repay.
Bingham, J., in passing
Keeping it afloat
upoo the authority conferred by the documents of appointment of the agent,
Bays: "The mandate authorizes the making of contracts for and on behalf of
li does aol authorize the making of contracts for and on liethe principals,
half o( the agent. No doubt there are many eases in which a general agent
to make contracts of a certain kind has been held to bind his principal by
^( that kind, though
made for his own purposes.
But all such
a contract
They are cases
cases proceed upon the doctrine of estoppel by holding out.
in which the other contracting party has been induced to enter into the conmade to him by the principal that the agent's ads
tract by a representation
I can find no case where the extent of the authority of a
were authorized.
general agent not held out as such has been measured by anything outside or
Sometimes, in order
beyond the actual terms in which the agency is created.
whether the principal is liable, the question is asked whether
to ascertain
It is in my
what the agent has done is within 'the scope' of his employment.
opinion a loose and unsatisfactory test of the liability; but, applying it in
this ease. 1 am satisfied that what Burnard did was not within the scope
It was to his own knowledge wholly without its scope.
of his employment.
Nor is the case one of negligent or of tortious conduct in carrying out the
If it were, some liability might fall on the deagency intrusted to him.
The making of the contract sued on was a wilful act not done in
fendants.
carrying out the agency at all, but done wholly outside it. In my view Burnand had no more right to sign this policy on the defendants' behalf than he
Again, it is sometimes said that where
had to forge their signatures to it.
one of two innocent parties must suffer from the fraud of a third person, he
who has enabled the third party to commit the wrong ought to bear the loss.
I do not think this test is applicable to the present case, where the only questiou is one of authority. But even if it were applicable, it would, in my opinhad in fact enabled Burnand to
ion, be wrong to say that the defendants
commit the fraud. All they had done was to authorize him to underwrite
risks for them: and the giving of such authority afforded him no additional
facility for committing frauds. Then, again, it is said that even if the plaintills had asked to see the authorities, and had read them, they had no means
of ascertaining
whether the policies were issued for the benefit of the principals or tmt.
Thai may be true. But my answer is, that a man is not to be
held liable because it has been difficult or even impossible to ascertain whether he was liable or not. If a person contracts with an agent, it is for him to
If the ausee as best he can that the agent is acting within his authority.
thority exists by reason of a holding out, then the person making the conmust take care that the agent does nothing which the holding out does
if the authority does not arise from a holding out, then care
not warrant:
must be taken to see that what is being done is within the terms of the actual
authority. It is often difficult, or inconvenient, or impolitic to make inquiries
does not make the princiabout an agent's authority, but that circumstance
pal liable where he is otherwise no) liable.
The other contracting party takes
the risk, and. though now and then it turns out that the risk is serious and
real, the event is not of sufficient frequency to interfere with business.
The
view, then, that I take of this case is that the plaintiffs are not entitled to
that:
rely on any authority excepl such as is to he found in the documents;
LUthority to be there found is limited to the making of policies 'for' the
dants; that the policy sued on was QOl made 'for' the defendants, and
that therefore they are not bound by It. In shorter words, I think it is the
plaintiffs who;; "
eated and not the defendants, and thai the loss
The law is, I think, accurately stated in Story
must lie where i! has fallen.
on Agency, § 133, at page 149 of the 9th edition:
'Where the agency is not
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Judicial Court of

v.

293

EXTENT

BEECHER.

Massachusetts,

1849.

3 Cush.

511.)

Shaw, C. J. This is an action of assumpsit for goods sold and
delivered, which' are alleged to have been purchased of the plaintiff by
the defendant, through the agency of William Pierce, acting under a
power of attorney from the defendant. The question is upon the legal
construction of the defendant's power of attorney to Pierce, which is
To this power was
in writing, and is stated at large in the report.
however,
that said Pierce
"Provided,
annexed the following proviso:
in
amount at any
or
incur
debts
shall not make purchases
exceeding
also
that
this power
dollars,
and
one time the sum of two thousand
or agency shall not extend for a period of time beyond January 1st,
1842." The power was afterwards extended by a memorandum to the
of January, 1843.
The presumption is, that the plaintiff knew of the terms of this power and of its limitation, before he sold goods to Pierce, on the strength
and, indeed, the evidence was,
of
and on the credit of the defendant
Various questions of fact were subthat he had seen the instrument.
mitted to the jury on the evidence, as to the extension of the power, or
;

it,

If

a

it

a

:

it

held out by the principal, by any acts, or declarations,
or implications, t<>be
general in regard to the particular act or business,
must from necessity be
construed according to its real nature and extent
and the other party must
act at his own peril, and is bound to inquire into the nature and extent of the
authority actually conferred.
In such
case there is no ground to contend
that the principal ought to be bound by the acts of the agent, beyond what
authorized; because he has not misled the confidence of
he has apparently
the Other party who lias dealt with the atfent. Each party is equally innocent;
just sense
cannot be said that the principal lias enabled the agent to
and in
The duty nf Inquiring then is
practise any deception upon the other party.
incumbent upon such party, since the principal has never held the agent out
And
be trusts
as having any general authority whatsoever in the premises.
without Inquiry, he trusts to the good faith of the agent and not to that of the

principal.'

"

See. also, Deffenbaugh

107

v.

Jackson Paper Mfg. Co.,

120

Mich.

242, 79 N. W.

(1899).

i

a

it

I

a

In
recent case, the rial court, having instructed the jury that the burden
was upon the plaintiff to prove that bis agent had do actual authority t<>do
The court said: "The court
was held t<>be error.
the thing complained of,
fair pre
to the jury that the burden was anon plaintiff to prove by
ponderance of the evidence that Sturm had do actual authority to do the
thing complained of. We are of opinion that the court erred In this Lnstruc
tiuii.
i< elementary
that the power <>ran agent to hind his principal rests
entirely upon the authority conferred upon blm. Without such authority, for
which the principal himself becomes, by a<t nr conduct, responsible, the agent
'Every person, therefore, who undertakes to deal with
can bind himself only.
an alleged agent, is put upon inquiry, and must discover at bis peril that such
is in its nature and extent sufficient
pretended agent has authority, that
ami that its source can be traced to the
a<
to permit him to do the propost
Co.,
will of the alleged principal.' 81 Cyc. 1322; EDrmentrout
v. insurance
Dispatch
B. a. 346, 56 Am. St Rep. 181."
305, 86 N. W. 635, 30
68 Minn
rt_'. Co. v. Nat Bans of Commerce, i"'.' Mine. im. 124 v W 236 (1910).
W. Va. 621, 87
E. 555 (1900); Shull v.
Bo endorf v. Poling,
New Blrdsall Co., 15
D. B7, 86 N. W. 654 (1901).
S.

18

8.

o,

i!

L

d

t.

it

it
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waiver of the limitation, and the like; but the real question arises
upon the correctness of the instructions, in matter of law.
The court instructed the jury, that the plaintiff must show, that such
Is were sold under the power to Pierce, as his agent, and not upon
the personal credit of Pierce; and that, although the power was limited, and such limitation was known to the plaintiff, yet that the defendant would be liable for Pierce's purchases, even though he had
already exceeded the amount authorized hy the power; if they were
satisfied, from the evidence, that, at the time of the purchases, Pierce
represented, that by such purchases he would not exceed his limit.
in effect, was given,
In another connection, the same instruction,
with a slight variance of form, as follows: "That if the plaintiff had
inquired oi Pierce about the agency, and had been informed by him
that it was not full, and he had no reason to suspect the truth of
Pierce- declaration, and if the plaintiff then sold goods to Pierce, as
agent, as aforesaid, the defendant would be liable for such goods, even
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though the agency was then full."
The former part of this instruction, that it must appear, that the
goods were not sold on the personal credit of Pierce, is unquestionably
correct; but, in regard to the latter part, which makes the defendant
nsible for the veracity and accuracy of Pierce, a majority of the
court are of opinion, that it was not correct in point of law.
This power of attorney, which is in the nature of a letter of credit,
is precise and limited in amount; and, though it contains some expressions, intimating that the attorney is the general agent of the constituent, to purchase and sell goods, yet this is controlled by the proand express condition; and, taken all together, as every written
instrument must be, it is an authority to purchase in the name and on
the credit of the author of the power, to the amount of $2,000, and no
more.

The precise point is this, whether, if Pierce, through design or mistake, represented to the plaintiff, that when he made the purchase in
<|uestion. he had not purchased on the credit of his principal to the
amount of $2,000, when, in truth, his purchases exceeded that sum,

It is unquestionably true, that the
defendant was hound by it.
statements and representations of an agent, in transacting the business
of his principal, within the scope of his authority, are as binding on
his principal, as any other acts done within the scope of his authority;
But an agent cannot enlarge his authey are res gestae, and are acts.
than by his other acts; and the
declarations,
more
his
by
thority any
rule is clear, that the acts of an agent, not within the scope of his auIt is often said, indeed, that one is
thority, do not hind the principal.
hound by the acts of a general agent, though done against his instructions. This is because the acts are within the scope of his authority;
and the violation of his instructions, in the execution of such authority, is a matter solely between himself and his principal, which cannot affect a stranger dealing with him without express notice.
the
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7

3

7
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and not in favor of the seller of the goods.
Parsons v. Armor,
Pet.
Hill, 279; Attwood v. RunL. Ed. 724; Stainer v. Tysen,
Darn.
Cr. 278. The case of Putnam v. Sullivan,
nings.
Mass.
45,
Am. Dec. 206. was decided on the ground, that the defendants,
by leaving blank indorsements with their clerk, had authorized him
his act to bind them as indorsers.
On the whole,
majority of the court are of opinion, that the verdict
must be set aside, and
new trial granted.
413,

y/^jt
(Supreme

Court

of Michigan,

1906.

142

v.

WALSH MFG. CO.

Mich.

1.

GRAND RAPIDS ELECTRIC CO.

LOS x.

W. 1.)

entli

g,
i

of W11d<

dl

The opinion

J

by

a

in

a

Assumpsit for goods sold and delivered.
Defendant's superintendent, Edsall, ordered of plaintiff
dynamo for the mill of which he was
There was
superintendent.
the mill, and the defendanl
dynamo
denied his authority to buy one, or to do anything hut operate the mill,
hire and discharge the men.
Plaintiff knew nothing further of the
authority except the agent's own representations, his business card,
and the letter heads, furnished
defendant company for Edsall's
correspondence, on which appeared "J. C. Edsall, Supt." Judgment
for plaintiff and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
•
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The argument
that the defendant ought to be bound, because
Pierce was his agent, and he, by his letter of attorney, had put
in
This,
his power to make such purchase.
appears to us, assumes the
The plaintiff knew that he was limited to
very point to be proved.
$2,000; he knew, therefore, that
he had purchased to that amount,
his power, by its own limitation, was at an end. If
were otherwise,
power to purchase to the amount of $2,000, would operate as
power
to purchase to an unlimited amount.
But
urged, that, upon this
construction, no one could safely deal with the agent. This objection,
we think
answered by the consideration, that no one
bound to deal
with the agent
whoever does so
admonished of the extent and limitation of the agent's authority, and must, at his own peril, ascertain
the fact, upon which alone the authority to bind the constituent depends. Under an authority so peculiar and limited,
not to be presumed that one would deal with the agent, who had not full confidence
in his honesty and veracity, and in the accuracy of his books and accounts. To this extent, the seller of the goods trusts the agent, and
he
deceived by him, he has no right to complain of the principal.
he himself, and not the principal, who trusts the agent beyond the
and, therefore, the maxim, that where
expressed limits of the power
one of two innocent persons must suffer, he who reposed confidence in
the wrong-doer must bear the loss, operates in favor of the constituent,

omitted.
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Defendant's
counsel contend that a party
dealing with an agent is bound to inquire into the extent of his authority, ignorance of which is no excuse. This is undoubtedly a correct statement of a general principle of the law of agency, but this
rule is n/t to be applied without qualifications and under all circumstances, fit is equally well settled that, having ascertained the general
character or scope of the agency, the party is authorized to rely upon
the agent's having such powers as naturally and properly belong to
such character, and. in the absence of circumstances putting him upon
inquiry, is not hound to inquire for secret qualifications or limitations
of the apparent powers of the agent. ; Inglish v. Ayer, 79 Mich. 516,
44 X. W. 942; Allis v. Voigt, 90 Mj«!h. 125, 51 N. W. 190; Austrian
& Co. v. Springer, 94 Mich. 343, 54 N. W. 50, 34 Am. St. Rep. 350.
r — The legitimate powers of a general agent, in the absence of known
limitations, must depend largely upon the circumstances of each particular case, and usually present questions of fact for the determination
of a jury. The apparent right of the superintendent and general manager of a small business to make a purchase of machinery costing over

$600 might be quite different from the right of the superintendent
The defendant
a large business to make the same expenditure.
company was a foreign corporation, carrying on, through Edsall, as its
local representative, extensive business enterprises at Frederic, consisting of a large heading mill and auxiliary lumber camps, an opera
house, and a general store, employing many men, of all of which, as
we understand the record, Edsall was the superintendent and general
manager, j We do not think it can be said, as a matter of law, that

of

which was necessary for the lighting
outside of the apparent powers with which
defendant had clothed Edsall as to justify the court in directing a
We therefore think thajj the court committed
verdict for defendant.
no error in submitting the question to the jury]
purchase

the

of

of the dynamo

the plant was so clearly

MOORES

v.

CITIZENS' NAT. BANK.

(Circuit Court of the United States,

S.

D. Ohio,

W. D.,

1883.

15

Fed.

141.)

Robt. B. Moores was cashier of defendant bank.
Plaintiff loaned
him $9,100, for which he assigned to her 91 shares of stock in defendant bank, which he claimed to own.
As a matter of fact, he
had previously transferred to other parties all his shares, but. neither
plaintiff nor defendant knew of the cashier's fraud for some years.
He is now insolvent, and defendant bank declines to recognize plaintiff as a stockholder, and denies to her all rights pertaining to that relation.
]

art of the opinion is omitted.
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But it must be borne in mind that Moores,
in his efforts and negotiations to borrow, was acting for himself and
not as cashier of the bank. His representations that he was the owner
of a large amount of defendant's capital stock were not official representations, and cannot, upon any principle of law known to this
court, bind the bank.
They were but the representations of an individual, contending with pecuniary embarrassments, and if believed to
be true and acted upon by the plaintiff, and loss resulted therefrom,
As cashier, he was
the bank is in no way responsible for the same.
defendant,
bind
it within the scope
the
and
could
of
but the agent
only
of his authority, and in the regular course of business. But Moores,
when assuming to borrow money, either for himself or his friends,
was acting for himself, in a matter in which the bank had no interest, and it therefore cannot be affected by anything that he may have
promised or said, as an inducement to make the loan.
If plaintiff relied on such representations, as she evidently did, and
the same turned out to be false, the defendant is under no legal obligation to make good the loss. This much will not be seriously quesBut they say that, as cashier, he
tioned by the plaintiff's counsel.
was intrusted with the custody of the defendant's certificate-book,
containing blank certificates signed by the president, and that he was,
to accept and cancel surrendered certificates,
as cashier, authorized
and
issue new certificates to transferees, and that
same,
the
transfer
such service came within the scope of his agency; that the issuance
the
by him of the certificate held by the plaintiff, and constituting
foundation of this action, was an official act within the scope of his
special duties; and that he, having afterwards obtained a loan or advance of money from the plaintiff upon the faith of its regularity and
genuineness, and in ignorance of its spurious and fraudulent character,
perpetrated a wrong for which the defendant, the bank, who clothed
him with the power to inflict the injury, is justly and legally amenable.
It may, as we have already said for the sake of the argument, be
conceded that money loaned or advanced by an innocent party, upon
the faith of such a certificate, could be recovered from the corporation.
But is the plaintiff, in the eye of the law, such an innocent
These terms have in law a technical meaning.
Ignorance
person?
of facts, which the law under the circumstances of the particular case
requires a party to know, does not excuse the want of diligence or
throw around the party the immunity which attaches to persons exempt from all laches or blame. In other words, if there is any fact
which, in contemplation of law, puts a party on inquiry, and he fails
to make the investigation which, if made, would develop the fraud.
he is to be treated in all respects as if he had actual knowledge of
the facts.
8

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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See, also, Jacoby v. Payson, 85 Hun, 367, 32 N. Y. Supp. 1032 (1895), in
which tin- agent applied the proceeds of a check to the payment of his individual debts, and N. V. Iron Mine v. First Nat. Bank, 39 Mich. 644 (1878), in
which
was held by Cooley, J., that the fact that an agent of large powers
drew negotiable paper in his own favor should have put the bank upon Inquiry
party dealing with an agent has knowlas to his authority to do so. When
edge of such facts as will put him on inquiry as to the extent of the agent's
authority, the principal will not be bound by acts not contained in the auWlllson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App.
Taylor Mfg. Co. v. Brown,
thority conferred.
19, M
W. 1071 (1889).
p.
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There
another principle of law applicable to this ease.
An agent
cannot lawfully act
the same matter for his principal and for himself, in eases wherein their interests are adverse to each other.
To
/;/
illustrate:
cashier were to draw
and
check
his OWfi furor,
then, as cashier, certify for the bank that the check was good, and
he had funds in the hank to meet it. the hank would he hound to pay
upon proper indorsement and presentation.
point of fact,
But if,
he had no funds in the hank to check upon, the bank could not
be held liable upon his certificate, although made in his capacity of
cashier of the bank, notwithstanding the party suing the hank may
have in good faith, bought the check in the belief, predicated on the
cashier's certificate, that the check was drawn against
fund in the
hands of the hank, and that
was good and would be paid on proper
Yet,
such check was drawn in favor of
ntation.
stranger,
and certified by the cashier to be good, his bank would be legally bound
and liable thereon.
The reason why the bank
not liable for
check
cashier in his own favor and certified to be good, even in
drawn
in good faith and in ignorance of any fraud,
the hands of one buying
has been stated. An agent cannot act for his principal and himself
in matters in which they have adverse interests, and every one purcheck
upon its face, admonished by the law of the
chasing such
necessity of making inquiry into the fairness and good faith of the
transaction, and
he does not do this, however honestly he may rely
on the integrity of the agent, the loss must be sustained by him.
Now,
this principle applicable to the facts of this case?
Keep
in mind that the plaintiff was dealing with Moores, the cashier, in
his individual capacity.
She agreed to loan her money to him on
condition that he would have
certificate issued to her for 91 shares
of the defendant's capital stock. He undertook to do this. The undertaking was for his own benefit, in order to enable him to consummate the loan.
He had possession of the bank's book of certificates.
One of the certificates contained therein was signed by the president
in blank, and left with him for use when occasion required it.
He
took this, and without authority, without consideration, and without
the knowledge
of any other officer of the bank, filled
up in the
to her, with the contract of the fifplaintiff's name and delivered
teenth of July, 1867, as
security for the repayment of the money
loaned. This certificate, made by Moores for his own benefit,
filled

Ch. 1)
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and placed the agent in the position to do the wrong, and not on the
innocent party.
But if the complaining party knows, when accepting a check, certificate of stock, receipt, or other acquittance or obligation, issued or executed by the agent in the name of the principal,
that he was acting in regard thereto for himself and in his own interest, such knowledge would put such party on inquiry, and divest
him or her of the legal rights and incidents pertaining to that class
of persons.
The plaintiff having had knowledge of the fact that Moores, upon
whom she relied to have the stock transferred to her, was acting for
himself as well as in his capacity of cashier — that
acting for the
bank upon one side and for himself on the other, in reference to the
matter of issuing this certificate — she
not, in the judgment of this
court, an innocent holder of the stock; and as the certificate was issued without authority and in fraud of the rigbts of the bank, the
court instructs you that the plaintiff
not entitled to recover in this
Your verdict will therefore be for the defendant.
action.
is
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up in his handwriting and signed by him as cashier.
Now, while the
plaintiff relied upon his honesty, and believed that the certificate had
been issued in good faith and by competent authority, she knew that
in issuing it Moores was acting for himself; that the certificate was
issued by him for his own benefit, to be used for the purpose and
in the manner stated. This knowledge, we think, was enough to put
her on inquiry. If she had made the inquiry, which the law as well
as prudential
reasons required, under the circumstances of this case,
Moores' fraudulent action would have been developed, and the loss
resulting therefrom avoided.
Agents intrusted with important interests and invested with large
powers have many opportunities
for an abuse of their trusts. Nevertheless, if their fraudulent acts are within the scope of their agencies, and a loss must result either to their principals or to an innocent person, who relied upon their action in the belief that the same
was valid, the law would cast the loss upon the principal who selected
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SECTION 2.— AUTHORITY AND INSTRUCTIONS
I. In Gkm'.ral

GRIGGS
(Supreme

v.

Court of Vermont,

SELDEN. 8
1886.

58

Vt.

561, 5

Atl.

504.)

by one Gibson, who was the agent
business in boots and shoes. He
her
custom
of defendant to manage
but
had on one occasion been perto
buy,
had no express authority
bill of plaintiff, and the latter
a
to
buy
defendant
of
mitted by letter
The matter was subcase.
in
the
present
authority
he
had
supposed

Assumpsit for leather ordered

mitted to a referee.

Rowkll, J. The referee has found a fact, if it is a question of
fact, as it certainly is (Sessions v. Newport, 23 Vt. 9), that the plaintiff
was justified in his belief that Gibson, in carrying on the business, and
making purchases and sales, "had the usual authority of an agent who
He further finds that the
had the sole management of the business."
defendant "held out" Gibson as her agent, which was known to the
plaintiff, and acted upon by him in good faith, j This finding makes
the defendant liable, on the ground that if one 6olds another out to

1

9

2.

bjj

the world, and accredits him as his agent, he is bound by th& person's
acts done within the scope of the agency thus given to himl In such
given to
cases the question is not what authority was intended to
him
with
dealing
the
third
person
the agent, but what authority was
him.
to
was
given
in
believing
the
principal,
justified, from the acts of
Amer. Lead. Cas. 568; Story, Ag. & 127, note

Judgment affirmed.

&

Mo. 152,

3

&

il

1

3

See,
S. D. 523, 54 N. W. 811 (1893).
Approved in Aldrich v. Wilmarth,
W( Lch v. Clifton Mfg. Co., 55 S. C. 568, 33 S. E. 739 (1899).
Atl. 206, 56 Am. Rep.
I,, Brooke v. N. Y., L. E.
W. R. Co., 108 Pa. 529,
•:;.-, (1885), the doctrine
was laid down that "as between principal and third
is the aptie true limit of the agent's authority to bind the former
authority with which the agent is invested; but as between the principal and the ageut the true limit is the express authority, or instruction,
given to the agent. The principal is bound by all the acts of his agent within the scope of the authority which he held him out to the world to possess,
Private restricnotwithstanding the agent acted contrary to instructions."
C. B. Ry. Co., 91
Baker v. K. C, St. J.
tions cannot affect third persons.
b

y

9
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(Kansas City Court of Appeals,
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PAGE MILL CO.

Missouri,

1S9S.

77 Mo. App. 672.)

Defendant manufactured flour. One
broker, at plaintiffs' request, telegraphed defendant for
on flour. Defendant wrote, naming a price of $3.95 per
By error in transmission,
at the same time telegraphed.
the telegram read $3.25, and on receipt of the telegram, without waiting for the letter, Gardner sold plaintiff a car load at $3.25.
Smith, J. 10 * * * Immediately on receipt of this letter, Gardner wired defendant that he had sold the flour at three dollars and
The defendant, immediately, on the same day,
cents.
twenty-five
that
it would not fill the orders at any such figures.
wired Gardner
Gardner immediately investigated the matter and ascertained at once
that the price in the telegram should have been three dollars and ninety-five cents per barrel.
After ascertaining this fact, Gardner on the same day wrote a letter
to the defendant referring to the sale of the flour and to the mistake
in the price, and inclosing the memorandum of the sale hereinbefore
At the time the sale was made flour of all grades was adset forth.
vancing in price at Brenham, and continued to advance until after the
time the flour in question ought to have been delivered, and at the
time delivery should have been made, the flour contracted was worth,
on the Brenham market, the sum of $4.05 per barrel, and all other
grades had made the same proportionate advance, so that it was impossible for plaintiffs to have purchased any grade of flour without having
sustained a loss. Plaintiffs testified that they finally had to buy flour.
and pay $4.40 per barrel in order to supply his trade. The plaintiffs
further testified on the trial of said cause that, when they bought the
flour from said Gardner, the contract was that they were to have a
credit of forty-five days, or one and one-half per cent off for cash, and
that the flour was to be shipped in ten days.
The plaintiffs by their appeal question the propriety of the action
of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer to the evidence adduced.
The defendant insists that there was nol shown in evidence any such
Plaintiffs
Gardner, a
quotations
barrel, and
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were retail grocers.

of the sale as meets the requirements of the statute ol
memorandum
An agenl
frauds and therefore the demurrer was properlj unstained.
v. Banl ,
his
to
own
Leete
is a competenl witness
agency.
establish
v.
269
Mo.
Green,
31
Co.
788;
^pp.
Mm.
21
115
S. W.
Pump
204,
<>f
the
eon
duet
and
from
the
acquiescence
His agenc ma) be implied
1'''';
Kurd,
49
v.
CummhVs
Mo.
Knox,
48
v.
Vpp.
Sharp
principal.

And it may be stated as a general ru\4 that wherever
139.
person has held out another a- his agent, authorizeclto act for him
in a given capacity, or has knowingly and without dissenl permitted
h other to aet as hi- agenl in snch capacity, or where his habits and
Mo. App.

a

i° Tart of the opinion is omitted.
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urse of dealing have been such as to reasonably warrant the presumption that such other was his agent authorized to act in that capacity, whether it be a single transaction or a scries of transactions,
his authority to ad for him in that capacity will be conclusively presumed SO far as it may be necessary to protect the rights of third persons who have relied thereon in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable prudence; and he will not he permitted to deny that such Other
was his agenl authorized tii do the act he assumed to do, provided thatN
such act is within the real or apparent scope of the presumed authority.
J
mson v. Hurley, 115 .Mo. 513, 22 S. W. 492 (quoting Mechem on/
Agency); Rice v. Groffmann, 56 Mo. 434; Summerville v. Railway, 62
Mo. 391.
And it seems well settled in the law of agency that where it
appears that an agent had repeatedly performed acts like the one in
question, which the principal has ratified and adopted, his authority for
the performance of the disputed act may be inferred. Cummings v.
Hurd, 4' * Mo. App. loc. cit. 139, and cases there cited. Gardner testified
that he had been acting as agent of defendant for a number of years in
making sale of the latter's flour and that his contracts as such had always been carried out by such latter. He further testified that he sold
and handled the defendant's flour as a broker on commission, and that
his orders were always promptly filled.
One of the plaintiffs testified
that he had bought flour of Gardner regularly for three or four years
as agent of defendant and the contracts so made with him had always
been promptly complied with by defendant.
In the light of the precedents just referred to we must conclude that Gardner was the agent
of the defendant authorized to make the sale of the flour to plaintiffs.
The fact that Gardner was a broker selling on commission rendered
him none the less an agent of defendant.
Tiedeman on Sales, §§ 271,
272.

Having reached the conclusion that the evidence adduced tends to
prove that Gardner was the agent of the defendant, invested with the
authority to enter into the contract with the plaintiffs for the sale of
the flour, we find no difficulty in reaching the further conclusion that
the signing of the written memorandum thereof by Gardner himself
was sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds.
Such
a contract may be signed for the principal by a person thereunto
lawfully authorized, and though the agent sign his own name alone the
principal may be still charged by parol evidence. The rule, of course,
is otherwise where the agent enters into a contract in his own name
under seal. * * *
'Gardner offered and sold the plaintiffs the flour in accordance with
the authority conferred upon him by the telegram of the defendant.
He acted within the scope of that authority in making the sale to the
The plaintiffs appear to have purchased in good faith and
plaintiffs.
are not to be affected by the communications had prior thereto between the defendant and its agent. It seems to us that the plaintiffs
made out a prima facie case entitling them to a submission, and there-

.
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EXTENT
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ft***

fore the action 'of the court in sustaining the demurrer to the evidence was such an error as requires a reversal of the judgment, which
All concur.
is ordered accordingly.

II. Secret Instructions
LUDLOW-SAYLOR
Court of Kansas,

WIRE CO.
1903.

67

v.

Kan.

FRIBLEY.

710.

74 Pac.

237.)

Pollock, J. The traveling salesman of plaintiff sold defendant
company 1,500 bales of wire ties, and reported such sale to have been
made at the price of $1.10 per bale, f. o. b. the cars Baxter Springs.
This sale was made in February, payment to be made May 1st. Defendant paid on the purchase price $1,425, leaving a balance due, as
shown by the account of plaintiff, of $225. This action was brought on
a verified account of the transaction to recover the remainder of the
purchase price. By verified denial, defendant put in issue the correctness of the account, and also alleged as a complete defense the fact that
the traveling salesman, as agent of plaintiff, duly authorized thereto,

ft

It

&

12

I

a

is,

7

had guarantied the price of the goods purchased as of the date of payment, May 1, 1900; that the price of like goods f. o. b. the cars Baxter
Springs, May 1, 1900, was 95 cents per bale, and not $1.10, as demanded by plaintiff, and alleged the full payment of the purchase price at
such figure. By proper reply the authority of the agent to attach such
condition to the sale was put in issue. Defendant offered no defense in
support of the authority of plaintiff's agent to guarantee the price.
There was judgment for defendant.
Plaintiff brings error.
The sole question
was the general authority of plaintiff's agent
as traveling salesman, in the absence of notice to the contrary on the
matter of law, sufficient to bind plaintiff to the
part of defendant, as
conditions attached to the contract of sale as pleaded?
The trial court
so instructed.
The sale of the goods out of which this controversy
fell directly within the scope of the agent's authority.
While
that authority maw as between the agent and his principal, have been
limited, and the agent responsible to his principal for exceeding its
bounds, yet, as between plaintiff and defendant, as no limitation upon
the agent's authority was known to defendant, and as the agenl acini
within the apparent scope of his authority, the conditions attached to
Babcock v. Deford, II Kan. 411; Banks v.
ale hound plaintim
Kan.
687,
Pac. 111. 11
31
Everesl
Waggener,
follows that the judgment must be affirmed.

ii
person who Invests an agenl with
would be dangerous to hold thai
an apparent authorltj could limll thai authority by
secret reservation
97, 12 Jur. N.
882, 86
Edmunds v. Bushell, L. R.
B. 20 (1865),
the height of Injustice, and lead to the
per Mellor,
Such
rule would
N. M.
it Pac, 721 (1807).
Co. v. Bank,
grossest frauds.
Western n.
Specific Instructions of the principal i" the agenl can have do effect on
t.

:>

J.

c^

o

i
e

.*-

I.

Q.

L.

8.

B

Q.

;i

J.

I

;i

a

it
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Known Limitations

ITT.

HUTSON
(Supreme

v.

PRUDENTIAL INS.

Court of Georgia,

1905.

122

Ga. 847,

I

1

CO. 12
50

S. E. 1000.)

A premium
policy. Exceptions to a nonsuit.
the
agent of
by,
general
and
to,
accepted
1st was offered
the company September 11th. and another payment was made in OcInsured died November
tober for the premium due November 1st.
1st.
The company refused to pay the policy and returned the aboveAction on
due August

an insurance

mentioned

payments.
J. (after stating the facts).f There was evidence tending to
Assumestablish that Adams was the general agent of the company.
ing that the evidence was sufficient to establish that he was, did he Wave
authority to waive any of the forfeitures stipulated in the policy?! It
is elemental that a general agent may bind his principal with respect
Underlying
to all matters within the apparent scope of his authority
the
iof/his
for
acts
agent,
the doctrine of the liability of a principal
whether general or special, is this fundamental princip)e : The agent
J
Private
can only bind his principal within the scope of his agency.
an
with
known
agent
not
to
dealing
limitations
persons
or
instructions
who assumete to act within the apparent scope of his authority cannot
affect them.] In special agencies for a particular purpose, persons dealCiv. Code 1895, §
ing with th* agent must examine his authority.
3023. 1A general agency does not necessarily import an unqualified au-
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Evans,

J

thority\to act for and in behalf of his principal in every instance.

The

Rohrbough v. U. S.
third persons, having no notice of such instructions.
"The auExp. Co., 50 W. Va. 148, 40 S. E. 398, 88 Am. St. Rep. 849 (1901).
thority of the agent must depend, so far as it involves the rights of innocent
third persons who have relied thereon, upon the character bestowed, rather
Austrian v. Springer, 94 Mich. 343, 54 N. W.
than on the instructions given."
Even a special agent who acts within his ap50, 34 Am. St. Rep. 350 (1892).
parent power binds his principal, even though he acts contrary to private inHowell v. Graff, 25 Neb. 130,
linns which limit his special authority.
A principal cannot escape liability by secret understand11 X. \Y. l ii' (1888).
Hall v. Union
ings with his agent of which the public can have no knowledge.
ral Life Insurance Co., 23 Wash. 610, G3 Pac. 505, 51 L. R. A. 2S8, 83 Am
• it
(1900).
itations printed in Latin, and not made known to the public, cannot
Catholic Bishop v. Troup, 61
affeel the principal's liability to third persons.
By-laws of business corporations are, as to third persons,
111. App. 641 (1895).
private regulations of do force as limitations upon acts of agents which, but
for the by-law, would be within the authority. Rathbun v. Snow, 123 N. Y.
v. Deford, 14
See. also, Babcock
25 X. E. 379, 10 L. R. A. 355 (1890).
Kan. ins (1875), per Brewer, .7.; Smith v. Droubay, 20 Utah, 443, 58 Pac.
\. Neal, 155 Ala. 177, 33 South. 39 (1902); Edwards v.
1112 (1899); Patterson
Schaffer, 49 Barb. 291 (1
12 Ace., Longworth v. Conwell, 2 Blackf. 469 (1831), where the limits were
not secr< t. but known to the third part v. Marvin v. Universal Life Insurance
Co., S5 N. Y. 27s. 39 Am. Rep. 657 (1881).
rt of the opinion is omitted.
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agent's authority may be limited, and, if the party dealing with him has
notice that his powers have been restricted, his principal will not be
bound if he exceeds his authority.
The defendant company in its contract of insurance expressly limIt
ited the powers of all of its agents with respect to certain matters.
was expressly covenanted that no condition, provision, or privilege of
the policy could be waived or modified in any case except by indorsement on the policy signed by its president or other designated officials.
The insured was put upon notice that the premiums were to be paid
at the company's home office, or to an agent who held the company's
receipt signed by one of its governing officers ; and the insured bound
himself to pay these premiums on certain specified dates, or within
When the August
the period of grace provided for in the policy.
premium fell due, it was not paid, nor was it paid or tendered within
On September 11th the policy had, unthe 30 days' grace thereafter.
der its terms, become lapsed, and the insured and his beneficiary were
bound to know this fact.
Provision was made in the policy for its
being revived within a period of two years, provided past due premiums were paid, together with interest thereon, and provided, further, that the insured furnished to the company satisfactory evidence
of his insurability. After the policy had become lapsed, neither the
insured, nor any one acting in his behalf, made to the defendant company an application for a revival of the insurance, or furnished the
defendant with any proof of the insurability of the insured.
Plaintiff maintains that the acceptance of the August premium by the
general agent without requiring an application for revival, or proof
that the insured was in good health, amounted to a waiver of the stipulations in the policy touching the manner in which it might be revived.
This contention is not sound, for the reason that there was an express
provision in the policy that no waiver of any forfeiture could be made,
save by certain designated officials of the company, and that no agent
had any power to waive any stipulations upon which the contract of in* * *
surance was based.
We have not dealt with the question as to the admissibility of the
testimony of Adams, the general agent, with regard to the circumstances under which he received the money for the August premium.
for tl
that, had this testimony been excluded, the result would
inevitably have been the same. Judgment affirmed.
GODD.PB.& A.— 20

/
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HANK
(Supreme

Court

of

v.

(Part

2

OHIO VALLEY FURNITURE CO.

Appeals

Virginia,

of Wesl
880,

70

I.,

L905.

57

W.

Va. 625, 50 S. E.

w. A. :W2.)

for $2,625.96, on a note for $2,to a directed judgment
signed by the defendant, and indorsed in blank by the payee and
The note, one of sevprominent stockholders of defendanl company.
eral similar notes, was sent to one llnston, agent of defendant, to be
discounted, the proceeds to be sent to defendant,
llnston represented
to the bank that he was agent of the maker, but that he had secured authority to discount the note for his own benefit. As he was well known
to plaintiff bank, and had an account there, the cashier discounted the

Exception

500.

note.

POFFENBARGER, J. 18 * * * When the party has possession of
paper, and neither the fact of agency nor any other circumstance
inconsistent with title in the holder is known to the other party, he may
deal on the basis of ownership, although there is in fact an unknown
agency. I le may take good title despite this indisputable fact of which
he has no knowledge.
These cases furnish no authority for the posiOwnertion that the note is the equivalent of a power of attorney.
ship of the note, and possession thereof in the capacity of agent, are
inconsistent things.
Ownership includes, of course, all powers of control and disposition.
Agency is no part of this, but is a new and distinct thing which the owner may create out of it and in respect to it.
If the holder is the owner, he cannot be the agent of himself, because
Had the fact of agency been
his agency is merged in his ownership.
known in any of these cases, it would therefore have negatived the
possibility of ownership in the holder, and no dealings could have been
had with him on the basis of ownership.
Know ledge of the fact of agency destroys the apparent title of the
holder, and the intending purchaser must then look to the authority
of the agent. That one having possession of negotiable paper has only
prima facie title has been demonstrated by cases already cited relating
to accommodation paper.
The same principle certainly allows a man
to part with a title by admission which can be defeated by proof. The
note cannot be considered a power of attorney, giving such authority
as is claimed, for the power would run into ownership, a status which
"If the agency of the
negatives the character of agency necessarily.
party is made to appear, the principal will not be bound beyond the
11
And. where the holder has notice that the party
authority given.
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Part <»f the opinion is omitted.
i* A principal may limit the authority of his agent, and when he docs so
tin- ;iL r<-iit cannot bind Ms principal beyond the limits of his authority, by
contract, estoppel, or waiver, to those who know the limitations of his power.
Instructions
54 C. C. A. L".»:; (1902).
Modern Woodmen v. Tevis, 117 Fed. ••:<;:».
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acting as agent is such, he is bound to inquire into his authority."
Rand. Commer. Paper, § 388.
The maker, by constituting the agency and intrusting the note to the
agent in such form that it might be disposed of by mere delivery, held
the agent out to the world as possessing power to pass the title to it.
Upon the apparent authority with which the principal had thus clothed
the agent, persons dealing with the latter might rely, if they had no
notice of any limitation upon such authority.
"Private instructions to
a general agent circumscribing his power will not avail to shield the
principal from liability to parties dealing with him in ignorance of the
limitation.
But if such persons are aware of the instructions, the prin1 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 994.
cipal is not bound."
"A
principal may confer as much or as little authority as he sees fit upon
his agent, and he may also impose such lawful restrictions and limitations upon his agent as he may deem proper, and such restrictions and
limitations will be a- binding upon third persons who had notice of
them as upon the agent himself, provided the principal does nothing
them."
Lead Pencil Co. v. Wolfe, 30 Fla. 360, 11 South.
The law does not permit an agency to be loaded down with
secret instructions inconsistent with the authority actually or apparently conferred, but if a stranger dealing with the agent knows of the limitation, he has no cause for complaint, and in this respect there is no
to

waive

488.

difference between a general and a special agency. 1 Am. & Eng. Ency.
Law (2d Ed.) 994, 995. "If limitation of the agent's authority is public, or known to the person with whom Ik- deals, the principal will not
he hound if the agent exceeds his authority; but if such limitation he
private, the agent may bind his principal, although the former exceed
his authority."
Bryant v. Moore. 26 .Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec. 96. "If the

shipper of goods on freight contracts for the price thereof with the
general agent of the owner of the vessel, having reason to know, that
although his agency might be general, yet that his authority was restricted in that particular instance, the shipper cannol claim to have
the terms of the contract
fulfilled as against the principal of such
tit."
Barnard v. Wheeler, 24 Me. 412.
The difference hit ween general and special agencies in the law of
commercial paper is stated in Daniel on Negotiable Instrument

•n 2~s. as follow-.; "Where the agency is specially given to do a
particular thing, the agent is circumscribed within the limits ,.f actual
authority; hut where the agency i- general as that of a hank cashier,
for instance all acts within the scope "f that general authority are
binding on the principal."
On the subject of limitation of authority,
this work says, in the next sentence, "And if he seeks to avoid liability, he must show not only limitation of the general authority, hut
that the party dealing with the agenl had notice."
Under the an
n> the agent, known t" the third person, limit tho authority <>r the agenl
bind the principal, whether the agenl be general <>rspecial
r s. v Wil
Fed. Cas. So. 16.724, i Ware it:: (1830)

i<>

SHE
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thority conferred upon the agent in this case by placing tlie note in his
hands, read} for deliver} to a purchaser, he could have passed the
title to a purchaser who know thai he was acting in the capacity of
The purchaser would have been warranted in relying upon the
agent.
apparent authority' with which the agent was clothed, provided he knew
of no limitation.
Hank v. Real Estate Co., 150 Mo. 570, 51 S. W. 691.
The declaration on the part of the holder, after having admitted the
agency, that he had secured the right to use the note for his own benefit, calls for the application of another principle of the law of agency,
which is a limitation imposed by law upon the power of every agent,
general or special, of which all persons must take notice, namely, that
an agent has no power to use his office otherwise than for the benefit

When he undertakes to exercise it for a purpose
which can in no way benefit his principal, but will benefit himself or
some third person, he places himself in a position in which the law
determines that he is outside of the scope of his agency, and the person
who deals with him in such position will not be heard to say he was in
ignorance of the want of authority, for ignorance of law excuses no
man.
It is of the very essence of an agency that it shall be used for
the benefit of the principal. Men appoint agents to subserve their interests, carry on their business, preserve their property, and not for
the purpose of giving it away to others and converting it to their own
"If one who is known to be an agent for the negotiation of his
use.
principal's draft transfer the draft to a third person in payment of the
agent's debt, that person will acquire no title to the draft, however
honest his actual intention may be. The declarations of an agent, although accompanying his acts, constitute no evidence of the extent of
* * *
his authority.
a transaction between an agent and another
person be entire, and be known to such other person to be a breach of
trust on the part of the agent, the principal is not bound at all, although
some portions of the transaction might, if standing alone, have been
within the agent's power and duty." Dowden v. Cryder, 55 N. J. Law,
329, 26 Atl. 941.
The reasons underlying these legal propositions are stated in the
opinion in the case just cited, as follows: "It is a universal principle
in the law of agency that the powers of the agent are to be exercised
for the benefit of the principal, and not of the agent or third parties.
Persons dealing with one whom they know to be an agent and to be
exercising his authority for his own benefit acquire no rights against
the principal by the transaction.
Such a transaction is usually, and perhaps properly, spoken of by the courts as fraudulent; but, however
honest the intention of the parties, the agent's act is invalid, merely
because the circumstances known to both prove it to be ultra vires."
Tiedeman on Commer. Paper, § 92, says:
"It is implied in every
agency, in the absence of express evidence to the contrary, that the
power of the agent is to be exercised for the benefit of the principal,
This principle was applied by
and not for his own private advantage."
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the Supreme Court of Virginia in Stainback v. Bank of Virginia, 11
Grat. 269, in which, after stating the nature of the agent's powers, the
court held as follows : "A party dealing with the agent, with knowledge
or means of knowledge that under such a power he is indorsing the
name of his principal for his own benefit, is not entitled to recover
from the principal." In Stainer v. Tysen, 3 Hill 279, the rule is declared in this language : "The naked power to do acts for and in the
name of the principal negatives all authority on the part of the attorney
to act for the benefit of any one besides the principal, and persons dealing with the attorney as such are bound to notice this limitation."
Other cases illustrating the rule are Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill 262 ; Suckley v. Tunno, 1 Brev. 257; Holden v. Durant, 29 Vt. 184, Odiorne v.
Maxcy, 13 -Mass. 178; Bank v. Studley, 1 Mo. App. 260.
Most of these are cases in which the agent pledged or sold the paper
in payment of his own debt, so that the third party dealing with him
This,
derived a peculiar benefit from the unauthorized
transaction.
however, does not seem to be the reason for denying validity of title in
such purchaser.
It seems to stand upon the want of authority in the
agent to exercise his powers for his own benefit or for the benefit of
anybody except his principal. Knowledge of this perversion of authority on the part of the purchaser is necessary to the invalidity of his
title, of course.
But when he does have such knowledge, he is bound
to know the want of authority in the agent to so use his powers.
In
the case of Dowden v. Cryder the purchaser was not a creditor of the
agent. He took the draft in exchange for $2,060 in cash and a diamond
necklace valued at $1,100. There was no advantage in the transaction
to the purchaser, except a possible profit on the necklace and the
discount of $40 allowed.
In Trust Co. v. Abbott, 44 N. J. Law, 257,
the agent held a power of attorney authorizing him to sign the principal's name to any paper or papers, notes, etc. He drew a note in his
own favor, and signed the principal's name by himself as agent, and
sold it to the defendant.
In the action on the note, the court held that
the power did not justify the signing of such documents as were
ribed in it for purposes outside of the principal's business, and
that the burden was upon the plaintiff to show that he was a bona fide
In stating the reason for the rule,
holder, for value, before maturity.
the court -aid: "But in whichever form the instrument was delivered,
it did not justify the signing <>f notes for purposes outside of the principal's business.
The note in suit was not fjivm for such a purpose.
but was put forth for the personal benefit of the attorney, who eon
1 it- proceeds to his own U e.
It was therefore issued under an
apparent authority, but in fraud of the principal." The court rev<
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, because the evidence did not
show when, from whom, and under what circumstances the attorney
had received the mon<
The same principle was enunciated and applied by this court in
W. Va. 1 is. Id S. !•'.. 398, 88 \m. St.
Rohrbough v.

the
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See, also, Express Co. v. Trego, 35 Md. 47.
This is a
Rep. 849.
heavy penalty to visit upon the bank, but nothing worse than would
have befallen it had any other limitation upon the agent's power been
( )ther instances of such penalties, consequent upon nondisregarded.
i bservance oi legal rights, arc to be found all along the beaten highof the law. Take one who pays full value
way of the administration
| [e loses
for property, knowing the sale is made to defraud creditors.
everything, while, if the same sale had been made to a person ignorant
<^i the intent, it would have been valid.
( m the basis >>\ an assertion of title to the note and repudiation
of
the agency by the representation
of right to use the money, the case
-lands no better, [f I luston had no title under the paper, taken in connection with hi- former representation of agency, the bank had no
right to rely upon his mere verbal assertion of title. Title to property
cannot be acquired in that way.
Having knowledge of a fact, sufficient to put it upon inquiry, at least — the admission of agency — the
bank was bound to make a proper inquiry, and this requirement could
not be satisfied by an inquiry directed to the party whose interest it
would be to misinform as to, and deny, the very fact sought for. 7
Cyc. "42; Carter v. Lehman, 90 Ala. 126, 7 South. 735.
For the error of the court in excluding the defendant's evidence and
directing a verdict for plaintiff, the judgment must be reversed, the
verdict set aside, a new trial allowed, and the case remanded.

w"
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and Custom

CAWTHORN
(Supreme

Court of Alabama.

1892.

v.

LUSK.

97

Ala.

674.

11

South.

731.)

Head, J. The action is brought by appellants to recover damages
for the breach of an agreement for the sale of 800 sacks of dried
The
grapes, made by Stollenwerck & Co., as agents of defendants.
case was tried by the city court without a jury, and judgment rendered
The sale of the grapes by Stollenwerck & Co. at 3^
for defendants.
cents per pound f. o. b. to be delivered in September and October following, and that the intention and understanding of these parties was
that the sale was a finality ; also that defendants refused to deliver the
The only disputed question of
grapes. — are uncontroverted facts.
fact relates to the authority of Stollenwerck & Co. to bind defendants
by the contract of -ale, without first submitting it for their acceptance
rejection.
Defendants, who reside and are doing business in California, while
nwerck & Co. are their agents or brokers in
conceding thai
Birmingham, Ala., to sell dried fruits, claim that they were only authorized to make contracts of sale subject to confirmation. That such
<>r
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is the nature and extent of their general authority is shown by the
letter of instructions, dated July 9, 1890, sent by defendants to them.
and by the general custom of the trade, of which plaintiffs, having
been engaged in the same business in Birmingham for several years,
are chargeable with notice.
The question then arises whether authority, express or implied, was
subsequently conferred to sell the grapes at 3^ cents per pound.
Plaintiffs claim that such authority is implied from a telegram sent by
defendants to Stollenwerck & Co., when interpreted by the custom
The law presumes that when a commercial
and usage of the trade.
agency is to be exercised, in the absence of limitation or prohibition, it
is to be conducted in the mode authorized and justified by the customs

In Guesnard v. Railroad Co.,
and usages of such trade or business.
76 Ala. 453, this doctrine is asserted as follows : "Where a mercantile
agency is to be executed at a particular place, the principal who employs the agent is presumed to consent that he may execute it, in the
absence of particular instructions, according to the general custom
and usage relating to that kind of trade or business, whatever it may
be.
The law implies that he gives his consent for his agent to act as
all other similar agents who are honest and diligent are accustomed to
do; and it is immaterial, as a general rule, whether the principal is
informed as to such customs and usages or not." It is true that, when
written instrument, the nature and extent of
authority must be ascertained from the instrument itself, and
cannot be enlarged by parol proof. This rule is not violated by the
They are admitted, not
admission of proof of the usages of trade.
for the purpose of enlarging, but of interpreting, the powers actually
"The known usages of trade and business
Savs Judge Story:
given.
true
often become the
exponents of the nature and extent of an imStory, Ag, § 96; Wheeler v. McGuire, 86 Ala. 398,
plied authority."
uth. 190, 2 L. K. A. 808.
The telegram referred to was sent by defendants to Stollenwerck &
Co. [uly IS. 1890, and i- a- follows: "Cannot offer dried grapes below
3'.. f. o. b. Have advanced t" .V'',." This tele-ram was in response
to cine sent by Stollenwerck & Co. to defendants the day before, of
which the following is a copy: "< >rmsby offering dried grapes 4.70.
Can't you let us meet that price?" The evidence shows a custom or

an agency is created by a
the

that a telegram sent by the principal
e of the trade to the effeel
to the broker, giving a price, without any stipulation in the tele]
that -ahs made at such price shall he subjeel to confirmation
by the
principal, is authority to the broker to sell finally and unconditionally
were. Tin's custom
at that price, no matter what the prior instructions
tiffed to I,-. tWO witnesses, whose testimony is uncontradicted.
True, [sadore facobs, who represents defendants, testifies: "None <. f
our letter- or telegrams to Stollenwerck & Co. instructed them to
dried grapes, our instructions being to take order- for dried gl
'
nfirmation; and, even if letters or tele-rams had been
Why
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sent instructing brokers
to sell, it would he understood
that they
could only sell subject to confirmation, unless specially stated, 'You
"
may sell without confirmation.'
It will be observed thai the witness does not deny the existence of
the custom, but only testifies to the private understanding between
defendants and their brokers. Such private understanding is not binding on plaintiffs, unless communicated to them. There is no pretense
that it was communicated;
on the contrary, the evidence shows that

of July 18, 1890, was shown to plaintiffs as Stollenwcrck
Co.'s authority to make a final and unconditional sale.
We find
from the evidence that there was such custom.
Considering the telegram in connection with the one to which it was a response, it might
well he contended, without reference to the custom, that it was at least
implied authority to sell dried grapes at Z 1/^ cents per pound f. o. b.
But it is not necessary to so find. There being no instruction or stipulation in the telegram that sales at that price are subject to confirmation, Stollenwerck & Co. were thereby authorized under the custom
to sell finally and unconditionally the grapes to plaintiffs, and defendants are bound by the contract of sale to the same extent as if they
had sold the grapes.
Herring v. Skaggs, 62 Ala. 180, 34 Am. Rep. 4. 15
The measure of damages is the difference between the price which
plaintiffs agreed to pay for the grapes, including cost of transportation to Birmingham, and the market price at Birmingham at the time
of delivery, with interest.
Under the evidence, we assess the plaintiffs' damages at the sum of $945.
The judgment of the city court
is reversed, and a judgment will be entered in this court in favor of
the plaintiffs for said sum of $945, together with the costs in this court
and the city court.
This opinion, except as to assessment of damages, was prepared by
the late Justice Clopton.
Reversed and rendered.
the telegram
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&

is Accord:
Lowenstein v. Lombard, 164 N. Y. 324, 58 N. E. 44 (1900);
Cruzan v. Smith, 41 Ind. 288 (1872), quoting Story on Agency.
A merchant in London, who employs an agent in Liverpool, is bound by the
usage of trade at Liverpool.
Graves v. Legg, 2 H. & N. 210, 26 L. J. Ex.
316, 3 Jnr. (N. S.) 519, 5 W. R. 597 (1857).
One who authorizes his agent to
sell on the Stock Exchange by Implication authorizes a sale in the form and
on the conditions usual on the Stock Exchange.
Ilarker v. Edwards, 57 L.
J. Q. B. 1 17 (1887). But the custom must affect only the mode of performing
the contract and not its intrinsic character.
Robinson v. Mollett, 44 L. J.
C. P. 362, L. R. 7 H. L. 802, 33 L. T. 544 (1874), reversing 20 W. R. 544 (1872).
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DENVER ENGINEERING WORKS
CO.

(Court of Appeals of Colorado,

1901.

17 Colo.

App. 15, 67 Pac. 173.)

Action for the price of mining machinery, sold by the Denver ComOn
pany to one Berkey, who was sales agent of the Gates Company.
Works,
B.
Iron
L.
"Gates
was
his
printed:
office
of
the window
and
His
cards
Kinds."
of
all
Machinery
Mining
Manager.
Berkey,
Plaintiff made no further
letter heads contained similar statements.
inquiry as to Berkey 's authority. From a directed verdict for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
16
* *
Thomson,
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Discussing the question of the duty of
third persons dealing with an ostensible agent, Mr. Mechem says:
"In approaching the consideration of the inquiry whether an assumed
authority exists in a given case, there are certain fundamental principles which must not be lost sight of. Among these are, as has been
that an agency
seen : That the law indulges in no bare presumption
That
the agent
facts.
from
It must be proved or presumed
exists.
or by
his
representations
either
by
cannot establish his own authority,
be
established
by
cannot
an
authority
That
it.
assuming to exercise
is
authority
a
even
That
general
reputation.
or
mere rumor
general
not an unlimited one, and that every authority must find its ultimate
source in some act of the principal. Persons dealing with an assumed
agent, therefore, whether the assumed agency be a general or special
one, are bound, at their peril, to ascertain not only the fact of the
agency, but the extent of the authority ; and, in case either is controverted, the burden of proof is upon them to establish it." Mechem,
Ag. § 276. In Lester v. Snyder. 12 Colo. App. 351, 55 Pac. 613, the

J.

ling was expressly approved.
the case at bar Mr. Miller, the general manager of the plaintiff,
who conducted the transaction in question in its behalf, made no inquiry with reference to the authority of Mr. Berkey : and neither himself nor his company had any knowledge of the relations existing between Berkey and the defendant, except what was shown by the letter
It was in reliance upon these that the
head, sign, card, and circular.
was the general agenl of the defendMr.
Berkey
sold.
was
rty
The deTie was the manager of its Denver office.
ant at Denver.
fendant was bound by the arts of Mr. Berkey within his apparenl au■

In

Where a person holds oul another to the public as having a
general authority to act for him in the particular business in which he
imaged, third persons ma) safely deal with the agenl in the trans
But there is a limit to the authority of an
action of such business.
agent, general or special, and the principal is not bound by his ad
No matter how extensive the authority of an
outside of such limit.

thority.

n

i

it

<>f the opinion

Lb

omitted

Tin: AUTHORITY

•".1 I

(Pari

2

agent may be in the transaction of his principal's business, it is still
and his act outside of the boundary by
confined to thai business;
which the business is circumscribed
would not hind his principal.
Stewart v. \\ oodward, 50 \ t. 78, 28 Am. Rep. 488 ; President, etc., of
Mechanics- Bank v. New York & X. M. K. Co., 13 X. Y. 5"'); Rich-

Greeley, 38 Iowa, 666; Eougue v. Burgess, 71 Mo. 389; Ed
Dooley, 120 X. Y. 5 10. 24 X. E. X27 ; Navigation Co. v.
Dandridge,8 Gill & I. 248, 29 Am. Doc. 543; McAlpin v. Cassidy, 17
Tex. 450; Story, A.g. § *7.
Now, Mr. Miller knew that the defendant was engaged in the manMe was so advised by the
ufacture i>i general mining machinery.
letter head.
The sign on the window appears to have been substantially the same as the letter head. The card did not describe the defendant as a manufacturer, but presented a picture of its manufacturing establishment and machine shops, with the words "Mining Machinery of Every Description"; and, as Berkey was held out as the
agent ^i a manufacturer, his apparent authority extended only to the
That the defendant
sale of the goods manufactured by his principal.
allowed him to style himself its manager is immaterial, because he
could bind the defendant only in the management of the business
in which it was engaged.
There was nothing in the evidence of
authority which Mr. Miller saw and upon which he relied to warrant
him in assuming that Mr. Herkey had any authority to buy mining maSo far as appearances went, — at least appearances for which
chinery.
the defendant was responsible, — the purchase of mining machinery was
no part of the defendant's business ; and there was nothing to indicate
There
that Mr. Berkey was empowered to act outside of its business.
and, in
was no apparent authority in Berkey to buy this machinery,
order to bind the defendant by his contract, the burden was on the
plaintiff to prove that the purchase was specially authorized by it.
Mining Co. v. Fraser, 2 Colo. App. 14, 29 Pac. 667.
While the plaintiff, in making the sale, relied exclusively upon the
visible indicia of Berkey's authority, at the trial it undertook to prove
in Denver of
a custom among agencies handling mining machinery
When or how the custom
purchasing goods from local companies.
originated, or how long it lasted, is not stated, except that it prevailed
We do not think
in Denver in the fall and winter of 1896 and 1897.
Rethis assertion of a custom requires very elaborate discussion.
specting the effect which custom or usage may have upon the manner
in which an agent may transact the business of his principal, Mr. Mechem says: "Where the principal confers upon his agent an authority
of a kind or empowers him to transact business of a nature in referand publicly known usage, it is
ence to which there is a well-defined
of the law, in the absence of anything to indicate a
the presumption
contrary intent, that the authority was conferred in contemplation of
the usage; and third persons, therefore, who deal with the asrent in
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faith and in the exercise of reasonable prudence, will be protected
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against limitations upon the usual authority, of which they had no
notice. In order to give the usage this effect, it must be reasonable ; it
must not violate positive law ; and it must have existed for such a
time, and become so widely and generally known, as to warrant the
that the principal had it in his view at the time of the
presumption
appointment
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It

is

of the agent."

only, however, the mode of transacting the business which can

be affected by usage. Xo man can be compelled by custom to alter the
character of his business.
Concluding the section from which we have
"Usage, however, cannot
already quoted, Mr. Mechem says further:
operate to change the intrinsic character of the relation, nor will it be
permitted, as between the principal and the agent, or as between the
principal and third persons having notice of them, to contravene express instructions, or to contradict an express contract to the contrary. So a usage not known to the principal cannot operate to authorize the making of an invalid instead of a valid contract, or to bind
him to take one thing when he has ordered another."
Aside from the fact that the custom mentioned in the evidence here
was not defined, it had no such term of existence as to make it binding
on any one; but, waiving this objection, whatever may have been its
nature and limits, it could afford no protection to the plaintiff.
So
far as the plaintiff knew or had any right to believe, ami so far as

know or have any right to believe, the business of the defendant
was confined to the manufacture and sale of mining machinery; and
no custom in any locality where it sent an agent to act for it could
force it to do a different business.
Presumptively because it manufactured mining machinery it did not desire to buy mining machinery,
and no custom, however ancient or well-defined, could compel it to
do so. 17
It seems that some time after the transaction in question Berkey informed the defendant of his purchase as having been made on his own
account, and the defendant proposed to assist him in doing an individual business, but there was no ratification.
Proof was proffered
by the- defendant that it knew nothing of the purchases as having been
made for it, thai Berkey had no authority to make the purchase, and
that it never in any manner recognized the purchase as having been
< If course, the
made in its behalf; bul the evidence was all excluded.
-ion was error; bu1 it can hardly he said that it worked harm to
the defendant.
The burden was on the plaintiff to prove the agent's
authority and ever) fad which mighl tend to mala- his contracl the con
tract of his principal, and, in the absence of such proof, disproof by the

we

i7 General customs are Judicial!] known, and form part of the law.
Local
Moore v. Tickle, n v C.
customs cannot alter the law, and must be proved.
Ex
244 (1831).
Whal i- usual Is nol always matter of judicial knowledge.
Reese v. Bates, '-'i
Istence of :i custom It often for the Jury on the evidence.
\ a. 321, 20 s. B. 863 (1807);
Hlchborn v. Bradley, iit towa, 130, 00 \. \V.
502

' 1002).
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defendant was unnecessary.
Upon the evidence there was no question
to submit to the jury.
To this extent we agree with the court. Jint it
was on the plaintiff's side that the failure was, and the judgment
should have been for the defendant.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proReversed.
ceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.

FARNSWORTH
(Supreme

Judicial

v.

Court of Massachusetts,
Dec.

HEMMER.
18G1.

1

Allen,

494,

79 Am.

756.)

Contract, brought by a real estate broker to recover a commission
for his services in negotiating an exchange of land between the defendant and Fanny W. Cooper.
At the trial in the superior court, it appeared that the plaintiff was
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a real estate broker,

and was employed by the defendant

to negotiate

or exchange of certain real estate in Boston, and that through
his aid an exchange thereof was effected with Mrs. Cooper for real
estate owned by her, which she in like manner had employed the plaintiff to aid her in selling or exchanging, before his employment by the
defendant, and that he accordingly acted for both parties, and charged
a commission
to both, and that he had commenced an action which
was still pending against Mrs. Cooper, to recover the commission
charged to her. The plaintiff never informed the defendant that he
was acting for Mrs. Cooper, and there was no evidence that the defendant knew the fact.
The plaintiff offered evidence of a custom
among the brokers of Boston to charge a commission to both parties
in cases like the present, and the defendant, for the purpose of testing
the validity of such custom, admitted that it could be proved to exist,
but claimed that, if proved, it was a bad custom, and invalid in law ;
and Lord, J., so ruled.
A verdict was accordingly returned for the
defendant, and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.
Bigexow, C. J. The principle on which rests the well-settled doctrine, that a man cannot become the purchaser of property for his
own use and benefit which is intrusted to him to sell, is equally applicable when the same person, without the authority or consent of
the parties interested, undertakes to act as the agent of both vendor
and purchaser.
The law does not allow a man to assume relations
so essentially inconsistent
and repugnant to each other.
The duty
of an agent for a vendor is to sell the property at the highest price;
of the agent of the purchaser to buy it for the lowest. These duties
are so utterly irreconcilable
and conflicting that they cannot be performed by the same person without great danger that the rights of
one principal will be sacrificed to promote the interests of the other,
or that neither of them will enjoy the benefit of a discreet and faiththe sale
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ful exercise of the trust reposed in the agent. As it cannot be supposed that a vendor and purchaser would employ the same person
to act as their agent to buy and sell the same property, it is clear
that it operates as a surprise on both parties, and is a breach of the
trust and confidence intended to be reposed in the agent by them
respectively, if his intent to act as agent of both in the same transIt is of the essence of his contract
action is concealed from them.
that he will use his best skill and judgment to promote the interest
This he cannot do, where he acts for two persons
of his employer.
He is therefore guilty of a
whose interests are essentially adverse.
all.
He
commits a fraud on his
Nor
this
his
contract.
is
breach of
or knowledge, to act
their
assent
in
without
principals
undertaking,
as their mutual agent, because he conceals from them an essential
fact, entirely within his own knowledge, which he was bound in the
Story on Agency, § 31 ;
exercise of good faith to disclose to them.
Copeland v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 6 Pick. 198, 204; Pugsley v. Murray,
4 E. D. Smith, 245 ; Rupp v. Sampson, 16 Gray, 398, 77 Am. Dec.
416.

Such being the well-settled rule of law, it follows that the evidence
A custom or usage to be
offered by the plaintiff was inadmissible.
legal and valid must be reasonable and consistent with good morals
and sound policy, so that parties may be supposed to have made their
18
If such a usage is shown to exist,
contracts with reference to it.
then it becomes the law by which the rights of the parties are to be
But the usage on which the plaintiff relied
regulated and governed.
It would be unreasonable,
was wanting in these essential elements.
because, if established, it would operate to prevent the faithful fulfillIt would be contrary to good morment of the contract of agency.
als and sound policy, because it would tend to sanction an unwarrantable concealment of facts essential to a contract, and operate as
a fraud on parties who had a right to rely on the confidence reposed
in their agents. Exceptions overruled.

EARKSDALE
itutional Court of South

v.

Carolina,
Dec.

BROWN.
1816.

1

Nott & McC.

517,

Am.

720.)

Action for tin- proceed <>i~rice sent t<> defendants t<>sell as factors,
with instructions to sell for cash. They sold to one Powers, who ship
ped it and wrni off without paying for it.
it, J. 1" Thai
does, in many instances constitute the law,
and that contracts must lie con trued with reference to the usage of
i« A usage in contravention of a well-settled and Balutary rule <>f Law can
not be sustained bj courts ol lustice. Raisin v. Clark, n bid. 158, 20 Am. Rep.

Ferguson v. Gooch, 94 V*. I. 26 8. B. 897, W I.. R. A. 234 (1S0G);
Robinson v. Mollett, L. R. 7 II. I.. B02, n L. J. 0. P. 862, 88 L. T. Rep. N. s.
•Ml (1874).
i» Part of the opinion is omitted.

86 (1874);

318

THE

AUTHORITY

(Part

2

I

is

it

it

;

a

is

is

I

do not mean to say that no confidence

to be placed in the man

I

if

is

is

of good credit, or that property may not, in any instance, be delivOn the contrary all
ered to the purchaser until the money
paid.
the confidence which
necessary, in the usual course of business,
think ought to he allowed.
should have thought that
the factors
for the money when they delivered
bank
had received
on
check
the rice, that they would have acted within the scope of their authorhad been dishonored.
purSuch conduct in
ity, even though
chaser would have been a species of swindling against which
could
not have been expected that the seller would have been guarded.
The
it

a

it

a

a

I

* it
*

a

*

a

a

a

a

few words.
If factor
whole doctrine, indeed, may be expressed in
confidence which amounts to giving credit to
reposes
purchaser,
when he has been directed to sell for cash, he does
at his own risk,
21
and must he an.swerable for the consequences.
new trial refused.
.Motion for
Wis. 2o3 (1858):
Hall v. Storrs,
"The general rule in regard
Accord:
the admissibility of usage requires that
should be reasonable, certaiu,
and consistent with the general known import of the words used in the conRedfield, .1., in Catlin v. Smith, 24
tract in which tin- us;il:c is to lie applied."
Vr. 85 (1851).
Cf. Smith v. Wits,,],.
B.
Adol. 728 (1832); Clark v. Van
Northwick,
Pick. 343 (1823).
Proof of usage is admissible to interpret the
meaning of tin- contract, or, where its meaning is equivocal or obscure, to
ascertain it- nature ami extent, but not to vary its terms, or introduce new
1'arsons v.
conditions, or contravene the specific instructions to the agent.
.Martin. 11 Gray, 111 (1858).
'tin- dissenting opinion of Cheves, J., is omitted
7

20

&

:;

it

to

1
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a

I

it,

ir.uk- or business lo which they relate, are principles too well established to be questioned now.
Numerous examples are to be found
among the cases arising on policies of insurance;
and perhaps no
stronger case can be found than that of three days grace allowed in
- of hills of
But to entitle a usage to that high respect,
exchange.
it must be a reasonable one.
It must he for the benefil of trade generally, and not for the convenience and benefit of a particular class
oi individuals. 20 And 1 can conceive of no usage that will authorize
a departure
from positive instructions.
The instructions of a principal to his agent make the law by which he is to he governed.
And
to authorize him to depart from them would he depriving the parI can see no benefit
ties of the privilege of making their own terms.
resulting to the community from such usage. It is calculated rather
to destroy that confidence which is necessary for the encouragement
of trade. No planter would dare to trust his property in the hands
of a factor upon such terms. That such courtesy has been indulged
have
until now, and that it would he thought uncivil to refuse
difand
no douht
have as little doubt that any factor attempting
once
But let
ferent method of doing business would suffer by it.
be underbecome general, and no inconvenience would result.
Let
stood that
factor
to give indulgence at his own risk, and that he
not to sacrifice the interest of the planter to the feelings of the
merchant, and the evil will correct itself.
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SECTION 3.— APPARENT AUTHORITY
I. In Gexerai,

PICKERING
(Court of King's Bench,

1812.

v.

BUSK.

15 East,

38, 13 Rev.

Rep. 364.)

Trover for hemp. Swallow, a broker, had bought for plaintiff two
of hemp, one of which was transferred in the books of the
wharfinger to the name of Swallow, the other to the name of PickerThe hemp was paid for by the plaintiff, and later
ing or Swallow.
sold by Swallow to defendant's assignor in bankruptcy.
Lord El*LENBO ROUGH, C. J. It cannot fairly be questioned in
this case but that Swallow had an implied authority to sell. Strangers
can only look to the acts of the parties, and to the external indicia
of property, and not to the private communications which may pass
between a principal and his broker, and if a person authorize another
to assume the apparent right of disposing of property in the ordinary
course of trade, it must be presumed that the apparent authority is
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parcels

the real authority, I cannot subscribe to the doctrine, that a broker's
engagements are necessarily and in all cases limited to his actual authority, the reality of which is afterwards to be tried by the fact.
It is clear that he may hind his principal within the limits of the authority with which he has been apparently clothed by the principal
in respect of the subject matter;
and there would he no safety in

transactions if he could not.
If the principal send his commodity to a place, where it is the ordinary business of the person to
whom it is confided to sell, it must he intended that the commodity
was sent thither for the purpose of sale.
If the owner of a horse
send it to a repository of sale, can it he implied that he sent it thither
( )r if one send goods to
for any other purpose than that of sale?

mercantile

an auction-room,

can it he supposed that he sent them thither merely
afe custody?
Where the commodity is sent in such a wax- and
to such a place a- to exhibit an apparent purpose of sale, the principal will In- bound, and the purchaser safe.
The case of a factor not being able to pledge the goods of his prin
cipal confided to him for -air. though clothed with an apparenl owner-hip, has been pre sed upon us in the argument, and considerably
The court, however, will decide that quesdistressed our decision.
tion when it ai
insistently with the principle on which the pres
It was a hard doctrine when the pawnee
ent decision is founded.
]
had no authorit)
told that the pledger of i
to pledge
them, being a mere factor for sale; and yet since tl
sou v. Tash, thai doctrine has never been overturned.
I remember
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Mr. Wallace arguing in Campbell v. Wright, 4 Burr. 2046, that the
bills of lading ought to designate the consignee as factor, otherwise
il was luu jusl that the consignors should abide l>y the consequence
of having misled the pawnees.
The present ease, however, is not
the case of a pawn, but that of a sale by a broker having the possession for the purpose of sale.
The sale was made by a person who
had all the indicia of property; the hemp could only have been transferred into his name for the purpose of sale; and the party who has
so transferred it cannot now rescind the contract.
If the plaintiff
had intended to retain the dominion over the hemp, he should
placed it in the wharfinger's books in his own name.

GIIXMAN

v.

ROBINSON. 22

(At Nisi Prlua in the Court of Common Pleas,
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M. 226,

28

Rev.

have

Rep. 795,

12

1S25.

1

E. C.

L.

Car. & P.

642,

Ryan &

304.)

Assumpsit for goods sold. One Womack ordered goods on defendant's account, but intercepted them on the way, and applied them
to his own use.
He had bought goods of plaintiffs and others several
times before as the agent of defendant, for which defendant had paid.
Best, C. J. Upon principle, if a man holds another out to the
world as his general agent, he is responsible for his acts; and it is
important that it should be so, because, otherwise, a man might accredit another, and, after he had cheated many to their ruin, turn
round and say, Though this man appeared as my agent, yet he had
no authority from me. You must be satisfied, not only that the goods
were ordered for the defendant, but that the authority of the party
ordering them was so far recognized as to render the defendant reIt is admitted, that, in the cases of policies and bills of
sponsible.
This feature in
exchange, agency is proved by several instances.
the law of agency is not confined to those cases, but applies equally
and similarly to the ordering of goods.
* \
Verdict for the plaintiffs.

ANTRIM IRON
(Supreme

Court of Michigan,

1905.

CO. v.
140

ANDERSON.

Mich.

702,

104

X. W.

319,

112

Am.

St. Rep. 434.)

Carpenter, J.
Plaintiff brings this action of replevin to recover
timber cut from section 31, Star township, Antrim county, Mich.,
by one Elgie Dow, and by Dow sold to defendant.
On the 10th of
September, 1902, plaintiff, the owner of said timber, acting through
23

-- Another case, based upon orders of the same agent, was similarly decided in the Court of King's Bench.
Todd v. Robinson, Ryan & Moody, 217,
21 K. C. L. 736 (1825).
' be opinion is
Par
omitted.
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cept that on section 31.
Defendant's testimony tends to prove that
it covered the standing timber on all the land embraced within the
written contract, including that on section 31.
At the time this oral
contract was made it was contemplated by Bolio and Dow that it
should be put in writing; and that in the meantime, according to the
testimony of the defendant, Dow might enter upon the lands, and
commence cutting and removing the timber.
Bolio testifies that he
subsequently did execute a writing, and mail it to Dow, and that in
this writing the timber standing on section 31 was not included.
Dow
testifies that this writing was never received by him, and that before
he was interfered with he had cut the timber in question.
It is conceded that the consideration paid by Dow was actually received by
plaintiff. Plaintiff never gave Bolio any written authority to act for
nor any express verbal authority to sell the timber standing on
section 31. The issue was submitted to
verjury, who rendered
dict for the defendant.
Plaintiff brings the case to this court, and
urges many reasons why the judgment entered on said verdict should
be reversed.
We answer many of those reasons by saying, first, though the contract to sell the standing timber was invalid as
contract because not
in writing (see Russell v. Myers, 32 Mich. 522),
was good as
license, and the timber, having been cut before the license was revoked,
became the property of Dow; second,
was not necessary that the
agent who gave this license should have written authority.
Spalding
v. Archibald, 52 Mich. 365. 17 X. W. 940, 50 Am. Rep. 253.
authoris

it

a

it

a

a

a

it,

ity for

ea<-h of the foregoing
Plaintiff contends thai thi

propositions.
no evidence tending to prove that
Bolio had even verbal authority to sell this timber to Dow.
The undisputed evidence shows that Bolio did have authority to contract
with Dow for the lumbering of all this timber, and thai he also had
authority to sell Dow all the Standing timber covered
said contract
that on section 31.
There was also evidence thai Dow boughl
the timber believing
Bolio had authority to sell it.
The legal rule
applicable to this
Mi:. Mechem
his work
orrectl) stated
on Agency (section 283)
lie principal
bound to third
persons who have relied thereon in good faith and
ignorance of
— L'l
Godd.Pb.A
by

re was

A

in

is

in

I

a

i

by

!■
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its agent. Charles L. Bolio. entered into a contract with Dow, whereby
Dow agreed to cut, skid, draw, and load on cars the timber in question and the timber standing on four other sections belonging to
plaintiff. In February, 1903, this contract was rescinded, and a new
and oral contract made, by which Dow purchased from the plaintiff.
through said Bolio, its agent, certain timber standing on the land covered by the former written contract.
There is a dispute as to what standing timber was embraced in
this new oral contract.
Plaintiff's testimony tends to prove that it
covered all the standing timber embraced in the written contract, ex-

T,'i.: AUTHORITY

.i-2

(Part

2

or restrictions by (he apparent authority he lias given
agent, and nol 1>\ the actual or express authority where that
differs from the apparent : and this, too, whether the agency be a
' '
genera] or a special one."
Under this rule it cannot be said thai Bolio did not have verbal
The court charged, in
authority to make the contract in question.
effect, that the jury might find that plaintiff ratified the action of its
Plaintiff contends that there was no evidence justifying
agent, Bolio.
this charge.
If so. the charge was not erroneous, because it bore only
upon the question of Bolio's authority, and under the rule we have just
* * *
stated the undisputed testimony established that authority.
any limitations
to the

_

JOHNSTON
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(Supreme

v.

MILWAUKEE

Court of Nebraska,

1895.

&

W. INV. CO.

40 Neb. 480,

64 N. W. 1100.)

Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.
This was an action of replevin for 250 head of cattle
by the defendant in error against the plaintiffs in error. On the first
trial there was a verdict and judgment in favor of the defendants in
Inthe district court.
This judgment was reversed by this court.
vestment Co. v. Johnston, 35 Neb. 554, 53 N. W. 475.
The case has
been retried, resulting in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and
*
the defendants now prosecute error. * *
On the trial in the district court a special verdict was taken,
whereby, under instructions conformable to the former opinion, the
jury found that no such custom prevailed. The jury also found that,
prior to the sale of the cattle in question, Adams had not, with the
plaintiff's knowledge, performed any similar acts, and under a peremptory instruction there was a finding that Adams possessed no acThere were other findings, not matual authority to make the sale.
consider.
The former opinion
shall
terial to the questions which we
no
actual
existed for the
a
that
authority
holding
strongly implied
sale made by Adams, and we shall not here reconsider that question.
The judgment in favor of the plaintiff was evidently entered on the
theory that, in the absence of such actual authority, or apparent, conferred either by a custom pi business or by the exercise of prior similar acts, the plaintiff couljd not be bound by Adams' acts.
Replevin.

Irvine,

C 25

One instruction given by the court clearly shows that the judgment
proceeded on this theory. \This instruction was as follows: "An act

C

-' Sr^e Bentley v. Doggett,
quoting Story on Agency, §
his agent within the scope
world to possess."
Baker v.
486 (1887).
2s part of

the opinion

51\Wis. 224, 8 N. W. 155, .37 Am. Rep. 827 (1881),
"The principal is bound by all the acts of
of the authority which he holds him out to the
K. C, S. J. & C. B. Ky. Co., 91 Mo. 152, 3 s. W.
127.

is omitted.
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a

■
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[

by
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is within the apparent authority of the agent when it is of like character as that of prior acts performed hy him for the same principal,
and which such principal, knowing the same, sanctioned or ratified.
The act of an agent within his apparent, but not within his real, authority, will bind his principal only in case the person dealing with
such agent knew of such prior acts, and dealt with the agent in reliance thereon ; and in this case you are instructed
that, unless y< >u
find from a preponderance of the evidence that Thomas R. Adamhad, prior to the sale of these cattle, performed acts of a similar character, and that the plaintiff, after knowledge or notice thereof, sanctioned or ratified such prior similar acts, then you will not be justified in finding that Adam- possessed the apparent authority to sell
the cattle in question.
The defendants cannot base any rights in this
action upon the ground that they dealt with Thomas R. Adams as
having the apparent authority to sell the cattle, unless it appears from
the evidence that they, or one of them, knew of facts giving such apparent authority to Adams, and acted upon such appearances in the
transaction of purchasing the cattle in question.
The mere fact that
the plaintiff had intrusted the care, management, and possession of
these cattle to Thomas R. Adams gave him no authority to sell them.
Although authority on the part of an agent may, in proper cases, be
implied from the word- and conduct of the parties, or from the circumstances of the case, yet the extent of the authority so implied cannot exceed the necessary and legitimate effect of the facts from which
it i- inferred, but must be limited to the performance
of like acts unThe authority, if implied at all, can only
der like circumstances.
be implied from facts."
In the light of all the instructions
it was clearly the view of the
court that, having disposed of the question of actual authority, and
the jury having found that no such general custom existed as would,
under the former opinion of the court, confer authority upon the
agent, no apparent authority could exist, unless by the exercise by
jent of such authority in the past, supplemented by knowledge
of those act- on the part of the company, and by similar knowl<
on the pari of defendants, relied on by them in making the purchase.
It i- familiar law that a principal
bound
the acts of his agent
not only when performed
within the scope of his actual or implied
authority, but when within tin
apparent authority conferred
upon him by the principal.
There have been many cases distinguish
tin
between
special agent, and
ing
general agenl and
not without value, although in most cases
perhaps this distinction
-imply throws back one step the process of investigation.
Indeed,
with regard to act- of corporations,
has often been said that the onl)
their corporate capacity.
agents are it- din
genera]
cting
Strict application of the distinction would therefore constitute all
of corporations nol performed under
resolution of the board of
special agents, and would require all persons deal
i
f

di

a

in

it

it
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pursuance

of such resolutions,

2
to

at one stage oi the law, might have been a proper doctrine.
But the courts must take notice of the fad thaj the province of corthat corporations
dons is now vastly enlarged;
now exist, not
only for the transaction of public or ecclesiastical affairs, but for the
We have now
purpose <>f carrying on ordinary business transactions.
and other institunot only operating railroads
private corporations
tions having quasi public functions, but also corporations conducting
banks, manufacturing establishments, live-stock raising, as in the present instance, and even retail shops.
The domain of individual enterprise has. in other words, been invaded by corporations; and in
the conduct of such enterprises we can see no reason and no principle of law requiring the application of rules to such corporations
different from those applying to individuals under similar circumstances, except where the acts relate to the operations of the corporation in its capacity as such. What we mean to express by this is that
in transactions having no relation to the corporation in its corporate
capacity, but solely in regard to the conduct of its business affairs, the
* * *
general principles applicable to individuals should apply.

is

it

in

a

is

a

is

a

a

dJl

The sale of these cattle was clearly within the power of the corThe only question was the apparent authority of this parporation.
ticular agent of the corporation to make the sale ; and we may thus
divest ourselves in the present inquiry of all investigation as to corporate functions, and consider whether or not there was error in
the judgment, independent of the fact that the plaintiff is a corporaA review of the authorities bearing on the question would be
tion.
almost endless, and their confusion is such that it would hardly be
We conceive that the rule whereby a principal is bound
profitable.
the
acts
of his agent beyond his actual authority, but within its
by
apparent scope, is founded, in the first place, on the rnaxim that,
where one of tvvp innocent persons must suffer, it should be that
one who misled the other into the contract (Story, Ag.;'/§ 443), and
this doctrine is founded on a broad principle of equitable estoppel or
estoppel in pais. iWe conceive that a proper statement ol it with reference to such a case as we have before us is as follows :-\ That where
a principal has,
situhis voluntary act, placed an agent in such
ation that
person of ordinary prudence, conversant with business
usages and the nature of the particular business,
justified in presuming that such agent has authority to" perform on behalf of his
principal
particular act, such particular act\ having been performed,
the principal
estopped, as against such innocent third person, from
denying the agent's authority to perform it.
We do not think that, in order to bring
caVe within this principle,
all cases necessary to show that by general custom, as defined
the former opinion of the court, such agents have such authority.
Xor do we think that
necessary in all/cases to show that the

in it
is
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same agent had previously performed similar acts ; that such acts were
the principal ; that the third person also knew of them, and
relied on them in the transaction ; or even that similar agents had in
A number of elements may influence
the past performed such acts.
In this case the corporation was located
the solution of the question.
in Milwaukee, in the state of Wisconsin. It was formed for the purpose of doing business in Wyoming, and most of its business was
there conducted.
The very fact that the corporation and its general
officers held their office at a remote point was an element for consideration.
Rathbun v. Snow, supra [123 N. Y. 343, 25 N. E. 379, 10
L. R. A. 355]. One might be justified in dealing with a person in
apparent management of the business in Wyoming, where the office
of the corporation was in a distant state, where he would not be so
justified if he found the general offices and general officers of the corporation at or near the place where the business was conducted. Furthermore, the general nature of the business and its requirements
were elements for consideration.
Furniture Co. v. Hardaway, 104
Ala. 100, 16 South. 29. It might well be that one would be justified
in buying ripe fruit from one found in charge of orchards where
he might not be justified in dealing with such a person in goods not
perishable in their nature.
Business usage might have its influence,
although not so general and uniform, as by implying notice to the
principal to also apply that such custom was in view when the agent
r^was appointed.
We mention these instances merely by way of illustration, and we
hold that the apparent authority of the agent beyond his actual authority does not depend solely upon custom or solely on the performance of previous similar acts, whether known or unknown to a person
dealing with him ; but that, subject to the general rule we have above
stated, and to general legal principles, the question is one of fact,
to be determined by the jury under all the circumstances of the transaction and the business as disclosed by the evidence.
It follows that the special findings referred to were insufficient
whereon to found the judgment, and that the instruction quoted was
erroneous.
Reversed and remanded. 28
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1
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rti N. W. 540,
Followed in Barrlson Nut. Bank v. Austin, 65 Neb, <;.■:•_'.
R. A. 294, KM Am, si. Rep, <;:;;i (1902); Same v. Williams, 'J Neb. (Unof.)
\. w. 246 (1902); Thomson v. Shelton, i!» Neb, 844, 68 N. W. L055
in st. Loul
Gunning Adv. Co. v. Wanamaker,
(189fi).
115 Mo. App. 'Jin 90
s. w. t.".7 (1905), ante, p. 155, apparenl authority is defined us "such authority
mably prudenl man, oslng diligence and discretion,
in view of the
principal's conduct, would naturally Buppose the agent to possess. Much of
authority <>f an agent, whether asserted as Incidental, or on
the apparenl
- pr"\
. or "ii tii"
course of dealing rests on the principles of
tin- doctrine of estoppel.
The qui
rather what
third person bad
tip- righl i" i"ii"\" concerning
the :iL'"nt'~- powers, than what powei
principal Intended t" confer."
See, also, Smith v. BIcGulre,
II.
N. 664, 27
■■.• 165,
L. T.
w. k. 726 (185

69

i.
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KEITH
(Supreme

v

Court

authority

(Part

2

HERSCHBERG OPTICAL CO.
of Arkansas,

1886.

48

Ark.

L38, 2 S. W. 777.)

Anion

[or $51.75 on open account for goods sold by plaintiff's
Defense that agent agreed not to sell to any one
else in the same town, and that he sold to two others on the same
* hi learning this, defendant
refused to take the goods,
agreement.
and notified the plaintiff. Trial and judgment for plaintiff.
Smith, J.- 7 * * * The jury were told, in substance, to disre-

traveling agent.
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gard all testimony as to the agreement not to sell to any other parties unless ii was shown that the agent was a general agent, or had
And the court reauthority from plaintiff to make such contract.
if
agreed not to
effect
plaintiff's
agents
to
the
that
jected prayers
sell the same class of goods to any person in Booneville, and this
was an inducement moving defendant to make the purchase, and that
plaintiff's agent violated this agreement and sold to other parties,

this was a fraud on defendant, entitling him to rescind the contract;
also, that a principal claiming the benefit of a contract made by his
agent is bound by the terms of such contract, unless the other had
notice of the wani of authority in the agent.
l A special agfcjifcy exists when there is a delegation of authority to
to
cV> a single act. MA general agency is where there is a delegation
dcV, all acts conrected with a particular business
or employment.
Now, A. HirseinbVg, so far as the defendant knew, had a general
authority to sell the plaintiff's goods; his agency not being limited to
In reality, as the proof discloses,
any particular mode of doing it.
his authority, although it extended to do acts generally in the course
of his employment, was yet qualified and restrained by instructions of
But these instructions had never been communia special nature.
The rule in such a case is the agent is
cated to the defendant.
deemed, as to the persons dealing with him in ignorance of such
special limitations, conditions, and instructions, to be a general
agent, although, as between himself and his principal, he may be only
In other words, a general agency does not import
a special agent.
authority, hut that which is derived from a multitude
an unqualified
of instances or in the general course of an employment or business.
And the principal will be bound by the acts of his agent within the
scope of the general authority conferred on him, although he violates
by those acts his private directions, which are given to him by his
principal, limiting, qualifying, suspending, or prohibiting the exercise
of such authority under particular circumstances.

28

A

third person
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has a right to assume, without notice to the contrary, that the traveling salesman of a wholesale house has an unqualified authority to act
for the firm he represents in all matters which come within the scope
Smith, Merc. Law (3d Ed.) 173; Story, Ag.
of that employment.
127; Paley, Ag. (4th Am. Ed.) *199 et seq.,
17-19,
126,
(8th Ed.) §§
and notes; 2 Kent, Comm. (12th Ed.) *620; Brooks v. Perry, 23
Ark. 32; Leake v. Sutherland, 25 Ark. 219; Jacobson v. Poindexter,
42 Ark. 97; Meyer v. Stone, 46 Ark. 210, S3 Am. Rep. 577; Butler
v. Maples, 9 Wall. 766, 19 L. Ed. 822; Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson,
Insurance Co. v. McCain, 96 U. S. 84,
13 Wall. 222. 20 L. Ed. 617;
Thus,
24 L. Ed. 653; Bryant v. Moore, 26 Me. 84. 45 Am. Dec. 96.
the
288,
baggage
in Minter v. Pacific R. R., 41 Mo. 503, 97 Am. Dec.

master was, by the printed rules of a railroad company, forbidden to
He nevertheless
take articles of merchandise on passenger trains.
and
the company
rule,
the
knowing
not
took a carpet, the passenger
for
its
loss.
was held liable
The true question for the jury, then, was not whether A. Hirschberg had real authority, but whether he had apparent authority, to
It follows that the charge of the
make the contract he did make.
court on this subject was wrong.
A contract which restrains the business or industrial freedom of a

person within reasonable limits is not against public policy. Thus a
covenant to sell patent teeth to no other dentist in a certain town
of Vermont was held valid in Clark v. Crosby, 37 Vt. 188, and so a
covenant not to sell any furniture in his line to any in the town of
O. but B. Roller v. Ott, 14 Kan. 609. See Greenh. Pub. Pol. rule
565.

In 19 Amer. Law Rev. 962, it is stated that the supreme court of
Texas, in Watkins v. Morley, had decided, in September, 1885, that

by a drummer not to sell a certain class of goods to any
in a town except A., is within the apparent scope of
merchant
other
But we have not seen
hi- authority, and is binding on his principal.
full report of that ca
^'The general rule i-. as to all contracts including sales, that the
agent i» authorized to do whatever is usual to carry out the object
of his agency; and it is a question for the jury to determine whal
If. in the sale of the goods confided to him, it is usual in
i s US ual.
the market to give a warrant}, the agent may give that warranty in

a contract

rthe

/\

Benj. Sales (4th Am. Ed.) § 624, and cases
order to effeel a sale."
v,
Beard, 8 How. 451, 12 P. FA. 1151; Schuchardl v.
cited; Le Roy
35'',
Talmage v. Bierhause, 103 End.
17 I.. Ed. 642;
Aliens, 1 Wall.
X. II. 7?, 5 \tl. 711.
Hobbs,
v.
64
27'). 2 X. E. 716; Smilie

A principal is equally bound by tin" author
T. 678, L06 B. 0. i- 868 (1863).
itv which be actually gives, and by thai which by his own net \u> appears to
This
give. Osborne .v Co. v. Qatewood (Tex. Civ. A.pp.) 7» 8. w. 7U (1003),
■ teral or a special agenl (Lister v. Ulen, ;; t
illy, whether i"
M,i 543, 100 Am. i
re latitude
78 [1869]), though :i general agency ;ii lows
Inl (Wilcox \ Routh, it Mi is. 176 1 1848]).

I

Tin: AUTHORITY

828

(Part

2

The rejected prayers set oul above should also have been given.
When an agent for the sale of property is acting upon the line of

committed to him, his principal is chargeable with the false
made by him.
Strayhorn v. Giles, 22 Ark. 517;
representations
Scull,
Matlock v. Reppy, 47 Ark. 148, 14
Morton v.
23 Ark. 289;
The plaintiff cannot recover the price of the goods withS. \Y. 546.
out performing the condition upon which the sale was made.
Reversed, and a new trial ordered.

business

PATTERSON
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(Supreme

Court of Alabama,

1902.

v.

NEAU

135

Ala.

477,

33

South.

39.)

Appeal from judgment of $1,500 for plaintiff, on the ground that
the court refused to charge: "If the jury believe the evidence they
must find for the defendant."
Dowdku,, J. While the complaint in this case, as originally filed
and afterwards amended, contained a number of counts, the cause
No questions are raised on
was tried alone on the seventh count.
the plaintiff claims for the
count
the
seventh
By
the pleadings.
death of his minor son, a boy 16 years of age, who was killed by
falling rock while he was digging coal in the defendant's mine. The
complaint avers a wrongful employment of plaintiff's minor son by
the defendant, in that he was so employed to dig coal without the
knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, his father. It is not charged
that the death was caused by any negligence on the part of the defendant or his agents, but the right of action is rested upon the
wrongful employment as alleged in the complaint.
On the trial the undisputed evidence showed : That Matthew Neal,
the minor son of the plaintiff, was killed by falling rock, while engaged in mining coal in one of the several mines operated by the
Matthew had been employed by the defendant, with the
defendant.
knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, as a driver in the mine ; and,
three days before the accident, Matthew exchanged places with his
brother, who was employed as a coal digger in the mine, — Matthew
taking the place of his brother as a coal digger, and the brother the
place of Matthew as a driver, — and pending this exchange of places
and work between the two brothers the accident resulting in the
The defendant, Patterson, was at the
death of Matthew occurred.
time the owner and operator of several coal mines, including the one
Clark was the general superintendent of the defendant's
in question.
Winters was an assistant under Clark, and was
mining business.
Clark alone, as superintendthe mine boss of the mine in question.
ent, was given authority by the defendant to employ coal diggers in
Winters had no such authority given him. That his authe mines.
thority and duty was to boss and direct the miners, and the opera-
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tions in the mines.

That sometimes persons would applv to him for
employment as coal diggers, and that whenever such was the case he
would report the application for employment to Clark, who would
approve or disapprove, and that he never employed any one to dig
coal without having first obtained the approval and consent of Clark.
That whenever Clark employed a coal digger for the mine in question, he sent such person to Winters, who assigned the coal digger
to his place of labor in the mine, and that, whenever Clark approved
the application of one seeking employment
through Winters, upon
such approval or consent by Clark he (Winters) would then make
the employment, and assign such applicant to a place in the mine to
dig coal. It is not pretended that either the defendant or Clark, his
general superintendent,
employed Matthew to dig coal in the mine,
or that either of them had any actual knowledge that he was engaged
in that work. Neither is it pretended that there was any express employment of Matthew to dig coal in the mine by Winters.
The first contention is that there was an implied contract of employment with Matthew by Winters, and, furthermore, that Winters
had implied authority to employ, by reason of the principal's acquiescence in previous acts of employment of coal diggers by Winters.
And the second contention of the plaintiff is that Winters had apparent authority to give employment to dig coal in the mine. These
contentions are based upon the following state of the evidence in the
record : Winters was the boss of the mine, and superintended
the
laborers and the work in the mine. Two or three witnesses for the
plaintiff testified that on several occasions Winters gave employment
to persons seeking work in the mines as coal diggers, and assigned
them to their places and work, but also stated that they did not know
and could not say whether he (Winters), in said instances, had the
previous approval and consent of the defendant or of the general
Clark, to give the employment to said persons.
In
superintendent,
this connection
the testimony of Winters was that he had never
given employment to any person whatever, to dig coal, without having first reported the application of such person to Clark, and getting his approval and consent to give the employment, and, when
such consenl was obtained, he would then assign the applicant to his
and work in the mine.
And the testimony of (dark wax thai he
never knew of Winters having given employmenl to anj person to
dig coal in the mine, withoul having firsl obtained his (Clark's) apal and c"ii .lit to employ the person.
We do nol think, upon tin- question of implied authority, growing
out of a knowledge of and acquiesi ■nee in the acts of the agent by
the principal, there is any mat' rial COnflicI in the evidence. The facts
Bed to by plaintiff's
witnesses as to the employment of persons
to dig coal by Winters are entirely consistent with the furthei
thai he had no authority to employ, and that in the given instances
the employment
Winter-' acts and conduct in
came from Clark.
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this respect nol being in excess of or inconsistent with authority and
duties of his agency, they are not such as that a knowledge of them
by the principal would raise up an implied authority in him to employ
coal diggers.
We arc quite char that the evidence as to Winters'
want of authority, express or implied, to employ persons to dig coal
in the mine, is free from any conflict.
It is true that there was also
evidence on the part of the plaintiff tending to show that, on the day

of places between the two brothers — Matthew going
into the mine to dig coal -Winters, being informed of the swap,
made no objection, and, furthermore, that Winters knew that Mat
thew was digging coal from that time on until the accident, which
happened three days later, and made no objection to it. This, without knowledge on the part of the defendant or his superintendent,
Clark, was of itself insufficient to afford any inference of ratification
of \\'inter>' conduct, or to show any implied authority in Winters to
Matthew, or to assent to his changing places with his
employ
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brother.
As to the second contention — that Winters was clothed with apparent authority to contract for his principal with persons to digcoal in the mine — it is clear that the case is not one where the doctrine of apparent authority has any application.
This principle of
the law operates by way of estoppel, and to prevent the practice of
fraud.
If the plaintiff had contracted with Winters for the employment of his (plaintiff's) son to mine coal, and was suing for his son's
wages, and the defendant should deny the authority of Winters, as
agent, to make the contract, the doctrine of apparent authority
might be invoked.. The doctrine of apparent authority can be invoked only by one who has been misled to his detriment by the appearance of authority in an agent with whom he deals, though not
existing in fact. The principal is liable for the agent's act within the
scope of his actual authority, because it is his own act, and is liable
for the agent's act within the scope of the apparent authority which
he holds the agent out as having, but which in fact he has not, because to dispute the existence of such apparent authority would enable the principal to commit a fraud on innocent third persons rely1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 990.
ing on such appearance.
The principal may not hold out his agent to the world as possessing
authority, and escape liability from his acts in dealing with innocent
third persons within the scope of the agency, by secret limitations
upon his authority. But if the party dealing with the agent does not
rely upon his apparent authority, the principal will not be bound by
the unauthorized acts, which are apparently, but not actually, within
the scope of the agent's authority. Tallmadge v. Lounsbury, 50 N.
Y. St. Rep. 531, 21 N. Y. Supp/908.
It is clear that the plaintiff here did not rely or act upon any apThe boy was not induced to dig
parent authority in the agent.
coal by an appearance of authority in Winters, for the undisputed
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evidence shows that he began to dig coal without ever having consulted Winters.
We are unable to see how the doctrine of apparent
It cannot be pretended that
authority can have any application.
either the plaintiff or his son was misled by dealing with the agent
under the appearance of authority.
The authorities cited in the
brief of appellee on this question are all cases where the agent, within
the scope of his agency, dealt with persons relying upon his apparent
Xot
authority, and lay down the doctrine we have stated above.
one of these cases is analogous in the facts to the one before us.
Our conclusion is that, on the law and the undisputed evidence in
this case, the defendant was entitled to the general charge as reThe view we have
quested, and the trial court erred in its refusal.
taken of the case, we think, renders it unnecessary to notice other
assignments of error. Reversed and remanded. 29
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II. Limitations
VAN EPPES
(Supreme

v.

Court of Alabama,

SMITH.
1852.

21

Ala. HIT.)

Smith sues for $23 for putting up an awning in front of defendant's
stable. The work was ordered by an employe of the defendant, who
attended to letting out horses and carriages for hire, and who nightly
turned over the collections to defendant's agent, Austin.
LiGox, J.f The motion to dismiss the writ of certiorari, because
the reasons set forth in the petition for it were not sufficient to auThe
thorize its issue, was correctly overruled by the court below.
statute which allows appeals and writs of certiorari to judgments
rendered by justices of the peace, declares, that when such cases
reach the appellate court, they shall be tried de novo on their merits,
upon issues made up under the direction of the court, thus indirectly
forbidding their dismissal for any irregularities in the manner of
bringing them before that court.
trial, it appears by the bill of exceptions, the court charged
( In
the]
the jury, vthat a person may have several agents, with full powers to
do the same act, and if the plaintiff had ground sufficient to satisfy

ordinarily reasonable man of the agency of Stall, and tliat he had
performed the work and delivered it. before h<- was informed to the
This, as a
contrary, it would be sufficient to charge me defendant."
law,
cannot
inferences
be
The
supported.!
of
of
a part)
proposition
dialing with one whom he supposes to bc\thc agent of another, de- A^£/L
duced alone from the acts of such supposed agent, are no proof of
an

i uui

Gunning Adv. Co.

737 (1905), ante, p. L55.
; Part "f the opinion is omitted

v.

Wanamaker,

115

m<». App.

-7i>, 90

S.

W.

—
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agency, and the jury should not be told to look to (hem as such.™.
In Scarborough v. Reynolds, l-1 Ala. 253, it is held, "that the 'agency
of a party must first be proved by other evidence than his acts, before
it can be assumed that his acts are binding on the principal!*
Some
act "i the principal, in relation
to the thing done, is indispensable
to make OUl the agency, and the pretensions and acts of the party
ling to be the agent have no foundation u«on which to rest,
until the principal is thus connected with them. )
The text hooks lay it down as a rule in such cases, and this court
7
has repeatedly reiterated it, that, when a person deals with one who
professes to be the agent of another, the persVmi contracting with
him is bound to know the extent of his authorityA Paley on Agency,
309; Fisher v. Campbell, 9 Port. 210; Gullett v.\Lewis, 3 Stew. 23.
But the last part of the charge in this case assujnes the law to be,
that if a party deal with one whom he reasonably/supposes to be the
agent of another, the contract is binding on the/latter, unless he informs the dealer before the contract is completed that the professed
or supposed agency does not exist. This is manifestly erroneous,
and based upon a misconception of the law; for under it the burden
of proof is thrown on the defendant, and he is required to prove the
want of authority of him who unauthorizedly intermeddles
in his
business ; when by the rules of law, it is on the plaintiff to show the
* * *
fact of agency.

For

the error shown above, let the judgment be reversed

and the

cause remanded.

FIGUEIRA
(Supreme

v.

LERNER.

Court of New York, Appellate .Division, Second Department,
52 App. Div. 216, 65 N. Y. Supp. 293.)

1900.

Woodward, J.

This is a proceeding, brought under the provisions of subdivision 4 of section 2232 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
to oust the occupant of certain premises in the borough of Brooklyn,
on the ground that said occupant had intruded into said premises without permission of the owner, and that the occupancy thus commenced
had continued without such permission.
The occupancy was admitted
by the answer, but it was urged that it was with the permission of the
Presenting oneself as agent, and making declaration to that effect, create
Tompkins Mach. Co. v. Peter, 84 Tex. 627, 19
valid apparent authority.
s. \V. S60 (1892).
Agents cannot empower themselves to act.
Crawford v.
Whittaker, 12 W. Va. 130, 26 S. E. 516 (1896); Edwards v. Dooley, 120 N. Y.
The apparent authority is that which he appears to
540, 24 X. E. 827 (1890).
Crom that which he actually does have, and not from that which he may
pretend to have, or from his actions on occasions which were unknown t<>ami
unratified by his principal. Oberne v. Burke, ::<»Neb. 581, 40 N. W. 8.38 (1890),
containing a valuable discussion.
There is a distinction hetween the apt| powers and the acts apparently,
hut not really, within the power.
Mechanics' Bank v. X. Y. & N. 11. Ry. Co., 13 N. Y. 599 (!«<;).
30

no
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learned justice having decided in favor of the owner of the premises,
Fowler v. Marcus,
it is not for this court to disturb this conclusion.
The evidence clearly warrants
41 App. Div. 425, 58 N. Y. Supp. 867.
the decision; for there is practically no dispute that Marks was merely
authorized to bring a tenant to the owner of the premises, or to his
As to
general agent, and to receive a commission for such work.
interview
with
whether this authority was extended at a subsequent
defendant,
the
to
the owner in respect to the renting of the premises
the evidence is conflicting, and the justice before whom the question

is,

was tried has found in favor of the petitioner.
While a principal is bound by his agent's acts when he justifies a
party dealing with his agent in believing that he has given to the agent
authority to do those acts, he is responsible only for that appearance
of authority which is caused by himself, and not for that appearance of
conformity to the authority which is caused only by the agent; that
bound equally by the authority he actually gives, and by that which
he
is

if

E.

a

is

is

is

For the appearance of authority he
by his acts he appears to give.
For the
responsible only so far as he has caused that appearance.
The fundamental
responsible.
appearance of the act the agent alone
that one man can be bound only by the authorized acts
proposition
commisof another. 81 He cannot be charged because another holds
it.
within
are
him,
that
his
acts
Edwards
asserts
and falselv
sion from
The limited scope of Marks'
827.
v. Dooley, 120 X. Y. 540, 24 N.
when
he announced that he
the
defendant
to
indicated
agency was
must see the owner of tin- premises before renting the same, and

did not extend the authority, and did not do any acts from
believing that the powers of
would be justified
tided, the defendant did not come into thi
on of the premises with the consent of tin- owner, and the order
appealed from should 1"' affirmed.
The decision of the justice below, upon the conflict of evidence in
ctto this point, must, as we have already indicated, he conclusive.
The order appealed from should he affirmed, with costs. All concur.
in

the owner

which the defendant
Marks had
1-

Record:
180
:;7::

1902);
50 W.

Leary
Wright

K. 102.

v. Albany Brewing Co., 77 App. Dlv.
K. B. 746, 71 F.. .1.
v. Glyn, [1002]
l
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The
owner, given by one Marks, acting as agent for the owner.
learned justice, upon the trial of the issue thus raised, determined the
matter in favor of the owner of the premises, and an appeal from the
order entered upon this decision comes to this court.
We are asked to reverse the order upon the ground that the weight
of evidence preponderates in favor of the appellant, that the final order
is against the evidence, and that it is contrary to law ; but an examination of the record docs not warrant this relief. The question
presented was whether Marks was in fact the agent of the owner of
the premises, with authority to rent and give possession to the appellant. Upon this point there was a direct conflict of evidence, and, the

<;. 7:> N. T. Supp.
197, 80 I.. 'I'.

K. B.

THE

ai CHORITY
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SECTION 4.— EXPRESS A.ND IMPLIED AUTHORITY

FARMERS'
(Court

of Appeals

&
of

MIAMI WK'S' BANK
DR( >\ ERS' BANK.
New

fork,

L857.

16

v.

BUTCHERS'

N. Y. 125, 69 Am.

&

Dec. GTS.)

Action by a holder for value of three checks for $1,000 each, and
two for SI. 5d0 each, for the face of the checks. They had all heen
certified as good by defendant's paying teller, who had full authority
to certify checks when the drawer had sufficient funds in the hank,
but who was instructed not to certify when there were not sufficient
Green, the drawer of these checks, induced the
funds on deposit.
teller to certify when there were no funds by telling him he wanted
them for temporary use, and they should not become a charge upon
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the bank.

(dissenting). 32 * * * The question I now propose to examine is whether the teller had power to enter into these
In the first and most obvious
contracts as the agent of the defendants.
view of an agency of any description, the principal is bound by such
33
In a just sense, this is
acts as he has authorized, and no others.

Comstock,

rart of

J.

The majority opinion There
the dissenting opinion is omitted.
held the bank no! liable on the ground that there was a distinction
the terms of a power and tacts entirely extraneous, upon which the
one dealing with the
exercise the authority conferred may depend,
bound to know the extent of the power, hut not these extrinsic facts.
whether the drawer had funds.
I he authority of an agent may be shown, either directly by express
words of appointment,
either spoken or written, or it may he implied or Indirectly shown, by evidence of the relative situation of the parties, the nature of the business and the character of the intercourse between the parties
Acts and doings are often quite as significant
justifying such an inference.
as words
spoken. Geylin v. De Villeroi, 2 Houst .".11 (1860), ante, p. 50,
in whirl, the court instructed the jury: "Bivt, although it is perfectly true as
that the agent
a general rule, as stated by the counsel for the defendant,
must nol exceed the general scope of his authority, yet it is equally true that
the extent or scope of the authority conferred on the agent depends upon
the nature and character of the business to be done or transacted, and it is
appears) always construed to include
(unless a contrary intention manifestly
all the uecessary means of executing it with effect. And not only are the
mean- necessary and proper for the accomplishment
of the end proposed Included in the authority, but also all the various means and methods which
The scope of
are justified, or allowed, in that particular trade or business.
the authority must be measured by the nature, requirements and necessities
The agency may be either genof the thing to be done and accomplished.
A general agent Is, first, a person authorized
eral, or special and limited.
by his principal to transact all his business of a particular kind, or he is a
person who. being engaged in a certain trade or business, is employed by
\A< principal to do certain acts or things for him in the course of that trade
or business.
In both of these cases the agent will, if there be no limitation
of his authority known to these parties, be taken as to them to be a general
have the power to bind his principal by all eonagent, and will therefore
32

omitted]
between
right to
agent is
such as
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33.J

universally and necessarily true, because the proposition is involved in
the very idea of agency.
there are apparent exceptions in the books,
in
fact, but are merely varieties in the application of
they are not such
the rule, which do not contradict the rule itself. This will appear
when we consider the modes in which powers are derived from a principal to an agent so as to bind the former in favor of third parties.
An agency may be constituted by writing. When this is the case,
the agent takes precisely such authority as the instrument confers,
upon a fair construction of the language used, taken in connection with
An authority thus dethe general or particular purpose of the power.
rived of course includes, in the absence of special restrictions, all such
incidental powers and means as are necessary in the execution of the
main purpose.
The agency may also be created by a special verbal
I use the word special, not with reference to the powers
appointment.
to be exercised, but to the mode of creating them by special or express
When the language of such an appointment is once ascerwords.
tained, it is perfectly obvious that the authority of the agent is precisely what it would be if it were conferred by a writing in the same
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If

language.
But there is another, and, for all purposes connected with the presWithout any
ent inquiry, only one other, mode of delegating power.
express or special appointment, an implied agency may arise from the
Where a person has
conduct of a party.
Story on Agency, § 54.
recognized a course of dealing for him by another, or a series of acts
of a particular kind, an implied agency is thereby constituted to carry
on the same dealing or to do acts of the same character.
Now. the
only difference between such an agency and those which are created
by express appointment, whether verbal or in writing, is that the latter
may, by the very terms of the power, be confined to a single transaction or act, while the very existence of the former is derived from a
course of recognized dealing or a series of recognized acts. This implied agency is therefore never a special one, in the sense in which
All express agencies may or may
that term has generally been used.
not be special, according as they authorize, or do not, more than a
act.
has been said concerning general and special agenthere never was any other intelligible distinction indicated by those
Where this distinction does not exist, in other words, where
the power is not .special in this
by express appointment

Although much

tracts entered Into with such third parties, which are within the sci
The duty, therefore, of determining the extent to
his ordinary employment.
which the principal has accredited his agent, is devolved on the Jury; and
If they are satisfied that the principal by his conduct, words, or :irts warranted t!i<' agenl to imiii himself oul n> the world as possessing certain authority in thai respect, he, the principal, will be bound by the <xercise of thai
authority, whether the agenl really po jessed It or Dot." The plaintiff had a

rerdlct

THE

.\(

iiioKiTY

(Tart

2
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and those implied from conduct are entirely similar in all their charIn the one class, the authority is manifested
tics .iii.l incidents.
from
delegation; in the other, it is presumed or implied
even
against
allowed
is
This
presumption
if the principal.
the real facts oi the case, where the rights of bona fide dealers arc conIn all this class, it is presumed that the principal has actually
cerned.
delegated power to <\o the acts which he has been in the habit of
'The power thus presumed is to be judged
nizing and approving.
It will
in all respects as though the delegation were actually shown.
words,
within
justify and uphold acts of the same kind, or, in other
the presumed authority, hut no others.
I have observed that there may be seeming contradictions of the
fundamental doctrine, that a principal is bound only by such acts of
This presumptive or implied
his agent as he has duly authorized.
have accepted and approved
man
because
a
may
agency is one of these,
bound, as to third persons,
be
and
so
authorized,
never
acts which he
of these apparent conother
only
and
the
Another
similar
acts.
by
tradictions is where the acts done by the agent are justified, as to innocent dealers, by the authority, whether conferred by express delegation or presumed in the manner indicated, but are opposed to special
In such cases the liability of the principal rests
private restrictions.

upon a just distinction between the power conferred and private inBut the power must in all cases be vested
structions as to its exercise.
either actually or presumptively, and if it be not, the principal cannot
be charged.
so far stated, are simple and elementary, although
exobscured by loose and indeterminate
somewhat
been
have
they
it
bethe
inquiry,
present
them
to
Applying
in
the
books.
pressions
comes plainly of no importance whether the power of Mr. Peck, the
defendants' teller, to certify checks, was derived from a special appointment or from a recognition of his acts. At the circuit it appears
to have been placed on the ground of recognition, and no special apThe difference is merely in the mode of conpointment was shown.
Viewing
stituting the agency. The power in either case is the same.
and
approved, the init as derived or implied from acts recognized
If they
acts?
those
been,
were
what
quiry at the circuit should have
actual
deposits,
drawn
upon
checks
of
were confined to the certification
then the power to be implied or presumed was to do acts of the same
character, but not of a character wholly different, although clothed in

The principles,

the same form.

In a word, the certifying authority of the teller is to be construed
and treated in all respects as though it had been given to him by
a written instrument specially defining and restricting it; and viewing the authority in this manner, we are to inquire whether, under
of checks drawn
expressly confined to the certification
a power
the teller could
defendants,
upon sufficient funds on deposit with the
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a

a

a

v.

(Supreme

CONTINENTAL

Court of Georgia,

1890.

*

*

*

a

a

It

a

if

is

a

is
a

It

is

CLAFTJN

JERSEY WORKS.
85 Ga.

27,

11 S.

E.

721.)

i

in

[e

a

I

a

&

in

a

in

by

One Weisbein,
Savannah,
merchant
fraudulent representations as to his solvency, secured large amounts of goods from Claflin
Co. and Jaffray
Co.
By
heavy ale he secured SoO.000
with which he absconded.
left his manager, Uchtenstein,
charge
under
written power of attorney to manage the business, and make

&

a

in

&

Godd.Pb.1

pi

if

tions, pay bills, and do any acts necessary and proper for carrying on the business, as fully as the principal might do
nt.
Claflin
Co. and Jaffray
Co. demanding pay, and Lichten
having no money, he offered to pay
md turned over to
them
-it amount to settle their accounts,
large pan
&
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a

is

is

is

it

is

?

is,

bind them by certificates which were fictitious and false.
These certificates, as we have seen, are to be regarded as acceptances; and
another mode of stating the inquiry therefore
could the teller, with
authority only to accept checks drawn upon actual funds, bind his
principals, by accepting for the accommodation of the drawer, when
there were no funds on deposit and none in expectancy
This question,
proper now to observe, cannot be determined in
the plaintiffs' favor on the ground that the limitations upon the agent's
power were in the nature of private instructions merely, in regard to
its exercise.
The difficulty which meets us in this view of the case
that the power exercised
not embraced at all in the commission.
An
authority to accept drafts, in the regular business of the principal,
upon funds of the drawer,
precise and well defined authority.
It
cannot, in my opinion, include acceptances out of the principal's business, and for the accommodation of third persons.
So, an authority to
accept or certify checks, in the regular course of banking business,
would seem to be equally definite.
does not embrace
power to
pledge the responsibility of the bank for the accommodation of persons who are not depositors and have no funds.
urged that the teller
proper agent or officer to answer questions and give information as to the funds of
person who draws his
check. But this
very different thing from entering into
written
engagement which operates to transfer the fund,
there be any, from
the depositor, and which, whether there be any funds or not, imposes
pecuniary obligation on the bank, to last until barred by the general
statute of limitations.
ought not to be contended seriously that such
power can be derived from the simple practice in
bank of turning
to its books and communicating
to inquirers, through the teller or
book-keeper, the condition of its customers' accounts.

Tin: AUTHORITY
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such goods being the same originally purchased from said linns and
still unpaid for. The Continental Works and other creditors attacked
this conveyance as a fraud upon the rest of the creditors, and outside
the scope of Lichtenstein's
Appeal from a verdict and deauthority.
cree against defendants.
:;i
Simmons. |.
The errors assigned in the fifth to eighteenth (inthe motion for a new trial go to the refusal of the
of
grounds
clusive)
court to give in charge to the jury certain principles of the law of
agency which hear upon the question of the extent of Lichtenstein's
authority. The requests rmay embody sound law, but it is immaterial
whether they do or not. Where an agent's authority is conferred and
defined in writing, the scope or-<Lxtent of such authority is a question
for determination by the courtA Mechem, Ag. § 104; 1 Thomp.
Trials, § 1370; Berwick v. HorsfaJl, 29 Law J. C. P. 193; Dobbins v.
/
Manufacturing Co., 75 Ga. 23# 243; Pollock v. Cohen, 32 Ohio St.
As said by this court in the case above cited (page 243) : "That
514.
it was the duty of the court to construe both the charter and the letter
of attorney, and to determine the extent of power conferred by both
and each of them upon the agent, we think, is a plain proposition.
Taken alone, and without proof of other circumstances to which it
was necessary to resort to clear ambiguities or to explain doubtful intention, there was nothing for the jury to find.
The question was
purely and simply one of law, to which it was the exclusive right and
duty of the judge to respond."
In requesting charges upon the extent and nature of a general
agency, there seems to have been an attempt by the plaintiffs in error
to enlarge the authority of Lichtenstein beyond the limits of his power,
or at least to establish the construction that the instrument created a
If there was any such effort, the court did not err
general agency.
in defeating it. It is not allowable, by the adduction of extrinsic oral
evidencj , to add to the powders expressly given In the writing. \ The
authoru r must be proved by the instrument itselfl Neal v. PatteV, 40
Ga. 363U The very purpose of a power of attorney is to prescribe and
publish fne limits within which the agent shall act, so as not to leave
him to the uncertainty of memory, and those who deal with him to
or misconception, as to the extent of his
the risk of misrepresentation
authority! To confer express authority is to withhold implied authority, fihere can be no parol enlargement of a written authority.
Whan. Mg. § 225: Mechem, Ag. $ 306; Reese v. Medlock, 27 Tex.
Batty v. Carswell, 1 Amor. Lead. Cas. 687,
120. 84 Am. Dec. 611;
notes; Pollock v. Cohen. 32 Ohio St. 514.
Besides, the power of attorney was relied upon throughout the whol
transaction.
The plaintiffs in error believed Lichtenstein's acts to be
within the letter of his authority, having taken the advice of counsel in
reference thereto, so that they cannot claim to have been misled by

of
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any appearance of authority
other than that which the writing
gives. 35 * * *
The court found the act of Lichtenstein to be outside his authority,
but the case was reversed on other grounds.

DUN WOODY
upreme

Court of Florida.
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Cockrkll, J.

v.

1905.

SAUNDERS.
50

Fla.

202,

39

South.

965.)

30

The plaintiffs in error, as plaintiffs below, sued
for the loss and hire of a barge or lighter. The declaration consisted
of three counts — the first an ordinary count in bailment for the loss
through the alleged negligence of a bailee for hire ; the second count
alleged a special contract whereby the bailee became an insurer of
the barge ; and the third count was for the rental value of the lighter
between the hiring and the loss. There was verdict and judgment on
the last count alone, and to the judgment the plaintiffs sued out this
writ of error.
No question is raised here on the pleadings, all assignments of error therein being expressly abandoned, and the only assignments, in
view of the disposition of the case, that we shall consider, are those
based upon certain instructions given, modified, or refused.
The barge was hired for the purpose of being towel from IVnsacola
to St. Andrews Bay and there receive on board a cargo of lumber,

when it was to be towed back with such cargo to Pensacola by the
defendant's tugboat, and there was evidence that the owners of the
barge placed thereon a master, with direction to see to it that the
barge was loaded in a certain way, and that this manner of loading
caused it- loss. * * *
The court erred in giving tin's charge: "If you find that TTver had
authority from the defendant to hire the barge Brainard for the trip
from Pensacola to St. Andrews and retnm. yet the existence of such
power would not authorize him to bind the defendant by a contract
that the barge, during the •
»n of her under such hiring, should
be at the risk of the defendant."
The defendant in error asserts that
this instruction "was intended to present boldly to the jury the asser
Hon thai there was no evidence to -bow that liver had the power, or
that the plaintiffs bad the right to rel\ on his having tin- power, to
bind the defendant by a contract that the barge during bailment should
ee, also, Savage v. Pelton, i <''>]". App. I 18, 27 Pae. 948 (1891).
One
wild deals with an agent acting under ;i written authority is to be regarded
power
blm,
allng with the
before
and must at bis peril know that the
ad of the agent i- one that Is authorized bj the power. Stalnback \. Rend,
II Grat 281, 62 Am. Dec. 648 (1854); Sandford v. Handy, 23 Wend
\. Beaumont, 68 41a. 204 (1880), ante, i>. 291 . Quaj \. Pre(1840) ; Cummins
iddlo A Ferries Co., 82 Cal. I, -- Pac. 925 (1889).
it of the opinion Is omitted.

Tin: AUTHORITY

340
be

defendant's

at

risk."

(Part

2

We shall accept this interpretation of the

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

charge.

There was evidence from which wc can legitimately infer that Tlycr,
who alone participated in the transaction on behalf of the bailee, was
at the time acting as his general agent in the barge and towboat business, though Saunders had other lines of business not represented by
liver, and, further, that subsequent to the loss of the barge when
liver was charged with having made the contract, Saunders, though
present, did not deny his authority. There was no proof of custom or
usage or previous dealings, or that the bailors had knowledge of any
limitations upon the agent's apparent authority. While a general
agent's authority is confined to such transactions and concerns as are
incident and appurtenant to the business of his principal, and to that
branch of his business that is intrusted to his care, yet within these
limits the principal is bound. Mechem on Agency, §§ 286, 287.
The same authority says : "Where the agent is authorized to transact all the principal's business of a certain kind, the very breadth of
the employment and variety of the duties to be performed necessarily
involve more or less of discretion and choice of methods, and render
impracticable, if not impossible, much of particularity or precision,
either as to the exact means and method to be employed, or as to the
Where so little is expressed,
scope or extent of the authority itself.
more may well be implied.
The fact of such an authority, of itself,
presupposes a general confidence bestowed upon the agent, and a
general committal to his discretion and judgment of all beyond the
essential objects to be attained and the outlines of the course to be
It may not unreasonably be presumed, where nothing is
pursued.
indicated to the contrary, that such an agent possesses those powers
which are commensurate with his undertaking, and which are usually
and properly exercised by other similar agents under like circumstances. This presumption may well be and is constantly relied upon
by persons dealing with such agents, and so reasonable, proper, and
necessary is this reliance, that it may justly be required that, if the
principal would impose unusual restrictions upon the authority of such
an agent, he should make them known to persons who may have occasion to deal with the agent."

87

independent judgment on the part of the agent is usually necesv. Weeks, 173 Mass. 304, 53 N. E. 818 (1899).
This is especially
true where the agent's duties are not merely ministerial, capahle of being defined and executed strictly, but involve large powers and wide discretion.
Howard v. Baillie, 2 H. Bl. 618 (179G).
If the principal, by his declarations
or conduct, has justified the opinion that he had in fact given to the agent
more extensive powers than those in the writing, then to that extent he will
be bound by acts outside the express authority.
Rawson v. Curtiss, 19 111.
156 (1858);
Ins. Co. v. New Mexico Lumber Co., 10 Colo. App.
Merchants'
223, 51 Pac. 171 (1897).
A written power may be expanded by the declarations or acts of the principal.
Philadelphia Trust, Safe Deposit & Ins. Co.
v. Seventh Nat Bank (D. C.) 6 Fed. Hi (1881).
Cf. Mechanics' Bank v.
Schaumburg, 38 Mo. 228 (1866).
"When the appointment
has been expressly
made in writing, it frequently happens that much of the agent's resulting
37 Some

sary.

Hilliard
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For the purpose of conducting this business over which he had general charge, should the circumstances arise, rendering such a course
necessary, we see no limitation upon his power from the facts disclosed
Much
here, to buy a barge outright and bind his principal thereby.
less are there limitations upon his power to buy the barge for the
limited time required for the performance of this contract, since, as
it may be gathered from the evidence, these were the only terms upon
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which he could secure it.
The question of the scope of the authority of an agent is generally
one of fact, or of mixed law and fact, and therefore, under our system,
that prohibits charges upon the facts, such question is best left to the
of a jury under general instructions for its guidance.
determination
Other and different facts may be evidenced on another trial, and werefrain therefore from any further expression of our views.
It is unnecessary to discuss the form or effect of the verdict.
For the error pointed out, the judgment is reversed at the cost o
the defendant in error and a new trial awarded.

REESE
(Supreme

Court of Texas,

v.

1863.

MEDLOCK.
27

Tex.

120,

84 Am.

Dec. 611.)

Action for the recovery of land and the cancellation of a deed executed by one Powers as agent for Reese, deceased. Verdict for defendant.

Moore,

J. 88 It

is a well settled general principle that, when an
is
created
and
conferred by a written instrument, the nature
agency
and extent of the authority given by it must be ascertained from the
itself, and cannot be enlarged by parol evidence of the
instrument
usage of other agents in like cases, for that would be to contradict or
There may, however, be
vary the terms of the written instrument.
some qualifications and limitations properly belonging to this general
rule, whereby, especially in cases of general or implied agencies, theusages of a particular trade or business, or of a particular class oi
persons, are properly admissible, not, indeed, for the purpose of enlarging the powers of the agents employed therein, but for the means
those powers which are
and rightly understanding
of interpreting'
actually given.
under
which the agent sold
The power of attorney
Medlock,
did not authorize
defendant,
in
the
to
controversy
the land
cannot surely be
him to barteJ: or exchange it for other property.
and uniform
such
a
become
general
there
has
that
insisted
seriously
custom or usage of trade, by agents for the sale of land in this state,

/il

;i minutely
detailed
authority
le Implied, because, even where acting under
Inevitably
omitted In drawing the
er of attorney, some Item is almosl
Mini. -i,t.
Adame Express Co. v. Byei (Ind.) 90 N. i:. 518 (1911), quoting
:;i Cyc. L366.
it Pari of the opinion is omitted.
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AUTHORITY

(Tart

2

to the legal import of the instrument under which
contravention
derive
their authority, as to overturn and abrogate the well estabthey
lished rules of legaj construction, by which the courts would other
It', however,
wise be governed.
such was the fact, the testimony offered by the defendant falls far short of justifying the application in
this case of such an exception to the general rule to which reference
has been made, and the court did not err in excluding it from the
jury. * * *
in

For error in instructions

SECTION

5.—
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GUXKRAP AND SI'hXIAL AUTHORITY

PACIFIC BISCUIT
(Supreme

reversed and remanded.

as to ratification,

Court of Oregon,

CO. v.

1901.

40

DUGGER.

Or.

."><):>,
07

Pac.

:V2.)

Plaintiff appeals.
Verdict and judgment for the defendant.
Bean, C. J. This is an action to recover the value of goods, wares,

and merchandise alleged to have been sold and delivered to the deIn .March, 1899, the defendant purchased of her son a cigar
fendant.
■

applied in Henry v. Lane. 128 Fed. 243, 02 C. C. A. 625.
v. Loose,
of express and implied authority, see Gregory
the power of the
!'.» Wash. 599, 54 Pae. 33 (189S), ante. p. 54. In discussing
trustee of a church to bind the church by agreements with the contractor,
Sode the building contract, the court said in Moyle v. Congregational
le, otah, 69, 50 Pac. 806 (1897): "But if Mr. Hollister, in a public manner, and for such a length of time that it would be presumed that the deand did
fendant knew of such acts, exercised authority <d' a superintendent,
all he is shown t<>have dune, the law would imply that he had authority to
Implied authority to do certain things
do those things of a similar character.
»rs on the agent no greater power than express authority to do the same
work on Agency (section 274), says:
.Mr. Mechem, in his excellent
thing.
'Although, as has been seen, authority may he implied from the words and
conduct of the parties, or from the circumstances
of the case, yet the extent
SO implied cannot exceed the necessary and legitimate effect
of the authority
of the facts from which it is inferred, but must be limited to the performAnd in section '.'A'2 the same
ance of like acts under like circumstances.'
It the agency arises by implication from acts done by the agent
author says:
with the tacit consent or acquiescence of the principal, it is to be limited in
If it arises from the general habits of
its scope to acts of a like nature.
dealing between the parties, it must be confined in its operations to dealings
If it arises from the previous employment of the agent In
of the same kind.
:i particular business, it is, in like manner, to be Hunted to that particular
In other words, an implied agency is not to bo extended by conbusiness.
struction beyond the obvious purpose for which it is apparently created.' In
order for an agenl to bind the principal, it must appear that the acts done
by the agent were in the exercise of the power delegated to him, and within
24 Cal. 12S-141 ;
Blum v. Robertson,
the limits and scope of the power.
Hirshfield v. Waldron, 54 Mich. 649, 20 X. W. 628."
The facts and part of the opinion in this case are given on p. 104.
As to the limits of implied power, see, also, Gates Iron Works v. Denver
Engineering Works, ante. p. 313.
As

Quoted

:iii(l

i" the extent
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and confectionery business in Independence, some miles distant from
her home in Linn county.
It was agreed that he should remain in
general charge of the store as her agent, with authority to sell ancT~~
dispose of the goods and replenish the stock as it might be necessary,
but he was instructed not to buy on credit.
In October, November,
and December, 1899, he purchased on credit of the traveling salesman
of the plaintiff and its assignors, who had no knowledge of his instructions, the merchandise mentioned in the complaint, which was received
in the store, and either sold and disposed of by him in due course of
business, or by the defendant a short time thereafter, when the stuck
was sold in bulk.
Upon these facts, the single question presented is whether the defendant is liable for the goods so purchased by her son, and this depends upon whether he is to be regarded as a general or special agent.
If his agency was special, the defendant is not liable, because he exceeded his authority ; but, if general, his principal is bound, notwithstanding he acted contrary to her instructions/ A general agent is
one authorized to transact all his principal's business, or all his business of some particular kind, while a special agent is one authorized to
do one or more specific acts in pursuance of particular instructions, or
within restrictions necessarily implied from the act to be done. 1 Am.
& Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 985. 40 Within these definition*; the deThe mere fact,
fendant's son must be regarded as a general agent.
that his authority was confined to a particular business did not make
He was given full charge and control of the
him a special agent.
business, with power to sell and dispose of the stock and replenish it
by purchasing new goods ; and therefore his principal is liable for his
acts, within the scope of his apparent authonfty, notwithstanding he
If a general agent dismay have disregarded his secret instructions.
regards his instructions, his acts will nevertheless be binding on his
principal, so far as third persons who deal with him without notice are
con&rned, although lie may be personally liable to his principal therefor.

]

Tips rule has been frequently applied by the courts to facts similar
to-Wose in hand. Thus, in Drug Co. v. Lyneman, 10 Colo. App. 249,
i or definitions
is a well-settled

\

ami spei lal agents, Bee ante, i». 20. Thai there
in the rules <>fliability for the acta <>rgeneral ami

of general

distinction

ler v. McGulre,
58 (1902); Noble v. Nugent, 89 in. 522 d^-TM: Wl
•'••",Ark. <;-jt,
)!••_•.r, South. 190, 2 i.. R. a. 808 (1888); Liddell v. Sahline,
Even in courts making this di tinctton, it is neverthes. w. 705 (1891).
known
nized thai a general agent, acting under specific Instructions
third persons, has do more power t" bind l>ls principal bj arts outside
U. S. v. Williams. Fed. Ca
in (ructions
than bas a special agent

w.

Ala.

it

t,,

MllDII

16.724,

i

Ware

(175)

IT.". (1830).

^/'
.

/

f

''It

the

Ai i

iiokity

(rart

2

drug business belonging to a married woman was conducted by her husband as general manager, and she was held liable
he goods purchased by him, although she told plaintiff's salesman
that her agent must no longer buy goods of his company; it being
assumed that, because the goods were delivered and mingled with
the stock and sold, the limitation on the authority of the agent had
lorn withdrawn. In White v. Leighton, 15 Neb. 424, 19 N. W. 478,

50 Pac. 736, a

The goods constituting
the control of her son as her general agent.
claim
were
purchased by the son, rethe foundation of the plaintiff's
sold
as
other
goods were. The defendant was
ceived at the store, and
when the order was given,
was
she
liable,
present
although
held to be
of
the
plaintiff's agent, to buy
son,
in
the
her
presence
directed
and
no more goods than he could pay for at the time. The court ruled
that the fact that the goods were received at the store and disposed
of by the defendant's agent amounted to a ratification of the contract
of purchase, and that the instruction given by defendant to her agent
to buy no more goods than he could pay for did not have the effect
of limiting his authority, or depriving him of the character of a general
agent. In McDowell v. McKenzie, 65 Ga. 630, it was held that a merchant whose agent purchased goods in New York on credit, although
the credit was unauthorized, could not refuse to pay, when he had
See, also,
received and sold the goods and pocketed the proceeds.
v.
Wray, 17
627;
Webster
25
256,
E.
S.
Smith v. Holbrook, 99 Ga.
v.
442;
Ind.
Cruzan
32
Spurlin,
v.
207;
Stapp
Neb. 579, 24 N. W.
Smith, 41 Ind. 288.

It follows from these views that the judgment of the court below
must be reversed, and a new trial ordered.

SORREL
(Supreme

v.

BREWSTER.

Court of Michigan,

1850.

1

Mich.

373.)

a

is,

Verdict for plaintiff. New trial denied.
Assumpsit.
GrEEN, J. 41 The first inquiry which naturally arises in this case,
what was the nature and extent of Raitte's agency, in purchasing
the furs in question, as between Brewster, his principal, and the plainIf we are able to arrive at satisfactory conclusion upon this
tiff
?
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the defendant was carrying on a business through an agent, under an
agreement that he was not to give orders for goods without the consent of his principal. The court held, however, that because the agent
was in charge of the business, and held out to the world as having
authority to ^o everything necessary to carry it on, his principal was
liable for merchandise purchased by him of parties having no notice of
the limitation of his authority. In Palmer v. Cheney, 35 Iowa, 281, the
defendant was engaged in the mercantile business, which was under

4i Fart of the opinion

is omitted.
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question, there will be no serious difficulty in determining the rights of
the parties involved in this suit.
The only evidence of Raitte's power to act as the agent of Brewster, is found in the letters of Brewster, dated the 24th of April, 1844,
one of which is addressed to the plaintiff, and the other to Raitte.
In his letter to the plaintiff, the defendant says: "On my return
to Fort Wayne yesterday from the south, I found your letter of the
9th inst, advising me that you had from five thousand to eight thousand fur skins, mostly coon, which you wished to sell, and which I
As my business will detain me one or
should be glad to purchase.
two weeks yet in this country, I have this day written to Mr. Thos.
G. Raitte, of Norwalk, who is my agent, to make you a visit for the
purpose of purchasing your furs, and I hope and trust that you and
Mr. R. will be able to make a bargain for your lot of furs."

his letter to Raitte of the same date, the defendant says : "AnI hand you a copy of a letter which received yesterday at
Wayne, from Mr. Sorrel of Lithopolis, and I wish you to see Mr. S.
without delay, and see if you can purchase his lot of furs ; but if you
cannot make a trade with him for them, I wish you to write me at
Fort Wayne (to which place I shall return and remain one or two
weeks), and also to Maumee City and Detroit, so that I shall get your
letter at one of those places, and I will go and see Mr. S. with you,
If you can't buy Mr. S.'s furs, I
and see if I can't purchase them.
wish you to make an agreement with him to keep them until I can
see him, as it will not do for us to lose so large a lot of furs this
season."
There does not appear to be any evidence that the contents of this
last letter were made known to the plaintiff at or before the time of
the sale, nor is it at all material whether such was the fact or not, there
being nothing in it which does not harmonize perfectly with that written to the plaintiff.
The defendant, then, must be held bound by the acts of Raitte, as
his agent, to the extent to which he held him out, in his letter to the
plaintiff, as being authorized to act for him. In that letter he informs
the plaintiff that Raitte is his agent, and that he has written to him to
make the plaintiff a visit for the purpose of purchasing the lot of furs
in question, and hopes they will he able to make a bargain for them.
Here is no restriction, or limitation, or condition whatever imposed
upon the power of the agent in making the purchase indicated by the
the agency is announced in the most genprincipal; but th<
eral terms, accompanied by an invitation on the part of the principal
to the plaintiff to bargain with the agent as such.* 2

In

I
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nexed

ts Some ca >- distinguish between tii^ extent of 111*- authority, whether limited "i" unlimited, and the nature of the agency, whether general or special.
in either <•.■!-••
an agent, acting within the general scope of the authority, held
mi! to tii'- world
by the principal, will bind him.
Noble v. Nugent, 89 111.
Others regard an agency
522 (1878), citing Doan v. Duncan, it hi. 'jt
(1866).

j

THE
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At

i

HORITY

(Tart

2

by

is

it

in

by

is

in

case

is,

from that class of
then, very clearly distinguishable
held
out
the principal,
nol
which
the
agency
special agencies,
regard
any acts, or declarations, or implications, to be general
In the hitter case
must from necesto the particular act or business.
and the
sity be construed according to its real nature and extent;
hound to inquire into
other party must act at his own peril, and
Story on
the nature and extent of the authority actually conferred.

This

.

a

;

a

a

a

a

is

2

powers as a special agency.
under limited and circumscribed
See Gilison v.
Snow Hardware Co., 94 Ala. :;t»;. 10 South. 304 (1891), ante, p. 10; Bohart
v. Oberne. •':<; K:m. um. la Par. :;ss <1SS7), and Littleton v. Loan Ass'n, 07
opinion of AtkinE. B26 (1895), especially
the dissenting
Ga. 17_'. -~>
S.
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a

a

it

a

is

it

in

a

^

133.
nc)
hi
note to this section. Judge Story very justly remarks, that "the
whole difficulty,
considering this doctrine, arises from confounding
two things with each other, which are essentially distinct, namely, the
be limited or
extent o\ the authority given to an agent, whether
unlimited, with the nature of the agency in which he
employed,
A person may be general agent,
he general or special.
whether
that is. he may be employed in the general business of his principal,
and yet he may he privately limited in the exercise of his agency, by
certain instructions
given by his principal, far within the general
On the other hand, he may be
special agent,
scope of that business.
particular object only, and yet he
that is, he may be employed for
may have an unlimited authority to act within the scope of his agency
in that particular affair, or he may be limited therein by like instructions."
In section 133, before referred to, Judge Story illustrates the docmerchant should appoint
trine thus: "If
special agent pro hac
to buy or sell
for
him
in his discretion, and
of
cotton
cargo
he should, by an open letter, state that he had so authorized the agent
to buy or sell on his account, and that he would ratify and confirm
his acts in the premises
person who should deal with the agent
upon the faith of that letter, and buy or sell the cargo of cotton accordingly, would be entitled to hold the principal bound by the acts
of the agent, although the latter might have violated his secret instructions as to the price of the cotton purchased or sold."
See, also, note
to section 127, Id.
Let us apply this doctrine, thus explained and illustrated, to the
case before us.
The defendant advertises the plaintiff that Raitte
his agent, and that as such he has requested him to visit the plaintiff, to purchase his lot of furs.
He makes no allusion whatever to
He thus recommends Raitte
any restriction of his agent's power.
to the plaintiff's confidence, as one with whom he may safely bargain
for the sale of his furs. What, then, had any arrangement between
the defendant and Raitte, of which the plaintiff had no knowledge,
to do with the rights of the parties?
The plaintiff has
right to hold

.1.

NATURE
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AND

347
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the defendant bound by the acts of his agent, within the scope of that
such agent may have acted in bad
agent's authority, notwithstanding
faith towards his principal, or violated any instructions, or private
Hence, the testimony
or agreement between them.
understanding
which was offered on the part of the defendant, of an agreement between himself and Raitte, in regard to the advance of moneys and
the purchase of furs, was irrelevant, and the objection made to its
introduction was well grounded.
Putting this testimony entirely out of the case, the facts appear
thus : Raitte, as the agent of the defendant, acting under a general
authority for that purpose, bargained with the plaintiff for his entire
Upon ascertaining the quantity, it appeared that they
lot of furs.
amounted to more than the parties had anticipated, and Raitte stated
to the plaintiff that he had not funds enough with him to pay the enFor the balance, it was then agreed
tire sum to which they amounted.
that Raitte should give the plaintiff Brewster's due bill, which was
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done, and the furs were
*
* *
defendant.

all afterwards

McALPIN
(Supreme

v.

Court of Texas,

delivered

by Raitte to the

CASSIDY.
1856.

17

Tex.

449.)

furnished,

sold, and
Suit for $915.20 for goods and merchandise
of
Answer,
plaintiffs.
to
delivered.
agents
payment
WhEELER, J. 43 There were two principal questions contested at
the trial : (1) Whether Hill was the agent of the plaintiffs; (2) whether, as agent, he had authority to receive payment of the debt of his
principal in satisfaction of his own individual debts. The decision
of the case turned mainly on the latter question; and the verdict and
judgment

affirm that he had such authority.

There is no question that Field was the general agent of the plaintiffs.
He appears to have had authority for soliciting, receiving and
forwarding orders upon their house, collecting moneys due them, and
This appears
promoting generally the extension of their business.
to have been the general scope of his authority; and the evidence was,
perhaps, sufficient to authorize the jury to conclude that Hill had a
This, however, is the utmosl which the
like agency and authority.
ecting his general authority can hi- claimed to have es
then is, whether it was within the scope of
as such agent, to accepl satisfaction of tin- debl of his
hi> authority,
And it is clear that, with
principal in the paymenl of lii- own debts.
I lis
out tin- consent of his principal, express or implied, it was not.
authority as a collecting agenl gave him no righl to change the secu
rity of iiis principal f"r the debts, or to make himself tin- debtor to
for the like amount in lieu of the persons who owed
the principal

eviden
tablished.

<i

Pari

The question

<if the opinion

i- omitted.
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debts, without the consent of the principal, express or implied,
effect. Story on Agency, §§ ()() , 413.
There is no evidence of anj express authority or assent, on the
or of any usage of
part oi the plaintiffs, to any such arrangement;
trade, or of any course of dealing between the parties, from which
such authority might be implied.
There is nothing in the evidence
to warrant the belief that the agent had authority to receive payment
otherwise than in the ordinary mode of business;
and that is, ordinarily, to receive it in money only.
Story on Agency, §§ 98, 99, 181 ;
Robson v. Watts, 11 Tex. 764.
There may be circumstances which
will vary this duty. But there are none such in this case. The same
general principle pervades all cases of agency, whether general or special ; that
that the principal
bound by all the acts of his agent
within the scope of the authority which he holds him out to the world
to possess. But when the agent exceeds the scope of that authority,
no act of his
binding on his principal. A general agency properly
exists where there
delegation of authority to do all acts connected with
But such an
particular trade, business or employment.
agent can no more bind his principal when he transcends the scope
of his employment, than can
limspecial agent whose authority
ited to
or includes in
single act.
Every agency carries with
as an incident, all the powers which are necessary, or proper, or usual,
as means to effectuate the purposes for which
was created, and
none other.
In this respect there
no distinction, whether the authority given
to an agent
In each case
general or special, expressed or implied.
embraces the appropriate means to accomplish the desired end, and
limited to the use of those means.
the agency arises by implication from acts done by the agent with the tacit consent or acquiescence of the principal,
deemed to be limited to acts of
like nature
from the general habits of dealing between the parties,
deemed to be limited to dealings of the same land
from the
in like manner
particular business,
employment of the agent in
deemed to be limited to that particular business.
"And the authority
must be implied from facts which have occurred in the course of
such employment, and not from mere argument, as to the utility and
propriety of the agent's possessing it.
arises from an authority
to do
limited to the approprisingle or particular act, the agency
ate means to accomplish that very act, and the required end; and
the implied agency stops there. In short, an implied agency
never
construed to extend beyond the obvious purpose for which
apThe intention of parties, deduced from the nature
parently created.
and circumstances of the particular case, constitutes the ground of
every exposition of the extent of the authority, and when that intention cannot be clearly discovered, the agency ceases to be recognized
or implied."
It
87.
Story on Agency,
upon this principle that
held that an agent employed to receive payment
not, in general,
the
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clothed with authority to compound the debt, or to commute it for
something else, as his own debt; but can only receive it in money,
unless his particular employment confers the authority, or it can be
implied from the general usage of business, or the habits of dealing^
This is the well settled doctrine of the law, and
between the parties.
it is obviously founded in reason and justice.
The only evidence of an express authority to Hill to collect the debt
or receive payment is found in the testimony of Hill himself, to the
effect that Field, after collecting a part, placed the balance of the claim
in his hands, telling him that he was satisfied that Cassidy, one of
the defendants, was considerably involved, and authorized him to settle the claim in any way that would be advantageous to the plaintiffs.
It cannot be pretended that this gave the authority claimed for Hill,
of using the claim to pay off his own various indebtedness, whenever and however contracted, even if Field had been empowered by
The attempt seems to have
the plaintiffs to confer such authority.

been to justify the assumption of authority by Hill, and the extraordinary mode of settling the debt due the plaintiffs on the ground
But if it were so, the obthat Cassidy was in failing circumstances.
Field was, to take measfrom
Hill
under
the
authority
of
vious duty
ures to secure the ultimate payment of the debt. The authority went
to that extent and no further, unless, at least, it were proved that the
other disposition made of it was most to the advantage of the plainBut the attempt to justify the assumption of authority on that
tiffs.
ground appears to be unfounded in point of fact, as well as in law.
The proof is that Cassidy was at that time considered solvent, and
there is no evidence that his codefendant, who was jointly liable for
But it would make no differthe debt, was in failing circumstances.
ence, as respects the authority of the agent, if both were in failing

circumstances and the plaintiffs were in danger of losing their debt;
since the mode of settlement adopted was not in accordance with the
ordinary mode of business under the circumstances, and there is no
evidence of any usage of trade, or business habits of the parties, or
any authorization or assent by the plaintiffs, express or implied, to
*
* *
such an arrangement.
For errors in the trial, reversed and remanded.

BATTY
(Supreme

A jumpsit

v.

CARSWEIX.

Court of Judicature of New York.

1806.

2

Jnims.

48.)

note.
a promissory
Verdicl for plaintiff.
This was a
delivered the <>]>in i<>n of the court.
Bui the note,
1 power, and oughl to have been
trictly pursued.
to which Abner Carswell authorised the witness to put his name, was

Li\

upon
.

J.,
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whereas, the one he signed had only
in six months;
The note, then, as Ear as it concerned Aimer, adsixty days to run.
1 1is
no
revocation, was made without his authority.
mitting there was
state
alter
not
the
docs
commenced,
was
after
the suil
confession,
It was merely that he had allowed David to put his name
Of the ease.
This must have been the one of which the first witness
to a note.
speaks, which was to he payable in six months.
There must he a new trial, with eosts to abide the event of the
to

be payable

suit.

New

trial

YOUNG

granted.

v.

HARBOR POINT CLUB HOUSE ASS'N.

(Appellate

Court of Illinois,

1901.

90

111. App.

290.)
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HarkKR, P. J. 44

The plaintiff in error brought this suit to rean
breach
of
alleged contract with the defendant in error
cover for
he
was
employed as room clerk for the hotel of the defendwhereby
ant in error for the summer season of 1899, at a salary of $100 per
month.
The case was tried by the court by agreement without a jury
in connection with the one brought by L. C. Young against the Harbor
Point Club House Association already considered in review by this
The court found the issues against the plaincourt, 99 111. App. 292.
tiff and entered judgment against him for the costs.
There was
We agree with the conclusion reached by the trial court.
no valid contract of employment made between the plaintiff and his
The agency of plaintiff's father was
father as agent of the defendant.
4G
He was authorized to employ a
a special and not a general one.
The
of
defendant as to salary.
room clerk subject to the approval
in
letter
of
his
Tracy
the
to
upon
language
place
proper construction
of March 25th, "We have always paid $75 per month for this position
■*■*
Part

of the opinion is omitted.
"This distinction between general and special agencies is sometimes very
unsatisfactory. Whether the authority be general or limited, the servant cannot charge the master if he exceeds it. He is of course more likely to transcend the bounds of a narrow than of an extended power; hut the principle in either ease is the same: Within his commission he binds his master,
1 Minor's Institutes. 206, approved in Cross v. A.,
beyond it lie does not."
in the dissenting
T. & S. F. R. R. To.. Ml Mo. 132, 42 S. W. G7o (1897).
Bank v. Butchers' & Drovers'
opinion of Comstock, .1.. Farmers' & Mechanics'
Bank, L6 X. V. 125, 1 18, 69 Am. Dec. 678 (1857), it is said that the distinction between general and special agencies is valuable in some cases, but In
most of no value whatever.
The difficulty is in applying the general principles to the particular facts, so as to determine from the facts the character
Mcintosh & Huntington Co. v. Rice, 13
Of the agency and the authority.
*B

It seems Impossible to define the terms
Colo. App. 393, 58 Pac. 358 (1899).
"general" and "special" in terms which make the definition applicable to each
particular case. It by no means follows that one called a general agent has a
certain power, but that when he is called a special agent this power may not
Insurance Co.
he taken to he within the limits of his authority.
Merchants'
v. X. M. Lumber Co., i<> Colo. App. 223, 51 Pac. 174 (1897).
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and trust you can see your way to have your son accept at that price."
When the
is that it was a limitation upon his authority as to price.
agency is special, the authority must be strictly pursued, and the prinIt is the duty
cipal is not bound if the agent exceeds his authority.
of a person dealing with a special agent to ascertain the extent of his
Wilauthority, and if he does not, he must suffer the consequences.
Co.,
Merritt,
Coal
&
Mining
Summit
23 111. 623; Blackmer v.
liams v.
46
his
of
had
plaintiff
the
All the knowledge
187 111. 32. 5S X. E. 289.
was
not
father
His
letters.
Tracy's
from
was
derived
father's agency
in control of the hotel but was more than a thousand miles away from
:**
*
*
affirmed.

Judgment

BASS DRY GOODS CO.
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(Supreme

v.

Court of Georgia,

Action on contract

GRANITE CITY MANFG. CO.
1903.

11!» Ga. 124,

45

S. B. 9S0.)

for failure to deliver goods sold.

Verdict for

defendants.

The court charged: "If you believe from the evithat Arnold sent Brown to the plaintiff with instrucdence
tions to sell the goods in question to them at a certain price, or at
figures not below a certain price, you would be authorized to find that
Brown was the special agent of Arnold, and. as between Arnold and
plaintiff, the plaintiff would be bound to take notice of the instruction
Assuming that the goods
This was error.
given Brown by Arnold."
were not on hand, and that therefore Arnold was principal, it appeared
that he had written Brown, "While in Atlanta call on Bass Dry Goods
As Brown had been
Co. and try to close them the following pant-."
Lamar,
*

J.

47

*

*

appointed traveling salesman, it could hardly be claimed that this
letter amounted to a suspension of his general powers as such.
But even if it be treated as creating a special agency to sell particular goods to a particular person, the purchaser was only required to
This the purchasers did when they read the
examine his authority.
letter.
They were nol bound by private instructions nol included in
the writing, but were justified in assuming thai he could fix the price:
While a gen
thai being an essential element in the contrad of sale.
act.
a
selected
to
one
do
particular
than
broader
powers
haeral agent
the authority in both cases musl be construed to include all necessary
Where one is appointed
and usual means for effectuallj executing it.
11 a particular
article to a particular person, this confers on the
ia
.,,.,
i

la Hi'' more true when tii<' special authority is In writing, and the
Martin
of the purpose
il to the accomplishment
the agent i i
Bee, also, Fenn v. Harrison, ;; T. G
rnswortb,
19 v v. :.:.:. (1872).

Thif

,,,

I L790).
i pari

of ti

pinion

is omitted.
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special agent authority to agree on the price; otherwise the appointment is illusory, ami nol real.
Civ. Code 1895, § 3023; Barclay v.
48
* * *
1 [opkins, 59 Ga. 562 ; 1 tolnian v. Ga. R. Co., 67 Ga. 595.

Judgment reversed

SECTION 6.— AUTHORITY FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSES
I. To Buy

/

«< K

BEECHER
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(Supreme

v.

Court of Michigan,

VENN.
1877.

35

Mich.

466.)

Marston, J. Venn brought an action of assumpsit against
Beecher to recover a balance due on meat ordered for and delivered at
This meat was ordered by one Maxwell,
the Biddle House in 1875.
and evidence was given on the part of the plaintiff tending to show
that "Maxwell was in Beecher's employ at thirty dollars per month ;
that Beecher was the owner and proprietor of the hotel and employed
Maxwell as his agent in and about the hotel, and in running it." The
plaintiff further introduced evidence tending to show "that the defendant had caused to be inserted in the Detroit Tribune, and other papers,
an advertisement, in which Maxwell was named as manager of the
Biddle House." There was no evidence given tending to show any
custom or established course of business which would authorize an
agent in the employ of the proprietor of a hotel to purchase supplies
for the same on credit of the proprietor, or that defendant had ever
established such custom or practice.
Evidence was also given by the
plaintiff tending to show that defendant recognized his liability and
agreed to pay any balance found due.
Evidence was also given tending to show that while defendant had
held himself out as proprietor and owner of this house, that he had
also held out one G. M. Pettee as his agent, and that a balance was
due plaintiff for meat ordered by and delivered to Pettee for use at
^s The general principles as to special authority have been stated many
what
times, but the great difficulty arises in applying thorn, in determining
Is the extenl of the special authority, and what powers may be deemed necesThe authority
White v. Langdon, 30 Vt. 599 (1858).
sary for it- execution.
unless the inference is expressly excluded by other circumstances,
all the usual modes and means of accomplishing the ends and objects of the
..." .Midi. So. & N. Ind. R. It. Co. v. Day, 20 111. 375, 71 Am. Dec. 278
And if the principal clothes the special agent with the apparent munit858).
- of a greater authority, he will be bound accordingly.
Lister v. Allen,
:l Md. 543, 100 Am. Dec. 78 (1809); In the case of the special agent, however, third persons arc under special duty to make inquiry concerning the authority. Dispatch Ptg. Co. v. Nat. Bank of Com., 109 Minn. 440, 124 N. W.
236 I 1910).
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the Biddle House.
Evidence was given by defendant having
trary tendency to the above.
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a con-

It is insisted that there was no evidence that .Maxwell had authority
to buy the meat on defendant's credit, and that the evidence did not
show any subsequent recognition by the defendant of his liability, or
of Maxwell's authority, and that the court erred in not so instructing
the jury.
We do not discover any error in the charge as given, or in refusing
to charge as requested, upon this part of the case. The evidence fairly
tended to show that Maxwell had authority to bind the defendant in
making the purchase.
Where the owner and proprietor of a hotel
employs another as his agent in and about the hotel, and in running it,
and holds such person out as manager of the house, we are of opinion
jury would be warranted in finding from such evidence that such a
person had authority to purchase the usual and necessary supplies for
the hotel, and to bind his employer in making such purchases.
Such
an agent cannot well manage and properly take care of a hotel if he
has not the authority claimed in this case. 49
Complaint is also made of that part of the charge illustrating this
case by the authority of a wife to purchase necessaries.
The jury, we
think, could not have been misled by what was said; they were cautioned against applying the illustration or analogy fully to the case
before them.
As we discover no error, the judgment must be affirmed with costs.
The other Justices concurred.
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a

BORN
(Supreme

Court of Georgia,

v.

SIMMONS.
L900.

ill

Ga. 869, 36 S, E. 956.)

Action between W. H. Horn and W. E. Simmons.
From the
Reversed,
judgment, Born brings error.
Simmons, C. J.
the
By a power of attorney which authorizes
agents "to transact all such business .1- I may nol be able to attend
to in person, to take charge of and attend to the collection of all my
■
to ] •n •l< after the collection of rents,
outstanding debts,
divisions of crops with tenants, make such compromises and
as in their judgmenl is for my interest, make sale of
such property as I may desire to dispose oi from time to time, and
:

e

ements

generally to do and perform all acts thai 1
health, and for this purp<
to
pts, and such other papers as may be
tion of the business heretofore set forth,"

might do were 1 in good
sign my name to bonds.
necessary in the transac
the agents are nol

1 \ superintendent
of a mine has authority, by virti
C his position alone,
t"
necessarj
to buy provision
for n boarding house which are absolutely
enable tii<- mine to continue In operation, bul nol to buy articles which are
632,27 Pac. 67 (1891),
H<:iM v. Eiend
required.

Godd.Pb
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power to purchase mules and wagons and give promissory notes
therefor.
The general words in the power musl be construed with
reference to the specified objects to be accomplished, and limited by
Mechem, Ag. §§ 306 308; Claflin
the recitals made in regard thereto.
v. Jerse} Works, 11 S. K. 721, 85 Ga. 27, and cases cited. 60
Pkk Curiam,
rudemenl reversed.

SMITH
(Supreme

PREMIER

Court

II

of New

TYPEWRITER
ARTEL LIGHT

York. Appellate Term,
N.

v. Supp.

CO.
CO.

v.

L911.

7'J

NATIONAL
.Misc.

Rep. 405,

130

L36.)
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Seabury, J. This action was brought to recover $100 alleged
to be the agreed price of a typewriter sold and delivered to the defendant corporation.
The evidence is insufficient to establish that
the defendant purchased or ratified the alleged purchase of the typewriter.
It appears from the record that the defendant had in its
On November 10, 1910, the defendant's bookemplo) a bookkeeper.
keeper, under the express direction of an officer of the defendant,
This typewriter was delivered
signed an order for one typewriter.
and paid for. On December 1, 1910, the same bookkeeper signed a
second order for an additional typewriter.
The typewriter was delivered to the defendant.
Upon receiving the typewriter, the defendant promptly repudiated the order given by the bookkeeper, and repiested the plaintiff to remove the typewriter from the defendant's
,
)lace of business.
The record affirmatively shows that the bookkeeper had no actual
ithority to make the purchase. I While it is trtte that authority of
an assumed agent to make a pyrc-wase will be implied, where the alI principal has repeatedly
recognized and approved of similar
acts, still a single act done under express authority is insufficient to
justify the inference that the assumed agent has the apparent authorpurit}- to subject the alleged principal to liability upon subsequent
chases made without actual authority.!
Woods v. Francklyn (Com.
PL) 19 X. V. Supp. 577. As the bookkeeper was without actual or
apparent authority to make the purchase, the defendant was not
bound by his act in attempting so to do.
The judgment is reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to
the appellant to abide the event. All concur.
■■
An agent of ;i manufacturing company, In charge of a branch store for
the sale of its goods, bias no authority to buy from another household goods
to i"' delivered to third persons, though he represents to t h<* seller that he has
authority. Cowau v. Sargent Manfg. Co.,
Mich. 87, 104 N. W. :;T7 (1905).
of one mill
There is no warrant for the assumption that the superintendent
any authority to buy for another mill.
Hinde Paper Co. v. Atterbury,
<'. A. 296, L85 Fed. 76 (1911).
A manager of a business lias not thereby
.Meyer & Co. v. Baldwin, 52
authority to buy upon his employer's account.

ill
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v.

AUSTRO-AMERICAN
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STAVE

&

LUMBER CO

of United States, Second Circuit,
Fed. 564, 10!) C. C. A. 254.)

(Circuit Court of Appeals
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* The paper which is relied
Laco.m i'.i:. Circuit Judge. 51 * *
upon as showing the terms of the alleged contract is in the form of a
letter, dated Shreveport, La., April 26, 1904, addressed to defendants
in New York, and signed by the manager of plaintiff's mill, who had
authority to make contracts of sale. The Mr. Gott referred to in
the letter was a representative
of defendants who had come to
Shreveport from New York in reference to the sale of plaintiff's 1904
cut. The important parts of the letter are as follows: "We confirm
herewith our verbal agreement made with your Mr. Harry J. Gott.
\\ e agree to sell to you and you agree to buy from us all the selects
and the firsts and seconds and box boards contained in our cut of
cottonwood lumber beginning from May 1, 1904 and ending Dec. 31.
1904, this cut to consist of the maximum of eight million feet in all.
The prices will be as follows: $17 for selects, $20 for firsts and seconds, and $25 for box boards.
These prices are for 1,000 feet board
measure f. o. b. cars, Shreveport.
Net cash. You will advance to us
on each first of the month for the month previous on this contract $10
per 1,000 feet board measure on basis of log run mill cuts or No. 3
common cut. This advance to be made on the box common lumber
which is not sold under this contract, in consideration of a rate of 6
per cent, interest, and on the other lumber, will sa) selects and better,
the advance is made free of interest.
The lumber is to be well manu* *
*
factured and sawn
so as to be one inch thick when dry.
The lumber is to be well piled 1>\ us in our mill yard. The advance
ot $10 per 1,000 feet board measure has to be based upon the measurcnicnt of our inspector as said lumber is sawn, after allowing 5 per
cmt. for shrinkage for drying. The payment is to be made in such'
a way that we will draw
sighl draft on you, attaching to the said
*
*
*
draft a bill of sale for the lumber cut during the month.

All

the lumber under this contract, selects and better, has to be
shipped and paid for in full inside of six months after it is cut."
After provisions for revision of measurement, segregating, num
bering, and marking each pile subjeel to advance, inspection, and
loading on cars, the contrad proceeds:
"The advance of $10 per
1,000 on box lumber which grad( is not s«,ld under this contract, has
to be repaid to you according to shipments made at the end of the
month, including the 6 per cent, interesl less the difference in the
of the selects and better shipped oul during the mouth.
For
• feel ol box lumber during one mouth.
instance, if we ship oul
we have to pay had, o. you at the end of the month $5,000 plus 6
i 'a i '. of the opinl

in

le omit ted.
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per cent, interest an this $5,000. From this amount is to be deducted
between the $10 and the price agreed upon the selects
and better shipped out during the said month.
( )n account of the
short time your Mr. Gott had to spend here, we leave it to yon to
draw up a contract under the terms mentioned in this letter, and we
agree to sign and return it to you."
There is a sharp conflict of testimony as to what took place when
this paper was drawn up; but, the verdict being for plaintiff, we
must accept the narrative of Kobler, its manager.
The writing embodied correctly the terms of an agreement between himself and
Gott, it was signed "The Austro-American Stave and Lumber Company." by K older, and Gott also signed with his own name, "H. J.
Gott," in the presence of a witness who also signed. There was a
carbon copy.
Gott took the original away with him.
The first question raised in the case was whether Gott had any authority, or any apparent authority, to enter into this contract on
behalf of the plaintiff.
He was a young man of 27, sent down to
between them
Shreveport by defendants after some correspondence
and the plaintiff.
Examination of the alleged contract shows that
it is a peculiar one. It provides for the sale, purchase, and delivery
of lumber to be cut, which shall be of certain specified grades.
It
further provides for advances on account of the purchase price to be
made from time to time as such lumber is cut, and also for measurement, inspection, shipping, etc.
All these clauses are usual in contracts of this sort, and any one who had apparent authority from another person to purchase lumber for such other might very well be
supposed to have authority to bargain as to those provisions, as to
when advances should be made, in what amounts, etc.
But this document contains other provisions which are certainly
unusual.
It requires the purchaser of the higher grades to make
advances, not only on the monthly cut of such grades, but also on
the monthly cut of the lower grade, which he had not agreed to buy.
And this lower grade, as we have seen, is more than one-half of the
total amount of lumber cut.
In other words, at the end of each
month the purchaser is to pay part of the purchase price of the lumber -cut for him during that month, and is also to lend to the seller
a sum of money, at the rate of $10 per 1,000 feet board measure for
all box common lumber cut by the seller for his own use or to be
sold by him to some one else.
For this loan the seller is to pay interest at 6 per cent, until it is repaid.
Moreover, the time of such
The language is, "If we ship out 500,000
repayment is left uncertain.
feet of box lumber (common) during one month we have to pay backto you at the end of the month £5,000 plus 6 per cent, interest," but
there is no guarantee that 500,000 feet, or e\en one foot, will be
If the seller were not able
"shipped out" in any particular month.
to find a purchaser for his box common month by month as it was
the difference
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cut, it would not be shipped out, and it would soon come to pass,
that, besides paying advances on their own lumber defendants would
be loaning plaintiff many thousands of dollars to enable it to carry
its lumber and to continue cutting more of it to sell to some one else.
We are clearly of the opinion that Gott's assent to this proposal
cannot be held to bind defendants, unless the record discloses ap* * *
parent authority to make some such unusual contract.
The court found no evidence of such authority to the agent. Judgment for plaintiff reversed.

BROWN

v.

JOHNSON.

(High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi,
51 Am. Dec. US.)

1849.

12 Smedes &

M.

39S,

C. J. 52 R. M. Johnson authorized B. F. Johnson to purchase for him a particular parcel of land, being part of section 32 in
township 9, range 4 west, which was about to be sold under a decree
of the chancery court, for default of payment by a purchaser from
The agent did not
the state, it being part of the seminary lands.
buy the land he was authorized to purchase, but bid off and purHe
chased, in the name of his principal, part of section thirty-one.
cash
make
the
payto
his
principal,
borrowed money in the name of
ment required by the terms of the sale, and in his name, also, executed bonds to the state for the remaining two thirds of the pur-
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Sharkey,

chase money.
So soon as R. M. Johnson was informed of what had been done,
he disaffirmed the contract of the agent, and filed a petition in the
chancery court to prevent the confirmation of the sale, and the chancellor thereupon set it aside, and ordered the bonds to be delivered
ii]), and also that the land should be resold according to the terms of
Governor Brown, some time afterwards, filed
the original decree.
should be set aside, which was
a petition that the order of rescission

refused, and thereupon an appeal was prayed, which professes to be
As counsel have filed a written
an appeal from the original order.
agreement that the merits of the case only shall be considered, we
over objections that might arise to the regularity of the pro
ceedings.

The

granted.
agent had

authority
trictiy

scription,
62

was
was decided at last January term, hut a re-argument
It was then decided that the sale was void, because the
so.
This is undoubtedly
The
exceeded his authority.
to
and
was
special,
or
required
particular
in this instance
of
this
from
an
de
authority
If
the
agent vary
pursued.
Paley on \-<\i^v, 150.
his act is void as to his principal.

case

Part "i' ii"' opinion

la omitted.

(Part

'_'

THE AUTHOR] w

The agent haja no authority whatever to purchase any part of section
thirt) one, and the principal was entitled to have his bonds delivered
up.

for other reasons.

SAUGERTIES& N. Y. STEAMBOAT CO.
Courl of New

(Supreme

Stork,

Appellate Division, L902.
V. Supp. 151.)

\.

v.

MILLER.

7<'>App.

l

and remanded

Reversed

>iv. 1G7, 78

Action to recover charges for carrying horses, carriages, and bagof defendant between his residences at Rhinecliff and at New-

gage

Defendant had directed his head coachman to have them transported, and had given him the money to pay the expenses, but the
coachman had
charged to defendant.
Smith,
In Mechem, Ag.
lie right of an agent to pledge
303.
'An agent authorized to purthe credit of his principal is thus stated:
chase goods for his principal, and who
supplied with funds for
purthat purpose, has no implied authority to bind his principal by
chase on credit and in such
case the principal will not he bound by
purchase on credit, although the goods come in fact to his use, unless
ratification of
he has knowledge of the fact, and does something
or unless
be shown that
the custom of the trade to buy on
a

a

:

it,

is

\

4

it

it

in

a

lit."

a

a

it

In Mroofcs v. Mortimer. 10 App. Div. 518, 42 N. Y. Supp. 299. the
opinion, in part, reads: "In orde'r to uphold this position, we must esas
rule of Law that thi mere relation of master and servant
tablish
implies
right in the servant to rise the credit of the master to obtain
'

a

S.

a

a

:

Authority to buy cannot be inferred from mere authority to sell, for the
acts are so distinct in nature thai neither is in general dependent upon nor
incidental to the other. Keyes v. U. P. Tea Co., si vt. 420, 71 Atl. 201 (1908).
startling rule of law that an agent, specially employed to sell
It would be
his principal's wares, can bind bis principal by buying from third persons on
Finance Co. v. Old Pittsburgh Coal Co., 65 Minn. 142,
bis principal's account.
68 X. W. 70 (1896).
An agenl to manage
beer business bas no authority n> buy whisky. Hack\V. L013 (1904).
One employed to
ett v. Van Frank. 105 Mo. App. 384, 79
manage
business in the manufacture and sale of logs and lumber may hire
men. mills, and vessels, but uot purchase mills, fixtures, and make permanent
One authorized
to eniimprovements.
Holmes v. Morse. 50 Me. 102 (1862).
goods
to purchase
ploy, pay, and discharge farm laborers is not authorized
for the men employed on the farm. Carter v.
on credit, not even clothing
Burnham, 33 Ark. 212 (1876).
The opinions of Clayton and Thacher, .1.1.. are omitted.
When the principal has put the agent in funds, and the third person accepts as pari payment the agent's check, be cannot look to the principal to
good the amount, for be must be deemed to have accepted the responCleveland v. Pearl, 63 Vt. 127,
sibility of the agent instead of the principal.
For further extensions of the prin21 Atl. 261, 25 Am. St. Rep. 748 (1890).
ciple, sec Bohart \. Oberne, 36 Kan. 284, 13 Pac. 388 (1887); Cochran v. Richardson, :;:: Vt. 169 (1860); Komorowski v. Krumdick, 56 Wis. 23, 13 N. W
i
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is

t

$

J.

it

pert.

ss-i

(1882).
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such articles as the servant uses in the performance of his duties, and
that, where the articles are furnished to the servant and used by the
master, an obligation is created upon the master's part to pay therefor ;
and this without regard to the limitations which the master may have
imposed upon the servant, or the provisions which he may have mack;
We believe
to provide the servant with supplies he is required to use.
thus far.
carried
been
that the doctrine of implied liability has never
aware,
relation
that
the
mere
held,
are
so far as we
It has never been
use
the
credit
to
right
the
servant
in
the
of master and servant created
* * *
If,
however,
him.
master,
upon
and
impose
liability
of the

as the agent of the defendant for the purpose of
supplies for his household, the result would not be differIt is settled that an agent may not buy on credit, and charge the
ent.
principal, where the latter has furnished funds with which to buy.
Laing v. Butler, 37 Hun, 144, affirmed in 108 N. Y. 637, 15 N. E. 442;
Komorowski v. Krumdick, 56 Wis. 23, 13 N. W. 881 ; Mechem, Ag.

Mathieu

is treated

purchasing

See, also, Jaques v. Todd, 3 Wend. 83.
This rule of law is a salutary one, and seems to be necessary for the
protection of principals against the fraudulent acts of their agents.
The seller can always protect himself by demanding cash or proof of
With any other rule, the prinauthority to purchase upon credit.
himself
against the fraud of an agent,
to
protect
is
cipal
powerless
who may, under the rule as held below, squander the funds intrusted
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§ 363."

to him. and pledge the credit of the principal
If the principal seeks to protect himself by
purchases of his agent to be made upon credit,
therefor, he then renders himself liable for

for the purchase made.
requiring all authorized
and advancing no funds

unauthorized purchases
It is a well-recognized rule of law that, if a
made upon his credit.
principal authorize the agent to pledge his credit for property or services which he is authorized to procure; he gives to him an implied authority t<> pledge his credit for whatsoever he may purchase, though
unauthorized, if it lie within the scope of his agency.
The principal
all
purchases.
superintending
himself
personally
could only protect
by
This, <,f course, is impossible. The strict limitation of an agent's power to pledge the credit of the principal is an essential safeguard to
large commercial transactions which must he conducted through agents.
It is a limitation of which the law gives notice to all persons dealing
with agents.
in principle between the purchase
1 am unable to see any distinction
If there
upon credit.
of property on credit and the purcl
an
in
of
to
the
fact
pledge
agenl
from
agency
be no implied authority
the credit of his principal for property purchased and used by the principal, 1 am unable to see why there should be any implied authority
to pledge the credit of his
in the agenl from the lie
could have protected
This,
plaintiff
rendered.
for
principal
himself by demanding cash for the transportation, and could even have
enforced that demand by asserting its lien. This iv not a ca e where

'.

Tin: ai TH0RITX

!60

(Part

2

therefor.
The question here raised is an important one, and cannot be influenced by any apparent hardship to the plaintiff. I am unable to see
any principle of law upon which the defendant can be held liable. The
judgment

should be reversed.

Judgment reversed, and new trial granted, with costs to appellant to
abide event.

SPRAGUE
(Supreme

Judicial Court of

v.

GILLETT.

Massachusetts,

1845.

9 Mete.

Wilde, J. This

91.)

is an action of assumpsit for the price of
tity of cordage purchased of the plaintiffs by the defendants'

a quan-

a

is,

agent ;
and the defence
that the agent was not authorized to make the purThat he was not in terms expressly so authorized
chase on
credit.
admitted but he was authorized to make the purchase, and no funds
were advanced to him, to enable him to purchase for cash. 65 This, by
implication, unquestionably
authorized him to make the purchase on
the defendants' credit.
When an agent
authorized to do an act for
his employer, all the means necessary for the accomplishment of the
act are impliedly included in the authority, unless the agent be in some
Thus,
an agent
particular expressly restricted.
employed to pronote or bill to be discounted, he may, unless expressly restricted,
cure
is

a

if

is

;

is

8

a

&

65 The fact that the principal did not at all times furnish the agent money
to pay for goods he was authorized to purchase may make him liable on purSee Spear
chases for which he did put the agent in funds.
Tietjen Supply
The effect of the acceptance
Co. v. Van Riper (D. C.) 103 Fed. 689 (1900).
and use by the principal of the property purchased on credit by the agent is
well brought out in Brittain v. Westall, L37 N. C. ?,0, 49 S. E. 54 (1904).
The
court gives
valuable notice of leading cases on the subject, including Patton
v. Brittain, 32 N. C. (10 [red.)
(1848), and Komorowskl v. Krumdick, 56 Wis.
H (1882), which may be compared with advantage.
23, 13 X. W.
S
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If there be no implied auone of two innocent panics must suffer.
thority in the agent from the mere fad of agency to pledge the credit
oi his principal, the plaintiff was not an innocenl party in giving that
credit.
The rule is unquestioned that an agent may charge his principal not only within his actual authority, but within his apparent authority; but there is no apparent authority to pledge the credit of the
It is nol claimed that there
principal from the mere fact of agency.
are any surrounding circumstances here from which such apparent
authority could be found, except that Connell was acting confessedly
and openly as the agent of the defendant in contracting for this transportation.
There is evidence to the effect that property had theretofore been transported, and a bill afterwards paid by Connell, the coachman. There is no evidence that this fact was known to the defendant.
In fact, the proof is to the contrary. Upon the evidence, it stands unwas contracted for
contradicted that, at all times when transportation
Connell,
funds
from
he had in his possession
the defendant to pay
by
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So an
indorse it in the name of his employer, and thereby bind him.
authority to a broker to effect a policy will authorize him to adjust a
Story on Agency, §§ 58-60; Richardson v.
loss under the policy.
Anderson, 1 Campb. 43, note. Without doubt, therefore, the defendants' agent was authorized to purchase on credit, and to bind the deThis authority is necessarily
fendants to pay the purchase money.
that
the
fact,
from
agent was not furnished with
the
admitted
implied
any funds wherewith to pay the purchase money ; and certainly he
was not bound to advance his own funds, nor to become chargeable
himself.
It has been objected, that a longer time of credit was allowed than
was usual in like purchases, and that the defendants were thereby led
to believe that their agent had paid for the cordage, and that, about
two months after the purchase, they paid him the amount. There is
no foundation for this objection.
It is not admitted by the plaintiffs
that six months was an unusually long credit in like purchases ; nor
would it be material, if it were admitted.
The plaintiffs are not
If the deresponsible for the misconduct of the defendants' agent.
fendants have been deceived by him, their remedy is against him.
That can be no defence in this action. It is not material whether the
agent was authorized to give a note in the defendants' names; for,
whether he was or not, the defendants are liable in this action.
Exceptions overruled.

MOREY
(Court of Appeals

v.

WEBB.

of New York.

1874.

58 N.

Y.

350.)

Action for balance alleged to be due for cheese sold and delivered to
defendants.
The agent had been provided with funds to pay for the
same, but had converted them to his own use.
Rapaixo, J. According to the course of dealing between these
parties, the shipment of the cheese bought by Chapman for Webb,
Turner & Co. usually, if not invariably, preceded the payment of the
Xo notice to the plaintiff was shown that Chapman's authority
price.
On the contrary, the
limited
to purchases for cash on delivery.
was
of
bad
he
no
knowledge
testified
that
any such restriction.
plaintiff
Chapman was introduced to him by one of the defendants' linn, as
authorized to purchase cheese for them. With defendants' knowledge
His dealings as such agent were
he put up a sign as agenl for them.
The cheese was delivered, marked and
numerous and extensive.
shipped to the defendants according to Chapman's directions, and reg
ularly paid for at a ubsequenl time, with the exception of the three
lots now in controversy.
We see no ground upon which the judgmenl should he disturbed.
affirmed, with costs. 56

Judgment
6» Bee,

:ii

o,

Larlvee

the principal furnished

v.

A'Hearn,

207

the agenl m

Mass. 288,98 X. D. 708 (1911), In which
Intervals.

y al stated

Tin; A.UTHOR.ITI

362
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II. To Sell Personal Property
(A)

In

General

PEERLESS MACHINE Co.
Canty, J.

bt

1.

is

(Supreme

Court

of Minnesota,

L895.

v.

<ii Minn.

GATES.
124, 63

W. 200.)

N.

However,
and introducing this class of machines among the farmers.
both parties agree that defendant first took the machine on trial at
the agreed price of $480, and that after trial he refused to accept it.
Defendant claims that after this he purchased the machine from the
".ei-er Company,
through one Lyttle, who he claims was its agent,
discount of
for the price of $240, from which was to be deducted
Plaintiff denies
$50, and also $30 which he had paid for freight.
no evidence that Lyttle had any authorthis, and claims that there
ity from the Geiser Company to sell the machine, and therefore no
cerevidence to sustain the verdict.
The evidence of his authority
However, plaintiff introduced evidence
tainly not very satisfactory.
tern ling to prove that one Bell was the "traveling agent" of the Geiser
Company, and defendant testified that, in the presence of Bell, Lyttle
represented to plaintiff that "he was the agent for the company, and
had full control in this part of the country." We are of the opinion
that, under all the circumstances of the case, the question of Lyttle's
authority was for the jury.
Several parts of the charge are excepted to. The court charged
"The court charges you that the possession of
the jury as follows
man
the property by
presumptive evidence of ownership— preonly one place
sumptive evidence of the right to sell it; and there
where the property
where such a thing can be questioned, and that
no such claim here.
Consequently, the
has been stolen, and there
he
had
to sell or disright
in
of
Lyttle,
possession
property being
instructions:
Secfor
certain
"Plaintiff
asks
it."
of
pose
the duty of the party who deals with one not
genond. 'That
eral agent to inquire into the nature and extent of his agency, and
*

*

57

Tart of the opinion

*

*

a

is

it

*

a

is

is

is

is

a

:

5.

*

is

is

a

<
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it

a

a

it,

This is an action of replevin, for the recovery of the
ession of a threshing machine.
Both parties claim title from the
same vendor — the Geiser Manufacturing Company.
Plaintiff claims
that it purchased the machine from the Geiser Company
July 17,
1892, ami defendant claims that he purchased it from the Geiser Company, ami took possession of
prior to that time, to wit, in Octoher,
verdict, and from an order deOn the trial, defendant had
1891.
new trial plaintiff appeals.
nying its motion for
There
evidence tending to prove that defendant got the machine from the Geiser Company for the purpose of putting
on trial,

is omitted.
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This the court gives to you, with
to deal with the agent accordingly.'
this modification : that where the party represents himself to be an
agent, and has the property sought to be disposed of in his possession,
that the rule is entirely altered. Third. 'That no man has a right, in
dealing with an agent, to rely upon his own statements as to his authority.' The court gives you that, with the same modifications just
stated. Fourth. 'You are instructed that the defendant has no right
This the
to rely upon the declarations of Lyttle as to his agency.'
court gives you. with the same modification: that, if he had made this
statement about any other property than that which he had in his
possession, it would have been good law; but, with the property in
Fifth. 'You are inhis hand and possession, the rule is otherwise.
structed that if the agent of the Geiser Company, Lyttle, was only a
special agent, in dealing with him it was incumbent upon Gates
to inquire into Lyttle's authority, and not rely upon his own declarations and acts.' This the court gives you, with the modifications stated
before."
From this it will be seen that the trial court held, as a question of
law, that Lyttle was in possession of the machine when he sold it to
defendant, while there is hardly a shadow of evidence in the case
tending to show that he ever was even in apparent possession of the
But, even if he was in possession of it, his possession was
machine.
None of the indicia of ownership
the possession of his principal.
He did not pretend to be the owner of the propwas given to him.
erty, and his apparent possession of it was not evidence of his authority to sell it. Even if Lyttle, having such possession, had repted himself to be the owner of the property, and had sold it as
the purchaser would have no title, even though there
Greene v. Dockenapparently nothing to put him on his guard.

such owner,

dorf, 13 Minn. 70 (Gil. 66).
This disposes of all the questions
order appealed from is reversed, and

C<

(Supreme

Court

WILL

of New

v.

a

raised having any merit.
new trial granted.

The

HILL."

lork,

1847.

I

Denlo,

323.)»«

Trover for white pine lumber, shipped, according to the bill of
No.
lading, "for Miles Covill," by one Potter, to defendants for sale.
Covill had a written contract
bill of lading was senl to defendants.
See,
ley, L20 N. r. MO, 24 v B. B27 (1890).
Mere possession
508 (1868).
Md. 76, 90 Am. !><•<•.
:,,,,! control
with the relation of principal and agent.
Is entirely consistent
v. Loeb, ' 9 Ml. App. 1 16 (1896).
Wil
■••Sec i x. v. 522 (1848), in which the Courl of Appeals ordered the
arj to constitute b
i.i.i. for a new trial, on the ground thai the fa<
w n.
con vers Ion h»<l nol
•

Approved

Johnson

In

\

Edward

v. I

29

,

THE

364

ai THORITY

(Part

2

the lumber should be shipped by Potter, as the agent
name oi the plaintiff, title to remain in plaintiff until the
Winn plaintiff inquired of defendants
purchase monej was paid.
the lumber, they answered that Totter was largely indebted to
them and they had given him credil for the lumber on account of
They refused to deliver the lumber unless plainsuch indebtedness.
tiff would reimburse them for the advances they had made Potter.
The latter for many years had been in the lumher business, shipping
to defendant-; for sale on his account large amounts each year.
BRONSON, C. J. ao It is a principle of the common law, which has

with

Potter that

in the

and

but few exceptions, that a man cannot be divested of his property
Ami although possession is one of the most
without his consent.
usual evidences of title to personal chattels, yet, as a general rule,
mere possession will not enable a man to transfer a better title than
he has himself or than he has been authorized by the owner to grant.
Exceptions in favor of trade are allowed in the case of money and
But as to other personal chattels, the mere
negotiable instruments.

means it may have been acquired, if there
or authority to sell from the true
owner, will not enable the possessor to give a good title. In Pk'cering
v. Busk, 15 East, 38, ante, p. 319, which is one of the strongest cases in
the books against the true owner, the broker not only had the possession of the hemp, but it had been transferred to his name in the books
of the wharfinger by direction of the owner; and from this evidence, in
connection with the fact that it was the ordinary business of the broker to make sales, an authority from the owner to sell was implied.
So far has the rule for protecting the owner been carried, that although he sell and deliver possession of the property, if there he a
condition that the title shall not pass until the price is paid, the voluntary assignee of the purchaser will acquire no right as against the
owner.
Haggerty v. Palmer, 6 John. Ch. 437. Nor will the creditors
of the vendee acquire any such right, by receiving the property on
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possession,

by whatever

be no other evidences

of property,

account of their debts, or taking it by virtue of their executions or
attachments.
Strong v. Taylor, 2 Hill, 326; Hussey v. Thornton,
Marston v. Baldwin, 17 Mass. 606;
4 .Mass. 405, 3 Am. Dec. 224;
Barrett v. Pritchard, 2 Pick. 512, 13 Am. Dec. 449. And see Root v.
French, 13 Wend. 570, 28 Am. Dec. 482. But in the case of a conditional sale, with a delivery of possession, it may be that a bona fide
or one who makes advances
purchaser, who parts with his money;
the credit of appearances,
to
trusting
to the vendee on the property,
which is sometimes
principle
lien
on
the
or
a
title
;
will ohtain
good
must
suffer from the
innocent
when
of
two
persons
one
that
applied,
fraud of a third, the loss shall fall on him who has enabled such third
See Haggerty v. Palmer, 6 John. Ch. 437;
person to do the wrong.
Root v. French, 13 Wend. 570, 28 Am. Dec. 482; 2 Kent, 497.
eo

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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But it is not now necessary to decide that question ; for there was
no conditional sale, nor a sale of any kind from the plaintiff to Potter. The title was never to vest in Potter; but only in such persons
as should purchase from the defendants, to whom the lumber was
to be shipped, and who were to sell it as the property of the plaintiff.
and account to him for the avails, to the extent provided for by the
The plaintiff was to hold the possession as well as the title
contract.
And alto the property until the purchase money should be paid.
defendants,
he
was
to do
the
to
the
lumber
though Potter was to ship
transaction
The
plaintiff.
the
of
in
name
and
the
the
it as
agent,
amounted to nothing more than a bailment of the lumber to Potter
for the purpose of forwarding it to the defendants to be sold, with
an interest in the bailee as to all which the property might bring bePotter had no
yond the specified sum of $8.25 per thousand feet.
more power over the property as against the plaintiff, than though he
had received it as a common carrier for hire, and without any other
interest; nor did the plaintiff do any thing which was more likely to
mislead third persons, than though he had delivered the property to
And it hardly need be said, that a
Potter as such common carrier.
mere bailee can neither give a good title, nor create a valid lien as
* * *
against the true owner.
the
plaintiff.
Judgment for

HEATH
(Supreme

v.

STODDARD.

Judicial Court of Maine

1898.

91

Me. 400, 40 Atl. 547.)

Wl swell, J.

The piano was at one time
Replevin for a piano.
the property of the plaintiff, who intrusted it to one Spencer for the
purpose of taking it to, and leaving it at, the house of the defendant,
but without any authority, as the plaintiff claims and as has been found
by the jury, to sell the piano or to make an) contract for its sale; the
arrangement being, as the plaintiff claims, that Spencer should merelj
take it to and leave it at the defendant's h use, and that a day or two
later the plaintiff would go there and make a sale of it if he could.
Spencer had the piano taken to the defendant's house, but, instead of
simply leaving it so thai the plaintiff mighl subsequently sell it, he
assumed authority in himself to sell it to the defendant, who bought it
and paid in cash and otherwise the full purchase price fixed by Spen
cer, without any knowledge of his want of authority.
Spencer was himself a dealer in pianos and musical instruments, and,
with the plaintiff
upon the very day when he made the arrangemenl
to take one of hi- (plaintiff's) pianos t<- the defendant's house, he had
seen the defendant and attempt* d t" S<11 him one of his pianos.
as an agenl the presiding
Upon the question of Spencer's auth/rit)
*,
'i'lie
mere fad thai Sp<
follows:
the jurj as
e instructed
the
to
defendant, even as the
it
and
sold
piano
had possession of that

thh ai"i'iiiii;ity

3o6

(Tart

2

a

is

it

it,

in

in

that

purpose."
in

While these instructions were technically correct, so far as they go,
we do not think that they were adequate,
view of the defendant's
position, and we fear that the illustration given was so extreme as to

x

be misleading.

8

a

a

5.

in

a

it if
is a

;

I,

5

a

a

is

&

is

is

A

not only bound by the acts of his agent, whether
principal
general or special, within the authority which he has actually given
also bound by his agent's acts within the apparent auhim, but lie
thority which the principal himself knowingly permits his agent to
assume, or which he holds the agent out to the public as possessing.
Am.
Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 969, and cases cited.
Whether or not
bound by the acts of his agent, when
principal
dealing with
third person who does not know the extent of his
authority, depends, not so much upon the actual authority given or
intended to be given by the principal, as upon the question, what did
such third person, dealing with the agent, believe, and have a right
to believe, as to the agent's authority from the acts of the principal?
Atl. 504; Towle v. Leavitt, 23 N. H.
Griggs v. Selden, 58 Vt. 561,
Walsh v. insurance Co., 73 N. Y.
55 Am. Dec. 195
For instance,
person should send
store or
commodity to
warehouse where
the ordinary business to sell articles of the same
nature, would not
jury be justified
coming to the conclusion
that, at least, the owner had by his own act invested the person with
whom the article was intrusted with an apparent authority which
would protect an innocent purchaser?
In Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 43, ante, p. 319, quoted by Mellen, C.
Me. 38, 22 Am. Dec. 220, Lord Ellenborough
J., in Parens v. Webb,

1
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it

is

it,

defendant says, Heath's name not having been mentioned to the defendant, would not necessarily give a title to the defendant.
To Illustrate:
Suppose yon are a livery stable keeper, and you lei a man have
a horse to go from here to Portland.
Yon let him have that horse,
but it is for a special purpose
to go from here to Portland.
He
ts a man on the road, and asks him what he will give him for the
. and they dicker, and finally the man whom he meets buys that
for $125.
Yon do nol suppose that would divest you of the
title as a livery stable keeper, because you never have given authority
to that man to sell?
Yen gave authority to that man to drive to
Portland and hack, and if any man was foolish enough to buy that
horse of that man he will have to stand his chances.
I give you this
as an illustration.
It may be an extreme illustration. Now, if a party
allow- another to take a piano, and go into the country to leave
and that party who takes
sells it, and there
not any authority for
sale,
then whoever purchases
in the country, or wherever
that
left, or on the way, can obtain no greater title than the party has who
conies hack to the question of whether this man Heath,
sells it. So,
the plaintiff
this case, ever authorized Spencer to so deal with that
sale of
as to constitute him an agent for
the
property,
way of

Cli.l),
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"Where the commodity is sent in such a way, and to such a place,
to\exhibit an apparent purpose of sale, the principal will be bound

says :/
as

the plaintiff and Spencer or the limit of authority given by the plaintiff, would not a jury have been warranted in coming to the conclusion that the purchaser was justified in believing, in view of all of
the plaintiff
these facts, that Spencer had authority to sell, and
tl^ft
knowinglv placed Spencer in a position where he cotild assume this
apparent authority, to the injury of the defendant?.' We think that
a jury might have properly come to such a corrclusiolt, and that conthat it
were inadequate in this respect:
sequently the instructions
was nowhere explained to the jury that a principal might be bound
but within
by the acts of an agent, not within his actual authority,
which the principal had knowingly and by his
the apparent authority
acts permitted the agent to assume
cptions sustained.

own

CLOUGH
(Supreme

Judicial

Court

v.

WHITCOMB.

of Massachusetts,

i^tu.

in.~ Muss.

-1*2.)

for the price "i g
Is sold ami
ntract on an account
an
order
taken
on
to
defendant
by one Clark,
delivered by plaintiff
defendant
to
from
had
goods
Clark
agreed
accept
traveling pedler.
annexed

The case came up on excepin exchange for the goods so ordered.
tion-, by plaintiff to charges of the court.
ptions that the goods in <\\wsWells, I- It appears by th<
the plaintiff,
directly; and
to
the
defendant
by
delivered
were
tion

-

ll

ii

:i

Is

I

:i
-'
«■
1
1
<

f

a

-"'
s

full and discrlm
Ala. 166 (1877), is
I ii Leigh v. Mobile *v ■>hio R. Co.,
the exceptions to the maxim of the law of sales, nemo
[Dating discussl
Hi'with
who
Intrusted
the a
tint u'""i non /"//-./. Including
or
j,, n ,,)■ his principal's property, and with tin- Indicia of ownership,
Such was the case in Columbus Buggj Co. \. Turley, 73
of authority t" selL
."••",
Am. St. Rep. 550 (1805), where
529, i-.i South. 232, 32 I.. It. A. 260,
with carriagi
tahle \\;is Intrusted
livery ai
tin- proprietor of
Compare Towle \. taavltt,
Bale, which Ik- wrongfully Bold for bis owe debts.
was left for repair
23 x. II. 1160, 55 Am Dec. 195 (1851), in which :« carriage
See, ;ii>".
carriage maker, and by him sold contrary to Instructions
with
Mi
532,
South. 65 (1906); Glluian oil
Parry Mfg. Co. \. Lowenberg,
Norton 89 Iowa, 134. 56 N. W 663, l^ Am St Rep. WO (189:i).
Co
v
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and the purchaser safe."
Spencer was a
Let us apply this principle to the present case.
dealer in pianos.
Immediately before this transaction he had been
There was evidence tending
trying- to sell a piano-'to the defendant.
With this knowledge, he
to show that the plaintiff knew these facts.
intrusted the possession of this piano with Spencer for the purpi
its being taken by Spencer to the defendant's house with a view to
He did not
its sale.
Spencer was not acting merely as a bailee.
house,
it done by
but
had
personally take the piano to the defendant's
other
for
some
was
employed
or expressman.
Spencer
a truckman
between
arrangement
the
have
been
private
^Whatever may
purpose.
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They wore so delivered upon
through Clark, the alleged agent.
written orders, signed by the defendant, addressed to the plaintiff,
and giving the description, quantity and prices of the goods desired.
These orders were solicited and forwarded by Clark, who was the
plaintiff's agent for that purpose and was to have a commission upon
sales so made.
Whether be was authorized to make contracts of sale
and to receive payments or to make agreements as to the mode of
payment was in dispute upon the conflicting testimony of the partie.-.
Unless he had such authority or was held out by the plaintiff
his receipt of, or agreement to receive, in
as having such authority,
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not

payment, other goods, by way of barter, would not bind the plaintiff,
Upon the face of
and he may recover for the goods in this action.
the orders upon which the goods were delivered, the price is payable
in money to the plaintiff.
The first instruction given to the jury seems to us exceptionable,
There was
because not properly adapted to the facts of the case.
no evidence that the goods were delivered to the defendant by Clark
upon a contract for the same made by himself, as agent of the plaintiff, or otherwise.
It was in dispute whether the contract of sale was
made by Clark, as agent, or by the plaintiff directly ; but the delivery,

as the case is reported, was not made by Clark; and it was made by
the plaintiff, not upon any verbal contract with Clark, but upon the
The case
defendant's written order, addressed to the plaintiff himself.
therefore differs essentially from Brigham v. Palmer, 3 Allen, 450.
The facts indicate a contract of purchase and sale with the plaintiff
Finch v. Mansfield, 97 Mass. 89.
directly, and not with the agent.
A commission, alThe second instruction is erroneous in itself.
orders,
sales
effected
through such
lowed to one who solicits
upon
orders, does not constitute him or prove him to be an agent with authority to make absolute contracts of sale ; C2 much less to receive
payments, and make agreements to receive payments in other goods
As we understand the instruction, it was that an
by way of barter.
agreement to give Clark a commission on goods sold through his
solicitation made or proved him to be an agent to sell said goods.
This instruction, taken with the previous one, rendered a verdict for
the defendant almost inevitable.
For these reasons, a new trial should
be had.
There was evidence tending to show that, either by previous authority or by subsequent acquiescence, the plaintiff sanctioned the
62 Compare Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305, 42 Am. Rep. 332 (1882), and Smith v.
Certainly one
Clews, lor, X. V. 283, 11 N. E. 632, 59 Am. Rep. 502 (1887).
formerly authorized t" "solicit orders" has no authority to soil.
Abrahams
v. Weillor. 87 III. iT'.i dsTTi.
Nor can authority to sell specified property
I'nion Trust Co. v. Means, 201
confer power to sell after acquired property.
Pa. 374, 50 Atl. !>7i (1902); Blackmer v. Summit Coal & Mining ('<>.. 187 ill.
:;-j. 58 X. E. 289 (1900).
Nor property of another kind.
McCord Co. v. Woll39 i aL 271, 2G Pac. 969 (1891); Forresl v. Vanderbilt, 107 Fed. 734, 46
A. en. 52 L. E. A. IT-'; (1901) (agent to sell yacht, sold launch).
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mode of dealing adopted by Clark. But it does not appear that the
verdict was rendered on that ground, and no question is now oper
before us in relation to it. Exceptions sustained.

SCUDDER
(Supreme

Court of Michigan,

v.

ANDERSON.

1884.

54

Mich.

122,

19 N.

W.

775.)

Plaintiff, as vendee of John Scudder, brought this
Campbell, J.
action in trover for the conversion of various articles formerly owned
by the Marquette & Pacific Rolling-Mill Company, and used on their
This company had, up to
mining property in Marquette county.
1878, worked an iron mine on 40 acres of their own, and an adjoining 40 acres in which they owned seven sixteenths in fee, and had
In October, 1877, a levy of
a lease of the other undivided interest.
execution on their landed mining property was carried to a sale, one
Ward being the purchaser.
On the third day of September, 1878,
William W. Wheaton, who was general agent in charge of the company's interest, sold the property in suit here to John Scudder, in payment of a claim, which Scudder then held against the company for
his services as secretary, to the amount of about $1,800. In August,
1879, defendant, who was sheriff of Marquette county, levied on this
property under claim of legal process against the company, and sold it.
This case came on for trial, and the plaintiff recovered judgment.
Various errors are assigned, relating chiefly to questions of title.
Some other objections were also argued, which will be referred to.
point was made that sufficient evidence was not given of Wheaton's
authority to sell. But, if this property was movable property, we can
see no reason to doubt the power of a general agent and manager
to dispose of it. Purchases and sales of personalty for use about mining premises must be of frequent occurrence, and would presumably
04
The point was not
be under the control of the general manager.
* * * Afwas
think
not
well
We
it
taken.
pressed.
strenuously
firmed.

A

•"»

Tart of the opinion is omitted.
t* Authority to buy things and have them charged Is in no sense authority
Moffel v. Moffet, 90 iowa,
12. 57 N. W. 954
to sell the principal's property.
sale is necessary
position thai
Bui when an agenl is put In such
(1894).
authority to sell may be inferred. Sherry Lumber
to protect the property,
\\i>. Cent. B. Co., 87 ill. App. 598 (1891).
Uood.Pb.A A. — 24
a

■!

•

a
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(B) To Make Warranties

HERRING
(Supreme

Courl of Alabama,

v.

L878.

SKAGGS.
62

Ala.

L80, .".l Am.

Rep. 4.)

.Action for damages for breach of a warranty by a sales agent that
sate was burglar proof.
The safe had been broken open and rilled
"i a sum of money and other valuables.
Stone, J. 6B In Skinner v. Gunn, ( ) Port. 305, speaking of the
power oi an agent to bind his principal, this court said: "The power
in this case is to sell and convey the negro in the name of the plaintiff, and the agent must, as an incident of that power, and in the absence of any prohibition, have the right to warrant the soundness of
the slave, as that is a usual and ordinary stipulation in such contracts,
and must therefore be implied to effectuate the object of the power."
The court, in the same case, had said, "An authority to do an act,
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a

must include power to do every thing usual and necessary to its acThis doctrine was reaffirmed in Gaines v. McKinley,
complishment."
1 Ala. 446, and in Cocke v. Campbell,
13 Ala. 286.
It will be observed that, in these cases, the court states, as matter of law, that
power given to sell a slave carried with it power to warrant his soundness, in the absence of prohibition.
A similar principle is found in
the books, in reference to the power of an agent to bind his principal, by warranty of the soundness of a horse he is authorized to sell.
It is a "usual and ordinary stipulation in such contracts," say the
courts.
Perhaps the custom of such warranties is so general, and
has prevailed so long, that it has come to be treated as judicial knowlCertainly it was not intended to be affirmed, that an agent with
edge.
general powers of sale, has unlimited power to bind his principal, by
any and every stipulation the various phases of traffic may be made
If so, the words, "in the absence of prohibition," found
to assume.
in the case of Skinner v. Gunn, supra, are meaningless and powerless.
In the case of Fisher v. Campbell, 9 Port. 210, a question arose on
the implied power of an agent to bind his principal. That was the
case of a non-resident
planter, whose overseer in charge made purIt was proved that
chases of supplies for the plantation and hands.
the employer had given the overseer instructions to purchase pork
for his slaves from a particular mercantile house at Montgomery, with
whom he had made arrangements for that purpose, and had given
him no directions to buy any where else, nor had he any authority
The plantation was in Lowndes
to purchase from any other person.
county, and, the roads being bad, the overseer purchased pork in his
Comown county, much nearer to him, and at Montgomery prices.
and
refused
the
court
a
plaintiffs,
on
by
charge requested by
menting
03

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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below, this court said, "The last branch of the charge is stated as a
corollary from the preceding propositions; 'that any special directions given to McMay [the overseer] by the defendant, as to the
place of purchasing, was wholly immaterial as to this purchase, unfrom the evidence they were satisfied that plaintiffs were informed at the time of such sale of such special directions; and that
without this information, the plaintiffs would be entitled to recover,
if the proof was fully made out.' We understand the law to be the
When a person deals with one
exact converse of this proposition.
who professes to be the agent of another person, the person contracting with him is bound to know t\ie extenjt of his authority." — See,
also, McCrary v. Slaughter, 58 Ala. 230.
We are not prepared to assent to the /doctrine, in unlimited sense,
that a general agent to sell has, by virti/e thereof, the pbwer to bind
his principal by every species of warra/ty a purchaser irAy exact. In
Benjamin on Sales, § 624, is the following language :f "Warranties
are sometimes given by agents, without express authoriW to that effect. In such cases the question arises as to the power of an atfent,
who is authorized to sell, to bind, his principal by a warranty/ The
general rule is. as to all contracts including sales, that the agent is
authorized to do whatever is usual to carry out the object of hU
agency, and it is a question for the jury to determine what is usual
If in the sale of the goods confided to him, it is usual in the marki
to give a warranty, the agent may give that warranty in ordej^o
effect a sale." We fully approve and adopt this language of this Very
accurate writer. We do not intend, however, to overturn the do/rine
declared in Skinner v. Gunn, and Cocke v. Campbell, supra. /As a
general r
into such
such

e

the agent has power to do whatever is usual — ti enter
ress stipulations as arc usual and customary — in effecting

sales.

What

lations arc usual and customary in effecting such sales.
It is declared in the
matter of judicial knowledge.
is not alw
within
and
to
the
slaves
be
of
horses
knowledge of the court
sales
It can not be affirmed that such
that it is usual to give warranties.
in the sale of all chattels.
Generally, and we hold in a
sale like the present, "it is a question for the jury to determine what is
This, in the absence of express authority in the agent to war
usual."
rant; for if the agent had such express authority, then his act is the
sti

s

And,

in the absence of express authority,
the
"in- for the jury, whether such warranty is
It' the jury, on the evidence, find there
customary in the sale of safes.
uch custom, then the principal is hound, "in the absence of pro
hibition" resting on the agent, and brought to the knowledge of the
purchaser, to the same extent as if the principal had himself given the
On the other hand, if there was no such authority given,
warranty.
and no such custom found to exist, then the principal would not be
Tine, if the principal ratified the act of such agent, alll;
d.

ad

of his principal.

1 it

is
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act itself had been unauthorized,
this would bind the principal.
But the receipt of the purchase money would have no sucli effect, unless received or retained with knowledge
that the agent had given
the warranty.
The sale in the present ease was made by an agent. In the absence
of proof of express authority to warrant, it was incumbent on the
plaintiff to show a custom in the sale of safes, to warrant them as
burglar proof. Either the express authority, or the authority implied
from such proven custom, would constitute the act of the agent the
act of the principal ; hut the law does not imply the authority from
the fact that Stewart, who conducted the sale, was a general agent.
The third count of the complaint avers that the defendants "did employ an agent, and authorized him to sell such safes, and did hold
him forth to the public residing in and about the town of Talladega,
Alabama, and elsewhere, as their general agent for the sale of iron
safes."
This is the entire averment of authority, and we hold it inIt should have been averred that the agent had authority
sufficient.
to make the warranty.
Being averred, proof of express authority,
or custom to warrant, would have sustained the averment. 68 The
third count is insufficient, and the demurrer to it should have been
sustained.
Under the principles above declared, it became a material inquiry
whether Stewart had express authority to warrant the safe as burglarproof. He should have been permitted to prove he had not such exTrue, this would not necessarily exonerate the depress authority.
fendants.
It would bear on only one phase of the inquiry; for, if
such warranties are usual and customary in the sale of iron safes,
then even a prohibition of such authority to the agent would amount
to nothing, unless knowledge of such prohibition was carried home
to the purchaser before the sale was consummated.
So, if the published descriptive
pamphlet with which the agent was furnished,
tended to disclose what classes of safes were, and what were not represented as burglar-proof, and such pamphlet was exhibited to the
purchaser pending the negotiation, then that pamphlet should have
been allowed to go to the jury, as shedding some light on the contro* * *
verted question of warranty vel non.
For these and other reasons, reversed and remanded.
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the

ee While an agent of a manufacturer may warrant goods to be free from
latent defects due to the process of manufacture,
and that they are suitable
for the purpose for which they were specifically designed, he has no authority,
in the absence of express authority or usage of the trade, to warrant goods
to be "all wool." Elinor v. Priestley, 39 Misc. Rep. 535, SO N. Y. Supp. 371
Xor does authority to warrant goods extend to goods sold subsequent
(1902).
to the warranty.
Wail v. Borne, 123 N. Y. 592, 25 N. E. 1053 (1890); Ide v.
Brody, 156 ill. App. it:» (1910).
Three isolated instances of sales with warranties made in three or four
years are not sufli<i<nt to establish a usage of trade to warrant.
Herring v.
Skaggs, 73 Ala. 4-10 (1882).

Ql.

NATURE AND
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BRADY
(Court

of Common Pleas, 1861.
C. P. 223, 4 L. T. Rep. N.

v.
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TODD."

9 C. B. N.

S. 592,

S. 212, 9 W.

R.

7

Jur.

4S3, 99

N. S. 827, 30 L.

E. C. L.

J.

592.)
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ErlE, C. J. Upon this rule to set aside the verdict for the plaintiff
and enter it for the defendant on the plea denying the warranty of
a horse, the question has been whether the warranty by the defendThe jury have found that Greig, in selling the horse
ant was proved.
for the defendant, warranted it to be sound and quiet in harness. The
defendant stated, and it must on this motion be taken to be true, that
he did not give authority to Greig to give any warranty. The relevant
facts are, that the plaintiff applied to the defendant, who is not a
dealer in horses, but a tradesman with a farm, to sell the horse ; and
that the defendant sent his farm-bailiff, Greig, with the horse, to the

plaintiff, and authorized him to sell it for thirty guineas.
The plaintiff contends that an authority to an agent to sell and deliver imports an authority to him to warrant.
The subject has been frequently mentioned by judges and textwriters ; but we cannot find that the point has ever been decided. It
is therefore

necessary to consider

it on principle.

The general rule, that the act of an agent does not bind his prinBut
cipal unless it was within the authority given to him, is clear.
67 Followed in Cooley v. Perrino. 41 X. J. Law. 322, 32 Am. Rep. 210 (1S79),
in which it is said by the court: "A sale of a chattel is a transfer of its title
1 Parsons on Conby the vendor to the vendee for a price paid or promised.

would
nothing more appearing,
A direction
to sell, therefore,
519.
with the
m a special agent no authority beyond that of agreeing
particulars. Under certain circumIn regard to these componenl
purchaser
stances a sale Legally Imports more than these particulars, and In such eases
Thus,
enlarged.
the authority under a power to sell would be correspondingly
it' a sale be made by sample. It is thereby impliedly warranted that the bulk
Hence it lias been properly held that
as good a quality as the Bample.
I
where a broker was empowered to sell goods which were in bulk, and by the
custom of brokers, it was permissible to sell such goods by sample, and he
was not restricted by his Instructions as i<> the mode of sale, his sale by sam-

tracts,

and the warranty of quality therein Implied, were binding upon his prinland,
The Monte Allegre, 9 Wheat. 616, 6 L. Ed. 174; Andrews v. Ki
i Wall. 859, 17 L. Bid. 642.
Bui In a sale
v. Alien,
. 354;
Schuchardl
of a horse, Bubjecl to the buyer's Inspection, no warranty of quality is Implied, and it seems a morl and clear deduction of reasoning thence to conclude thai in an authority tO male sUCb a sale, D.0 authority BO tO warrant
is Implied.
The warranty is outside of the sale, and he who is empowered to
*
*
o
ther power than thai t<> sell.
Nor have they any better basis on principle than on authority. Their under
lying principle Is said to be thai the agent, being empowered (<>sell, is Inof
the sale, and a warranty
trusted with ail powers proper tor effectuating
If by this
qualitj \t both a proper and a usual power for thai purpose.
were mennl thai the agenl la Intru ted with all powers proper to the mal Ing
bis
Undoubtedly
of an effectual sale, \\~ accuracy could nol be questioned.
to whatever la proper to be done In fixing the price, and the
authorit] i
le of vesting the title and
time and mode of payment, and the time and
Bui If the
to the sale.
mi these things are Inciden!
delivering the chattel,
with all powers convenlenl for
expression mean thai the agenl Is Intrusted
i Inducing
the purchaser to buy, even to the extenl of enabling
the purj
ple,

cipal

'in

■">.
1

plaintifl contended thai

ai

b

iiiokity

(Part

2

created an authority in
grounds,- among others, he referred
to cases where the agent lias by law a general authority to hind his
principal, though as between themselves there was no such authority,
such as partners, masters of ships, and managers of trading business;
and stress was laid en the expressions of several judges, that the servant oi a horse-dealer or livery-stable keeper can hind his master hy a
warranty, though, as between themselves, there was an order not to
warrant: see Jlelyear v. 1 lawke, 5 Esp. N. P. C. 72, Alexander v.
Gibson, 2 Campb. 555, l\nn v. Harrison, 3 T. R. 757.
We understand those judges to refer to a general agent employed for a printhe business of horse-dealing;
cipal to carry on his business, that
in which case there would he hy law the authority here contended for.
But the facts of the present case do not hring the defendant within
this rule, as he was not shown to carry on any trade of dealing in
horses.
was also contended that
special agent, without any express
authority in fact, might have an authority by law to hind his princias, where
principal holds out that the agent has such authorpal
so.
party to deal with him on the faith that
ity, and induces
In such
concluded from denying this authority,
case the principal
as against the party who believed what was held out, and acted on
the

to warrant,

the circumstances

on various

a

a

it

is

is

a

a

;

a

a

it

a

it

a

a

le

I

a

a

i

it

I

think it is in violation of
him to make collateral contracts to that end, then
the -tit led rule that the special agent mnst be confined strictly to his express
authority, and is in opposition to well-considered
and authoritative deeisions.
"i- example,
miu'ht very much facilitate the sale if the agent could endorse
tie- vendee's note for the purpose of raising the money to pay the price, and
such an exercise of power would jeopardize the principal no more than would
warranty of quality; and
sale on credit, and very much less than might
imagine that a special agent could not make such an endorsement bindyet
ing on his employer, Cor in Gulick v. Grover, 33 N. J. Law, 463, 97 Am. Dec.
728, iIm Court of Errors held that even a general agent had no authority so
his principal's debtor to borrow money to pay the debt.
dorse, to enal
So in Dpton v. Suffolk County .Mills. 11 Cush. 586, 50 Am. Dec. 103, it was
general agent for the sale of flour could not warrant
adjudged that even
voyage to California.
And in Bryant v.
that
would keep good during
special agent
Moore, -*'• Me. 84, 15 Am. Dec. 96, a warranty of oxen by
likewise, in
empowered e> exchange, was held invalid against, the principal,
was decided that an authority to sell
Lipscomb v. Kitrell, 11 Humph. 256,
guaranty is not
claim confers no authority to guarantee it — that such
similar conclusion was reached as to
ary incident of the sale: and
bank <to<-k. in Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y.~79."
Another portion of this opinion may he found on p. 170.
warranty is held
i"f. Dennis v. Ashley, L5 Mo. 453 (1852), in which giving
sale, citing especially Benson, J., in Nelson
usual means of making
to be
Hill (N. V.) 338 (1844). But in Smith v. Tracy. :;t; N. Y. 7!) (1867),
v. Cowing,
this i- denied as to a special authority to sell particular property, .and in
the leading case of Wait v. Borne, \S.\ N. Y. 592, 25 X. E. L053 (1890), the
implied power of an agent to warrant quality is limited to eases where a
t.i warrant
can be Shown. The distinction between usual and unusual
further brought out in Reese v. Bates, 94 Va. 321, 26 s. 10. 865
warranties
particular trade is
The question of whether a warranty is usual in
(1F97).
Dingle v. Hare,
<:. B. X. S. 145,
era! !'<>ythe jury upon the evidence.
a

7

a

Is

6

a

a

a

a
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it: see Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38, ante, p. 319. But the facts do
not bring the defendant within this rule.
The main reliance was placed on the argument that an authority
to sell is by implication an authority to do all that in the usual course
of selling is required to complete a sale ; and that the question of
warrant)' is in the usual course of a sale required to be answered, and
that therefore the defendant by implication gave to Greig an authority
to answer that question, and to bind him by his answer.
It was a
part of this argument that an agent authorized to sell and deliver
a horse is held out to the buyer as having authority to warrant.
But
on this point also the plaintiff has in our judgment failed.
YYe are aware that the question of warranty frequently arises upon
the sale of horses ; but we are also aware that sales may be made
without any warranty or even an inquiry about warranty. If we laid
down for the first time that the servant of a private owner intrusted
to sell and deliver a horse on one particular occasion is therefore by
law authorized to bind his master by a warranty, we should establish a precedent of dangerous consequence: for, the liability created
by a warranty extending to unknown as well as known defects, is
greater than is expected by persons unexperienced in law ; and, as
everything said by the seller in the bargaining may be evidence of
warranty to the effect of what he said, an unguarded conversation
with an illiterate man sent to deliver a horse may be found to have
created a liability which would be a surprise equally to the servant
and the master.
We therefore hold that the buyer taking a warranty
from such an agent as was employed in this case, takes it at the risk
of being able to prove that he had the principal's authority: and, if
there was no authority in fact, the law from the circumstances does
not in our opinion create it.
When the facts raise the question it will be time enough to decide
the liability created by such a servant as a foreman alleged to be a
general agent, or such a special agenl as a person intrusted with the
sale of a horse in a fair or other public mart, where stranger meets
stranger, and the usual course of business is for the person in possession of the horse, and appearing to be the owner, to have all the
The authority may under
powers of an owner in respect of the sale.
such circumstances as arc la t referred to be implied, though the cirIt
cumstances of the presenl case do nol create the same inference.
is uni
to add, that, if the seller should repudiate the warranty b) In- agent, it follows thai the sale would be void, there being
no question raised upon this point.
Judgment for the defendant.

A
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WESTURN
(Supreme

Court of Wisconsin,

v.

189&

(Part

PAGE.
94

wis.

261,

Action for damages for breach of warranty of
plaintiff by defendant's agent, Mall.

Maksiiau.,

2

68 N.

W.

1003.)

traded to

a horse,

One question, only, is necessary to be decided in the
instructdid the trial court err
determination of this appeal ; that
defendant's
Hall,
the
Mr.
If
follows:
as
in- the jury, in substance,
of
agent, made an agreement of warranty respecting the soundness
8S
full
Hall
he
gave
because
horse,
bound
by
defendant
the
the
right to rely
authority to sell or exchange the horse. Plaintiff had
upon the authority of Hall in making whatever agreement was made
a

it,

is

is,

in

|.

of the agreement or sale.
We assume that the learned trial judge relied on Boothby v. Scales,
27 Wis. 626, where this court decided that general authority to an
agent to sell includes power to sell with warranty, unless the purchaser
exceeding
knows the private instructions to the agent, or that he
has
been
repeatedly
such
case
that
his powers, overlooking the fact
In Pickert v. Marston, 68 Wis. 465,
overruled in subsequent cases.
Am. Rep. 876, the subject was discussed at length,
laid down by standard text writers, and suprule,
and the general
of authority, was there stated with apweight
the
great
ported by
as to all contracts, including
rule
"The
general
as
follows
proval,
to carry out the object
usual
do
whatever
to
the
that
agent
sales,
question for the jury to determine what
of his agency, and
usual in the
If, in a sale of the goods confided to him,
usual.
550, 60

is is

X. W.

is

it
is

a

is

it

is

:

32

a

it

:

it

is

is

is

:

is

it

&

a

warranty, the agent may give that warranty in ormarket to give
The subject was again before the court in
der to effect the sale."
Taylor Co., 86 Wis. 281, 56 N. W. 915, 918,
Larson v. Aultman
In the opinion of the court by Mr. Justice
39 Am. St. Rep. 893.
well settled that the agent
"The rule
there said
Cassoday,
employed to sell has no implied power to warrant, unless the sale
usually attended with warranty."
one which
cause of action
So,
that, in order to make out
comes to this
for breach of an express warranty of an article sold by an agent,
incumbent upon the party seeking to enforce such warranty to
or that such
prove express authority from the principal to make
it,

is

attended with such warranties; and the question
one for determination by the
of whether so usually attended or not
90 Wis. 107, 62 N. W.
Pennington,
v.
Roche
jury from the evidence.
of the foregoing, the
In
the
Marston,
light
supra.
v.
946; Pickert
is

sales are usually

es The agent may make himself liable on the warranty, or both himself and
Dahlright against the other.
principal, but a recovery against one bara
iv, Germunder, L98 N. 1'. -150, 92 N. E. 106, 19 Ann. Cas. 771 (1910).
a
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instruction under consideration is clearly erroneous, which must work
of the judgment appealed from.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
a reversal

CONKLING
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(Supreme

Court of Iowa,

v.

STANDARD OIL CO.

1908.

138

Iowa,

596,

116

N. W. 822.)

Action for damages. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant by its agent sold plaintiff Polar Ice Oil for use on his automobile,
under warranty, as plaintiff claimed, that it was not inflammable or
capable of combustion, and that it was absolutely safe to be used as
a cooling medium. The next day the oil caught fire and his machine
was burned and destroyed.
Bishop, J. 69 * * * On the question of the authority of the
selling agent of defendant to warrant the oil sold to plaintiff but little
need be said. We grant to counsel for appellant that there is no evidence in the record of authority granted in terms. And we may confor the purpose of the case that, by general rule, a bare authority
But
does not carry with it by implication authority to warrant.
sell
to
an essential attribute to every agency "is the power to do all that is
usual and necessary to accomplish the object for which the agency was
Mechem on Agency, § 347. And every one knows that the
created."
manufacturer of goods who employs sales agents puts his goods into
the hands of such agents to be sold. So, where goods are designed for
a particular purpose, and therefore to appeal to a particular trade, he
naturally expects his agents to make known that purpose, and to represent to proposing purchasers that the goods are adapted to and can
cede

be safely used for such purpose.
Accordingly it must be presumed that that which he expects to be
done, and without which the object of the agency could not adequately
And especially this
be accomplished, he has authorized to be done.
should be the rule where the article offered for sale is of such a character as that the proposing purchaser cannot be expected in reason to
have knowledge of the properties thereof, and must rely upon the
superior knowledge and skill of the manufacturer and those who rep:
we shall see presently, the law will imply a
| liiui.
Mon
warranty in the case of a sale so made, and it would be illogical, at
. to permit a principal
to say he did nol authorize that which the
law attaches as a o n equence to the very act the agent was empl
As defendant was the manufacturer of the oil in question, and
to do.
knew the properties thereof as plaintiff could nol know, and as it was

carrying
«»

such

Part of

ti

oil in stock to
pinion

is om

be

sold by its agent in charge as a cooling
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medium for gasoline engines, we do nol think it is in any position to
deny the authority of such agent to make representation of the purof the oil and that it could be safely used for that purpose. * * *
Judgment affirmed.

UPTON
(Supreme

Judicial

Court

v.

SUFFOLK COUNTY MILLS.

of Massachusetts,

L853.

n

Cush.

59 Am.

586,

Dec.

163.)

for breach of warranty that flour should
Assumpsit
during the voyage to California.
Mk'ivai.f, J. The court have not found it necessary

keep

sweet

is

a

it
is

a

is,

is

is,

a

;

;

A

is &

it

is

is

it

&

2

7

is

a

is

a

is

§

1

is

3

is

Chit. Law of Com.
Man. 199.
ing what he
employed to effect.
When one authorizes another to sell goods, he
presumed to authorize him to sell in the usual manner, and only in the usual manStory on
ner, in which the goods or things of that sort are sold.
Cush. 228.
The usage
60.
See also Shaw v. Stone,
Agency,
of the business in which
employed furnishes the
general agent
Hence,
measured.
rule by which his authority
general selling
agent has authority to sell on credit, and to warrant the soundness of
Mass.
the usage. Goodenow v. Tyler,
the article sold, when such
Campb. 555; Nelson v.
Am. Dec. 22; Alexander v. Gibson,
36,
Kent, Com. (6th Ed.) 622; Russell on
Hill (X. Y.) 336;
ing,
Factors, 58; Smith on Master and Servant, 128, 129. Hut as stocks
2

6

5
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It

it,

to form an
opinion upon a question which was ably argued, namely, whether the
contract declared on legally purports to be a contract between the
plaintiff and the defendants. Assuming that it does, yet we are all of
because Allcott had
opinion that the defendants are not bound by
no authority to bind them by such contract.
appears from his testimony that he was their general selling agent, and had no special instructions in regard to making sales; that no authority (by which he
doubtless means express authority) was ever given to him by the defendants to make such
warranty as that on which this action
brought; that no extra price was paid for the flour by reason of the
warranty that though the sale was entered on the defendants' books,
yet that the warranty was not entered there and that the defendants
had no notice of the warranty until they were called upon by the plaintiff to answer for
breach of it.
The single question which we have examined
what
the extent
of the implied authority of
The answer
general selling agent?
the same as that of other general agents. And
an elementary
authorized
principle that an agent, employed generally to do any act,
to do
only in the usual way of business. Smith's Merc. Law (Am.
I'M. 1847) 105 (5th Ed.) 129; Woolrych on Com.
Merc. Law, 319;
not, by virtue of
general agent
Jones v. AYarner, 11 Conn. 48.
his commission, permitted to depart from the usual manner of effect-
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and goods sent to auction are not usually sold on credit, a stock broker
or auctioneer has no authority so to sell them, unless he has the ownWiltshire v. Sims, 1 Campb. 258;
er's express direction or consent.
Bell, Com. 388. And it was said
1
Man.
205
;
Com.
of
&
Law
3 Chit.
Allegre, 9 Wheat. 647, 6 L. Ed.
Monte
Thompson
Mr.
by
(The
Justice
to sell and not to warrant,
authority
have
auctioneers
that
only
174)

unless specially instructed so to do.
As there is no evidence nor suggestion of a usage to sell flour with
the hazardous warranty that it shall keep sweet during a sea voyage,
in which it must twice cross the equator, we deem it quite clear that
nothing short of an express authority, conferred on Allcott by the defendants, would empower him to bind them by such a warranty. See
Cox v. Midland Counties Railway Company, 3 Welsb. Hurlst. &

(C) To Fix Terms

DAYLIGHT BURNER
f Supreme

Judicial

CO. v.

Court of New Hampshire,

ODLIN.
51 N.

1871.

H.

5G. 12 Am. Rep.

45.)

Action against the defendant as a common carrier for delivering
The goods
goods marked C. O. D. without being paid for the same.
bad been sold on credit to one Berry by Moore, a traveling agent of
Defendant refused to deplaintiff, empowered to sell on commission.
liver until Berry brought an order from Moore to deliver "without
Verdict for defendant.
i. I )."
BELLOWS, C. J. From the uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff
and the finding of the jury, it may be assumed that Moore was clothed
by the plaintiff with an apparent authority, like that of a factor, to sell
all the goods of the plaintiff he could sell within bis business circuit.
on a commission of ten per cent.

in

is

a

is

in

in

by

le,

As incident to thai general authority, he had power to fix the terms
including the time, place, and mode of delivery, and the price
of the goods, and the time and mode of payment, and to receive payproof of the
ment of the price, subject <>f course to be controlled
such trade or business.
mercantile usage
the adjudged cases upon the question of the
There
some conflict
factor to sell on credit, bul we think the weighl of
authority of
favor of the position thai he may sell on credit.
modern authority
4

is

it

it

1

1

5

5

1

5

6

v.

is

7

is

Mass. 36,
Goodenow v. Tyler,
shown.
Mete (Mass.) 576; Greely v.
Batcheller,
l" Km. Dec. 54; Van Men v. Vanderpool,
Cow.
Dec,
192; Roberl on v. Livingston,
\m.
Johns. 70,
Cases (4th
Lead.
Am.
And
see
Leland,
490.
Wend.
v.
glass
as the
note, where
-aid
that
established
universally
662,
Ed.)

unless
contrary usage
Am. Dec. 22; Hapgood
Bartlett,
Greenl. 178,
a
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Gord. 278.
Plaintiff nonsuit.
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law-merchant that a factor may sell on credit.
So is Laussatt v. Lippincott, 6 Serg. & R. 386, 9 Am. Dec. I 10. and May v. Mitchell, 5
Humph. 365, and Story on Agency, § 20 v
The same views are recognized in Scott v. Surinam Willcs, 406;
Russell v. Ilankev. 6 T. R. \2; Haughton v. Mathews, 3 B. & P.
489, per
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Chambre,J.;3

Selw. X. P. 719.
before us, Moore stands much on the same footing as
a factor.
The most marked distinction is, that he is a travelling merchant, and did not apparently have his principal's goods with him; hut
this, we think, cannot affect the rule.
The reason of that rule in the case of factors is, that it is found, by
experience and repeated proofs in courts of justice, that it is ordinarily
the usage of factors to sell on credit; and the same reason will apply
in this case.
We have a case, then, where the agent was apparently clothed with
the authority to sell the plaintiff's goods, without limitation as to the
quantity, and on commission, for cash or on credit as he might think
proper; and this being so, Moore must be regarded, in respect to third
ns, as the plaintiff's general agent, whose authority would not
he limited by instructions
not brought to the notice of such third persons. Rackman v. Charlestown, 42 N. H. 125, and cases cited.
As Moore, then, in respect to third persons, had the power to sell
on credit, the authority to control the delivery of the goods so sold and
sent to his order, for the purpose of making it conform to the contract
of sale, would necessarily come within the scope of his agency; and
we think his order to the defendant would justify a delivery of the
goods without payment, unless he had notice of the agent's want of
As to him the agent's apparent authority was real auauthority.
70
thority.
The marking of the package by another agent of the plaintiff, to the
effect that cash was required on delivery, was not in law notice of such
want of authority, although it might be sufficient to put the defendant
upon inquiry. That, however, was properly left to the jury, and they
have found it not to be sufficient for that purpose.
The marking of
the package in that way does not necessarily imply that the agent had
no authority to sell on credit, but it might indicate merely that the
person so marking it supposed the sale to be for cash. And it might
well be considered to come within the scope of Moore's agency to make
the delivery conform to the contract of sale.
As the defendant, therefore, is found to have had no notice of any
want of authority in Moore, and was not put upon inquiry, there
must be:
Judgment on the verdict.

In

the

case

to When the agent is authorized
to sell on credit he may take a promissory
not- in his own name, if he exercised reasonable care, and nol be answerable
to the principal for the • alue of the goods sold if the maker becomes bankrupt
now v. Tyler, 7 Mass. 36, 5 Am. Dec. 22 (1810).
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HOFFMAN HOUSE

CO.

County, General
(Common Pleas of New York, City and
Rep. 246, 2S N. Y. Supp. 724.)

Term.

1894.

8 Misc.
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Bischoff, J. 71

Plaintiff sued, as the assignee of the claim of L.
Co.,
to
recover the fair and reasonable value of the
&
Somborn
The answer dedelivered to the defendant.
sold
and
champagnes
nied generally the sale and delivery, besides pleading payment and
an offset against the plaintiff's assignors growing out of discounts
on former purchases, to which the defendant claimed to be entitled
On the trial, Julius
by agreement with Somborn & Co.'s agent.
Somborn, a member of the firm of Somborn & Co., called as a witness for the plaintiff, testified to the fact of the sale and delivery of
champagnes of the fair and reasonable value of $232 to the defendThis testimony not only remained wholly uncontradicted, but
ant.
was conceded by the defendant's president, Stokes, to be true; and
the defendant's efforts on the trial were confined to the proof of an
agreement with Somborn & Co.'s agent that the defendant should
be allowed a discount of 10 per cent, of its purchases, the aggregate
amount of the discounts claimed being $320.13. There was abundant
testimony for the defendant to the effect that an agreement to allow
the discounts was in fact made by Somborn & Co.'s general salesman
the defendant's

with

president

some time before

the purchases

on

which it was claimed were made.
Both parties asked for the direction of a verdict — the plaintiff for
the amount of his claim, the defendant for the amount of its offset.
The trial justice intimated his intention to grant the defendant's motion, whereupon the plaintiff's counsel requested submission of the
This was denied, and an exception taken to the
case to the jury.
A verdict was thereupon directed for the defendant for
denial.
$67.13, the excess of the defendant's claim against the plaintiff's asOn
signors, to which direction plaintiff's counsel again excepted.
the
entered
on
from
the
term
judgment
below
appeal to the general
recovery to an amount
verdict the court reduced the defendant's
equal to the plaintiff's claim, and, as so modified, affirmed the judgment.

*

*

*

is urged by counsel for the appelto have arisen on the facts in evidence, and relating to the de
is whether or nol
fendant's claim againsl the plaintiff's assignors,
tieral salesman employed by a firm of merchants to sell its wares
implied authority to fix the price and terms upon a sale. The
The
affirmative of thai proposition admits of no successful dispute.
and
one
his
authority,
of
measure
employment of the agenl is the

The only question of law which

lant

employed to sell, inferentially, then fore, lias authority to fix the price
anand adjusl the terms of the sale, for without the last-mentioned
m

Part of the opinion

la omitted.
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thority all other authorit) would be of no avail. "An agent authorized to soil either real or personal estate may enter into ;i contract
This
within the tonus of ltis authority, which will hind his principal.
is of the very essence of the authority
given-- an authority to sell.
That he can hind his principal by a formal contract is the doctrine oi
the hooks from tlu- earliesl law on the subject" (Haydock v. Stow,
40 X. Y. 363, 368); and, wo may add, that without a price and terms
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It is conceded that, if the agent
there could he no contract of -ale.
has departed from the instructions of his principal, to the purchaser's
knowledge, the principal will not be bound; but whether or not the
defendant or its officers knew that Somborn & Co.'s salesman had
no authority to stipulate for the discounts claimed on the trial was
^i fact, which we must assume to have been determined
a question

by the trial justice in the defendant's favor.
But one alleged error in ruling on the trial is urged by counsel
for appellant, namely, the admission of the testimony of the defendant's witness Cornish as to the amount of the discount claimed by
It is sufficient to say that no exception appears to have
defendant.
been taken to the ruling. Judgment affirmed, with costs.

-

PAYNE
(Supreme

Replevin for

v.

POTTER.

Court of Iowa,

a horse.

1859.

9

Iowa.

549.)

Judgment for plaintiff and defendant

ap-

peals.

Stockton, J. 72 The first

assignment of error is upon the charge
The rule of law is that no man is bound by the act of
of the court.
another, without or beyond his consent ; and where an agent acts
under a special or express authority, whether written or verbal, the
party dealing with him is bound to know at his peril what the powep
of the agent is, and to understand its legal effect; and if the agent
exceed the boundary of his legal power, the act, as concerns the
principal, is void. Delafield v. State of Illinois, 26 Wend. 193 ; Story
on Agency, § 165. The power must be pursued with legal strictness,
and the agent can neither go beyond nor beside it. The act must be

with that authorized to be done or the principal
1 Am. Lead. c. 544, 545, note to Rossiter v. Rossiter.
is not bound.
So it is held that an agent to whom a horse is given to sell for the
principal, cannot deliver him in payment of his own debt, and the
owner may recover the horse from a purchaser to whom he has been
Parsons v. Webb, 8 Greenl. 38, 22 Am. Dec. 220.
so delivered.
And it is held that a special authority or direction to sell, does not
authorize a sale on credit, unless commercial custom has given rise

legally identical

-

Part of the opinion

Is omitted.
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to such an understanding in some particular business. The question
whether in such case a discretion to sell on credit is given, must
73
In May v. Mitchell,
depend on the authority in the particular case.
to an agent three mules to be
5 Humph. 365, a principal delivered
taken to the southern market, and to be sold for the best price that
he could get, and the proceeds to be returned ; the agent took them
to the south and sold them on credit, and the purchaser proved insolvent; it was held that the agent was vested with a discretionary
power to sell upon the best terms that could be procured according
to the course of trade in that part of the country to which the mules
were carried, and as this was proved to be on credit, the agent was
Jeld not to be liable to the principal.
Every general power necessary implies the grant of every matter
Peck v. Harriott, 6 Serg. &
xessary to its complete execution]
R.146, 9 Am. Dec. 415. In the absence of special instruction to the
contrary, and in the absence of such prescription as to the manner
of doing the act, as implies an exclusion of any other manner, an authority or direction to do an act, or accomplish a particular end, implies and carries with it authority to use the necessary means and inducements, and to execute the usual legal and appropriate measures
And not only are the means necessary and
proper to perform it.

proper for the accomplishment of the end included in the authority ;
but also, all the various means which are justified or allowed by the
Thus (says Judge Story) if an agent is authorized
usages of trade.
to sell goods, this will be construed to authorize the sale to be made
on credit as well as for cash, if this course is justified by the usages
Story on
of trade, and the credit is not beyond the usual period.
Agency, § 60.
We think it results from the rules above laid down that the burden
lay upon the defendant to show that the sale by the agent on credit
was justified by the usages of trade, and that the credit given was not
unreasonable.
Without such proof the authority of the agent could
only be construed into an authority to sell for cash; and in this view
there was no error in the charge of the court to defendant's preju* * *
dice.
Judgment reversed.

a

Belling agent cannot, without special authority, resort to unusual and
means for carrying en his agency.
Shaw v. Stone, l Cush.
228 (1848).
Bui giving tii<- third party e refusal for two days is not unusual
or unreasonable.
Melater v. Cleveland Dryer Co., 11 111. App. 227 (1882).
T8

extraordinary

-s

THE AUTHORITY.

t

FARLEY ORGAN

TAYLOR

&

(Supreme

Court

o( New

Hampshire,

(Part
CO.
L879.

v.
59

2

STARKEY.
N.

II.

142.)
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Trover for an organ which the agent, Davis, had traded for a
buggy and $ \0 cash.
Stanley, J. The contract between the plaintiffs and Davis was
It was evidence of the agreement under which
properly admitted.
Davis was in possession, and tended to show that his authority was to
sell, and not to exchange.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary,
74
Davis, having no authority except to
to sell means to sell for cash.
sell for cash, could not lawfully exchange for other property, either
in whole or in part (Story Agency, § 78), and if he did the title would
nol pass, for the plaintiffs did not hold Davis out, or authorize him to
Holton v. Smith, 7 N. H.
hold himself out. as owner of the organ.
446; Burnham v. Holt, 14 N. H. 367; Towle v. Leavitt, 23 N. H.
360, 55 Am. Dec. 195.
Judgment for the plaintiffs.

BROWN
(Supreme

Court of Vermont,

v.

WEST.

1897.

69

Vt.

440,

38

Atl.

87.)

Tyler, J. In July, August, and September, 1892, the plaintiff was
retail merchant in Ludlow, in this state, and the defendants were
wholesale grocers in Springfield, Mass. They had in their employment
one Andrews, as a traveling salesman, who was under instructions
from them to sell certain "limited goods," so called, according to price
lists which they furnished him, and at no other prices, and to make
collections and receipt bills in their name as rendered from their office.
The defendants were under an express contract with the manufacturers of these goods not to sell them for less than the fixed prices.
During this time Andrews sold the plaintiff several bills of goods,
including some that were "limited," and subsequently settled with the
plaintiff, and allowed him discounts as agreed upon at the time of
sale.
Only the last three consignments were in controversy here.
The plaintiff had no express knowledge of the defendants' instructions to Andrews.
He knew that Andrews sold him these goods at
list prices; that the orders therefor were sent to the defendants at
list prices; and that the defendants rendered him bills at those prices;
but he supposed that the defendants knew and assented to the deduc-

a

74 The agent has no authority to sell for Confederate
bonds unless they
Brown v. Smith, 67 N. C. 245 (1872).
are circnhuii g as money.
Nor to acadvertising of the principal's wares on the building of the
eept in payment
third person. BeCk v. Donohue, 27 Misc. Rep. 230, 57 N. Y. Supp. 741 (1899).
Nor to exchange the goods of his principal for other goods, even though he
could make a sale in do other way.
Block v. Dundon, S3 App. Div. 539, 81
X. V. Supp.
(1903).

mi
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tions, and that they adopted this method to evade their contract with
the manufacturers.
The salesman clearly had no authority from his principal to sell the
limited goods for less than the fixed prices ; but the plaintiff contends that the defendants held Andrews out to the public as their
general agent, and as having competent authority to make the sales,
and that they are bound by his acts. This would be the rule applicable
to the case if the plaintiff did not know and had no reason to believe
that the salesman's authority was limited.
It was said in Griggs v.
Selden, 58 Vt. 561, 5 All. 504, ante, p. 300: "In determining the liability of the principal, the question is not what authority was intended to
be given the agent, but what authority was a third person dealing with
him justified from the acts of the principal in believing was given him."
Xo principle is better settled in the law, nor is there any founded on
more obvious justice* than that if a person dealing with an agent
knows that he is actijng under a circumscribed and limited authority,
and that his act is outside of and transcends the authority conferred,
the principal is not bound; and it is immaterial whether the agent
is a general or special one, because a principal may limit the authority
of the one as well as that of the other. See Walsh v. Insurance Co.,

N. Y. 10.
The plaintiff must have known of the defendants' contract with t
manufacturers,
for the referee finds that he supposed that the defend
ants' practice of rendering him bills in accordance with the price
lists, and the agent making discounts on payment thereof, were understood methods of evading the defendants' contract with the manufacturers not to sell below fixed prices.
He knew that the defendants
rendered him bills for the goods ordered by him through the salesman at the list prices, and that the salesman collected the bills of him
73

at less than those prices.
These facts were sufficient to have put the
plaintiff on inquiry as to the extent of the agent's authority to make
discounts.
He should have inquired of the defendants whether the
salesman was acting under their authority in making the deductions,
rather than have assumed that they were conniving to defraud the
manufacturers. 76
Judgment reversed, and judgment for defendants.

n Bui where the third person baa do knowledge of the limits on the agenfs
authority to fix prices, the principal cannol repudiate the contract on the
grounds alone thai the price la too low.
sin.,.
Mabray v. Blelly-Goodfellow
Co., r3 Mo. App. 7 (1808).
Cf. Sloan v. Brown, 228 Pa. 195, 77 Atl. 821, 139
Am. st.

Rep. 1019 (1910),

in

which

a telegram

to the agent,

"if

canM

sell, bor-

row," was held to be enough to pul the third person on notice of limitation on
the price, and Pulton v. Sword Medicine Co., 1 15 Ala. 381, m South 393 (1906),
in which the written order f«n- the g
la conveyed similar notice of 111«- limj
the agent'a authority.
Bee, also, Seven iiuis Chautauqua
Cu. v. I
Bros. Co., 26 Ky. Law Rep. 834, 81 S. W. 288 (1904).
Qodd.Pb.A A.— 25
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HOOK
(Supreme

Savage, J.

TiioiUTY

v.

court of Maine,

(Part

2

CROWE.
1905.

LOO Me. 399,

63

Ad. inso.)

Action to recover the price of two awnings and one
The
sold and delivered by the plaintiffs to the defendants.
agreed statement of facts shows that one Harry 1\ Hook, the selling
agent of the plaintiffs, applied to the defendants for an order, and
that the defendant- gave an order for the articles mentioned, on condition that he (Harry 1\ Hook) would take the pay therefor in clothOn
ing and work out of defendants' store, which he agreed to do.
the same day Hook delivered to the plaintiffs an unsigned order for
The goods were
the awnings upon one of their printed blanks.
A
shipped to the defendants seven days later and by them received.
bill for the same was sent to them by mail the same day. The plaintiffs took the order from their agent, Hook, without knowledge of the
agreement which he had made with the defendants in regard to the
manner of payment, and without notice or suggestion of payment
On the day the original order was
otherwise than in cash as usual.
given the agent, Hook, had work done by the defendants to the
mount of $1.50, and nearly a month later he had clothing of them to
the amount of $8.50, all in accordance with his agreement with them
when they gave the order for the awnings.
The defendants now
seek to have these items allowed against the bill sued by the plaintiffs.
The court below gave judgment for the plaintiffs for the full amount
of their bill, and the defendants took exceptions.
The case hinges upon whether the defendants at the time they gave
the order knew that Hook was acting as agent for the plaintiffs, or
whether they believed him to be a principal. For, whatever may be the
implied authority of selling agents to make terms and provisions for
payment, and however principals are bound generally by the conditions their agents agree to, we think it cannot be gainsaid that an
agent has no implied authority, which binds the principal, to contract
that payment may be made by goods to be sold or services to be rendered to him on his own personal account.
The doctrine laid down
in Parsons v. Webb, 8 Me. 38, 22 Am. Dec. 220, and also Rodick v.
Coburn, 68 Me. 170, is analogous, and not distinguishable in princiPersons dealing with an agent knowing him to be such, are
ple.
bound to know that he has no such implied authority.
If they deal
with him upon such terms, they are bound to know that the principal
will not be bound, unless he ratifies.
Accordingly, if these defendants made such unauthorized agreement with the agent, knowing him
to be such, and nevertheless received the goods ordered, they should
pay for them. Although the contract with the agent was express, it
If under such circumstances
was invalid as to the manner of payment.
the defendants chose to receive the goods, they affirmed the order
sash curtain
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itself, and became liable to pay in cash. 76 In this respect tbis case is
to be distinguished from Billings v. Mason, 80 Me. 496, 15 All. 59.
On the other band, if the defendants dealt with Hook, the agent,
believing him to be a principal, the plaintiffs, who were undisclosed
principals, must take tbe contract, if they seek to enforce
as their
agent and tbe defendants left it. If they seek the advantages of tbe
contract, they must suffer its burdens, and must allow the defendants
by way of payment for tbe goods sold and services rendered to the
agent.
is

is

is

is

in

is

LEACH
(Supreme Court

v.

BEARDSLE&

of Errors of Connecticut,

L853.

22 Conn.

404.)

r<

in

a

d<

in

it

by

by

J.

a

.

a

in

in

Case to recover the value of certain oxen delivered to defendant,
and by him delivered
New York City, together with one of his
Defendant took
own, and sold to butchers.
payment
twenty day
The butchers became insolvent.
Verdict
payable to himself.
new trial.
Plaintiff moved for
for defendant.
Church, C.
We infer from the verdict of the jury, that the
claim of the plaintiff, thai his instructions to the defendanl were to
This
sell for cash, and not on credit, was nol sustained
the proof.
was submitted
the judge to the jury,
the
charge, "thai the implied undertaking of the defendant was, to sell
the usual and customary manner."
the cattle,
The
well known usage and
fendanl claimed, thai there was
la

S.

Baldwin v. Tucker, 112 Ky. 282, 65
W. 841, 23
To the same effeel
Law Rep. 1538, .",7 I.. R. a. 151 (1001), containing an extensive aud vain
Wilson v. Glvan, 65 Mo. 80
able review of the authorities; also, Wheeler
II. 146(1835); Gorbani v. Felker, L02 Qa, 260.
(1877); Holton v. Smith,
28

E. 1002 (1807).

x

7

&

K'y.

B.
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As to whether or not the defendants knew Hook was acting as
agent, the agreed statement of facts
vague and uncertain.
written, but unsigned,
true tbat Hook delivered to tbe plaintiffs
true tbat that order discloses on its face that the plaintiffs
order.
were the principals, and therefore that Hook was only an agent. But
does not appear satisfactorily, and we cannot find, that the defendants saw tbe written order or knew its contents, or tbat they were in
The
any way informed that Hook was an agent, and not
principal.
case states tbat the defendants "did give the order sued for."
But no
"sued for."
The suit
for tbe price of goods ordered, and
order
tbe
defendants
The
give an order for tbe goods.
did
unquestionably
whether they gave the order which Hook delivered to the
question
plaintiffs, and were so advised of its contents, and tbat plaintiffs were
the principals.
We think the plaintiffs' case on this point fails for
want of proof.
effect to the contrary, cannot
The ruling of the court below, being
Exceptions sustained.
be sustained.
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custom in the city of Now York, where this sale was to be made and
was made, for drovers to sell, on short credit, and to receive notes,
in their own names, for the price, and thai he had conformed to this
custom, in the sale of the defendant's caitle.
In the absence of clear stipulations in contracts, usage of trade or
business is often proved, to show the actual intent and purpose of the
Such usage must he lawful and reaparties, though not expressed.
sonable, and so certain and general, in the place where the business
or among those engaged
is to be done, or the contract performed,
in such business, that the parties to the contract may reasonably be
and to act in reference to it. It such case,
supposed to know
may be taken, that the usage entered into, and became part of, the
contract.

A

a

if

it

a

2

§§

is

is

in

if

cattle should be made, furnished strong evidence, that he not only
assented, but empowered his agent, the defendant, to sell on the
And, although commission
usual credit, and in the usual manner.
merchants, in the absence of instructions or custom, must generally
there be an usage modifying the course of busisell for cash, yet,
made in
other respects, and the sale
ness, in this particular, or
Story
legally performed.
the usual and customary way, the agency
Kent, Com.
on Agency,
60, 77, 96, 110, 189, 199, 209, 226;
The usage here offered to be proved, and which was proved,
622.
contract definitely
not
to contradict or control the terms of
was
instructions
to sell for
been,
have
would
positive
as
expressed,
cash down, had been proved; but only to show the extent of the
matter not thus expressed,
duty and obligation of the defendant, in
but inferable from the nature of the business in which the defendant
had long been engaged, and the well known manner in which such

J.

2

a

§

1

6

if

it

&

;

&

&

2

a

Usage can not control or vary
business had been usually conducted.
contract, but will be conthe clear and unequivocal stipulations of
C.
P. 525
Smith v. Wilson,
trolled by them. Taylor v. Briggs,
244;
15.
A. 728; Blackett v. Royal Exchange Ins. Co., C.
Taun. 446; Glendale Man. Co. v. Protection Ins.
Yates v. Pym,
292.
The usage
Greenl. Ev.
Co., 21 Conn. 19, 54 Am. Dec. 309;
to the
sale,
credit
but
to
extended
this
case
not
only
proved in
manner of sale, which the defendant followed, in taking the note for
the price of the plaintiff's cattle and his own, in his own name.
But,
no custom regarding this had existed, we could not say,
as
was asked of the judge at the trial, to say, that the circumstances of taking the note, payable to himself, would subject the de-

3
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1

9,
8

3

is

it

is

general usage, affecting any branch of business, furnishes good
evidence of what
regarded as right and reasonable, in that respect,
to, negligence or misconduct can not be
conformed
when
and
Brace,
Am. Dec. 149; Casco Mfg.
Barber
v.
Conn.
imputed.
Sw. Dig. 10.
Cush. 408; Chitty, Con. 20;
Co. v. Dixon et al.,
Proof of the general usage, claimed by the defendant to exist in
the city of New York, where the plaintiff intended the sale of his
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(D) To Collect

1828.

3

(Court of King's Bench,

THORNTON.

v.

Car.

&

CAPEL

P.

352,

14

E. C. L.

605.)

a

it

Goods sold. Plea — General issue. On the part of the plaintiffs,
who were coal merchants,
appeared, that coals were delivered by
their servant at the house of the defendant in Regent's Park, with
vendor's ticket in the name of the plaintiffs. No evidence was given
of any order, but the vendor's ticket was proved to have been delivered to the defendant's footman; however, there was no proof that
ever reached the defendant.
On the part of the defendant
was proved, that the defendant's son
had,
years, bought coals of
person named Ellsworth, who
professed to sell on his own account, hut who, unknown to the defendant and her son, really sold (in commission.
further appeared,
the defendant's son always received hills of parcels in the name
of Ellsworth, and paid him for coals, Ellsworth giving receipts in his
own name; and that being asked
her son to deal with Ellsworth,
the defendant ordered these coals <>f him, and received
hill of par
week after the coals were delivered,
Cels in his name; and in about
she paid him for them;
more than
month after this pay
ment, the plaintiffs senl tin defendant
notice "to pay the amount to
them or their clerk, and not to Mr. Ellsworth."
a

be called.

There

is

The plaintiffs mu

t

C.

J.

Lord Tenterd

,

a

r,

hi

a

a

by

It

a

al

!

it

it
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a

if,

fendant to this loss.
The plaintiff was not injured by this, — the
purchasers failed, before the time of credit expired, and it was therefore, immaterial, whether a note had been taken or not, or who retained the possession of it.
Nothing is more common, than for
factors to buy, sell and sue in their own names.
If the isolated fact,
that one takes a note in his own name, furnishes, prima facie evidence, that a sale was made on his own account; yet, when explained, as it may be, and shows a mere agency, — only a mode of
doing the business for the principal, the responsibilities are not thereCorlies v. Cumming, 6 Cow. 181. And yet, if a sale be
by varied.
made, and a credit given, without authority, and a note taken for
the price, payable to the agent personally, he has been holden liable
for the amount.
Hemenway v. Hemenway, 5 Pick. 389. And so,
after the time of credit has expired, the agent shall then give further
time, bv
note payable to himself.
Kent, Com. 622; Hosmer v.
Beebe,
Mart. (N. S.) 368.
In this opinion, the other judges concurred, except WaiTE, J., who
tried the cause in the court below, and was disqualified.
New trial not to be granted.

no
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(Part

2

evidence that the defendant ever gave any order to the plaintiffs;
indeed it is proved, that the defendant only dealt with Ellsworth, who
is admitted by the notice to he the agent of the plaintiffs; and if he,
as their agent, had authority
to sell goods, so had he (in the absence
of advice to the contrary) an implied authority to receive the proceeds
of such sale.
The plaintiffs cannot avow the acts of their agent as to
one part of the transaction, and repudiate them as to another part.
With respect to the notice, as the money was paid before the notice
came to the defendant's hand, that cannot operate in the plaintiff's
favour.

Nonsuit.

HIGGINS
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(Court

v.

MOORE.

of New York,

of Appeals

1SGG.

34

N. Y. 417.)

Action to recover .^2,569.77, the price of a cargo of rye, sold to
defendant by a broker to whom defendant paid the price.
Verdict
for defendant.
Peckiia.m, J- 77 The judgment was sustained in the Superior Court
mainly on the ground that a grain broker, who had never had possession of the rye sold, hut was only authorized to contract for its
sale, had thereby an implied authority to receive the purchase-price.
The court was not satisfied with the finding of fact by the referee
as to the usage of trade, which allowed a payment to a broker, but
I agree that the evidence is entirely unsatisdid not set it aside.
factory to establish any such usage. To my mind it is utterly insufficient.
This court however has no authority to interfere with this
judgment upon that ground. The fact as found is conclusive here.
The first question arising here is, had the broker, merely as such,
authority to receive payment? I think he had not. In Baring v.
Corrie, 2 B. & Aid. 138, Holroyd, J., said: "A factor who has the
The former
possession of goods differs materially from a broker.
He not only has the
is one to whom goods are sent or consigned.
possession, but generally a special property in them ; but the broker
has not the possession, and so the vendee cannot be deceived by
that, besides employing a broker to sell goods does not authorize
him to sell in his own name."
In that case it was held that the purchaser from a broker had no
authority to set off a debt against the broker, on the ground that
Brokers are
the broker had no authority to sell in his own name.
defined to be "those who make contracts between merchants and
tradesmen in matters of monev and merchandise for which they have
a fee."

It
~~

1

Liv. Agency,

has been questioned
Part of the opinion

73

(Ed.

among

la omitted.

1818).

civilians, says Livermore, whether
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an authority to sell or let includes an authority to receive the price
or not, and that Pothier says this power is not generally included.
But that in some
Id. 74; Pothier's Traite des Obligations, 477.
hands of public
into
the
cases it will be presumed, as if goods are put
the price.
of
the
habit
receiving
in
brokers to be sold, and they are
receive
payto
authority
an
Putting the goods in their hands implies
on
securities.
receive
payment
to
does
285,
as it
ment. 2 Liv. 284,
v
3 Chit. Com. Law, 207, 208.
employed to sell has no
broker
a
that
is,
doctrine
The general
Russ. Fact. & Brokers, 48
authority as such to receive payment.
Toliffe, 1 Wood & Rob. 326; Baring v.
v.
Joliffe,
Law Lib. 68-110; Mynn v:
'
Corrie, 2 B. & Aid. 137. . Exception is made to this general rule

is

is

is

is

it,

&

3

a

In the latter case the property had been put into the posante, p. 319.
session of the broker and the title in his name. "The sale was made by
Thompson,
person who had all the indicia of property." Ireland v.
C. B. 149.
the facts as stated,
Cross v. Haskins, 13 Vt. ?3fr. In this case,
the syllabus of the
state.
was
so
does not distinctly appear; but

it

in

it

1

in

4

in

a

of

in

of

in

3

Humph. 613.
Hackney v. Jones,
case by the reporter.
had possession of the
never
broker
however,
the
In the case at bar
Ti and never delivered it; but the plaintiffs retained possession
rye,
till they delivered to the defendant, and they were well known to the
the negotiation for the
them had taken part
one
defendant;
The
York.
broker wa^ simply auNew
of
the
city
owner,
as
sale,
his
was the whole
This
sale.
Eor
the
contracl
make
to
thorized
aureality, and he had no other or further apparent
authority

I

of the

*

la

In

bj

possession
an agent
\< to receipt of payment
Bailey v. Pardridge, 134 111. 188, 27 v E. 89 (1890).
- omitted.
be opinion of w right, J.,

the defendRe*

*

a

by

of

the referee therefore
the usage found
Irrespective
payment to the broker.
ant was not discharged
versed. 79

g

by

thority.

i
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I

Smith Mer. L.
in some cases where the principal is not disclosed.
129, by Hoi. & Gholson ; see, also, as throwing light upon this question, though not directly in point, Whitbeck v. Waltham, 1 Sol. 157;
Morris v. Cleasby, 1 M. & S. 576. Story says an agent to conclude
a contract is not, of course, authorized to receive payment thereunder.
Story, Agency, § 98, and cases there cited.
Where the person contracting for the sale has the property in his
clothed with the indicia of authority
he
possession, and delivers
not known. Such
the owner
when
to receive payment, especially
then clothed with
He
below.
court
the
to
referred
by
are the cases
real authority.
the
third
to
persons
that
as
and
authority,
apparent
352;
Busk,
15 East, 38,
v.
Pickering
Thornton,
P.
Car.
v.
Capel

sold,

Tin: AUTHORITY
Tli )WARD
(Supreme
80

*

*

of Georgia,

2

RTCE.
1876.

64

Oa. r>2.)

*

J.

2

§

is

;

if

is

a

it
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:
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The question involved in this case is
whether an agent, who is authorized to sell certain specific machines
tor his principals, and who sells one on time, and takes a note from
the purchaser thereof, due at a future day, payable to his principals,
and delivers the note to them, is then their agent to receive the payment of the note, the same not being in the possession of such agent,
but in the hands of his principals. 81 In other words, was the payment
of the note given by the defendant payable to the order of Howard &
Soule for a sewing machine purchased of their agent, Shaffer, a good
payment of that note as against them, when made to Shaffer, their
agent, at his office in Athens, he not having the note in possession,
but promising the defendant he would get the note from the plaintiffs and deliver it up to him.
The rule as stated by Paley on Agency is well sustained by authority, and that rule is, that if money be due upon a written security,
it is the duty of the debtor, if he pay it to an agent, to see that the
person to whom he pays it is in possession of the security, for though
the money may have been advanced through the medium of the
agent, yet if the security do not remain in his possession, a payment
AlPaley on Agency, 274.
to him will not discharge the debtor.
received
the
defendant
in
this
case
have
plaintiffs'
may
though the
machine through the medium of their agent, he promised to pay them
for
and
he took the risk of paying the agent the money due to
the plaintiffs therefor, when he knew the agent did not have his
will not discharge him from its payment to the plaintiffs unnote,
less he could show that they had received the money.
Smith on
due
"Where money
Mercantile Law, 68, thus states the rule
written security, such as
bill or bond,
the duty of the
upon
in possession
debtor,
he pay to an agent, to see that such agent
of the security, for otherwise he will not be discharged unless the
not even though the agent whom he pays
money reach the principal
may have been usually employed to receive money, for his non-production of the security rebuts the implication of authority arising
from such his employment." The same principle
recognized by
98.
Story on Agency,
See the case of Williams v. Walker,
Sandf.
Ch. 325, in which the authorities bearing upon this question are cited
and reviewed.
C.

a
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Warren,

Court

v.

(t'art

Part of the opinion is omitted.
or Interesting illustrations of the variations of situation as affecting the
right to pay the a'-'eiit. see Law v. Stokes, 32 N. J. Law. 219, 90 Am. Dec. 655
(1867); Crawford v. Whittaker, 42 W. Vit. 4.°>0,20 S. !•:. 510 (1890); and P.utler
v. Dorman, 68 -Mo. 298, 30 Am. Rep. 795 (1878), containing a valuable review
of the authorities.
so
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The case of Capel v. Thornton, 14 E. C. L. 605, ante, p. 389,
cited by the defendant in error, in which it was held that an agent
authorized to sell goods has, in the absence of advice to the
contrary, an implied authority to receive the proceeds of such sale,
There was no written security
was an action for coals delivered.
If Shaffer had authority to sell the
given therefor in that case.
plaintiffs* machines, as their agent, he would have had the implied
authority to have received the money therefor from the purchaser;
or if authorized to sell on credit, to have taken the purchaser's note,

payable to them, as was done in this case; but it does not follow
that the agent had the authority to collect that note, due eight
months after date, when it had been turned over to the plaintiffs as
their property by the agents, without proof of any special authority
to do so, or any evidence that such had been their habit and custom,
We have given to
the agent not having the note in his possession.
this question quite a thorough examination, on account of the apparent hardship of requiring the defendant to pay for the machine
twice, but we are well satisfied as to the law applicable to the facts
of the case, and feel bound to enforce the general rule of the law
in this case as well as in all other cases. This general rule of lawwill injure no one who exercises the ordinary degree of prudence in

requiring the production of his note before he pays it. In our judgment, the court below erred in overruling the motion for a new trial.
Let the judgment of the court below be reversed.

—

HAHNENFELD
(Common

v.

WOLFF."

Pleas of New Vmk City and County,
15 Misc.

General Term,

1895.

Rep. 133, 36 N. Y. Supp. 473.)

Defense payment.
by the defendant that the sale was
of one Grimshaw, and it conmade to him through the instrumentality
in
defendant's possession, and
invoice
the
from
conclusively appeared
him,
to Grimshaw were
which
the
payments
alleged
upon
produced by
receipted for by the latter, that the defendant, before such payments,
knew the plaintiff, and not Grimshaw, to be his vendor. Grimshaw was

Action for the price of merchandise.

Bischoff, J.

It

was conceded

employed by the plaintiff to solicit orders from customers, and did noi
ion of the whole or any
appear to have been intrusted with the |
part of the merchandise sold. 1 fader these circumstances the payments
to '.rim-haw wne made by the defendant at his peril of the former's
Accord: < i.i rk v. Murphy, 164 Ham 100, n v B. 674 (1805); Simon
Johnson, 101 Ala. 868, L8 South, 101 (1803), containing a discriminating re'_'i Mich. 3fl (1871);
emnnn v. Monnphan,
view "i conflicting
Brown v. Lally, 70 Minn. 88, 81 v W. 538 (1000). Of. Boskins Co. v. Johnson,
selling
5 Sneed, 160 (1858), giving a much broader scope to the power of the
•s

v.

Tin: AUTHORITY

(Part

2

;

12

ly.

Tt is well settled that an agent to solicit orders
want of authority.
or to sell goods, who has not the possession of the goods, has
lliggins v.
to receive payment.
no implied or apparent authority
13 X. VV.
Wis.
53
515.
Dunham.
Moore. 34 X. V. 417: McKindly v.
Am. Rep. 740; Butler v. Dorman. M) \m. Kep, ?'5; Meyer v.
Kane v. Barstow, 42 Kan. 465,
Stone, 46 Ark. 210, 55 Am. Kep. ?77

Pac. 588,

Am. Rep.

1" Am.

St. Kep. 490;

Kohn

v.

Washer,

745.

64

Tex.

131,

53

by

22

1

a

By

plaintiffs exProof of Grimshaw's authority to collect, either
course of dealing, was, thereinference from
press direction, or
success upon the trial (Higgins v.
Fore, essential to the defendant's
Moore, supra; Lamb v. Ilirschherg,
Misc. Rep. 108, 20 N. Y.
Supp. ^7X). and the absence of such proof renders the judgment apJudgment reversed, and new trial ordered,
pealed from erroneous.

(E) To Rescind
BRADFORD
(Supreme

v.

Court of Alabama,

BUSH.
1846.

10

Ala.

386.)

is

a

if

It

J.

if

a

note for $500 given in payment of horses purchased
Action on
from the agent of plaintiff. Upon evidence that subsequent to the
one of the horses was older
trade the agent said to defendant that
than he represented he would take her back and allow for her value on
the note, the jury allowed plaintiff only $229.89. Plaintiff appeals.
authorized
Collier, C. 83
does not follow that
person

«8

Part of the opinion is omitted.

*

*

declarations evidence against him.
Reversed and remanded.

*

a

a

a

is

it

if

is

a

to sell property, his agency continues, so as to permit him to rescind
the sale, or adjust the damages which the vendee may sustain by
complete by the sale, and the
The transaction
breach of warranty.
rights of the parties become vested, the one in the thing sold, and the
he relies
incumbent upon the vendee,
And
other
the price.
defence
third person as furnishing
upon the acts or declarations of
octhat
that
person
to
prove
to the payment of the purchase money,
and
made
his
acts
as
vendor,
the
relation in respect to
cupied such
in
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with costs to the appellant to ahide the event.
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DENMAN

v.

395

EXTENT

BLOOMER.

(Supreme Court of Illinois,

1S49.

11 111. 177.)

a

a

;

a

is

it

!

is

his having completed and closed up the business, to transact which he
was constituted an agent; but within the scope of such employment,
thus exhausted, or has been revoked,
and until the power
conferred
the agent can bind the principal, to the same extent that the latter
In this case, Johnson's powers had not
could have bound himself.
He
his
terminated by
having completed the business confided to him.
true, but he had received only
part of the
had sold the raft,
purchase money, while Ins employment required him to collect the
whole. To deny the authority of the agent to take back the raft, while

in

the transaction was thus incomplete, would often prove most detriSuppose the agent had discovered that Denmental to the principal.
all probability, the balance of the purman was insolvent, and that,
chase money would be lo-t. authority to rescind the sale, and take
hack the raft, would have been indispensable to entitle him to proi

the interest

of

the principal.

omitted.

It

a

a

Is

Pari "f tii' opinion
1

»«

in

a

not so strong

a

is

thai of Anderson v. Coonley, 21
Wend. 279.
There the agent was authorized to contract for barley,
contract which he had made.
and
was held, thai he mighl rescind
The
to make Other purchases still continued.
SO long as his authority
the
with
prinMa.
conflicl
386, does nol
of Bradford v. Bush, 10
ciples above laid down, or with the <--^<- referred to. There the agenl
was authorized to sell some horses, which he disposed of to the denote,
was
payment.
fendant, and received other property, and
subsequenl tunc, bind his principal,
held that the agenl could not, at

This
it
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a

if

it,

Assumpsit to recover money paid by Denman to Bloomer's agent,
Johnson. Johnson had sold Denman a raft of lumber on the .Mississippi river and landed it. Denman thought it not safely landed, but
Johnson said he would insure it. Denman paid Johnson $300 on the
Next morning the raft was gone down the river and Johnson
price.
rescinded the sale and gave Denman a draft for $34 on Bloomer, which
Bloomer now refuses to pay.
Caton, J. 84 The fifth and eighth instructions given for the deThe eighth instruction supposes that Bloomfendant, were erroneous.
er was the owner of the raft, and that Johnson was his agent to sell
The jury were then instructed,
and receive the purchase money.
and
had
sold
delivered
the raft to Denman, and rethat
Johnson
part of the purchase money, he had no authority to rescind
ceived
-tlie sale, and make Bloomer liable for the money thus received.
particular
An agent appointed for
special purpose — to transact
/business, cannot go beyond the scope of such an appointment, and
1/ bind his principal nor can he act after such employment ceases, by

the authority

:::>u*

(Part

2

by a new agreement, to make good a defeel in some of the horses.
Clearly, in this ease, the powers of the agent were exhausted, and his
The ease before us, however, was very different.
authority terminated.

The

agent had but partially completed the transaction, when he thought
proper to rescind what had been donej and in doing this, we think he
acted within the scope of the authority, which the instruction supposes
was conferred upon him, and perhaps for the hest interests of his
*
*
*
principal. 88

Reversed

with costs.

III. To Sell Real
(A) In
MARR

Judicial Court of Maine,

General

GIVEN.
1843.

23 Me.

55, 39 Am.

Dec. GOO.)

Writ of entry. Given bought a farm, giving a mortgage back. Suit
and entry had been made to foreclose.
To save the place, Given gave
to Moody a power of attorney under which he made a quitclaim deed
from Given to Rufus Marr. The latter paid the mortgage, saying that
I "men could have the place back by paying back the money, but he had
not done so.
Henry Marr, claiming under quitclaim to Rufus Marr,
gs this action against Hannah, the wife of John Given.
SiieplEy, J. The intentions of the parties are to be regarded in

the construction of the power of attorney from John Given to Elias
Moody. It is not necessary, that a power to convey lands should be
It may be imparted by implication.
Com. Dig.
expressly delegated.
Poiar, A. 2. Moody was authorized "to bargain, sell, grant, release,
and convey" ; "and upon such sale or sales, convenient and proper
deeds, with such covenant or covenants, general or special, of warranty, quitclaim, or otherwise, as to my said attorney, shall seem expedient, in due form of law, as my deed or deeds, to make, seal, deliver, and acknowledge."
The power of attorney is silent as to what
he w ras to sell and convey.
The language used was appropriate to the
sale and conveyance of real estate according to the forms in use in this
part of the country, and not usual in the sale and conveyance of personal property.
The power is sufficiently broad to authorize the agent to sell and
And it would seem to
convey whatever estate Given might then own.
be necessary to permit it to have that effect, or to decide, that it was
claimed the power to convey the
wholly void. Moody, by virtue of
it,
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(Supreme

v.

Estate

85 The power of ;m agent authorized to sell machinery
to take back the
machine if it does not work is discussed in Oster v. Mickley, 35 Minn. 245, 28
See, also, Butler v. Dorman,
N. W. 710 (188©.
68 Mo. 298, 30 Am. Rep.
795 (1878).
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a

a

it,

right in equity to redeem the estate, which Given had before conveyed
in mortgage to Brinley, and made a conveyance of it to Marr, who
caused it to be recorded, and entered into possession of the greater
portion of the estate, and has continued to possess it without interrupGiven, during all that time, has never
tion i'or nearly twenty years.
denied, that Moody was fully authorized to sell, has never claimed
any interest in the land, and does not now claim any. The defendant
was instrumental in procuring the conveyance to be made to Marr under that power, and in inducing him to advance the money clue upon
the mortgage, and does not therefore place herself in a position to
claim such a limited construction of the power, as will wholly defeat
stranger
and deprive Marr of the land. She must be regarded as
to the title.
The language used in the power and explained by the
period authorizes the conclusion,
conduct of the parties for so long

McCULLOUGH
(Supreme

Court of Errors

a

sale and conveyance

of all

HITCHCOCK.

v.

of Connecticut,

1S99.

71

Conn.

401,

42

Atl.

81.)

a

J.

&

a

if

&

a

contract for the sale of land
Action for specific performance of
Mead, his agents.
purporting to be made by defendant by Anderson
he could
Defendant had written them saying he would like to sell
do so to advantage, but as he had no knowledge of the value he would
purchaser.
like to have them give him an idea of the value and find
writMead had no authority to make
Anderson
ANDREWS, C.

a

is

a

it

h

I

is

in

is a

A

a

a

;

a

is

is

it

ten contract binding on the defendant to convey the land in question,
unless
can be found in the letter of November 23, 1896. That letter
The contention
does not, in terms, purport to give any such authority.
implied from the request in the
that such authority
of the plaintiff
custom of the real estate businos
that
letter to find
purchaser
bindpurchaser for lands may sign
broker authorized to find
that
ing contract for the sale of that land. We do not understand any such
custom can exist only as
matter "l"
custom to cxi>t in this state.
307,
There
no finding
32 Atl. 367.
fact. Smith v. Phipps, 65 Conn.
no case cur.
Connecticut, and there
that any such custom prevails
rule,
which recognizes anj sui
a

is

A

is

our who negotiates the sal
real estate broker or agenl
puronly to find
His business, generallj speaking,
real property.
In

,

i

B

896, Fed. Oas.
No. L.667 (1869),
BH
in v. O'Brien,
ompare
the court holds thai authority to an agenl to Bell real estate musl be
fair and candid person mu
dear and distinct, of such character thai
An answer to an agent, "1
given.
witii.
hesitation thai the authorltj
contracl
win -•ii" mi terms specified, fifes the agenl qo authority to make
By common law the power to convey m
those terms.
134.
seal.
Heath v. Nutter, 50 Me. 378 (1862), ante,
and
I

p.

n

a

i
t;

is

a

which

r
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it

was their intention to authorize
that
88
the rights of Given in any real estate.
Judgment for demandant.

Tin:

ai THORITT

(Part

2
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chaser who is willing to buy the land upon the terms fixed by the
owner.
He had no authority to bind the principal by signing a contract of sale. 8' A sale of real estate involves the adjustment of many
manors besides the fixing of the price.
The delivery of the possesand the
sion has to be settled; generally the title has to be examined;
conveyance, with its covenants, is to be agreed upon and executed
All ^\ these things require conferences, and time for
by the owner.
These are for the determination of the owner, and do
completion.
not pertain to the duties, and are nol within the authority, of a real
estate agent.
For these obvious reasons, and others which might be
of the law which withholds from
it
is a wise provision
suggested,
such an agent, as we think it does, any implied authority to sign a
Coleman v. Garrigues.
contract oi sale in behalf of his principal.
18 Barb. 60;
Roach v. Coe, 1 E. D. Smith, 175; Lindley v. Keim, 54

X. I. Eq. 418 423, 34 Atl. 1073; Duffy v. Hobson, 40 Cal. 240, 6
Am' Rep. 017: 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 964, note; 3 Waite,
Act. ,\ Def. 286, 2X7; Halsey v. Monteiro, 92 Va. 581, 24 S. E. 258;
Armstrong v. I. owe. 76 Cal. 616, 18 Pac. 758.
The other judges concurred.
There is no error.

(Supremo

Court

CARSTENS

v.

McREAVY.

of Washington,

1890.

1 Wash.

359,

25 Pac. 471.)

Action to compel specific performance of an alleged agreement to
two lots in the city of Seattle.
Stiles, J. 8S * * * The appellant was the owner of certain
real property in the city of Seattle, and the court found that, at a

convey

certain

date, agents named,

wdio

were real-estate

agents

in Seattle,

"were the agents of defendant for the sale of the aforesaid real estate,
and were then and there duly authorized and empowered by the defendant,

by waiting under the defendant's hand, to make and negotiate a sale of said real estate." The agents, thus authorized, executed
and delivered to the appellee a contract for the sale of the appellant's property, without his knowledge, and in his absence from the
state, and received a portion of the purchase money.
Appellant refused to recognize the contract thus made, claiming that the authority
by him given to "sell" did not include the authority to execute a contract, or anything more than to find a purchaser.
This was the vital
point in the case, upon which the court held with the appellee, and
directed that the contract thus made he performed.
The statute of frauds may he satisfied by the execution of a con•" I'nr
an Interesting
discussion of the powers of factors and brokers, and
<.f the consequent restrictions of the powers of real estate brokers, see Davis
v. Gordon, 87 Va. 559, 13 S. E. 35 (1891).
Pi it of the opinion i< omitted.
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a

is

a

is,

tract for the sale of lands by the hand of another person than the
party to be charged, if that person be thereunto lawfully authorized,
and it is well settled that such third person may be thus lawfully authorized orally, by written direction not under seal, and even by a
It, therefore, only recourse of conduct amounting to an estoppel.
mains to determine whether the ordinary real-estate agent or broker,
authorized to sell land, is thereby empowered to enter into a contract
binding upon his principal, in an action for specific performance. 89
A real-estate agent is a person who
generally speaking, engaged
in the business of procuring purchases or sales of lands for third persons, upon
commission contingent upon success. He owes no affirmnot liable to him for negligence or failure,
ative duty to his client,
and may recede from his employment at will, with.* ait notice. On the
unite in holding that in case
other hand, courts almost unanimously
party able
of an ordinary employment to sell, when he has procured
and
his
principal,
to
the
demanded
and willing
terms
by
buy upon

if

it is

is

is

a

it

is

is

is

contract.
We are aware that courts have held to this extent, basing their dedistinction between an authority to sell and an aucisions upon
thority to find
purchaser, and upon the well-known rule that an
thing
presumed to include all the
authority to an agent to do
of
with effect. But such holdand
usual
means
executing
necessary
a
themselves
to
our
commend
do
not
ings
judgment, and as this
not the gennew question in this state, and we are satisfied that
eral practice of agents to make such contracts, we do not hesitate
to dissent from the decisions above mentioned, especially as there
no lack of authority for the position we take. We cannot shut our
to the obvious defect in the argument that authority to sell, in
this instance, necessarily implies authority to execute
A
contract.
sale of land "executed with effect" includes the execution of
deed,
and the delivery of possession, neither of which the agent can do,
unless his authority to sell
the delivery of possessupplemented
so that he docs not,
power of attorney to convey;
sion to him, and
although in
of the authority to "sell," have all the neces
i

]

a

is

by

a

a

is

is

it

is

it

a

is

a

a

a

means of executing that authority with final effect.
He stops
short somewhere, and, when we are inquiring where the probable and
v.
Am. Rep. *',it (1870); Armstrong
10 Cat 240,
Jee Duffy v. Hobson,
Lowe, 76 Cal. 616, L8 Pac. 75
Scully v. Book,
Wash. L82, 28 Pac.
556(1801);
Milne v. Kleb, 14 N. J. Eq. 378, L4 Atl. 646 (1888), containing
n

a

3

6
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It

has notified him of the purchaser's readiness to buy, the agent's work
not his duty to
ended, and he
entitled to his commission.
he
contract, or to make one, and he
not in default
procure
seems clear that, orfails to do either. Therefore, to our minds,
not within the contemplation of the owner and agent,
dinarily,
where property of this character
placed in the hands of the latter
for sale, that he shall, without consultation with his client, execute

THE

tOO

AUTHORITY

(Part

2

a

a

is it

by

a

is,

the evils thai would attend the extenproper place of his stoppage
sion oi his actual authority, beyond the finding of
purchaser, furnish ample reasons for fixing his limit there.
An agency of this kind may be created
the slightest form of
words, without
to determine
to litigation
any writing, leaving
"to sell," or "to find
purwhether the substance of the authority
chaser,'" wherein the unscrupulous
and dishonest agent would be at
once arrayed as the principal witness against his client, with every
advantage from some note, "made at the time," of what the instruction was.
premium in such cases, and the
Perjury would go at

a

it

not necessary that real-estate
why custom and the law have made
agents should actually procure contracts in order to earn their compensation, and why, in this connection, the common understanding
of the phrase "authority to sell" means only authority to find
purchaser, whether the authority be given orally, or by written request.

J.

J.

In considering this case, we have examined the numerous authorities cited by both sides, as well as many others, and find the position
we take fully sustained by Morris v. Ruddy, 20 N.
Eq. 236; Milne
v. Kleb, 44 N.
Eq. 378, 14 Atl. 646; Duffy v. Hobson, 40 Cal. 240,
Am. Rep. 617; Armstrong v. Lowe, 76 Cal. 616, 18 Pac. 758;

6

Amer.

&

213

2

Warvelle, Vend.

;

966;

it

;

2. §

Eng. Enc. Law,
The earlier cases in New York were to the same effect, notably Coleman v. Garrigues,
18 Barb. 60, and Glentworth v.
Luther, 21 Barb. 145 but they were overthrown by Haydock v. Stow,
40 N. Y. 363, without sufficient reason, as
seems to us. We note
Mechem, Ag.
p. 573, note

if

that in nearly,
not all, the states where the courts at any time held
agents to sell real estate authorized to execute contracts of sale, especially in New York and Illinois, the legislatures very soon after
amended the statutes of frauds, so as to require the agent's authority
to contract to be in writing.
is

a

well defined in McGavock v. Woodlief, 20 How. 227, 15 L.
thus: "The broker must complete the sale; that
he must
situation, and ready and willing, to complete
purchaser in
is,

is

sale"

state of
presents
the case at bar, and
be remarked of Rutenmust do to "complete
265,

a

a

Lyon v. Pollock, 99 U. S. 668, 25 L. Ed.
facts not found, to any extent whatever, in
therefore not applicable, and the same may
broker
What
berg v. Main, 47 Cal. 213.

is

a

find
the purchase on the terms agreed on, before he
a
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a

;

a

a

a

Scarcely any man,
confiding and unlettered would be its victims.
when listing his property with
real-estate agent, stops to give details, either as to the property itself or as to the arrangements he
firstdesires to make, yet no one would sell upon equal terms to
class business man, and to an habitual drunkard, or well-known inand the ordinary owner would not sell at all to
person
solvent
bad rewhose very occupancy would tinge the neighborhood
with
pute. These are good reasons, and are probably some of the reasons

entitled to his com-
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if the broker has "completed the sale" so as to
to his commissions, by finding a purchaser, without a contract, his duty is thereby performed,
and his authority exhausted.
The judgment of the court below must be reversed, and the action
costs to appellants.
dismissed;
Per contra,

mission."

be entitled

LYON
(Supreme

v.

POLLOCK.

Court of the United States,

1878.

99 U. S. 668,

25

L. Ed.

265.)

Action in equity to compel conveyance by Lyon of land sold to Pollock by Lyon's agent. Lyon, who was a Union man during the Civil
War, had left Texas.
Mr. Justice Field, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of

it

it,

This case turns upon the construction given to the letter of Lyon
to Paschal, of the 24th of August, 1865.
That letter clearly did not
authorize the execution of a conveyance by Paschal in the name of
Lyon to the purchaser.
Its insufficiency in that respect was authoritatively determined in the action at law for the lands; the instrument executed by Paschal as the deed of Lyon being held inoperative
to pass the legal title.
The question now is, was the letter sufficient
to authorize a contract for the sale of the lots? To determine this,
and give full effect to the language of the writer, we must place ourselves in his position, so as to read
as
were, with his eyes and
mind.
appears from his answer, as well as his testimony, that he
was in great danger of personal violence in San Antonio, shortly after
the commencement of the rebellion, owing to his avowed hostility to
secession, or at least that he thought he was in such danger.
He apprehended that his life was menaced, and was in consequence induced
to flee the country.
He possessed at the time
large amount of property, real and personal, in San Antonio. This he confided to the care
of his partner, Bennett, to whom he gave
power of attorney, authorizing him to take charge of and control the same, and sell
for
whatever consideration and upon such terms as he might judge best,
and execute all proper instruments of transfer; and also to collect
and receipt for debts due to him.
Bennett took possession of Lyon's
until July, 1865, when he transferred
property and managed
with the business and papers
his hands, to Paschal, and at once
informed Lyon by letter of the transfer.
was under these circumstances that the letter of Lyon to Pasi hal, which
the subject of consideration, was written.
Its language is: "I wish you to manage
[my property] as you would with your own.
If good opportunity
have,
to sell every thing
would he glad to sell.
may be
partis will come into San Antonio who will be glad to purchase
my gas stock and real estate."
D.PB.&A.-
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as Lyon then was, a fugitive
from the state, it could
have been intended by him that if propositions to purchase his
property or any part of it were made to Paschal, they were to be communicated to him, and to await his approval before being accepted.
lie was at the time at Monterey, in Mexico, and communication by
water between that place and San Antonio was infrequent and uncertain: and he states himself that it was impossible to send letters
as the road was blockaded.
Writing under these cirby Matamoras,
cumstances, we think it clear that be intended by his language, what
the words naturall)
convey, that if an opportunity to sell his property presented itself to Paschal, he should avail himself of it and
close a contract for its sale.
His subsequent conduct shows, or at least tends to show, that such
was his own construction of the letter, and that he approved, or at
He must
made of his property.
least acquiesced in. the disposition
have been aware, from the laws of the state, which he is presumed to
have known, that taxes were leviable upon his property, and that
unless they were paid the property would he sold for their payment;
took no steps from 1865 to 1873 to meet them,
yet he confessedly
and thus prevent a forced sale of his property; a course perfectly
natural if it be conceded that the property was in charge of an agent,
with power to manage anrl sell it as his judgment might dictate. His
indifference, also, after rumors reached him that a sale of his property had been made by Paschal in 1867, can scarcely be explained upon
The same may be said of his inattention to
any other hypothesis.
the payment of the assessments upon his stock in the San Antonio
Gas Company, of which he had received intimations.
From the time
Paschal took charge of his property, in 1865 to 1873, a period of eight
years, he certainly manifested, if his own story be accepted, a most
extraordinary want of interest in regard to his real property, of great
value, situated in an unfriendly community, subject to taxation, and
liable to be sold if the taxes were not promptly paid ; and also in
regard to his personal property, consisting of shares in the San Antonio Gas Company, of great value, liable to assessments, and to sale
if the assessments were not paid wdien due. It is much more reasonable to suppose that he knew of the sales made of the real property and of the assessments on the shares, and that he was undisturbed by the reports which reached him, because be considered that
the sales were made and the assessments paid from the proceeds, by
his authorized attorney.
The testimony of Bennett tends also to corroborate this view. He
states that he knew from his correspondence with Lyon that he treated Paschal as his agent for the sale of his property.
The conduct
of Lyon, as expressive almost as any language which he could use,
cannot, of course, change the construction to be given to the words
contained in his letter to Paschal, but it tends to strengthen the conclusion as to the intention of the writer.

Situated

hardly
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Holding the letter to confer sufficient authority to contract for the
of Lyon's real property in San Antonio, there can be no doubt
of the right of the complainants to the relief prayed. The deed executed to them by Paschal in the name of Lyon, though invalid as a
conveyance, is good as a contract for the sale of the propertv described in it : and is sufficient, therefore, to sustain the prayer of the
bill for a decree directing Lyon to make a conveyance to them and
enjoining the enforcement of the judgment at law.' JU
sale

Decree affirmed.

PEXFOLD
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(Supreme

Court of Michigan,

v.

WARNER.

96 Mich.
Rep. 591.)

1893.

179,

55

N. W.

GSO. ?,7>Am.

St.

Hooker, C. J. John W. Zimmerman, being the owner of a parcel
of land in Frankfort, Benzie county, Mich., joined with his wife,
Barbara E. Zimmerman, in a power of attorney to their son, Morris
M. Zimmerman.
This was duly acknowledged and recorded.
In
1888, John W. Zimmerman quitclaimed the premises to his wife, Barbara, and. shortly after, died,
in 1890, Morris W. Zimmerman, as
for
Barbara
Zimmerman, conveyed the premises, except the
attorney
west 100 feet, to the plaintiff, for a valuable consideration, by warIn September, 1891, Barbara E. Zimmerman quitclaimed
ranty deed.
the premises, except the west 50 feet, to the defendant.
Plaintiff
brought ejectment.
Judgment being rendered in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appealed.
This power of attorney was given by husband and wife at the
time when the title to the real estate in question was vested in him,
and his wife had no title to any lands, aside from her inchoate right
of dower in this parcel. Counsel argue from these facts that the language of the power should be construed to cover lands subsequently
acquired, while on the other hand it is contended that this power of
attorney conferred no greater authority than to convey her right of
dower in a deed whereby her husband's title' should he conveyed.
We an- impressed by the importance of certainty in instruments
authorizing the conveyance of land-, and by the serious consequences
likely to arise if it be determined that a power of attorney may mean
one thing or another, as the tint> of Surrounding circumstances resting
on parol testimony may vary.
When placed upon record, as under our
he,
laws
it
there
may
should be no uncertainty in it> meanrding
Luthoritj to sell on special terms authorized an agent t" make ai
ecutory contract to conyey, bul not "ii different
terms.
Jackson \. Badger,
::.". Minn. 52, 26 N. W. 90
The power must !"• Interpreted «iiii reference t-> the subject-matter
and the circumstances
under which the agent
on v. Smith. 5 Minn. 78 (Gil. 68) 77 im Dec. 639 (1861) ; UIsspU v.
mi. |s| (1873).
Authority n> do with land :is "it' ii was your own"
w .nil v. Thnisfin
m <(hlo St :;I7 i

THE

10 t

frig, and strangers

Ar

DHOR] ! Y

should not be required

(Part

2

to look beyond die language

We arc aware that there arc authorities which appear to attach
importance to surrounding circumstances, but, beyond such as may
used.

to create an estoppel, we cannot approve them; and, inastitles to land cannot in Michigan
be maintained
upon an
estoppel, we cannot recognize the authority of such cases.
Eliminating extrinsic circumstances from the question, its solution is com\'o doctrine is better settled than that these "powers
paratively ca^y.
of attorney are strictly construed, and cannot be enlarged by con"
struction.
Wood" v. Goodridge, 6 Cush. 117, 52 Am. Dec. 771;
Morrell v. Frith. 3 Mees. & W. 402; Neilson v. Harford, 8 Mees. &
\Y. 806; Jwithington v. Herring, 5 Bing. 442; Rossiter v. Rossiter,
8 Wend. 494, 24 Am. Dec. 62;
Jeffrey v. Hursh, 49 Mich. 31, 12
N. \Y. 898 ; Id., 58 Mich. 246, 25 N. W. 176, and 27 N. W. 7.
The legislature has signified its approbation of this doctrine by restricting powers by statute. See How. St. c. 215; Id. §§ 5625, 5629.
Recurring to the instrument in question, we find the language to be as
follows : "John W. Zimmerman and Barbara, his wife, * * * do
make, constitute, and appoint Morris W. Zimmerman our true and
lawful attorney for us, and in our name, place, and stead, and in
the name, place, and stead of either of us, to bargain, sell or mortgage
any and all real estate belonging to us, or either of us, in any real
estate in the county of Benzie," etc.
The plain import of this language limits the power to lands then
owned by the parties. Weare v. Williams, 85 Iowa, 253, 52 N. W. 328.
As the title then stood, plaintiff had no title in the premises. She had
an inchoate right of dower, which she might release by joining with
her husband in a deed of the premises, or by her conveyance to the
holder of the title.
Rhoades v. Davis, 51 Mich. 306, 16 N. W. 659.
It was not an interest that could be conveyed by her so long as the
husband held the title to the fee.
But when she received a deed from
her husband, and became owner of the fee, the inchoate right of dower was extinguished by the merger, and there was nothing left for it
to operate upon, so far as that parcel of land was concerned, unless we
are to extend the power by construction, which, as we have seen, the
courts do not favor. This land did not belong to her when the power
of attorney was executed. 91
Some other questions are raised upon the record, but, as the case
must hinge upon the power of attorney, we think it unnecessary to pass
upon them. The judgment will be affirmed.
The other justices concurred.
be deemed
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much

as

si For distinction between authority to sell "all the land I own" and "any
lands I may own," Bee Weare v. Williams, 85 Iowa, 253, 52 N. W. 328 (1892),
and the cases there reviewed.

405

AND EXTENT

NATURE

Ch. 1)

(B) To Convey and Warrant

VALENTINE
(Supreme

Judicial Court of

Massachusetts,

v.

PIPER.

1S39.

22

Pick.

85, 33 Am. Dec. 715.)
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Writ of entry, wherein was demanded the premises appurtenant
to an ancient wharf. Demandants relied on a deed, executed by Geo.
Sullivan as attorney of Andrew Price, a clergyman in England, to
Lawson Valentine, father of the demandants.
Shaw, C. J. 92 The present case comes before the Court upon a
motion of the defendant to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial,
on the grounds of misdirection, and mistake of law in the admission
of evidence, and as a verdict against evidence.
The action was brought by the heirs of Lawson Valentine, to recover a tract of flats, over which the sea ebbs and flows, as appurtenant to, and parcel of a tract of land, bounded on salt water, and the
plaintiffs began by showing a title to the upland, in respect to which
The land consisted of a wharf, lying
this tract of flats was claimed.
street,
bounding on Boston harbour,
near the bottom of Summer
as
Valentine's wharf, Price's wharf and
known at different periods,
under several persons of the name
claimed
Bull's wharf. Valentine
of Price.
The first exception is to an instrument, purporting to be a letter
of attorney from Andrew Price to George Sullivan. Evidence was
given, tending to show, that Andrew Price, at the time of making the
instrument, and for many years previous, had resided in England, and
Under these
the instrument
purported to have been executed there.
circumstances, secondary evidence was offered to prove the execution
of the instrument, which was objected to, without calling the attesting
witnesses, or proving that they were not within the jurisdiction of the
court, but the objection was overruled, and the secondary evidence
* * *
admitted. And the Court are of opinion, that this was correct.
instrument.
Some objection was taken to the legal effect of this
It purported to authorize the attorne; to make sale of the real estate

of

the

constituent,

as

therein

described,

but there were no express

But the
authorizing the attorney to execute a deed or deeds.
this
to
excepthat the instrument is not open
i are of opinion,
and
the
sense,
ordinary
Where the term "sale" is used in its
tion.
is,
attorney
confer
on
the
to
ral tenor and effect of the instrument

words

to execute the proper
tate, the authority
into effect, is >
sale
such
law,
to
carry
instruments required by
maxim, thai an auof
a
general
is
It
in
pursuance
sarily incident.
end,
with
it an authority, so
carries
definite
a
:omplish
thoril
i

»2

Part of tiic opinion

is omitted.
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THE

AUTHORITY

(Tart

2

far as the constituent ran confer it. to execute the usual, legal and
A
appropriate measures proper to accomplish the object proposed.
power of attorney might be so drawn as to authorize the attorney to
make sale oi an estate, where it mighl be apparent that it was the
intention of the constituent to authorize the attorney to negotiate for
afterwards to ratify it and to exa sale, leaving it to the constituent
ecute deeds.
Should it appear, cither from the restricted words u^vil,
or from the tenor i^i the whole instrument, that such was the intent,
it ought to he construed as conferring such a restricted power only.
In the present case, we think it was the intent of the constituent to
03
* * *
confer en the attorney an authority to transfer the estate.
for
demandants.
the
verdict
Judgment upon

SCHULTZ
of Appeals

GRIFFIN.

of New York,

1S90.
121 N. Y. 294,
St. Rep. 825.)

24

N. E. 480,

18 Am.

Griffin gave Schultz a contract to pay him $1,000 upon his sale of
Griffin's farm for $20,000, part cash and part by payment of two mortSchultz sued for his commission and recovered.
gages on the farm.
Griffin appeals.
Andrews, J. The principal point urged for the reversal of the
judgment is that the contract tendered to the defendant, whereby
Longnecker agreed to pay such portion of the purchase money as was
represented by the mortgage to the Buffalo Savings Bank and the
mortgage to Williams "by assuming'' those mortgages, was not a compliance with the terms upon which Schultz was employed to sell the
farm.
It is insisted that his authority extended only to a sale in which
the purchaser should absolutely pay and discharge the mortgages, and
that the agreement made by Longnecker would be satisfied by his paying the portion of the purchase money over and above the mortgages
to Griffin personally, and by his assent to a covenant in the deed of the
farm to assume the mortgages. The agreement between Schultz and
The price for which the
the defendant is not free from ambiguity.
farm was to be sold is fixed, and the agreement proceeds to specify
that the purchase money should be paid, a part to Griffin personally,
The language as to the payment of the
and a part on the mortgages.
mortgages may be susceptible of two meanings, according to extrinsic
circumstai

it

!).

.-(..ril:
r>7 Am. Rep.
Farnham v. Thompson, 34 Minn. 330, L'<; x. \v.
should not
While power to sell lands must In- strictly construed,
Hemstreet v. Burconstrued ;i- to defeat the intention of the parties.
power to contract to convey
dick, 90 ill. m (1878).
The distinction between
broughl ou1 in Hunter v. Sacramento Valley Beet
power t<>convoy
(C. C.)

11 Fed.

15,

7

is

a

59 (1885).

a
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defense th°t the terms of the agreement were not
mplied with by t>tf. in the selling of the f c rm,
regard to the mortgages. ?rom « judg. for r>tf.,
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contract

its

l

between the -parties is ^mbiguou
meaning, it would seem to be

n-°tur
to receive full satisfaction, includi
assumption
e
of the mortgages by the buyer, befor
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It appears that the mortgages were accompanied by bonds of Griffin.
He had an interest that the mortgages should be paid, to relieve him
from his liability on the bonds. On the other hand, the contemplated
purchaser would have an interest to apply so much of the purchase
money as was required for that purpose to the extinguishment of the
In the absence of any circumstances indicating a different
mortgages.
interpretation, and regarding alone the language of the contract, the
most natural meaning would seem to be that actual payment of the
purchase money, part to Griffin personally, and part on the mortgages,
was to be made before any conveyance by Griffin. It seems quite clear
that, if the Longnecker contract had been accepted and signed by
Griffin, the latter would have been bound to convey on receiving $11,000 in cash, and the covenant of Longnecker assuming the mortgages.
Such a transaction would have left Griffin still liable on his bonds,
with his liability changed in equity to that of surety for Longnecker
for the mortgage debts. Avers v. Dixon, 78 X. Y. 318.

It does not appear whether the mortgages were or were not due. If
it had appeared that they had not matured, so that they could not have
been paid without the consent of the holders, we are inclined to think
that the contract with Schultz would be construed as an authority to
sell the land subject to the mortgages.
It could not reasonably be supposed, in such case, that Griffin, who. as the contract shows, was seeking to sell his farm, would have inserted an impossible condition, or
one which could not be performed except by the consent of the holders
of

But the case gives no light upon this point; and, as
the burden was upon the plaintiff to show that the contract with Longnecker was such a one as was authorized by the agreement with Griffin,
we- are of opinion that judgment was erroneously given for the plainthe mortgages.

The further point is made that Schultz was n<>t authorized to make it
of the sale that the conveyance should be with warrant v.
'he defendant's counsel cites in support of this point Xixon v. Hy:
Se^Ott,
Johns. 58, which supports his contention.; The rule that an

(a condition

agent to sell personal property has implied power fo warrant, in the
absence of any restriction, where sale with warranty is usual and customary in similar cases, was declared in Nelson v.JCowing, 6 Hill, 336,
substantially overruling Gibson v. ('"It. 7 Johns. 39D.

There seems to be no well-founded distinction between nfal and personal property, requiring a different construction of an arency for Beffe
in the two cases.
The great preponderance of authoritymow is thai a
power, without restriction, to sell and convey real estate gives authority
to the agenl to deliver deeds with genera] warranty binding on the
this is the common and
principal, where, under the circumstances,
usual in'Le Roy v. Beard, 8 Mow. 451, 12 1.. Ed.
1151; Peters v. Farnsworth, 15 \ t. 155, 40 \m. Dec. 671; Vanada v.

,

the AiriioKii

ins

Hopkins,
McLean,

Marsh.

(Part

v

"J;

2

04

Taggart v. Stanbery,2
Am. Dec.
543, Fed. Cas. No. 13,724; Rawle, Cov. § 20, note.
It is sufficient, however, For the disposition of this appeal, that the
first point considered must prevail.
Judgment reversed, and a new
All concur, except GRAY, J., absent.
trial ordered.
1 T. T.

293,

19

(C) To

MANN'S EX'RS
(Supreme

Collect
v.

ROBINSON.

Court of Appeals of West Virginia,

1SS1.

19

W. Va.

49,

42

Am.

Rep. 771.)

Action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land.
Hunter, as agent of Mann, sold the land to Robinson for part
cash and part bonds. Hunter received payment of all the bonds. Both
principal and agent were now dead. The circuit court held the payment to Robinson good and decreed a deed to Robinson.
Green, J. 9b * * * Some of the text-books lay it down broadly, "that an agent employed to sell has no authority as such to receive
See Sugden on Vendors (14th Ed.,
payment of the purchase-money."
I
8th Am. Ed. 1873) vol. 1, c. 1, § 3, par. 11, p. 70, bottom p. 48.
If the
apprehend, that this broad proposition needs qualification.
property be personal property, the authority to sell for ca$h would
carry with it generally the power and authority to receive the purchaseSee Hackney v. Jones, 3 Humph. 612; Taylor v. Nussbaum,
money.
2 Duer. 302; Higgins et al. v. Moore, 34 N. Y. 417; Cross v. Haskins,
13 Vt. 536, 540.
But if the subject-matter of the authority to sell be
land, it is important to determine accurately, what is meant by authority to sell. There cannot be a perfected sale of land but by conveyance ; and a power of attorney under hand and seal authorizing an
agent to sell and convey land for cash would confer on the agent the
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( »ne

power to receive in cash the purchase-money,

when the sale was made.

»* A leading and well-reasoned
case, in which the court held that an agent
may do such things as arc most usual and proper to accomplish
the thing
intended to be done, including the giving of a deed with the usual warranties
and covenants, and also the breaking up of a great tract of land into smaller
tract
All powers must be construed with a view
would be salable.
This would not, of course, justify a deto the design and object of them.
parture from the Instructions, prescribed by the principal in the power.
Etice
v. Tavernier, 8 .Minn. 248 (Gil. 214), 83 Am. Dec. 778 (1863);
Smith v. Allen,
It is sometimes held that to justify the agent in execut86 Mo. 178 (1885).
ing a warranty deed, he must have broader power (ban a naked power to sell,
m v. Coffin, 118 Mass. 156 (1875);
id.. 108 -Mass. 175, 11 Am. Iter. 335
See, also, the leading case of Le Roy v. Beard, 8 How. 451, 12 L. Ed.
(1871).
11.-1

(1850).
to the effect of a warranty deed, given under authority to execute a
quitclaim deed, see Robinson v. Lowe. 50 W. Va. 75, 40 S. E. 454 (1901); Kane
v. Sholars, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 154, 90 8. W. 937 (1005).
»5 l'art of the opinion is omitted.
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is,

See Peck et al. v. Harriott et al., 6 Serg. & R. 146, 9 Am. Dec. 415.
On the other hand a verbal or parol authority to sell would mean
simply an authority to contract to sell the land ; for no verbal or parol
a

conveyauthority could be given to make a perfected sale, that
Such authority must be under seal.
Ordinarily an authority to
an authority to collect the purcontract to sell would not carry with
Moo.
R. 327. 90
See Mynn v. Jolliffe,
chase-money.
167
Man. G.
C.
and 168
In Ireland v. Thompson, 56 E.
L.
"In the case
S.), Maule, Judge, in speaking of this case, says:
was decided that an agent
M.
R. 326,
of Mynn v. Jolliffe,
not, as such, authorized to receive the puremployed to sell an estate
And there
no doubt, that on the sale of an estate to
chase-money.

it

is is

1

&

&

(4

1

&

it

ance.

is

9

a

if

a

I

6

&

;

I

loosing the money."
underThese general views seem to me eminently sound and as
Am. Dec. 415,
R. 146,
stand the case of Peck v. Marriott,
Serg.
they are the views entertained by that court, though not so expressed
in that case.
Sugden to sustain his general proposition refers also to Pole v. Leask,
have not access to this case.
Doubtless there are
28 Beav. 562, but
parol or verbal authority to sell land would under
some cases, where
the circumstances be held to confer authority to receive the cash-payan auctioneer be
ment on the sale of the land being made. Thus
lot at public sale upon certain terms, one
verbally authorized to sell
ten per cent, of the purchase-money
should be paid
in cash on the day of sale, the auctioneer lias authority to receive this
payment; as the court says: "His authority to receive the stipuHe receives the deposit not meredeposit cannot be questioned.
lie
bound to keep
for the indemnity
as the agent of the seller,
enabled to looK into the title proof the purchaser, until the latter,

it

is is

ly

of which was, that

t" sell Land does ool Imply power to Bell on credit Presumpage al the place of sale may rebul this
to be for cash.
sale
0. 440(1906);
presumption.
Winders v. Bill, in v C. 694, 54
Marble v.
But the authority, always underBang, 54 Minn. 277, 55 N. W. 1131 (1893).
stood, i" '!" iiii things necessary i<> the execution of the power requires the
mediate act, to receive the price.
agent empowered to sell and convej as
fraud upon the
Without payment before conveyance, the sale might be
i;. 146,
Serg.
Am Dec H5 (1820).
the
principal. Peck v. Harriott,
agent makec
contract be has no power t<i make, then be bas no right to
m Ither baa be before any contract of sale
prlc<
receive pari of the purchu
Scbaeffer v. Mut Benefll ins. Oo., 88 Mont 159, LOO Pac.
entered Into.
Bale, bul not to convey, carrli 225 (1909).
Mere authority t<>contract for
White v. Lee, '.»7 Miss. 193, 52 South. 20G
no authority to colled payment
;i

(1910).

if

9

.

e

a

6

>v

a

a

S.

u

A

Is

a

Mi re power

tively

It
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is

it

;

imply such an authority would be most inconvenient and unnecessary
being clearly for the interest of the vendor, that he, and not his
and no inconvenience to
agent, should receive the purchase-money;
any one arising out of the limit to the authority of the agent, which
clearly,
excludes his right to receive the money. The proper course
that the vendee should retain the money and the vendor the estate, till
made; and thus neither of them runs any risk of
the conveyance

Tin: authority

1 10

(Part

2

posed to be conveyed to him and decide on its sufficiency, or until the
of time limited for the purpose in fixing the day for the payment
and security for the residue of the price."
So in the case of Yerby v. Grigsby, 9 Leigh, 387, a decree was rendered, which impliedly affirmed, that an agent, who had been appointed
by a verbal authority to sell land, had under the circumstances appear'The court says
ing in that case authority to receive the cash-payment.
not one word on this subjeel : and this inference is to be drawn only
from the decree.
The reporter too fails to state, what the circumstanc"In the opinion
es or evidence was; in stating the law he merely says:
oi the court below as of this court the evidence established, that John
Green was authorized by Charles to make such a contract as was made
the complainant."
The contract which was made was a sale of
two lots for $425.00, of which $250.00 was to be paid and, as the
agreement states, was paid in cash to John Green.
So far as I can see,
there was no authority from anything appearing in this case to justify
the reporter in stating in the syllabus in this case, that so broad a propas that "when the owner of lands authorized anosition was held in

is

I

1

it

;

by

a

is

is

is

a

other to make
contract for the sale thereof, the authority of the agent
to receive so much of the purchase-money, as
to be paid in hand,
sell."
incident
to
said
the
to
power
necessary
Nothing of the sort
and no such broad proposition can possibly be inferred
the court
from the statement of the case or the decree entered.
hit be this as
may, there
certainly nothing in this or in any
other case, which
have seen, that gives any countenance to the idea,
a

a

is

the same thing, to
that
simple parol authority to sell land or, what
make
contract of sale would impliedly authorize the agent making
the sale to receive the deferred payments of the purchase-money.
Such
implication would be entirely unnecessary in order for the agent to
is

it

it

;

execute the authority conferred on him and on every correct princonld not be made. In such case
ciple
clear, that no authority
to the agent to collect any deferred instalments of the purchase-money
can be inferred.

I,

:

if

is

:

In this case not only was no authority given by Mann to Hunter to
collect these deferred payments; but the paper, which Mann signed,
seems to me to go much further than w as necessary and clearly to
negative the idea, that Hunter was to collect the deferred payments,
he sold the land.
The language used
"That should H. F. Hunter
William T. Mann, will endorse said sale and take
sell said land,
is

It

by

said II. Hunter."
my interest in money or bonds as contracted
perfectly obvious, that the bonds here referred to are the bonds for
Mann stipulates here exthe purchase-money of the land when sold.
pressly, that his -hare of these bonds was to be given to him, which
utterly inconsistent with the idea, that all these bonds were to be
collected by Hunter. But even had there been express authority given
by Mann to Hunter to collect the deferred payments of the puris
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a

a

is

is

;

3

7

a

&

a

a

it

it

is,

chase-money, when the land was sold, yet he would have had no aubefore
thority to collect it in the manner, in which he did, that
was due, receiving for
according to the deposition of the purchaser,
Robinson, cattle, horses, sheep and notes of third parties, which were
An agent authorized to receive money or colpayable to Robinson.
house or
bond of
receive
another thing, as
not
lect
can
debt
Co. v. Hblloway,
third person in discharge of debt. See Wilkinson
Stew. 27; Wiley v. Mahood. 10 W.
Leigh, 284; Gullett v. Lewis,
Va. 221. These were cases of attorneys at law, who being authorized
to collect debts received payment in something else than money but
just as applicable to any other agent as
they show, that the principle
Indeed they are based on the ground, that the
to attorneys at law.
the same as that of any other agent
authority of an attorney at law
is

* is

if

Decree reversed;

cause remanded.

(D) To Fix

or

HAMPTON
(Supreme

Court of [owa,

Modify
v.

1883.

the

Terms

MOORHEAD.
[owa, 91, 17 N. W. 202.)

62

J.

a

contract for the sale of land,
Action for specific performance of
W. Moorhead as attorney in fact for the defendant. T. L.
Moorhead. The court refused specific performance, but made $2,000,

made by

a

paid the agent,

lien on the land.
by

J.

is

07
some evidence
Adams,
There
virtue of which the
power of attorney,

tending to show that the

it

it

sale

is

alleged to have been
made, was forged, but we do not deem
necessary to determine what
may be cone
the fart was.
For the purposes of the opinion
But, conceding such fact,
that the power <>f attorney was not forged.
'hat. under the plaintiff's own testimony, the sale
we are nol abl<
to

a

pinion

Is

omitted.

J.

if

a

i>

of

ti

»t part

J.

it

in

it

appears clearly enough that the plaintiff
While
ran he sustained.
was paid only
W.
the
court found, yet
cashj as
paid $2.<xn
think,
the
hown
circumstan
under
not,
did
we
Moorhead, and
payment to Thomas L. Moorihe undisputed evidence, become
no pretei se that any part of the money actually came
head.
There
re, would not have
intoThomas k. Moorhead's hand-. This,
W. had retitute
payment to Thomas k.
by
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is

a

a

is

a

it

a

debt.
to collect
due by an agent authorized
debt before
The^ collection joo of
violation of his duty; and the person,
to collect
debt
generally
responsible,
who knowing his authority pays him money in this way,
Gaitskell,
13
Parnther
v.
the
not
to
principal.
the money
paid
*
*
East, 432.

Tin: ai nioKi

i \

(Part

2

But the
ceived the money while acting within the scope of his power.
undisputed evidence shows thai he did nol thus act. J. W. Mo orhead's
\\ hat lie undertook to do was to make an
power was to make a sale.
in part was concerned.
at least, so far as the transaction
exchange;
lie took a patent-right as a part of the consideration for the land.
The language of the power oi attorney is not very accurate, hut
there is no question as to what it means. After descrihing the land it
in these words: "To make sale of the
sets out the power conferred
same or any part thereof for such sum or price, and on such terms, as
to him (the said attorney) shall seem meet, and to ask, demand, recover, and receive all sums of money which shall become due and
owing to me by means of such sale or sales, and to take all lawful
Under this power the attorney
means for the recovery thereof," etc.
was authorized to make a sale, and only that. 9S A sale is defined to
be "an agreement by which one of two contracting parties, called the
seller, gives the thing and passes the title to it in exchange for a certain
It differs from an exBouv. Law Diet.
price in current money."
change, wdiere the consideration is paid in property other than money.
In Parsons on Contracts, vol. 1, p. 520, it is said: "A sale is distinctly
discriminated in many respects from an exchange in law; an exchange
being the giving of one thing and the receiving of another thing, while
a -ale is the giving of one thing for that which is a representation
of
all values."
See, also, Vail v. Strong, 10 Vt. 457. When, therefore,
J. W. Moorhead undertook to take a patent-right in part consideration,
he undertook to do what he had no authority to do, and the plaintiff
should have known it. The trade was, therefore, void.
It differed in
no respect ffom wdiat it would have been if there had been no power
of attorney. There being no sale, the money received could not be regarded as secured in pursuance of a sale, and it not coming actually
into Thomas L, Moorhead's hands he was not affected by the receipt
of it by J. W. Moorhead. We think, then A that the court erred in
r * *
charging the land with a lien for this money.
ney. j*
Reversed.

(5

Is,

y

S.

1

-•

1

a

a

'.)
I

as The agent has no implied authority to accept payment In any other
medium than money.
He may not accept drafts, notes, or checks.
Ormsby
VS.', Iowa, 202, 98 X. W. 724 (1904).
v. Graham,
Nor a certificate of deposit.
Ill':;
Wilkin v. Yoss, 1U0 Iowa. r.im.
\. \V.
Nor bonds. Paul v.
(1903).
Grimm, 165 Pa. 139, 30 Atl. 721, 44 Am. St. Pep. 648, 35 Wkly. Notes ('as.
451 (1895), containing
review of the cases and many illustrations of the
Nor a cancellation of
rule.
debt against the agent; Catterall v. Ilimlle,
C. P. 186 (1866);
L. B.
Hunter v. Eastham, 95 Tex. 648, 69 S. W. 66
wares, and merchandise.
Nor
Lumpkin v. Wilson, 52 Tenn.
(1902).
If the consideration be anything else than money, it is
1^71).
Heisk.) 555
not a salt.-, but a barter or exchange.
Coulter v. Portland Trust Co., 20 Or.
469, 26 Par-. 565, 27 Pac. 266 (1891); Id., 23 Or. 131, 31 Pac. 280 (1S92), with
an Interesting
review of authorities;
Kkirvin v. O'Brien, 43 Tex. Civ. App.
W. 696 (1906).
95
Hie m
must pass current; Confederate money will
not do. Turpiu v. Sam^om, 30 Tex. 112 (1.S72).
1,
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McLAUGHLIN.

Court of New York, General Term, Third Department,
70 Hun, 56S, 2i N. Y. Supp. 280.)

1S93.

Action to compel defendant to convey certain premises by virtue
of a written contract made between the parties, in which one La
Fountain had afterwards filled in some descriptions, terms $10 cash,
The cash was paid,
balance in one year or the contract to be void.
for payment of the
time
the
one
year
extended
beyond
but the agent
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balance.

The opinion of Putnam, J., at circuit, was as follows:
I think that all the evidence in, and facts of, the case, indicate that
La Fountain was, to a certain extent, the agent of the defendant.
The contract was drawn with a blank space left, to be filled in with
a proper description of the lots agreed to be conveyed ; and I infer
from the evidence that La Fountain, as defendant's agent, was authorized to write in the contract the proper description of the lots,
and hence that the contract, as read in evidence, was a valid and auBut although La Fountain was an agent of dethorized contract.
fendant, to make the contract, that fact did not give him, either actually or presumptively, any authority to cancel, extend, or modify
The admission of defendant, proved by several witnesses, that
it.
"Mr. La Fountain did all his business for him," should be deemed to
— the makapply to the business then being discussed and transacted
made, and
contract
being
The
sale
of
lots.
the
for
of
contracts
ing
the right of the parties fixed and determined by the writing, the admission of defendant should not be construed to mean that La Fountain had authority to modify or extend or change the contract.
When this written contract was made, the agency must be deemed
to have ceased, in the absence of competent evidence of its continuUnder
It was for the plaintiffs to show such continuance.
ance.
well-settled principles, they could not show such continuance by the
The
But they show it in no other manner.
agent's declarations.
defendant,
saw
after
plaintiff Mould testified that the first time he
the making of the contract, the latter said that La Fountain was not
I conclude,
authorized to extend the contract, or to act as his agent!.
therefore, that plaintiffs fail to show a valid extension of the time
to perform the contract.
They show the agency of La Fountain to
Bui such agency does not give him
tin making <>f the contract.
power to modify, change, or extend it. See Brewster v. (Sanies. 103
X. Y. 556, 9 X. E. 323; Ritch v. Smith, 82 X. Y. 627; Bid
Edwards v. Dooley, 120 X.
v. Menier, 107 X. Y. 490, 14 X. E. 438;
Smith v. Kidd, 68 N. Y. 130, 131, 23 Am.
51, 24 N. E. 827;
Rep.
B)

157.
the

the pure!

terms of tin- contract, plaintiffs were to pay the balance ol
ar from it- date, and if said mone) was nol

Tin:

11 i

.w

i

noiMTY

(Part

2

I think, therefore,
then paid he contract should be null and void.
lu>
of the contract.
i
was
essence
of
the
time
of
the
payment
that
Wells v. Smith. 2 Edw. Ch. 78; 7 Paige, -'-'. 31 Am. Dec. 274.
Hence, the time of payment being, by the terms of the contract, material, ami strict Fulfillment of the terms of the contract not having
been waived or extended by defendant, 1 conclude that plaintiffs are
The complaint should he disnot entitled to a specific performance.
J.

1
1

it

It

J.

J.,

missed, with a >sts.
i:kkhk,
and
Argued before Mayham, 1'.
seems to me that this case should be affirmed,
HERRICK,
seems
The agency proved,
upon the opinion of the court below.
conthe
Written
or
modify
extend
to me. did not grant power to
tract.

09

IV. To Cou.ivcT
General
v.

DEERE.

(Nisi Triiis in the Court of King's Bench. 1828.
C. L. 507.)

Moody

&

BARRETT

Malkin,

200,

22

E.

a

a

The
Defense payment.
Assumpsit for goods sold and delivered.
person, sitting in plaintiff's counting-house
money had been paid to
This person gave
behind the railing, with account books near him.
In fact, no such person was employed
receipt, signed W. Long.
about the place.

The only question for the jury is, whether
C.
the sum of £6. 16s. was paid at the plaintiff's counting-house or not?
he were not, the
verdict.
entitled to
was, the defendant
In great place of business like
consequences would be very serious.
a

a

If

J.

is

it

If

Lord TenterdiCn,

to an agent to sell land does not per se confer authority to
Land Co. v.
West End Hotel
:iik1 cancel the contract of sale.
Nor docs authority to sell at
Crawford, 120 N. C. -".IT. L'T
E. .".1 (ist>7).
given manner, give any power to sell ;it any other price.
fixed price, or in
Dayton v. BuEq. 831 (18G8)
National Iron .Minor (O. v. Bruner, 10 N.
Rice v. TavNor in any other manner.
ford, IS Minn. 126 (Gil.
(1872).
&

Authority

ernier,

8

a

S.

a

.1

bo

Minn.

248

(Gil.

214),

S3

Am.

Dec.

;

J.

lilt

778

Though

(1863).

when

the

a

6

principal leaves discretion with the agent he will be bound, even though the
Sprigg's
Ex'rs v.
agent sell for loss than the amount he has siiu'--ostod.
Berman,
Mart. (N. S.) 510 (1828).
Matreasonable time.
Moreover, the authority must be exorcised within
n

—.

a

If considerable time
Sowle, lu Neb. 398, 11 X. W. 857 (1882).
presumption that the
may have changed so as to raise
conditions
principal no longer holds the agenl out as having authority. Wasweyler v.
Martin, 78 Wis. 59, hi N. W. 890 (1890).
course, cannot fix terms for his own advantage, even though
Finch v. Conrade's Ex'rs, 154 Pa.
no fraud is Intended and do injury results.
26 At], 368, 32 Wkly. Notes Cas. 196 (1893); Hill v. Helton, SO Ala. 5-8,
South. 340 (1886), post, p. 77:;.

ela]

1
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this, no transactions could be carried on, if it were not sufficient for
to send his money to the seller's place of business, and
pay it to any person whom he finds there, whether actually authorized to receive it or not, who appears to be intrusted with the conduct
of the business. The debtor has a right to suppose that the tradesman has the control of his own premises, and that he will not allow
persons to come there and intermeddle in his business without his
authority. 1 If, therefore, the jury are of opinion that the payment
was made at the plaintiff's counting-house, their verdict must be for
the defendant.
Verdict for the defendant.
a purchaser

BUTMAN
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(Supreme

Judicial

v.

BACOX.

Court of Massachusetts,

1864.

90

Mass.

[S

Allen]

2.".)

Plaintiff left her bank book with her mother to enable her to draw
or deposit on her account.
Defendant, her brother, asked a loan of
$150, and plaintiff sent the mother an order on the account.
The
brother tried to show that he had repaid the loan to the mother.
Per Curiam. The evidence offered contains no express words by
which the plaintiff constituted her mother her agent to receive payment of this debt.
Xor is the power to receive it implied by the
which
the
evidence
tended to prove ; for that agency related to
agency
other matters, and was not general, but limited to those matters.
.Exceptions overruled.

(B) Implied from

Possession

ROBERTS

v.

of Notes or Securities

MATTHEWS.

(High Court of Chancery,

L682.

l

Vernon,

150.)

The case was, the defendant Matthews employed one Smith a
scrivener to place out £50. for him at interest, which the scrivener
did to the plaintiff, and took the plaintiff's bond for it in the defendant's name; and about three months afterwards delivered the bond
to the defendant.
Plaintiff Roberts all along paid his interest to
the scrivener, and about five years after the entering into this bond,
the scrivener calling upon him for the principal, he paid £30. of it.
i Payment

to

a

clerk

In a country

I>;i\i- v. Waterman, 10
Gardiner v. Davis, 2 Car. & I'.
good.

while Hi" employer

Is absenl Is
See, also,
Dec. 216 (1838).
(1825), in which the agem
C. L.
t" :i shopman authorized i" t ■

store

N't. 526,
19, L2 i:

.'•.:: Am.

ill

\his own name
paymenl over the counter, who receives money elsewhere than in the shop,
m-.'. K
.it. 5 Ex. 269, 19 F.. F. Ex. 346 (1850). As to paymenl
B iwen \.
clerk "i demands having no connection with the bush
I>Ui., 36 Mi. li. l 19 (1877).
• lowed t" trade in

THE

Jli'>

AUTHORITY

(Part

2

and the scrivener nol having the bond in his custody, gave the plaintiff a receipt for £30. received in pari for the use of the defendant
Matthews.
for the bond being in the
Adjudged this was a void payment;
custody of the defendant Matthews, and not in the scrivener's, the
plaintiff ought to have seen his money indorsed on the bond; and
though this alone were enough to make it an ill payment, yet this
was the stronger; for thai the plaintiff was not ignorant whose
money it was; the receipt he took for the payment of the £30. being
for the use of the defendant.
And many precedents were cited to
.nne pur]

MARTYN
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(High Court of Chancery,

1702.

v.

KINGSLEY.

Finch, Precedents

in Chancery,

200.)

In this case a difference was made, where a man trusts his scrivener
(who puts out money for him) with the custody of his bond, and
in the first case, if he rewhere with the custody of his mortgage;
ceive the money, and delivers up the bond, this shall bar the obligee;
not so in the case of a mortgage, because a legal estate is vested,
which cannot be divested without assignment.

WOLSTENHOLM
(High Court of Chancery,

1705.

v.

DA VIES.

2 Freeman,

Ch. 280, 2 Eq. Cas. 700.)

The plaintiff having borrowed £100. of the defendant's testator
upon bond, which was procured by Williams, a scrivener in the Old
Bailey; when the bond was sealed, it was delivered to the obligee;
the plaintiff paid several years interest to Williams, the scrivener,
and £50., part of the principal money, which the scrivener paid to
the obligee, but the last £50. of the principal money being paid to the
scrivener, he broke before he paid it to the obligee ; and the question
was. whether Sir Jo. W. the plaintiff was to lose the money, or the
And the Master of the Rolls said, that it was the constant
obligee?
rule of this court, that if the party, to whom the security was made,
trusted his security in the hands of the scrivener, that payment to
the scrivener was good payment, but if he took the security into his
own keeping, payment to the scrivener would not be good payment,
unless it could be proved that the scrivener had authority from the
party to receive it; and although in this case the scrivener had received the interest and part of the principal, and paid it to the obligee,
yet that did not imply that he had any authority to receive it; but
as long as he paid it over, all was well, and any one else might have
carried to the party as well as he; and the plaintiff not proving that
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the scrivener had any authority from the obligee to receive, he wa>
forced to pay the last £50. again, although the Master of the Rolls
declared that he thought it a very hard case.

CURTIS

v.

(High Court of Chancery

DROUGHT.'

in Ireland,

1828.

1

Molloy,

487.)

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

D. Robert, the common agent of Margaret Bradford and of Thos.
Drought, negotiated a loan of £300. by the former to the latter, taking
and delivering to Miss Bradford a bond therefor. Drought regularly
paid the interest, and finally the principal, to Robert. In 1816 she
died and her executor sues on the bond.
Hart, L,d. Ch. 3 * * * As to the acquittance of the debtor by
the agent, if one employs an agent to lend money, and take a security which he delivers to his principal, he has no authority to discharge the debtor.
Xo one would be safe if an attorney who was employed to take a
security for money could be permitted to say he had received back
the amount and discharged the debtor. There has often been a question touching the extent of the authority of an agent who has been
permitted to hold the security in his hands, whether he had power to
cancel the security and discharge the debt ; and there are some cases
of great nicety upon that. Martyn v. Kingsley, Pre. Ch. 209, ante,
But it has never been heard of when the owner has had the
p. 416.
precaution to take the instrument containing the evidence of the debt
into his own custody, that the agent then had authority to receive the
* * *
amount and give a valid acquittance.

JOY
(Supromo

Bill

Court of Michigan,

v.

VANCE.

L895.

L04

Mich. 07. 02 N. w. 140.)

foreclose

a mortgage.
Defense payment.
Complainants
mortgage and four accompanying notes, and as the infell due, sent them to the Michigan Mortgage Company
for collection.
The Vance mortgage became due February 28, 1891.
March 11, 1892, Vance paid the mortgage, taking a receipt of the
Michigan Mortgage Company in full. The latter failed to pay it to
complainant and soon after failed.
to

purchased

the

Accord: Whltlock v. Waltham,
« Part of the opinion is omitted.
<IODD.PK.& a. — 27

•

l

Salkeld,

157

(1708).

THB AUTHORITY

I I 3

Hooker,

4

*

(Part

2

*
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The case is reduced, therefore, to the
single question of the authority of the Michigan Mortgage Company
to receive the money upon the mortgage.
Unless we arc to say that
the collection
of the interest through this company, from time to
time, constituted it an agenl for the collection of subsequent installments of interest and the principal, we cannot deny complainants the
relief sought. 8 Vance admits he paid the interest to the company
without taking the trouble to ascertain whether they had the mortWhen he paid the mortgage, he was satisor \\h«> owned it.
fied with the statement that the mortgage was mislaid, although he
received a receipt which indicated that it did not belong to the company to whom he was paying it. It was perhaps the natural thing for
him to pay it. in reliance upon the statement of these men with whom
but his rights
he was acquainted and in whom he had confidence;
the
to
receive
money, not upon his
must depend upon their authority
T.

confidence in them.
Defendants' counsel claim that there was a general authority to collect from the fact that Mr. Cutcheon was in the habit of having this
company make collections for his clients, including this estate for
The
which he had purchased several mortgages from the company.
authority of the company does not depend upon the amount of busiPart of the opinion is omitted.
As t •> the implied authority of an agent authorized to collect the interest,
1,1 receive tin- principal also, see Security ('<». v. Graybeal,
85 Iowa, 543, 52
.\. \v. 497, .".:» Am. St. Rep. ::i l (1892); Doubleday v. Kress, no N. Y. 410, 10
110 .Midi. 580, 68 N. W. 278, '■)'>
Am. Rep. ."<iu (1872); Wilson v. Campbell,
I.. R. A. 544 (1896).
One may be willing to intrust to the agent the collection
of the interest, ami unwilling to place in his hands the collection of the prinWhen one
cipal note. While v. Madigan, 78 Minn. 2S6, 80 N. W. 1125 (1899).
bond is left with the agent, and the others are not in his possession, the
Ward v. Smith, 7
agent has authority to collect the one, hut not the others.
And when the third person makes various
Wall. i'.T. 19 I-. Ed. -01 (1869).
payments he will he protected as to payments made while the securities are
in tin- agent's possession, hut not as to payments made after the securities
*

If estoppel is relied upon to show the auhave left the hands of the agent.
thority, the third person must have known that the agent had the securities,
Crane v. Gruenethough ii is not necessary that he should have seen them.
When the prinwald. 120 X. V. 274, 24 X. E. 456, 17 Am. St. Rep. 643 (1890).
cipal withdraws the instruments evidencing the debt, that is an implied revocav. Dau, L22 .Mich, 522, 81 N.
Bloomer
tion of the authority of the agent.
W. :;::i (1899).
Ami it has even been held that the authority is revoked when
the agent wrongfully assigns the debt to another party.
Crane v. Gruenewald. supra.
Neither mere authority to make a loan. Fortune v. Stockton,
is- in. 154, ."..".x. E. 367 (1899); Antioch College v. Carroll, 11 <>hio Dec. (Reprint) 220 (1S90); nor mere possession of the securities by an agent who has
had no Other Connection with the loan, gives implied authority to collect the
debt, Doubledaj v. Kress, 50 N. Y. 410, 10 Am. Rep. 502 (1872) ; Union Cent. L.
Minn.
[ns. v. Jones, 35 Ohio si. ::r, l (1880); McMahon v. Germ. Am. Nat. Bk.,
Both conditions must concur.
313, 1-7 X. W. 7. -'.i I.. R. \. (X. S.i (17 (1910).
The mere
Central Trust Co. \. Folsom, nrr N. v. 285, 60 X. E. 599 (1901).
fact that a note is payable at the agent's ollice amounts to a designation of
Klindt
the place of payment, but not of the person authorized to receive it.
v. Biggins, 95 Iowa. 529, 64 x. W. 414 (1895);
Caldwell v. Evans, 5 Bush,
Ward v. Smith. 7 Wall. 117. IP I.. Kd. U07 (lSli!l|;
380, 96 Aiu. Dec. 358 (1869);
I... an & Trust Co., 41 111. L'<i7 (1866).
Wood v. Merchant
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clone by it for the complainants, but upon the character and extent of the employment, as evidenced by the express authority conferred and the method of their dealing with it.
Campbell v. SherSo far as shown, Mr. Cutcheon
man. 49 Mich. 536. 14 N. W. 484.
retained the custody of his papers, sending from time to time specific
authority and directions for the performance of particular and designated acts.
We search the record in vain for evidence that he gave
a general authority
to collect mortgages purchased or held by him.
He found them profitable business acquaintances, for they had mortgages which he wished to buy ; but he appears to have carefully man-

in

it

it,

aged the collections in a way which enabled him to keep track of
them, as a prudent lawyer should for clients who confide their busiHe had a right to suppose that the mortgagor would
ness to him.
not pay notes or mortgage without receiving them, and by keeping
them in his own hands he interposed the only practicable obstacle
Had the
to the perpetration of a fraud by the mortgage company.
mortgagor been as careful to ascertain the authority of the company
no one would have suffered.
were to restrict
as the complainants
is, the loss should fall upon him, and not upon the complainAs
ants, who are in no way responsible for it.
The decree of the circuit court must be reversed, and one entered
the bill, with costs of both
here for the complainants, as prayed

SMITH
(Court

of Appeals

of New Xork,

KIDD.

v.

68

1877.

\.

6

courts.

v. L30, '2?, Am. Rep. 157.)

The mortgages had been paid
two mortgages.
the trial judge to be the general
who was found
the matter of investing, managing, collecting,
agent of the plaintiff
and securing, both principal and interest, moneys belonging to plaintiff.
receipt, and promised to get the paGeorge gave defendanl
from Miss Smith, bul he never did so, and later absconded.
Rapaixo,
Laying oul of view the subsequent dealhad by the plaintiff with George,
ignorance of his fraudulent
no evidence, that at the time
conduct,
very plain thai there
lit. \]>iil
to receive
1867, George had any authority
of
Mad this con
the principal of these two mortgages as her attorney.
clear that the
immediately after that paymenl
by

.\<ti<-n to foreclose

is

is

it

1,

n

is

it

in

*

J.7

a

in

to one George,

th

t

s towa, 109(1865).
When the third per
Tappan v. Morgeman,
Lccord
attempts to show ostensible authority In the agent to collect, aotwltb
r< nol
bis i"
standing the securities
the burden of proof is on
Bucb thai different
minds mlgbl rea
such third person, and
the evidence
is
sonably draw different conclusions therefrom, then
qu< tion Cor the
jury. Reid v. Kellogg,
D. 696, 67 N. w. r.si (1896).
Pari of the opinion i< omitted.
8.

6

1

a

it

If

Is

In

*

:i

sun

8
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defendant must have failed in his defense. Miss Smith, the plaintiff,
was the only witness by whom he soughl to prove actual authority,
ami she expressly negatived it.
There was no evidence of apparent
authority at that time, for George had never before undertaken to
The fact thai the plaintiff, on the 31st of March,
collect principal.
1866, advanced the money to McKinney through George was no proof
i^i authority
to him to collect the principal, when she did not intrust
him with the custody of the securities, hut held them in her own posNeither was the defendant warranted by the fact of the atsession.
torney being authorized to collect the interest, in inferring that he
Such authority in the
was also authorized to receive the principal.
absence of direct proof, may, in some cases, be inferred from the
attorney having possession of the bond and mortgage, but in such cases
it is incumbent upon the debtor who makes payments to the attorney,
to show that the securities were in his possession on each occasion
when the payments were made, for the withdrawal of the securities
Williams v. Walker, 2 Sandf.
would be a revocation of the authority.
Ch. 325. and cases cited; Doubleday v. Kress, 50 N. Y. 410, 10 Am.
Rep. 502.

The finding that George was the general agent of the plaintiff in
the matter of collecting both principal and interest prior to, and at
the time of, the payment in question, therefore, depends wholly for
its support upon the subsequent transactions, from which a general
These transactions conagency is sought to be implied retroactively.
sisted in the receipt by George of the interest on plaintiff's bonds and
mortgages and his payment over of such interest to the plaintiff, while
That authority to collect
she retained possession of the securities.
interest in such cases does not afford ground for inferring authority
to collect principal, where the agent or attorney is not intrusted with
in Wilthe possession of the securities, was expressly adjudicated
liams v. Walker, 2 Sandf. Ch. 325.
That decision is abundantly susIt
tained by authority and has frequently been cited with approval.
appears from the correspondence put in evidence, that it was the regular practice of George, whenever he made a loan, to send to the
plaintiff for the money, and when the transaction was consummated
to send her the bond and policy of insurance, and the mortgage when
recorded.
The only instances in which he appears to have collected principal
with her knowledge or sanction, occurred in 1869, 1870 and 1871,
when it appears from written statements rendered by him to plaintiff,
that he received the principal of certain mortgages and re-invested
the proceeds in other mortgages, and in 1873 she sent him a mortgage
These transactions
for collection.
having occurred long after the
payment made by McKinney are not evidence of apparent authority
on which he was authorized to rely, but are only available, if at all,
and their force in this respect deas evidence of actual authority,
pends upon the circumstances under which the payments were made.
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in these instances, the plaintiff placed the securities in his possesto him prior to his receiving the
sion, or delivered satisfaction-pieces
money, or otherwise expressly empowered him to collect the principal, they would afford no evidence of an actual general authority to
collect mortgages not placed in his hands, or which he was not otherwise expressly authorized to collect, the question being one of actual
authority and not apparent authority, by which the defendant's course
There is no evidence that George was not intrusted
was influenced.
with the possession of the mortgages thus collected, or of satisfacexcept
tion-pieces thereof, nor any evidence of the circumstances,
the testimony of the plaintiff herself, who testified that she never
verbally or in writing gave to George any express authority to collect
the principal of her mortgages generally, or at any time gave him authority to collect money for her generally. That mortgages were never
paid to him, to her knowledge, by any person without her express
authority and consent, and that the mortgages paid by her authority
signed by her for that
were satisfied of record by satisfaction-pieces
* * *
This evidence was uncontroverted.
specific purpose.
But there are settled principles specially applicable to cases like
the present, which render immaterial much of the inquiry in relation
These are collated in Dunlap's Paley on Agency,
to implied authority.
follows,
and seem fully to cover this branch of the case.
p. 274, as
If money be due on a written security, it is the duty of the debtor,
if he pay to an agent, to see that the person to whom he pays it is
For though the money may have been
in possession of the security.
advanced through the medium of the agent, yet if the security do
not remain in his possession, a payment to him will not discharge the
Henn v. Conisby, 1 Ch. Cas. 93, note. And even the agent
debtor.
being usually employed in the receipt of money, does not in this inIt has been
stance constitute such authority as will serve the debtor.
so held in respect to money paid upon a bond to one who usually
received money for the obligee, but who had not the custody of the
bond in question (Gerard v. Baker, 1 Ch. Cas. 94), and even where
the obligor had for several years paid the interest and part of the
principal to an agent of the lender through whom the money had been
borrowed, who had not the possession of the bond, but had regu-

larly paid the money over
obligor was adjudged w

obligee except the last payment, the
last sum over again.
For it was
the hardship of the case, thai the circumstance
held, notwithstanding
of the agent's having before received the interesl and part of the prinhut as long
cipal, did net imply that he had any authority to receive
over all was well, and any other mighl have carried
as he paid
v. Davies,
to the creditor as well as he.
Wolstenholm
Freem. Ch.
was the constant
In tlii- case the master of the rolls said, that
the party to whom the securit} was made,
rule of that <onrt, that
to ili<

the

it

it.

pay

if

it

1

it

the

the hands of the scrivener, payment to the
security
he took the security into his own
good payment, hut

if

trusted

in
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paymenl to the scrivener would nol be good payment, unfrom the
could be proved thai the scrivener had authority
could
not be implied from
party to receive it. and that such authority
which
that
had
received
principal
the scrivener
the fact
previously
104;
98,
also
Story,
Agency,
he had paid over to the obligor.
See
§§
Curtis v. Drought, 1 Molloy, 487.
These principles were applied in the ease of Williams v. Walker,
before cited, and although payments of principal had been made to
the attorney while he had the bond and mortgage in his possession,
and these payments were allowed, subsequent payments made to the
same attorney when the hond and mortgage were not in his possession were disallowed, and it was held not to be incumbent upon the
creditor to show notice to the debtor, of the withdrawal of the papers
from the possession of the attorney, but that it was the duty of the
party paying, on each occasion, to require the production of the bond.
keeping,
less

u

It is clearly estahlished that in the present case the securities were
confided to the attorney, but were in the plaintiff's possession at
the time of the payment, and that McKinney paid without requiring
The case is much stronger than any of those cited,
their production.
for it appears here, that George was at the time the attorney of McKinney, the receipts which he gave were not signed in the name of
the plaintiff, and McKinney trusted to the promise of George to get
And what was said in Henn v. Conisby, 1 Ch. Cas. 93,
the papers.
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not

"The circumstance of the creditor keeping
is peculiarly applicable.
No man would pay the money due on a
the security is conclusive.
mortgage or bond without having the security given up. The debtor's payment to the scrivener without taking up his security was an
evidence that he trusted the scrivener more than the creditor did, who
always kept the security."
the
Any other principle would be dangerous in the extreme.
on bond and mortgage
makes investments
fact that a capitalist
through an attorney, and employs him to collect the interest, and in
special cases authorizes him to collect the principal of particular mortgages, is sufficient to warrant a finding of a general authority to collect the principal of all the mortgages of the client, notwithstanding
that the client takes the precaution to retain his securities in his own
Therefore the rule has, in
possession, no investor would be safe.
cases, been strictly adhered to, that the possession
the adjudicated
of the securities by the attorney, is the indispensable evidence of his
authority to collect the principal (1 Molloy, 4S7), and that whoever
pays him without that evidence does so at his own risk, unless he can
- authority
aliunde, and that the fact that the agent has,
occasions,
received
principal which he has paid over to his
other
on
client is not, in this instance, proof of such authority.

If

In regard to the $2,400 mortgage, this case presents the further
feature, that at the time of the payment, the mortgage had still four
Xo authority to change the terms of the contract can
years to run.
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from the fact that it was originally made through the attorney, and there is no evidence in this case of any such authority.
Even though an agent have authority to receive payment of an obligaCamption, this does not authorize him to receive it before it is due.
bell v. Hassel, 1 Stark. 185; Parnther v. Gaitskell, 13 East, 437, 438;
Story, Agency, § 98; Doubleday v. Kress, supra; Fellows v. Northrup/39 N. Y. 121, 122; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 64.
For all these reasons we are of opinion that the finding that George
had authority to receive the principal of the mortgages cannot be sus* * *
tained.
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be implied

The plaintiff seems to be entirely free from fault. She took her
bonds and mortgages into her own custody and retained them, and
had a right to rely upon the rule of law, that although she might allow her attorney to collect the interest, he would have no power to
collect the principal without special authority, so long as she did not
intrust him with the papers. McKinney seems to have confided in
George, who was also his attorney, and to have been willing to place
the money in his hands, trusting to his promise to get the papers;
and without inquiry into his authority, or any ostensible authority,
seems to have reposed for years upon the promise of George, without
inquiring whether the papers had been obtained or the mortgages
One of the
satisfied, or calling upon the plaintiff to satisfy them.
think
that on
we
and
of
fraud
George,
from
the
suffer
must
parties
before us, the loss has resulted from the negligence
of McKinney or from his confidence in George, and not from any
appearance of authority conferred upon him by the plaintiff, by which

the facts now

the defendant

was misled.

The judgment must
to abide the event.

All

be reversed and a new

concur except

trial ordered, with costs

Church,

C.

J.,

HARRISON NAT. BANK OF CADIZ, OHIO,
(Supreme

Court

of Nebraska,

L902.

v.

AUSTIN.

91 N. W. 540, no L. it. A.
Neb. <;:;•_>.
Si. R< p. 639.)

65

1<>1 Am.

294,

dissenting.

One Burr conducted an extensive
Suit to foreclose a mortgage.
loan agency in Nebraska, defendants and others furnishing him the
money, and buying from him notes and mortgages made out to him
and by him indorsed and assigned and delivered to plaintiffs, and
The note and mortgage in question was one of man\' on
other lender-.
which Burr had collected interesl and principal, and failed to account
for the principal.

EOrkpatrk

i . C

*

*

*

ord, and from other testimony,
Burr was permitted by appellant
Pari of the opinion

is omitted.

From
is

it

to

the correspondence

in the

that
quite clearly established
loans,
these
both
colled
manage

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

I-

1

Tin: AinioKiTY

(rart

2

principal and interest, in all respects as though they were his own, appellant having apparently neither knowledge nor concern about the
wers themselves.
The officers of the appellant hank testify that
coupons and notes were sent to Burr for payment on account of
his indorsement, and not for collection.
It is suggested by counsel for appellee, and, we think, aptly, that this
claim of appellant is not consistent with sound business principles, nor
is it the usual method pursued by banks having paper for collection.
These notes and mortgages were made payable at the First National
Bank at Lincoln, and the uniform custom of appellant in sending them
to Burr instead of the hank cannot be reconciled with reason and
sound business methods if the contention of appellant that they were
The fact that
sent to Burr as indorser or guarantor is to be credited.
they were uniformly sent to Burr, taken in connection with the letters
from appellant to Burr appearing in the record, showing, as they do,
the custom of looking to Burr for the collection of overdue paper,
quite conclusively establishes the contention of counsel for appellee
that Burr was the agent of appellant, and was so regarded by it.
Appellant seems to have availed itself of Burr's services in making
these collections, placing loans, and foreclosing mortgages, until it
and this, it
was discovered that Burr was in failing circumstances;
appears from the record, was a discovery made more than a year after
It was then that appelthe note and mortgage in suit had been paid.
hands, and found
in
Burr's
its
business
lant made an investigation of
Burr testified that the
some $16,000.
that he had misappropriated
officers of appellant bank were in Lincoln on different occasions, staying in some instances several days, visiting at his office, and that they
must have known of the manner in which he was doing business for
them. It is true that Burr did not have the note and mortgage in suit
in his possession at the time he made the collection ; nor did he have
them again after sending them to appellant ; but this is only one of
the circumstances which are to be taken into consideration in determining whether or not Burr was in fact the agent of appellant in the collection of the note and mortgage in suit. In the case of Insurance Co.
v. Walter, 51 Neb. 182, 70 N. W. 938, this court said : "That the party
to whom money due another is paid is not in possession of the instrument by wdiich the indebtedness is evidenced is not conclusive of the
question of the authority or lack of it in the party receiving the money
to collect it." To the same effect is Estey v. Snyder, 76 Wis. 624, 45
X. W. 415; and Dunn v. Hornbeck, 72 N. Y. 87.
Although this note and mortgage, as well as other farm mortgages
handled by Burr on behalf of appellant, were made payable at the
National Bank at Lincoln, appellant saw fit to send the note and
mortgage direct to Burr for collection, and allowed him to deal with
the borrowers for a number of years in all respects as though he was
In the case of Johnston v. Investment
the owner of the mortgages.
Co., 46 Neb. 480, 64 N. W. 1100, ante, p. 322, this court said: "Where
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principal has, by his voluntary act, placed an agent in such a situation
that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages
and the nature of the particular business, would be justified in presuming that such agent has authority to perform a particular act, and therefore deals with the agent, the principal is estopped as against such
third person from denying the agent's authority." Holt v. Schneider,
a

57 Xeb.

523, 77

X. W.

1086.

the case at bar the apparent authority with which appellant
clothed Burr, even if he was not in fact its agent, and the acceptance
by appellant of all the benefits of his acts on its behalf, is such that
justice requires that in this case appellant should sustain the loss.
It conclusively appears from the exhibits in this case that Burr did
frequently collect both principal and interest at the times when he did
not have the notes or the coupons in his possession, remitting the
amounts collected to appellant, who thereupon returned to him for
delivery to the borrower the canceled evidences of the debts, and who
In Bank v.
in no instance objected to this course on the part of Burr.
Ridpath, 47 Xeb. 96, 66 X. W. 37, this court said : "When the extent

of an agent's authority is in issue, no special instructions having been
given him, his actual authority to do a particular act in connection
with the transaction may be inferred from proof that the principal
had authorized or ratified similar acts in connection with past transactions of the same character, and intrusted to the agent under similar
The testimony in the record is sufficient to establish
circumstances."
the fact found by the trial court that Burr was the general agent of
appellant in Xebraska for the negotiation and collection of farm loans
which it had made through Burr, and the right to collect the note
before due sufficiently appears from his custom, ratified by appellants,
This he apof granting extensions, and renewals of other loans.
the
of
and his
on
part
appellant,
without
objection
parently did wholly
acts concerning
notice. 9

which

were ratified by appellant

when brought

to its
*

■•
When the habit and course of dealing of the agent is shown to have been
known to, and permitted by, the principal, this Implied power may be broad
In
enough t<. authorize the agent, nol only to collect withoul the securities
<>r to foreclose
the mortga
hin. i, ut to colled before maturity,
The various "Kelly Cases" in Minnesota well Illustrate all tin' variations of
Sav. Bank v. KJaer, 82 Minn. L80, 84
Bee Springfield
th<
\. \v. 752 (1901), and the cases there discriminated; Thornton v. Lawther,
I.;:. ,"
v i U2 (1897), a case of remarkable confidence reposed in
22fi
tin- agent
!■■ .
or the want of it. while a tan of greal Big
ion of the securities,
ni!,<
tial i" determine Implied power, or tin'
nut in every •
i oion Trust Co. v. McKeon,
th Conn, .".(is, 57
l.i. i; ,,t u. t<>colled the debt

ah. L09
While

p.

EC,

(1904).
paper Indorsed In blank,
on a negotiable
one having In bJ
<.r to his order, may transfer good title to it. yet If be bold it as an agent, the
principal will n<>tbe bound to third persons having knowledge of the agem
Merchants
unlet
the ad ol the agenl Is within the Bcope of his authority.
lanufadurers' Bank \. Ohio Vallej Furniture Co., 57 W. v*a. 625, 50 8.
B, a. 312, ante,
bbij, 7"
308 (1905).

L
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(Part

It appears that the findings and judgment of the trial
sustained b) sufficient competent evidence, and are right,
therefore, recommended thai the same be affirmed.

1'i'k Curiam.
the judgment

of

For

the

reasons

the district

(C) What

BARKER
(Courl of Exchequer

court

stated

In Equity, L837.

court are
and it is,

the foregoing opinion,

is affirmed.

Received
v.

in

2

in

I\rlymet*

GREENWOOD.
2 Younge

& C. 414, 6 L. T. Ex. Eq. 54.)

Ai.ih:i;mi\,

B.
This was a bill filed by the plaintiff, claiming an
of certain monies paid by the defendant as the purchaser of
an estate, sold by the late Rev. Mr. Barker to him, through the agency
of a Mr. Churchill, a solicitor.
The bill prays a declaration that there
is a lien on the estate for the purchase-money
remaining
unpaid.
There is no doubt that if the purchase-money remains unpaid, the
plaintiff is entitled to the declaration and lien. There is no doubt,
also, as to the payment of all the purchase-money except the sum of
As to that, the facts are these: A distinct authority
£7,675. 19s. Sd.
was given to Churchill, with the assent of the plaintiff, to receive the
Now this sum of money was not
purchase-money from the defendant.
actually paid ; but was, on the 19th October, 1822, set off in an account
between Churchill and the defendant, Churchill being indebted to the

defendant

to that amount at the time.

I think it is satisfactorily made out by the correspondence that
Mr. Marker was indebted to Mr. Churchill in some amount, and intended that Mr. Churchill's debt should be paid, and only the balance
of the moneys received by Churchill from the defendant paid over

it

it

a

is

a

is,

to himself.
I must also assume, for the present, which, however, as far as the
facts are before me, is very questionable, that the amount of this
debt, on the 19th October, 1822, was more than £7,675. 19s. 8d., the
sum set off in account between Churchill and the defendant; and then
the question is this — if a man, being indebted to his own agent, authorize that agent to receive money due to him from his debtor, intending that he should thereout pay himself his own debt, does he
authorize that agent impliedly, to the extent at least of that debt, to
receive payment in any way he may think lit? I think he does.
An
as
seems to me, only
agent, with a general authority like this,
in his
bound to receive payment in such
way as thereby to put
power completely to discharge the duty he himself owes to his prinIf, therefore, he
bound to pay the whole over to the principal.
And
in cash from the debtor.
cipal, he must receive
person who
pays such an agent, and who means to be safe, must see that the mode
of payment does enable the agent to perform this, his duty. Tf, thereit
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in

is

in

a

a

a

case as this, the risk of being able to shew the debt
self, in such
due from the principal to the agent, and the specific circumstances
Here
under which the agent was appointed to receive the money.
are made out, but still he must shew that there
these circumstances
debt due to Churchill from Mr. Barker, equal at least to the
was
10
sum set off in account between himself and Churchill.

i

l:

If

a

,-i
I

I

7

Polio The agent has no Implied power to accept merchandise In payment.
Watts, ."",:.■(1838).
Nor
lock v. Cohen, :vi <»hi<»St "»1 (1876); Hays v. Lynn,
Ld. Etaym. '.>_s (1703); RobWard v. Evans,
note.
m of exchange, nor
This is especially true
the merchandise
son v. Watts, ii Tex. 764 (1854).
Ga.
u [or Hi'- personal use of the agent Walton Guano Co. v. McCall,
«'. i:. x. s. ii:»:
i-it L. .1. C.
in. 36 s. i:. 169 (1900); Sweeting v. Pearce,
v. McDole,
Wash. 170, 85
Cf. Dusenberry
265, *.»7 K. «'. I.. W9 (1859).
Pac. W (1906), in which the course of dealing and the appearance of authority
payment in the agent in
in the agent were held t" bind tin' principal by
,n
Shepard <'■>.v. Hackney, 7s Minn. 161, 81 N. W. 322
Nichols
nut.- was within the authority;
and Hurley v. Wat
in which acceptance of
i,^ Mich. 531, 36 x. W. 726 (1888),
in which the general rule is stated
practice i" set off pay
No usage can sanction
with clearness and vigor.
in,. ni due i"
principal on the agent's Indebtedness t<>the third person. Todd
17 Tex.
Ahi. 210,
B. C.
156 (1821); McAlpin \. Cassldy,
I'..
v. Reid,
1856), ante. p. :;i7.
Special emergencies may Justify an Inference of broader power in an agent,
a-, c ■_'..when an agent was given "full authority to act for"
creditor >>!an
Insolvent debtor, ami took personal property In satisfaction of the debt Oliver
hen an agent
brew off $200 in set ling
or
\. Sterling, L'" >hio St ■"•'•»i v 7m
mortgage, where the propertj was not worth more, ami do more could have
Even
Reed \. Northrup, 50 Mich. 142, L5 x. W. 543 (1883).
been collected,
n,ii
be in accord with the ordinary
in
case, however, the settlement must
McAlpln v. Cassldy, 17 LV»x,
"f business under the circumstance*.
mode
L.

8

&

:i

440 M856)

i

i

w

;

<
i

<

a

1

1

a

a

a

:

&

«
l
*.
m
n
i
>
;

a

P.

12

7

ill

19
1

a
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is

it

V

if

a

itj

fore, the agent be not a creditor of his principal, he must receive the
whole in cash ; for, otherwise, he does not, by the act done between
him and the debtor, put himself into the situation of being able to
pay it over.
Such were the cases of Todd v. Reid, 4 B. & Aid. 210; Russell v.
Bangley, 4 B. & Aid. 395; Bartlett v. Pentland, 10 B. & C. 760; and
For in those cases the assured^Kvas
Scott v. Irving, 1 B. & Aid. 605.
broker, to the whole amount \jrhich
the
himself
and
as
between
entitled,
the latter might have received in cash from the underwriter. I But
if the agent be himself a creditor of the principal, and the principal
intends, when he makes him his agent to receive, that he shall retain
his own debt out of the sum received, his only duty is to pay over to
the principal the balance, after deducting his own debt.; If he thereseems to me,
fore takes care to receive in cash that balance, he, as
situation as completely to discharge his duty as
puts himself into
For what possible difference
he had received the whole in cash.
make to the principal whether his agent receives the whole
can
enand retains part, or only receives that balance which he himself
who
however
does
not
A
from
the
person
agent?
titled to receive
money,
take the ordinary and proper course of paying the whole
this situation.
must take care to be able to prove that the agent
settlement in account, he takes upon himIf, therefore, he pays by

THB

L28

\r rHOMTY

(Tart

2
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I propose therefore to refer this question to the Master, namely,
whether, on the 19th of I Ictober, 1822, Barker the testator was inTf the defendant can
debted tO Churchill in any and what amount.
shew to the Master's satisfaction that there was such a debt then
due, and that it exceeded or equalled the sum .set off in account between
him and Churchill, this bill will be dismissed;
hut certainly without
. because
the bill was most properly filed to compel such proof
given, and its necessity arose from the unusual mode of settleIf, however, the defendant cannot
ment adopted by the defendant.
this,
will be entitled to a declaraof
the
plaintiff
Master
satisfy the
tion that he is to have a lien for the whole, if there be no debt — for
the balance, if the debt due to Churchill at the time in question (for
the subsequent accounts between Barker and Churchill are wholly
immaterial) was less than the sum set off in account between Churchill
and the defendant, and will have a decree with costs to that effect.

DIXON
(Supreme

v.

Court of New Hampshire,

GUAY.
1900.

70 N.

H.

161,

46

Atl.

456.)

Action for possession under landlord and tenant act. The tenant
had given the landlord's agent in payment of two months' rent a
hank book of deposit for the amount.
Judgment for plaintiff and defendant excepted.
Parsons, J. "That the power of a collecting agent by the general
law is limited to receiving for the debt of his principal that which the
law declares to be a legal tender, or which is by common consent
considered and treated as money, and passes as such at par, is established by all the authorities. 11 The only condition they impose
upon the principal, if anything else is received by his agent, is that
he shall inform the debtor that he refuses to sanction the unauthorized transaction within a reasonable period after it is brought to his
knowledge." Ward v. Smith, 7 Wall. 447, 452, 19 L. Ed. 207; Todd
v. Reid, 4 Barn. & Aid. 210;
Bartlett v. Pentland, 10 Barn. & C.
760; Howard v. Chapman, 4 Car. & P. 508; Story, Ag. §§ 98, 413.
The case is within the rule laid down.
Exception overruled.

ii "Illinois

is Dot money which the agent may accept. Graydon
Dec. 432 (1862).
Nor are depreciated notes
of the banks of Virginia. Ward v. Smith, 7 Wall. 447, 19 L. Ed. 207 (1869).
A- in ji;i\ incut iii ''out Vderate money, see Hendry v. Benlisa, 37 Fla. 609, 20
South. 800, 34 L. R. A. 283 (189G) ; Fretz v. Stover, 22 Wall. 198, 22 L. Ed.
v. Patterson,

7G9 (1ST.-,;.

f-urreney"

13 Iowa,

256, 81 Am.
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MILLER
(Supreme

v.

Court of Judicature

AND EXTENT

£29

EDMONSTON.
of Indiana,

1846.

S

Blackf.

291.)

Dewey, J. At the February term, 1844, of the Dubois Circuit
Court, Miller sued Edmonston on three sealed notes alleged to be
lost, dated 26th April, 1832, each for $133.33%, one payable in
The
twelve months, one in eighteen months, and one in two years.
the
following
to
the
Court
upon
agreed
the
cause
submitted
parties
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case

:

The notes described in the declaration were executed by the deOn the 8th of June,
fendant and one Morgan jointly and severally.
1836, Miller agreed by parol with Morgan, for a certain consideration, to give him further time on the notes until the 25th of January
following. On the 2d of August, 1841, the notes having been previously placed by Miller in the hands of an attorney at law for collection, without any special instructions, the attorney took from
Morgan his unsealed note for $626, payable to Miller one day after
date, and gave up to Morgan the three notes described in the declaration to be cancelled, and they were cancelled accordingly. Subsequently (but when does not appear), Morgan, at the request of the
attorney, confessed a judgment to Miller on the substituted note,
Morgan afterwards died inwhich judgment is still unsatisfied.
solvent.

The Circuit Court rendered a judgment in favour of the defendant.
The granting
We do not think the judgment can be sustained.
indulgence by parol, whether upon a valid or an invalid consideration to one of two joint and several obligors, does not constitute a
defence, at law by the other obligor against any part of the joint and
several debt.
When a demand

in the hands of an attorney at law for
collection, without any special instructions, the authority conferred
upon, and the duty assumed by him, is to use due diligence to colHe has no authority to comprolect the debt by suit or otherwise.
mise with the debtor, and cannot bind his principal by any arrangeThe transactions
ment short of an actual collection of the money.
of tin- attorney as stated in the record, therefore, were nugatory,
The imtes
and had no binding effeel upon his principal, the plaintiff.
and cancelled, nevertheless re
which were improperly surrendered
main in force.
Nor does tin- judgment Confessed on the new note
is placed

alter the case. The taking the judgmenl was equally unauthorized as
Had it
the surrender of the old notes, and cann.it merge them.
the
re
his
the
acts of
attorney,
appeared that the plaintiff ratified
had
he
it
not
shown
that
is
even
suit would have been differenl ; bu1
a knowledge
of the doings of the attorney.
Per Curiam. The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, etc.

Tin:

130

GRAHAM

v.

authority

(Part

2

UNITED STATES SAVINGS INSTITUTION."

(Supreme

Court

of

Missouri,

1870.

16 Mo.

L86.)

brought to recover the amount of two
chocks which were drawn on the defendant by third parties in favor
The drawers delivof the plaintiffs and made payable to their order.
ered the checks to the plaintiffs' collecting agent, one Dixon, in settlement of certain hills which the latter had in charge for collection,
Dixhem-' bills due from the drawer of the checks to the plaintiffs.
on indorse. 1 the defendant's firm name upon the checks and presented
them at the hank and drew the money upon them, which he seems
to have appropriated to his own use, without rendering any account
Thus far there appears to be no serious
thereof to the plaintiffs.
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CurriUr,

I.

This suit

is

controversy about the facts.
It Dixon had authority, general or special, to indorse the checks
in the manner stated, or the defendant was authorized to pay them
without the personal indorsement of the plaintiffs, it is not contended
The verdict of the
that the defendant would he liable in this action.

jury, however, negatives the supposition of the existence of any such
The defendant nevertheless undertakes to deduce
express authority.
of Dixon's general
the authority from the nature and character
of husiness in betransaction
and
the
agency in making collections
of
the action of the
complaint
chief
Their
of
the plaintiffs.
half
conn below is founded upon the refusal of the court to give the following instruction, namely: "If the jury believe from the evidence
that Charles Dixon was, at the times stated in the petition, the clerk
and collector of the plaintiffs, and that, as such, he received from
the plaintiffs, among other accounts for collection, two accounts, one
against Kramer & Loth, and one against Erfort & Petring, and that
and empowered to receive payment of and
he was fully authorized
receipt said bills or accounts, and that, in pursuance of his duties and

received in payment of such accounts the checks set
out in the petition, and afterward collected the money on said checks
from defendant, in accordance with his authority to collect said
accounts, then they will find for the defendant."
The logic of this instruction is that Dixon was authorized to indorse and collect the checks since he was authorized to receive them
The
in lieu of cash in payment of the bills he held for collection.
The checks required the bank to pay
deduction is a non seqnitur.
the sums therein specified to such person as the payees might direct.
Hut the payees never directed payment to be made to any one, un! Jixon was their agent for that purpose; and such agency is not
inferable from the mere fact that he was their agent in effecting the

authority,

he

collection, nor from all
12 Accord:
Rep. 324 fl

Deering

the

& Co.

v.

facts recited
Kelso,

74

in the instruction.

Minn.

41, 70 X.

Mis pri-

W. 7!Hi, 73 Am. St.
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mary duty was to collect the bills, not the checks given in adjustment
of the bills.
Was Dixon the
The question presented is purely one of agency.
plaintiffs' agent to indorse negotiable paper given in settlement of
He was their agent to adjust such
debts due to his employers?
claims and receive the amounts due upon them, and to do those subordinate and incidental things usual and customary in the accomplishment of the main purpose had in view, to-wit : the collection.
That main purpose had been accomplished when he had received
His duties as a collector ceased
the checks payable to his principals.
at that point. 13 His next duty was to account with his employers
for the proceeds of his collections, and turn over the checks to them.
The indorsement of
to be disposed of as they might judge proper.
the checks was no necessary incident of the collection of the acSo
The instruction was, in my opinion, properly refused.
counts.
was the defendant's second instruction. It traveled out of the issues
At the instance of the defendant, the court
made by the pleadings.
directed the jury to find for it in case they found from the evidence
that Dixon was authorized to collect and receive payment of checks
payable to plaintiffs at the time the checks in question were presented and paid. This fairly presented the real point in controversy,
and in the form selected by the defendant's counsel.
The other judges concur.
The judgment wilj be affirmed.

Q

(D) To Modify

tootle:
(Court

of Appeals of Colorado,

1893.

cook.
4 Colo. App.

Ill,

35

r.ic. ion.)

Action by plaintiffs to recover a balance due for goods sold and
Tin- partnership had been
delivered to Cook <x- Davis, a partnership.
As it was not paid,
dissolved and Davis had agreed to pay this hill.
plaintiffs drew on defendants at 5 days sight, and sent the draft to
The hank', knowing of the dissolution of
the bank for collection.
is M tin- agent's authority empowers him to cash negotiable paper, be still
Rigby v. Lowe, 125
has do power n> transfer it to a third person to collect.
As to his right to receive and transmil to his
Cal. 613, 58 Pac. 153 (1899).
principal checks and drafts, see Griffin v. Erskine, L31 Iowa, 144, 109 N. W.
Ann. Cas. 1193 (1906), In which it was pointed out by the courl thai
13
checks and other bills of exchange are the means of transferring monej In
nearly all commercial transactions,
and In authorizing an agent t" make collections, be maj be assumed to bave authority t<>transmit funds In the ordlnarj way. Though such paper will not absolutely cancel the debt, it is con
dltlonal payment, good from date of deliverj If the paper is honored, but no
If the agent lias authority n> take u note In
payment at all, it not honored.
payment, be h.'is not thereby authority (<>collect that note ciu'hi months later.
For many Illustrations, sec Scarborough \.
Howard v. (lice, 54 Ga. 52 (1875).
12 Ala. 252 (1847).

132

THE AUTHORITY

(Part

2
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the partnership,
took the acceptance of Davis alone, retained the
drafts, and allowed Davis to make payments From time to time until
he became insolvent.
Cook had no knowledge of this draft. Judgment for defendants.
Thomson, J. 14 * * * There is no question thai the hank was
the agenl of plaintiffs, and hence the argument that when it took the
individual acceptance of Davis upon the draft against Cook & Davis,
with knowledge that the linn of Cook & Davis had ceased to exist,
the plaintiffs were bound by its act, the effect of which, as urged,
was tit discharge Cook.
The mere taking of the acceptance of Davis, alone, would probably not have the effect claimed, hut it is needless to consider that question here. A principal is not hound by the
acts of his agent, unless they are done within the scope of his auSo, also,
thority, in the transaction of the business of his principal.
in order that a principal may be affected by his agent's knowledge,
the knowledge must be acquired while he is agent, and must pertain
to the business in which he is authorized to act. The bank was the
No authority is
agent of plaintiffs for the collection of the draft.
shown in the bank, except the general authority which accompanies
the forwarding to it of an instrument for collection.
Under that au-

thority it could collect the money due, and if it had done so the
debt would have been discharged, notwithstanding the bank might
have failed to forward the amount to the plaintiffs.
But it had no
power to compound the indebtedness, or release a debtor, or receive
anything except money in payment, or do anything whatever which
would operate to change the rights of the creditors or the liabilities
of the debtors. 15 Under this general authority, it could present the
draft for acceptance, in accordance with its terms, but it could not
bind the drawers by receiving a defective acceptance.
The knowledge, therefore, which the bank had of the dissolution, or its act
in taking the acceptance of one drawer, and not of the other, or any
other act outside of the general authority which it had, cannot for a
moment affect the prior relations between the defendant partner* * *
ship and the plaintiffs.
Reversed.
i* Part of the opinion is omitted.
id An attorney to collect and receive payment has no power to compromise
the claim, Geiger v. Bolles, 1 Thomp. & C. 129 (1ST. -!); nor to commute
the debt, nor to pledge it, Padfield v. Green, 85 111. 529 (1S77); nor to extend tin- time ol payment, Powell v. Henry, '.><;Ala. 412, 11 Smith. :',ll (1892);
nor i" do anything short of an actual collection of the money, Corbet v. Waller, :_'7 Wash. :MU. 67 Pac. 567 (1902).
While he may use the ordinary and
-ary means of collecting, as to retain counsel and bring suit, Ryan v.
Tudor, 31 Kan. 366, 2 Pac. T'.H (1884), and make his principal liable for the
method used, if authorized, Caswell v. Cross, 120 Mass. 545 (1870), yet he canttle in any other way than the one authorized, Powell's Adm'r v. Henry,
L'7 Ala. 612 (1855).
To compound the debt for less than is due is an evidence
<.f fraud, and the debtor may then have to pay again.
Penn v. Browne, 2
Freem. C. C. 21 i <!<;:t7).
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V. To Give or Receive Negotiable

(A) In
EXCHANGE
(Supreme

General.

BANK

Court of Georgia,

Paper

1903.

v.
118

THROWER.
Ga.

433,

45

S. E. 316.)
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Lamar,

J. Authority to borrow money is among the most dangerous powers which a principal can confer upon an agent.
Whoever lends to one claiming the right to make or indorse negotiable
paper in the name of another does so in the face of all the danger
He need not lend or discount until assured besignals of business.
yond doubt that the principal has in fact appointed an agent who
by the stroke of a pen may wipe out his present fortune, and bind
his future earnings.
The very nature of the act is a warning, and
if the lender parts with his money, he does so at his own peril.
If
the power was not in fact conferred, he must bear the loss occasioned
by his own folly. A power so perilous is not to be implied from acts
which in other matters less hazardous might create an agency.
It
must be conferred in express terms, or be necessarily and inevitably
inferable from the very nature of the agency actually created.
So
strict is the rule that it will not be presumed even from an appointment of one as general agent, unless the character of the business
or the duties of the agent are of such a nature that he was bound
to borrow in order to carry out his instructions and the duties of the
office.
Civ. Code, §§ 3004, 3021 ; Dobbins v. Etowah Mfg. Co., 75
Ga. 238 ; Mechem on Agency, § 536 ; Tappan v. Bailey, 4 Mete. 536 ;
Jackson Co. v. Com. Nat. Bk., 199 111. 151, 65 N. E. 136, 59 L. R.
A. 657, 93 Am. St. Rep. 113; Doubleday v. Kress, 50 N. Y. 410, 10
Am. Rep. 502.
While the agent here was given the rather high title of "cashier,*

-

that, of itself, did not clothe him with the powers which mighl have
'1 by an officer bearing that title if employed by a bank.
been •
In view of the reluctance with which the law presumes the existence
of the power to harrow, this title will he considered to Indicate that
he was
cash keeper, rather than a cash borrower.
Nor will the
authorized t<> till oul the blank-, ami indorse drafts
with a rubber stamp reading, "Paj to the order of the Third National
for deposit.
, Cashier,"
James T. Prince, Manager, by
thority to indor e in blank.
On the contrary, the
character of the stamp itself indicated that the principal only an
for the mere purpose of allowing
thorized a restricted indorsement
the hank, ratlur than tin- agent, to collect.
It does not import a
to indorse, nor d<>es possession of the draft indiral authority

tii

13 I

r

(Part

AUTHORITY

'2

cate that the agenl had the right to discounl the draft or collect the
proceeds. 1'
The stringent rules of agency arc intended to protect a principal
against unauthorized acts, hut not to shield one who has in fact conhis conduct.
Here the plaintiff deI such authority, or ratified
than that implied in
further
had
nied that any authority
been given
"cashier,"
use
the stamp ahove
to
the
title
and
the
right
conferring
of
the
conduct on the
had
denied
that
knowledge
Prince
It
coined.

necessary absences of the principal; that he had discounted another
draft with Thrower some months before, for $394, which was paid
without ohjection ; that on these and other like drafts, indorsed in
the same way. of which Prince denied knowledge, Brinsfield had collected some $8,500, which he had appropriated to his own use; that
he originally wrote the indorsements in his own handwriting before
the stamp above referred to was prepared ; and that there were other
stamps in the office used by him, on which the words "for deposit"
were wanting, apparently contemplating that he had authority to
in blank and to collect.
The evidence, while conflicting, was sufficient to sustain the verWe have no power to interfere where the
dict for the defendant.
judge of the lower court has re-examined the evidence on the motion
for a new trial, and by his refusal to set it aside expressed himself
Judgment affirmed.
with the verdict.
as fully indorse

i'. Accord: Paige v. Stone. 10 Mete. (.Mass.) ICO. 43 Am. Dec. 420 (1845), in
Which it is said thai to facilitate note making, and thus affeel the interest
and estates of third persons to an indefinite amount, is not within the objed i
of the law in regulating the common duties of the agent Sinclair & Co. v. Goodell, !»■':111. App. 592 (1900), quoting with approval TiedePaper, to the effect that the execution and negotiation
man on Commercial
of commercial paper by agents are so liable to the infliction of injury on the
principals thai the presumption of the law is more strongly opposed to an
Eviimplied authoritj to execute commercial paper than to do anything else.
dence thai the agenl bad indorsed in the principal's name thirty-three checks
Sewanee Minproof of liia authority unless the principal knows of it.
McCall, :: Head, 619 (1859), denying the authority of an agent to
ing Co. ■-■■
;
ill. even in an extraordinary emergency not amounting to an overbusiness has no implied power to
ruiii. The genera] manager of
...
onnell v. McLoughlin, 28 >r. 23, 42 Pac.
make or indorse negotiable paper.
If he has the power be may not exercise it for his own benefit,
1895).
\. V. iron .Mine v. Negaunee Bank, :;'.) Mich. 644 (1878); Bank v. Ohio Valley
Furniture Co.. 57 W. Va. 625, 50 s. B. 880, 7<) I,. R. A. :;12 (1905); Bank of
Morganton v. Hay. 143 X. <'. 326, ". s. E. 811 (1906); nor for the accomition of
third person, Gulick v. Grover, :::: X. J. Law. 463, '.>7 Am. Dec.
Boord v. Strauss, :;'.» Fla. 3S1, 22 South. 71.". (LS97).
728 11867);
a

<

(

a

,-i
;
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part oi Brinsfield, or that he in any manner ratified the indorsements
or collections which were shown to have been made by him. The
for the defendant was to the contrary, and was to the
testimony
effect that the trouble was not so much a want of authority to indorse, as the improper use Brinsfield made of the money after it
was collected; that he was a general agent, indorsing drafts, handling the cash, paying out money, occasionally drawing checks, and
in full and complete charge of the business during the frequent and
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BANK OF DEER LODGE
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(Supreme

Court of Montana Territory.

HOPE MINING CO.

v.

3 Mont.

1878.

14G, 33 Am.

Rep. 458.)

Blake. J. The appellant brings this action to recover upon the
following bill of exchange :
"$1,000.00
Deer Lodge. M. T., May 18th, 1874.
"At sight, pay to the order of the First National Bank, Deer Lodge,
one thousand dollars.
Value received, and charge the same to account of
Hope Mining Co.,
by Jos. M. Alger.
"To Chas. C. 'Whittlesey, Prest.
— '— -i
"Hope Mining Co.,
f
"St. Louis, Mo."
V^Zr
Indorsement: "Pay the Security Bank, or order, for collection, account of First National Hank. Deer Lodge, Montana.
"W. A. Clark. President."
The appellant has been incorporated under the laws of the United

States and is engaged in a general banking business.
It discounted
the bill upon its date and paid the proceeds to Alger. The respondent
has been incorporated
under the laws of the state of Missouri and
is mining some quartz lodes at Philipsburg and has an cilice in St.
Louis. Missouri. The appellant demanded payment of the bill at the
(.lliee in St. Louis, May 27, 1874, and the respondent refused to acNotice of its presentment and non-payment
cept or pay the same.
was properly given.
The respondent denied that Alger was its agent and claimed that
The court below rendered judghe had no authority to draw the bill.
ment for the respondent upon these ground-, and also found that it
was the custom of the respondent in drawing drafts upon itself to direct them to Chas. C. Whittlesey, president of the Hope Mining ComThe only authority of Alger to draw the bill is contained in
pany.
the following telegram, which was transmitted by the Western Union
Telegraph Company :
"Dated St. Louis, Feb. 23d, L874.

"To

.
"Receh ed at
Alger, Philipsburg:
ire for company's
property.

Joseph

need-.

If

funds

needed,

draw

on

See

that

McArdle

company.
"Chas.

has what

he

C. Whittlesey."
25, 1 S 7I. after
( >ne bill of exchange for
the death of McArdle.
$500 was drawn by
Alger, March 26, 1874, which was disc, muted by the appellant, and
afterward accepted and paid by the respondent.
The |
were

Tic

eceived

by

Alger

about

February
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This bill was signed in
for the benefit of the respondent.
action,
and all parties were
this
in
as
involved
that
manner
the same
ame.
No other hills were drawn on the respondent by Alger,
Alger
but during the months of February, March and April, 1874,
and
Lodge
Deer
checked against some fund- of the respondent in
the
when
the
respondent
Helena.
Alger was not in the employ of
the
in
defraying
used
were
second hill was drawn, and the proceeds
to
St.
from
Philipsburg
her
family
expenses of Mrs. McArdle and
reinquiries
make
not
any
did
the
appellant
The officers of

expended
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Louis.

ting the authority of Alger to sign these bills, or the purposes
for which they were drawn, and never saw the telegram.
We must consider the relations of Alger and the respondent which
It is evident that the telegram auaffect the rights of the appellant.
thorized Alger to draw upon the respondent for money for certain
Did it constitute Alger the agent of the respondent, and
objects.
Did the officers of
empower him to sign the bill in that capacity?
the respondent authorize those of the appellant, with whom Alger
dealt, to believe as fair and reasonable men that this authority had

An examination of the law of agency
been actually given to Alger?
will enable us to determine these questions, and if we find that either
of them should be answered in the affirmative, we must decide that
1 Pars, on Notes and
the respondent was bound by the acts of Alger.
there
cited.
cases
and
101,
Bills, 100,
which are applicable to these questions,
Some of the principles,
have been announced by this court in the case of Herbert v. King,
It was held that the principal is responsible for the
1 Mont. 475.
acts of his agent, when they have been done within the scope of his

and that "courts will not tolerate any enlargement of this
liability." The bill shows that Alger claimed to be the agent of the
respondent, and it was the duty of the officers of the appellant to
ascertain the extent of his power before they discounted it. In Mechanics' Bank v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 13 N. Y. 631, Mr. Justice
Comstock says: "Whoever proposes to deal with a security of any
kind, appearing on its face to be given by one man for another, is
bound to inquire whether it has been given by due authority, and
if he omits that inquiry, he deals at his peril." Blum v. Robertson,

authority,

24 Cal. 140, and cases there cited. In this action, the burden of proving that Alger was the agent of the respondent in drawing the bill
Add. on Cont. § 57. The power of an agent to
is on the appellant.
make the principal a party to negotiable paper is always restricted
"So carefully is this authority watched, that, where
by the courts.
power is given to do some things with regard to promissory notes or
hills, it cannot he enlarged by construction to do other, though some1 Pars, on Notes and Bills, 107.
what similar, things."
An
This doctrine may be illustrated by the following authorities.
in
the
bills
of
exchange
indorse
to
draw
and
authorized
is
who
agent
name of his principal has no power to draw or indorse the bills in
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Stainhis own name, or in the joint name of himself and his principal.
The agent of a corback v. Read, 11 Grat. 281, 62 Am. Dec. 648.
poration who was authorized to borrow money from a bank and extherefor, could not bind his prinecute the note of the corporation
cipal by borrowing the money and executing a bond for the same
Little Rock v. State Bank, 8 Ark.
under the seal of the corporation.
An authority to draw is not
165.
on
Agency (7th Ed.) §
227 \ Story
1 Pars, on Notes
and Bills,
an authority to indorse or accept bills.
In Tate v. Evans, 7 Mo. 419, the agent
107, and cases there cited.
was authorized November 28, 1839, to draw a bill of exchange "at
four months' date," and the bill was actually drawn December 23,
28, 1839, and payable "four months
1839, and antedated November
after date." The court held that the bill was not in conformity to
the authority conferred on the drawer and that the principal was not
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bound.

The authority of Alger to draw checks on the money of the respondent in this Territory is wholly distinct from that of drawing
The power to
in Missouri.
a bill of exchange on the respondent
exercise one of these acts does not include the other, and the fact
that Alger checked against the funds of the respondent during the
time which has been mentioned does not tend to prove that he had
the authority to draw the bill in controversy.
The appellant maintains that the facts which have been referred
to would authorize the officers of the appellant, as fair and reasonIn
able men, in believing that Alger had the right to draw the bill.
from
is
estopped
other words, the argument is that the respondent
disputing that Alger had the authority he exercised respecting the
bill. The officers of the appellant made no effort to ascertain the
power of Alger, and appear to have assumed that the payment of
the first bill by the respondent was a sufficient recognition of the authority of Alger, in drawing the second bill. If Alger had repeatedly
performed acts like the one in dispute, which had been ratified by
the respondent, the officers of the appellant could presume that he
But this conclusion could not be
was authorized to draw the bill.
The legal effect of
inferred from one instance of such recognition.
act is equivalent to the previous
the ratification of an unauthorized
This ratification, however, does
delegation of authority to do the act.
not operate a- presumptive evidence of original authority, bu1
Hank v.
act.
Commercial
confirmation
per se of the unauthorized
Warren. 15 \\ Y. 577. In Cook v. Baldwin, 120 Mass. 317, 21 Am.
Rep. 517, the COUrt held that the part payment by the drawee of a hill
of exchange is not such a recognition of his obligation as will, as mat
tcr of law, hind him to pay the remainder.
We are now brought to the consideration of
Whittlesey to Alger, and the rights of the parties

the

telegram

to the action

from
must

What is the character of the instru
depend upon its interpretation.
1'
tnenl which
is a hill drawn by the agenl of a corMger signed?

I.N

rii.'Kii'Y

u

THE

(Part

2

poration upon itself and may be treated as an accepted bill or a prom1 Pars, on Notes and Bills,
note, at the election of the holder.
2 Greenl. Ev. § 160, and cases there
62, 288, and cases there cited;
cited.
Alger had no authority to make such a bill or note; he was
The telegram
a special agent, and his power was accurately limited.

The judgment
Judgment affirmed.

is

cited. 17

affirmed.

GOULD

v.

BOWEN.

(Supreme Court of Iowa, L868.

lit'.

Iowa,

77.)

I

1.

in

a

Detinue for
promissory note, claimed by defendant under an infact for plaintiff.
nient by one Bowen as attorney
The material parts of the power of attorney under which
k.
the defendants claim the authority was given to transfer the note in
controversy, are as follows: "For me and in my place and stead, to
sell, convey and dispose of any and all property both personal and
real, which
have or may have in Delaware county, Iowa, and give
my name any bill of sale that may be necessary, of personal propwarranty deed or otherwise for any
my name to give
erty, and
of my real estate sold, and to collect
my name any money now
or hereafter to become due to me, and to do all other matters in relacould do,
tion to any of my property or debts which
present.
Giving and granting unto my said attorney full power and authority
rform all and every act and thing whatsoever, required
and about the premises, as fully as
and
lone
might
aid do
ally present."
fact therein named,
We hold that this language gave the attorney
contuthority to transfer the title and possession of the note
1

in

in

if

;

in

I

if

in

a

in

in
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§

is

it

if,

did not describe or recognize Alger as an agenl of the respondent,
him to draw in his own name on the respondent, if
but authorized
It is not necessary for
was
nee
led For a particular
purpose.
monej
us to pursue this inquiry into the effect of the ads of Alger on the
Alger violated his instructions
rights of all the parties to the bill.
and the respondent is not bound by his action in drawing the bill.
The purchaser of the bill should have exercised prudence and examined the tele-ram to see whether it justified the act of Alger. "And
from his omission to call for or to examine the instrument, he
should encounter a loss from the defective authority of the agent,
properly attributable to his own fault, since he must know that
he has no other security than his reliance upon the good faith and
72, and cases there
credit of the agent.'' Story on Agency (7th Ed.)

17 The limits of the power of the agent are discussed with discrimination
in the leading case of Stainbacb v. Read, 11 Grat. 281, 62 Am. Dec. 648 (1854),
and i" the recenl case of Bank of Morganton v. Hay, L43 N. C. 326, 55 S. B.

>il

(11
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We need not decide
to the defendant claiming the same.
the indorsement thereof would suhject the principal to all
the ordinary liabilities of an indorser, as that question is not necesThis holding is not in conflict with the
sarily involved in this case.
Pars,
and Bills, 106, recognized by this
1
on
Notes
in
stated
doctrine
court in the case of Whiting v. Western Stage Co., 20 Iowa, 554, that
a general authority to transact business, even if it be expressed in
words of very wide meaning, will not be held to include the power
of making the principal a party to negotiable paper. For, in this case,
the attorney in fact was not only empowered to dispose of all personal property and to make bills of sale thereof, but also to do all
other matters in relation to the debts of the principal which she could
In other words we hold, that by a fair construction
do if present.
of the power of attorney offered in evidence, the agent was clothed
troversy
whether

18
the power to make the transfer claimed.
There was no error, therefore, in admitting the evidence as offered,
and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

i« Sometimes the power must be regarded a more idle declaration unless
Edwards v. Thomas, 66 Mo. 468
the authority was meant to be conferred.
often the circumstances are such as to justify the inference that the
(1877).
principal intended bis general agent, managing his business, to give notes Cor
Lytle v. Bank
is purchased to carry on the business.
money borrowed <>rg
The power is presumed to be
of Dothan, 121 Ala. 215, 26 South. 6 (1898).
Whitten v. Bank of Fincommensurate with the necessity of the situation.
castle, LOO Va. 546, 12 S. E. 309 (1902).
Otheb Illustrations.- The principles enunciated in the foregoing cases as
paper
to buy and sell, to collect and to make commercial
to agents authorized
Authority to an
might be Illustrated In many other lines of employment.
agenl to acl In a particular business, or In particular matters in a business,
Implied or denied according to the usages and customs of the
is constantly
business, the curse of dealing of the particular principal, and the reasonable
mployment
But the Inference must always be based upon
necessities of tl
facts, for which the principal is responsible, and not upon mere supposed
Moreover, implied authority Is limited to acts for
convenience or propriety.
the Interests of the principal, and of a kind pertaining to the business upon
which the agenl Is employed, and which are reasonably necessary to accomThese principles have been applied to agents employed:
plish that business.
lo manaffi thi principal's business: Gregorj \. Loose, L9 Wash. 599, ■•i
Ga. 876, 36 S. E. '.x'><;
Pac 33 (1898), supra, p. 54; Baldwin v. Garrett,
11 S. E. 721 (1890),
Jersey
Wks.,
27,
85
Ga.
v.
Continental
Claflin
(1900);
supra, p. 337; Dearlng v. Lightfoot, 16 Ala. 28 (1849); Gulick v. Grover, 33
Duncan v. Bartman, L43 Pa. "i'-1
163, 97 Am. Dec. 728 (1868);
.[ Law,
'si Atl. 1099, 24 Am. St Rep. 570 (1891); Vescelius v. .Martin, 11 Colo. 391,
is pac. 338 (1888).
L43 Pa. 595,
To leas* or rent his principal's property: Duncan v. Hartman,
Babin v. Ensley, M App. i»i\. 548,
22 Atl. 1099, -i Am. St. Rep. 570 (1891);
s
Ishbaugh v. Spunaugle, 118 lew a. 337, 92 N. w
43 N. V. Supp. 849 (1897)
Peddicord v. Berk, 71 Kan. 236, 86 Pac. 165 (1906).
(1902);
Scarborough
v. Reynolds,
and settU claims for his principal:
To prosecuU
South. 513 (1890); Hill v.
Scales v. Mount, 93 Aba. 82,
252 (1847);
Thomp.
C. L29
W. 702; Gelger v. Bolles,
Shoe Co
150 Mo. 183, 51
pollock v. Cohen, 32 Ohio St 514 (1877); Citj of v V v. Du BoJs
,.'.
B7).
,, lend oi borrou
Exchange
Bank v. Thrower, n^ Ga. 133,
money:
433; Bickford v. Menler, 107 N. Y. 190, n v B.
ante
310 (ioo3)
1887);
Rider v. Kirk, 82 Mo. App. 120 (1899); N. Y. iron Mine
Ch,
gaunee First Nal Bank, 39 Mich. 644 (1878); Jacobs v. Morris (1901)

ill

.
~>

&

1

to

i

;

S.

:

'.»

I

;

"'.

\

l

p
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II

CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHORITY

BRANTLEY
(Supreme

v.

SOUTHERN LIFE INS. CO.

Court of Alabama,

1S75.

53

Ala.

554.)

a note for $1,000, signed by West, Brown & Brantley.
appeared that 1'ram lev, a farmer, had signed a surety bond for
West & Burns, as agents of the Insurance Company.
He had made
one Berry his agent, and while he was absent from the state, Berry
had signed his name to this note to settle a breach of the bond by the
agents, and the surety bond had been cancelled.
Brickell, C. J. 1 * * * All contracts must be read in the light
The occasion which gave rise to
of surrounding circumstances.
them, the relative position of the parties, and their obvious design
as to the objects to be accomplished,
must be looked at, in order to
arrive at their true meaning, and to enable the court to carry out
the intention of the parties.
Pollard v. Maddox, 28 Ala. 325. The
letter of attorney, introduced
as evidence of Berry's authority to
make the note on which the suit is founded, in the name of appellant,
is very broad and general in its terms.
Standing without explanation of the nature and character of the usual and general business
under which the letter was
of appellant, and of the circumstances
executed, it would be impossible to limit the authority of the agent,
or to give it any definite application. There is scarcely a conceivable
transaction, lying within the scope of lawful delegation of authority,
into which the agent could not enter, and bind the principal. The
operative words of the grant of authority are, "to sign my name in

Action on
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It

the general transaction of my business, giving and granting unto my
said attorney full power and authority to do and perform all and
every act or thing whatever, requisite and 'necessary to be done
in the general transaction of my business," etc. Powers of attorney

J.

L.
Ch. IS?,, 84 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 112, 49 Wkly. Rep. 365 (affirmed in
Oh. :;<;:;. 86 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 275, IS T. L. R. 384,
[1902] 1 Ch. 816, 71 L.
Klin.lt v. Higgins, 95 Iowa, 529, 64 N. W. 414 (1895);
50 Wkly. Rep. 371);
Wilson v. Campbell, 110 Mich. 580, 08 N. W. 278, 35 L. R. A. 544 (1896).
/., make contracts of employment:
Campbell v. Day, 90 111. 363 (1878) (auLtecl t" employ workmen); P.ush v. So. Brewing Co.. t'.'.i .Miss.
thor!
Sevier v. Birmingham, etc.,
(employ attorney);
856 (1891)
200,
L3 South.
12:', Mich. 493,
<■,,..:<j Ala. 258, 9 Sonth. 405 (1890), and Holmes v. .McAllister,
As to the authority
82 N. W. 220, 18 L. I:. A. 396 (1900) (employ medical aid).
of the agent to employ other agents, see post, p. 483 ff.

61, 70

i Part of the opinion

J.

is omitted.
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are, ordinarily, subjected to a strict construction; or, rather, the authority given is not extended beyond the meaning of the terms in
A distinction is carefully observed, between
which it is expressed.
such powers, and other powers created by deed or will, for the acof particular purposes.
The purpose to be accomcomplishment
plished is more regarded in the latter, than in the former class of
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powers, and a more liberal interpretation of the words creating the
Story on Agency, § 67 (n. 2). In a power of
powers is allowed.
attorney, words, however general, must be construed and limited in
subordination to the subject matter. Thus, a general power to draw

or indorse promissory notes will not authorize the drawing or inof third
dorsing of promissory notes for the mere accommodation
The authority must be confined and limited to the drawing
persons.
and indorsing of promissory notes, in matters of business in which
Wallace v. Branch
the principal has a direct and immediate interest.
Bank at Mobile, 1 Ala. 571. A physician, being about to remove
from the State, left his books and accounts for professional services
with a friend for settlement, giving him general authority to transact
all his business in this State. The agent had not authority to assign
the accounts, for the indemnity of a surety of the principal. Wood v.
McCain, 7 Ala. 800, 42 Am. Dec. 612. In Scarborough v. Reynolds,.
12 Ala. 252, a general authority to transact business was limited to
the management and control of a plantation, and declared not to authorize the adjustment of other concerns of the principal.
The circuit court properly received evidence that the principal, at
the execution of the power, had no other occupation or pursuit than
that of a farmer, cultivating and renting his lands, and that it was
executed in view of a contemplated
temporary absence from the
This evidence was proper, to enable the court to determine
State.
the scope of the agency, and to ascertain whether the act in question
was within the power conferred.
The general expressions of the
power must be restrained to the principal business of the party; for
it is this which is presumed to have been, and doubtless was, within
his contemplation, and which he was willing to submit to the agent.
A merchant, about going abroad temporarily, delegated t<> an agenl
full and entire authority to sell any "i" his persona] property, or to
buy any property for him, or on his account, or to make any contracts, and also to do any acts whatsoever, which he could, if pernt; this general language would be construed to apply
to
only
buying or selling connected with his ordinary business as a
Story on Agency, § 21. So, this power must be restrained
merchant.
and limited to the ordinary^ general Business of the principal in the
cultivation and renting of his lands, and the duties and transactions
it involved.
It cannot fairly and properly be extended to othei
CCrns of the principal, which cannot be presumed to have been within

the

U

j

ai

i

n.'uiTY

(Part

w

his contemplation, and may have required an agent of another char8
actor and qualifications to transact.
When the power was executed, the principal was surety of \\Yst
ami Burns, agents of appellees, on a penal bond, with condition for
If a breach of the bond
their faithful performance of the agency.
had then occurred, ami any liability rested on the principal, he was
not informed of it ; ami of course, an adjustment of such breach, ami

change of the character and form of his liability, with an extension
of the time ^i payment to his principals, was not within his contemThese matters were distinct and separate from his general
plation.
and ordinary business, to which his attention was directed, and in
reference to which he was delegating authority. The power did not
authorize the agent to adjust them, and to make the note on which
The circuit conrt erred in charging otherwise.
the suit is founded.
Whether the facts disclose a recognition, and acquiescence in the act
a

of the agent, imparting to it validity, is not a question

presented

for
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our consideration.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

VERY
(Supreme

v.

Court of the United States,

LEVY.
1851.

13

How.

345, 14

L. Ed.

173.)

Answer, satisfaction of
Suit in equity to foreclose a mortgage.
the mortgage by an agreement with one Davis, agent of complainant,
to pay in goods, part of which, to the amount of $1,898.25, were
delivered, and the rest of which had been constantly subject to the
Davis had full power to trade, sell, and disorder of complainant.
pose of any notes, bills, bonds, or mortgages, held, or owned, by
Very on any resident of Arkansas. The circuit court decreed the
mortgage satisfied.

* * * Upon this state of facts we are of opinion
Beto enter into the agreement in question.
authority
Davis had

Curtis, J. 3

z Accord:
124 i UilK.

Porges

v.

U.

S.

Mortgage

& Trust Co., 203 N. Y. 181, 96 N. E.

of
in the case of written powers, it must appear upon a fair construction
the whole instrument thai the authority in question is to lie found within the
four corners of the Instrument, either in express terms, or by necessary ImBryant v. La Banque du Peuple, [1893] A. C. 170, 62 L. J. P. C.
plication.
Delafield v.
H W'kly. Rep. 600;
Rep (N. s.i r,v\. l Reports, •';■':<'>.
6g 68 i
td., 2 Hill. 159 (1841); Doubleday v. Kress,
Illinois, 26 Wend. L92 (1841);
v. Wright, 6 Cal. 373, (1856).
50 N. V. int. io Am. Rep. 502 (1872); .lnhnst.ni
It will not be extended beyond what is necessary andr proper to carry into
full effect the authority. Golinsky v. -Allison, 114 Cal. 4. >8, 46 Pac. 295 (1896) ;
Rhine v Blake, 1 White & W. Civ. Cas. Ct. App. § 1066 (1881); Gouhl.v v. Motcalf T-", Te: 155 12 s. W. 830, 16, Am. St. Rep. 912 (1889); Campbell v. Foster
Home A-'n. m:: Pa. 609, 30 Atl. 222, 26 L. R. A. 117, 43 Am. St Rep. 818

t

(1894).
3 Part

of the opinion is omitted.
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sides the power to collect and sell, is the power to trade this bond
It might be difficult to attach any general legal sigand mortgage.
nification to this word. But considered in reference to the particular
facts of this case, we think its meaning sufficiently clear.
It is proved by Davis, that the power, though general in its terms,
wasjnven solely in reference to this particular bond and mortgage.
~Thebo7id~liad
yet four years to run.' When, therefore. Davis was
authorized to collect this bond, the parties to the letter of attorney

If It

it,
it
is

must have had in view some agreement respecting its extinguishand when he
ment, which should vary its original terms of payment;
interprean
inadmissible
not
was further empowered to trade
he was
which
tation that the new agreement for its extinguishment,
arreceive
specific
to
make,
might be an agreement
empowered to
be
to
are
that
powers
said
special
has been
ticles in payment.

is

is

if

to be effected,
to be within the power,
to them
attention
reasonable
with
and
ambiguous,
and they are
third
and
agent
both
the
which
on
would bear the interpretation
more
rebound,
although
upon
acted,
the
principal
person havethat
be
of
might
opinion
court
the
examination
fined and critical
Le Roy v. Beard,
different construction would be more correct.
Wash. C. C.
Cartwright,
1151;
v.
Loraine
451,
12 L. Ed.
How.
C. C.
Wash.
Crousillat,
v.
Tastett
De
8,500;
Xo.
151, Fed. Cas.
on
404;
403,
Story
on
Agency,
3,828;
Liv.
Xo.
Fed. Cas.
132*
as
t<> be construed,
generally
an
instrument
Such
74.
Agency,
view, and attending reain
the
man,
object
with
acquainted
plain
not
He
n-ed, has in fact construed it.
sonably to the language
meaning
of
the
concerning
lawyer
of
the
opinion
boundto take
sense.
in
popular
employed
and
apparently
technical,
word not
Bing.
Witherington v. [erring,
Davis to colbesides empowering
ease,
the
complainant,
this
In
I

5

a

a

a

is

a

§

is

1

2

S

3

a

a

is

a

a

is

which an object, admitted

n-it

\e

t

bond

it

-a word
him t<> trade
has authorized
language to signify an exchange of one
This power was intended
barter.
way
article [or another,
jeweler, in the
the
respondent,
he
on
to
acted
the complainanl
was unArkansas, and we think he cannol complain that
more especially when he accepted,
,„„!
its popul
amounting
1.25, and gave the dewithout objection,
.,

payable,

by

'

:

n

l

i

•

.
i.

it

a

by
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1r ,|,
,

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

a

is

a

meant, that neither the agent, nor
by this
construed strictly.
him
in that character, can claim under
third person dealing with
right to understand its
had not
which
they
authority
the power any
to be extended by
not
authority
the
and
that
language conveyed,
corview,
the
position
in
the
object
mere general words beyond
in
mode
the
particular
only
touch
in
words
the
question
rect. But

construction

should

t" the splrll

!"• according

nt

Taylor

v.

Harlow,

11

rather than according
Barb. 232 (1851).

THE

[ [ I

AUTHORITY

(Part

2

fendant no notice of his dissent from that construction of the power
under which
them, in part payment of the
his agent received
*
*
*
bond.
Decree affirmed.

HEMSTREET
(Supreme

Court

Of

BURDICK.

v.

Illinois,

1878.

90

111. 444.)

D. B. Gardner bought certain land, giving a mortgage
He paid little on it. and in 1859 sold to Hempstead, taking
a mortgage
back, and a power of attorney, authorizing him to sell,
or lease, or collect rents, for these lands. The first mortgage was
and, the interest and note being unpaid, suit was
still outstanding,
brought in 1862. which was settled by the conveyance to the mortgagees, by D. B. Gardner under his power of attorney, of the land
In 1874, Hempstead and wife conin controversy and other land.
The bill charges that
1 a tract including this land to Spencer.
this was a fraud upon the rights of the appellee, who holds under the
conveyance of 1862 and prays that Spencer's title be decreed to be
Decree granted and defendants appeal.
held in trust for Burdick.
Walker, J. 5 * * * It also insisted that the power of attorney
to D. B. Gardner from Hemstreet conferred no power to convey;
that it authorized him to sell, lease, collect rents, etc., and that such
was the construction put on it by Gardner and Hemstreet, as the
former always, on making a sale, sent the deed to the latter to execute. It is immaterial what construction the parties to the instruas
does not appear that the trustees knew of their
ment gave
so doing.
They purchased under the advice of an attorney that Gardner had power to make the conveyance, and we presume they acted
not material what the attorney in fact, or his
in good faith.
But
principal, may have supposed, — the question is, whether the instruthe language of the power of
This
ment did confer the power.
attorney conferring the power to act: "To sell or lease any and all
real estate belonging to me in said county of Iroquois, and to collect rents for any such property so rented or leased by him, and in
and about the leasing, selling and collecting of rents, or any of them,
to do any and all matters and things as fully as
as aforesaid,
could do were
personally present and doing the same."
The whole question turns on the meaning that shall be given to the
word "sell." Its popular meaning, we think, clearly embraces the
power to contract to sell and to convey or transfer the thing sold.
To complete the sale there must be
transfer of the title as well as
the thing sold. When the term
applied to personal property, there
In

1856,

it

I

is

it
is

it,

is

a

I

6
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back.

Part of the opinion

is omitted.
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no doubt it embraces the delivery as well as the bargain for the
sa l e — that it in such cases means the bargain for the sale, the receipt
of the purchase money and the delivery of possession, by which the
So in regard
sale is completed and the title vested in the purchaser.
to real estate, the word "sell," in its popular sense, implies the conAll know that a sale of land
tract and its completion by conveyance.
— until
is not complete until a conveyance is made to the purchaser
;

(

Decree

affirmed.

TTopwnon
(Supreme

Court of [owa,

1884.

v.

copmN.

63

[owa, 218, 18 N. W.

nil.)

Action for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of land
made by Hroad-.treet & Day, as agents for defendant, acting under authority of two letters from defendant's authorized agent. Relief denied.
review <>f111. - principles «-r construction, and '>r tin- author!
Goddard, 28 Mont 237, 72 Pac. 621, 98 km. si. Rep
trued us t<> give effect i<> the
'lii.' power will, If possible, i"
found in tin- words of the Instrument (Snell v
Intent "i the partle
erhauHer, 71 Minn. 57, 7:: N. W. 833 |I^'.M>. and in the object t" !"• ■■>•■
' Md. 50 [1882];
Holladaj v. Dally, 19 Wall.
compll ii"i fPosner v. P.
Perry v. Holl, 2 De <:. I'. & J. 88, 29 L. J. Ch.
2 i. Ed. 187 [18731;
National Ban* v. Old Town Bank, L12 Fed 726, 50 C. C v : <
677 [I860];
possible, to all the '-'ruin-, of power (Vai
and bo ae to give effect,
[1902])
Marsh.] 285, 19 Am Dec. 92
Heirs v. Hopkins' Adm'r, 24 Ky.
■ For :i valuable

[1

J.
J.

If

■"•

I
(1903).

[l
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i

A contract or agreement
the title has passed to and vested in him
to sell does not pass the title at law, although in equity the land is
considered as belonging to the buyer; b\ut even in that forum the
sale is not considered as complete, as it will compel a specific perWe \
formance, and complete the sale by a conveyance of the title.
regard the word "sell," as used here, as giving ample power to comSuch /
plete a sale by making a deed of conveyance to the purchaser.
See/
is the ruling of the courts of California and Massachusetts.
Fogarty v. Sawyer, 17 Cal. 591, and Valentine v. Piper, 22 Pick. 85(
This is, then, we think, supported by reason, and
33 Am. Dec. 715.
also by authority.
This may be
But it is said the power must be strictly construed.
true, but it does not require that it shall be so construed as to deWhere the intention fairly appears
feat the intention of the parties.
A
that intention must control.
employed,
from the language
intention,
that
defeat
to
be
never
given
strained construction should
6
nor to embrace in the power what was not intended by the parties.
According to the fair and reasonable meaning of the words, we
* * *
think power to convey was conferred.

(Tart

THE AUTHOR] IV

146

Reed,

7

*

*

2

*

2. The nexl question in the case is whether
Broadstreel & Day were empowered by the letters to make the contract. While there is one expression in the letter of ( Ictober 7th which,
if considered atone, would seem to indicate an intention by defendant
to reserve the right to reject or accept any offer which might be made
for any portion of the land, we think, when the letters are considered
together, thai they confer on the agents the power to make the conThe defendant transmitted to them the list and the prices at
tract.
which he would sell the land with the first letter, and in that letter he
T.

it,

although
tells them that if they can (.fleet any sales he will be glad of
other parties,
satisfactory offers
are made through them.
But he answers them that
they find pursold to other
chasers at the prices named in the list before the land
parties, their customers shall have it. In the second letter he tells them
is

if

if

he reserves the right to sell through

in

it

if

at the prices and on the terms named, subject to the right reserved by
he receives satisfactory
defendant to sell through other parties,
And
offers through them before these agents have found purchasers.
this construction has been put upon
by the agents who have conthe honest belief that
tracted with plaintiff for the sale of the land
the power to make the contract was conferred on them by the letters.

is

a

is

is it

by

is it

it

it

it

is

It

capable of the construction claimed
may be that the language
only empowered the agents to submit
by defendant, viz., that
the offer of plaintiff to him, and that he reserved the right to accept or
certainly open to the construction put upon
reject the offer; but
the other parties, and the true rule of construction undoubtedly
shall be taken
ambiguous
writing
that when the language of

for

is

it
is

it,

8

this true when
and especially
against the contractor,
of which
fairly susceptible has been placed upon
and third parties have been induced to act in the belief that that conthe correct one. Jackson v. Blodget, 16 Johns. 172; Melstruction

most strongly
a construction

i

Part of the opinion is omitted.
the situation of the
The ambiguity may often be resolved by considering
parth
as, <-. g., the Illiteracy of the principal and the remoteness of the busiW. 477 [1901]), the
Loan Agency v. Miller, «.»» Tex. 464, 61
ness (Texas
exigencies of the business (Muth v. Goddard, 28 Mont. 237, 72 Pac. 621, 98
Am. St. Rep. 553 [1903]), or the position of the principal (Le Roy v. Beard,
It
How. 451, 12 L. Ed. 1151 [1850]; Maynard v. Mercer, 10 Nev. 33 [1875]).
duty of the principal to make bis terms so clear that they cannol be
W. 238 (1896).
Halff v. O'Conner, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 191, 37
misconstrued.
Hut because the Instructions are aol clear the agent is not thereby authorized
Oxford Lake Line v. First Nat Bank, 40 Fla.
them entirely.
to disregard
Though be will be excused
he lias bona tide
180 (1898).
349, 24 South.
Berry v. Haldeman, 111 Mich. (JU7, 70
construction.
permissible
adopted
\. \V. 325 (1897).
a

If

S.

8

S.

s,

i
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it

that "sales of the lands described can be made on the terms one-fourth
The fair construction of all this language is,
to one-third cash," etc.
that
em] towers the agents to contract for the sale of any of the land
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Mete. 15, 38 Am. Dec. 384; Broom, Leg. Max. 571.

The judgment of the circuit court dismissing plaintiff's petition is
reversed, and the cause will be remanded, with directions to enter a
judgment requiring the defendant, upon the payment by plaintiff of the

balance of the purchase money, with interest at 8 per cent, from October 20, 1880, within such time as the court shall direct, to execute
to him a conveyance of the premises; or, if plaintiff so elects, such
judgment

will

be entered herein.

REXYYICK
(Circuit Court of the United
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McCrary, J.

9

This

v.

WHEELER.

States. I). Iowa.

ls^O.

4^ Fed.

131.)

bill in equity praying the cancellation of
a certain judgment appearing upon the records of the district court
of Scott County, Iowa, in favm- of the defendant and against the
plaintiff, on the ground that the same has been settled and satisfied.
The judgment was rendered on the 18th day of February, 1861, in a
suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon certain real estate.
The
is a

mortgaged property was sold under the judgment in 1861, and bought
in by Wheeler, for $700. and the sheriff's deed was immediately made
to him.
This left a balance unsatisfied on the record which now
amounts, including interest at 10 per cent., to something over $2,000.

Xo attempt was ever made to collect this balance until December, 1878,
about 17 years after the date of the judgment, when a general execution was issued, and attempts were made to enforee it^ payment, which
led to the filing of this bill, and the allowance of a temporary injunction
to restrain, until further order, the collection of the judgment.
The note and mortgage on which said judgment of foreclosure was
rendered were mad'' by complainant. James Renwick, to defendant,

8, 1857, for the purchase money of a piece of land in
Davenport, then purchased by Renwick from Wheeler through Wheeler'- agent and attorney in fact. Erastus Ripley.
Wheeler resided in
Pennsylvania, and Ripley in Davenport, Iowa.
Renwick, who also re
sided in Davenport,
made certain payments on the mortgage debt,
The sum secured by the mortamounting in the aggregate to $565.
.\ ith interest, and the mortgage covered, besides the
land purchased from Wheeler, another adjoining tract, lor which Renwick had paid $600.
Before the commencement of the foreclosure
suit, Renwick had become financially embarrassed, and was unable to
pay the balance of the debl : and he alleges in tin- present hill that he
entered into an agreemenl with Wheeler, through his agent, Ripley,
that Win
Id take the entire mortgaged property in satisfaction
of the balance due, and that to carry out thi
nent (Renwii I

Wheeler, April

i '.i rt <>fti

pinion Is omitted.

1 18

'i

in

ai

niMwiTY

(Part 2
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ing unable to make a good title by deed on accounl of judgments against
him) an amicable foreclosure was had. in which the judgment in question was rendered by default, and was lefl unsatisfied, after the sale,
here is (1) as to the
'The controversy
by negligence or oversight
truth of this allegation; and (2) as to its sufficiency as a matter of
* * *
law to entitle the complainant to the relief sought.
It is insisted on behalf of defendant that it does not appear that
Ripley, the agent of Wheeler, had authority to make the contract relied upon. This depends upon the construction of the power of attorThat instrument, which is hefore us,
ney under which Ripley acted.

after authorizing the agent to sell, convey, or mortgage any real estate
belonging to Wheeler within the state of Iowa, and to collect all sums
due on that account, provides as follows: "And we do further constitute the said Erastus Ripley our general attorney in fact to transact
any or all business for us, or either of us, of any kind whatsoever, in
the state of Iowa ; to rent houses and sign leases, and to collect money,
execute receipts for the same, and to satisfy any mortgages made or
to be made to us, or either of us, upon any lands in the state of Iowa;
it being the true intent and meaning of this instrument to confer upon
power and authority to
the said Erastus Ripley full and unrestricted
act for us in all matters of every kind whatsoever arising, or that may
arise, in the said state op Iowa."
It is said that the general language in this power of attorney is restrained by the special and specific authority elsewhere in the same
instrument conferred,i/The general rule is that general terms following, in the same instrument, words which confer a specific authority,
are to be held subordinate to, and as limited by, the specific authority.
Instruments of this character are strictly construed ; and the authority
is never extended beyond that which is given in terms, or which is
necessary or proper for carrying the authority so given into full effect.
Story, Ag. par. 68. 10 And language, however general in its form, when
used in connection with a particular subject-matter, will be presumed
to that matter, and therefore to be
to be used in subordination
io Accord : Rountree v. Denson, 59 Wis. 522, 18 N. W. 518 (1884).
Authority to act concerning mining operations, followed by authority to sign the
principal's name to any paper of a certain sort, does not give authority to sign
paper except abont the mining business, and also paper of the sort specified
v. Alden, 5 Cal. 463 (1855).
General power to bind the principal,
Washburn
in tli.sence of evidence of a different intent, must be construed
as giving
authority to bind him separately, and not conjointly with another, Harris v.
Johnston, .",t Mini,. 177. ", X. \Y. 970, 40 Am. St. Kep. 312 (18'.)::).
of the agent's power is for court or jury,
to whether the construction
. 850; also, Claflin v. Continental Works. 85 c;a. 27, 11 S. E. 721
te, p. :;:;7:
. p. 848.

and Booth v. Kossler,

G2 Neb. 704, 87 N. W.

532

(1901);

While the existence of an agency is a question of fact, what may lawfully
di • i :i question of law.
Lome (.'reek Building Ass'n v. State
00 111. App.
rns. Co., 29 Or. 569, 16 Pac. 366 (1896); Balladay v. Underwood,
\'.<-vry v. ihi hlemari, m Mich. 667, to N. W*. 325 (1897);
L899);
Loudoa
Fund Society v. Hagerstown
Sav. Bank, 36 Pa. 498 (1897);
78 Am. Dec.
L860).

As to evidence of agency, see p. 820.
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construed and limited accordingly.
Id. par. 62. Applying these rules
to the power of attorney under consideration, it appears that the particular subject-matter was the business of Wheeler in the state of
Iowa, relating to his real estate, including selling, mortgaging, leasing,
collecting moneys due for rents or as purchase money, and including
With respect to all business of this
the satisfaction of mortgages.
Iowa, Ripley, as Wheeler's agent,
within
nature
the
state
of
general
had "unrestricted
power and authority," and was to act as his "general attorney in fact." The settlement in question was a transaction
relating to the particular subject-matter of the agency; and therefore
the agent had discretionary power to accept the mortgaged premises
in full for the debt. * * *
Decree for complainant.
Godd.Pb.& A.— 29

tiik

4;><)

ai

niuKirY

CHAPTER

(Part

2
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(Court

v.

of King's Bench, 1802.

BACK.
2

East,

142, 6 R.

R. 409.)

The bond of submisMotion to set aside an award of arbitration.
[L. S.] For
sion to arbitration had been signed: "Mathias Wilks.
and dewas
sealed
[L. S.]"— and
James Browne, Mathias Wilks.
Browne.
his
late
partner,
livered by Wilks for himself and also for
Lawrence, J. No doubt in point of law, the act done must be
the act of the principal, and not of the attorney who is authorized to
The whole argument has turned upon an assumption of fact
do it.

This
that this was the act of the attorney, which is not well founded.
Reports, where the attorney
is not like the case in Lord Raymond's
had demised to the defendant in her own name, which she could not
do ; for no estate could pass from her, but only from her principal.
But here the bond was executed by Wilks for and in the name of his
principal: and this is distinctly shewn by the manner of making the
Not that even this was necessary to be shewn ; for if Wilks
signature.
had sealed and delivered it in the name of Browne, that would have
However, he first
been enough without stating that he had so done.
signs his own name alone opposite to one seal to denote the sealing
and delivery on his own account, and then opposite the other seal he
denotes that the sealing and delivery was for James Browne. There
is no particular form of words required to be used, provided the act be
done in the name of the principal.
I. ! Blanc, J. Wilks first signed it in his own name, as for himself,
and then to denote that the act was also done in the name of Browne,
he signed it again for James Browne. I cannot see what difference it
can make as to the order in which the names stand.

Rule discharged.
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PEARSON.

Court of the United States, LS82.
L. Ed. 774.)

10S

U.

S. 418,

2 Sup.

Ct. 790, 27

Action against Whitney and Post, as partners under the name of
Mining Company, on a contract made by Whitney as superintendent of the company, and signed:
"A. W. Whitney, [Seal.]
Supt. Keets Mining Co.
[Seal.]." Oral
[Seal.]
John B. Pearson.
evidence was allowed to show that Post was a partner of Whitney,
and Post brings error.
Gray, J. It is unnecessary to consider whether, if this were to be
the Keets

contract under seal, it could be held to be upon its face the
the Keets Mining Company, and not of Whitney only, or
oral testimony would have been admissible to charge Post :
the Civil Code of Dakota, "all distinctions between sealed
and unsealed instruments are abolished," and "any instrument within
the scope of his authority, by which an agent intends to bind his principal, does bind him. if such intent is plainly inferable from the instru-

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

treated as a
contract of
whether the
because, by

ment itself." Civ. Code Dak. 1877, §§ 925, 1373. 1
By the subject-matter of this contract, which is the delivery and
milling of ore from the Keets mine: by the description of Whitney,
both in the body of the contract and in the signature, as superintendent
of the Keets Mining Company: and by the use of the words "parties
of the first part," which are applicable to a company and not to a single
individual, the contract made by the hand of Whitney clearly appears
upon its face to have been intended to bind, and therefore did hind.

and. upon proof that Post was a partner in the company,
v. W'yman. 101 U. S. 392. 25 I.. Ed. 1050;
Hitchcock v. Buchanan, 105 U. S. 416, 26 L. Ed. 1078; Goodenough v.
Thayer, 132 Mass. 152.
The order sustaining Post's demurrer to the original complaint gave
the plaintiff leave to amend, and did not preclude the plaintiff from
renewing, nor the court from entertaining, the same question of law
upon a fuller development of the facts at the trial on the amended
('aider v. Haynes, 7 Allen,
complaint,

the company;
hound him.

Judgment

Whitney

affirmed.

i The Btrld rale aa to the execution of Instruments wider Beal no longer
are abolished by statute.
applies in some states where distinctions a
Though some courts
Wheeler v. Walden, 17 Neb. L22, 22 S. W. 346 (1885).
hold that statutes dispensing with the necessity of seals have nol changed the
mi. .in..:, law rale as to deeds executed by agents,
Jones v. Morris, oi Ala.
518 (18781.

(P art

Tin: AUTHORITY

152

WILSON
(Supreme

M.wun i.

Court

of Nebraska,

v.

^

BEARDSLEY.
L886.

20

Neb. 440, :\0 N. W. 529.)

The Facts In the above case are substantially as
Larison, the plaintiffs in error, were, at the time
referred to heroin, and arc now, importers and jobbers of tea, cigars,
and spices, having their principal place of business at ( )maha, Nebraska.
During the times aforesaid they had in their employ a traveling
man named A. P. Nichols. Under their contract of hire with him
they were to pay him a salary of $75 per month, and commissions upon
all sales, and he was to pay his own expenses. On the fifth of January,
1883, Wilson & Larison wrote a letter to Nichols, at Ogden, Utah,
telling him, among other things, that he might draw on them for $75.
This letter Nichols received, and altered by prefixing the figure "1"
to "75," so that it read $175. The change was skillfully made, and

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

follows:

C.

Wilson

J.

&

well calculated to deceive.
The testimony shows that Nichols, at this time, was a guest of defendant in error; that Nichols desired to draw on plaintiffs in error
for $150: that it was made to appear that an indorser to the draft
about to be drawn was necessary ; that defendant in error was requested by Nichols to indorse said draft, and, as an inducement to do so,
exhibited to him and the bank cashier the letter of plaintiffs in error,
altered as aforesaid, apparently authorizing him to draw on them for
$175 ; that on the faith and credit of that letter defendant in error did
indorse said draft ; that in due course of business said draft was pre-

sented to plaintiffs in error at Omaha for payment, and payment by
them was refused on the ground of "no funds" ; that said draft was
thereupon duly protested, and returned unpaid to the bank at Ogden,
where defendant in error was required to pay, and did pay, the full
amount of the draft, with protest fees, amounting in all to $152.25.
On the trial of the cause in the court below judgment was rendered
for $75 in favor of Beardsley, from which the plaintiffs herein bring

the cause into this court by petition in error.
No case has been cited exactly in point by either party, and we are
compelled to adopt such a rule as will, as far as possible, do justice
The rule is well settled that a principal will be
between the parties.
bound by the acts of his agent within the scope of his apparent auSt. Louis & M. P. Co. v. Parker, 59 111. 23 ; Fatman v. Leet,
thority.
41 Ind. 133; Kerslake v. Schoomaker, 3 Thomp. & C. 524; Tucker v.
Woolsey, 64 Barb. 142 ; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Weaver, 34 Md.
431 ; Bronson v. Chappell,
12 Wall. 681, 20 L. Ed. 436; Golding y.
Merchant, 43 Ala. 705. The plaintiffs must have intended that their
letter, above referred to, should be used as a letter of credit to enable
Nichols to obtain the $75 upon the draft which he was authorized to
draw on them. To this extent he was acting within the scope of his
The draft, therefore, was unauauthority, and his acts were valid.
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thorized only as to the excess over $75.
Nichols was the plaintiffs'
agent, and so held out by them, to some extent at least, as being trustworthy. This fact, while it would not make them liable for any material alteration in the letter made by such salesman, is yet a circumstance tending to show that he had some claim upon them, and thereby, no doubt, led to less careful inquiry in regard to the extent of the
agent's authority than otherwise would have been had. The letter was
in the nature of a power of attorney, by which the principals agreed
to ratify the act of the agent to a certain extent, authorizing him to
2
Now, supdraw in his own name upon them for a certain amount.
pose that the agent had changed this so as to show authority in him
to draw two drafts on the plaintiffs, each for $75, could they plead,
as a defense to the first draft, that it was unauthorized,
and that, therefore, an innocent indorser, relying upon their letter, should be defrauded? We think not. The authority would be wanting only as to
the second draft.
The same rule is applicable here; there being an
actual authority to draw to the extent of $75.
The judgment of the court below is clearly right, and is affirmed.

SECTION 2.— SEALED INSTRUMENTS

CLARKE'S LESSEE
(Supreme

Court of the United States,

v.

COURTNEY.

1831.

5 Pet.

319,

8

L. Ed.

140.)

Ejectment against a large number of persons in possession of a large
tract of land in Kentucky. Plaintiff claimed under demise from James
B. Clarke, and some of the defendants on a deed of relinquishment by
Carey L. Clarke, as attorney in fact of James B. Clarke and wife.
Story, J. 3 [After holding that the power of attorney gave no
* * * But if this
authority to make such a release:]
objection
were not insuperable, there is another, which, though apparently of a
technical nature, is fatal to the relinquishment.
It is. that the deed is
not executed in the names of Clarke and his wife, but by the attorney,
in his own name. It is not, then, the deed of the principals, but the
The language is, "I, the said Carey L. Clarke.
deed of the attorney.
■ An ad done under an authority must be done In pursuance
<>r thai au
thority. Cllnan v. Cooke, l Sch. v. Let 32,9 Rev. Rep. :: (1802).
11 an agent
filling up a blank
the note la aoi trold Ln toto,
i. in onlj for the excess amount
Lie,
Johi
Miss. (1 Smedes &
if the contract La separable, it will be upheld
m.i it, i<» a iii. L843).
v
in the
if the authority.
Qano v. C. . * N. W. Ry. Co., 19 wis. 57, S .v
YV. I." fiRSO),
But If there la no way to determine what Is authorized, and
1,
Choteau v. Allen, to Mo. 290
what is not t^ whole execution la defective,
•t
of the opinion

is omitted.

Tin: ai

\'< I

i

noKiTY

(Part

2

attorney as aforesaid," &c. "do hereby relinquish," &c; and the attestis. "In witness whereof the said Carey I.. Clarke, attorney :i^
aforesaid, lias hereunto subscribed his hand and seal, this 25th day of
November, in the year of our Lord 1800.
Carey I.. Clarke, [L. S.|"
The ad does not therefore purporl to he the art of the principals,
Tins
but oi the attorney.
It is his deed, and his seal, and not theirs.
may savour ^i refinement, since it is apparent that the party intended
But the law looks not
ss the interest and title of his principals.
to the intent alone, but to the faet whether that intent has been ex-

;

it

it

;

J.

it

it

is

it

I,

it

it

it is

if

a

is

;

S.

J.

a

I,

if

is

it

review

135 (1840).

ectuate

the intenl

of Die early

eases is given in Townsend

While courts will Interprel the words
of tin' parties

appearing

from

in

a

i

An Interesting

•_:; Wend.

the whole

v. Corning,
deed so as

Instrument,

a

it

<;

>rds must hi- there t" interpret.
The <-<>nrtcannot supply these, nor
i," supplied by evidence aliunde.
Cadel] v. Allen. 99 N. C. 542,
is absurd to give
That
seal the effect of changing the
E. 399 (1888).
was pointed out in Eckhart v. Reidel, J<; Tex.
parties liable on a contracl
>._■(1856 .
S.
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by

a

J.

a

]>.

ecuted in such a manner as t<>possess a legal validity. 4
The leading case on this subject is Combe's Case, ( ) Co. R. 75, ante,
35, where authority was given by
copy holder to two persons as
li-; attorney s, to surrender ten acres of pasture to the use of
N. and
afterwards, at manor court they surrendered the same, and the entry
on the court roll was, that the said attorneys in the same court showed
the writing aforesaid, hearing date, &c. and they, by virtue of the authe said letter of attorney given, in full court, surthority to them
rendered into the hands of the said lord the said ten acres of pasture,
N. &c.
to the use of the said
and the question was whether the
surrender was good or not, and the court held
was good.
"And
was resolved, that when any has authority as attorney to do any act,
he ought to do
in his name who gives the authority, for he appoints
the attorney to be in his place, and to represent his person; and therethe attorney cannot do
in his own name, nor as his proper act,
but in the name and as the act of him who gives the authority.
And
was objected that in the case at bar the attorneys have made
where
the surrender in their own name, for the entry
that they surrendered,
was answered and resolved by the whole court, that they have well
performed their authority; for, first, they showed their letter of attorney, and then they by the authority to them by the letter of attorney
as much as to say, as
given, surrendered, &c. which
they had said,
we, as attorneys, &c. surrender, &c. and both these ways are sufficient.
As Ik- who has
letter of attorney to deliver seisin saith,
as attordeliver you seisin or,
ney to
by force of this letter of attorney,
deliver you seisin. And all that
well done, and
good pursuance of
his authority,
lint
attorneys have power by writing to make leases
by indenture for years, &c. they cannot make indentures in their own
names, hut in the name of him who gives the warrant."
Such
the language of the report, and
has been quoted at large,
has been much commented on at the bar; and
because
points out
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clear distinction between acts done in pais, and solemn instruments
It has
deeds, as to the mode of their execution by an attorney.
Kett,
1
v.
been supposed that the doctrine of Lord Holt in Parker
a
intimated
different
466,
Salk. 95, and better reported in 2 Mod. R.
But correctly considered it is not so. Lord Holt expressly
opinion.
admits (468), that the doctrine in Coombe's Case, that he who acts
under another ought to act in his name, is good law beyond dispute:
and the case there was distinguishable; for it was the case of a subdeputy steward, appointed to receive a surrender, which was an act in
a

or

However this may be, it is certain that Coombe's Case has never
In
departed from, and has often been acted upon as good law.
Frontin v. Small, 2 Ld. Raym. 1418, where a lease was made between
M. F. "attorney of J. P." of the one part, and the defendant of the
other part, of certain premises for seven years, in a suit for rent by
M. F., it was held that the lease was void for the very reason assigned
in Coombe's Case. Lord Chief Baron Gilbert (4 Bac. Abridg. Leases
and Terms for years, I, 10, 140) has expounded the reasons of the

pais.

doctrine with great clearness and force ; and it was fully recognized
in White v. Cuyler, 6 T. Rep. 176, and Wilks v. Back, 2 East. 142. If
it were necessary it might easily be traced brick to an earlier period than
Coombe's Case. 4 Bac. Abridge. Leases and Terms for years, I, 10,
In America, it has
140, 141; Com. Dig. Attorney. C 14; Moore, 70.
been repeatedly the subject of adjudication, and has received a judicial
The cases of Bogart v. De Bussy, 6 Johns. 94, Fowler v.
sanction.
Shearer, 7 Mass. 14, and Elwell v. Shaw, 16 Mass. 42, 8 Am. Dec.
126, are directly

in point.
appears to us, then, upon the grounds of these authorities, that
and conseto the Mate was inoperative;
the deed of relinquishment
quently the court erred in refusing the instruction prayed by the plainthe extiff, that it did not bind him; and in directing the jury, that
of
deto
the
land
the
bar
was
recovery
was proved,
ecution of
*
Reversescribed therein.
a

1.

*
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ually.

i.o.)

I
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by

i-

a
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Blackf

name, describing themselves
which two persons
trict, agree thai the "trustee-" shall
certain school
executed
certain sum for In- services, and which
individthem
jOns
names,
binding Upon
their own

of
teacher
te<

v ".T.

a

contrad

-,. nu

\XK.

SI

Courl "f Indiana,

WTRACTS

by

(Supreme

v.

i

WILEY

C<

»

*

it

it

il"

It

A

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

been

Tin- ai

150

i i:i>i;i i v

(Part

2

In a justice's court, an article of agreement between tlic parties,
containing conditions precedent to he performed by the plaintiff, may
be filed as the cause of action, without an averment of performance
of the conditions,

J

FRAMBACH
Court of Colorado,

1905.

FRANK.
.°>3Colo.

529,

81 Pac.

247.)

is

it

1
;

&

is

a

it

It

a

:

is

is

§

is

a

it

if,

Action on a contract signed by the agent, Frambach, by which he,
acting for himself and for the Cripple Creek Beam Milling Company,
- to certain terms about the purchase of a mill, and, in case of
purchase, to the issue to Frank of a one-fourth interest in the mill.
Frambach purchased the mill for the company, and on this action
by Frank judgment was rendered for plaintiff for $13,000.
Goddard, J. We think it satisfactorily appears from the evidence
that the appellant was the authorized agent of the company, and acted
as such agent in the purchase of the mill.
The question to be determined, therefore, is whether this agreement, by its terms, imposes a
personal obligation upon the appellant to pay the amount agreed to be
In
paid the appellee, notwithstanding the property was so purchased.
other words, does the language used in the agreement, when construed
in the light of the surrounding circumstances, ex vi termini, bind the
appellant, or does it obligate the company only to pay to the appellee
the consideration mentioned?
It is well settled that an agent may bind his principal by a written
contract not under seal without executing the same in the name of
from the whole instrument,
the principal,
may be gathered that
he either acts as agent or intends to bind his principal. In such case,
although he executes the instrument in his own name he will not be
clear intent to the conpersonally bound unless the language shows
that an apparent agent intends to bind
trary; and the presumption
In Story on Agency (9th Ed.)
160a,
his principal, and not himself.
the rule in respect to written contracts not under seal
stated as follows
"It very clear from the authorities that
not indispensable, in order to bind the principal, that such
contract should be executed in the name and as the act of the principal.
will be sufficient if, upon the whole instrument,
can be gathered from the terms
thereof that the party describes himself and acts as agent, and intends thereby to bind the principal, and not to bind himself." In general when
person acts and contracts avowedly as the agent of another, who
known as the principal, his acts and contracts, within
the scope of his authority, are considered the acts and contracts of
the principal and involve no personal liability on the part of the agent.
Am.
Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 1119; Whitney v. Wyman, 101
U. S. 392, 25 L. Ed. 1050; Smith v. Alexander, 31 Mo. 193; Rathbon
Hall v. Huntoon, 17 Vt. 244, 44 Am. Dec.
v. Budlong, 15 Johns.

1
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332; 3 Clark & Marshall on Corps, p. 1860, § 615a; Magill v. Hins5
dale, 6 Conn. 465, 16 Am. Dec. 70.
It appears from the face of the agreement under consideration that
it was contemplated and understood by the appellant and appellee
that the former might act in one of two capacities in purchasing the
mill — personally in his own behalf, or as agent of the Cripple Creek
Beam Milling Company — and only in the event he should act in the
representative capacity was the appellee entitled to the compensation
sued for. Eliminating that part of the agreement which refers to
the obligations of the appellant in the event that he should elect to
purchase the mill for himself, there remains a complete agreement in
which there is a full disclosure of the name of his principal, and the
fact that appellant was acting as the agent of such principal, thus
showing the capacity in which the promise was made, and who was
intended to be bound thereby.
We think, therefore, that, when tested by the foregoing rule, the
agreement clearly evidences the obligation of the company, and exonerates the appellant from any personal liability thereunder, and the
In this view
court below erred in rendering judgment against him.
of the instrument, it becomes unnecessary to notice the objection urged
against its validity, as the judgment must be reversed for the reasons given.
Reversed.

CITY OF DETROIT
(Supreme

Court of Michigan,

v.

JACKSON.

1843.

1 Doug.

106.)

Upon an agreement
on certiorari from Wayne circuit court.
award for $2,204
the
a
ji/dgment upon
for a submission to arbitration
errors
it was assigned
other
Among
the
city.
had been entered against
executed
not
by the city.
duly
arbitration
to
that the submission
^as
Fklch, J. 6 * * * 2. It is contended that, admitting the authority of Zina Pitcher to enter into the submission on behalf of the
plaintiffs in error, he has not so executed the agreement for submis"The mayor, recorder, aldermen and
sion, as to bind bis principals.
freemen of the city of Dein.it, by Zina Pitcher, mayor of said city,

Error

-iL'ns in the umiuc <>t'his principal, the latter only la liable
To admit parol evidence to shovt it was Intended to be the
the writing, which Is no! allowable
would be to contradict
11 v. Pollard, 73 Tex. 96, U B. W. 166, L5 Am. st. Rep. 764 (1889).
to bind the agent, be will nol
there are In the contract apt word
18 Q. B. 744, 66 i: C. 1
i„. liable on the contract, Jenkins \. Hutchinson,
129 (1853); John
71:: (1849); Ogden v. Raymond, 22 Conn. 879, 58 Am. Dec,
18, '-'i 8. B. 586 (1896); the more *" if in- be :i public
son v. Welch,
12 W. \':i
agent whose authority is publicly known, tfcCurdy \. Rogers, 21 Wla. 197, '.'i
Am. Dec 168 I
' Pari <>ftin' opinion Is omitted.
o When

t h<- Hgoni

the contract
agent's contracl

on

mu:

B

AUTHORITY

(

Part 2

and agent for thai purpose duly appointed," is the description of the
contracting party in the bodj of the agreement; and the justice's certificate of its acknowledgment
describes the party appearing before
him in precisel) the same words.
Bui the agreement is signed "Zina
Pi tidier. Mayor of 1 Jetroit," without any other addition; and it is con-

_

tended that a disclosure of the agency should have been made by an
addition to the signature, as well as by description in the body of
tne
the instrument.
t is perfectly
competent for an agent, who has due authority to
ontract on behalf of his principal, so to execute an instrument, as
to make himself
Thus, in
personally responsible for his principal.
v.

himself

\\ ood, 7 Cow. 453, 17 Am. Dee. 529. the defendant described
in the charter party on which the suit was brought, as agent
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for J. & R. Raymond, hut in fact agreed for himself, his executors
and administrators,
to pay the freight therein mentioned, and was
In Spencer v. Field, 10 Wend. H7, the
held to he bound personally.
contract was made between the defendant and "J ames Hillhouse, com-

for and
missioner of the school fund for the state of Connecticut,
in behalf of said state," was under seal, and was signed "James HillIt was held that it was
house, Commissioner of the School Fund."
not the contract of the state.
In Pentz v. Stanton, 10 Wend. 271, 25
Am. Dec. 558, the plaintiff declared on a bill of exchange, drawn by,

and signed "H. T. West, Agent." The suit was against the principal,
who was held not to be bound, his name not appearing on the bill.
Taft v. Brewster and others, was upon a bond, in which the defendants, by the name and description of "Jacob Brewster, Thaddeus
Loomis and Joseph Coats, trustees of the Baptist Society of the town
of Richfield, acknowledged themselves to be held and firmly bound,"

The same description was added to their signatures. It was held
See,
to be their individual bond, and not that of the Baptist Society.
White v. Skinner, 13 Johns. 307, 7 Am. Dec. 381 ; Tippets v.
Walker. 4 Mass. 595.
&c.

In these and numerous other cases of the same class, the Court
have simply looked to the form of the instrument itself, in order to
tain whether it is the contract of the principal, or of the agent
If, by the terms of the agreement, a party describing himpersonally.
self as agent, undertakes to do certain things, the mere addition of
the word agent, or indeed any other designation which he may add
to his name, will not make it the contract of his principal.
Such ad-

dition will be regarded as mere description; and will not have the effect of binding a third person, who is not, in form, made a party tcV
the instrument.!
It is not enough that the person executing an instrument have powter as agent to bind a third person ; he must, in fact,
make it the obligation of that person in terms, in order to bind him.
But in determining whether an instrument, executed by an agent,
contains the obligation of the principal, we are to look to the whole
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The particular form of execution is not material, if
instrument.
Magill v. Hinsit be substantially done in the name of the principal.
dale, 6 Conn. 464, 16 Am. Dec. 70 ; Pentz v. Stanton, 10 Wend. 275,
In this case, the plaintiffs in error are fully de25 Am. Dec. 558.
scribed in the body of the agreement for submission, as the contractThe submission is directly asserted to be theirs; the name
ing party.
of the agent is given, as the instrument, through whom the act is
The agent does not purport to act for, or in any manner to
done.
On the contrary, the body of the instruhimself,
personally.
bind

the contracting party, it would not certainly bind the plaintiffs in
But here, the capacity in which Pitcher acted, is fully exerror.
No part of the instrument shows that he makes any contract
plained.
individually; but the whole of it shows that he acts as the agent for
plaintiffs in error, and to have added or prefixed their name to
^he
nis signature, would have been but to repeat, in the same instrument,
hat already sufficiently appeared.
is true there are cases which appear to establish the doctrine,
that the name of Hie principal must be signed to an instrument executed by an agentAlBut in th/ case of New England Marine InsurdelVrering the opinance Co. v. De Wolf, 8 Pick. 35, Parker, C.
remarks,
to maintain this
cited
Court,
authorities
"the
that
of
the
ion
seal.
No doubt this
under
instruments
only;
deeds
are
of
position,
Not onW must the prinregard to sealed \struments.
rule
cipal's name be signed to them, but his seal must be affixed also.
E&st, 142; Simonds
T. R. 176; Wilkes v. Back,
White v. Cuvler,
He
Am.
alin,
Caines, 66; Elwell v. Shaw, 16 Mass. 42,
I..1. Raym. 1418;
Co. 76b; Prontin v. Small.
126; Combe's Case,
Greenl. 231,
Mass. 14; Stinchfield v. Little,
Fowler v. Shearer,
7

I

1

9

2

2

8

6

2

in

"J

in

J.,

kit

S.

□

I
,

>v

,
Il

I

In
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I

|_ 'I

i

f

|
n

8

■

'I'll.- rigid rale as to deeds Bhould nol be extended to mercantile transacin the
Pick. 56 (1829).
New England Marine Ins. Co. v. De Wolf,
tions.
to
trumentf doI under Beal the courts will look i" the Instrument
Andrews v. Estes, n Me. 267, 26 Am. Dec. 521
earn whal the Intention Is.
392,
his has heen well expressed In Whitney v. Wyman, 101
Publishing As
v.
Sun Printing
i;,| [050 (1879), approved
■;,
i..
!.■
I'
Oaa
II i"\ • '•'I'll., minuMnn i<
'
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ment fully shows, that he is the mere agent, and that the submission
It is in the precise form
is the submission of the plaintiffs in error.
the
as
S7,
Wend.
Field,
proper form of draw10
v.
in
Spencer
given
as to bind his prinso
an
agent,
executed
be
by
instrument,
to
an
ing
It is signed "Zina Pitcher. Mayor of Detroit." Were there
cipal.
nothing in the body of the instrument, which clearly showed who was

the AiTiioKiTY
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2

Am. Dec. 65.
Where/however, the instrument is not under seal,
In such cases, it is enough if the contract
rule prevails.
a different
name
tlh
of
is made in the
principal, and as bis contract, through the
is made to the instrument pur:. and the signature of the agent
In
New
lus
England Marine Insurance
to
principal.
charge
porting
Co. v. De Wolf, before cited, the declaration was upon a guaranty
endorsed on the hack of a note, given for a premium on insurance,
as follows:
"By authority of J. De Wolf, Junior, in a letter dated
September 24, 1824, 1 hereby guaranty his payment of the premium
It was held that the defendant
Isaac Clap."
or policy No. 10.079.
10

was hound as guarantor of the notes; Clap, the agent, having authority to sign for his principal, and his intention to do so, being evident

warranty itself.
instance of the manner of executing a contract by an
They are, upon their face,
the case of bank bills.
found
which
they were issued; but they
promises of the corporation by
an abbreviation showing
with
cashier,
and
are signed by the president
from

the

in

is

it,

A familiar

a

5

5

it

a

it

a

it

268,

note.

*

*

*

it,

is

the proper construction of the
We entertain no doubt as to what
We think the plaintiffs in
agreement for submission in this case.
error must be regarded as one of the contracting parties, although
without adding the name
their agent has signed his own name to
of his principals.

SECTION 4.— NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

(Supreme

Court of Georgia,

1846.

1

MERCHANTS' BANK OF MACON
GEORGIA.

v.

CENTRAL BANK OF

Ga. 418, 44 Am. Dec. 6G5.)

a

bill of exchange, which requested the Fulton Bank
Action upon
to
of New York
pay Scott Cray, agent, or order, $5,000. The hill
was endorsed by "Scott Cray, Agent," and was protested in New
York, and notice of protest was given. The principal was not disbut was afterwards shown to be the plaintiff in error, defend1.
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It

has never been contended,
only the capacity in which they sign.
their signatures the name
not
add
to
did
these
because
agents
that,
of the corporation, they were personally bound, and not the corpobank,
check was drawn by the cashier of
ration.
Even where
was an official or
private act,
and
appeared doubtful whether
was an official act,
parol evidence has been admitted to show that
Bank
Mechanics'
for the purpose of making the bank responsible.
Wheat. 326,
L. Ed. 100; Story on Agency,
v. Bank of Columbia,
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1

§

8
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If a person, assuming to act as the agent of a corporation, but
without legal authority, makes a contract, and the corporation reand use the property acquired under
ceive the benefit of
such
acts will ratify the contract, and render the corporation liable thereon. Angell and Ames (2d Ed.) 178; Utica Ins. Co. v. Kip,
Cow.
25; Story on Agency,
162; Episcopal Charitable Society v. Epj/copal Church in Dedham,
Pick. 372; Bank of Columbia v. PatterCranch, 299,
son,
L. Ed. 351; Randall v. Van Vechten, 19
Johns; 60, 10 Am. Dec. 193 Utica Ins. Co. v. Bloodgood,
Wend.
654; Mechanics' Bank v. Bank of Columbia,
Wheat. 334,
L. Ed.
100.
It contended by the plaintiff in error, that an act of an agent,
to be binding upon his principal, must be done in the name of the
principal and, inasmuch as the name of the principal does nowhere
cannot be evidence to charge the principal, the
appear on this bill,
Merchants' Bank of Macon, formerly the Bank of Hawkinsville.
The bill
payable to the order of Scott Cray, agent; drawn by
Cowles, upon the cashier of the Fulton Bank, New York; ao
ance waived, and endorsed "Scott Cray, Agent."
The inference drawn from the paper is, that Scott Cray acted as
agent for some person, or corporation, hnt who, or what, <loes not
The name of his principal does not appear. The general
appear.
rule
this: in order to bind
principal, on
contract made
an
must purport, on its face, to be tin- contract of the prinagent,
cipal; and his name must he inserted in it, and signed to it.
that tin- agent be described as such in the instrument.
147; Pale) on Agency, by Lloyd, 180, 181,
'it. 629, 3d edition.

I'. it of the opinion

Is

i

§

enough

Story on Agency,

i
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On the trial the agency of Scott Cray was proven by the
ant below.
books of the bankX^Error was alleged upon various grounds, chiefly
because the bill did n§t bind the bank, as its name nowhere appeared
upon the instrument. I
Xisbet, J. 8 Ther£ are two counts in the plaintiff's writ: One
founded on the bill of exchange, the other for money had and re•1.
The testimony proves that the bill was discounted by the
Central Bank, at the instance of Scott Cray, for the Bank of Hawkinsville ; that the money was paid to him, and deposited in the
agency of the Hawkinsville Bank at Macon, to the credit of Jerry
Cowles, the drawer; and that two-thirds of it was applied in extinguishment of a debt due by him to the Hawkirfsville Bank; the
balance, Mr. Cowles was permitted to check out.
Under this state
of facts, if it is conceded that the Merchants' Bank of Macon is not
liable to pay this bill, upon the endorsement of Scott Cray, yet it is,
in our opinion, liable upon the common count, upon principles ex
/aequo et bono.

omitted.
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-

This rule applies, more particularly, to solemn instruments under
1; and as to them, to use the language of Judge Story, it is "reguFor, so far as
larly true." Inn n>u universally true in all its extent.

a

is

8

5,

2

is

a

If

§

it

it,

regards instruments under seal, there are some exceptions to some
Although the rule is thus strict as
of the requirements of the rule.
t<> sealed instruments,
yet a more liberal rule obtains as to unsolemn
In such
instruments, especially commercial and maritime contracts.
-. in furtherance
of the public policy of encouraging trade, if it
that the true object
he collected,
can. upon the whole instrument,
and intent <^i it are. to hind the principal, and not merely the agent,
however informally
courts of justice will Jkdopt that construction of
This
commercial
on
154.
Story
Agency,
may he expressed.
laid down.
rule
last
under
not
under
and
comes
the
seal,
contract,
and aplus
contract,
intends
to
bind
principal,
an agent, in
parol
bound.
/Wheaton's
to
as
the
Selwyn,
principal
act
agent,
pears
Fairf. (11 Me.) 267, 26
Am. Ed.; Andrews v. Estcs,
823, note
Pick. 56;
Am. Dec. 521; New England Ins. Co. v. De Wolf,

?/

it

it

is

it

is

is

is

is

is

it

It

appears from the face
may be stated generally, that where
of the paper, that the credit
not given to the agent, and the name
disclosed at the time of the transaction, and the act
rincipal
bound.
The queswithin the powers of the agent, the principal
bound, does not affect this question, for
tion whether the agent
there are many cases where both principal and agent are bound.
was the intent
Now,
apparent on this bill of exchange, that
of the parties to bind Scott Cray's principal: else why make
payIt
able to him as agent, and why take his endorsement as agent
still more manifest that he does appear to act as agent. Th/e testimony upon the trial, too, is, that the name of his principal was disclosed to the Central Bank at the time the bill was discounted.
We
hold, too, that upon parol contract, where the intent
not suffito be bound, the defect can be supciently clear that the principal
A party cannot be discharged, who
plied
parol testimony.
apnew party may be introduced
parently liable on the contract, but
Aug. and Ames, 236, 237; Mechanics' Thank v. Bank of
by parol.
Wheat. 326,
mbia,
L. Ed. 100; Mott v. Hicks,
Cow. 536,
13 Am. Dec. 550;
Emerson v. Providence Hat Mfg. Co., 12 Mass.
Am. Dec. 66; Hodgson v. Dexter,
Cranch, 345,
240.
L. Ed.
130:
Meeson
Adolphus
Ellis, 4S6;
Welsby Kxcheq.) 440.
Story on Agency, 190, 191, 334-336.
The testimony on the trial shows that
was the intent of the
parties to hind the Bank of Hawkinsville
by this endorsement.
*
Affirmed.
is

2

(

1

&

*

*

it

8

&

6

7

1

5

5

a

1

by

is

is

is

is

•A discriminating review of the cases
given in Forsyth v. Day. 41 Me.
382 (1856), ante, i>. "';. and
still more extensive one may lie found in Sbuey
v. Adair, 18 \.
51 Pac. 388, :".> I.. K. A. it::. 63 Am. St. Rep. 879 (1S97).
a
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Angel! and Ames, 235-237.
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BEAUPRE.

Court of Minnesota,

18(38.

13

Minn.

1ST

[Gil.

177].)

(1,400) of flour, and transport the same and deliver to Capt. M. P.
Small, commissary of subsistence for the United States, on the levee
in St. Paul, at such time as he, the said Small, shall direct, for the
sum of 25 cents for each barrel so transported and delivered in good
Temple & Beaupre,
order.
[Signed]
"Agents Steamer Flora.

"B. F. Pratt."
The words, "agents steamer Flora," attached to the signature of
The rule is, that
Temple & Beaupre, are descriptio personarurrU
when words which may be either descriptive of {the person, or indic-

ative of the character in which a person contracts, are affixed to the
name of a contracting party, prima facie they are descriptive of the
10
but the fact that they were not intended by the parperson only;
ties as descriptive of the person, but were understood as determining
the character in which the party contracted may be shown by extrinsic evidence, but the burden of proof rests upon th\ party seeking
to change the prima facie character of the contract. \ And when a

'•'

io a signature, "l». EL, Agent for the Churchman," has Been held to Inbo
dicate probably, merely a memorandum to Bhow from what/fund the note
t<> pay the aote.
higned should be paid, and i- bind the agenl personally
See extended dis.-usx. v. 571, Seld. Notes, 253 (1854).
I... win v. Walton,
Mining Co., •"'■»Mont. LI, mi Pac. L59
v. Greenwood
in Knlppenberg
Bion

11

n

Is

II

II

I.

7

.v

I.

8

•

5)

l

,
;

N

i:

s

H

n

Is

!

a

g

it

superin
"president,
to treal «ii" words "agent,
is unreasonable
Th.it
persons has often been suggested.
:is mere descriptive
tendent," "manager,"
in
siguj
Whatever may be the custom in England, in the United States men
are ool wont thus t<» designate their rank or call
Lng business Instruments
ever,
rarely,
artificial,
and
highly
m
„d when Bucb terms are used
Thes
of the per on.
i,, accord with the facts, to regard them as descriptive
the capacitj In which he acts, and
are always Intended as descriptio
eems absurd
principal
on the paper anything appears to show who this
stended discussion m Sec
See
,„,) to give effect to tins evident Intent.
\.
Bank v. Midland Steel Co., 155 Ind. 581, 58 v E. 833, 52
Sal
.,
Gerber vi
Mchols,
Cal. 535, 68 Am. Dec. 280 (1857);
iy re
307
The great weight of authorltj Is, however, the
Mont. 172 (1870).
Stuart
102 [nd. 143, other way though with much conflict, Avery v. Dougherty,
Lamar calls the
For what Mr. Justii
123, 52 Am. Rep. 680 (1*
the valuable review in Falls v. Moel
"anarchy of the authorll
Ed 266 (1888).
507
*u\<- Ct. 1310, 32

I
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McMillan, J. This action is brought by the plaintiff to recover
damages for an alleged breach of a contract to transport and deliver
certain flour. The contract is in the following words :
"St. Paul. May 6, 1863.
Paul,
Ramsey county. Minnesota,
"We, Temple & Beaupre, of St.
for the consideration of $25 to us in hand paid, the receipt whereof is
have bargained, agreed, and contracted with
hereby acknowledged,
B. F. Pratt, of St. Peter, to receive at his mill in St. Peter, county
of Nicollet, state aforesaid, one thousand and four hundred barrels
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party who thus seeks to change the prima facie character of the contract, socks to do so on the ground of agejney in making the contract, the fact of his agency must be established, for if he acted as
an agent without authority he is personally
liable.
the trial of this cause the only evidence was me deposition on
The defendant offered no evidence. There
the part oi the plaintiff.
the fact of the agency of Temple &
is no evidence to establish
In the absence of evidence to prove that fact, those porBeaupre.
tions of the deposition of the plaintiff indicated by the letters A, B,
they might be
C, respectively, although under other circumstances
competent as evidence tending to show that the plaintiff contracted
They were therefore properly
with them as agents, are not material.
stricken out.
This determines the only point raised by the appellant's counsel.
The judgment below is affirmed.

SECTION 5.— PAROL EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN

HIGGINS
(Court of Exchequer,

v.

SENIOR. 11

1841.

8 Mees.

& W. 834.)

Special assumpsit for compensation for the non-delivery of iron.
Defendant claimed he contracted only as agent.
Parke, B. The question in this case, which was argued before
us (Parke, Alderson, Gurney, and Rolfe, BB.) in the course of
the last term, may be stated to be, whether in an action on an agreement in writing, purporting on the face of it to be made by the de-

fendant, and subscribed by him, for the sale and delivery by him of
goods above the value of £10, it is competent for the defendant to discharge himself, on an issue on the plea of non assumpsit, by proving
that the agreement was really made by him by the authority of and
as agent for a third person, and that the plaintiff knew those facts, at
Upon considerathe time when the agreement was made and signed.
tion, we think that it was not : and that the rule for a new trial must
he discharged.
There is no doubt, that where such an agreement is made, it is
competent to show that one or both of the contracting parties were

ii Accord: Barrow v. Home Produce Co. (C. C.) 57 Fed. 463 (1893), in
which Baker, J., quotes ;it large from leading authorities; Weston v. McDredge Co., 118 Cal.
.Milliin. 42 Wis. 567 (1877);
So. Pac. Co. v. Von Schmidt
In Schenck
368, 50 Pac. 650 (1897); Higgins v. Dellinger, 22 Mo. 397 (1856).
v. Spring Lake Ii<-;ich Imp. Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 44, 19 Atl. ssi (IMtO), the doctrine
is denied, but this seems to conflict with I'.orcherliiis v. Katz, 37 N. J. Eq.
150 (1883), and Smith v. Felter, 63 X. J. Law, 30, 42 Atl. 1053 (1899).
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1

7

§

QODD.PB.& A.
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it

if

by

i

it

2, in

.

3

it

a

pearing to be the principal buyer; but there being evidence that the
defendant fraudulently put forward Read as the buyer, whom he knew
to be insolvent, in order to pay
debt from Read to himself with the
goods purchased, and having subsequently got possession of them,
was held, on the principle of Mill v. Perrott,
Taunt. 274, and other
that the defendant was liable; and .-is
observed
Mr. Smith,
the very able work to which we ;ire referred, (Leading Cases, vol.
125,) that decision turned altogether upon the fraud, and
had not,
would have been an authority for the admission of parol
evidence to charge the defendant not to discharge Read.
Rule discharged.
p.
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&

;

is

a

is

it

it,
it

agents for other persons, and acted as such agents in making the contract, so as to give the benefit of the contract on the one hand to (Garrett v. Handley, 4 B. & Cr. 664; Bateman v. Phillips, 15 East, 272), and
charge with liability on the other (Paterson v. Gandasequi, 15 East, 62,
post, p. 73S), the unnamed principals ; and this, whether the agreement
be or be not required to be in writing by the Statute of Frauds : and
this evidence in no way contradicts the written agreement.
It does
not deny that it is binding on those whom, on the face of
purports
to bind; but shows that
also binds another, by reason that the act
of the agent, in signing die agreement, in pursuance of his authority,
in law the act of the principal.
But, on the other hand, to allow evidence to be given that the party
who appears on the face of the instrument to be personally
connot such, would be to allow parol evidence to contracting party,
tradict the written agreement which cannot be done. And this view
of the law accords with the decisions, not merely as to bills of exchange
C.
(Sowerby v. Butcher,
M. 371
Tyr. 320; Lefevre v. Lloyd,
Taunt. 749;
Marsh. 318) signed by
person, without stating his
agency on the face of the bill but as to other written contracts, nameAd.
ly, the cases of Jones v. Littledale,
Ell. 486, Nev.
A. 677,
and Magee v. Atkinson,
M.
W. 440.
true that the case of
Jones v. Littledale might be supported on the ground that the agent
really intended to contract as principal; but Lord Denman, in delivering the judgment of the court, lays down this as
general proposithe agent contracts in such
tion, "that
form as to make himself
personally responsible, he cannot afterwards, whether his principal
were or were not known at the time of the contract, relieve himself
from that responsibility." And this
also laid down in Story on
269.
Agency,
direct authority, and cannot be
Magee v. Atkinson
distinguished from this case.
The case of Wilson v. Hart,
Taunt. 295,
Moore, 45, which was
cited on the other side,
clearly distinguishable.
The contract
writing was, on the face of it. with another person named Read, ap-

Tin: AUTHORITY

466

(Tart

2

BARBRE \. GOOD \1M
[Supreme

Action on

Court

<>r Oregon,

LS96.

28 Or.

465,

38

Pac. »'>T.•<:: Pac. T.ts.)

contract fur logs, executed under seal, by G. W. HandAfter about three-fourths of the logs had
Goodale.
J.
been delivered Goodale refused to take any more, and Barbre sues to
recover under the contract upon parol evidence that 1 landsaker was
Barbre's agent, and had signed the contract in his name instead of I'.arbre's by consent oi defendant.
Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant
appeals.
* * The
Wolverton, J. ia
is
here
question
presented
whether it is competent to show by parol testimony that a contract executed by and in the name of an agent is the contract of the principal,
where the principal was known to the other contracting party at the
date of its execution.
There are two opinions touching the question
among American authorities, — the one affirming, and the other denyGenerated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
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saker and

a

C.

ing : lint the ease is one of first impression here, and we feel constrained
to adopt the rule which may seem the more compatible with the promotion of justice, and the exaction of honest and candid transactions
between individuals.
The English authorities are agreed that parol
evidence is admissible to show that a written contract executed in the
name of an agent u* the contract of the principal, whether he was
known or unknown ; And the American authorities are a unit so far as
the rule i- applied 'to an unknown principal, but disagree where he
was known at the time the contract was executed or entered into by
All the authorities, both English and American, concur in
the parties.
holding that, as applied to such contracts executed when the principal
was unknown, parol evidence which shows that the agent who made
the contract in his own name was acting for the principal does not
contradict the writing, but simply explains the transaction ; for the
effect is not to show- that the person appearing to be bound is not
bound, but to show that some other person is bound also. And those
authorities which deny the application of the rule where the principal
was known do not assert or maintain that such parol testimony tends
to vary or contradict the written contract, but find support upon the
doctrine of estoppel; it being maintained that a party thus dealing
with an agent of a known principal elects to rely solely upon the agent's
and is therefore estopped to proceed against the prinresponsibility,
cipal.
The underlying principle, therefore, upon which the authorities seem
to diverge, is the presumption created by the execution of the contract in the name of the agent, and the acceptance thereof by a party,
where the principal is known.
Is this presumption conclusive, or is it
■-

Part "f the opinion

Is omitted.
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and may not be extended to negotiable instruments and specialties under seal, as they constitute an exception to the rule.
As bearing upon
these deductions, see 1 Am. & Eng. Knc. Law. 392 : l">riggs v. Partridge,
64 X. Y. 362, 363, 21 Am. Rep. 617; Nicoll v. Burke, 78 N. Y. 583;
New Jersey Steam Xav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 380, 12 L.
Ed. 465; Nash v. Towne, 5 Wall. 703, 18 L. Ed. 527; Stowell v. Eldred. 39 Wis. 626; Chandler v. Coe, 54 X. II. 561 ; Ford v. Williams.
21 How. 289, 16 L. Ed. 36; Hunter v. Giddings, 97 .Mass. 41, 93 Am.
Dec. 54; Trueman v. Loder, 11 Adol. & E. 589; Higgins v. Senior, 8
v. Dobell, L. R. 6 C. P. 486; Mechem, Ag. §§
instrument is valid without a seal, although executed under seal, it is to be treated as written evidence of a simple
contract; and the seal adds nothing, except, under our statute, it is
made primary evidence of a consideration.
Stowell v. Eldred, supra;
Byington v. Simpson, 134 Mass. 169, 45 Am. Rep. 514; Rector, etc.,
v. Wood, 24 Or. 404, 34 Pac. 18, 41 Am. St. Pep. S60.
Now, looking to the contract which is the basis of
cause of acwas executed in manner and
tion under consideration, we find that
the defendant, and to subserve
form as requested
special purpose
peculiar to his own interest, with the express avowal that
should he
treated as the contract of plaintiff, although executed in the name of
further disclosed thai both the defendant
Handsaker, the agent.
and the plaintiff afterwards so treated it: the plaintiff proceeding unobedience with the terms and conditions thereof,
der it. and
cutting, hauling, and hanking the logs preparatory to delivery, and the
defendant
making payments to him from time to time, sometimes

Mees. & W. 84J
699.

;

Calder

If

an

is

by

in

in

It

it

a

by

it

\jne

44'->, 698,

Is

it

If

In

it
i

•

it
i

a

>

i

Is

I

8.

•

ia Si. in. courts limit the operation of Hiis rule to cases where the principal
Ford \. Williams, <'.- U.
whs undisclosed
(21 How.) 287, L6 I.. Ed. .",<".
upon their face, Arm
p.ist. p. 791, mi. others to contracl
doubtful
(1858),
It the contracl clearlj
Btrong v. Andrews. 109 Mich. 537, 67 v W. 567 (1896).
not admissible
I" fasten liability on an
liable parol evidence
who
l-jt
(1884); Vail \. Kortb
Rowell v. Oleson, 32 Minn. 288, •_'<»x. w.
other.
The rule can have no
western L. ins. «'.>.. 192 in. 567, 61 N. E. 651 (1901).
•■in which the agent bad uo authority
application to ^
to contracl
for the
principal and has contracted In iii own nam.'. Estrella Vineyard Co. \. Bui
I.t, 125 Cal. 232, 57 Pac. 980 (1899),
entlal thai the agenl sign the paper in the principal's mime,
nol
enough
though of course he should do so.
the bodj of the paper
irs thai the note
the note of the principal.
Haskell v. Cornish, 13 Cal.
ir. (1859).
Pentz v. Stanton, 10 Wend. 271, 25 Am. Dec 558 (1833).
•
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Without attempting to reconcile the decisions, 13 we bedisputable?
lieve the better rule to be that the presumption thus created is a disputable one, and that the intention of the party must be gathered from
his words, and the various circumstances which surround the transaction, as its practical effect is to promote justice and fair dealing.
The principal may have recourse to the same doctrine to bind the party
thus entering into contract with his agent. Parol evidence, however,
is not admissible to discharge the agent, as the party with whom he
has dealt has his election as to whether he will hold him or the prinThis doctrine must be limited to simple contracts,
cipal responsible.

THE
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2

and sometimes through Handsaker, the agent. This is ratification, and constitutes a very significant feature of the inquiry. Aside
from this, the contract discloses upon its face that a part of the consideration for these logs moved directly from defendant to plaintiff.
Under these attendant circumstances, and others which might be alluded to, we think the court committed no error in admitting the testimony
to show who were the real parties to the contract, as well as to explain how the clause touching the $1,700 came to be placed therein.
The admission o\ the parol evidence touching this clause may be upheld as being explanatory of the consideration which in part supports
* * * Affirmed.
the contract.

directly,

RICHMOND LOCOMOTIVE & MACHINE WORKS
MORAGNE.
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(Supreme

Court of Alabama,

189S.

119

Ala.

80,

24

South.

v.

834.)

Action on two notes signed, "J- M. Moragne, W. B. Beeson, G. W.
Wharton, Board of Business Managers." Defense, that defendants
were agents of the Etowah Alliance Manufacturing Company, an
Alabama corporation, that plaintiff knew this, and so dealt with them
Plainin selling some machinery and taking these notes for the price.
tiff demurred, the demurrer was overruled, and plaintiff appeals.
McClELLAN, J. If an agent, in the execution of a promissory
note, disclose his principal, make it appear on the face of the paper
that it is the contract of the principal, and sign it as agent, of course
the principal is bound, the undertaking being within the agency ; and
14
On the other hand, if a principal is not disclosed
the agent is not.

n The distinction between negotiable paper and other simple contracts is
Stated, and extensively illustrated, in Williams v. Robbins, 82 Mass. (16 Gray)
77. 77 Am. ]>••<•.396 (1860), and Bank of British North America v. Hooper,
To make liable on commercial
71 Mass. (5 Gray) 567, 66 Am. Dec. 390 (1856).
paper persons whose names do not appear upon it is alarming. It is important
and the parties liable, from the face of
w parties to know the security,
Fenn v. Harrison, 37 R. 761 (1790); Wheeled Scraper Co. v. Mcthe bill
Millan. 71 Neb. 686, 99 N. W. 512 (1904); Sydnor v. Hurd, 8 Tex. 98 (1S52).
<T. Carpenter
v. Farnsworth, 106 Mass. 561, 8 Am. Rep. 360 (1871), in which
the words ".Etna Mills" printed in the margin of a check was held enough
to make the check the obligation of the .Etna Mills, and not of the agent
ed the check "I. D. Farnsworth, Treasurer," with Casco Nat. Bank
v. Clark, 139 N. V. 310, 34 N. E. 908, 36 Am. St. Rep. 705 (1893), in which it
was held thai the appearance of "Ridgewood Ice Co." in the margin of a note
was nol a Cad carrying any presumption that the note was, or was intended
to be, one of that company.
Endorsement on aegotiable paper payable to a corporation by the proper
of the
□ held to be the Indorsement
agents In their own names has often i
And so with drafts
Lay v. Austin, 25 Fla. 933, 7 South. I 13 (1889).
company.
Chipman v. Foster, lis* Mass. i^'-i H875). The difference
drawn by the agent
between a maker of paper and the Endorser, or the drawer of a bill of ex•■ Ls emphasized
in Collins v. Buckeye
State Ins. Co., 17 Ohio St. 215,
The acceptor of a bill, however, is treated like the
Robinson v. Kanawha Valley Bank,
miikcr of a note, and not like an Indorser.
Slawson v. Loring, 5
ihio St Hi. 8 N. K. 583, 58 Am. Rep. 829 (1886);
Allen, 340, 81 Am. Dec. 750 (1862).
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on the face of the paper, and the party signing describes himself as
agent, trustee, or the like, without more, it is the obligation alone of
the party whose name is set to the paper, the superadded word or
words being mere descriptio personse, to be disregarded as surplusage ; and evidence cannot be received to show that he was in fact the
agent or trustee or the like of an undisclosed principal, cestui que
trust, or the like, and that the obligation was that of such other person. And, again, if the paper discloses the names of two parties either
of whom may be the obligor, and it is doubtful from the whole instrument which of the two is intended to be bound, and the signer
describes himself as agent, or as acting in other representative caparol evidence is admissible to show that it is the obligation
of the party named in, but not signing, the paper.
These propositions are not only settled by the great weight of authority in other jurisdictions, but they have been several times declared and reaffirmed by this court, and never departed from, as a
critical examination of the cases relied on by the appellees themselves
Lazarus v. Shearer, 2 Ala. 718; Baker v. Gregwill demonstrate.
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pacity,

ory, 28 Ala. 550, 65 Am. Dec. 366 ; Drake v. Flewellen, 33 Ala. 106 ;
May v. Hewitt, Id. 161 ; Ware v. Morgan, 67 Ala. 461 ; Collins v.
Hammock, 59 Ala. 448. In all these cases, where parol evidence was
let in, the names of two or more possible obligors appear on the face
of the instrument in such way as to render it doubtful from the paper itself which of them was intended to be bound, the question being
thus brought within the category last above stated. This is not true
of the instrument now before us. The only possible obligors upon
it are those whose names are signed to it. The only other name upon
the paper is that of the payee. The name of no other possible obligor
being disclosed, the words, "Board of Business Managers," following
the signatures of the defendants, it being in no wise indicated of
what or of whom they arc business managers, are merely descriptive
of the persons of the signers, and to be wholly disregarded as surThus the case is brought within the second category above
plusage.
stated, and the defendants should not have been allowed to plead or
prove that it was the intention of the parties to the note to bind the
Etowah Alliance Manufacturing Company, of which they were the
board of business managers, and not themselves individually.
The rulings of the trial court were not in line with these views,
The cause is remanded.
and its judgment must be reversed.

Tin:

170

R
(Supreme

aithoki

\\\ LINGS

v.

Courl of Georgia,

Rl

iv

(Part

2

T
>BS< >\ .

1883,

Tt> 6a.

595.)

Crawford,

J. This suit was broughl against Georgia Robson
defendant, i<> recover of her $360, for six tons of commercial
She was sued upon a note given tin.' re for, which was signed
guano.
"I. A. Robson, agenl for wife," and also upon account for guano
for the same amount called for by the note.
When the case was called for trial, the court, on motion of defendant's counsel, dismissed it upon the grounds:
i L) Because the note sued upon was the note of
J. A. Robson, and
not that of his wife, Georgia Rohson.
(2) Because the account sued upon was settled by the note, and
could not he sued Upon.
We think that the court erred in dismissing the suit, on both
the
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grounds.
1. Where one signs a note with his own
name, and nothing appears upon its face to show that he is acting for another, he will he
held personally liable. And so, too, where one signs for another for
whom he has no legal authority, as where he adds to his own name
executor, guardian, or where he simply adds
the word administrator,
is held to be a personal one.
But in
the word agent, the obligation
this case whilst J. A. Robson signs his own, instead of his wife's
name, it is clear that the intent was to sign for and bind the wife,
and that the contract was for her benefit.
We think that this paper
shows two material facts; one, that the debt was the wife's; the other,

that he was her agent to make it. And the failure upon her part, wdien
-tied thereon, to plead non est factum, may well be construed into
an implied admission of his authority to make it.
Where the principal is distinctly indicated, as in this case, on the
face of the paper, such principal, and not the agent, will be the party
The rule, however, is that this must appear in some way;
liable.
the particular form in which it is done is immaterial,
if it in fact
in his or her name, that
be done for the principal, and substantially
will be sufficient. 15 Of course such liability will ahvays depend upon
the right of the agent to bind the principal ; but wherever it exists,
is "When the names of both principal and agenl appear in the Instrument,
and the contract, though in the name of tin- agent, discloses a reference to
tin- business of the principal, so that the Instrument as it stands is con^is! t-ni
with either view. <>t'its being tin- engagement of the principal, or that of the
agent, parol evidence is admissible in a suil against tin- agent to charge him
by showing either that credit was given to him or that he had not authority
to bind the principal, or to discharge him by proving that the consideration
i directly to bis principal," etc.
smith v. Alexander, :;i .Mo. 193 (1860).
A- to when parol evidence may, and when it may not. he admitted, see the
elaborate note in 21 I.. R. A. (N. S.) 1045 to \. V. P. Ins. Co. v. Martindale.
also
75 Kan. L42, 88 Pac. 559, 1-1 Am. St. Rep. 362, 1L' Ann. ('as. 077 (1907);
v. Greenwood
Knippenberg
Min. Co., 39 Mont. 11. 101 Pac. 159 (1909).
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and the paper shows that he is acting for the principal and not for
The note here sued, on its face
himself, the principal will he bound.
forbids the conclusion that J. A. Robson was the principal ; it shows
that he was only an agent, and at the same time for whom he was
This much appearing in the paper itself authorizes the adagent.
mission of parol evidence to show who the wife was, for it is no
attack upon the writing to do this by additional testimony.
See ColHns v. Johnson, 16 Ga. 458; Graham v. Campbell, 56 Ga. 258; People
v. Superior Court of New York, 10 Wend. 292; Parsons, Notes and
Bills. 92, 95, 102 ; Tiller v. Spradley, 39 Ga. 35.
2. Upon the second ground of the defendant's motion to dismiss
the plaintiff's suit, we think that the court also erred.
Section 2867
of the Code declares that bank checks and promissory notes are not
payment until themselves paid.
In the case of Weaver v. Nixon & Wester [69 Ga. 699] , decided
September term, 1882, this court held that "a bill, acceptance or
promissory note, either of the debtor or of a third person, is no payment or extinguishment of the original demand, unless it is expressly
agreed to receive it in payment."
Let the judgment of the court below be reversed.

McGratii,

L893.

A.

95 Mich.
15.

130,

.".
I

Court of Michigan,

K

WIXKGAR.
X.

\v.

i

(Supreme

v.

T(

KEIDAN

001.

20

f

L.

R.

10

J.

Plaintiff had judgment upon the following promGrand
Rapids, Mich., Dec. 22. 1887.
Ninety days after date,
promise to pay to the order of Geo. Keidan
three hundred thirty-six and 96-100 dollars at the )ld National Bank
of Grand Rapids, Mich., value received, with interest at the rate of
eight per cent, per annum until paid. W. S. Winegar, Agt."
Defendant, with his plea, filed an affidavit setting forth "that the
attached to the declaration in said cause, and
note,
copy of which
served upon said deponent, with
not
copy of said declaration,
the note of this deponent, defendant as aforesaid; and he denies the
note:

"$336.96-100.

is

a

a

is

(

1

issory

the execution
thereof, ami says that he, said defendant,
indebted to s
plaintiff upon said note, nor for any pan
thereof, nor i- he indebted to said plaintiff
any sum whatever, n<>r
any manner \vhaie\ it."
'pon the trial def< ndanl offered to show that
188
before plain
tiff had any dealings with defendant, plaintiff was informed that de
fendant was carrying on bu
ent of Maggie <".. Win
and was not doing business for himself; that business relations were
tabli hed between plaintiff and said Maggie G. Winegar; that

and

not

on

it

of the oplnii

n
i

i

Pa rt

ted.

1,

in

in

in

;i
(j
]

is

same

I
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continued from the early part of 1884 to and
and embraced many transactions between
plaintiff and Maggie (".. Winegar; that many instruments wore made
between the parties, which were signed exactly as the note sited upon
gned, and that this form of execution had come to he recogni/.ed
and adopted between the parties as binding Maggie G. Winegar ; that
during that time no business was transacted by the defendant in his
individual capacity, and alt the business done was that of his prineipal. ami known and understood to be such by plaintiff; that the
said note was given and accepted as the obligation of Maggie 0. Winegar; that the note was given for duebills and goods furnished by
plaintiff to Maggie G. Winegar, and such duebills and goods were by
plaintiff charged to said Maggie G. Winegar on the books of plaintiff;
that the taking of these notes did not in the least change the character of the indebtedness;
and that defendant never received any
benefit or consideration
for said note. The court refused to admit
stimony, and directed a verdict for the plaintiff.
The clear weight of authority is that the promise in the present
case is prima facie the promise of William S. Winegar, and, as between one of the original parties and a third party, the addition of
the word "agent" is not sufficient to put such third party upon inquiry.
The question here, however, is whether, as between the immediate
parties to the instrument, parol evidence is admissible to show the real
character of the transaction.
In his excellent work on Agency, Mr. Mechem lays down the following general rules, which we think are sustained by reason and the
weight of authority: "(1) Where the paper, on its face, is the undertaking of the agent only, no reference being made on its face to representative capacity, and where the paper, on its face, is unmistakably
the principal's, parol evidence will not be received, in the one case
to exonerate, and in the other to charge, the agent. (2) But where the
paper bears on its face some reference to a principal, or some appellation indicating representative character, while it is undoubtedly true
that the mere addition of the word 'agent,' 'trustee,' 'treasurer/ and
the like, or the mere recital in the body of the instrument that the person signing is such agent, treasurer, or trustee of a principal named
or unnamed, is, as has been seen, to be regarded, prima facie, as descriptio personae, merely, and not as characterizing the act as one
done in a representative capacity;
and while it is true, as a general
rule, that parol evidence is not admissible to exonerate an agent from
a contract into which he has personally
entered, yet it is believed that
the preponderance of authority will warrant the statement of the
rule that — First, between the immediate parties to a bill or note, parol
evidence is admissible to show (a) that, by a course of dealing between the parties, that form of execution has come to be the recognized and adopted form by which the obligation of the principal
is entered into; or (b) that the instrument was, to the knowledge of
said business
including
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the parties, intended to be the obligation of the principal, and not of
the agent, and that it was given and accepted as such; (c) that an
instrument which is so ambiguous upon its face as to render it uncertain who was intended to be bound was known to be intended to
be the obligation of the principal."
Mechem. Ag. § 443, and cases
cited. See. also 1 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 390, 391.
In Metcalf v. Williams, 104 U. S. 93, 26 L. Ed. 665. Mr. Justice
Bradley says: "The ordinary rule, undoubtedly, is that if a person
merely adds to the signature of his name the word 'agent,' 'trustee.'
or 'treasurer,' without disclosing his principal, he is personally bound.
The appendix is regarded as a mere descriptio personae. It does not
of itself make third persons chargeable with notice of any representative relation of the signer. But if he be in fact a mere agent, trustee,
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or officer of some principal, and is in the habit of expressing in that
way his representative character in his dealings with a particular party,
who recognizes him in that character, it would be contrary to justice
and truth to construe the documents thus made and used as his personal obligation, contrary to the intent of the parties."
In Kean v. Davis, 21 N. J. Law, 683, 47 Am. Dec. 182, Chief Justice Green says : "The question is not, what is the true construction
of the language of the contracting party? Whose language is it? And
the evidence is not adduced to discharge the agent from a personal
liability which he has assumed, but to prove that in fact he never
incurred that liability ; not to aid in the construction of the instrument, but to prove whose instrument it is.
Now, it is true that the
construction of a written contract is a question of law, to be settled
But whether the conby the court upon the terms of the instrument.
tract was in point of fact executed, when it was made, and by whom
it was made, are questions of fact, to be settled by a jury, and are
provable in many instances by parol, even though the proof conflicts
with the language of the instrument itself."
in Hicks v. ilinde, 9 Barb. 528, where an agent drew a bill on his
principal for a debt due from the principal to the payee, adding the
word "agent" to his signature, and the payee knew that the drawer
was authorized by his principal to draw the bill as his agent, and it
was the understanding of all parties thai the drawer signed only as
agent, and not with a view of binding himself, it was held that the
drawer was not personally liable on the bill. 17 * * *

As is so often said, it is the intent of tin- parties which IS to be
carried out by the courts.
The rule that rejects words added to the
signature is an arbitrary one.
Its reason is not SO much that the
word> are not, or may not he, suggestive, hut that they are Inn sug
i» Accord,

in a -nit

Rep.

Hardy v. Pllcher, ."iT
between the parties:
See the •
review in Knlppenberg
1 1, KM Pac. L59 (1909).
Instruments
La*
to descriptio
personam
i: 702, ::i I. R \. (N. B.) :<i^. post, p. 667

132 (1879).
Co., 39 Mont

wood Mil.
Effect '•! Negotiable

Vint.

u

Miss,

in

v. Green-

Haupl \.
(1911).

ill
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gestive, and the instrument, as a whole, is nol sufficiently complete
to point to other parentage.
The very suggestiveness of these added
words has given rise to an irreconcilable confusion in the authorities
• the
legal effect o\ such an instrument.
Extrinsic evidence, therefore, is admissible in such case, between the immediate parties, to explain a suggestion contained on the Face of the instrument, and to
carry out the contract actually entered into as suggested, hut not fully
shown, by the note itself.
The presumption that persons dealing with negotiable instruments
take them on the credit of the parties whose names appear should not
he absolute in favor of the immediate payee, from whom the consideration passed, who must he deemed to have known all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the inception of the note, and with such
In the case
knowledge accepted a note containing such a suggestion.
of Tilden v. Barnard, 43 Mich. 376, 5 N. W. 420, 38 Am. Rep. 197,
under a state of facts similar to those offered to be shown here, it
was held that defendants there were not liable.
We think that in the present case defendant was entitled to make
Under the general issue, defendant was entitled
the showing offered.
to give in evidence any matter of defense going to the existence of
1 Shinn, PI. & Pr.
any promise having legal force, as against him.
§ 740.

The judgment

justices

is reversed,

and a new

LIEBSCHER
<Supreme

trial ordered.

The other

concurred.

Court of Wisconsin,
496,

1889.
17

Am.

74

v.

KRAUS.

Wis.

St. Rep.

387,

43

N. W. 166, 5 L. R. A.

171.)

Ortox, J. This action was brought on the following promissory
note:
'So37.40. Milwaukee, January 1st, 1887.
Ninety days after date
we promise to pay to Leo Liebscher, or order, the sum of six hundred and thirty-seven dollars and forty cents, value received.
"San Pedro Mining and Milling Company,

"F. Kraus, President."
The plaintiff demands judgment on this note against both the corThe defendant
poration and Frederick Kraus, as joint makers.
Kraus answered that he signed the note for the said San Pedro Mining & Milling Company, as its president, and not otherwise, and
that his signature was placed upon said note for the purpose of
showing who executed the same on behalf of said company, and as
a part of the corporation signature to the note, and for no other
The plaintiff offered to prove on the trial, substantially,
purpose.
that Kraus did not sign the name of the company, but signed his
own name as a joint maker, intending to hind himself, and that this
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is

is

is

if,

was according to the understanding of the parties at the time. This
offer was rejected, and a verdict in favor of Kraus was directed by
This evidence is admissible only on the ground that there
the court.
is an ambiguity in the signatures to the note.
If, in the law, this
signing imports that both the company and Kraus are jointly bound,
or that only the company is bound, there is no ambiguity, and parol
evidence to alter or vary this effect is inadmissible.
But
in the
law, such signing imports only that both are bound, or the companv
bound, according to the facts and circumstances
only
in explanation of it, and the intention or understanding of the parties, then
there
an ambiguity, and the evidence was proper.
The contention of the learned counsel of the appellant that this
signing imports that both are bound
inconsistent with the offer
of such evidence.
The learned counsel of the appellant has expressed, in his brief, the true principle as follows: "As to the ques-

6

<>

is

it

is

it

it

a

it

There appears to be an inconsistency in cases where
first held
that such
note ipso facto binds the person who signed
witli his
official name, and yet that parol evidence might be given to make
certain.
Heffner v. Brownell, 70 Iowa, 591, 31 X. W. ')47. This
case
mentioned as the only one in which
has been decided that
such signing binds the person as well as the corporation; but there

a

I

it

is

a

it

6

would seem to be somewhat of an ambiguity in the opinion.
In
Bean v. Mining Co., 66 Cal. 451,
Pac. 86, 56 Am. Rep. bid,
seems
to have been decided that
similar note hound the company alone,
cited,
but that parol evidence was proper to explain it.
No case
can find none, where
has been decided squarely thai such
and

<

note bound both the company and the person whose name appi
below, with the name of his office or agency, or bound the company
alone, excepl the case of Chase v. Pattberg, 12 Daly, 171, where the
note was; "\\'e promise to pay," etc.
"[Signed] English S. M. !o.

II. Pattberg, Manager;"

it

and
was decided that the companv was
bound, and that Pattberg was.
The authorities are generally the other way. In Draper v. Steam
Allen, 338, tin- note was: "We promise to pay," etc.
Heating Co.,
mi
hating Company.
"[Signed] Massachu
I.. S. Puller,
Treasurer."
In
astle v. Foundr) ('<>.. 72 Me. 167,
was: "We
promise to pay," etc., "at ■■
Belfast Foundry Company.
[Signed
W. W. ("astle. President."
Belfasl
In
Poundrj Company.
Falk v. Moebs, 127 (J. S. 597,
was:
Sup. Ct. 1319, 32 I.. Ed. 266,
I

it

I

5

not

it

8

|
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is

a

is

tion of parol evidence, the rule of law
that such evidence cannot
be admitted to vary the terms of
contract, or to show contrary in'tion than that disclosed by the instrument, unless there
an ambiguity." This has been often decided to be the law by this court.
Foster v. Clifford, 44 Wis. 569, 28 Am. Rep. 603; Cooper v. Cleghorn, 50 Wis. 113,
X. W. 491; Hubbard v. Marshall, 50 Wis. 322,
X. W. 497; Gillmann v. Henry, 53 Wis. 470. 10 X. W. 692.

THE

(Tart

2

to pay," etc., "to the cr.lcr of Geo. Moebs, Sec. &
"[ Signed | Peninsular Cigar Co. Geo. Moebs, Sec.
ddiese notes
& Treas.," and indorsed "Geo. Moebs, Sec. & Treas."
were held to be unambiguous, and not explainable by parol evidence,
and the notes of the companies alone.
Many other easrs of similar
See,
rig are found in the above cases and in the text-books.
Mechem, Ag. ^ 439; 1 Rand. Co,,,. Paper, 188; 1 Daniel, Neg.
1
[nst. §§ - "" 305; Gillel v. Bank, 7 111. App. 499; Scanlan v. Keith,
Latham v. Flonr-Mills, 68 Tex. 127,
102 111. 634, 40 Am. Rep. 624;
3 S. W. 462;
Store. Ag. § 154; Pars. Notes & B. 312.
'ldie question comes very near, if not quite, having been decided
by this court in Houghton v. Bank, 26 Wis. 663, 7 Am. Rep. 107,
where it is held that an indorsement on a note not belonging to the
bank, by ''Geo. Buckley, Cas.," he being cashier of the bank, bound
the bank and not himself.
In Bank v. Bank, 16 Wis. 120, it is held
that a note signed by "J. H. Sidmore, Cash.," bound the bank alone.
In Rockwell v. Bank, 13 Wis. 653, where the bank promises to pay
in the body of the note, and it is signed only by "D. D. Spencer,
shier, it was held that the bank only was bound.
The principle of these authorities seems to be "that if the agent
sign the note with his own name alone, and there is nothing on the
face of the note to show that he was acting as agent, he will be personally liable ; but if his agency appears with his signature, then his
principal only is bound." Here the corporation could not sign its
own name, and it is not otherwise shown on the face of the note
than that Kraus signed the corporate name, and by adding the word
"President" to his own name he shows conclusively that as president
of the corporation he signed the note, and not otherwise.
Such is
the natural and reasonable construction of these signatures, and so
it would be generally understood. The affix, cashier, secretary, president, or agent, to the name of the person sufficiently indicates and
shows that such person signed the bank or corporate name, and in
that character and capacity alone. The use of the word "by" or "per"
or "pro" would not add to the certainty of what is thus expressed. It
is not common to use these words in ■commercial
business.
It is
sufficiently understood that the paper is signed by the officer or agent
named, and for the corporation.
But it is useless to prolong this discussion.
It is almost too plain for argument.
The note was that of
the corporation alone, signed by Kraus as its president.
The circuit court properly rejected the offer of parol proof, and
correctly instructed the jury to find a verdict in favor of Kraus. The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 18

"We

promise

Treas.,

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

AUTHORITY

at/

1

etc.

is An Instructive discussion

in Guthrie v. Imbrie, 12 Or. 1S2, 6
read: "$500. Portland,
to pay to David Guthrie,
or order, ninety days after date, five bundred dollars in U. S. gold coin, without Interest
[Signed] James Imbrie, Pres't.
[Seal.] J. J. Imbrie, Sec. G. M.
is found

53 Am. Rep. ::::i (1885),
The aote sued on
a, July 8, i s 7.~>. For value received, we promise
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SECTION 6.— EFFECT OF VARIOUS FORMS OF

EXECUTION

TUCKER MFG.
Judicial

(Supreme

CO. v.

FAIRBANKS.

Court of Massachusetts,

1867.

98

Mass. 101.)

bill of exchange: "Boston, March 23,
after date pay to the order of Messrs.
months
$4,46976.
1866.
four hundred and sixty-nine
thousand
four
&
Co.
Tucker
Hiram
the same to the account
received,
and
dollars,
charge
value
76/100
oF David Fairbanks and Co., Agts. Piscataqua F. & M. Ins. Co.
To Piscataqua F. & M. Ins. Co., So. Berwick, Me." The draft was
"accepted wFTrie" Treasurer, David Fairbanks, President," and was
Action_on

the

following

Two

"Payable in Boston, Hiram Tucker & Co."
J." * * * 3. The question whether the defendants are
The
liable upon the face of the bill requires more consideration.
must
which
difficulty is not in ascertaining the general principles
govern cases of this nature, but in applying them to the different
forms and shades of expression in particular instruments. In order
to exempt an agent from liability upon an instrument executed by
him within the scope of his agency, he must not only name his
principal, but he must express by some form of words that the writing is the act of the principal, though done by the hand of the agent.'
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indorsed,

Gray,

If

expresses this, the principal is bound, and the agent is not.
But a mere description of the general relation or office which the
>n signing the paper holds to another person or to a corporation, without indicatin g that the particular signature is made in the
execution of the office and agency, is not sufficient to charge the
Amid the
principal or to exempt the agent From personal liability.
he

great variety of language which may be used by merchants in haste
or thoughtlessn< ss, ignorant <>r unmindful of legal rules, or not anticipating the importance of holding one party rather than the Other
The
The seal was that of the Granger Market Company, a corporation.
mint held that, bul tor the seal, there is nothing which purports to bind the
The words, "President," "Sec. Q. m. Co.," are merelj descrip
corporation.
They do not disclose the name of any principal, and are, In
Ho persona?.
ui
Bui the seal on the face of the note calls for extrai
fad too Indefinite.
n musl be assumed it was put there
proof to Bhow why it \\:is put there,

Co."

\
Bradlee, 166 Mass. 28, 30 N
See, also, Brown
e.
ol
32 Am St Rep. 130 (1802), and Reeve v. First Nat Bank
R. \. i 13, 33 \m. St Rep. 675
,.,,,, :,i
.(. Law, 208, 23 Ail. 863, 16 I
\
11. ii i ,. i- v Brownell, 70 Iowa, 591, 83 N. W. 947 (1887), and Bean
■
neer Mining Co., 66 Cal. 161, 6 Pac 36, 56 \m. Rep. 106 (1885), re|
,, h i natures.
On this the later Iowa
VT Iowa, 246, 64 N. W. 226, 18 I
of MathewN v. Dubuque Mat
i;
See the dissenting opinion,
ting.
676 (1893), 1
i • Part of the opinion Is omitted.

for
,-,

,

some purpo
|;
\ 5og

nviii

l

\.
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responsible, it musl often happen thai cases fall very near the dividing line; and, in order to maintain uniformity of decision, it is necessary for the court to refer to the cases already adjudicated, especially
within its own jurisdiction.
rhe authority which at first sighl seems most strongly to support
the position ni the defendants is thai of Ballou v. Talbot, 16 .Mass.
461, 8 Am. Dec. l-h>. in which a note signed "Joseph Talbot, Agent
for David Perry," was held not to hind Talbot personally.
That case
has since been recognized
and followed
in this Commonwealth.
(
.lefts v. York, -I Cush. 372, 50 Am. Dec. 7 >1 ; Page v. Wight, 14 Allen, 182.
But the important and effective word in Ballou v. Talbot
was not the word "agent," nor the name of the principal, but the connecting word "for." which might indeed indicate merely the relation
which the agent held to the principal; but which was equally apt to
express the fact that the act was done in behalf of the principal, in the
same manner as if the words had been transposed thus:
"For David
Terry. Joseph Talbot, Agent."
See Deslandes v. Gregory, 2 El. &
1.1. 602.
This is made manifest by considering that if the word
"agent" had been wholly omitted, and the form of the signature had
been simply "Joseph Talbot, for David Perry," or "For David Perry,
Joseph Talbot," it would have been well executed as the contract of
the principal, even if it had been under seal, and of course not less
so in the case of a simple contract.
Long v. Colburn, 11 Mass. 97, 6
Am. Dec. 160; Emerson v. Providence Hat Mfg. Co., 12 Mass. 237,

Am. Dec. 66; Mussey v. Scott, 7 Cush. 215, 54 Am. Dec. 719;
Met. Con. 105, 110.
On the other hand, in Hills v. Bannister, 8 Cow. 31, a note signed by
two persons, with the addition "Trustees of Union Religious Society,
Phelps" (who were a legal corporation), was held to bind the signers
personally: and in Barker v. Mechanic Insurance Co., 3 Wend. 94,
20 Am. Dec. 664, a note signed "John Franklin, President of the
Mechanic Fire Insurance Company," was held on demurrer not to
be the note of the company, although alleged to have been made
within the authority of the president and the scope of the legitimate
business of the corporation; the court saying: "In this case, there is
an averment that the president was lawfully authorized; but it does
not appear that he acted under that authority ; he does not say that
he signs for the company; he describes himself as president of the
company, but to conclude the company by his acts he should have
contracted in their name, or at least on their behalf."
The variation
between the words "for" and "of" seems at first view slight ; but in
the connection in which they are used in signatures of this kind the
difference is .substantial.
"Agent of" or "president of" a corporation
named simply designates a personal relation of the individual to the
corporation.
"Agent for" a particular person or corporation may
nate either the general relation which the person signing holds
to another party, or that the particular act in question is done in
7
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of a receipt, signed "Robert Eastman, Agent for Ward 6, Lowell,
Mass.," if executed under such circumstances as to amount to a conIn Fiske v. Kltract, might be binding on the agent personally.
474,
in a careful review of the cases by Air. Justice
dridge, 12 Gray,
Dewey, the New York decisions above mentioned were quoted with
approval, and a note signed "John T. Eldridge, Trustee of Sullivan
Railroad," was held to be the personal note of Eldridge. In Haverhill Insurance Co. v. Newhall, 1 Allen, 130, a note signed "Cheever
Xewhall, President of the Dorchester Avenue Railroad Company."
was held to bind Xewhall personally, although given by him to an
insurance company (as was expressed in the note itself* in consideration of a policy issued to the railroad corporation, which he was in
See also Fullam
fact authorized to obtain and sign the note for.
Allen, 403:
v. West Brookfield, 9 Allen, 1 ; Morell v. Codding. 4
942;

H. &C.

Christian. 4 I-.l. & Bl. 591; Parker v. Winslow, 7 El. &
X. 540; Bottomley v. Fisher,
Price v. Taylor, 5 11.
,\:

v.

1

Tanner

211. 20

"O. i>.. tor A.
"A- B., by C. D., Agent"
signature
Lazarus v. Shearer,
correct, is equally available.
Exchange Bank v. Lewis County, 28 w. V&. 273 (1886), with
•'Ala
"A. B. [for C. D.]," however, 1ms been held the note of
many Illustrations.
Early v. Wilkinson,
aning.
otherwise the brackets seem t" have
held
Grat, (50 Va.> 68 (1852), and "C. l>.. for A. B.," has sometimes
Rich. 503,
,,, bind »' l» though this was overruled In Robertson v. Pope,
II \m Dec 267(1845). Bui "C. I'.. Agent for A. B.," binds C. I>. Exchange
Lewis Countv, 28 W. Va.. 273 (1886); Tannanl v. Rocky Mt. Nat.
Bank
'<• Witl v. Walton,
N. V 571,
Am. Rep. 156 (1871);
Bank
Colo. 279,
v.
Seld Notes 253 (1854); Dawson v. Cotton, _»". Ala. 591 (1855); Peterson
ll '.Minn. 160, 16 \. W. 303, 20 Am. St Rep. 564 (1890). "C. D. as
Honian
Werner v. Wheeler, L42 App.
Vgenl for A. B." is generallj held to hind A. B.
• Supp. 158 (191
Div. 358, 127 V
signed
xecutlon will be good, even
If the name of the principal
Berkey \. Judd, 22 Minn. 287
though the agent's name is entirely omitted
Western
347 (1835);
Co.,
16 Pick.
,1-t:,,v. Boston
r.ra.llee
Wheeled Scraper Co. v. McMillan, 71 Neb. 6N6, 99 V W. 512 (1904).
acl done under an authoritj muHl he done in pursuance of thai author
if an agenl in nil
Rev. Rep.
Let 32.
(1802).
Sch.
ity. Clinan v. Cooke,
blank note exceedi hia authority, the oote is ool void In toto bul
tng
Miss,
M.)
Bmedes
Johnson v. Blasdale,
only for the excesi amount
will be upheld to
eparable,
If the contract
17.' in Am.
85(1843).
Wis. 57,8 v W.
N. W. Ry. Co.,
the extenl of the authority. Gano v.
and what
no waj to determine whal is authorized
(- (is«0)
there
Bul
,„,,
boteau v. Allen. 7"" Mo. 290 (1N70).
|( wbole execution
though

"f

is

mode

formallj

i
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behalf of and as the very contract of that other; and the court, it
such is manifestly the intention of the parties, may construe the
words in the latter sense. But even "agent for" has been held under
a mere descriptio
personam of the agent, as in
some circumstances
571,
which
the name following these
in
Walton,
X.
Y.
9
De Witt v.
but the name of a
the
name
of
principal,
words was not the proper
behalf, and a
the
on
in
principalis
carried
agent
which
the
newspaper
"'
Churchman,
was held
The
for
"David
Agent
Hoyt,
note signed
to be the note of Hoyt and not of his principal ; and in Shattuck v.
Eastman, 12 Allen, 369, in which it was held that a paper in the form
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Judgment for the plaintiffs.

LOEB
(Supreme

v.

DRAKEFORD.

Court of Alabama,

1883.

75

Ala.

464.)

SomicrvillE, J.
The purpose of the present bill is to claim the
benefit of certain mortgages and other collateral securities placed in
the hands of Lehman, Durr & Co. by one Thomas B. Dryer, in the
latter part of the month of March, in the year 1881.
Dryer was indebted to complainants for advances made to him during that year, and
also for antecedent debts aggregating about two thousand dollars, and
based on previous transactions.
The theory of the bill
that there
is,

21

*

*

.

a

a

a

is

It

*

a

is

is

was an express agreement made by Dryer, during his life-time, that the
old. or pre-existing debt should be paid out of these securities.
The
whole question
as to the existence of such an agreement.
It not
contended that such
contract was made with the deceased in person,
but only with his authorized agents.
claimed, however, that this agreement was authorized by one
Felts, who acted under
written power of attorney executed by Dryer,
and bearing date March 28th, 1881.
The testimony shows very conclusively, that Felts did assent to such an arrangement, claiming his
certain power of attorney, which was at the time
authority under
exhibited to the other contracting parties.
But this was
joint power
of attorney, given to W. G. Campbell, M. B. Swanson and W. W.
authorizing the three to act as agents in this transaction jointly.
Such
power conferred upon several can not be exercised by one
a
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Tt differs
From those just staled.
distinguishable
v. Talbot, in omitting the word "for" (the only evidence,
contained in the note there sued on, that it was made in behalf of the
principal), leaving the words "A.^ts. Piscataqua F. & M. Ins. Co."
as a more description
of the persons signing this hill.
The eases of
Mann v. Chandler, 9 Mass. 335, Despatch Line of Packets v. Bellamy
Manufacturing Co., 12 X. H. 205, 37 Am. Dec. 203, and Johnson v.
Smith, 21 Conn. 627, cannol avail the defendants against the later
decisions of this court.
See Fiske v. Eldridge, 12 Gray, 476; Barlow v. Congregational Society in Lee, 8 Allen, 461, 462. The name
of the principal does not appear in the body of the hill. The address
of the bill to the corporation and the request to them to charge the
amount to the account of the drawers have certainly no tendency to
show that the drawers are the same as the corporation, the drawees.
The fact that the bill was delivered to the plaintiffs by the insurance
company, as shown by the contemporaneous receipt, does not make
The defendants must therefore
it the less the promise of the signers.
as
the drawers of the bill.
he held personally responsible
is nol

- '

Pari of the opinion

is omitted.
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It is required that all
alone, at least in the case of private agencies.
must act together jointly in the execution of such an agency. Cald- f
well v. Harrison, 11 Ala. 755; Story on Agency, § 42; Evans on Agen22
cy (Ewell's Ed.) *32.
a
trust
be delegated by one of such agents to another.
Nor could such
to rely upon the personal integrity and ability
is
supposed
The principal
of each of his selected agents, these qualifications constituting the reaHence, the maxim applies, "Delegatus non delegare/
son of the trust.
Story on Contr. § 127.
We are satisfied from the testimony that neither Campbell nor
They
Swanson concurred with Felts in the execution of this power.
were not personally present at the time, and are not satisfactorily shown
to have afterwards assented to what he did in the attempted execuThe power was not, therefore, legally extion of their joint authority.
ecuted, and the contract made by Felts, acting alone, conferred no lien
in favor of the complainants upon the proceeds of the various collateral
securities placed by Dryer in the hands of Lehman, Durr & Co.
We see nothing in the record authorizing us to infer that any other
person or persons had authority from the deceased either to make or
to ratify the contract attempted to be made between Felts and the complainants, as stated in the bill.
in our judgment, free from error,
The decree of the chancellor
is,

affirmed.

Aid.

628,

D.

B. 248,

7

B.

ARMSTRONG.
&

1822.

v.

1

(Court of Kind's Bench,

5

GUTHRTE

&

it
is

and

E. 0. L.

343.)

underwriter on policy of insurPlea, general issue. At the trial at the last assizes for Northance.
question arose as to the execution of
umberland before Bayley, J.,
In
order to prove this,
power of attorthe policy by the defendant.
a

as

ney signed by the defendant

by

a

a

Assumpsit against the defendant

was produced,

which

he constituted

&

I

-

i
I.
.

a,

P.

T1

4

5

(6

&

22 if the power is given to a.
B. us partners, either may act for the pari
X"erg.) ti (1833);
13 Tenn.
Deakln v. Dn
nershlp.
Gorden v. Buchanan,
Am. St !:<•]>.827 (1887).
U all the
derwood, 37 Minn. 98, 33 X. W. 818,
Bobbins v. Horgan, 192 Mass.
loinl agents consent, then one may ad tor all
- N. E. 503
13,
(1906).
it the authority shows an Intent thai part of the agenta simii act, then
EL Co. v. Stewart,
St
Cedar Baplds
execution
nol necessary.

f>
i>
r1
1

(1868).

\.

n

::
i

I

i

j

b

If

a

is

n

I

:i

5

:i

In

E

I

a

;i

i('

;l11 deliberated
majority may act
nature,
Conn. 50, 10 Am. Dei
Patterson v. Leavltt,
In re Bal
peclally
matters ministerial.
(1821), citing Co. Litt I81h
commltt
The lame rule applies to
Bin. 181 (1813)
nmore Turnpike,
v. Bo
Ibamber of Commerce, 15-1
McNeil
corporation.
directors
of
meeting ua
enough
245, l". !.. B. \. 559 (1891).
majority did at tend
held whlcb all mlghl have attended, and which
majority vote
De
itch Line of Packets
Ided upon
and the
203 (1841).
r. Bellamy Mfg. Co., 12 N. II. 205,37 Am. !>■■<•.

public
When the power is of
had :in opportunity to do bo.

i
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fifteen persons, there named, "his true and lawful attorneys, jointly and
separately for him, and in his name, to sign and underwrite all sueh
policies of insurance, as they liis said attorneys or any of them should
The policy was executed for
jointly and separately think proper."
in the power of attornamed
defendant,
the
by four of the persons
execution of the powthis
a
sufficient
ney. The learned judge thought
er, hut reserved the point. The plaintiff having obtained a verdict.
J. Williams moved to enter a nonsuit. This was a naked authority,
In Viner's Abridgment, title Auami must he construed strictly.
"If a letter of attorney to make
thus:
down
laid
it
is
PI.
7.
thority. B.
livery of seizin conjunctim et divisim be made to three and two of
them make livery, the third being absent, it is not good, for this is not

conjunctim nor divisim." And Com. Dig. Attorney, C. 11, is exactly
to the same effect. And in Co. Litt. 181b, it is stated, "If a charter
feoffment he made, and a letter of attorney to four, or three, jointly
or severally to deliver seizin, two cannot make livery, because it is
Here,
neither by the four or three jointly, nor any of them severally."
executed
neither
is
it
and
the power is to fifteen jointly or severally,
The latter words,
by the whole jointly, nor by one of them severally.
to exercise the
are
who
the
persons
to
them,"
only apply
"or any of
itself.
authority
the
to
reference
have
no
discretion, hut they
Ar.HOTT, C. J. The law undoubtedly is as stated by Mr. Williams,
Whenever a
but we are not disposed to extend the rule further.
feel itself
will
Court
occur,
the
shall
cited
those
similar
to
ease exactly
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bound by them. But in this case we ought to look at the whole instrument : and if we do so, there is no doubt what the meaning of it is.
Here, a power is given to fifteen persons jointly and severally to execute such policies as they or any of them shall jointly or severally
think proper. The true construction of this is, as it seems to me, that
the power is given to all or any of them to sign such policies, as all or
The argument is, that the latter
any of them should think proper.
words only apply to the persons who are to exercise the discretion.
That would have been quite correct, if those had been different from
But they are the same; these
the persons entrusted with the power.
of the former, and the
words,
the
meaning
therefore,
control
latter
verdict is right.
Rule refused.
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SECTION

1.— GENERAL

CATLIN

v.

(Nisi Triiis in King's Bench,
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This was

RULE

BELL.
1815.

4 Camp.

1S3.)

action of assumpsit for not accounting for goods delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant, to be sold on her account.
The defendant is master of a ship trading from this country to the
"West Indies, and the plaintiff entrusted to him a quantity of millinery
goods, which he undertook to sell for her there.
The first defense was, that these goods had paid no duty on exportation ; and it was proved that the defendant's ship, in which they were
It was contended,
carried, cleared out at the custom-house in ballast.
an

therefore, that the adventure was illegal, and that no action could arise
out of it.
Lord ELi.Kxiiukorr.n. You do nothing unless you show that it
formed part of the agreement between the parties to defraud government of the duties. This would contaminate the contract on which the
action is founded: hut it cannot he affected by the simple circumstance
of the ship clearing nut in ballast.
It was then stated, that the defendant not being able to sell the
Is in the island to which they were destined, had sent them to the
Caraccas, in search of a market, where they had been destroyed by an
earthquake ; hut
Lord Ellenbo rough clearly held, that there being a special confidence reposed in the defendant with respect to the -ale of the goods,
he had no right to hand them over to another person, and to give them
a

new destination.

1

i The -.iin.' principle has often i
□ applied to public agents and especially
"it Is <>f the greatest public
to boards and officers of cities and the state
Importance to establisb the general rule of agency, thai 'delegated authority
•■to <i".' :i- governing the
cannot be delegated again, without -i"-'-i;ii power
Lyon v. Jerome, 26
official powers, acts and contracts of our state officers."
Wend. 185, 37 Am Dec 273 (1841); Matthews v. Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115, 36
Am Rep. 776 (1878); Gale v. Kalamazoo, 28 Mich. 344,
Am. Rep. 80 (1871).
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BONWEIXv. HOWES.
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15 Daly,
(Oonkmon Pleas of New lork City and County, L888.
Bupp. 717, reversing i N. v. Bupp. 435.)

43,

2

N. Y.

Judgment
Action to recover commissions as a real estate broker.
Defendant
appeals.
again
Term.
General
for plaintiff, affirmed by the
complaint
of
the
dismissal
a
for
motion
The
HOESBN,
\ "an
J.
It appeared that the defendant never
ouglt to have been granted.
never knew of such employment
assignor,
employed the plaintiff's
until alter the exchange of the two pieces of property had been efOf these
fected, and never authorized or ratified such employment.
The evidence adduced by the
tacts, there cannot be any question.
plaintiff showed that Rogers, the plaintiff's assignor, knew that Reuben
W. Howes was acting as the agent for his son, John T. Howes, the
defendant, in selling the Tenth Avenue property; and that not until
after the property had been exchanged for the Haberman property,
in Fourth avenue, did Rogers ever have the slightest communication,
There is no testimony to
directly or indirectly, with the defendant.
of Rogers' employaware
was
previously
prove that the defendant
have granted the
should
court
the
facts,
state
of
ment.
Upon this
Howes,
who employed
W.
Reuben
motion to dismiss the complaint.
had no right
and,
such,
he
sell,
as
to
an
himself
agent
Rogers, was
by an agreedefendant
the
bind
to
or
a
subagent,
or power to employ
Atlee v. Fink,
ment that the subagent should receive a commission.
100, 42 Am. Rep. 385.
was said by one of the justices of the city court that the testimony established the fact that it was customary in New York to
That is true, but irrelevant ; because
employ brokers to sell property.
the question here is, has one agent any authority to employ another?
I understand the rule to be
No proof on that subject was offered.
that "except where necessity requires, or a known usage of trade
justifies, the employment of subagents, an agent whose duties involve
personal trust and confidence and the exercise of judgment and discretion, cannot, without authority from his principal, delegate to an75

Mo.

It

2
He may employ
other the confidence and discretion reposed in him.
else.
Lewis
but
acts,
nothing
mechanical
mere
to
perform
another
Reuben
regarded
The
probably
60.
jury
3
Abb.
Dec.
v. Ingersoll,
W. Howes as the real owner of the property, and believed they were
doing substantial justice in requiring the nominal owner, who holds

2 The maxim,
"delegatus non potest delegare," is based on the fact that
lerally a personal trust and confidence which cannot be delegated;
agei
tor the principal employs the agenl from his opinion of his personal skill
and Integrity, and the latter has uo right to turn his principal over to another
Wilson v. York & Md. Line R. Co., 11 Gill & J.
oi whom he knows nothing.
Warner v. Martin, 11 How. 209, 13 L. Ed.
(1839), quoting 2 K< mi's Com.;
The distinction between whal may and what may not be delegated
667 (1850).
by an agent Is dearly stated and illustrated in Kohl v. Beach, 107 Wis. 400,
83 V W. 657, 50 L. R. A. 600, 81 Am. St. Rep. 849 (1900).
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real estate in his name, to pay the debt that the real owner contracted.
shows that Rogers knew that Reuben W. Howes
was dealing in the character of an agent. If he wished to hold the
principal he ought to have ascertained that Reuben had authority
to employ a subagent, or else he should have required some instrucwith, the defendant.
Hard
tions from, or had some communication
cases ought not to make bad law ; and I am of opinion that it would
be dangerous to permit one agent to employ another at the expense
of the principal.
Upon a new trial, it may be shown that the principal knew that
Reuben W. Howes intended to employ, or had employed, a broker
Judgment
to assist him, and that he approved of the employment.
reversed, and new trial ordered, with costs to abide event.

But the testimony
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SECTION 2.— EXCEPTIONS

ELDRIDGE
(Supreme

v.

HOLWAY.

Court of Illinois,

1857.

18 111. 445.)

Plaintiff authorized one Cobb
Forcible detainer before a justice.
to begin the action for him, and Cobb had one Kates serve written
Evidence to prove
notice and demand of possession on defendant.
this being excluded, the jury found for the defendant.
Scates, C. J. An attorney in fact of plaintiff employed an attorney at law in this case, who served the written notice and demand
of possession. The court excluded this evidence, on the ground that
delegated authority cannot be delegated.
This is true as a general principle, when properly applied to the
classes of cases where personal confidence is reposed, and skill, judgStory on Agency, §S 12, 13, 14. It was,
ment, etc., are involved.
doubtless, to obviate this literal application of the principle that the
convention, out of abundant caution, inserted clause 17 of section 8,
art. 1, in the Constitution of the United States, 3 Story, Com. Const.
Some powers arise, by implication, as incidents to
§§ 1236, 1237.
So, in the performance
others, and are essentia] to their exercise.
of a general or special agency, many acts are to be performed of an
indifferent nature, which may as well be done by one person as another, and which an agent mighl find it extremely inconvenient to
The maxim withholding the
to perform personally.
be compelled
power of subdelegation of authority only has place when there is
where the interest of the principal
an object, an end to he gained
When, from the nature
ution.
cted or injured b

THE

186

of

the act to be done, there can

(Part

AUTHORITY
be no difference,

the principle

2

cannot

apply.
Such

There is neither confidence, skill, discreis the case here
tion or judgment required to deliver a written notice, and make oath
of it. which could prevenl the employment of any one by an agent.
The service of declarations in ejectment, notices to take depositions,
and a great \ariet\ of acts now done by attorney's clerks and others,
would fall under the same rule contended for, and compel attorneys
personally.
may serve such notice and demand, and we perceive
no reason why an agent, to bring suit, may not employ an attorney.
Where agents
Agents, as such, cannot appear in courts for parties.
to appear
attorneys
must
employ
they
as
attorneys,
not
are
licensed
for the client in the courts.
The act here falls strictly within a class which may he done by
It is rather the true and only mode
such supposed >ubdelegation.
of acting out an agency where an attorney becomes necessary, than a
such

acts
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An attorney

subdelegation of power.
Had the agency here been an attorneyship, it might present another
question — one involving a question of confidence reposed, or skill and
judgment — which could not be transferred. But the agency does not
3
appear to be of that character.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

NORWICH UNIVERSITY
(Supreme

Court of Vermont,

v.

1ST4.

DENNY.
47

Vt.

13.)

Assumpsit on a subscription of $200 to induce the location of plaintiff University at Norwich. Verdict for plaintiff.
The liability of the defendant for the sum claimed
BARRETT, j.
If
depended on the subscription of his name to the paper presented.
Ins name was put there by his authorization, then he is liable; if not
Whatever authorization
then he is not liable.
by his authorization,
given, he gave to Dr. Nichols. The question of fact in controin the jury trial was, whether the defendant gave such authorThat was determined by the jury upon legitization to Dr. Nichols.

It is shown
imate evidence, with proper instructions by the court.
the
there
was
by
procurename
put
and agreed that the defendant's
the
from
of
virtue
authority
in
act
to
X.,
Dr.
pretending
ment of
defendant.
It is now insisted that Dr. N. could not delegate such authority,
so as to enable another to make a binding subscription of the defendhas been fully agreed upon, and there remains a
»When the transaction
utive authority to receive the property and pay over the money, the
Grinnell v. Buchanan, 1 Daly. 538.
e assigned.
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It is matter of entire inant's name. This cannot be maintained.
difference for any purpose or reason by what hand the name was
written; provided it was done by the procurement of Dr. N. under
and in execution of the authority given by the defendant to him.
He might as well do it by the fingers of another person, as by the
pen of another person. He was not delegating any authority, but only
performing an authorized act by a servant, instead of doing it with
his own hand. It was the act of his mind and will, and was an effectual doing by him of the act he was authorized to do.
It differs entirely from cases in which the person is authorized to
do things requiring the exercise of that person's judgment and dis-

An arwhich can be exercised only by the person himself.
bitrator cannot delegate his function to another; but having heard
and decided as arbitrator, he can have another person draw up his
himself.
So in this
instead of doing
award and put his name to
him
on
by the decase, Dr. N. could execute the authority conferred
of
the
direction
under
fendant, by procuring another to use the pen
himself.
the
pen
of
using
his own mind and will, instead

of Tennessee,

(Court of Chancery

1S73.

Tenn.

5

BLAIR.

N. R. CO. v.
1

LOUISVILLE

&

Judgment affirmed.

Ch. 351.)

to call to account and to hold defendant Blair and his sureties
bond for deficiencies in the accounts of the Nashville Agency
his
on
of plaintiff. The business was large and varied, the freight bills durBlair was staing the period in question amounting to ^863,834.01.

Bill

tion agent.

*

it

it

If

»<
i

is

It

*

6

Ch.

*

has been left to be inferred from the
true,
And this
large deficiency that there must have been negligence.
which
to
office
ms to have been at the Louisville
but the negligence
that
was, made the regular returns.
the cashier, whose duty
agent
station
attention
of
their
the
called
office had been vigilant, and
to the increasing deficiency, and he had failed to take the proper steps
to prevent it, he would have been clearly guilty of neglect of duty.
does appear that the defendant, Blair, was not expected to keep
But

Cooper,

a

it

also appears that the
book-keeper, and
the books and was not
out, the freights
handed
received
bills
and
the
freight
were
kept,
books
a

f

i

Til'-

B.

a

;i

i

Newton v.
discretion.
the delegation
go on whether
cases
354);
Weaver v. Carnall, 35 Miion, 13 v.V. 587, 67 Am. i'
An
mere amanuensis).
was
198 37 Am. Rep. '-"-' (1879) (where the agent
insurance agent may delegate to another the mere signing of bla name to
policy be baa approved, Grady v. Am. Cent. ins. Co., 80 Mo. w>'> (1875); but
,„,, the power to pass upon applications, Cullinan v. Bowker, 180 N. Y. 93, 72
N. B. '.'II (1904).
D. 248, 123 N. W. 686 (1909),
Fansei v. Garden Cy. Bt Bank, 24
cord:
ted.

the opinion

in

pari

•
f

■
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received from the collector and remitted by the cashier. These, therefore, were specially his duties.
He was employed by the company and
It is not shown
reported to it. although in the name of the agent.
accounts, unless
examine
these
that the station agenl was expected to
1 am of opinmother
office.
them
the
his attention was called to
by
ion, consequently, that the complainants have failed to make out a case
against defendants on the bond.
lau 1 am also clearly of opinion that the defendant, Blair, was not
bound for the faults of cither the cashier or collector, unless he was
cognizant of them, or connected with them, of which there is no preThese agents were employed and paid by the comtence in this case.
plainant, and were, as the testimony shows, absolutely necessary to the
In such a case, it is a matter
discharge of the duties of the agency.
of no consequence whether the sub-agent was appointed on the recommendation of the chief agent, or appointed directly by him with the
In all cases of this sort, where the subsanction of the principal.
the
exigency of the business or is authorized by
agency is required by
will
the
not be responsible for the negligence or
the principal,
agent
misconduct of the sub-agent, if he has used reasonable diligence in his
Story on Agency,
choice as to the skill and ability of the sub-agent.
nor
shown
that the persons
neither
321.
It
is
217a,
201,
charged
§§
employed as cashier and collector in this case were not good men, and
of unexceptionable character when employed ; or, in other words, that
the defendant, Blair, knew that they were, for any reason, unfit for the
discharge of the duties to which they were assigned.
I am of opinion, therefore, that the complainant has wholly failed to
make out any case against the defendants ; and order that the bill be
dismissed with costs.
Note. — This decision was, upon appeal, affirmed.

BLOWERS

v.

SOUTHERN RY.

(Supreme Court of South Carolina,

1906.

74 S. C. 221, 54 S.

E.

368.)

Action by a mail messenger to recover for services in transferring
mail matter from one train to another for a period of six years. There
was evidence that he did the work under the supervision of the station
agent of defendant, who, when Irwin ceased doing -•., ^ork, hired
another man to do it. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals.
t * * * An exception
is taken
to the following
JONES, J.
further,
if
the station agent
law,
matter
:
"I
a
of
as
charge you,
charge
was authorized by any superior officer who had authority to make this
contract and he was carrying out the orders of his superior officer and
made a contract that would be within the scope of his authority, and
f Part of the opinion is omitted.
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the railroad agent, if he is acting under the direction or by the authority of a superior officer who had power and whose duty it was to attend
to these matters and make such contracts, if he acted under his orders
and direction, then the acts of the agent here would be acts of the superior officer." The specifications of error being: (1) That an agent
or officer to whom authority is delegated cannot delegate the authority
to another. (2) There was no evidence that any superior officer of defendant company was authorized to make a contract with plaintiff to

transfer the mail.
We are not sure from the record but that this charge was made at
the request of the defendant, and, if so, defendant cannot raise objecBut, assuming that the charge was not made at the retion thereto.
quest of defendant, we see nothing in it prejudicial to defendant's conThe principle delegatus non potest delegare does not apply
tention.
when there is express or implied authority in the general or superior
"Where an
agent to employ subagents in the work of the principal.
or noof
the
acts
subagent,
the
a
subagent,
to
has
employ
power
agent
tice given in the transaction of the business, have the same effect as if
done or received by the principal." Bates v. American Company, 37
S. C. 101, 16 S. E. 883, 21 L. R. A. 340. The authority to employ subagents may be implied from the nature of the duties and powers committed to the general agent. 1 Ency. Law, 981.
In this case the superior agent and the alleged subagent were both
engaged in the work of the principal in the matter of transportation,
and the subagent from the nature of his position and duties was under
the direction and supervision of the superior agent in the matter of
mail transportation when it became a part of the principal's business.
Under such circumstances, if the subagent acts under the orders of a
superior officer, his acts become the acts of the superior officer and the
principal as well. There was some evidence that the general superintendent of transportation had control of the matter of mail transfer
and in the direction and supervision of mail transfer clerks, as already
*
*
*
indicated.
Reversal,
judgment,

unless the plaintiff within thirty days remits part of the
found to be excessive.
which the

DARLING
(Supreme

Judicial

Oourl

v.

STANWOOD.

of Massachusetts,

i^<;7.

'.>»; mmss.

pu

aii.mi1

504.)

Contract to recover a balance <>f account for money expended and
Verdict for
commissions charged in purchasing cotton for defendant.

plaintiff.
- it.r,
n
»

When the defendanl employed the plaintiff to bin
In- account in the New < "rleans mark. I and to ship it to Boston,
T.

M

Pnrt of thr opinion
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to have contemplated

(Part

L>

thai the purchases would be made

ordinary course of such business at that port. I Ipon the question
whether the plaintiff is liable in damages for negligently or improperly executing such a commission, the evidence of the usages of the cotin the
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ton trade were
fendant himself
broker to effect
to a sub-agent,

clearly admissible, especially as it appears thai the dewas well acquainted with them. The employment of a
the purchases was a justifiable delegation of authority
because this manner of transacting business was the
usual and known custom of the New Orleans market.
The statement
that the seller oi the cotton is understood to warrant that the cotton is
sound at the time of sale seems to have been a part of the narrative
given by the witnesses of the course of the business; and not an attempt to prove by custom a warranty in a case where none would be
implied by law.
In a business which requires or justifies the delegation of an agent's
authority to a sub-agent, who is not his own servant, the original agent
is not liable for the errors or misconduct of the sub-agent if he has
used due care in his selection.
The instructions of the presiding judge
seem to have been conformable
to law and well adapted to the case
* * *
disclosed by the bill of exceptions.
Exceptions sustained on another question.

SKINNER & CO.
(Queen's

Bench

v.

WEGUELIN EDDOWES

Division of the High Court of Justice,
Ellis, 12.)

1882.

& CO.
1

Cababe' &

Action to recover £474 collected on insurance on a ship by defendant's Paris agent, for plaintiff, and not paid over.
Day, J. The doctrine has always been, that if
employ an agent
to do work for me, and he employs a sub-agent, the agent remains

I

responsible to me.
On the facts I am clearly of opinion that the defendants are responsible to the plaintiffs for the money received by M.

Magniol.

Judgment accordingly.

BRADSTREET
(Supreme

Court

v.

of Pennsylvania, 1872.

EVERSON.
72

Pa. 124, 13 Am.

Rep. 6G5.)

Action to recover money collected by defendant's Memphis agent,
and by him misappropriated.
Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant removed the verdict to the supreme court upon error.
* The next
Agnew, J.°
question is upon the nature of
the liability arising upon the receipt.
It is in the following words:
Pi rt of the opinion

Is omitted.
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Pittsburg,
Bradstreet & Son, Improved Mercantile Agency.
Everson,
&
Co. four
Preston
Messrs.
of
Received
1865.
June 2d,
Bradford,
MemC.
Watt
versus
collection,
for
acceptances
duplicate
M.
Brad[Signed]
$1,726.37.
in
all
to
Tennessee,
amounting
phis.
J.

"J. M.

street & Son."
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It is argued, notwithstanding the express receipt "for collection,"
that the defendants did not undertake for themselves to collect, but
only to remit to a proper and responsible attorney, and made themselves liable only for diligence in correspondence, and giving the necessary information to the plaintiffs; or in briefer terms, that the attorney

in Memphis was not their agent for the collection but that of the plaintiffs only. The current <>f decision, however, is otherwise as to attorfor collection, and the
neys at law sending claims to correspondents
reasons for applying the same rule to collection agencies are even
They have their selected agents in every part of the counstronger.
trv.
From the nature of such ramified institutions we must conclude
that the public impression will be. that the agency invited customers
It
on the very ground of its facilities for making distant collections.
and
must be presumed from its business connections at remote points,
its knowledge of the agents chosen, the agency intends to undertake the
performance of the service which the individual customer is unable to
perform for himself. There is good reason therefore to hold, that such

agency is liable for collections made by its own agents, when it
If it
ojertakes
the c ollection by the express terms of the receipt.
-Dn
the
intend,
by
limit
its
to
it
in
it has
responsibility
power
does not so
term- of the receipt.
An example of this limited liability is found in the case of Bullitt v.
Baird [27 Leg. Int. 171], decided at Philadelphia in 1870; the only
There the receipt
case in this state upon the subject of such agencies.
direction,
proceeds, when
and
to
our
according
read: "For collection
an

received by us, to be paid over to King & I laird." Across the face of
The owner of the within
the receipt was printed these words: "N. B.
mentioned taking all the risks of the mail, of losses by failure of agents
unit, and also of losses by reason of insurrection or war." The
limitation of the liability of Bullitt & Fairthorn, by Mr. Bullitt, him-

is evidence of his belief that a greater liability
a good lawyer,
would arise without the restriction.
Recurring to the analog) of attorneys at law, the first point to be
dered is the interpretation given by the courts to the terms of a

In our own state we have several decisions in
ollection."
In Kiddle v. Poorman, 3 Pen. & W. 22 \, Kiddle, an attorney in
Franklin county, gave a receipt in these words: "Lodged in m) hands
for
a judgment-bill granted by Henr) M. Morwitz to Henrj Hoffman
1,200, due with interest since the 1 5th of May 1811, which
the
•
d if it Can
is entered tip in Bedford county, which I am to haw
ent this bill to his brother, a nractising
Riddle
ccomplished."

point.

i
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The money was made by (lie sheriff, but by the
lawyer in Bedford.
neglect of the Bedford Riddle was not received from the sheriff, who
became
Hoffman surd the
insolvent, and the money was thus lost.
recovered.
On a writ of
his
on
Franklin county Riddle,
receipt and
error it was contended that the words of the receipt, "which I am to
have recovered if it can be accomplished," imported only a limited undertaking to have it collected by another, and not to collect it himself.
But this court held that the receipt contained an express and positive
for the collect ion of the money, if practicable, and not
undertaking
merely for the employment of another to that end; and that the defendant was bound by every principle of moral and legal obligation to
make good the collection of the judgment by the application of reasonable diligence, skill and attention.
The next case is Cox v. Livingston, 2 Watts & S. 103, 37 Am. Dec.
This was the receipt: "Received of Mr. Thos. Cox, of Lancaster,
Pa., for collection, a note drawn in his favor by Mr. Dubbs, calling for
$497.65, payable three months after date." The note was left with an
The receipt was dated August 30th, 1837,
instruction to bring suit.
and Livingston died in January following without having brought suit.
Dubbs became insolvent.
It was held that Livingston was liable for
the collection, though only two terms intervened between the receipt
and his death.
Krause v. Dorrance, 10 Pa. 462, 51 Am. Dec. 496, was assumpsit
against two attorneys for money collected and not paid by another
The liability of the
attorney to whom they sent the note for collection.
original attorneys for the collection was admitted, but the point was
made and succeeded, that a demand before suit was necessary. Rogers,
J., says expressly they were liable for the acts of the agent whom they
employed, but being without fault themselves, a demand was necessary
before a resort to an action.
In Rhines v. Evans, 66 Pa. 192, 5 Am. Rep. 364, the receipt was:
"Received for collection of A. Rhines one note on Lukens & Beeson,
of Rochester, dated October 30th, 1857, for $365." The liability of
Evans, the attorney was conceded, and the question was on the Statute
of Limitations, and it was held the action was barred by the lapse of
seven years and five months from the date of the receipt.
These cases show the understanding
of the bench and bar of this
state upon a receipt of claims for collection.
It imports an undertaking by the attorney himself to collect, and not merely that he receives it for transmission to another for collection, for whose negligence he is not to be responsible.
He is therefore liable by the very
term< of his receipt for the negligence of the distant attorney, who is
his agent, and he cannot shift responsibility
from himself upon his
client. There is no hardship in this, for it is in his power to limit his
responsibility by the terms of his receipt when he knows he must employ another to make the collection.
Bullitt v. Baird, supra.
We find ca^es in other states holding the same doctrine.
In Lewis
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& Wallace v. Peck & Clark, 10 Ala. 142, both firms were attorneys.
The defendants gave their receipt to the plaintiffs for certain notes for
collection, and after collecting the money transmitted it to the payees
in the notes instead of the attorneys who had employed them, the
payees having however endorsed the notes : Held that Peck & Clark
were liable to their immediate principals, the plaintiffs, there being no
evidence that the payees had given them notice not to pay over to
Lewis & Wallace, the original attorneys. This is a direct recognition
of the liability of the collecting attorney to the transmitting attorney.
The case of Pollard v. Rowland, 2 Blackf . 22, is more directly in point.
Rowland received from Pollard claims for collection, and sent them to
Stephen obtained judgment,
Stephen, an attorney in another county.
and collected the money : Held that Rowland was accountable to Pollard for the acts of Stephen to the same extent that Stephen was, and
could make no defence that Stephen could not ; and that Rowland was
iiable to Pollard for the money.
Cummins v. McLain et al., 2 Pike,
402, was a case nearly similar to the Pennsylvania
case of Krouse v.
The attorney 10 sent the claim to another attorney at
Dorrance, supra.
a distance, and was held liable, but for the omission of the plaintiff to
make a demand, he failed to recover.
The court say the attorney is
In a Mississippi case
liable for the acts of the attorney he employs.
two attorneys, Wilkison and Willison, received of plaintiff a claim for
collection, and brought suit and obtained judgment.
They dissolved
Wilkison retiring from the practice; and Willison took
partnership,
another partner, Jennings, who received the money from the sheriff.
In a suit against Wilkison as surviving partner of Willison, he was
Wilkinson v.
held liable for the receipt of the money by Jennings.

Griswold,

12

Smedes& M.

669.

In view of these reasons and authorities, we hold that a collecting
agency, such as the defendants have been found to be, receiving and
remitting a claim to their own attorney, who collects the money and
fails to pay it over, is liable for neglect.

-

Judgment affirmed.

(Supremo

Court

SIMPSON

v.

Michigan,

1886.

<»f

WALDBY.
63

MiHi.

189, 30

N. W.

100.)

agamsl defendants, as bankers, for the proceeds of drafts
the First National
Bank of
collected by defendant's correspondent,
own New York draft for
St. Albans, Vermont.
The latter
\ erdict, no i
the money, but failed before the draft W3S paid.
•.hi

Moll.

i"Tii.' liability

of .'in attorney :it Imw for ci>1lections made by :i
treated in the leading case of Cummini v, Heald, 24 Kan. 600, 36 \.m
Rep, 264 (lsxo), and "i :i collection agencj in Hoover v. Wise, '•>! 0. 8. 308,
2

i..

Bd.

392 (1

THE U rHOBITY

!'•' I

Morse, J. 11

*

*

*

The counsel

(Tart

for defendants

2

here,

contend

they did below, that in the case ni collections,
like this, whore
there is no special agreement, the home bank is only responsible for
the use oi ordinary care and prudence in the selection of the agencies
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as

This is undoubtedly the
through which it attempts the collection.
of the court below, taken
purport and meaning of the instructions
as a whole, to the jury.
The question is therefore directly before us. what is the law of the
case when a person steps into a hank, in the ordinary course of business dealing, and intrusts to it the collection of a draft drawn upon
some person residing at a distance, in case the home bank, through
the failure or dishonesty of another bank, selected by itself, never
receives the money upon such drafts, though the same is paid by the
drawee: In the absence of any agreement in regard to the matter.
who must bear the loss in case the home bank has not been at fault
in the selection of its agent or agents?
There is a conflict of authority upon this proposition; and, as it
has never been settled in this state, we must be guided and governed
in our action by what seems to us the most correct view in justice and
on principle.
It is held in New York, Indiana, Ohio, and New Jersey that the
home bank must be the loser, upon the principle that such bank undertakes the collection of the draft or bill, and selects its agent or agents,
and must be responsible for their default or neglect, as it would be
for the default or neglect of its officers or clerks in the collection of
a home bill, or as a contractor would be bound to answer for any negligence or default of his subcontractors or workmen in the performance of his contract.
Allen v. Merchants' Bank of New York, 22
Wend. 215, 34 Am. Dec. 289; Reeves v. State Bank of Ohio, 8 Ohio
St. 460: Titus v. Mechanics' Nat. Bank, 35 N. J. Law, 588; Ayrault
v. Pacific Bank, 47 N. Y. 570, 7 Am. Rep. 489;
Abbott v. Smith,
4 Ind. 452; Tyson v. State Bank, 6 Blackf. 225, 38 Am. Dec. 139.
In other states it is adjudged that the customer depositing the draft
for collection must be presumed to know, and contract upon the knowledge, that in the ordinary course of business the home bank must
employ correspondents or agents abroad to make the collection and
transmit the money collected.
The holder or maker of the draft,
having full notice of the usual course of business, must be held to
assent thereto. "He therefore authorizes the bank with whom he deals
to do the work of collection through another hank."
"The bank receiving the paper becomes an agent of the depositor, with authority
to employ another hank to collect it. The second bank becomes the
subagent of the customer of the first, for the reason that the customer
authorizes the employment of such agent to make the collection."
If, therefore, there is no want of ordinary care and prudence in the

"

Part of the opinion

Is omitted.
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'

I
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&

before the collection of its draft transmitting such money to defendants.
defendants were negligent or in fault in not immediately
forwarding such draft to New York, upon its reception
them, or
in its presentation there, they are, in my opinion, liable to plaintiff
for the money; but,
there was no negligence in either of these
respects, the question arises, who must bear the loss on account of
the inability of the St. Albans Bank to meet its draft transmitting

if

by

If

the

money?
a

in

a

is

it

In Reeves v. State Bank of Ohio, supra,
held that when
bank in Ohio received for collection
draft payable
New York,
and for that purpose forwarded the same to its correspondent in New
(

.

such 'hio hank was responsible t<> the owner "f the draft for
conduct of such correspondent, and for the proceeds of the draft
such correspondent;
that such
immediately upon in collection
>hio hank, and not the subagenl of
respondent was the agent of the
the owner of the draft, and payment to the agent was payment to
the hank, unless there was some agreement or authority between the
< by

the

is

it

a

a

it

by

F.

9

&

owner and the hank beyond the mere tact of the draft being received
lui- collection.
In Mackersy v. Ramsays (in the House of Lords)
Clark
maintained.
Mackersy
818, the same doctrine
employed bankers
bill drawn upon
perEdinburgh to obtain for him payment of
son in Calcutta.
The hap
cepted the employment, and wrote
him, promising to credit him with the money when received.
They
transmitted the hill, in the usual course of hi;
to banket
London, and
was forwarded to India, where
them
was duly
in
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;

8

J.

6

1

7

&

8

;

v.'

selection of the subagent, and no negligence or fault on the part of the
home bank, the customer must be the loser for the default or negligence of such subagent who is regarded as his agent.
Guelich v.
National St. Bank of Burlington, 56 Iowa. 434. 9 N. W. 32X, 41 Am.
St. Rep. 110; Dorchester & Milton Bank v. New England Bank, 1
Cush. 177; East Haddam Bank v. Scovil, 12 Conn. 303; Hyde v.
Planters' Bank, 17 La. 560, 36 Am. Dec. 621 ; .Etna Ins. Co.
Alton
City Bank, 25 111. 243, 79 Am. Dec. 328; Stacy v. Dane Co. Bank,
12 Wis. 702; Bowling v. Arthur, 34 Miss. 41
Citizens' Bank v. Howell,
Md. 530, 63 Am. Dec. 714; Bank of Washington v. Triplett,
Pet. 25,
L. Ed. 37; Daly v. Butchers'
Drovers' Bank. 56 Mo.
94, 17 Am. Rep. 663; Jackson v. Union Bank,
146; Bank
Har.
of Louisville v. First Nat. Bank of Knoxville,
Baxt. 101, 35 Am.
Morse, Banking, 347-356.
Rep. 691
Nearly all the cases cited above, in support of both sides of the
question, relate to transactions by which the draft or bill failed of
collection by neglect of the notary to make demand in time, or proper
protest, or default of the agent in not moving quick enough to make
the money.
In the case at bar the draft was collected of the drawee, and the
loss of the money resulted from the failure of the St. Albans Bank,
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The bank in India that collected the money failed, and the
Edinburgh bankers did not receive it. They, however, wrote to the
drawer of the bill, announcing the fact of its payment, but never
Held,
actually credited him with the amount thereof on their books.
obto
drawer
of
the
that the Edinburgh bankers were the agents
made,
bill;
that,
been
actually
payment having
tain payment of the
they became ipso facto liable to him for the amount received, and that

paid.

not he called upon to sutler any loss occasioned by the conduct of their subagents, between whom and himself there existed no
privity. In 56 Iowa, ami 9 X. W. 328, supra, an attempt is made to
distinguish this case, on the ground that the decision was based upon
to forward
the fact that the Edinburgh bank expressly undertook
the paper, and upon its payment to place the amount thereof to the
credit of the depositor, and for the performance of its undertaking
and that, upon such a contract, the
it was to receive a commission,
bank would be bound to give him credit when it was paid to its cor-

But
respondent, and therefore became directly liable to the customer.
and
bankers,
one
usual
the
among
the commission charged was only
at
bar
in
case
the
on
collections
;
have
a
commission
banks generally
it being 35 cents on each $100, which was divided between defendants
Besides, the opinions, both of Lord Campand the St. Albans Bank.
bell and Lord Cottenham, delivered in the house of lords, were placed
upon the broad ground that the Edinburgh bank was liable for the
conduct of the bank in India, the same as it would have been for the
default or neglect of one of its own officers or clerks in the collection
of a home bill, and that its correspondents were its agents, and not
the agents of the drawer of the bill, who had no privity with such

and that the correspondence between the Edinburgh
correspondents;
bankers and such drawer, if it proved any special contract, established
only such an agreement as the law would have inferred from the dealings between the parties.
The ruling in that case squarely covers the point in issue here, and
to my mind is the better doctrine, and most in accord with principle.
The learned jurists holding otherwise all admit that, if a person intrusts a home draft or bill to a bank for collection, such bank is responsible to the customer for any negligence or default of its agents,
officers, or employes.
I cannot see why any different rule should
prevail in the collection of a foreign bill. It is in every case that I
have examined sought to be maintained upon the theory that the customer knows the bank must act through some other person or persons
at a distance, and therefore, impliedly, from the very nature of the
course of business, assents to the employment of such persons, and
makes them bis agents.
leave an indorsed
This reasoning does not strike me as sound.
note against persons in my own town for collection, and consequent
know that some agent or employe of the bank
demand and protest,
and
do not know or inquire
will do the work, or some pare of

If I

I

I

it,
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I

contract, however, with the bank that suitable agents
who will do it.
be employed, and hold it responsible
for their acts.
The law
intrust the same bank with the collecauthorizes me to do this.
tion of a foreign draft, I also know that they will employ some agent
or correspondent abroad, of their selection, not mine, of whom I know
nothing, and with whom they are supposed to have business relations.
I presume, and have a
do not inquire whom they are to select.
right to presume, that they have business knowledge of such agent
or agents, which I do not and cannot possess, by the very course of
their dealings as bankers.
In each case the bank holds itself out, for
to collect my paper, and it can make no difference
a consideration,

will

If I
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I

whether the compensation is great or small.
In each case it selects
its own agents in the premises.
In each case I have no part in or
control over such selection.
In each case there is no privity between
I fail to perceive why, in the one case
the party selected and myself.
more than the other, I adopt the immediate party collecting or protesting the bill as my agent. I cannot find any good reason for making this particular case of the collection of a foreign bill an exception
to the general rule of agency.
The law in general "is clear that,
by the employment of under agents or servants for his own convenience, or to perform part of what he has contracted to do, the employer becomes civilly responsible to those with whom he contracts
or deals in his business."
Judge Story, in his work on Agency, announces the doctrine thus :
"It is a general doctrine of law that the principal is held liable to
third persons, in a civil suit, for the frauds, deceits, misrepresentations, torts, negligence, and other mal feasances or misfeasances, or
omissions of duty of his agent in the course of his employment, although the principal did not authorize or justify, or, indeed, know of,
such misconduct."
In no other case that I can recall is a person presumed, by implication of law. without any agreement to do so, to adopt the subThe carrier is
agent of a person with whom he deals as his own.
responsible for the negligence of Ins agents and employes, as is also
tlie ship-owner and the contractor.
Why this distinction in the case
If in their case, why sin mid it not also be
of a banker or bankers?
made in the case of collecting agents and attorneys?
Bui collecting
agents and attorneys have been held to the general rule.
Pollard v.
Rowland, 2 Blackf. 22; Hoover v. Wise, 91 I . S. 308, 23 1,. Ed.
392;
Bradstreel v. Everson, 72 Pa. 124, 13 Am. Rep. 665; Lewis
v. Peck, 10 Ala. 1 12.
It has been said by some of the court thai the holding of banks
liable for the default and neglecl of their correspondents in a
like the present would render the collection of hills and drafl
this nature extremely difficult, and thai it would tend ver) much to
destroy the facilities which at pn <nt exist, and subject the holders
Oodd.Pb.A

A.

::•_'

the \i

L99

of bills to inconvenience

1 iioki

rv

(Part

2

expense, and probably, in many cases,
and bankers or other persons
But
serious loss.
hold themselves out to collect such bills or drafts for a compensation,
or their advantage, they ought to be governed by the same rules of law
that apply to other persons, and, if they wish to avoid such responsibility, it is very easy for them to accept such business only upon
Failing to do this,
a special agreement as to their duties and liabilities.
drafts,
be responsible, as
1 think they must, in taking such hills or
ether business men are, for the misconduct of their selected agents at
*
*
*
home or abroad."
and

as long

i>>

Judgment reversed, and

a

as banks

new trial -ranted.

BANK OF ROCKY MOUNT
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(Supreme

Courl

el"

North Carolina,

1906.

142

v.

FLOYD.

N. C. 187, 55 S. E. 95.)

Action by the plaintiff bank against Floyd, the Murchison Bank,
and others, to recover $1,059, the amount of a check drawn on the
Dunn Bank, deposited with plaintiff bank by Floyd for collection,

and applied at once to his account to be charged back if the check was
Plaintiff sent the check to the Murchison Bank, and it
not paid.
forwarded it to the Dunn Bank, which failed, and the proceeds were
Judgment against the Murchinever paid to the Murchison Bank.
son Bank.
Coxxor, J. 13 * * * The first question presented for our consideration is the duty of the plaintiff and the Murchison Bank to the
The leading ease for this view is Exchange Nat. Bank v. Third Nat. Bank,
Accord: Arkansas, Second
I . S. 276, 5 Sup. Ct. 1)1. 28 L. Ed. Ti-'i-' (1884).
Nat Bank v. Bank of Alma. 99 Ark. 386, 138 S. W. 472 (1911); Indiana, Tyson v. St. Bank, 6 Blackf. 225, 38 Am. Dec. L39 (1842); Louisiana, Martin
Streissgnth
v. Bibernia Bank, L27 La. 301, 5:; South. 572 (1910); Minnesota,
v. Nat. Germ. Am. Bank, 43 Minn. 50, 44 N. W. 71>7. 7 L. R. A. 363, 19 Am.
Montana.
Power v. First Nat Bank, G Mont. 251, 12
St. Rep. 213 (1890);
review of the cases; New Jersey, Titns v.
. with exhaustive
Law, 5ss iisTir,
\(tr York, Allen v. MerHies' Nat. Bank, 35 N.
1
chants' Bank, 22 Wend. 215, 34 Am. Dec. 280 (is:; .)); Ohio, Reeves v. State
Mackersy v. Ramsays, 9 CI. & Fin.
Bank, v Ohio St. 165 (1858); England,
12

L12

J.

818,

850 (1843).
i hi' agent

hank expressly stipulates
that it will assume no liability
for defaults Of its subagents, it can. of course, only he held for its own mis
conduct CaL Nat. Bank v. ttah Nat. Bank, L90 Fed. 318, ill C. C. A. 218
Equally if the agent hank expressly assumes liability for the corre(1911).
.Mechanics' Bank v.
al it musl respond for defaults of its subagents.
Earp, \ Rawle, 384 (1834); Landa v. Traders' Bank, lis Mo. App. 356, 94
S. W. Tin (1906).
While in this view there is in law no privity between the principal and the
subagent, yet the principal has an equitable right to pursue his property, or
When

Is, in the hands of the subagent, or of anyone who cannot estabits proc
lish his right against the true owner, on the ground that he is a bona fide
Naser v. First Nat. Bank, 110 N. Y. 492, 27 N. Y. St. Rep. <V70, 22
holder.
N. K. 1077 (1889).
13 Part of the opinion is omitted.
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While there is a diversity of opinowner in dealing with the check.
ion and the decisions of the courts are not uniform upon the subject,
this court in Bank v. Bank, 75 X. C. 534. approved and adopted the
following rule of conduct : ''It is well settled that when a note is deposited with a bank for collection, which is payable at another place,
whole duty of the bank so receiving the note in the first instance
to transmit the same to a suitable bank or other agent
And, as a part of the same doctrine, it is
at the place of payment.
well settled that, if the acceptor of a bill or promissory note has his
residence in another place, it shall be presumed to have been intended
and understood between the depositor for collection and the bank that
it was to be transmitted to the place of residence of the promisor,"
In an opinion expressed with his
or, we may add. drawee or payor.
clearness,
and
Bynum, J., say-: '"This decision is consousual force
This case has been recognized as conof
notions
nant with
justice.*'
think
we
is sustained by the weight of austate,
and
in
this
trolling
the
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is seasonably

thority in other courts and the reason of the thing.
Mr. Morse, in his work on Banks & Banking (volume 1, § 235),
thus states the law: "When the paper is payable in some other place
than that in which the bank is located, its duty is (1) to forward the
bill, or note, or check, in proper season to a subagent selected with
due care; (2) to send to such agent any instructions bearing upon
its duty that may have been received from its depositor; and (3) to
make inquiry with due diligence if notice of the arrival of the paper
does not come to it within such time as it might reasonably be exlie further says: "If a bank fails to do its duty in the
pected."
matter of collection with reasonable skill and care, it is liable for the
damage resulting to any party interested in the paper, whether his
Section 2?2.
name appears on the paper or not.''
It is conceded that there is much diversity of opinion and decision
in respect to the liability of the receiving bank for the default of its
subagent, and the courts of the several jurisdictions holding variant
of
view- proceed upon entirely distinct and opposite constructions
the implied powers conferred
Upon the bank first receiving the col"If a bank receive a paper for collection on a party at a dislection.
tant place, the agent it employs at the place of paymenl is the agent
the owner and not of the bank; and, if the bank select- a compeand reliable agent and gives proper instructions, its responsibility
The two rules are stated
Hank v. Bank, 71 Mo. App. 451.
classified, with a discussion of the rea. and thi
1 Banks & Banking,
upon which they rest.
§§ 272 287.
rule,
we have seen, this court has adopted the Massachusetts

of

tory reason: "The employwhich i- based upon the following
of a subagent is justifiable, because this maimer of conducting
business is the usual and known custom, and in a business which
requires or justifies the delegation of an agent's authority to a subagent, who is not his own servant, the original agent is not liable for

ment

Tin: AUTHOEITT

500

(Part

2

the errors or misconducl of the subagent, if he lias exercised due care
in the selection."
Measured by this standard, there can be no doubt
in regard to the conduct of the plaintiff hank in sending the check
Murchison Bank; its standing and fitness to discharge
to defendanl
His honor would have been justified in
the duty being conceded.
Measured by the same rule, the Murchison
the jury.
so instructing
Bank would have been in the strict line of its duty in sending its
collection to its correspondent in Dunn, hut for the fact that the Dunn
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Bank was the drawee of the check.
This brings us to the pivotal question in the case: Is the drawee
or payee of a bill, note, or check a suitable agent to which such paper
This question has never been decided
should be sent for collection?
seek for an answer upon the reason
must
we
court;
hence
by this
of the thing, the general principles underlying the law of agency, and
By accepting the collection
adjudged cases in other jurisdictions.
Bank became, in reNational
Murchison
bank
the
from the plaintiff

spect to Floyd's interest, his agent; but, as the amount had been
In this
credited to him, the plaintiff was entitled to the proceeds.
view of the case it is not material whether the Bank of Rocky Mount
was the proper party plaintiff, as all of the persons interested were
before the court and their relative rights and duties presented for
adjustment.

The Missouri Court of Appeals in Bank v. Bank, supra, in answering the question presented here, says: "It was negligence to
place a collection, which as a matter of business required prompt atThe evitention, in the hands of the debtor to collect from himself.
The defenddence here discloses the impropriety of the transaction.
ant sent the check to Burr Oak, where it arrived on the 9th. If it
had sent it to some one other than the debtor, it would undoubtedly

have been paid, since the bank continued to do business and meet its
Morse on Banks, § 236, says:
obligations on the 9th and 10th."
"The debtor cannot be the disinterested agent of the creditor to collect the debt, and it cannot be considered reasonable care to select an
agent known to be interested against the principal to put the latter
Surely it is not due care in one
into the hands of its adversary.

a promissory note for collection to send it to the debtor, trusting him to pay, delay, or destroy the evidence of debt as his conscience
this would not be reasonable care and diligence, why
permits.
should the same conduct be held to be reasonable care and diligence
when applied to a bank?" citing Bank v. Packing & Prov. Co., 117
To the same effect are all of
111. 100, 7 N. E. 601, 57 Am. Rep. 855.
the authorities to which we have been cited and which we find in our

holding

If

investigation.
The law is well stated in Ger. Nat. Bank v. Burns, 12 Colo. !t39,
21 Pac. 714, 13 Am. St. Rep. 247, in which it is said: "Even if we
can conceive of such anomaly as one bank acting as the agent of rd-
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other to make a collection against itself, it must be apparent that
the selection of such an agent is not sanctioned by businesslike pruHow can the debtor be the proper agent of the
dence and discretion.
His interests are
creditor in the very matter of collecting the debt?
the debtor is embarrassed,
all adverse to those of his principal.
* * * The fact that the L,. Bank
there is the temptation to delay.
was a correspondent of the defendant to a limited extent does not
* * As a matter of law such method of doing
*
alter the rule.
In
It violates every rule of diligence."
business cannot be upheld.
is
Am.
it
728,
Rep.
58
687,
2
Atl.
428,
109
Pa.
Goodman,
Bank v.

If

"Such suitable agent must, from the nature of the case, be
Auten,
some one other than the party who is to make the payment."
Receiver, v. Bank, 67 Ark. 243, 54 S. W. 337, 47 L, R. A. 329; 1
In Farley Nat. Bank v. Pollock, 145 Ala. 321,
Dan. Neg. Inst. 328.
39 South. 612, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 194, 117 Am. St. Rep. 44, 8 Ann.
Cas. 370, the same principle is announced, and in the note it is said :
"The American cases are almost unanimous in support of the doctrine
that it is negligence in a bank having a draft or check for collection
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said:

The annotator gives a long list of
to send it directly to the drawee."
authorities sustaining this proposition.
The defendant Murchison National Bank, however, insists that it
has shown that the custom or usage prevails by which a bank, having a check upon its own correspondent in good standing, may inThe same point has been frequently made
trust it with the collection.
and almost uniformly met with the declaration that such custom, if

In this connection it is said by the Court
shown to exist, is invalid.
of Missouri, in Bank v. Bank, supra: "It was said to be
customary for banks to transmit collections to their correspondent,
To this we answer
even though such correspondent was the debtor.
that it is not a reasonable custom, and therefore must fail of recogniWe concede it may be, and perhaps is, in many
tion by the courts.
instances, the most convenient mode for the bank intrusted with the
But, if the bank adopts that mode, it takes upon itself
collection.
of Appeals

risk of the consequences."
In Min. S. & Door Co. v. Metropolitan Bank, 76 Minn. 136, 78
N. W. 980, 44 L. R. A. 507, 77 Am. St. Rep. 609, the court says:
"We cannot agree with counsel that the usage and custom lure relied

the

defense to the claim thai the defendant was negligent when
Bank for presentation and
to the Mapleton
!-nt, as a general usage and custom will nol justify neglig
It may l»e admitted thai such a coui e i frequently adopted, but it
musl be at the risk of the sender, who transmits the evidence upon
winch the right to demand paymenl depends to the party who is to

upon as

a

forwarding this check

make the payment.
Such
,f the law, unre.i
Pollock,
and

supra, Simpson,
the best-considen

a

J.

usage
and
•>.

custom is opposed to thi
In Parle) Nat. Bank v.
"A custom musl be reasonable,
not only that the hank or part;.

and

invalid."
:

hold,

THE AUTHORITY

502

(Part

2

who is to pay the paper is not the proper person to whom the paper
should be sent for collection, but also that a custom to that effect isunThe same rule is laid clown in the notes, and a
mable and bad."
* * *
Morse on Banks, § 236."
sustain it.
to
cited
of
cases
number
No Error.
«.v

Minnei* Accord, as to transmission
to the drawee bank for collection:
Door Co. v. Metropolitan Bank, 7('> Minn. L36, 78 N. W. 980,
apolis Sash
l;. a. 504, 77 Am. St. Rep. 609 (1899); Merchants" Nat. Bank v. GoodAil. 687, 58 Am. Rep. 728 (1885); Am. Exch. Bank v.
man, L09 Pa. 122,
Cf. Wilson v. Carlinville
Nat. Bank, 71 Mo. App. i-'.i (1897).
Metropolitan
When the paper
Nat. Bank, L87 111. 222, 58 N. E. 250, 52 L. K. A. 632 (1900).
in accordance with the
is senl by the agenl to the debtor tor collection
the debtor fails
strnctions of the principal, there is of course ao liability
Firsl Nat. Bank v. Citizens' Sav. Bank, L23 Mich. 336, 82 N. W. 00,
to pay.
is L.'k. A. 583 (1900).
.
collecting bank is not liable for the deleading case for the view that
sub-agent is Fabens v. Mercantile Bank, 23 Pick. 330, 34 Am.
faults of
Conn.
Accord: Connecticut, Lawrence v. Stonington Bank,
Dec. 59 (1839).
Illinois, -Ftna ins. Co. v. Alton City Bank, 25 111. 243, 71) Am.
521 (1827);
N. W. 328,
loira, Guelich v. Nat. St. Bank, 56 Iowa, 434,
Dee. 32* (ISG.1):
Kansas, Bank of Lindsborg v. Ober,
leading case;
Am. Rep. L10 (1881),
Pac. 324 (1884); Kentucky, Falls C'y Woolen Mills v. Louis31 Kan. 599,
ville Nat. Banking Co., 145 Ky. 64, 140 S. W. 66 (1911); Mainland, Jackson
liar.
J. 140 (1823); Massachusetts, Dorchester Bank v.
v. Union Lank.
Cush. 177. 186 (1848); Mississippi, Tiernan v. Com.
New England Bank.
Bank,
low. Ols. 40 Am. Dec. 83 (1843); Missouri, Lamia v. Traders' Bank,
First Nat. Bank v. Sprague,
118 Mo App. 356, 94 S. YV. 770 (1900); Nebraska,
34 Neb. 318, 51 N. W. 846, 15 L. R. A. 498, 33 Am. St. Rep. 044 (1892); North
Carolina, Planters' Lank v. First Nat. Bank, 75 N. C. 534 (1876); PennsylKawle, 3S0 (1X34); South Dakota, Fanset
vania Mechanics' Bank v. Farp,
Garden C'y St. Bank. 24 S. D. 24S. 123 N. W. 686 (1909); Tennessee, Bank
Baxt. 101, 105, 35 Am. Rep. 091 (1874);
of Louisville v. Bank of Knoxville,
Stacy v. Dane Co. Bank, 12 Wis. 029, 707 (1800); Kohl v. Beach,
Wisconsin
107 Wis. 4(i0. 83 N. W. 657, 50 L. R. A. GOO. 81 Am. St. Rep. 849 (1900).
When the first agent is negligent, he of course is liable for any losses causSecond Nat. Bank v. Merthe default of the suhagent.
ed thereby through
A. 273, 98 Am. St. Rep.
R.
L.
55
W.
65
S.
Ky.
930,
Bank,
111
Nat.
chants'
&

1

6

4

7
I

4,

8

v
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SECTION 3.— EFFECT OF DELEGATION

HOAG
(Supreme

Court of Michigan,

GRAVES.

v.

1S90.

81

15

Mich.

62S,

46 N. W.

109.)

a

a

it,

Assumpsit to recover half of $500, alleged to have been collected
by defendant through his agent, one Anthony.
Hoag was the owner
of the amount due on an insurance policy which had been issued on
the life of one Sweet, then deceased. Graves, in his interest, arranged
with Anthony in New York to collect
and Hoag gave Anthony
power of attorney, and made
contract with Graves to give him half
the amount collected, Graves bearing all costs of collection.
*

*

a

*

J.

18
C.
The fact that the company admitted
liability was derived through
letter from Anthony to Graves.
Quite
correspondence passed between these parties, and Graves testifies

a

all of the letters received by him from Anthony to
dozen such letters.
plaintiff testifies that he saw perhaps
After several days'
Anthony collected on the 24th of June $500,
delay he retained from the amount $100 for his services, and forwarded
draft for $400, payable to the order of Brice W. Hoag.
He receipted to the insurance company for this money as the attorney
in fact of Brice W. Hoag. Graves handed the draft over to Hoag,
that he showed

it,

a

a

H<aL:. and

retained $250, and gave $150 to Graves.
the balance of $500 from the
insurance company, and signed the receipt for the full amount, as
D.
follow>:
"Brice W. Hoag, Creditor of Myron \Y. Sweet.
lie kept the whole of the second
Fact."
Edgar Anthony, Attorney
the subagent of Graves,
. and the plaintiff claims that Anthony
who drew the money upon
15,

1887,

Anthony collected

is

in

By

On July

is

a

s,

1,

in

And because the contract between Hoag
and not his agent at all.
his hands
1887, recites that Graves has
and Grave
of date June
claim of $1,000 on certificate 3,977 of the National
For collection
Benefit Society of New York, he
Liable to him for $250 collected
has
which
Anthony
neglected and refused to pay
by Anthony, and
over.

S.

6

1

6

i

B

V

ti Accord: Commercial Bank v. Jones, 18 Tex. 11 (1857); Waldman v.
South. 666, 24 Am. St. Rep. 883 (1890); Davis v.
Insurance Co., 91 Ala. L70,
When the agenl
King, 66 Conn. 165, 34 Atl. L07, 50 \.m. St Rep. mi (1895).
ies full responsibility for the undertaking be will be liable for the acts
niployed and
of the subagents, even when the principal knew they would
v v. Super. Ct -"'77 (1859); Barnard
Raney v. Weed,
nted thereto.
1". (1886);
Williams v.
V B. 364, 55 Am. Rep.
v. Coffin, ill Mass. 37,
W. 953 (1900); Bosslter v. Trafalgar Life
Moore, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 102. 58
\- 'n. i'7 Beav. .':77 (1859).
it <pf be opinion is omitted.
t

Assur.

i
■
i;
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After hearing all the testimony, the circuil judge charged the jury
follows: "The question presented in this case is one of those
interesting ones which arise in trial of eases, and which, by reason
Of the endless combination of facts, there seems to be no end or limit
It seems to the court thai the controlling question here was
to.
whether from the time oi the making of the contract of June 1st the
man Anthony was under the control of Mr. Graves or of Mr. Iloag;
and when ihat question is solved, it solves the case for that matter.
as
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1 cannot quite understand
how it would he possihle that Mr. Graves
could be held responsible for the conduct and acts of Mr. Anthony
unless he had the power to control him, and, indeed, take the husiness
And it seems to the court
out of his hands if it became necessary.
that by the power of attorney of January 29th the man Anthony,
under the circumstances, as they seem to have been disclosed by the
testimony, was the agent of Mr. Hoag; that at the time when the

contract of June 1st was made, it was understood between the parties as to what the situation was. If that contract had been intended
to have been construed as taking the authority of Mr. Hoag from
Mr. Anthony, and putting the control of Mr. Anthony into the hands
of Mr. Graves, it hardly seems to me that that kind of a contract
It does not seem to me that the contract
would have been drawn.
goes far enough to do that, and, as I said before, if it does not do
that it does not quite seem to me that it could be said that it was

understood between the parties that Mr. Graves should be responsible
for the acts of Mr. Anthony, except in so far as the contract specifies ; that is, he should be liable for his acts in whatever costs he might
make, and things of that kind ; hut for the misfeasance of Mr. Anthony, it does not seem to me that the contract goes far enough. With
this in view, it seems to me that the duty is upon the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant."
We think the view of the circuit judge is correct. The legal principle involved is well expressed by Mr. Mechem in his work on Agency, at section 197, as follows: "If an agent employs a subagent for
his principal, and by his authority, expressed or implied, then the
suhagent is the agent of the principal, and is directly responsible to
the principal for his conduct, and if damage results from the conduct of such subagent, the agent only is responsible in case he has
But if the
not exercised due care in the selection of the subagent.
of
his
principal,
business
the
transact
agent, having undertaken to
him
in
he has
assist
what
to
account
a
on
own
his
subagent
employs
undertaken to do, he does so at his own risk, and there is no privity
between such subagent and the principal. The subagent is therefore
the agent of the agent only, and is responsible to him for his conduct, while the agent is responsible to the principal for the manner
in which the business has been done, whether by himself or his servant or his agent."
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The written agreement cannot be contradicted by parol testimony,
but it must be construed in the light of the circumstances and situaThe
tion of the parties as they existed at the time it was executed.
circumstances were that Hoag had already made Anthony his attorney in fact to liquidate, settle, and adjust this claim against the inHe was at the time the contract of June 1st was
surance company.
entered into the agent and attorney of Hoag, and there is no evidence
Anthony received the money of
that he ever revoked his authority.
the insurance company by virtue of his power of attorney from Hoag.
He did
and not by virtue of any authority he received from Graves.
virtue
of any
Graves,
or
of
by
to
as
the
or
claim
act,
agent
not act,
of
no
sense
a
was
in
subagent
from
and
him,
received
authority
Graves, but was the immediate agent of Hoag. The authority conferred upon Anthony was to liquidate, settle, and adjust the claim,
and this authorized him to receive the money due upon the claim, and
thus liquidate it. Hoag recognized this authority in receiving without
question the draft as avails of the first payment made upon the claim,
and which was received after the execution of the contract of June
1st.
The relations between Hoag and Anthony had not changed when
Anthony, as the agent of Hoag, received the balance of the claim,
and gave a receipt in Hoag's name, by himself as his attorney in fact,
in full liquidation of the whole claim.
The plaintiff's cause of action, as stated in his declaration, is that
Graves collected $500 through his agent, and neglected and refused
There was no evidence showing or tending
to pay plaintiff his half.
to show that Anthony, who collected the money, was the agent of
Graves, but, on the contrary, it was conclusively shown that he was
Hoag's agent, and it follows that the plaintiff entirely failed to make
his case.

The judgment is affirmed.

The other justices

concurred.
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SECTION i.— LOYALTY
I. In General

LUM
(Supreme

v.

Court of Minnesota,

McEWEN.
1894.

56

Minn.

27S, 57 N. W. GG2.)

Linn, in behalf of citizens of P>rainerd, gave to Clark nominally, to
McEwen really, his note for $5,000, in order to induce McEwen to use
his influence to have his principals build a railroad to Brainerd. McKwen would have done as he did without the note, and he had no influence in inducing his principals to build the road. Linn sues to have
the note adjudged null and void, and delivered up and canceled.
On
the ground that the note was in circulation, was fair upon its face, and
that the contract was still executory, the court below decreed for

plaintiff.

Mitchell, J. It is only necessary to consider one of numerous
questions argued by counsel.
The defendant McEwen was the superintendent and general manager of the business of the Northern Mill
That company had a sawmill on Gull river, eight miles
Company.
from Brainerd. and also a logging railroad extending from Kilpatrick
lake, 25 miles from P.rainerd, some distance out into the woods.
The
mill company had under consideration a plan for remodeling its mill,
and extending its logging road to Gull river, where the mill was situated. At this juncture of affairs, in consideration of McEwen's agreement to use his influence and authority as superintendent and manager
of the mill company to secure the removal of its mill and the extension
(506)
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of its road to Brainerd, the plaintiff executed the obligation in suit, by
which he promised to pay to defendant Clark $5,000 nine months after date, on condition that within that time the mill company extended
its logging railroad to Brainerd. and built within the limits of that city
a sawmill of a specified capacity.
This note was given for the benefit
i f McEwen, but was made payable to Clark, in order to conceal McK wen's connection with the matter.
That this contract was illegal and void on grounds of public policy
will not admit of a moment's doubt. Loyalty to his trust is the rirst
duty which an agent owes to his principal.
Reliance upon an agent's
integrity, fidelity, and capacity is the moving consideration in the creation of all agencies : and the law condemns, as repugnant to public
policy, everything which tends to destroy that reliance.
The agent
cannot put himself in such relations that his own personal interests become antagonistic to those of his principal. He will not be allowed to
serve two masters without the intelligent consent of both.
Actual injury is not the principle the law proceeds on, in holding
such transactions void.
Fidelity in the agent is what is aimed at. and.
as a means of securing it, the law will not permit him to place himself
in a position in which he may be tempted by his own private interests
to disregard those of his principal. 1 In the matter of determining the
policy of removing the mill and extending the road, McEwen, in the
di -charge of his duties, whether merely that of making recomm.
tions, or of exercising authority to act, owed to his principal the exercise of his best judgment and ability, uninfluenced by any antagonistic
pergonal interests of hi- own. His attempt to secure $5,000 to hin
was calculated to bias his mind in favor of the policy upon which the
payment of the money was conditioned, regardless of the interests of
the mill company.
It is not material that no actual injury to the company resulted, or that the policy recommended may have been for its
best interest.
Courts will not inquire into these matters. It is enough
to know that the agent in fact placed himself in such relations that he
might be tempted by his own interests to disregard those of his principal.
The transaction was nothing more or less than the acceptance by the
agent of a bribe to perform his duties in the manner desired by the
•i who gave the bribe.
Such a contract is void.
This do, -trine
rests on such plain principles of law, as well as common business

'The ruii' i- universal that do one baring duties <>f a fiduciary character
t<>discbarge
Bhall !"• allowed t" enter into engagements in which he has, or
>>r which possibly may conflict, with
can have, :i personal interest, conflicting,
tin- Interest of those whom be i- bound t" protect Glover v. Aim- (C I
8 Fed. ■■■<\
(1881); Bedford Coal Co. v. Parke County Coal <'".. n Ind. App.
•'•.:•<>.
89
E. 112 (1009).
'ill.- rule applies t" public agents, and when :i board lets ;i contract in be
half of the public, from which Bome members <>f tin- board are i<> reap a personal advantage, it i- \-'i<i as against public policy; and it matters not that
those wiin are Interested were a minority <>rthe board.
People v. Township
Board, 1 1 Mich. 222 (1*
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The doctrine
honesty, thai the citation of authorities is unnecessary.
is perhaps as clearly and concisely expressed as anywhere in Harrington v. Dock Co., 3 Q. B. Div. 549.
The fact thai the validity of such
transaction is attempted to be sustained in courts of justice does not
speak well for the state of the public conscience on the subject of
loyalty to trusts in business affairs.
This was an action by the maker of the instrument to have it surIn view of the relation which he bears to
rendered up and canceled.
the transaction, there may be some doubt whether courts should give
him affirmative relief.
Bui defendants do not raise the point, and we
only advert to it in order that this case may not be considered an authority on the question.
Order affirmed.

JANSEN
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(Supreme Court of Nebraska,

1893.

v.

WILLIAMS. 2

36 Neb. 8G9, 55 N. W. 279, 20 L. R. A. 207.)

C. 3 This action was brought by the defendant in error
•over the sum of $100 retained as commission from the proceeds
of the sale of real property, effected by the plaintiffs in error. The
petition alleged the employment of plaintiffs in error to sell said real
property for the sum of $3,000, and that the plaintiff named in said
petition meantime reserved for himself the right to sell said property
if he met with an opportunity to do so before the same should be sold
by plaintiffs in error; that, soon after such employment, the plaintiff
below entered into negotiations with one E. T. Hartley for the sale of
said property, and was about to sell said property to said Hartley for
the sum of $3,300; that, during such negotiations with said Hartley,
plaintiffs in error, for the purpose of preventing the defendant in error
from making said sale, and wrongfully compelling the defendant in
error to pay plaintiffs in error a commission of $100, induced said
Hartley to abandon his negotiations with defendant in error, and agree
to pay to them, the plaintiffs in error, $3,000 for said property; and
that thereupon plaintiffs in error represented to defendant in error that
they had sold said property for $3,000 to a good, responsible party,
and induced the defendant in error to execute a deed to Albert W.
Jansen, one of the plaintiffs in error, and defendant in error executed
the same, believing that said grantee was another than the said plaintiff
in error, and thereby deceived and defrauded the defendant in error
to defendant in error's damage in the sum of $100.
The answer admits the placing of said property in the hands of
plaintiffs in error for sale at $3,000, but alleged that said E. T. Hartley

Ryan,

Norria v. Tayloe, 49 111. 17,
ill. 117. 15 N. E. 298 (1896).
i Pari "f the opii i"n i- omitted

2

Accord:

v. Dnpuy,

L63

95

Am. Dec. 568

(1S6S),

and Prince
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was obtained by plaintiffs in error as an original purcbaser, to whom
they sold the property without any knowledge of any previous negotiations with defendant in error, and that the deed was taken to said
Jansen only for the purpose of securing money advanced to said Hartlev, and that the acts in connection with said transaction were in good
To this answer there was a reply in the nature of a general
faith.
* * *
denial.
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At the request of the defendant in error the court instructed the jury
as follows : "An agent ought, as far as possible, to represent his principal; and, to the best of his ability, he should endeavor to successfully
It is also his duty to keep his
accomplish the object of his agency.
principal fully and promptly informed of all the material facts or circumstances which come to his knowledge, and, since he is expected to
represent his principal, he cannot have a personal interest adverse to
the interest of his principal; and if he deals with the subject-matter of
the agency the profits will, as a general rule, belong to the principal,

and not to the agent. In all things he is required to act in entire good
faith towards his principal. There are duties which the law imposes
upon an agent, without any express stipulations on the subject; and
one of these duties of an agent is to keep his principal informed of his
acts, and to inform him within a reasonable time of sales made, and
to give him a timely notice of all facts and circumstances which may
An
render it necessary. for him to take measures for his security.
agent cannot act for his principal and for himself in the same transaction, by being both buyer and seller of property, and has no right to
act as the agent for others for the purchase of property without the
knowledge or consent of such owner, nor to take any advantage of the
confidence which his position inspires to obtain the title in himself.
If you find that the defendants were the agents of the plaintiff for the
sale of the property mentioned in the petition, and that in making the
sale they purposely kept from the plaintiff any of the material facts
touching said sale, for the purpose of subserving their own interest,
and intended to and did keep the plaintiff in the dark as to such facts
until after the said sale was consummated, and deed executed by said

plaintiff, then I instruct you that they are not entitled to a commission
for selling the same."
In Stettnische v. Lamb, IS Neb. 627, 26 N. W. 374. is this Langu;
"The rule is well settled that a party will not he permitted to purchase

hold it for his own benefit, where he li.i
is inconsistent with his
a duty to perform in relation thereto which
This statement was
character as a purchaser on hi- own account."
of
then
and
its
correctness
sustained by several authorities cited,
l .
l
the
of
and
text
of
cases
he no doubt.
In the lighl
adjudged
to
had
perform
error
the
in
what
plaintiffs
duty
therefore, let u
see
toward, the defendant in error in respect of the real property which
an interest in property,

matter
the

following language

and

of

the agency between them. Upon this subject
in Pom. Eq. Jur. § 959: "In d<

is found
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without the intervention of his principal, if an agent for the purpose
of selling property for the principal purchases it himself, or an agent
for the purpose of buying property for the principal buys it from himof a third person,
self, either directly or through the instrumentality
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It will always be set aside at the
the sale or purchase is voidable.
The amount of consideration, the absence of
option of the principal.
undue advantage, or other similar features, arc wholly immaterial.
Nothing will defeal the principal's right of remedy except his own
confirmation after full knowledge of all the farts."
In Porter v. Woodruff, 36 X. J. Eq., on page 179 et seq., the following language is found : "The general interests of justice, and the safety
of those who are compelled to repose confidence in others, alike de-

mand that the courts shall always inflexibly maintain that great and
salutary rule which declares that an agent employed to sell cannot
make himself the purchaser, nor, if employed to purchase, can he be
The moment he ceases to be the representative of
himself the seller.
his employer, and places himself in a position towards his principal
where his interests may come in conflict with those of his principal, no
matter how fair his conduct may be
moment he ceases to be that which
to his principal demands.
He is no
He ceases to be the champion of one

in the particular transaction, that
his service requires, and his duty
longer the agent, but an umpire.
of the contestants in the game of

bargain, and sets himself up as a judge to decide between his principal
and himself what is just and fair. The reason of the rule is apparent.
Owing to the selfishness and greed of our nature, there must, in the
great mass of the transactions of mankind, be a strong and almost ineradicable antagonism between the interests of the seller and the buyer; and universal experience has shown that the average man will not,
where his interests are brought in conflict with those of his employer,
look upon his employer's interest as more important, and entitled to
more protection, than his own.
In such cases the courts do not stop
to inquire whether the agent has obtained an advantage or not, or
whether his conduct has been fraudulent or not.
When the fact is
established that he has attempted to assume two distinct and opposite
characters in the same transaction, in one of which he acted for himself, and in the other pretended to act for another person, and to have
secured for each the same measure of advantage that would have been
obtained if each had been represented by a disinterested and loyal representative, they do not pause to speculate concerning the merits of the
■
n, — whether the agent has been able so far to curb his natural greed as to take no advantage, — but they at once pronounce the
void because it is against public policy.
The salutary obprinciple is not to compel restitution in case fraud has been
committed, or an unjust advantage gained, but to elevate the agent to
a position where he cannot he tempted to betray his principal.
Under
a less stringent rule, fraud might he committed, or unfair advantage
transaction

f the
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Story, A.g.
known to his principal to be such. Dunl. Paley, Ag. 33
not inapplicable, nor
210; and other cases cited. And this rule
relaxed, when the employment
springs
fixed price, for
to sell at
law,
of
the
abuse
to
prevent
the
of
adopted
from the prohibitory policy
man
requires
confidence, and to remove temptation to duplicity.

off the character of agent when he assumes that of principal."
Mechem, Ag., in section 455, states the rule as follows: "The agenl
will not he permitted to serve two masters without the intelligent conthe lawlearned judge, SO careful
said
As
sent of both.
will not permit
guarding against the abuse of fiduciary relations that
an agent to act for himself and his principal in the same transaction, as
All
to buy of himself, as agent, the property of his principal, or the like.
ratified
respects the principal, unless
such transactions are void, as
To repudiate
full knowledge of all the circumstances.
him with
has been or
he
Whether
them, he need not show himself damnified.
law
the
tlu'
proceeds
not
principle
rial. Actual inquiry
not,
whal
in
the
agenl
void.
Fidelity
holding mi.1i transactions
upon
is

il

it

a

is

by

to put

in

is

:

is

a

by

\\

ill.

in in

di

a

b)

it,

an

to place himself

in

a

the law will not permit the
uring
which
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regard that of his principal."
AI1 private
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speak
-This
doctrine,
again
to
Mich.
11
Township.
v.
People
the beautiful language "f another, has its foundation, nol so much
th,- commission of actual fraud as in that profound knowledge of the
human heart which dictated thai hallowed petition, "Lead us nol into
temptation, hut deliver us from evil.' and that caused the announceman cannol serve two m
ment of the infallible truth,
med at, and,

,
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taken, and yet, owing to the imperfections of the best of human instituin
or prove
tions, the injured party be unable either to discover
unTo
this
redress.
against
him
to
as
to
guard
manner
entitle
such
removed, and the prohibition against
certainty, all possible temptation
made broad enough to cover all
dual character
the agent acting
The rights of the principal will not be changed, nor
his transactions.
not
the capacities of the agent enlarged, by the fact that the agent
discretion, but simply acts under an authority to purinvested with
particular
specified price, or to sell
particular article at
chase
recognized by the
No such distinction
article at the market price.
be established without removing an important
adjudications, nor can
C. 326;
Younge
Benson v. Heathorn,
safeguard against fraud.
Y.
427."
X.
276,
36
Bond,
34 Barb.
Conkey v.
Law, 440.
found the following
In Ruckman v. Bergholz, 37 N.
from
one where the
case
this
distinguishing
"The
judge,
language:
the jury
instructed
the
of
agent,
to
the
was
left
open
negotiations
price
was
that, though the plaintiff was interested in the purchase wheji
made, he might, nevertheless, recover his commissions as agent, notwithstanding the defendant was not aware of the existence of such infundamental rule that an
In this there was error, for
terest.
purchaser, unless he
agent employed to sell cannot himself be
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These quotations we shall properly close with the language of Story,
of this court, in Englehart v.
§ 210, quoted, with the approval
Plow Co.,21 Neb. 48, 31 NT.W.391: "In this connection, also, it seems
proper to state another rule in regard to the duties of agents, which is
of general application, and that is that, in matters touching the .agency,
agents cannot act so as to bind their principals where they have an
This rule is founded upon the plain
adverse interest in themselves.
and obvious considerations that the principal bargains in the employment for the exercise oi the disinterested skill, diligence, and zeal of
the agent for his own exclusive benefit.
It is a confidence necessarily
reposed in the agent, that he will act with a sole regard to the interests
of his principal, as far as he lawfully may; and 'even if impartiality
could possibly be presumed on the part of the agent, where his own
interests are concerned, that is not what the principal bargains for, and
in many cases it is the very last thing which would advance his interIf, then, a seller were permitted, as an agent of another, to beest.
come the purchaser, his duty to his principal and his own interest would
stand in direct opposition to each other, and thus a temptation, perhaps
in many cases too strong for resistance by men of flexible morals, or
hackneyed in the common devices of worldly business, would be held
out, which would betray them into gross misconduct, and even into
crime.
It is to interpose a preventive check against such temptations
and seductions that a positive prohibition has been found to be the
soundest policy, encouraged by the purest precepts of Christianity."
It is unnecessary to quote further illustrations of the correctness of
the instructions given the jury at the request of the defendant in error.
The same principles announced in these instructions pervade all the
text works, and the decisions of the courts, which have to deal with
the relations of principal and agent. In none of them is recognized
the right of the suppression of important facts, of which the principal
had a right to be informed, as a part of "the secrets of the real-estate
business," as was claimed by plaintiff in error Murphy in his testimony. The evidence fully sustains the verdict which was rendered by
the jury. Indeed, a verdict different would probably, of necessity, have
been set aside, as has been shown by abundant citation of text writers
and authorities.
The instructions clearly gave the law to the jury, were applicable to
the evidence, and the judgment of the district court must therefore be
The other commissioners concur.
affirmed.
Vg.
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II. Agent Act for More Than One
THOMPSON
(Nisi Prius in King's Bench,

HAVELOCK.

v.
1S0S.

1 Camp.

10 R.

527,

R.

744.)

Capt. Thompson was employed as master of defendant's ship, the
Lord Nelson. During the time he contracted the ship in the government
service in Egypt, the captain to receive Is. per ton per month and the
The government paid both amounts
owner 40s. per ton per month.
to the defendant, and the plaintiff sues to recover for money had and
received.

Is it contended that a servant, who has enof his time and attention to my concerns,
whole
the
gaged to devote
It would
a part of them, to another?
services,
or
his
out
may hire
monfor
this
been
had
suing
owner
if
the
different
thing,
a
been
have
plaintiff
events
the
at
all
present
that
of
opinion
I
am
clearly
but
ey ;
has no right to it. Under this contract, he must have been taken from
superintending the defendant's ship ; and I do not know how far it
might go, if such earnings could be recovered in a court of justice.
No man should be allowed to have an interest against his duty. I

as high a freight as possible for
were meritorious;
his owners, and that his services to government
still there would be no security in any department of life or of business, if servants could legally let themselves out in whole or in part.
My opinion upon the subject is quite decisive : and if it be doubted, I
beg that a bill of exceptions may be tendered.*

will assume, that the plaintiff obtained

GATY
(Kansas City Court of Appeals,

v.

SACK. 8

Missouri,

1885.

\
19

Mo. App. 470.)

Action to recover commissions for obtaining a purchaser for deThe agent did not complete a sale, but defendant
fendant's farm.
himself sold the farm to a purchaser, discovered by plaintiff.
*
* *
III. It appears from the record thai at
Philips, P.
J.°

the time plaintiff claimed to be acting as agent for defendant he was
secretly interested in a farm known as "the Dyke farm." This was
»One agent cannol authorize* another agent to ad to the prejudice of their
Adams Express Co. v. Trego, 35 Md. 17 iis7L'>. approved In Clarke
v. Kelsey,
n Neb. 766, 60 V W. 138 (1894).
Geiger v. Harris, 19 Mich. 209 (1869), In which tin- court found
Record:
when the agent cannol
ure, or under circumstances
that in moment
prejudice
be working for his principal, be may ad for another, If without
tnployer.
omitted.
Pari of the opinion
GODD.pB.fi
33

fcd

principal.

\

i

'■
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the farm he took the said purchaser oul to see on the day defendant
propose. 1 that he go b) to see his farm.
Defendant complains thai the
court excluded evidence offered by him tending to show that the
plaintiff concealed from him the fad of this secret interest. The contention of appellant is. that plaintiff's interest, thus concealed, conflicted with his duty as agent for the sale of defendant's land, and
should be held to defeat plaintiff's action.
In support of this posi
tion we are referred to Story on Agency, § 210, and other like authori-
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ties.

The rule invoked is "that in matters touching the agency, agents
cannot act so as to hind their principals where they have an adverse
This interest manifestly refers to the subject
interest in themselves."
matter of the agency — the thing on which the agent undertakes to act
and deal with for the principal. It has no application to the facts of
this case.
It cannot be so extended as to make it apply to the instance
«>! a real estate agent having his own lands or any other lands for sale,
so long as lie does not permit his interest in other like transactions to
interfere with his duty to his principal. Otherwise a real estate agent
could only have on his list of lands for sale one farm at a time, or
W( »uld not be allowed to sell his own lands, without first advising one
of his patrons of his purpose and interest in other tracts.
Suppose
he did keep the fact of his interest in the Dyke farm concealed from
defendant, how did that fact concern the defendant, or in and of itself
affect his relation as agent for defendant's land? Defendant does not
pretend, or at least he did not offer any proof to the effect, that he
would not have intrusted the sale of his land to plaintiff had he known
* * *
that he was secretly interested in the Dyke farm.
Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.

EVERHART
(Supreme

Tip

v.

SEARLE.

Court of Pennsylvania,
7

1872.

71

Pa. 256.)

C. J.
The case before us is rather novel. It involves
question whether the same person may he an agent in a private
transaction for both parties, without the consent of both, so as to entitle him to compensation from both or either.
We have the authority
of Holy Writ for saying that "no man can serve two masters;
for
either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he will hold to
the one and despise the other." AH human experience sanctions the
undoubted truth and purity of this philosophy, and it is received as a
cardinal principle in every system of enlightened jurisprudence.
The plaintiff below was appointed by one A. S. Flagg, of Massachusetts agent to sell certain real estate, situate in Luzerne county, Pennsylvania, and was to receive for his compensation all that he might
a
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realize over S125 per acre. Two days after the date of this authority.
to wit, on the 17th day of January 1870, he accepted from the plaintiff in error the contract in writing upon which this suit was brought,
promising to pay him S500 as therein set forth, "for his services in
assisting him to negotiate a sale and purchase, by him of fourteen of
of the
eighteen shares, or all, if he can obtain them conveniently,
eighteen (shares) of a certain piece or parcel of land situate in Lackawanna township," etc., composed of the same land he was appointed
to sell. We need not spend time to argue, what is not susceptible of
controversy, that by the terms of the instrument he accepted employment as agent to purchase the same land which he was employed as
agent to sell. It is true, the learned judge below, no doubt strongly
impressed by the maxim "that the laborer is worthy of his hire." endeavored to make a distinction in the transaction between an undertaking as an agent, and the sale of a preference to the defendant as a
I ought to say, however, that this was hardly his interpretabuyer.
tion of the writing, but rather the plaintiff's explanation of his duty
under the contract.
lint the plaintiff, as a witness on the stand, had
no right to construe the language of the written contract on which he
had brought his suit. There was nothing left out. and no ambiguity
in
and therefore not within the rule of oral explanation.
The interpretation was for the court on the terms of the instrument, and they
obviously stipulated for the plaintiff's services to assist the defendant
in negotiating for the shares mentioned, ''or all,
he can obtain them
conveniently." He was thus to be acting with the defendant, or b\
himself, for the defendant, just as the object in view might demand.
This was an agency "pure and simple."
do not think, however, that
the result as to the plaintiff's claim ought to be at all different from
what
likely to be, on the -round assumed by the learned court
for even on that ground the agent bargained away what his first emThis was bad faith towards
ployer had engaged, viz.. his discretion.
him, and ex maleficio non oritur contractus.
There was plausibility and seeming force in the argument that as
the sale, was not injured
Flagg, the plaintiff's principal
the arrangement with the defendant, there was nothing wrong
making
that arrangement.
specious, but not sound.
This
The transaction
be
■

regarded as against the polic) of the law, and not binding upon
Ib

Is

<
j1
1
.1
1
i
ti
*•
.1
1
i
<',•
•
t■

Impartiality.

;i

\<

I

I,

a

1

ol

is

it

tinis

Is

[f

agent of two principals
bonest, "the utmost that <':m be expected
Bui Impartiality is exactly tinwhich
British Am. Assurance Co. v. Cooper,
Inconsistent with agency."
Colo. App.
-'>. M) I'ac. iit (1895).
of the essence of the agent's contract that be
will us<- bis best Bkill and judgment to promote the Interest of ins employer.
This be cannot do when be acts for t\\" persons whose Interests are essentially adverse.
therefore guilty
He
breach of iiis contract
Paras
Allen, 194, 79 Am Dec. 7.".»; (1861),
worth v. Ilemmer,
leading case, fol
'i- 93 \m
lowed in Walker v. Osg
9* Ma
168 (1807), which dis
tingulshed Rupp v. Sampson, 16 Gray, 398, 77 Am. Dec. in: (1800), post,
.Ms.
The
cannot defend himself behind the double agency by settli
t..m \. Holllday, 59 ill. 176 (1871).
the Illegality of the contract

of him

«
•
t

:i
-'
•
11
1
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who has a right to object to it. "It matters not," it is said
(page 210, of Hare and Wallace's Notes, 1 Lead. Cases in Eq.), "that
there was no fraud meditated and no injury done; the rule is not intended to be remedial oi actual wrong, but preventive of the possibility
<a it."
This was said of "any one who arts representatively, or whose
The
office is to advise or operate, riot for himself but for others.
principle is general, that a trustee, so far as the trust extends, can
never he a purchaser of the property embraced under the trusts withand this principle applies
out the assent of all the persons interested;
to executors, administrators, guardians, attorneys at law, general or
* * * and to all persons, judicial or private, minspecial agents,
isterial or counselling, who in any respect have a concern in the sale of
the propertv of others ; it extends to sales by public auction, and to
judicial sales as well as private." Id. 209. And for this innumerable
authorities, English or American, are cited. To the same effect is
Campbell v. Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co., 2 Whart. 55 ; Paley on
Agencv, 32. "It is a fundamental rule applicable to both sales and
purchases, that an agent employed to sell cannot make himself the
purchaser ; nor if employed to purchase can be himself the seller.
The expediency and justice of this rule are too obvious to require exFor with whatever fairness he may deal between himself
planation.
and his employer, yet he is no longer that which his services require
and his principal supposes and retains him to be." It is clear from
all the authorities, not only those referred to, but those cited in the
notes to Fox v. Mackreth and Pott v. Same, 1 Lead. Cases in Eq. 172,
not here specially referred to, as also in numerous cases in our reports
from Lazarus and Others v. Bryson, 3 Binn. 54, that an agent to sell
cannot become an agent to buy. It is against the policy of the law that
Ex parte Bennett, 10 Vesey, 381. "The
such a principle should hold.
rests," it was said in 8 Tomlin's
ground on which the disqualification
Brown, 72, "is no other than that principle which dictates that a person
No man can serve two masters. He
cannot be both judge and party.
a
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that is intrusted with the interests of others cannot be allowed to
make the business and object of interest to himself, because, from a
frailty of nature, one who has the power will be too readily seized with
the inclination to use the opportunity for serving his own interest at
the expense of those for whom he is intrusted.
The danger of temptation from the facility and advantage for doing wrong which a particular situation affords, does, out of the mere necessity, work a disqualifi-

cation."
We regard the case of the plaintiff below within the principles of
these citations, although it doubtless appeared to him, as it did to his
able counsel and the learned court, that there was nothing of actual or
meditated fraud in the transaction ; but the learned judge, we think,
erred in refusing the defendant's 1st point, and in charging as set forth
* * *
in the several assignments of error.
Judgment reversed.
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ANDREWS

v.

RAMSAY

& CO.

(Kind's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice [100?,].
L. J. K. B. 865, 89 L. T. 4.j0, 7S2 W. R. 126.)

Lord Alverstone,

517

2

K. B.

635,

72

In

this case an action was brought to
had
been retained by the defendants
recover a sum of £50., which
remuneration for their servas
their
with the assent of the plaintiff
The main point
house.
the
of
plaintiff's
sale
the
ices in negotiating
defendants,
while actthe
because
that,
is
the
case
suggestion
of the
£20.
the
from
purchaser
received
had
agents,
as
the
plaintiff's
ing
as a secret profit, and because when that was discovered by the plaintiff the defendants had paid over that £20. to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover back from the defendants the amount
cannot see how that fact
retained by them by way of commission.
has anything to do with the matter. The £20. was recoverable by the
plaintiff from the defendants because it was a secret profit made by
them, and came out of the sum which the purchaser would, it may
be assumed, have been willing to pay for the house, and it therefore
rightly belonged to the plaintiff. That the plaintiff was undoubtedly
C.

J.

a

is

a

is

a

it

is,

entitled to the £20. seems to me to have no bearing on the question
whether the defendants were entitled to commission from the plaintiff.
It is said that the defendants ought not to be called upon to hand over
the £50. to the plaintiff because the plaintiff has had the benefit of
their services.
The principle of Salomons v. Pender, 3 H. & C. 639, seems to me
in my opinion, amply sufficient to do
to govern the case, and it
was held that an agent who was himself interested
so. In that case
in
contract to purchase property of his principal was not entitled
to any commission from the principal. The principle there laid down
not in
that, when
person who purports to act as an agent

&

*

*

a

it
is

§

is

it

p.

a

is

it

:

is

*

3

is

I

by

position to say to his principal, "I have been acting as your agent,
not entitled to recover any
you." he
have done my duty
and
C.
H.
v. Pender,
In
Salomons
commission from that principal.
defendthe
that
true
"It
B.,
said
639, 642, Bramwell,
Bu1
be one) of the plaintiff's services.
ant has had the benefit (if
hem
hahave
'What
done
to
you
in
say,
defendant
the
position
volunteer, and docs not come within the line of your duties
done as
And in tin same case Martin, B., quoted the pa
as agent.'"
said: "In this con
210. where
262,
from Story on Agency.
another rule, in regard to the
seems proper
nection, also,
of general application, and that is. that,
duties of agents, which
matter, touching the agen.
cannol art so as t<, hind their
in

<

in

This
themselves.
principals, where they have an adverse interest
the
that
prin
rule
founded upon the plain and obvious onsideration,
ha- the exercise of the disinterthe employment,
cipal bargains,
of the agent, for his own exclusive
ested skill,
il

di

in

is
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A

RUPP
Judicial

Court

of

SAMPSON.

Massachusetts,
I

(Supreme

v.

I860.

16

Gray,

398,

77

Am.

».c. 410.)

Contract for "hrokerage" on rattans imported in the ships Brothers
and Merrimack.
Rupp corresponded with one Clew, and got him to
come on and meet the defendants, whereupon Clew and defendants
made
contract.
Verdict for plaintiff, and defendants alleged exa

cept!
cord:
Cannell v. Smith.
12 Pa. 25, 21 Atl. 793, 12 L. R. A. 395 (1891).
;iL'«-!it cannol recover for his services for two principals, even from one
who with t'ui! knowledge "f the double agency promised to pay him,
appears thai the other principal w;is Ignoranl of the situation. Rice v. Wood,
113 Mass. 133, L0 Am. Rep. 459 (1873).
Ami when one principal employs the

The

if

&

of another having adverse Interests, the first principal cannol
against the second the contract made through the agent.
Bartram
Moyd, 'an I.. T. :;.".7. 20 T. L. K. 281 (1904), reversing, on the question
fication, 88 I.. T. 286 (1903).

it

1
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confidence necessarily reposed
the agent, thai he will
regard to the interests of Ins principal, as far as he
lawfully may; and even
could possibly be presumed
impartiality
en the part oi an agent, where his own interests were concerned,
not what the principal
that
bargains for; and
many eases,
the very last thing which would advance his interests.
The seller
an estate nmst he presumed to be desirous of obtaining as high
price as can fairly be obtained therefor; and the purchaser must
for as low
equally be presumed to desire to buy
price as he may."
seems to me that this ease
only an instance of an agent who
acted improperly being unable to recover his commission from his
principal.
impossible to say what the result might have been
this ease had aeted honestly.
the agenl
clear that the purchaser was willing to give £20. more than the price which the plaintiff received, and
may well be that he would have given more than
that.
impossible to gauge
any way what the plaintiff has lost
the improper conduct of the defendants.
think, therefore, that
the interest of the agents here was adverse to that of the principal.
entitled to have an honest agent, and
principal
only the honentitled to any commission.
In my opinion,
esl agent who
an
agent directly or indirectly colludes with the other side, and so acts
in opposition t<» the interest of his principal, he
not entitled to any
think, supported both by authority and on
commission.
That
no authority directly bearprinciple; hut if, as
suggested, there
on the question,
think that the sooner such an authority
made
the better.
The result
that the county court judge was right, and
this appeal must be dismissed.
Wills,
also rendered an opinion.
Appeal dismissed.
benefit.
act with

enforce
Sons v.
of rati-
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Bigelow,

C. J. We can see nothing in the conduct of the plaintiff
was fraudulent, or which operated to deceive the defendants
in making the agreement to pay him for his services.
He made no
false representations to them. They knew the nature and value of
his services and the extent to which they were beneficial to them. It
was wholly immaterial that he was also to receive compensation from
the other party.
It might well be that the services of the plaintiff
were of value to both parties, and that e&ch might be willing to pay
according to the benefit received by each.
(We know of no principle of
law, on which an agreement to pay for services rendered, honestly
entered into, can be avoided on the ground that another person, having interest wholly distinct and independent, has stipulated by a separate contract to pay for the same services/
Both contracts are valid ;
they are made upon good consideration ; and each agrees to make
compensation for a benefit which he expects to receive from the bargain. In the present case, there is nothing to show that the commissions which the plaintiff was to receive from both parties were excessive or unreasonable, or that they would together constitute an unusual or extraordinary compensation
for the services rendered by
him.
On the contrary, the jury had found, under the instructions
given by the court, that the sum claimed of the defendants had been
earned and was due when this action was brought, notwithstanding
the contract with the other party for the payment of a like sum.
The claim of the plaintiff would have stood on a very different
ground if he had been employed as a broker to buy or sell goods. It
would in such cases have been a fraud for him to conceal his agency
for one from the other. The interests of buyer and seller are necessarily adverse, and it would operate as a surprise on the confidence
of both parties, and essentially affect their respective interests, if one
person should without their knowledge act as the agent of both.
Hut
Farebrother v. Simmons, 5 B. & Aid. 333 : Story on Agency, >j 31.
the plaintiff did not art in any such capacity.
He was not an agent
to buy or sell, hut only acted as a middleman
to bring the parties
lie
together, in order to enable them to make their own contracts,
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which

Mood entirely indifferent
between them, and held no such relation
in consequence of hi-, agency as to render his action adverse to the
Tin- distinction was taken at the trial and
interests of either party.
fully and accurately stated in the instructions given to the jury. 10
The evidence offered h\ the defendants as to the usages Of Hade
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was rightly rejected, because it related to a class of contracts
Jt was therefore
which was in issue in the present case.
vant. Exceptions overruled.
that

III.

Adverse Interests

oe

(Part

3

unlike
irrele-

the Agent

(A) Personal Profit

TURNBULL
1869.

38

L.

GARDEN.

J.

Ch. 331, 20 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 218.)

James, V. C. In this case the plaintiff, Mrs. Sarah Turnbull, is a
widow lady, who has for many years employed the defendant, Mr.
R. S. Garden, as her agent in this country for the purpose of receiving the income which was receivable by her in this country, and
for the purpose of making payments out of it by her authority. Mr.
Garden carries on the business, not only of an army agent, but that
of accoutrement maker. I do not know whether this is a full description of his trade. In the course of the year 1867 he caused an attachment to be lodged in the city of London, upon some moneys of the
plaintiff in a bank there, to meet a claim of his for a balance of
£97. odd, being the result of the cash accounts between
him and
the plaintiff, the balance upon the receipts on her account, — the debts
due to him in his own trade as an accoutrement
maker, and payments made by him on her account.
She has challenged that account in two or three very important particulars. She says, "There
was no such balance as that of £97. due from me, because, in the account which you have rendered to me, you have charged me most
extravagant sums for payments made on account of my son, a young
cornet who had gone out to India, and as to whom
had written to*
you to tell you to furnish him with the necessary outfit"; and she
says, "That was the only authority
gave you in addition to the
earlier authority," an authority which
no doubt, relied upon by
the defendant, and which accompanied the young man when he came
to this country, to give him such moneys as were really necessary
for him, without going to any extravagant expenditure.
That being the authority, Mr. Garden charged the plaintiff, Mrs.

I

is,

I

a

seem to have been, at all events, of
amount
certainly startling.

a

a

a

a

if

is

a

Turnbull, as having paid altogether in respect of the outfit of this
sum very nearly amounting to £700.,
young man
sum, certainly,
which
very startling
supposed to be the cost of
reasonable and
proper outfit, which an agent, acting with
due regard to the interests of his employer, would have thought of ordering and sanctioning on behalf of the son of
widowed mother, whose means do not
is
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Probably the startling extent of the outfit which was furnished
extent, explained by that
to the voung man is, to a considerable
the
other
charge which the plaintiff
to
reference
with
which appears
this you have, in my acto
addition
"In
The
plaintiff
says,
makes.
count, charged against me, as money actually paid, moneys which
You have charged me with a paywere never paid on my account.

ment to Mr. Daw of £113.; you never paid him any such sum. You
have charged me with a payment to Mr. Fagg of £40. ; you never
You have charged me a very much larger
paid him any such sum.
sum z-- paid to Mr. Williams, a tailor; but you never paid him any
such sum." The defendant says, "True it is I never did pay any such
sums ; but I was authorized to charge you more than I actually paid,
— to represent to you that
had paid what I had not paid, — I was

That custom did not meet with the approbation of this
Court. One might give a great many more instances of customs of
that kind; but if there be such a custom as that which is alleged in
this case, the sooner that custom is put an end to the better it will be
for all persons concerned; and if that custom is carried into effect

really paid.

is

it,

by the practice, of which there is some trace in this case, of sending
in invoices of one sum to the agent and another invoice to be shewn
by the person who has received it to the customer, the sooner that is
put an end to, I think, the better, with reference to another branch
although
of the law. In this particular case there is some trace of
no evidence shewing that Mr. Garden has ever received
there

in

is

is

in

is

in

d

military

by by

of

is

it

r<

the trade
custom
and universally
tailors and outfitters for them to be allowed trade discount
tradesmen for goods paid for through them, bul supplied

known

a

is

is

more than one invoice.
this: they say
The case which Mr. Garden's witnesses make
world, in this
all
the
over
known
trade discount which
there
disthere
that
to
trade;
say,
other
particular trade and every
would
which
nol
the
other
count which the on.- tradesman allows to
this
affidavil
the
Thai
way
pul
lowed to the customer.
the general, established and wellof Mr. Goody: "I say that
is
a

oi

other
such
other tradesmen, and to charge their customers with the full amount
such other tradesmen to or on account
charged or invoiced
such customers, and to receive and retain such trade discount as and
by
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I

authorized to do all this by the custom of my trade or profession
of army agent." It is not the first time that we have heard in these
courts of a custom of this kind. I recollect one case, before the
Master of the Rolls, where a custom was alleged by a commission
agent in Liverpool of taking his customer's good flour and mixing
There was
it with bad flour for the purpose of making a profit.
another case where a commission agent said it was the custom in
his particular trade in Lancashire, not only to charge a commission,
but also to alter the invoices by making them higher than what was
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; and 1 believe thai if the plaintiff in this suit had
purchased and paid for the goods supplied by other persons than the defendant, but paid for by or through him, she would
not have been allowed Mich discount, but would have been charged
the full amount which she has been charged."
11"the case had been

•nail}

within

that principle, that is to saw if it were a mere
the tradesman and the commission
agent,
it would
stand upon a very different footing.
According to that,
the charge paid by a gentleman buying an article lor himself would
have been one thing, while a person in the position of a commission
agent going to order it. and receiving a share of the profit as a consequence of giving the order, would have been dealt with on a very
different footing.
What appears in this case shews the danger of allowing even the
smallest departure from the rule that a person who is dealing with
another man's money ought to give the truest account of what he
has done, and ought not to receive anything in the nature of a presbrought

simpl)

division oi profit between

or allowance without the full knowledge of the principal that he
The danger of allowing the smallest departure, even to
the extent these witnesses have carried
shewn in this case. For
what does happen with regard to an item in this case? There
the
gunmaker, who says, "My price for the guns was £86., but before
had executed the order
was told
should have to send them in to

I

is

it,
is

I

I

a

it,

a

is

I

is

I

the defendant, and the defendant gave me to understand
that ho
should require £15. per cent, discount on this order, and
immediately increased the price and charged £100. instead of £86., in order
that
might give him the discount." That
trade disclearly not
count.
It
fictitious account against the cussimply making up
tomer, who has ultimately to pay
in order that the person who
paying
may pocket the difference at the expense of his emit

is

The same thing occurred in the case of Mr. Williams, who,
having been called upon to make an allowance of £15. per cent, to
the defendant, says that he was astonished at the demand, and did
not make
in the sense of
trade discount, which he would not
have made to any other person,
division of profit between one
tradesman and the other.
He says, "Having received that intimation from the defendant,
immediately added to the bill £15. per
cent., in order that
might take
off in his favour," and Mr. Fagg
says, "I allowed him the discount."
it

I

I

a

a

it

ployer.

a

These cases all shew that this was
profit taken by the defendant
dealing as the agent for the plaintiff, intended to be concealed, and
actually concealed from the plaintiff, who had not the slightest
knowledge of any custom of the trade that such deduction would be
think the items of charge complained of were utterly unmade.
warranted, and that the plaintiff was fully entitled to come into this
from any attachment in respect of
balance of
a

i
d

I
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her account based on such charges as these, and I again repeat that
the sooner this mode of doing business is put an end to the better
I am of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled
for all parties concerned.
to an account as prayed by the bill from the 17th of January, 1865,
on taking which account all discounts so charged must be disallowed
and, having regard to the circumstances unagainst the defendant;
outfit was supplied under such an order
large
this
very
der which
was
furnished
by the plaintiff to him, there ought to be
which
as that
to chambers to inquire how much of that ought to be
a reference
disallowed in respect of the outfit, having regard to the terms of the
authority and any subsequent recognition by the plaintiff of the
charged.

things

against her in respect of the sums alleged to have been paid but in
truth not paid to other persons, I hold she is entitled to all the costs
of the suit up to the hearing except as to one part of the case, which
seems to have been put into the bill without any foundation whatever,
viz., a charge with regard to an advance on jewelry of the plaintiff's
daughter, as to which the case has wholly tailed. Some expense has
hem incurred by the evidence given on the one side and on the other
as to that part of the case, and the plaintiff must pay the defendant
his costs of that part of the suit, and those costs will be set off
11
against the costs which 1 have ordered him to pay to her.

McKINLEY

WILLIAMS.

v.

States,

of the United

(Circuit Court of Appeals

94, -J<>C. C. A. 312,

36

D.

S.

Eighth Circuit,

7t Fed.

1896.

App. 749.)

Circuit Judge." The law guards the fiduciary relations
of a conflict
It
seeks to prevent the possibility
jealous care.
It demands
between the duty and the personal interesl of a trustee.
his prinof
that the agent shall work with an eye single to the interesl
but his
him from receiving any compensation
It prohibits
cipal.
his
to
principal,
commission, and forbids him from acting adversely
It visits such a breach of duty, not
either for himself or for others.
pborn,

with

u Approved

[).

Illustrated

a

a

L872).
the

opinion

i-

.,:
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i;

2CT
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,
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i:

i.

II

.".
1
1

.1

''

<
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r

t,

and

B. •-•I".. ::" I.

A

L. R. 9 «.». B. 180,
In Mori on v. Thompson,
cus
T. Rep. (N. S.) H69, 22 Wkly. Rep. 859 (181
to himself the profits of iiibrol er to appropriate
usage for
Infringes
fundamental
law '"''
beyond In
<'. P. 362
n L.
v. Mollett,
Robli
[>le of n-'iii and wrong.
iisTh. reversing 20 W. R. 544, 26 I.. T. Rep. (N. S.)
I.. S02, ::••: L. T.
•jm7
s| (1872); Tetley v. Shand, 25 I.. T. Rep. (N. B.) 658, 20
.i. u.

i:: i

7
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The plaintiff having been driven to come into this court in consequence of the attachment in the Lord Mayor's Court, and having
obtained relief upon the ground upon which I hold her to be entitled
to relief, and in consequence of the impropriety of the charges made

omitted.
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only with the loss of the profits he gains, but with the loss of the
compensation which the faithful discharge of dutj would have earned.
I\> permit
the agent of a vendor to become interested, as the purchaser or as the agent of a purchaser, in the subject-matter
of the
agency, inaugurates so dangerous a conflicl between duty and selfinterest, tliat the law wisely and peremptorily prohibits it. An agent
of a vendor, who speculates in the subject-matter of his agency, or
intentionally becomes interested in it as a purchaser, or as the agent
of a purchaser, violates his contract of agency, betrays his trust,
forfeits his commission as agent, and becomes indebted to his princi13
Warren v. Burt,
pal for the profits he gains by his breach of duty.
595, 7 C. C. A. 105, 107, 58 Fed. 101, 103;
12 U. S. App. 591,
Gunn v. Black, 19 U. S. App. 477, 485, 8 C. C. A. 534, 539, 60 Fed.
151, 156; Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503, 554, 555, 11 L, Ed. 1076;
Crump v. Ingersoll, 44 Minn. 84, 46 N. W. 141 ; Hegenmyer v.
Marks, 37 Minn. 6, 32 N. W. 785, 5 Am. St. Rep. 808; Jacobus v.
Munn, 37 N. J. Eq. 48, 53; Moore v. Zabriskie, 18 N. J. Eq. 51;
Perry, Trusts, § 919; Bank v. Tyrrell, 27 Beav. 273, 10 H. L. Cas.
Jo; Panama & S. P. Tel. Co. v. India Rubber, Gutta Percha & Telegraph Works Co., 10 Ch. App. 515, 526; Bent v. Priest, 86 Mo.
475.

482.

This is not the first time this court has been called upon to announce these principles, but the reckless disregard of them, which
characterizes the acts of some of the agents whose transactions are
portrayed to us, admonishes us that we cannot reiterate them too
often, nor enforce them too rigidly. The court below placed the decree from which this appeal was taken upon these indisputable prinThis decree avoids a contract of agency, deprives the agent
ciples.
of his stipulated compensation, and awards to the principal a recovery
of $160,827.43, on account of the gains which it finds the agent obtained by violating his contract of agency, and betraying his trust.
The agent, John McKinley, appealed from this decree, and his appeal presents two questions : First. Does the proof warrant the finding of the circuit court that the appellant was the agent of the appellee, John M. Williams, to sell leases upon his lands, when he gained
is Accord

J.

: Porter v. Woodruff, 36 N.
Eq. 174 (1882) ; TJ. S. v. Carter, 217
30 Sup. Ct 515, 54 L. Ed. 7G9 (1910).
Even though the agent '« the

highest bidder, and the sale is public aud free from fraud, he must account
to the principal for any profits,
liockford Watch Co. v. Manifold, 36 Neb.
801, 55 x. w. 236 (1893).
If the agent learns that more advantageous terms
can be obtained than his principal supposes, it is his duty to notify his principal.
Bnell v. Goodlander, 90 Minn. 533, 97 N. W. 421 (1903).
If the agent
«--iii secure more, it is his duty to do so, and if he attempt to keep it for himBelf, hie principal can compel him to account for it.
Tilleny v. Wolverton,
46 -Minn. 256, 48 -V W. 908 (1892).
If the agent obtains any advantage by
double dealing the law will take it from him.
Euneau v. Rieger, 105 Mo. 659,
16 8. W. 854 (1891); Bain v. Brown, 56 N. Y. 285 (1874); Dutton v. Willner,
52 X. V. 312 (1873).
The agent cannot enforce against a third party any agreement to give him
secret profits.
Sessions v. Payne, l L3 Ga. 955, :'.9 S. E. 325 (1901).
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And, second, if so, was the
the profits with which he is charged?
highest market value, or the amount which he realized from the property which he thus obtained, the measure of his liability to his principal?

alleged in the bill which he filed in the
he was a resident of Chicago, 111. ; that
that
court below in this case
of Duluth. Minn.; that the latter was
was
a
resident
the appellant
mineral lands, which he owned in
certain
leases
of
sell
to
his agent
Minnesota, under a written agreement made between them in August,
1891, to the effect that the appellant should sell and dispose of such
leases for the mutual interests of both parties to the contract, and
should receive one-fifth of the revenues derived from these lands. He
also alleged that, to enable his agent to sell such leases to better
advantage, he made a formal lease of the land to the appellant, so
that he could make an assignment of it in his own name, or could
sublet the lands with the written consent of the appellee; that the
appellant thereupon sublet several tracts of these lands, and sold his
apparent interest in them, under the formal lease to him, for which
he received large amounts of money, promissory notes, and stocks
in corporations, which he refused to account for or to turn over to
The prayer of the bill was that the appellant should
his principal.
account for, pay over, and assign to the appellee all the money and
property which he had acquired from his dealings with these lands,

it,

and that the original contract of agency should be canceled.
The appellant answered this bill. He alleged in his answer that
the formal lease, made at the same time as the contract of agency, was
he became liable to pay the rents rean actual lease; that, under
served, and obtained the right to all the profits he had realized by selling any part of his leasehold interest thereunder, or by subletting any
He also alleged that the appellee
part of the land described therein.
knew of the profits he was gaining at the times when he received
that he, nevertheless, assented to the leases and contracts
them
through which he obtained them, and consented that he should retain
;

for appellee.

*

*

these profits for his own benefit.
The court found that the appellant had not made out the extraordinary contract set forth in his answer, and affirmed the decree below
*
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(Court of Appeals

of Ne\i

>NKEY

lork,

OP

Tin: RELATION

(Tart 3

with the Principal

Dealings
C<

is

v. Bl

L867.

36

N.

>.\D."
v. 127, ■'>Abb. Proc.

[N. S.] 41f).)

Action to rescind a sale of stock in the Oswego Starch Company,
made By defendant to plaintiff, and to recover the price paid therefor,
and certain payments made by the plaintiff as a stockholder. The opinion show-, the essential facts.
Defendant appealed from order for
new trial.

See 34 Barb. 276.

It

is

4

is

;

5

2

§

3

it
is

It

a

a

a

a

is

The fact thai the defendant volunteered his agency
did not absolve him from the duty of fidelity, in the relation of trust
and confidence which he sought and assumed. The plaintiff was induced to purchase at an extravagant premium, stock of the value of
which he was ignorant, on the mistaken representations of the defendant, who professed to have none which he was willing to sell. This
assurance very naturally disarmed the vigilance of the respondent,
and he availed himself of the defendant's offer by authorizing him to
buy at the price he named.
The defendant did not buy, but sent him a certificate for the amount
required, concealing the fact that he had not acted under the authority, and that the stock transferred was his own.
There is no view of the facts in which the transaction can be upheld. He stood in a relation to his principal which disabled him from
concluding a contract with himself, without the knowledge or assent
of the party he assumed to represent.
He undertook to act at once
as seller and as purchaser.
He bought as agent and sold as owner.
The ex parte bargain, thus concluded, proved advantageous to him and
very unfortunate for his principal. It was the right of the latter to
on discovery of the breach of confidence.
rescind
not material
to inquire whether the defendant had any actual fraudulent purpose.
The making of
purchase from himself without authority from the
plaintiff was
fraud in view of the fiduciary relation
constructive
which existed between the parties.
In such
case, the law delivers
the agent from temptation by
et de jure, which
juris
presumptio
good intentions are unavailing to repel.
unnecessary to state our
view- more fully on this question, as
fully and ably discussed in
the opinion delivered by Judge Bacon in the court below, 34 Barb. 276,
and his conclusions are abundantly fortified by authority.
Gillett v.
214; Michoud v. Girod,
Beav. 78; Story, Agency.
Peppercorne,
How. 555, 11 L. Ed. 1076; Davoue v. Fanning,
Johns. Ch. 268, 270;
Moore v. Moore,
X. Y. 262; N. Y. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Protection Ins.
Co., 14 X. Y. 91
Gardner v. Ogden, 22 X. Y. 347, 78 Am. Dec. 192.
The objection that this theory
inconsistent with that stated in the
it,
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Porter, J.

i* Accord:

Salsbury

v. Ware,

183

III.

505,

56

N. E. 149 (1900).

Ch. 1)

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF AGENT TO HIS PRINCIPAL

527

complaint is not sustained by the record.
The essential facts are alleged, and the appropriate relief is demanded.
The fact that the complaint alleged other matters which the plaintiff failed to establish, impairs neither his right nor his remedy.
Utile per inutile non vitiatur.
The order of the Supreme Court should be affirmed, with judgment absolute for the respondent.
All concur.

RICH
(Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania,
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Notes

v.

BLACK.

LS96.

17::

Pa.

02.

33

Atl.

880,

37

Wkly.

('as. 499.)

Bill for an account and a reconveyance of real estate. Defendants were given the sale of the land at not less than $3,000 per acre.
Interlocutory decree for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
Stkkkictt, C. J. The rule of public policy which avoids, at the
instance of the cestui que trust, purchases made by agents for sale, is
absolute in its character.
practically
Courts of equity view such
transations with jealous eye : and it is only under special circumstances, amounting to a dissolution of the trust relation, when the
parties have dealt at arm's length, that their validity is recognized.
Davoue v. Fanning. 2 Johns. Ch. 254.
And the reasons arc obvious.
' )n the one hand, the relation which such agents bear is confidential,
and disarms the vigilance of their principals.
It affords peculiar facilities for obtaining exclusive information in respect of the property
intrusted to them for sale.
Their employment implies that they have
superior advantages for making sales, and that they will use every
effort and means to obtain the highest price for the benefit of their
On the other hand, their individual interest is to purchase
principals.
at the lowest price, and places them in a position which is inconsistent
with the faithful and proper discharge of the duties of the trust.
The
will naturally lead to temptation, to alms,-, and, as was
opportunity
aptly said by Mr. Chancellor Kent in Davoue v. Panning, supra, he
pois< 'iions in it 3 c<msequen
The cestui que trust i- nol bound to prove, nor is the court bound
to judge, that the trustee has made a bargain advantageous to himself.
The fad ma) he so, and
dearly to show it.

and

yel

haw it in his power distinctly
fraud," as i ,,,ni Hardwicke
Thus an agent, by
prove it."

the party not

"There may

he

observed, "and the party nol able to
virtue of his trust relation, may discover valuable mineral- in the
land, ami, locking the knowledge in his breast, take advantage of it in
If he den) it. how can the
making a contract with his cestui que trust.
court find the fad ? "The probability is that a trustee who has once
conceived such a purpose will never disclose it. and the cestui que
trust will he effectuall) defrauded."
Ex parte Lacey, <» Ves. <<27.
So he may take advantagi of In superior knowledge of the ma

628

EFFECTS
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3

and skill in manipulation to obtain results beneficial to himself.
"It
is to guard againsl this uncertainty and hazard of abuse, and to remove
the trustee from temptation, thai the rule does and will permit the
cestui que trust to come, at his own option, and without showing actual injury, and insist upon having the experiment of another sale"
(Davoue v. Fanning, supra): or, as was held in our own case of
Swisshelm's Appeal. 56 Pa. 475, 94 Am. Dec. 107, treat the purchase

of

land unsold by
sale made by
chasers for value. "This is a remedy that goes
Davoue v. Fanning,
very root of the matter."
as inoperative
pel

an account

in

of

respect

the

the proceeds

of

the trustee, and comhim to innocent purdeep, and touches the
supra ; Leisenring v.
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Black, 5 Watts, 303, 30 Am. Dec. 322; Parshall's Appeal, 65 Pa. 224;
Rice v. Davis. 136 Pa. 439, 20 Atl. 513, 20 Am. St. Rep. 931 ; Murphy
v. O'Shea, 2 Jones & La. T. 422.
The cestui que trust must, it is
true, move within a reasonable time; but what shall amount to a
reasonable time will depend on circumstances, and lies in the discretion
In the absence of special circumstances which may
of the court.
'en-then or shorten the time, the analogy of the law is followed.
Marshall's Estate, 138 Pa. St. 285, 22 Atl. 90.
These appellants misapprehend the rationale of this rule.
They
insist that because, as they claim, the sale was satisfactory to Mrs.
Rich, the rule has no application.
Conceding that in the first instance
it was satisfactory, that fact would not take away her option to rescind ; for these appellants then and for a long time afterwards ostensibly maintained towards her the character of agents for sale, and
willfully concealed the fact of their own interest. They maintain
their characters of inconsistency even now by claiming not only title
as purhasers, but commissions
Roll, whom they
as agents for sale.
first reported as the purchaser, confessedly knew nothing of it. The
alleged interest of Gillespie and Neeb is more than doubtful, and, if it
ever existed, was soon parted with.
To all practical intents and purposes, these agents were the real purchasers, without the knowledge of
their cestui que trust.
Rosenberger's Appeal, 26 Pa. 67.
However

Mrs. Rich may have felt in the first instance in regard to the sale,
it is not likely that it would have been satisfactory had she been fully
informed of the facts. When she gave her agents a minimum price,
it was manifestly intended as a guide to them in negotiating sale, and
implied a just expectation on her part and an engagement on theirs
that they would make an honest endeavor to obtain a higher price.
If Roll, Gillespie, and Neeb were really intending purchasers, the ob-

vious course was that these agents for sale should take competitive
bids. They did not occupy the position of middlemen with equal duty
to both.
Their primary duty was to Mrs. Rich. But, so far as appears, no bona fide effort was made by them to perform this duty.
Instead. Mrs. Rich was asked to take less, and, when this was refused,
they hastened to avail themselves of the minimum price in their own
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interest, and had already made large profits before Mrs. Rich's discovery of the facts. If they could realize profits for themselves, they
That was
could and should have done so for their cestui que trust.
their employment, and that their undertaking; and equity will treat
To sustain the purthat as done which ought to have been done.
chase made in these circumstances would work "actual injury" to Mrs.
Rich, tend to encourage breaches of trust, and violate a wise rule of
public policy.
Having taken action in time, the plaintiff was entitled to the relief
Decree
which the decree of the court below is intended to secure.
affirmed, and appeal dismissed, with costs to be paid by appellants;
and it is ordered that the record be remitted to the court below for

further proceedings.

SHANNON
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(Supreme

v.

MARMADUKE.

Court of Texas,

1855.

14

Tex.

217.)

as agent of Marmaduke,
Two
brother becoming the purchaser.
Suit to have the land
conveyed to Shannon.

Land was sold at public

sale by Shannon,

at 51 cents per acre, Shannon's

years later, the latter
conveyed to Marmaduke.
WheelER, J. It is the well-settled general rule that a person can"He
not act as agent for another and become himself the buyer.
his
own
cannot be both buyer and seller at the same time, or connect
inis
It
interest in his dealings as an agent or trustee for another.
minimo
emit
quam
Emptor
compatible with the fiduciary relation.
The rule is founded
potest, venditor vendit quam maximo potest.
the
presumption of the existence of
on the danger of imposition and
The policy of the rule
court.
of
the
fraud inaccessible to the eye
which, in the cases in
and
temptation,
is to shut the door against
which such a relationship exists, is deemed to be of itself sufficient
This principle, like most others, may
to create the disqualification.

to some qualification in its application to particular cases,
but, as a general rule, it appears to be well settled in the English
It is at
4 Kent, Com. 438.
and in our American jurisprudence."
firmed by Judge Story, in his treatise on Agency, that this doctrine
ognized in the fullest manner by the civil law. And he shows by
and well established
ample references that it is the fully-recognized
but
and
Vmeric«i jurisprudence,
doctrine, not only of the English
a
natural
there
that
is
is
assigned:
also of the civil law. This rca on
between the interest of the buyer and that of the
inconteatibility
It is a rule, he says, in regard t<> die
seller. Story on Agency, § 1".
■
l
ral
wlii.
application, that in mailers touchtits,
duti<
;,
where
a1
a
to bind their principals
o
the
cannol
ing
"Thi rule is founded
they have an adverse miere i m them

be subject

Qodd.Pb.&

a.

:; t
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on the plain and obvious consideration thai the principal bargains, in
for the exercise of the di interested skill, diligence,
the employment
fd., § 210, et seq.
and zeal of the agent, for his own exclusive benefit."
Although the fact is not proved by positive evidence that the purchase in this instance was made directly or indirectly by the defendant, yet the relationship subsisting between himself and the nominal
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purchaser, the inadequacy of price, and more especially the reconveyeviance to the defendant unexplained, afford strong circumstantial
Positive evidence of such secret
dence tending to that conclusion.
They are,
between parties can rarely be obtained.
understandings
by means of such evidence, seldom "accessible to the eye of the court,"
and hence the attendant circumstances must he 'Jooked to in order
But there is anreal character of the transaction.to
ascertain the
with
a controlling
other fact disclosed by the evidence which speaks
he
was only
That is the admission of the defendant that
force.
authorized to sell the land when it would bring three dollars per acre.
The instrument taken by the plaintiff from the defendant contemporaneously with the making of the title bond by Becknell to the latter

of the trust does not contain an express affirmative power
but
sell,
to
raises the implication that such authority had been conferred. As the defendant was a trustee clothed with the apparent title,
a written power was not necessary to the making of a legal conveyance ; hut the trustee was bound to observe the parol instructions of
And these were that he was to sell only when the
the beneficiary.
Under these instructions,
land would bring three dollars per acre.
as evidence

himself and the beneficiary in the trust, however it might
have been if the question of title had arisen between the plaintiff and
an innocent third person who had purchased without notice' of the
trust or of the instructions under which the trustee acted, the sale was
and a fraud upon the rights of the plaintiff./ And we
unauthorized
think it clear that the defendant, the trustee, cannot avail himself of
his own breach of trust to acquire the trust property or derive benefits

as between

to himself.

1"'

i< imt enough for the agent to tell the principal that he is personally
He must tell him every material fact — must make
ted in (Be purchase.
Dunne v. English, L. it. 18 Eq. 524, :;i L. T. 7-> (1874);
a full disclosure.
Murphy v. O'Shea, '1 Jones & La. -liil!, 8 Irish Law, Rec. 329 (1845); Molouy
15

it

\. Kernan, ii Dr.
It matters ma

.v War. 38 (1842).
that, the employment

is to sell at a fixed price.
The agent
must put off the character <>f agenl when he assumes that of the principal.
If the agent huys for less
Ruckman v. Bergholz, :J7 N. J. Law, 437 (1S74).
than the goods no- worth, he is accountable to the principal for the difference.
Pierce Co. v. Beers, ran Mass. L99, 7<; N. E. 603 (190G). The interests of the
buyer ami seller are conflicting, and the law will not allow the agent to act
White v. Ward, '2(> Ark.
for the seller and at the same time be the buyer.
■Iir, (1871).
It will ma :ii<i that In' paid more than any one else would have
14 ill. 15 (1852);
and that he bought under
v. Bleakley,
paid, Pensonneau
cover of the name of a thin] person, but for more than the property was then
worth, Robertson v. Chapman, L52 D. S. 673, 14 Sup. Ct. 741, 38 L. Ed. 592
(1894).
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Considering the price actually paid for the land and its value, it

is

to be supposed that the defendant could have believed he
was acting fairly and honestly towards the plaintiff to suffer the land
and the reconveyance
to be bid off at a price so grossly inadequate;
to himself under the circumstances affords strong reason to conclude
And if the
that the purchase was collusively made for his benefit.
determination of the question submitted to the jury rested on this
But
evidence alone, we should hesitate much to disturb the verdict.
respectthe
defendant
of
when taken in connection with the admission
ing the price at which he was authorized to sell, we think it free
from doubt that the verdict was fully warranted by the evidence.
It is suggested in argument that the sum for which the land actually sold was better evidence of its real value than the testimony of
The reduced price at which the
We think otherwise.
the witnesses.
sale was made is fully accounted for in the fact that the fairness of
the sale was questioned at the time, and that doubtless deterred bidders. The statement of facts, we think, establishes beyond question
the land to have been of the value at which it was estimated by the
And if it were really of less value, that
parties and the witnesses.
would not affect the application of the principles on which it must
acting as the trustee and agent of the
be held that the defendant,
a
to the property as against the latter.
title
plaintiff, did not acquire

The judgment

is affirmed.

FORLAYY
(Supreme

AUGUSTA NAVAL STORES CO.

v.

Courl of

<:

gla,

1905.

L24

Ga. 261,

52 s.

E.

SOS.)

Petition for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of certain
properties, for a reconveyance to petitioners of certain leases, and for
icral accounting.
* *
* q n ; s cage j s clearly within the fundamenK
j-ie

It is true
principle laid down in the sixth headnote.
in
this case.
of
the plaintiffs
that Forlaw was not nominally the agent
u;iwho
the
were
factors
the
lie
the agenl of
Ellis Young Company,
confidential
within
relations
Inhimself
but
brought
of the plaintiffs;
of a fiduciary character with Heath and Hogan when he and Young, by
advising with the former and sugge ting material changes in the terms
of the lease which had been contracted for with the Woodward I. vim
her Company, induced them to waive their (plaintiff's) interest and
the Cashin mill tract, so that
new
the turpentine privileges
right
a

in

iii

tal equitable

It

la

nl

of the opinion

omitted.

i^

might he obtained from the lumber company of the turpentine
true that Porlaw took the
privileges on this valuable trad "t" land.
from the lumber company to himself individually, hut this was
between him and the plaintiffs,
and understanding
under an
ri
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is,

according to which ;i corporation should be formed and a one-third mteresl of the stock thereof taken by Heath and Hogan, the Ellis- Young
Company furnishing them the money with which to pay for the same.
So the new lease ni the mill tract, whether Heath and Hogan, or the
Ellis-Young Company, or Forlaw were named therein as lessees, was
for
for the benefit of the corporation which was to be created; that
two of whom were, under the stipulathe benefit of the incorporators,

it

I

it

is

a

:

is

1

it

a

it

a

it

J.

a

a

it

The lease to Forlaw could
been stipulated for in the first contract.
not have been obtained but for the agreement and consent of the plainshould be made, or that agreement and consent had but for
tiffs that
The
the confidence reposed by the plaintiffs in Young and Forlaw.
latter and certain-named associates, neither of whom were Heath or
Hogan, proceeded to secure charter for corporation under the name
Forlaw Company," but with the identical object and the
of the "D.
same rights, powers, and privileges as had been contemplated for the
corporation agreed upon between himself, Young and the plaintiffs.
To rule that the Ellis- Young Company was to be permitted to hold the
to the turpentine privileges in the 3,713 acres and
leases assigned to
the lease to the Cashin mill tract, executed to Forlaw and assigned by
holding at variance with
him to the Ellis- Young Company, would be
would be unthe doctrine established by numerous authorities, and
supported by any authority to which our attention has been directed.
case like this,
The safe principle and sound, under the facts of
seems to be one announced in the American note to Keech v. Sandford,
was thus forcibly and comprehensibly exLead. Cas. Eq. 53, where
placed in such relation to another,
"Wherever one person
pressed
other,
or the act of
third person, or of
the
that
act or consent of
by
the law, that he becomes interested for him, or interested with him, in
prohibited from acquiring
any subject of property or business, he
rights in that subject antagonistic to the person with whose interests he
has become associated." 17 And in the case of Conant v. Riseborough,
139 111. 391, 28 N. E. 791,
was said: "The principles applicable to
'If confidence
the facts of this case are well settled by the authorities,
must be faithfully acted upon and preserved from any
reposed,
is

it The temptation of self-interest is too powerful and Insinuating to be
trusted;
and
musl be removed by taking away the right to hold the property purchased
hrimis v. Mct'au'g, 32 111. 429 (1863).
See, also, note, p. 524.
it
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a

a

in

When Forlaw
the petition, to be these plaintiffs.
tions set forth
went to the Woodward Lumber Company to secure the new lease, he
went armed with knowledge, with authority, with power he had acquired because of the confidential relations into which he had been
brought with the two men who are now seeking equitable relief.
The plaintiffs themselves, through Forlaw, had opened negotiations
with the AYoodward Lumber Company, which resulted in an agreement
being reached whereby the lumber company agreed to sell the entire
fixed sum, waiving
turpentine privileges on the Cashin mill tract for
part of the profits arising from the business which had
its rights to
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If influence is acquired, it must be kept
intermixture of imposition.
free from the taint of selfish interest and cunning and overreaching
Where a person is intrusted as
1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 308.
bargains.'
a confidential agent with the conduct of business where he professes
not to act for himself, but for others who have placed their confidence
in him, he is disabled in equity, even though he may be a volunteer,
from dealing in the matter of his agency on his own account.! 'The
agency being established, he will be compelled to transfer the be/efit of
his contract, although he may swear that he purchased on /is own
The rule applies, n/t only to
Dennis v. McCagg, 32 111. 429.
account.'
persons standing in a direct fiduciary relation towards others, but also
to those who occupy any position out of which a similar duty ought,
in equity and good morals, to arise. No party can be permitted to purchase an interest when he has a duty to perform which is inconsistent
Davis v. Hamlin, 108 111. 39, 48
with the character of a purchaser.
Am. Rep. 541 ; Vallette v. Tedens, 122 111. 607, 14 N. E. 52, 3 Am. St.
And the facts demanding the application of these rules
Rep. 502."
and principles, the statute of frauds cannot be invoked to prevent it.
If the allegations of the equitable petition in this action are true (and
they are to be taken as true as against the demurrer), the Ellis- Young
Company, the factors of plaintiffs, stand in a fiduciary relation to them,
and, if the fraud and conspiracy alleged can be proved, are trustees ex
malificio; and the same is true of Forlaw, in whose name the lease
from the Woodward Lumber Company was executed, should the same

charges be established by the evidence. In another well-reasoned opinion from the court last quoted, we have the following ruling which
strengthens the conclusion we have reached in the case at bar: "Where
a confidential agent of one having a lease of a theater, who, from his
position, was well acquainted with the profits of his principal in the
use of the building, and who knew, some months before the old lease
expired, that the latter was desirous of renewing his lease, offered privately to lease the theater of the owner, proposing to give a larger
rental than was reserved in the old lease, and denied to his principal
that he was competing with him for the lease, but in fact did procure
a lease to be made to himself, it was held, that the benefit of such lease
and thai the
a court of equity would hold to inure to his principal,
agent would be held to hold the same as trustee for his principal."
Davis v. I lamlin. cited supra.
It was contended bj coun I for the losing party in that case that
the rule which the court applied, which holds an agent to be a trustee
for his principal, had no particular application to the case, 1"
Davis, the agent, was nol an agent to obtain a renewal of the lease, and
not charged with any duty in regard therein; that his was but the
specific employment to engage amusements For the theater, and thai
he was only an agenl within the scope of thai employmenl ; thai Ham
lin, having a lease which
pire on a certain date, had no right
fter, and th.it Davis "in negotiating
or interest in the pro]
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for the Kasc did not deal with any property wherein lie had an interami that the leased property was not the subject matter of any
trust between them."
It was further argued that the relation therebetween Hamlin and Davis was only one of master and servant or of
employer and employe, and that the rule had never been applied to that
relation as a ela^v, "that the classes coming within that doctrine are
embraced within the list of defined confidential relations, such as trustees ami beneficiary, guardian, and ward, etc."
But the court replied
that the subject was not comprehended within any such narrowness of
view, but that in applying the rule, it is the nature of the relation which
is to he regarded, and not the designation of the man filling the relation.
Or, as clearly expressed in an elementary work on Equity, "The rule
under discussion applies not only to persons standing in a direct fiduciary relation towards others, such as trustees, executors, attorneys, and
agents, hut also to those who occupy every position out of which a
similar duty, in equity and good morals, ought to arise." 18 Bishop,
Eq. § 93. See, also, Fricker v. Americus Mfg. Co., 124 Ga. 165, 52
est,
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S. 1".. 65.

And we have no hesitancy in affirming the judgment overruling the
* * * Judgdemurrers of Forlaw and the Ellis- Young Company.
ment in each case affirmed.
All the Justices concurring.
is The disability extends to any clerks or agents of the agent. To hold
would be to open the doors to evasion and nullification of the rule.
Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 350, 78 Am. Dec. 192 (1SG0) ; Burke v. Bours, 92
i';il. ins. 28 Pae. 57 (1891).
On second appeal, see 98 Cal. 171, 32 Pac. 9S0,
Also to any partnership or corporation in which the agent
post, p. 539 (1893).
Bedford Coal Co. v. Parke County Coal Co., 44 Ind. App. 390, S9
is a party.
otherwise

X. E. 412 (1909).
If tin- agent sells to himself and resells at a profit he must account to the
principal for this profit.
McNutt v. Dix, S3 Mich. 328, 47 N. W. 212, 10 L.
K. A. 660 (1890).
A sale by the agent to himself is not void, but voidable at
the option of the principal, and if he does not dissent no one else can object.
If lie ratifies the sale, it is valid even as to him. Eastern Bank v. Taylor, 41
If he does not, he may treat the agent as holding in trust
Ala. 93 (1867).
for bis principal. Krutz v. Fisher, 8 Kan. 90 (1871), in which the agent bought
his principal's lands at a tax sale.
The mere fact that the principal lias
failed in pul the agenl in funds to pay the taxes will not justify the agent in
and holding the tax title.
Bowman v. Officer, 53 Iowa, 640, 6
procuring
X. W. 28 (1880).
The agent may retain the amount paid for taxes and other
proper expenditures,
hut beyond this he holds for the principal.
Barton v.
Moss, 32 ill. -V, (1863).
The agent is equally incapacitated to become a purAdams v. Sayre, 70
chaser id" his principal's property at a mortgage sale.
Ala. 318 (1881); Kimball v. Ranney, 122 Mich. 100, 80 N. W. 992, 46 L. R. A.
103, v <>Am. Si. Rep. 548 (1S99), containing a review of the cases.
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GOWER
Court of California,

ANDREW*.

v.

59 Cal.

1SS1.

110.

in Am. Rep.

212.')

it

i\-

Action to compel transfer of a lease, and application for injunction
pendente lite to restrain defendants from proceeding to recover the
premises.
Myrick, J. This is an appeal from an order refusing to grant an
injunction. The facts as presented by the pleadings and affidavits are
substantially as follows :
The plaintiffs were warehousemen, and as such occupied certain
premises as tenants of the defendant Hopkins.
The defendant Andrew was their clerk or agent in and about the business, and had
access to their books and papers, and knowledge of the business and
their customers.
The lease under which plaintiffs held the premises,
at a monthly rental of $400, was about to expire, viz., on the 1st of
November, 1879.
During some month or two prior to the expiration
of the lease, plaintiffs were negotiating with Hopkins for a renewal of
the lease at a reduced rental, but their minds had not met as to whether
there would be a renewal.
During the same time the defendant Andrew was, without the knowledge of plaintiffs, negotiating with Hopkins for a lease of the premises to himself and the defendant Ross.
During such negotiations, defendant Andrew, without authority from
plaintiffs, told Hopkins that plaintiffs would probably give up the
warehouse, and if so he would take it at $450 per month.
Hopkins.
without receiving definite information from plaintiffs that they intended to surrender the premises, but believing that such would lie the
case, gave to the defendants, Andrew and Ross, a lease of the premises
for four years from November 1st, 1879, at a monthly rental of $450.
Andrew's object in obtaining the lease was to enter into the business
of warehousing with Ross on their own account ; and Andrew solicited
from some of the customers of plaintiffs at the warehouse their storage
business, stating that "lie had become the lessee of the warehouse heDuring all this
Gilman did not want
Cower
any longer."
time Andrew was in tin- employ of plaintiffs.
As soon, however, as
ilie\- learned that he had taken the lease lie was dismi
We think the injunction should have been granted.
The granting

a

a

is

is

or refusing to grant an injunction
very much within the discretion
made; and an appellate COUrl
of the court to which the application
will not interfere unless
We think,
right clearly appears to exist,
.cr, that the fad
us clearly show
case where plaintiffs
will hi' entitled i<> relief.
they shall finally substantiate tho
to he the duty of the employe* to devote his entire
We understand
acts, so far as In- acts may affecl the bu in<
of
employer, to the
interesl and service of the employer thai In- can
no business
detrimental
be

to tin- busine

permitted

to do

ol

the employer;

for his own

benefit

in

;

hi

it

.

if
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and that he should in no
that which would have the
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effect of destroying the business to sustain and carry on which his
An agent should not, any more than a
services ha\c been secured.
trustee, adopt a course that will operate as an inducement to postpone
An ageni or sub-agent who uses the
the principal's interest to his own.
information he has obtained in the course of his agency as a means of
buying for himself, will be compelled to convey to the principal.

Elliott

v.

Merryman,

1

head. Cas. Eq. 91.

Andrew was not the agent of plaintiffs so far as
concerns the obtaining of a renewal of the lease; that he was not
charged with the duty of obtaining a renewal; it must, however, be
said that he was, by virtue o\ his employment, charged with the duty
of furthering their interest, and with the duty of not using the information obtained by him as their employe to their detriment.
It
seems to us that if Andrew desired to engage in the same business as
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It may he said

that

his employers, on his own account, a very plain and very proper course
was open to him, viz., to state to them all the facts, and ask them to
determine whether they desired a renewal.
By pursuing the course
which he did, he gave to Hopkins an inducement not only not to give
plaintiffs a renewal at a decreased rental, but also an inducement not
to renew at the then rental ; and he compelled plaintiffs to have an unknown competitor who based his action upon knowledge acquired by
him while in their employ. We do not think that this is equity or good
conscience.
The order refusing the injunction is reversed. 10

VAN DUSEN
(Supreme

Court of North Dakota,

v.

1904.

BIGELOW.
13 N.

D. 277,

100

N. W. 723,

67

L.

R. A. 288.)

Morgan, J. 20 This

equitable action is brought for a reconveyance
of certain real estate which was conveyed to the defendant by the
plaintiff while defendant is alleged to have been plaintiff's agent for
the sale of such real estate and failed to communicate to plaintiff that
he had received an offer for said land for a much larger sum than that
for which the plaintiff sold the same to the defendant.
The substance
of the allegations of the complaint is that defendant took advantage of
the confidence reposed in him by plaintiff as her agent and purchased
the land himself, under fraudulent concealment of facts, for a sum
much less than that which he could have sold it for, and much less than
the actual value of the land.
In the complaint plaintiff offers to return all money and the security received by her from the defendant
under such conveyance.
The defendant by answer denies that he was
plaintiff's agent for the sale of such land, and denies that he was
i» The dissenting opinion of Thornton,
20 part of th<.' opinion is omitted.

J., is

omitted.
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it,

and denies that
offered a larger sum for such land than he paid for
fraudulently concealed any facts from plaintiff, and denies that the
Whether deland was worth any more than he paid for the same.
lands,
whether deand
of
her
for
the
sale
fendant was plaintiff's agent
for
when
he
purchased
$1,400
land
of
for
an
the
offer
fendant had
The
at
trial.
contested
the
were
issues
that
were
the
$900,
for
himself
trial court found against the defendant on both these issues, and orreconveyance be made upon restoration by plaintiff of all
dered that
The defendant appeals from
that she had received under the sale.
review of the
judgment rendered on such findings, and requests
*

*

* a

a

a

it

he

In

a

agent with

a

is

a

a

a

is

It

by

is

is

is,

whether he was such agent in respect to the sale of
the land — that
—
the land that his contract for the sale of the land would bind her
We think that he was her agent in respect to
need not be determined.
the land, and, as such agent, he was under obligations to advise her
fully as to all facts within his knowledge bearing upon the value of
Dethe land, and upon all matters in reference to the sale thereof.
evidence
the
fendant had been her agent for several years. We think
sufficient to show that he was
in the record, outside of Exhibit A,
not
That
such
agency to sell the land
her agent to sell this land.
of
action.
in
kind
this
immaterial
explicit writing
entirely
shown
principal made by an
contract against
case of enforcing
not

third person.

case like the one at bar the agency may be shown by parol,

as

is

by

a

is

is

no statutory provision that requires an agency to negotiate for
the confidential relation existing between
sale to be in writing, lit
the gist of the cause of
them, followed
concealment of facts, that
lie was her agent for specific purposes connected with this land
action.
and with her other property.
By virtue of such agency he became acquainted with the value of the land, and knew that she knew nothing

there

is

It

thi
of it- value, and that she was relying wholly upon him.
istence of such confidence, arising OUt of their business relations

as

duty on his part to disclose all
to
igency, that gives rise to
he chi
value
of the land
facts known to him in reference to the
fraudulent
made
or
claimed
thai
he
false
not
himself.
buy
have
he had an
dis<
thai
should
.
that
he
menl
claimed
for $900, and thai this
of $1,400 for the land when he boughl
The relatio
ting between them,
ilent concealment.
-'

lo

is

as

shown

by

it

i
d

It
is

it

It

if

a

a
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is

is

is

is

entire record under section 5630, Rev. Codes 1899.
That he was in correspondence with her about the sale and value of
undisputed, and
this land, and advised her concerning the same,
That
he was her sole
A.
shown by his own letters outside of Exhibit
That he
dispute.
also
beyond
agent to care for her other property
also
and
vicinity
in
her
interests
all
alone looked after
Jamestown
and
matters,
certain
to
as
was
her
agent
Defendant
beyond question.
those
matters
she
as
to
confidence,
and
had
her
he
matters
those
to
as
Whether he was her authorized agent to sell
relied on his judgment.

the

evidence

ref<

rred to, was

uch

as demanded

frank

11

ri

'

is
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and full disclosures of all facts known to him bearing on the value of
the land before ho could become a purchaser of the same, although
avOV till \ made for himself.
In Morris v. Tayloe, 49 111. 17. "5 Am. Dec. 568, it was said : "Where
t<>lake charge of the lands of
a party accepts the position <^ an agetll
his principal, collect the rents and royalty, and pay taxes, a fiduciary
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and confidential relation is thereby created in regard to everything relating to such lands, and in treating with his principal for the property
the agent is bound to make the fullest disclosures of all matters connected therewith, within his knowledge, which it is important for his
principal to know in order to treat understandingly."
In Davis v. Hamlin, 108 111. 39, 48 Am. Rep. 541, it was said: "It
•'tended by appellant's counsel that the rule we apply, which holds
an agent to he a trustee for his principal, has no application to the case
at bar, because Davis was not an agent to obtain a renewal of the lease.
and was not charged with any duty in regard thereto; that his was but
a specific employment to engage amusements for the theater, and that
he was agent only within the scope of that employment; that Hamlin,
having a lease which would expire April 16, 1883, had no right or
interest in the property thereafter ; and that Davis, in negotiating the
. did not deal with any property wherein Hamlin had any interest,
and that such property was not the subject-matter of any trust between
them.
Although there was no right of renewal of the lease in the
tenant, he had a reasonable expectation of its renewal which courts of
equity have recognized as an interest of value, secretly to interfere
with which and disappoint, by an agent in the management of the
lessee's business, we regard as inconsistent with the fidelity which the
* * * In applying the
agent owes to the business of his principal.
rule, it is the nature of the relation which is to be regarded, and not
the designation of the one filling the relation."
In Cook v. Berlin Woolen Mills Co., 43 Wis. 433, the court said:
"But whatever may be the nature of the agency, a court of equity regards every purchase by an agent from his principal with jealous scrutiny, to see that the agent takes no advantage from the confidence of
his principal; with jealousy almost invincible, as Judge Story calls it;
and there is a class of agents who are held to a very strict rule, a good
deal like the rule which courts of equity once generally applied to trustees, and some few courts still apply.
When the nature of the agency
has given the agent control in the management of the principal's property, and peculiar opportunity of knowing its condition and value, a
purchase of it by the agent will be avoided at the suit of the principal,
unless the agent make it affirmatively appear that the transaction was
fair, and that he imparted to the principal all his information concerning the property, and acted throughout uberrima fide."
Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence (volume 2, § 959) lays down the
rule as follows : "Any unfairness, any underhanded dealing, any use of
knowledge not communicated to the principal, any lack of the perfect
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good faith which equity requires, renders the transaction voidable, so
If, on the other
that it will be set aside at the option of the principal.
the matter,
concerning
his
knowledge
all
own
hand, the agent imparted
as though
disinterestedness
and
candor
with
his
principal
and advised
and
a
fair
price,
and
paid
the
to
bargain,
a
were
stranger
himself
he
the principal on his side acted with full knowledge of the subjectmatter of the transaction and of the person with whom he was dealing.
and gave a full and free consent— if all these are affirmatively proved,

The judgment

is

*

*

*

J4.

art v. Gilruth, 8 S. D. 181, 65 N. W. 1065.
A duty of full disclosure of all material facts within his knowledge
bearing on the value of the land rested upon the defendant, and, unless
he made such disclosures before himself becoming a purchaser, the
conveyance becomes voidable upon plaintiff's election to so consider

therefore affirmed.

BURKE
(Supreme

Harrison,

Court of California,

v.

All

concur.

BOURS.
9S Cal.

1893.

171, 32

Pac.

9S0.)

When this action was here upon the last appeal
were that Pours
Pac.
(92 Cal.
57) the facts before the court
Co., who were agents of
had been employed by Faulkner, Bell
sale of the land, and had reported to them
Arguello, to make
form
sale thereof for the sum of $4,500, sending at the same time
of
deed to be executed by Arguello, without, however, inserting
that
the grantee;
the amount of the consideration or the name
Arguello filled in the amount of the consideration, and executed the
'.ours
that when
deed without inserting the name of any grantee;

J.

21

I

of

a

a

a

a

&

108, 28

■

Part

of the opinion

\a

It

*

*

omitted.

a

h

a

i

v

of

&

of

as
received the deed lie caused his own name to be inserted therein
money
the purchase
grantee, and senl his check for the amount
Co., who accounted for the same to Arguello.
to Faulkner, Bell
sed upon the grounds that
the court below
The judgment
of
Arguello for making
Bours was to be regarded as the agent
sale to himself.
make
agenl
-ale of the land, and could nol
this court was
of
the
judgment
which
The conditions under
that Bours
not
only
appears
now
now
exist.
then rendered do not

*
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the presumption is overcome and the transaction is valid."
See, also, Ingle v. Hartman, 37 Iowa, 274; Rubidoex v. Parks, 48
Cal. 215; Cottom v. Holliday, 59 111. 176; Jackson v. Pleasonton, 95
Ya. 654, 29 S. E. 680; Andrews' Am. Law, p. 813, and cases cited;
Mechem on Agency, § 466. and cases cited; 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law.
cited;
p. 1081, and cases cited; Wharton on Agency. § 235, and cases
Williams,
Neb.
36
v.
437;
Law,
37
N.
Ruckman v. Bergholz,
Jansen
J.
112;
111.
Stew14
v.
Casey,
207;
R.
A.
Casey
279,
20
L.
W.
55
N.
869,

.~>H>
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dealt openly with Arguello in the sale, and that the transaction was
fair and just, and the consideration
full and adequate, but it also appears that "the sale was made with the full knowledge and consent

of Arguello."
These circumstances
take the ease out of the principles announced at the former hearing, and show a complete defense to a recovery by the plaintiffs.
There is no inhibition upon a
purchase by an agent from his principal, "where the facts are fully
disclosed, and the agent acts in good faith, taking no advantage of
his situation.
The principal may, if he sees fit, deal with the agent
Meehem, Ag. § 466; Rochester v. Levering. 104 Ind. s\2, 4 N. E. 203.
The agent has the same right to
The rule which
deal directly with his principal as has a stranger.
prevents the agent from purchasing the property which he is authorized to sell for his principal is based upon the maxim that no
man can serve two masters, and that an agent shall not unite in his
own person his individual with his representative character, or place
himself in a position where his personal interest will be in conflict
with his duty to his principal. When, however, the agent deals with
his principal "at arm's length, and after a full disclosure of all that
he knows with respect to the property" (Murphy v. O'Shea, 2 Jones
& La. T. 425), or when the principal ratifies the purchase from him-
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as with any other person."

self with full knowledge
connected with the
of the circumstances
transaction,
he can thereafter avoid the sale only upon the same
grounds as if the purchase had been made by a stranger.
The powers of an agent in dealing with the property of his principal are limited in the same manner as those of a trustee.
A trustee is not forbidden to deal with the trust property when the beneficiary, with a
full knowledge of the motives of the trustee and of all other facts
concerning the transaction which might affect his own decision, and

without the use of any influence on the part of the trustee, permits
him to do so. Civil Code, § 2230.
The present case does not fall within the rule which is applicable
wdien an agent with a power of sale makes a sale to himself.
Bours
did not have any pow rer of sale from Arguello, and did not in fact
make any sale to himself.
His relation to Arguella, resulting from
his original employment by Faulkner, Bell & Co., was rather that
of a broker than an agent for sale, and his subsequent proposition to
them that he would himself purchase the land from Arguello at the
price of $4,500 placed him in the position of a purchaser dealing
directly with the owner.
Faulkner, Bell & Co. were the agents of
Arguello for the sale of the property, and the persons to whom
Bours, if he desired to purchase the same, would naturally make application. He had had no direct correspondence with Arguello, and
his offer and information to Faulkner, Bell & Co. must be regarded
the same as if made to Arguello.
Although his previous relation
to Arguello, by virtue of having been employed to make a sale of
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the property, still left him charged with the duty of disclosing any
facts or circumstances affecting the property which might have come
to his knowledge while holding such fiduciary relation, yet the record
does not show that there was any concealment or silence on his part
which would make him guilty of constructive fraud.

When Bours wrote to Faulkner, Bell & Co., making the proposition to purchase the property himself from Arguello for the sum of
•$4,500 he was not acting as the agent of Arguello in making a sale
of the premises to himself, but was making a direct proposition to
Arguello through Faulkner, Bell & Co., who were his agents for
the sale of the property. Arguello had been previously informed of
all that Bours had done in attempting to effect the sale, and it is
not disputed that $4,500 was the full value of the property.
The
court finds that, when Bours was first employed in behalf of Arguello, he wrote to Faulkner, Bell & Co., "fully advising them of
the condition of the said property ;" and that, after the receipt of
that letter, Arguello stated "that he agreed with Mr. Bours' opinion
of the property;" and that, after Bours had endeavored to make a
sale of the property, he again wrote to Faulkner, Bell & Co., "advising them therein of what he had done;" and that, as soon as he had
found a purchaser, he informed Faulkner, Bell & Co. thereof. These
findings are not excepted to, and, as it is not claimed that there were
any facts or circumstances within the knowledge of Bours that he
failed to disclose, must be construed as equivalent to a finding that
he made a full disclosure of all the information he had respecting
the value or condition of the property.
As the sale from Arguello to Bours is to be regarded as made
upon a direct dealing between them for the purchase and sale of the
property, the rules governing the ratification and confirmation by a
principal of the act of his agent have no application. The judgment
is affirmed.

DENNISON
(Kansas City Covai

of Appeals,

v.

Missouri,

ALDRICH.
L905.

114

Mo. App. 700, 91 B. W.

L024.)

Johnson, J.- 2
the
sale

Plaintiffs sued defendant as their agent to recover
of $4,000, received by the latter as a commission for the
of some mining property in Jasper county.
It is claimed de

sum

obtained the money as the fiduciary of plaintiffs, and then
The trial r<
repudiated Ins obligation to them to account for it.
A motion for a new trial was
suited in a judgment for defendant.

"fendant

filed by plaintiffs, and upon hearing, su tained by the trial judge, who
for his action: "That the conn i
assigned the following
iving instructions for defendant, and in refusing in tructions
2*

Part of the opinion

is

omitted.

542

EFFECTS

A\l>

C0NSEQ1 ENCBS

OF THE

RELATION

(Part

3

asked for by plaintiffs, in modifying instructions asked by plaintiffs,
and giving instructions on the court's own motion, and because the
court erred in admitting incompetent and irrelevant evidence <>n the
part of defendant, and rejected competent and legal evidence offered

plaintiffs." Defendant, after unsuccessfully moving for an order
to set aside that sustaining the motion for a new trial, brought the
case here upon appeal.

by

The instructions given by the court evidently are based upon a
of the principles controlling the relation of principal
misconception
and agent.
In effect, the jury was told that defendant during the
continuance of plaintiffs' right to sell the property under their contract with the owners, could, by the termination of his employment
under plaintiffs, absolve himself from all duty to them, and, by making an independent contract with the owners, enter into competition
with them for the sale of the property.
The relation of principal
and agent is one of trust and confidence analogous to that of trustees.
and cestui que trust, client and attorney, and employer and employe.

\

person acting in a fiduciary capacity is not permitted to use the /
information or advantage gained through his position for his own
benefit and against the interest of his correlate..
He must be faithful to his trust and to guard against faithlessness is not allowed to
intermeddle on his own account with the subject of his employment
so long as the one for whom he is employed to act has any right
or interest in the matter. If he does interfere, the fact of the prior
termination of his employment will not release him; from accountadefendant acbility. His trusteeship cannot thus be cast off.
cepted employment from plaintiffs to aid them in selling the property
he should have done nothing at any time to disturb their relations
with their principals, and he could not accept employment from the
owners for himself until after plaintiffs' employment was finally ended.
It is not indispensable to plaintiffs' right to recover that the continuation of their employment to the date of the sale of the property be found. If it existed at the time defendant began to negotiate
the contract with the owners for himself, which he succeeded in procuring on June 27th, plaintiffs should recover.
In such case defendant's bad faith in undermining his principals would bind him to them
and give to them the fruits of his faithless acts. Trice v. Comstock,
121
Fed. 620, 57 C. C. A. 646, 61 L. R. A. 176; Paul v. Machine
Companv, 87 Mo. App. 647; Eoff v. Irvine, 108 Mo. 378, 18 S. W.
907, 32 Am. St. Rep. 609; Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 117 Mo. 261, 22
S. W. 623, 38 Am. St. Rep. 656; Mechem on Agency, §§ 455, 456;
2 Sugden on Vendors, 406 et seq. ; Grumley v. Webb, 44 Mo. 444,
100 Am. Dec. 304.
On the other hand,
as defendant contends, the relation of plaintiff- to the
was finally ended on June 15th, and until after
that date he made no effort to seek employment direct from the own-

If

if,
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ers, nor gave willing ear to proposals from McDonald, then in such
While as stated, good
case plaintiffs would have no cause of action.
faith requires a fiduciary to serve alone the interest of his correlate
in the subject of the employment, the termination of such interest
ends all duty, and leaves him free to serve himself or others, provided
of such interest to lay
he has done nothing during the continuance
the foundation for future advantage to himself at the expense of his
principal's rights. Halperin v. Callender, 17 Misc. Rep. 362, 39 X.

Supp. 1044; La Force v. Washington University. 106 Mo. App.
'
(
517, 81 S. W. 20 J: Beauchamp v. Higgins, 20 Mo. App. 514.The errors noted justified the sustaining of a motion for a new trial,
All concur.
and the order is affirmed.

Y.

v. Shannon, 44 111. App. ITT (1892), in which the
The purchase
resigned in order to take advantage of his principal.
of a trust property will always be scanned by a court of equity
by a fiduciary
16
Newcomb v. Brooks,
with the most searching and questioning suspicion.
The burden of establishing the utmost good faith is on the
W. \'a. 32 (1879).
The necessity of the
agent Condit v. Blackwell, 22 N. J. Eq. 481 (1858).
rule is made clear In Cook v. Berlin Woolen Mills Co., 56 Wis. 643, l 1 N. W.
a purchase of the subject of his
"Such an agent, contemplating
808 (1883):
agency, lias dangerous power to confuse its condition and make it appear
worth less than it Is. Such an agenl might well be tempted, would generally
some power, so to shape his agency, as nol only to depreciate in apparThis
ent value, but temporarily in real value what he designs to purchase.
There is nothing in the
is not sai.l by way of comment on the facts here.
of such fraud against the superintendent.
record to raise any presumption
H Is said by way of Illustrating the justice and wisdom of the rule applicaAnd the respondents, to support
ble to purchases by such agents generally.
took upon them the onus proband! thai
the purchase of the superintendent,
positive and exhe had not abused his power; thai he practiced throughout
plicit frankness and impartiality: had imparted to his principals all his own
had given all the advice
information bearing on the value of the property;
againsl himself thai be should have given againsl a stranger; had derived
uberrima
Ivantage from bis agency, bul had acted openly throughout,
if he has kept hack any Information thai might have affected the acfide."
may be sel aside.
Prince v. Dupuy,
tion of the principal, the transaction
But when the agenl can establish his inL iiT. 15 N. i:. 298 (1896).
tegrity, fidelity and fair and open dealing with the principal, even a gift
There is no reason why a principal may
from the principal may lie upheld.
of
, this way express bis gratitude t" his agenl and his appreciation
Ralston v. Turpin, 129 0. S. 663, 9 Sup. <'t. I-". 32 L. Ed. Ti.
And a lease to the agenl i< Bubjecl
i) aflirming <•'. «'.i 25 Fed. T (1885).
Bligh,
St. 41,
Sim.
herd Selsey v. Rhoades,
to the same principles,
2»

Accord: New Era Co.

(1824).

l

l

&

'_'
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quishment of his agency before he can acquire a personal interest in
the subject of it. To leave a doubt of his position in this respect, is to
turn himself into a trustee.
It is unnecessary to recur to authority
for a principle so familiar or so accordant with common honesty. 20 The
agent was employed, in this instance, expressly to preserve the land
from being sold; and taking his agency to have been left unclosed by
the absence of an explicit renunciation of
neither Leisenring v. Black,
Watts, 303, 30 Am. Dec. 322, nor Riddle v. Murphy,
R.
Serg.
230, presented
stronger case to restrain the agent from purchasing
for himself.
Within the three preceding years, he had been reimbursed his expenses and paid for his services; but that was not
dissolution of the previous relation, and
not pretended that there
was any other evidence of it. On the contrary, the fact that he gave
intelligence of the sale to
cotenant of the plaintiff, as well as to
friend of the family, evinces
consciousness that his duties as
fiduciary were not entirely closed. He
therefore to be treated as havtrustee.
But did the defendant purchase of him with noing been
tice
Knowing, as he probably did, of the former existence of the
agency, he would be bound to inquire into the duration of
and he
would stand affected by it.
Judgment reversed and venire de novo awarded.
Part of the opinion

S.

it

•

is omitted.
Accord:
Barton v. Moss, 32 111. 50 (1863).
An agent who has sold property for his principal is not thereby incapacitated
to buy of the vendee, if it
appears that he sold in good faith, and not under mere color of a sale, to a
third person, with an understanding that
would later be turned over to the
Robertson v. Chapman, 152 U.
673, 14 Sup. Ct. 741, 38 L. Ed. 592
A mere formal surrender of the agency is not enough, particularly
(1894).
if
was made merely to enable the agent to acquire an interest in the principal's property.
Fountain Coal Co. v. Phelps, 95 ind. 271 (1884); Bowman
cer, 53 [owa, 640,
N. W. 28 (1S80), in which the agent had not been
put in funds to pay the taxes, and later bought
tax title; New Era Co. v.
Shannon, H 111. App. 177 (1892).
However, when the agency has really ceasovists, McKinley v. Irvine. L3 Ala. 683 (1848);
ed, the disability no Longer
though even then the agenl cannot be permitted for his own advantage
to
undo, so Car aa ho can, the business he has done for his principal, Merchants'
[ns. Co. v. Prince, 50 Minn. 53, 52 X. \V. 131, 36 Am. St. Rep. 626 (1892).
a

6

it
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Ejectment.
Defendanl
claimed under a tax deed to his father,
John Leech.
Gibson, C. J. 24 It is not denied that the defendant's father had
been the plaintiff's agent and curator of the land.
The father himself
testified that his agency had expired before the sale; but that is not
To capacitate him as a purchaser on his own account, he
enough.
The most open, ingenuous
must have explicitly resigned his trust.
and disinterested
dealing is required of a confidential agent while he
consents to act as such, and there must be an unambiguous relin-
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Rep. 343,

v.

MATTINGLY. 28

89 Ky. 83, 1 S. W.
Ky. Law Rep. 243.)

18S9.
12

545

488,

8

Ky. Law

B. F. Mattingly was surety on notes given by Spalding and Geo.
Mattingly to purchase cattle to feed. To protect him, they gave B.
F. Mattingly a bill of sale of said cattle, and a power to sell them
to satisfy the notes. They had hired one B. S. Mattingly to feed the
cattle for them, but failed to perform their agreement to erect feeding pens and furnish straw and hay, whereupon B. F. Mattingly sold
Spalding petitions in equity for relief
the cattle to B. S. Mattingly.
and appeals from judgment for Mattingly.
Bennett, J. 27 * * * The contention of appellant that appellee B. S. Mattingly is liable to him for the value of said cattle at
selling time, and also for the slops, less his expenses (although appellee B. F. Mattingly may not be liable), because at the time he purchased the cattle from B. F. Mattingly he was acting as appellant's
agent in slopping and attending to said cattle, cannot be sustained,
for the reason that the equitable rule which prevents an agent from
dealing with his principal's property for his own benefit, inconsistent
with the interest of that of the principal, "applies only to agents who
are relied upon for counsel and direction, and whose employment
is rather a trust than a service, or both, and not to those who are
employed merely as instruments in the performance of an appointed
service," — such as an employe to render manual labor for the principal, without any trust power being delegated to him, to act on behalf of the principal, but only to render some appointed labor for
him, for wages — then the employe may purchase the principal's
It would not be conproperty as well as any one not so situated.
tended that a person merely employed by the owner of a team of
horses to feed and drive them could not purchase them from any
other person authorized to sell them. Here, appellee B. S. Mattingly
was only employed to straw, slop, and attend to said cattle at an
agreed price; and appellee B. K. Mattingly, having the right under
to sell them, B. S. Mattingly was under no equithe circumstances
table obligation not to buy them for himself, upon fair terms.
After can-fully considering the whole case, we are of the opinion
that there is no reversible error in the proceedings in the court below.

The judgment

i^

affirmed.

ie Accord: Curletl v. Newman, 80 W. 7a. L82, 8 S. B. 578 (1887),
the court found the relations were not confidential.
27 pari of the opinion is omitted.
QOOO.PB.& A.— 35
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Wilson against Matthew C. Wilson for
which defendant had received for plaintiff.
Plaintiff wrote
him: "1 don't say 1 must have
but
would like to have at least
or $300 would not come amiss. You
$250 as soon as you can send
can send inclosed in
letter in $50's or $100 notes on par banks.
Defendfolded up and sealed."
Inly be careful to send
ant sent 18 bills of the denomination of $5, $10, and $20, and $100
letter carefully folded and sealed.
The letter never was received.
i:\yis, C.
The primary obligation of an agent, whose authority
limited by instructions,
to adhere faithfully to those instructions,
in all cases to which they ought properly to apply.
Story on Agency,
He
in general bound to obey the orders of his principal
192.
and, in order to
exactly,
they be imperative and not discretionary
the duty of
factor to obey an order,
make
not necessary
that
should be given in the form of
command.
The expression
of
wish by the consignor may fairly be presumed to be an order.
359; Brown v. McGran, 14 Pet. 494, 10 L.
Story on Contracts,
true that instructions may be disregarded in cases of
Ed. 550.
extreme necessity arising from unforeseen emergencies, or
performance becomes impossible, or
breach of law or
they require
morals.
194.
These are, however, exceptional
Story on Agency,
cases. /There may, perhaps, be others which have been sanctioned
by adjudications, founded on the principle that the departure comas indicated
But the general rule
plained of was not material.
in what has been said, and the case before the court
not brought
within any of the exceptions.
To justify
loss has resulted
departure from instructions, where
from such deviation, the case must be brought within some of the
recognized exceptions. 28
not sufficient that the deviation was
Assumpsit by Thomas
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28 Rechtscherd
Bank, 47 Mo. 181 (1870), in which the
v. Accommodation
agent "intended to act for the benefit of the principal."
So long as an agent
i- held i"
strict compliance with an order plainly expressed the principal
can never complain, nor the agent suffer, be the consequences to the former
what they may.
Wash. c. r. r>4!)
Courcier v. Etitter, Fed. Cas. No. 3,282,
The
Do O. M.
(1825); Pariente v. Lubbock. L'O Loav. r.ss.
G.
(1S55).
is that the principal knows his own interests and objects betpresumption
Hays v.
id- than does the agent.
111. App. .*:<;'.)(1903);
Hinton v. Ring,
is said to be the first and bighesl duty
Hill. 128 (1845), in which
Stone,
of an agent to adhere faithfully to the orders of his principal; and devia7
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not material if it appear that the party giving the instructions rethat the
garded them as material, unless it be shown affirmatively
deviation in no manner contributed to the loss. This may be a difficult task, in a case like the present ; but the defendant voluntarily assumed it when he substituted his own plan for that prescribed by the
To force a man to perform an executory contract, after
plaintiff.
substituting for the consideration other terms than those provided
for in the bargain, is to deprive him of the right to manage his own
To do this on the ground that the debusiness in his own way.
material,
when
is
not
it is manifest that the party considered
parture
it otherwise, is a violation of private right, which leads to uncertainty
In Nesbit v. Burry, 25
and litigation without necessity or excuse.
Pa. 210, this court refused to compel a man to give up his oxen al-

though he had sold them and received part of the purchase-money,
because it was a part of the contract that they were sold by weight,
and the weight was to be ascertained by "the scales at Mount JackThe scales designated were so out of repair that the weight
son."
could not be ascertained by them, and it was held that no others
could be substituted against his consent so as to divest his right of
property.

Whether an action for damages could have been sustained was
As between
not the question there; nor is it the question here.
risk
vendee,
of
and
the
and
the
property
right
consequent
vendor
- on delivery
of the goods purchased to the designated carrier,
But if a
packed, and directed according to usage or instructions.
different method of packing and directing, or a different carrier than
the one designated, be adopted by the vendor, he assumes the risk
in case of loss, unless it be shown that his deviation in no way conWhere the goods are stolen, how can this be
tributed to the loss.
shown? In sending bank-notes by mail, it is manifest that while a
large package would attract the attention and care of honest agents
The
on the route, it might tempt the cupidity of dishonest ones.
party who proposes to take the risk of this method of remittance
the advantages and disadvantages of the various
methods of enclosing the notes; and if he directs the money to be
remitted in notes of .SI 00 or $50, the debtor has no right to increase
There
ize of the package by remitting in notes of $10 and $5.
■rror in permitting the jury to find that the
departure from instructions was immaterial.
Judgment reversed and venire de novo awarded.
has a right to weigh

asequences.
The law will no! per
make him responsible for thi
mil the :iL'i'iit to violate his Instructions with Impunity,
or to use the property "f hi^ principal In any manner for his own profit The case was affirmed
in 8 Denlo, 575 (18 MJ).
As to ratification of the disobedience, see Walker v. Walker, 5 Helsk. 125
:i««ii win

(1871).
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HALL
(Supremo

v.

(Part 3

STORKS.

Court of Wisconsin,

1868.

7 Wis.

'jr.::.)

This cause was tried before the county court of Milwaukee county, withoul a jury, and a judgment was rendered for the
The counsel for the respective parlies have admitted by
respondents.
stipulation that the following facts were found by the county court:
resided in Whitewater, and did business at
1. "That the respondents
that point, and that the appellants were factors and commission msrchants in tin- city of 'Milwaukee."
on the 15th day of May, 1857, shipped a
2. "That the respondents
quantity of wheat consigned to the appellants, that the appellants received the wheat on the same day and sold it to Montgomery & Cutler,
and took in payment therefor, the check of Montgomery & Cutler,
dated on the 16th day of May, 1857, one day after the sale. And that
on the evening of the same day, the appellants forwarded to the respondents a statement of the amount of the sales, less their charges
and commissions, and forwarded in the same letter the amount of said
sale less their commissions and charges."
3. "That the check of Montgomery & Cutler was presented on the
day it bore date, to wit: on the 16th, and payment was refused, and
that Montgomery & Cutler on that day were insolvent, and that the
check has not been paid."
4. "That by the usual course of business in Milwaukee, commission
merchants collected cash sales on the day after delivery."
5. "That on the 16th day of May, the respondents shipped another
quantity of wheat to the appellants, which they received and sold for
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CoLB, J."

cash, and returned to the respondents a statement of the sales, and it
is for the last sale that the suit is brought."
6. "That up to the 16th of May, Montgomery & Cutler were in
good credit."
The appellants admit in their answer that the wheat was consigned
to them by the respondents to be sold for cash.
Upon this state of facts the question arises, who is to sustain the loss
of the Montgomery & Cutler check, the appellants or respondents?
We are most clearly of the opinion that it must be the former.
We do not understand the general proposition to be controverted,
that it is the first duty of an agent or factor whose authority is limited
by instructions, to adhere faithfully to those instructions in all cases
The express orders of the principal,
to which they properly apply.
when they are clear, possible and proper, leave no discretion with the

If a person employs
agent, but are absolutely imperative upon him.
another to act for him in any lawful business, he has an undoubted
right to limit and restrict the agent's authority as he thinks proper.
2»

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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And if the agent violates his duties and obligations to his principal,
whether by exceeding his authority, or positive misconduct, or by
negligence or omission in the proper functions of his agency, or in any
other manner, and any loss or damage results therefrom to the principal, he is responsible therefor and must make full indemnity.
There are a few exceptioins when an agent is held justified in cases
of extreme necessity, arising from unforeseen emergencies in departing
from positive instructions. But these exceptions have no application
Here the appellants in effect concede that they received
to this case.
the wheat, and were instructed to sell it for cash. Is there anything
ambiguous about such an instruction ? In the common, ordinary, popular acceptance of the language, was it not a clear, positive and unqualified direction not to sell or pass title to the wheat without cash in
hand ? When a country merchant forwards wheat to a factor in Milwaukee, to be sold for cash, does he expect that the grain will become
the property of another without the consideration being paid down?
A sale then for cash we suppose means that the money shall be paid
when the title to the property passes. This is the common, popular
sense of the language, and the appellants had no authority except to
dispose of the wheat according to the strict orders of their consignors. And if they have assumed the power of departing from the instructions, and a loss has occurred in consequence of it; they must
sustain it and not their principals. It appears to us, that to sanction
a latitude of action in the factor beyond the rigid commands of the
principal would be most mischievous, and unsettle long established
principles of law.
But it is said that in the absence of instructions or where the terms
of the instructions have a peculiar signification at the market where
the article is to be sold, the usual and customary manner of sale is to
be the rule for the factor and the consignor and factor are both deem30
This
ed to have contracted with a view to such custom or usage.
may all be very true, and yet how does the proposition help the appellants' case?
We have already stated that in our judgment there was nothing peculiar or doubtful or ambiguous in the direction given by the respondents to sell the wheat for cash. That in the popular and common sense
of the language, such a sale is understood to be one where property is
sold fur money in hand. And that it is an ingredient or condition of
h sale that the titl.- t<> the 1 roperty dues not pass to the purchaser
We are aware that cases can he
until the purchase money is paid.
found which go to establish the doctrine that when a factor has received goods with direction t'> sell for cash, hut which he does no1 sell
for cash, hut on short time, according to the usage and custom of the
market, it has been held that such a ale was in compliance with the
i age maj govern
10 (J. I;. 886, 70 E. 0.

when the Instructions

L

886

(1851).

are nol clear.
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of the principal.
See Clark v. Van Northwick, 1 Pick. 343.
Catlin v. Smith. 24 Vt. 85; Barksdale v. Brown et al., 1
NTott & McC. 517, ( > Am. Dec. 720;
Douglass v. Uland, 1 Wend. 492.
We doubt exceedingly the soundness and correctness of the rule
which permits a usage or custom in any particular business or trade
to qualify or vary the instructions to an agent, and allow him to show
that by the understanding of merchants a sale on credit was no violation of an order to sell for cash.
But if it may he shown that terms in
trade,
any particular business or
by usage have acquired a meaning
different from their ordinary acceptation, and that by such custom a
cash sale does not mean what the language imports, then it is obvious
that the evidence of such a custom should he most clear and satisfacNow, we do not think the proof in this case would at all warrant
t( >r\ .
us in saying that a local usage existed in Milwaukee so "ancient, uniform, notorious and reasonable" that the respondents and appellants
must be presumed to have contracted with reference to it, and that according to this usage a cash sale is when property is sold one day and
the purchase money is collected the day after delivery, and we should
not be authorized from anything we can see in this case in supposing
orders
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Contra:

custom to exist.
if such a custom does obtain in Milwaukee and the
appellants relied upon it to excuse themselves from a seeming violation of orders to sell for cash, then they should have established the
Since they did not show the excustom beyond all reasonable doubt.
hold
them to all the responsibility
must
custom,
we
istence of such a
and they must lose the
their
of
principals,
instructions
violating
the
of
amount of the check of Montgomery & Cutler, instead of the respondents. * * * Judgment affirmed.
such

a

And manifestly

GREENLEAF
(Supreme

Judicial Court of

v.

MOODY.

Massachusetts,

18GG.

13

Allen,

363.)

Foster, J. This case must depend for its decision upon the application of well estahlished legal principles to a state of facts of an unusual and extraordinary character.
The defendants, commission merchants or factors in New Orleans,
received during the rebellion in 1864 from the plaintiff a large quantity of hay consigned for sale, upon which they made advances in payment of freight and other charges amounting to about half its value.
Three hundred and twenty-one tons of the hay were sold to the military officers of the United States, for cash. The remainder, one hunNo fault
dred and thirty-four tons, were seized by military authority.
could be imputed to the factors for either of these events. The sales
for cash were clearly within the scope of their authority, and the sei-
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zure by the strong arm of military power was an occurrence beyond
their control.
The only payment which the United States officers would make, either for the hay purchased or for that seized, was in certificates of indebtedness, the negotiable notes of the United States, payable to the
The
bearer and upon interest at the rate of six per cent, per annum.
factors accepted these as payment, and at once sold them for their
The plaintiff claims
market value, ninety-three cents on the dollar.
that the defendants are liable for the loss sustained by this sale at a
discount, first, because as factors they had no right to take in payment
and secondly, because, if justified in accepting them,
such securities;
they had no right to sell them below par without notice to him. And

we are called upon to decide whether in either of these particulars
they violated their duty, so as to render themselves personally answerable to their principal, the consignor, for the loss sustained by the sale
of the certificates at a discount below their face.
The ordinary rule is clear, that factors must obey the instructions of
their principal ; that they may not compromise debts without authority ; that they must, under a change of circumstances, advise the consignor, and await his directions; and that they must conform to the
usages of trade presumed to be known to both parties, or to the course
But
pursued by them and approved by the owner in former instances.

31
To
what is their duty in novel, critical and unforeseen emergencies?
Story
answer this question we may refer to an opinion of Mr. Justice
in a suit relative to the conduct of a supercargo who had totally departed from the instructions of the shipper, which is so apposite that
In circumwe adopt its principles and the substance of its language.
the agent
that
it
is
necessary
only
stances of necessity or great urgency
was
"What,
then,
discretion.
reasonable
with
and
fide
should act bona
occurof
a
case
unexpected
in
to
do
such
supercargo
of
the
it the duty
rence, not within the contemplation of the instructions?" "Now I take
it to be clear that if, by some sudden emergency, or supervening necessity, or other unexpected event, it becomes impossible for the supercargo to comply with the exact terms of his instructions, or a literal
compliance therewith would frustrate the objects of the owner and
sacrifice his interests, it becomes the duty of the supercargo, under
such circumstances, to do the best he can, in the exercise of a sound

in such a case, an agent from necessity for
"In all voyages of this sort there is an implied authority
the owner."
: for the interest and benefit of the owner in all cases of unfore-

discretion."

"He becomes,

and emergency, created by operation and intendment of
law."
Forrestier v. Bordman, 1 Story. 43, 51. fed. Cas. No. 4,945.
A justification founded upon necessary departure from the ordinary
customs of trade or from actual instructions must undoubtedly be con-

seen i

that
174, 88 Am. Dec. 804 (1866), holding
v. Smith, 2 Cold.
Inking of a boal laden with grain <n<i ool Justify the agenl In selling
the grain, though it was his dutj to try to Bave it from destruction.

si See Foster
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The agent cannot be allowed
strued with considerable strictness.
lightly or unadvisedly to assume a latitude of discretion not conferred
upon 11in 1 by express authority, or by those usages of trade, which both
But the inparties are presumed to have known and contemplated.
terests of commerce require, and the enlightened principles of commercial law bestow, a discretion which enables the factor to protect his
principal from the irreparable injury which would be liable to arise in
the absence of authority to act under critical circumstances, unexpectedly occurring, which Ao not admit of delay for the purposes of comAnd the factor, so placed, who acts prumunication and consultation.
dently and in good faith, as the owner himself, being a wise man,
would have been likely to do if personally present, finds his protection
in the sincerity and sound discretion of his conduct, and is not answerable for consequences, although subsequent events may demonstrate
that his principal would have been the gainer by a different course
fn in the one he has conscientiously and discreetly adopted.
This is the rule which must govern the decision of the case here
submitted to us. It is a question of fact rather than of law. The good
faith of the defendants is expressly conceded. We might, in strictness, give judgment for them on the ground that the case stated does
But we prefer, in conformnot affirmatively establish their liability.
intention
the
of the parties, to consider
what
we
to
be
with
suppose
ity
and pass upon the question, whether the defendants did act with such
prudence and discretion as to exempt them from liability. Ought they
they had
to have refused the certificates proffered in payment?
done so, the only redress open to the plaintiff would have been an application to the war department at Washington or to congress or to
No rational man could regard these remedies as
the court of claims.
worth pursuing to avoid a discount of seven per cent., the whole
amount of which was only $1,659.28. The expense, the delay, the uncertainty of ultimate success, would have induced any one, having regard solely to his pecuniary interest, and acting in his own affairs, to
accept the proffered certificates rather than to attempt to stand upon
his strict legal rights, where no legal remedy was practically available
without disadvantages disproportionate to the amount at stake.
The propriety of selling the certificates may be considered more
As they were sold as soon as received, justice requires
questionable.
us to regard the factors' entire judgment and conduct together, and if
the principal was benefited by the whole exercise of their discretion,
and placed in a better condition than if they had refused to assume the
responsibility, it would be unfair to subject them to loss because they
might in one respect have done still better. No one can say that they
would have decided to accept the certificates without also, as a part
of the same mental act, deciding to convert them forthwith into cash.
In guarding
But we do not proceed upon this narrow ground alone.
the interests of a distant principal it was their duty to err on the side
of prudence rather than of overconfidence.
We must remember the

If
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situation of the parties and the country at the time of the transaction, and judge by the light they then had, and not according to the
wisdom that comes after the event. The ordinary facilities of correspondence between Maine and New Orleans were greatly interrupted.
The mails were slow
No telegraphic communication was possible.
and uncertain, and somewhat exposed to capture in transit.
The interval within which the most speedy interchange of letters could take
place was long enough for momentous events. The pecuniary credit
of the government depended on the varying fortunes of war. A single
disaster might have depressed the market value of the securities far
below the point at which they then stood.
Other factors and agents
similarly situated with themselves deemed it their duty to realize at
the current rates of the market.
More than half of the proceeds of
the property would be required in New Orleans to pay advances and
charges.
The justification of the sale is not to be placed on the ground that
they had a right to make a sacrifice in order to reimburse themselves,
for factors cannot sell below limits without notice to the owner of the
amount due and a request for payment.
But the fact that the consignor owed $14,303.45, payable in New Orleans, on account of this
shipment, was a circumstance of some weight in determining the question of expediency.
the securities were to be sent to the North, and
the money due to be remitted thence, double risks of transportation
must be incurred.
It is impossible for us to conclude that the course adopted exhibited
any such error of judgment or neglect of duty as ought to render mercantile agents personally responsible to their principals.

If

Judgment for

the defendants.

BRAY
(Supreme

v.

GUNN.

Court of Georgia,

1874.

53 Ga. 144).

Bray sent to defendant for collection, in New York exchange, a
draft on Brown & Co. After some difficulty defendant on September
'ected in Kimball currency, then at par, and informed plaintiff,
who, on September 12 acknowledged the letter. Kimball & Co. failed,
and on October 27 plaintiff demanded of defendant that he remit the
amount collected in New York exchange.
Upon an action of assumpsit defendant had verdict, and plaintiff appeals.
McCay, J. If an agent, acting in good faith, disobey the instructions of his principal, and promptly informs the principal of what he
has done, it is the duly of the principal, at the earliest opportunity,
to
repudiate the act if he disapprove.
Silence in such a case is a ratification.
See the case of M< Lendon v. Wilson & Callaway, 52 Ga. II.
from Troup county.
Taking this correspondence altogether, we think
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right to find that the plaintiffs were satisfied with the
act of Gunn in taking the money in the Kimball funds, and that his
is an after-thought
dissatisfaction
in consequence of the failure of
Kimball. The evidence is convincing that if they had promptly notiI loth
fied ( hum of their dissatisfaction,
he could have saved himself.
the parlies here were commercial men, and the rule is a fair and reasonable one thai it is the duty of the principal promptly to answer the
letters of his agent, and if he do not do so he is presumed to acquiesce
in what the agent informs him he has done or proposes to do.
the

had

a

Judgment affirmed.

FALSKEN
(Supreme

v.

FALLS CITY STATE BANK. 82

Court of Nebraska,

190-4.

71

Neb. 20, 08 N. W. 425.)

C. Farrington & Towle were loan brokers doing business
The plaintiff, Falsken, obtained through
Falls City, in this state.
them a loan of $3,500 upon his note and mortgage upon a tract of land
lying in that vicinity. Afterwards he loaned to Farrington $2,500 upon
Falsken lived at Kansas
the note of the latter, secured by collaterals.
City. On the 29th day of July, 1899, he transmitted through the mails
to the defendant, the Falls City State Bank, the Farrington note and
collaterals, accompanied by the following letter, as a copy of it appears
incorporated into the bill of exceptions :
"Kansas City, Mo., July 29, 1899. 914 E. 17 St. Falls City State
Bank — Dear Sirs : Inclosed please find note for $2540.00 against F. E.
Farrington for collection and collateral bonds ; Note of $2500.00 and
two Int. notes or coupons of $15.00 each attached to bond in favor of
F. E. Farrington. You will give to F. E. Farrington as soon as my
note is settled $2000 Two thousand to be paid Aug. 1-99 on my
$3500.00 loan and $75.00 to be paid on same Int. note also due Aug.
1-99 dated 2-7-95 due in five years.
Send me receipt for $2000.00
& Int. note from the said $3500.00 note & mortgage holder against me.
Said loan was made through
Farrington & Towle & the balance
$465.00 less your collection fee send me check. Yours truly, C. H.
Falsken."
On August 1, 1899, Farrington satisfied his obligation with the bank,
and obtained a surrender of it and of his collaterals.
On the same
day, and as a part of the same transaction, the bank gave him two
drafts on a Xew York hank for $2,000 and $105, respectively, and remitted to Falsken at Kansas City, by draft, $462.60; the aggregate of
the three sums being the amount of the Farrington note. At or about
the same time Farrington's receipt for the $2,000 represented by the
draft for that amount was also sent to Falsken, but by whom is not
Ames,
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at

82 Accord:
Not the
Boden v. French, 10 C. B. 886, 70 K. O. L. 886 (1851).
power of attorney merely, but all the direi-tions, by correspondence or otherwise, may be considered.
Moysea v. Bell, 62 Wash. 534, 114 Pac. 10:{ (1011).
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Farrington, who was or soon
and, we think, is immaterial.
York drafts to his own use,
New
the
insolvent,
appropriated
became
Faland failed to discharge to any extent the obligation of Falsken.
sken is shown to have admitted in the following October that the receipt
had come to his hands, and he testified that he learned in the following
February that Farrington had not applied the money to the payment of
He thereupon begun a series of attempts by solicthe plaintiff's debt.
itations and threats, direct and indirect, to obtain restitution from Farrington, which were continued through the summer of 1900, but wore

He seems not to have expressed any dissatisfaction with
unavailing.
the conduct of the bank until these efforts had proved futile, although
in the meantime he conversed more than once concerning the transaction with the officers of that institution.
Some time in the fall of 1900 — the transcript does not disclose the
— Falsken begun this acdate, but apparently in October or November
tion, alleging a breach of the contract of collection as expressed by the
letter of transmission of July 29, 1899, above copied, and praying judgment for $2,000 as moneys collected thereunder, and not paid over or

ceeding

is

a

in

a

is,

accounted for. The petition contains no allegation of fraud or of negligence. The answer, after admitting the contract and the collection of
the money, contains what amounts to a plea of payment to the satisfaction, and with the acquiescence, ratification, and approval of the
substance,
general denial of new matter.
plaintiff. The reply
defendant, which this prothe
for
verdict and judgment
There were
prosecuted

to reverse.
is

whether the
in the case
justified by having paid out the
acting in good faith,
did. The plaintiff contends that
money in the manner in which
not, because, although the letter instructed the bank to pay the sum
should be collected from
in controversy to Farrington as soon as
receipt for the money from
to send to Falsken
also directed
him,
But the two directhe holder of the note and mortgage of the latter.
nonresident,
The holder was
tions are not necessarily inconsistent.
and
not shown that the defendant or its officials knew either his
The letter calls attention to the fact that the
name or whereabouts.
Towle, and expressly didebt was contracted through Farrington
holder,
to
the
hut to Farrington,
the payment of the money not
applied to
who thus appeared to he intrusted with the duty of seeing
be seen that the sole question

is

defendant,

it

it

it will thus

it

&

it

is

a

a

it

it

it

is

il

if

a

it

*

it

if

*

Jt

*

to be
was "to he given to Farrington
desired use.
with
the
charged
duty
was
not
hank
The
certainly
on
loan."
my
paid
was in
of payment, either singly or jointly with Farrington; and
that Farrington properly discharged
tended to hi- obligated to see to
his trust, that intent was not expressed, hut must be inferred solelj
receipt from tin
from the direction to the defendant to transmit
holder to the plaintiff. The letter would have been literally complied
with
Farrington had paid the money to the holder, ami obtained his
to the hank for transmission.
for it, and delivered
the

pi
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circumstances we do not think that it was unreasonable to suppose that such was its intent, and, if so, the bank cannot, of
The
se, be held for the consequences of Farrington's default.
was
letter
that
the
is
plaintiff
said
behalf
the
can
on
of
be
most that
turned
afterwards
matter
that
a
to
with
respect
and
ambiguous
obscure
That it was so was due to the plainout to be of vital importance.
tiff's own fault or negligence, and he cannot, with justice, be permitted
isit its consequences upon one who cannot be accused of fraud or
We do not think it is
neglect, but at the most of an honest mistake.
requisite to invoke the doctrine of ratification, but the conduct of the
plaintiff for a year or more after he became fully acquainted with all
the facts tends very strongly to prove that he had the same understandIt is surprising, if he supposed
ing of his letter as did the defendant.
his damage in so large a sum,
to
violated
that his instructions had been
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Under all

the

that he did not sooner demand reparation from the bank, especially
when he encountered difficulty in obtaining restitution from Farrington. At all events, we think that the defendant is entitled to the proi m of the rule that an agent who, in good faith and without negliof faulty or ambiguous ingence, acts upon his own understanding
structions, is not liable to his principal in damages, although his interMinnesota Linseed Oil Co. v.
pretation of them may be erroneous.

Montague, 65 Iowa, 67, 21 N. W. 184; Pickett v. Pearsons, 17 Vt.
470; Vianna v. Barclay, 3 Cow. 281.
Such being the case, the verdict is the only one that would have had
support by the evidence, and the consideration of alleged errors in the
It is recommended that the judgress of the trial is not required.
ment of the district court be affirmed.

FEILD
(Supreme

v.

FARRINGTON.

Court of the United States,

1S69.

10

Wall.

141,

19

L. Ed.

923.)

Feild shipped cotton to Farrington & Co. with directions to sell
Next day he teleit. Cotton was then worth 50 cents per pound.
he saw Farringafter
Shortly
see
you."
graphed, "Do not sell till I
value of the
full
the
$11,000,
nearly
ton and secured an advance of
to sell the
wait
to
wish
a
he
expressed
The latter testified
in.
them
to sell
ordered
he
testified
Feild
market.
better
cotton for a
made
instructions,
and
he
asking
him
wrote
Later
they
in 10 days.
sue
now
cents,
and
at
30
sold
letters
they
After
repeated
no reply.
net
and
the
advance
their
between
$6,695,
the
difference
recover
to
others,
an
asked,
Feild
among
trial
the
On
cotton.
of
the
proceeds
instruction that if the jury find that Feild ordered a sale before the
price should fall any lower, and they failed to sell, then plaintiffs
must account to Feild for what the cotton would have brought if
Defendant brings error.
so sold.
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[After holding that Feild's failure to reply to the
* * *
letters amounted to a ratification of the conduct of plaintiffs:]
should
not have afThere is still another reason why the court
The plaintiffs had made
firmed the defendant's first proposition.
large advances on the cotton consigned to them, advances very nearly, if not quite, equal to its value, and much more than its market
value at any time after their letter to the defendant was written.
They had, therefore, acquired a special property in the cotton, and
they held it for their own indemnity as well as for the benefit of
Now, though it is true that factors are generally
the defendant.
bound to obey all orders of their principals respecting the time and
mode of sale, yet when they have made large advances or incurred
expenses on account of the consignment, the principal cannot by any
subsequent orders control their right to sell at such a time as in
the exercise of a sound discretion, and in accordance with the usage
of trade, they may deem best to secure indemnity to themselves, and
Of course they must act
to promote the interests of the consignor.
in good faith and with reasonable skill. This is the rule as laid down
in Brown v. McGran, 14 Pet. 479, 10 L. Ed. 550, in which it was

"where a consignment has been made generally without
any specific orders as to the time or mode of sale, and the factor
makes advances or incurs liabilities on the footing of such consignment, then the legal presumption is, that the factor is intended to
be clothed with the ordinary rights of factors to sell, in the exercise
of a sound discretion, at such time and in such mode as the usage
of trade and his general duty require, and to reimburse himself for
his advances and liabilities out of the proceeds of sale, and the consignor has no right, by any subsequent orders given after advances
have been made or liabilities incurred by the factor, to suspend or
control this right of sale, except so far as respects the surplus of the
consignment not necessary to the reimbursement of such advances or
said that

liabilities."
In view of this it is apparent that the jury had more to find than
the fact that Feild gave instructions to sell the cotton before any
fall in the price, in order to justify a credit to him for the amount
the cotton would have brought if sold at the time the instructions
were given.
There was, therefore, no error in denying the defend* * * Reversed
ant's first prayer for instructions to the jury.
for another error.
•»

I'urt ol Hie oitiniuu

is omitted.
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(Court
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AM»

C0NSEQ1 BNCES

MINNEAP< >US TRUST CO.
Appeals of New Zork, \'->o:,. im \. y.
90

App.

K10LATION

OF T11K

v.

(Fart 3

MAT1TKR.

205,

73 N.

k. 987, reversing

Dlv. 361, 85 N. Y. Supp. 510.)

Counterclaim for cona note and for commissions.
Plaintiff loaned defendanl $5,000, taking as
of securities.
aggregating $20,100. These notes
security notes ami mortgages
plaintiff was to collect, bul found such difficulty in doing so that
defendant instructed plaintiff to foreclose the mortgages as soon as
possible, bid in the property at about its present value and take judgAction on

version
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Plaintiff
ment against the makers of the notes for any deficiency.
due
full
sum
the
$24,434.90,
for
foreclosed, but bid in the property
makers
the
released
foreclosure,
thus
and
on the notes plus costs of
The property was then worth
of the notes from further liability.
this was a conversion of the
$20,000.
that
Defendant
alleged
only
she was awarded $17,a
referee
trial
before
and
upon
securities
due
the
amount
plaintiff and the value
between
difference
the
250.05.
Plaintiffs appeal from the affirmance by the Apof these securities.
pellate Division of the report of the referee.
34
* * * But we fail to perceive
WERNER,

how this finding
J.
negligence justifies the conclusion that the plaintiff was guilty of
It is true that the plaintiff was
converting the defendant's securities.
the pledgee of these securities as well as the agent of the defendant.
It is equally true that the defendant was not notified of the foreclosure, and that the plaintiff bid in the mortgaged lands in its own
There is, however, no finding that the plaintiff, in bidding in
name.
the property in its own name, was not acting for and on behalf of
the defendant, and there is no significance in the failure to notify her

of

The
are considered.
foreclosure, when the circumstances
The
Minnesota.
plaintiff's
mortgaged property was in the state of
place of business was there, and it held an assignment of the mortThe defendant's attorney had instructed the plaintiff to progages.
ceed to a foreclosure and sale. The defendant lived in the state of
New York, and could act much more conveniently and economically
It was
through her pledgee and agent than she could in person.
therefore quite natural and proper that the plaintiff should use its
All this was entirely consisown name in acting for the defendant.
tent with the plaintiff's duty as the agent and pledgee of the defendof the

ant.

It is obvious, however, that in departing from the defendant's instructions as to price the plaintiff was guilty of a breach of duty,
and rendered itself liable for any damages resulting from such breach.
Since there is neither evidence nor finding as to the financial responsibility of either Whitney, the mortgagor, or Van Dyke, his grantee,
who assumed payment of the mortgages, the most favorable view of
1

Part of the

<>pini<m is omitted.
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the case to which the defendant can be entitled is that, if the plaintiff
had obeyed instructions by bidding- in the property at its actual
value, a deficiency judgment might have been collected from Whitney
or Van Dyke. It would seem to follow as a logical corollary that
the defendant's right of recovery should be measured by what she
may have lost through the plaintiff's misconduct, for the law of damIn the absence of some arbitrary
ages is the law of compensation.
legal rule, this would naturally be the difference between the value

of the land and the amount bid for the same at the sale. That would
seem to be the rule applicable to this case unless the plaintiff's breach
We think it did not.
of duty amounted to a conversion.
The true rule is very succinctly stated in Mechem on Agency (section 476), where the learned author says : /'In many cases it becomes
difficult to determine whether the misconduct of the agent consists in

of instructions, or amounts, in law, to a conversion,
and the distinction is sometimes exceedingly technical./ A distinction
is nevertheless to be made. Thus it has been held that if property be
delivered to an agent, with instructions to sell it at a certain price,
and he sells it for less than that price, he is not liable in trover as for
Sarjeant v. Blunt, 16 Johns. 74; Dufresne v. Hutchinconversion.
In such a
son, 3 Taunt. 117; Palmer v. Germain, 2 M. ec W. 282.
case the agent had a right to sell and deliver, and in that respect
He disobeyed instruche did no more than he was authorized to do.
tions as to price only, and was liable for misconduct, but not for
So, where an agent was authorized to
conversion of the property.
deliver goods on receiving sufficient security, but delivered them on
inadequate security, it was held that trover would not lie." Cairnes
The principle thus enunciated seems to
v. Bleecker, 12 Johns. 300.
There can be no sound
be precisely applicable to the case at bar.
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a mere breach

distinction between a case of agency to sell at a specified price and
one to buy within a price or limit named.
We think the cases cited by the learned Appellate Division and the
In Scott v. Rogers. 31 N. Y. 676, the
defendant are not in point.
instructions were to sell wheat at a specified price on a particular
day. and, if not so sold, to ship it to a designated consignee in the
In Lavcrty v. Snethcn, 68 N. Y. 522, 23 Am.
city of Xew York.
was
agent
the
instructed not t<< part with a note unless lie
Rep. 184,

In Comley v. I >azian, 114 X. Y. 161, 21 N. E. 135.
got the money.
certain goods were not to be sold without the approval and consent
of the owners.
In Gilchrisl v. Cunningham, 8 Wend. 641, the as
foreclosed the same without inof
as collateral
a
mortgage
signee
struction-, and one of the defendants treated the property as his own.
In all of tht'
the breach of duty was held to be a conversion,
and in defiance of the
the act done was wholly unauthorized
Thai is the point of distinction between the two
owner's rights.
bove referred to.
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It is undoubtedly the duty of an agent to obey all the lawful instructions of his principal, and the agent is clearly responsible for
:;:
all losses occasioned by his disobedience thereof. ' Whitney v. Merchants" Union Express Co., KM Mass. 152, 6 Am. Rep. 207; Blot
v. Boiceau, 3 N. V. 78, 51 Am. Dec. 345.
But it is equally clear
that the rule of damages as for conversion is not applicable to all
cases where a principal may sustain lo>s through the negligence or
disobedience of his agent. Wamsley v. Atlas Steamship Co., 168 N.
V. 533, <-l X. K. 896, S3 Am. St. Rep. 699; Industrial & General
Trust v. Tod. 170 N. Y. 233, 63 N. E. 285. The law upon this subject is well summed up by Rronson, J., in McMorris v. Simpson, 21
Wend. 610, 613, as follows: "The most usual remedies of a principal
against his agent are the action of assumpsit and a special action on
the case, but there can be no doubt that trover will sometimes be
an appropriate remedy.
The action may be maintained whenever the
agent has wrongfully converted the property of his principal to his

own use, and the fact of conversion may be made out by showing
either a demand and refusal, or that the agent has, without necessity, sold or otherwise disposed of the property contrary to his instructions.
When an agent wrongfully refuses to surrender the
of
his
principal, or wholly departs from his authority in disgoods
them,
of
he makes the property his own, and may be treated
posing
as a tort feasor.
But there must be some act on the part of the

A mere omission of duty is not enough, although the propagent.
Nor will trover lie
erty may be lost in consequence of his neglect.
where the agent, though wanting in good faith, has acted within the
There must, I think, be an entire degeneral scope of his powers.
parture from his authority before this action for a conversion of the
goods can be maintained."
We think that it was error to hold the plaintiff as for a conversion,
and, as this view of the case will necessitate a new trial, it is unnecessary to discuss other exceptions treated at length in the brief of the
appellant.

The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted,
costs in all courts to abide the event.

with

as The fact that the agency Is gratuitous makes no difference in the liability of the agent if he undertakes the service, though the gratuitous agent
would not be liable for non-feasance, a total failure to perform. Marshall v.
Ferguson, 94 Mo. App. 175, 67 S. W. 935 (1902); Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84

(1809);

and post, p. 505.
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SECTION 3.— EXERCISE OF CARE AND SKILL

RICHARDSON
(Supreme

Judicial Court of

v.

TAYLOR.

Massachusetts,

36

1SS3.

136

Mass.

143.)

in equity against John W., Charles H. and Wm. E. Taylor.
Plaintiff had been in partnership with the last two. He bought out
their interest, and retained John \V. Taylor, their father and the former book-keeper of the firm, as his book-keeper and his agent to look
The father erover the partnership accounts and effect a settlement.
roneously overlooked items due plaintiff amounting to $719.64.
Without considering whether the defendant John
Per Curiam.
W. Taylor is properly joined in this suit, we are of opinion that the
master's report shows no ground upon which he can be held liable in
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Bill

He examined the books of the old firm, acting as
any form of action.
The master finds that, in doing this, he acted honagent of all parties.
There is no evidence to show that he agreed
estly and in good faith.
to guarantee the accuracy of the result of his examination, and there is
no evidence of false representations or of fraud or negligence by him
which would render him liable to the plaintiff.
Decree affirmed.

LAKE CITY FLOURING-MILL
(Supreme

Gilfillan,

Court of Minnesota,

1884.

32

CO. v.

Minn.

301,

McVEAN.
20 N.

W. 233.)

37

Plaintiff was engaged in operating a flourDefendant was a commission merchant ami wanhouseman engaged in buying and selling grain at Maiden Rock, WisIn May and June, 1882, plaintiff delivered to defendant the
consin.
sum of $1,500, in consideration of which, and of a commission of three
a bushel for purchasing, defendant agreed to buy for said plaintiff, with said money, good, sound wheat, none of it damp or musty, at
Rock, and store the wheat in his warethe market price at Maiden
< >f the wheal
house, and there deliver it to plaintiff on boat or barge.
purchased by defendant with said money, $606.15 in aggregate price,
though when he purchased it he believed it to be good, sound, and not
C.

mill at Lake City.

J.

damp, was not good, sound wheat, but was damp, and by reason thereame musty and wholly unlit for nulling purposes.
Plaintiff re
fused to receive this part of tin- wheat from defendant, but demanded
Page v. Wells, --~ Mich.
Accord:
in:, \. \v. sit
(1905).
37 Pari <>r tin' opinion i» omitted.

::IT.

I' :V. \

38

116 (1875);

Briere

v.

Taylor,

126 Wis.
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the kind and character

described in the
to comply, offering to deliver that purchased by him as aforesaid.
These are the facts found
by the court below . What degree of care and skid defendant bestowed
in purchasing the wheat is nol stated.
The action is to recover the
;;
*
LS
he refused

Tt created the relation of
The contract was one of employment.
In the absence of express agreement, or a usage
principal and agent.
of the business modifying them, the law attaches to the relation cerOn the part of the agent he is to
tain rights, duties, and liabilities.
obey the instructions of his principal, and to exercise in his employ-
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ment reasonable skill and ordinary diligence; that is, the degree of
skill ordinarily possessed and employed by persons of common capacity engaged in the same business, and the diligence which persons of
common prudence are accustomed to use about their own business
and affairs. Story, Ag. § 183. For a loss to his principal from neglect
of these duties he is liable. But he is not an insurer of success in the
business. 88 He does not, by merely accepting the employment, guaranty his principal against such incidental losses as may occur in the
course of the employment ; "because," says Mr. Justice Cooley, in
Page v. Wells, 37 Mich. 415, "these are incident to all avocations, and
no one, by implication of law, ever undertakes to protect another
If the principal desires to hold his agent liable for
against them."
such losses he must make his contract of employment accordingly.
We do not think the contract in this case established by the letters
sufficient to change the liability of the agent.
Order reversed, and new trial ordered.
38 Professional agents, such as lawyers and architects,
do not warrant that
they will make no errors, but only that they will exercise that degree of care
ami skill, and that judgment, which arc common to the profession or busiChapel v. (Mark. 117 Mich. 638, 76 X. W. 62, T2 Am. St. Rep. r>S7 (ISO.S).
The can-, skill and diligence required of an agent is illustrated in every
The following cases illustrate the rule as to agents emsort of business
ployed to collect an<l transmit money, BuelJ v. Chapin, 99 .Mass. 594, 1)7 Am.
68); to sett upon credit, Frick & Co. v. Lamed, 50 Kan. 77<>,.'!Pac. 383 (1893); to collect ordinary debts, Richards v. N. II. Ins. Co., 43 N.
II. 263 (1861); to colled negotiable paper, Allen v. Suydam, 17 Wend. 368
(1837),
reversed 20 Wend. 321, 32 Am. Dec. 555 (1838); First Nat. Bank v.
Fourth Nat. Baiik, 77 N. v. 320, 33 Am. Rep. 618 (1879); Wlngate v. Mechanics' Bank, in Pa. km (1848); /" invest money, Van Cott v. Hull, 11 App. Div.
89, \- x. Y. Supp. 1060 (1896);
Furber v. Barnes, :vi Minn. 105, 19 N. W.
728 (1884); Whitney v. Martine, 88 N. V. 535 (1882);
to cure for money and
],r<>i><rtn in his possession, Benson v. Liggett.
78 End. 452 (1881);
Clark v.
I. 19 I. a. Ann. 116 (1867); to effect insurance,
Norw
Shoenfeld v. Fleisher,
7:; III. Kit ,1^71r.
Strong v. High, 2 Rob. (La.) 103, 3S Am. Dec. 195 (1842);
Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 (1800,), a leading case.

3
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ADAMS
(Supreme

v.

5Go

ROBIXSOX.

Court of Alabama,

1SS0.

G5

Ala.

586.)

This action was. brought by Mrs. Margaret Robinson, a married
against James R. Adams, and was commenced on the 19th
September, 1877. The complaint contained but a single count, which
was in the words: "Plaintiff claims of defendant, who is, and was at
the time of the committing of the grievance hereinafter mentioned, a
real-estate agent in the city of Montgomery, in said county and State,
six hundred dollars as damages, for that the plaintiff, during the year
1875, intrusted and put under the defendant's control, as a real-estate
agent as aforesaid, a certain valuable store-room, and the cellars
connected therewith, the property of said plaintiff, being a part of
the corpus of her statutory separate estate, and being situated in said
"for the purpose of having
city of Montgomery," &c, describing
lease,
defendant,
as
such
let or rent for her the
the
real-estate agent,
said store-room and cellars, for
not
period
exceeding one year, beginning October, 1875, and ending October, 1876, at the rate, sum.
or price of $600 per annum, payable in monthly or quarterly installments, with good and approved security; and said plaintiff avers,
that she expressly instructed said defendant, in substance, in no event
less rate or price
to lease or rent out said store-room and cellars at
a

a

a

it

;

and that said
than $600 per annum, with good and approved security
defendant accepted the management and control of said property under the aforesaid instructions, and
thereupon became and was the
duty of said defendant not to lease or rent out the said store-rooms
and cellars without good security, under and in accordance with the
>aid instructions of plaintiff, and to pay to plaintiff the said rent as
stated, and to deliver said store-room and cellars to plaintiff at the
But said defendant,
expiration of such lease or renting as aforesaid.
disregarding his duty in the premises, violated said instructions of
plaintiff, and wrongfully and without authority rented and leased said
and cellars to an insolvent tenant or tenants, without
Store-room
manner.
security, and otherwise conducted himself in so improper
and ^o negligently and carelessly, that the rent of the said store-room
and cellars, or the value thereof, for said year, was wholly lost to

»»

Part of the opinion

is omitted.

a

by

by

,
I

a

'

plaintiff.
Wherefore she sue-," &c.
The defendant demurred to the complaint.
Demurrer overruled, and
verdict and judgment for plaintiff.
n;i;\ ii.i.i
The complaint in this case alleges
valid contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, the violation
the de
it, and
fendant of
duty growing out <.i~, and imposed on him
Its averments were, therefore, sufficient,
consequent thereon.
a
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certainly to entitle the plaintiff to the recovery pf nominal charges. —
li the defendant routed out the plaintiff's storeCode (1876) § 2978.
house, contrary to her instructions, a right of 'action arose immediately, in favor oi the latter, against the former.! The principle is well
settled, that when one contracts to do an act for another, and either
docs it unskillfullv. or fails to do it at all, an action in the case will
lie against him, to recover such loss or damage as may result from
his negligence, careles>nrss, or want of^ycill, in the discharge of the
duties

imposed

YM vers

on him by the contract.

v. Gilbert, 18 Ala.

467.
a damage, and wjfen none other is proved,
a
clear breach of dfity, nominal damages are
shows
and the evidence
v. Harris, 9 Ala. 173; Sedgwick on
recoverable.
Bagby
alwavs
Dam, 6th Ed., 461 [337].
Where, furthermore, an agent violates his positive instructions
given him by a principal, this would constitute gross negligence,
which would render him liable for such loss or damage as may be
occasioned by his misconduct ; and, on a principle well recognized in

Every wrong imports

many cases of tort, every doubtful circumstance would be construed
unfavorably to the rights and interests of the agent thus perpetrating
the wrong.
Story on Agency, § 333; Dodge v. Tileston, 12 Pick.
* * * Judgment affirmed.
333, 334."

MORRISON
(Supreme

Court of Alabama,

1832.

v.

ORR.

3 Stew.

& P. 49, 23 Am. Dec. 319.)

Lipscomb, C. J. 41 The defendant in error placed in the hands of
the plaintiff in error, an exemplification of a judgment, rendered in
Georgia, in his favor, against one Allen Orr, and took from him, a
receipt for the same, in the following words, viz. :
"July 31st, 1824. This day, received of Nathan Orr, a demand in
writing, against Allen Orr, for the sum of two hundred and sixty-five
dollars, damages, and a further sum of fourteen dollars thirty-seven
cents, costs. I am to endeavor to collect said amount, and pay it over
If it cannot be collected, to make due return of the
to said Orr.
same, to the said Orr. Damages awarded on the 20th June, 1824.
R. C. Morrison."
[Signed]
*o The agent is equally liable whether
is the result of Inattention, or Incapacity,

the omission of skill and diligence
Heineor of an intent to defraud.

Heard, 50 X. V. 27 (1872).
righl of the agenl to expenses and reimbursement depends upon whether they were Incurred in the exercise of ordinary diligence.
Brown v. Clay
ton, 12 Ga. 564 (1853).
*i Part of the opinion is omitted.

mann
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This receipt was the foundation of the action. The plaintiff belowcharged the defendant, Morrison, with negligence, in not using the
necessary means, to collect the amount of the judgment placed in his
hands.
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On the trial, the plaintiff proved, the defendant was the administrator of Allen Orr; that the estate had been declared insolvent; that
the claim had not been allowed by the County court, nor had it been
acted on ; that he had demanded the money and record of the said
Morrison, the defendant.
The defendant proved, that he placed the exemplification of the
judgment in the hands of an attorney, for collection, in the lifetime of
Allen Orr; and that suit had been brought on it; and that it was
dismissed, in the year 1825, for want of testimony— the record not
having been authenticated in the manner prescribed by law. That the
att< irney wrote to Georgia, for an exemplification, properly authentiIt was further proved, by the
cated, but never received an answer.
plaintiff, that the claim had never been filed for an allowance; and,
that the settlement

of the estate had been postponed,

at the instance

of Morrison, from September, 1828, till October, 1829. The defendant's attorney proved, that he had attended, for the purpose of laying
the claim before the judge of the County court, and having it acted
on ; but was informed, by him, that the settlement had been postponed and that he was drawn into an error by him, as to the time
when it would take place, and that it passed without his knowledge.
On this testimony, the judge on the trial, in the court below,
charged the jury, that they were bound, in the absence of testimony,
for
as to the fact, to infer that Morrison was to receive compensation
;
to
a
bound
diligence
was
therefore
he
greater
and
his agency ;
that
allowance,
liable.
him
made
an
for
the
claim
his
not
presenting
that
This charge was excepted to, and is now assigned for error.
If KTornson had been an attorney, whose business and employment
was the collection of debts, there is no doubt that the inference drawn
If one receives business, withby the judge would have been correct.
in the line of his profession, or occupation, and promises attention to
it — or, if he does not make an express promise, one would be implied

— the

that he was to receive the
word had been said about.
But, it seems to me, that the presumption rests encompensation.
tirel) on the -round, that it is in the proper line of the business of the
to such agencies
on SO undertaking it: and, it not accustomed
that
a compensation
for lure, that the law, so far from presuming
naked
was
a
mere
it
agency or
infer
that
would
ceived,
the underis
an
in
not
ingredient,
which
compensation
mandatory, in
. that, in our relations with
lt is one of those friend!
law would

create

ordinary compensation,

a presumption,

although not

a

ety, daily occur, without either party ever thinking of com]
tlQJL

«
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This distinction is recognized by Chief Justice Kent, in Thorne v.
IV. is. 4 Johns. SI.'-' If, then, it was a voluntary ami gratuitous
agency, without reward, the agent was not liable for a non-feazance
might perform his undertaking, or not. as suited his convenience.
dator,

It is true, by the civil

law. he would

be

liable

to the man-

for all damages that ensued from his failure to perform his
promise; but quite a different rule prevails at common law: by
the latter, such contracts are held to he of imperfect obligation, and
not to he enforced at law, for want of a sufficient consideration.
In a case, where one joint-owner of a ship, promised the other
joint-owner, to have an insurance effected, and failed to do so — on
the ship being lost, a suit was brought, and the promise was held to

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

he nudum

4 Johns. 84.
pactum.
It should, at any rate have been matter of proof, before the jury,
whether Morrison was to receive compensation or not.
But suppose the case should be viewed in another aspect ; and that
for his agency — arc the
the agent was to receive a compensation
case,
If such had been
him
liable?
as
to
render
such
facts in this
have
been held to the
he
would
only
of
his
the terms
undertaking,
exercise of ordinary care and attention, to the best of his skill, and
not such as a professional man, that is, one whose business it was to
conduct law suits, would be expected to use. Story on Bailment, 283
Orr must have known that Morrison was not an attorney
& 289.
at law, and he had no right to expect, in him, that skill and knowlessary to conducting a law suit. He certainly calculated
that he would employ an attorney at law to bring the suit, and take
on himself the wdiole conduct of it ; and if Morrison had neglected
to employ counsel, and undertaken the management of a suit himself,

would, perhaps, have, by so doing, fallen short of ordinary diliHe employed counsel, and suit was brought. * * *
We are therefore of opinion, that in any aspect, Morrison was not
liable — that if he is to be considered as an agent, under wages for

he

gence.

his services as agent, that no sufficient negligence has been fixed on
him. to make him liable for the debt; and that there is much less
semblance of liability, if he is to be viewed, as we think he ought, on
this record, as a mandatory only.
The judgment must, therefore, be reversed.
4; See especially
Thorne v. Deas, I Johns. 84 (1809), per Kent. C. -T. Also
Grant v. Ludlows' Adm'r, 8 Ohio St. 1 (1857), in which tin- court discusses
of, definito he considered in, and the indefiniteness
tIi.- various conditions
tions of, negligence and gross negligence.
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WALKER

v.

SMITH.

(United States Circuit Court for the Third District, 1S04.
Fed. Cas. No. 17,086.)
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1 Wash.. C. C. 152,

The plaintiffs, merchants in London, having been applied to by a
Mr. Brown of Philadelphia, for a parcel of goods, and doubting his
solidity, were introduced by the mutual friend of the plaintiff and defendant, to the defendant (Robert Smith); and on this introduction,
they sent the goods to him, and in a letter, stating their apprehensions
of Br own, requested him to receive the goods, but not to deliver them
to Brown, without payment for the amount being received, or such
and in case neither
secu rity given, as the defendant should approve;
was done, he, the defendant, was to dispose of them for account of
The defendant received the goods, and delivered them to
plaintiffs.
~Brown~without receiving payment or security.
Brown afterwards
failed ; and by a compromise, part of the debt was received, and remitted to the plaintiffs; and this action was brought to recover the balance.
In the account forwarded by the defendant, to the plaintiffs, after fruTTailure of Brown, and the compromise, no commissions are
charged.

Washington*, Circuit Justice [Charging Jury:] This is a short
The facts are few, and agreed between the
and perfectly clear case.
It is my duty to state to you the law, and to apply it to the
parties.
case.
The principles of law, as applied to the duties and obligations
Xo
of agents, have been correctly stated by the plaintiffs' counsel.
man can compel another to render him acts of friendship, or services
of any kind, whether gratuitously, or with a view to a remuneration.
But, if the person applied to, consents to render the service, and underthe business, he is bound to act in conformity to the terms on
which the request was made. This rule is universal in its application,
whatever may he the situations or professions of the parties; but, in
commercial agencies, it is of great consequence, that it should be rigThe defendant, by receiving the goods, and undertaking
idly enforced.
to act concerning them, bound himself to hold them, until paid for, or
secured by Brown ; and on his failure to do either, to dispose of them
lie delivered
nt of the plaintiffs.
But what has he done?
them to I'.rown, without receiving payment or security; he did the
itioned nol to do. The discretion which the devery thinj
fendant had, was confined to the kind of security to be taken, and did
not have him at liberty to take security; or deliver the -nods without
Mad he taken security, which afterany, as he might think- proper.
wards became insuffi cien t, he would have been excused;
provided he
acted with that caution and prudence, which he would have observed
in his own case.
The defendant, by the very nature of the transaction,
entitled to a commission, as certainly as if the plaintiffs had promit; and his relinquishing this compensation, after the loss had
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a

a

it

it
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a

a

;

a

is

whether an agent
liable for
breach of orders, and to what amount.
sum much inferior to the loss
The jury found for the plaintiff but
he had sustained.
[The plaintiffs' counsel then moved for new trial, because the verbut, after
dict was against law, evidence, and the charge of the court
and
overruled,
was observed by Washargument, the motion was
ington, Circuit Justice, that although he was not satisfied with the
verdict, nor should he have assented to
as
juror, yet the question
of damages, or of interest in the nature of damages, belonged so peculiarly to the jury, that he could not allow himself to invade their
determination to prevent, on their part, any
while he felt
province
invasion of the judicial province of the court.]
;
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is

is,

taken place, cannot alter the case,
[ndeed, he would have been liable,
if it had been undertaken gratuitously.
There was no ambiguity in the
plaintiff's letter upon the subject; and therefore, the defendant is
without excuse and has taken upon himself to answer for the loss.
He has made himself a guarantee of the debt,
The next question is, as to the damages?
1 admit the principle, that
in eases sounding in damages, the amount of those damages depends
upon the sound discretion of the jury. In cases, where merely vindictive damages are sued for, the jury act without control on this subject;
because there is no legal rule by which they can be measured;
and
unless they are so extravagant as to induce a suspicion of improper
But in these cases, where a rule
conduct, the court will not interfere.
can be discovered ; the jury are bound to adopt it. That rule
that
the plaintiff should recover so much, as will repair the injury sustained
by the misconduct of the defendant; and applying this rule to the present case, what other measure of damages can be thought of, but the
sum lost to the plaintiff by the violation of his orders? The sum demanded,
of no great consequence, perhaps, to either of the parties,
But the question itself
on the score of its amount.
important to the
commercial interests of this country; in its intercourse with foreign
A precedent
nations.
to be set to determine in
case like this,
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SECTION 4.— ACCOUNTING
I. General Duty

DODGE
(Supreme

Court of Georgia,

v.

HATCHETT.
1903.

118

Ga. 883,

45

S. E. 667.)

Attachment.

Dodge sued Hatchett, alleging that he delivered to the
in trust, and to be sold for the account of the plaintiff, and
the proceeds returned to him, certain personal property, consisting of
Horses, mul es, and a saddle and bridle, all of the value of $850 ; that
the defendant sold and disposed of the property, and has accounted to
plaintiff only for the sum of $435 ; that plaintiff has demanded of the
Cobb,

J.
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defendant,

defendant the remainder of the proceeds, which he fails and refuses to
It is alleged that by reason of these facts the defendant is
pay over.
The defendInd^ebtecfto plaintiff in the sum of $415, besides interest.
been
delivered
to him
had
ant answered, admitting that the property
that
set
and
up
the
value
was
of
alleged,
as alleged, but denied that it
care
in
taking
incurred
the
and
expenses
the amount paid to plaintiff
of and selling the property amounted to more than its value. He also
denied that any demand had been made upon him, or that he was in-

The trial resulted in a verdebted to plaintiff in any sum whatever.
for the defendant ; and, the plaintiff's motion for a new trial havrruled, he excepted.
The theory of the plaintiff's case, as indicated by his petition, was
43
There was
that the defendant was his agent to sell and account.
nee for the plaintiff tending to show that this was the true relaIf such was the case, it was the duty of the
tion between the parties.
agent to keep and render to his principal an account of all receipts and
and, whenever reasonably requested to do so, to make
disbursements
d ict

and

present to his principal a full and complete statement of his dealSee Civ. Code 1895,
and the state of the account between them.
Ag. §§
1 Am. 5 Eng. Enc. L. (2d Ed.) 1086, 1089; Mechem,
I

522, 528;

Reinhard, Ag.

§ 245.

suit against such an agent, alter the plaintiff lias shown the
menl between them creating the agency, thai the property was
delivered to the agent, and that the same has been sold, the burden is
shifted to the defendant to discharge himself by showing thai no such
or that
:, or that the property was never delivered,

In

a

1 \ servant or clerk la ool In general expected to keep accounts.
More
over an agent cannot be held liable tor not keeping accounts, It it is clear
An tin, 10 Vt 416, 133
Rich \
bis principal did uol witih him t<> do w.
67).
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he lias fully ac coun ted, or some other reason why he should not be
hold liable to the plaintiff. See Lee v. Clements, 48 Ga. US; Oliver
\. FTammond, 85 Ga7329, 11 S. E.655(2); Thomas v. Funkhouser, 91
The judge charged tin- jury, in effect, that the
Ga. -ITS, IS S. K. 312.
plaintiff carried the burden of proof throughoui the rase, and failed to
charge that the burden would he shifted under the circumstances ;il" >ve
We think this was such an error as to require the granting
stated.
of a new trial, under the facts of this ease.
Even if the defendant's
evidence was of such a character that the jury might have found that
he relieved himself from liability to the plaintiff, still the error requires
a reversal ^i the judgment, for the reason that the evidence was conflicting at many material points, and the plaintiff was entitled to have
the theory of the case as indicated by his evidence submitted to the
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jury.
Judgment reversed.

All

the Justices concur.

PETERSON

v.

(Court of Appeals of Kentucky,

Attachment in chancery.

Marshall,

44

*

*

POIGNARD.
184S.

47

Ky.

[8 B.

Mon.l

309.)

*

There are several circumstances
which tend strongly to excite suspicion with regard to the fidelity of
Poignard in his agency. Indeed we regard it as being well established,
that he acted in several particulars in violation of his trust, and that
he has neglected his duty in a most important point, in not having kept
a precise and accurate account of all transactions pertaining to his
C.

J.

agency. His competency to do this is well established, and it cannot
be doubted that he was well aware of its importance
and necessity.
His failure authorizes unfavorable inferences, and subjects him now
when called on for an account, to a heavy burthen of suspicion, as well
as of proof. 45
Nevertheless, we are not of opinion that on these grounds, every
doubt which may arise in the case, should as a matter of course, be
solved against him.
The difficulties and presumptions arising from
the great lapse of time, within which nearly all the parties concerned
in or cognizant of the most questionable transactions now involved,
have died, and many facts have doubtless been forgotten by those who
remain, should operate to some extent against Peterson, who had full
knowledge of Poignard's agency, and of the means in his hands, and
of the interests and transactions committed to him, and yet although
pressed and harassed from early in the year 1835, for debts which
Poignard ought to have paid for Monroe if he could, and although he
Part of the opinion is omitted.
Tin- ]o-~. and still more the destruction, of his accounts by the agent
Gray v. Haig. 20 Boa v. 210 (is.>lt.
nrasl full mosl heavily upon himself.
**

45
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was for several years in full correspondence with Poignard, it does not
appear that he ever complained, or ever inquired of his acts, until some
short time before he filed his cross bill in 1838.
Poignard, with his first answer to the cross bill, filed an account of
moneys paid, and liabilities incurred for Monroe, amounting to about
The
$4,850, and a list of moneys received for him, of about $1,391.
master to whom the accounts were referred, allowed as charges against
charges against
Monroe, only about $2,700, and made additional
Poignard, which swelled the account against him to about $7,663 ; and
calculating interest on each side, stated a balance against Poignard of

record of more than 900 pages.
As already said, the only difficulty which it is necessary to meet,
arises upon the accounts between Poignard and Monroe. Upon many
of the exceptions made to this account, the question as to the propriety
of the charge made, or the credit claimed, admits of no certain, and
not even a satisfactory solution. We have had to weigh probability
against probability, conjecture against conjecture, and doubt against
doubt.
We do not deem it necessary to state in this opinion the facts and
applying to the numerous exceptions to the report of
considerations
After a laborious investigation of the record,
Poignard's accounts.
which we have been enabled to bestow
and the fullest consideration
we have come to the conclusion, that after making all just
upon
charges and credits that are sufficiently established on either side, and
including all claims made by Poignard, he stands indebted to Monroe's
it,

in the sum of at leasl one thousand dollars; and under the uncertainties which meet us on every side, we cannot safely say that he
owes more.
Wherefore, the decree
reversed, and the cause remanded, with
directions to render
decree for the payment of one thousand dollars
by Poignard, in discharge of his debt to Monroe's heirs, and in discharge of so much of Peterson's demand against Monroe's estate,
which sum should hi- decreed either to Peterson or for the benefit of
Fisk, as circumstances may dictate and Poignard
the complainant,
the Chancery Court.
Should pay the costs both in this and
is

estate

in

a
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more than $8,500. To this report, Poignard filed nineteen exceptions,
He also filed eleven
complaining of charges made and credits refused.
exceptions to the account stated, as between Peterson and Monroe,
and Peterson filed four exceptions to the two accounts.
The general dismissal of the bill without an explicit decision upon
any of these exceptions, has thrown upon this Court the labor of investigating them all upon the pleadings and evidence contained in a
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(Appellate

Court

of

v.

OF THE

RELATION

(Tart

3

ROSENBAUM.

Illinois.

L900.

98

ill. App.

7.)

Freeman, I'. J.
Plaintiff in error sued to recover a balance
claimed to be due him for a salary upon a written contract for the last
The cause was submonth of the term of his employment thereunder.
mitted to the trial court without a jury, and from the judgment rendered, this writ of error is prosecuted.
it appears from the contract that plaintiff in error was employed for
a \ear at a fixed salary payable monthly, and was to receive also under
certain conditions a specified commission not involved in this controThe contract further provided that defendant in error should
versy.
pay all the plaintiff's traveling and other expenses not to exceed $2,250
It appears from the stipulation of facts between the parper annum.
ties that the defendant repeatedly demanded of the plaintiff itemized
statements of the money expended by the latter on account of such exHe merely reported, withThese the plaintiff never rendered.
penses.
his
had
been in one case $385 ;
out further explanation, that
expenses
in another $27; in another $531.40; and another $562.60; adding in
the last instance that his total expenses for the year had been $1,506.
Xo statement of what the expenses were, for which this sum had been
expended, was ever vouchsafed by the employe, but there is evidence
tending to show that in one case the latter wrote to his employer he
had expended money for a purpose which investigation showed it had
not been used for. 46
That the employer, Rosenbaum & Co., had a right to be informed
specifically what the expenses were which they were called upon to
They agreed
pay under the contract, admits of no serious question.
to pay "traveling and other expenses" incurred by plaintiff in error
while in their employment, not to exceed a certain sum. They had a
right to know that the expenses charged were legitimate business
Indeed, it is stipulated between the parties "that the term
charges.
'expenses' as used in the contract, includes only actual outlays necessarily made by plaintiff for railroad and stage fares, meals en route,
hotel bills, porterage, cartage, and a reasonable amount for the treatan
ing of customers, and also includes the expense of maintaining
office in Chicago."
The meaning of the contract undoubtedly is that
the defendant in error agreed to pay only such expenses as these
enumerated, legitimately incurred in their business, the total amount
not to exceed in any event $2,250. But they did not agree to pay any
other or different expenses plaintiff in error might incur, and were not
bound to pay anything without knowing what it was for, and that it
was a legitimate expense of the business.
Plaintiff in error therefore stands charged with the money advanced
4cThe more complicated and diU'milt the accounts, the more imperative the
of the agent Jenkins v. Gould, 3 Russ. 385 (1827).

duty
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account,
him for expenses and not accounted for. Until he does so
defendant in error is entitled to offset against his account the balance
of $231.91, claimed to be due for salary. "The law is settled and sustained by reason that the duty of an agent is not fulfilled in a case
of this kind by reporting to his principal that he has spent a round sum
* * * His duty to keep
of money in prosecuting his employment.
and preserve true and correct statements of account is a necessary
An account is a detailed stateconsequence of his duty to account.
furnish to the person having
will
which
be
something
It
must
ment.
the right thereto, information of a character which will enable him to
Wolf Co. v.
make some reasonable test of its accuracy and honesty."
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Salem, 33 111. App. 616.
The views above expressed make it unnecessary to discuss in detail
the propositions of law submitted by plaintiff, the refusal of which by
No error was committed in rethe trial court is assigned as error.
The judgment
law applicable.
the
fusing to hold them as expressing
is
affirmed.
of the Superior Court

KELLOGG

v.

(Appellate Court of Illinois,

KEELER.
1888.

27

111. App.

244.)

Garnett, J. This was an action of assumpsit by appellee against
appellant, judgment being given for $750 against appellant, from which
In the summer of 1886 Keeler sold to Kellogg four lots
he appeals.
in Chicago for $6,400. The transaction was not closed by deed until
Before the delivery of the deed to Kellate in October of that year.
logg the lots were again sold by Keeler to one Hill for $7,550. The
latter sale was made, as Keeler now claims, by authority of Kellogg.
In his evidence Keeler says, when he agreed to let Kellogg have the
property for $6,400, he told him he would let him have it if he would
allow him C Keeler) to re-sell it for him; that Kellogg said if he made

$100 a lot profit he would be satisfied; that he (Keeler) told him he
thought he could sell it for that before he got the deed, as property
Thru authority given to sell the lots for $6,800, is, to
was advancing.
extent, corroborated by the evidence of Hoffman, a witne
But there is no evidence in the record tending to support
appellee.
appellee's claim thai he is entitled to the difference between $6,800 and
To maintain that propo ition he testified to a conversation
0.
with appellant some months after he was given authority to sell, when
he put certain questions to appellant for the purpose of securin
admission that he was to have all he sold the lots for above $6
Bui Kellogg made no such admission, nor doe any witness testify thai
in fact, nothing in the record that
There
such was the contract.

warrant-

/

app*

stipulated figure does

ontention.l Authority to
not amoufl to a contracl

an agenl
to sell al a
to give him all he sell
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for above that sum. Kerfool v. Hyman, 52 111. 512. Tt is still the duty
oi the agent to make the property bring the highest price thai can be
obtained, and account to his principal for the whole sum less his reasonable compensation. 41
I'lie only evidence as to what was a reasonable compensation on such
a sale tended to prove that the highest reasonable charge would be a
much less sum than $750.
There being no evidence to support a verdict For $750, the judgment is reversed and remanded.
Re\ ersed and remanded.

TRirLER v. OLCOTT.
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(Court

of Chancery

of New York,

1818.

3

Johns. Ch.

473.)

Fanning, being indebted to Lord, gave him a bill of sale, absolute on
its face, of the ship Zephyr, on the agreement that Lord should recompense himself and hold the ship and surplus earnings to the use of
banning.
Later for a similar purpose he assigned the ship and surplus
earnings to Tripler and Craig. Olcott was employed by Fanning as
master of this ship, and after the assignment to Lord he accounted to
him as owner for all earnings.
Kent, Chancellor. 48 This case was brought to a hearing on the
part of the defendant Olcott, and we are only to discuss the case as
it regards him.
Two of the plaintiffs (Tripler & Craig) have not shown any right or
title whatever to an account, for they have not proved the assignment
charged in the bill to have been made by Fanning to them on the 18th
of December, 1813. This assignment is the only foundation of their
claim, and it is not admitted by the answer.
We must recur to the
resulting trust of Fanning, as the only existing right shown on the part
of the plaintiffs.
The bill of sale from Fanning to Lord was absolute upon its face,
and no resulting trust appears.
Nor is there proof of the express
agreement charged in the bill. The evidence, that the bill of sale was
intended to be qualified and not absolute, appears from the two letters
of Lord to Olcott, of the 29th of December, 1812, and the 16th of
August, 1813. In the one, he says, that the bill of sale arose from the
failure of Fanning and others, and was for the purpose of paying
custom house bonds, and to save friends; and in the other he states,
47 Tin- duty of the agent to account
is n<>t affected by the fael that the
profii or advantage he received was the resull of the violation of his duty as
agent.
Graham \. Cummings, 208 Pa. 516, 57 At I. 943 (1904) nor by the fact
that th«- profits won- received after the accounj with his principal has been
pettled.
Morrison v. Thompson, 43 L. J. Q. B. 215, L. R. 9 Q. B. 4S0, 30 L.
T. 869, 22 W. K. 859 (1874).
The principal has his election to take his money,
or the property which the agenl has without, authority purchased with this
money.
Greene iV Co. v. Haskell, 5 R. I. 447 (1858).
i - Pari of the opinion is omitted.
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that he took the ship and freight as security for about $6,000, and to
cover a demand of one Carey for $1,500. These were representations
entirely contrary to the statement in the bill of the agreement between
Fanning and Lord, made on the delivery of the bill of sale. Nor do
the two accounts given in the letters correspond with each other, and
and without any
they were mentioned to Olcott rather incidentally,
full, precise, and satisfactory explanation of the trust. They were not
intended to form any rule or guide to Olcott's conduct, and he could

it

in

It

by

It

is

is,

interest, and that he would not have accepted of any agency for any
other person, distinct from that of master of the ship.
On his return to the United States, in October, 1814, he duly acbound to
whether he
counts to, and with Lord ; and the question
account also to Fanning.
does not appear to me that Olcott could, with safety or propriety,
He had no business or
have dealt with any other person than Lord.
concern with the dealings between Lord and Fanning, and the loose
would be
Lord were of no use.
hints communicated to him
inconvenient,
affairs
of the
business
and
the
equally dangerous and
account
and
not
definitively
safely
could
world, to deny, that Olcott
If there had been
with Lord, under the circumstances of this case.
him and Lord, in
between
collusion,
and
proved
fraud and
charged
would
the settlement, to the prejudice of the known rights of others,

But no such allegation or
very different question.
exists; Fanning must look to Lord, and cannot look beyond him,
for an account of tin- management and proceeds of the property asto him

signed

in

if

a

have presented

trust.
S.

2

in

a

it

is

i

tl

a

that where

to have been

a

It

is

Ch. Cas. 121.
held
Pollard v. Downes,
to manage and reletter of attorney to
trustee made
the rent- and profits of find, and S. afterwards accounted to the
tee, for his agency, he was, after (Jie death of the trustee, and on
hill b\
que trust, directed to account to him.
requisite to
so destitute of .-ill farts and circumstances
Thai case
can
and
that
of
the
application,
the
principle
dear understanding
col
may hi' that there was
be regarded a- an authority.
lusion between the trustee and the agent, or that the a.-ent had notice
from the principal not to account with the tin tee, or thai the trusl had
stated

a

It

el)

a

if

It

an agent
impo sible to he maintained, that
expired at the time.
duly and fairly accounts with his immediate and authorized principal,
that he i, bound, in all cases, to accounl over again to the person stand
is
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The authentic evidence which he
only look to Lord, as the owner.
had of any right or title in the property, was the bill of sale and the
letter of attorney ; and he could not, and did not, recognize any other
A resulting trust, mentioned in this intitle, interest, or authority.
cidental and obscure manner, and especially when attended with the
clear title and positive acts and instructions of Lord as owner, did not,
answer,
probably, attract any attention from Olcott ; and he says, in his
exclusive
the
and
as
owner,
having
the
as
sole
that he considered Lord
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This would be a doctrine not to
ing behind li is immediate principal.
there must have been something in the case cited which
Lord Eldon,
docs not now appear, and which gave it a special direction.
in Beaumont v. Boultbee, 7 Vesey, 605, 610, 617, laid down this rule,
that an ace unit settled between an under and an upper agent, without
vouchers, and Upon mere confidence, was not to be considered as settled againsl the principal, without allowing him the liberty to surcharge
But, in that case, it appeared that the unand falsify those accounts.
der steward, (as he was termed,) was employed both by the upper
steward and the principal, and the liberty given to the principal went
no farther than to surcharge and falsify; and that was founded on the
extraordinary and unusual mode of accounting which had been adopted
in that case. Under such checks and limitations, there can be no doubt
that the party ought to account again to the person who has the ultiBut when no special circumstances appear, and there is
mate interest.
no fraud, then I apprehend the general rule to be otherwise, and that
* * *
it was truly declared in Clavering's Case, Prec. in Ch. 535.
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be endured;

Bill

dismissed.

THARP
(Supreme

THARP.

Court of Vermont,

Redfield, J. This being

in a case where a

v.

1843.

15

Vt.

105.)

bill in chancery to compel an account,
court of law has concurrent jurisdiction with courts
a

of equity, if the claim is barred at law, it cannot be enforced in equity.
This is a uniform rule. Staniford v. Tuttle, 4 Vt. R. 82. Hall v. Hall,
8 Vt. 156.
This claim is of nearly forty years standing, and the only ground of
exception to the operation of the statute of limitations, is the fact, that
the present claimant and his ancestor, in whose right he claims, have
resided without the state and beyond sea. All claims of such persons,
until the year 1832, were exempted from the operation of the statute of
limitations

in this state.

At

that time this exemption

was repealed

without any saving in favor of those even, whose rights, by the general
terms of the statute of limitations, had already become barred ; thus,
in terms, at once extinguishing all such claims.
It is not necessary,
now. to inquire whether it could have been the intention of the legislature thus summarily to annihilate this class of claims, or how far,
giving the statute its literal operation, it is to be esteemed a contravention of the United States constitution.
It is sufficient for the present
case, that, after the repealing of that exemption, and before the bringing the present bill, more than six years had elapsed, and thus the
plaintiff's right had become effectually barred by the statute of limitations. This is a sufficient reason why this bill cannot be maintained.
There is one other point in the case, which seems to be equally conThis defendant, it is admitted, rendered to the orator's anive.
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3

3

6

1

is

it,

it

a

a

is

Godd.Pb.& A.— 37

a

7

<>

a

*o An account stated is
mere admission that the account is correct.
It
is only prima facie, and does not work an estoppel.
The account may still
!><•
Impeached for errors.
Ruffner v. Hewitt,
W. Va. 585 (1874); Perkins v.
Bart, U Wheat 256,
L. Ed. 463 (1826).
Failure in
reasonable time to
object to an account rendered is presumptive acceptance of it as correct, but
by circumstances
tin- presumption
is not conclusive
and may be rebutted
accounting for the failure to object.
Lockwood v. Thome, 18 N. Y. 288
Id., 11 X. Y. 173, 62 Am. Dec. 81 (1S54).
(1858)
;

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

it

is

it,

cestor a full account of his proceedings, as early as 1807, and transmitted to him a copy of his account current in 1811. The ancestor survived until 1821, with these accounts rendered, in his hands, and without any the least objection to their fairness and accuracy; and after
his decease, until the filing of the present bill in 1841, twenty years
more have elapsed, and no complaint is made by the heir. Under/these
circumstances, it would be wholly unprecedented for a court of .equity
to open the account.
Mr. Justice Story, 1 Equity Jurisp. 501', says,
"An account rendered shall be deemed an account stated, from the presumed approbation and acquiescence of the parties, unless an objection
is made thereto in a reasonable time."
And "a settled account will be
deemed conclusive between the parties, unless some fraud, mistake,
omission or inaccuracy is shown." 49
This bill is not brought with any view to surcharge or falsify an
account settled between the parties.
That the time, which has elapse
since the account was rendered, is sufficient to bind the parties to
as
an account settled,
In Murry v. Toland, Johns. Ch. 569,
apparent.
laid down "If
575,
merchant receives
stated account from
abroad, and keeps
by him, any length of time, e. g. two years, without
bound by
and equity will not decree an account to be
objection, he
taken afterwards." The cases of Ellison v. Maffatt,
Johns. Ch. 46,
and Mooers v. White,
Johns. Ch. 360, are to the same point. Also
Irvine v. Robertson,
Rand. (24 Va.) 549.
Decree of the chancellor affirmed with costs.

EFFECTS

578

II. Title

AM> C0NSEQ1 ENCES

as

OF THE

Trover

for $3,561.08 which

found,
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court
collected
BEAN,

of Oregon,

L902.

the

as manager

defendant,
and not accounted
53
* * *
It

3

General

SALEM TRACTION CO.
Court

(Part

Principal and Agent

Between

(A) In

(Supreme

RELATION

v.

n Or.

ANSON.™
562,

69 Pac. 675.)

alleged, and the lower
of plaintiff's street railway, had

complaint

for.

that the plaintiff's
is next contended
J.
trover, and hence
in
and
not
contract,
was
action
on
an
remedy
by
the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action.
As a general rule, the mere failure of an agent to pay over
or account for money collected for his principal will not sustain an
action of conversion, because the agent is not bound to pay over the
identical money received, and the transactions create nothing more
than the relation of debtor and creditor between him and his principal.
Rovce j. Oakes, 20 R. I. 418, 39 Atl. 758, 39 L. R. A. 845; Hartman v. Hicks, 28 Misc. Rep. 527, 59 N. Y. Supp. 529; Vandelle v.
Rohan? 36 Misc. Rep. 239, 73 N. Y. Supp. 285 ; Walte**v. Bennett,
16 N. Y. 250; Borland v. Stokes, 120 Pa. 278, 14 Atl. (>1. But where

principal is entitled to receive, and the terms of th'4* employment
of the agent require him to pay over, the identical money received,
an action of trover will lie for its conversion.
Jackson v. Anderson,
4 Taunt. 24; Petit v. Bouju, 1 Mo. 64; Bunger v. Roddy, 70 Ind. 26;
Donohue v. Henry, 4 E. D. Smith, 162; Farrand v. Hurlbut, 7 Minn.
14 Wis. 226, 80 Am. Dec. 774;
477 (Gil. 383); Cotton v. Sharpstein,
Express Co. v. Piatt, 51 Minn. 568, 53 N. W. 877.
And such was the case here. The defendant was the agent and genwith power and authority
eral manager of the plaintiff corporation,
All the money so
to collect the moneys due it for services rendered.
The title immediately vested in
collected belonged to his principal.
no interest therein, and no auhad
and
the
defendant
the plaintiff,
He was bound by the
to
make
use
thereof
whatever.
thority
any
terms of his employment to pay the money over to the treasurer of
the plaintiff corporation, and could not even use it for the payment
The plainof current expenses without the approval of his superior.
tiff, as a matter of right, therefore, was entitled to the identical money
the

bo Accord:
Wells v. Collins, 71 Wis. 341, 43 N. W. 160, 5 L. It. A. 531 (1889),
in which tin- court Found the relation between agent and principal was not
one of debtor and creditor, bul the property in the very money collected by
Lance v. Butler, 135 N. C. 419, 47 S. E.
the agent rested in the principal.
188 (1904), holding thai the proceeds of sale by the agent are a trust fund
held by him for the principal.
51 Part of the opinion is omitted.
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received by the defendant on its account, and any unlawful use or
misapplication thereof constituted a conversion, for which an action
of trover was an appropriate remedy. Mech. Cas. Ag. § 476; Henry
14 Wis. 226,
v. Sowles (C. C.) 28 Fed. 521; Cotton v. Sharpstein,
* * *
80 Am. Dec. 774.

DIXON

v.

(Court of King's Bench,

HAMOND.
1819.

2 B. &

Aid.

310.)

of Davidson brings assumpsit for
as assignee in bankruptcy
was the surviving partner of
had and received.
Davidson
Flowerden. who owned a ship, the Sidney, which he pledged to defendant as security for a loan. Defendant was an insurance broker,
and effected an insurance on the ship as agent of Flowerden and
Verdict for plaintiffs and defendant moved for a new trial.
Davidson.
AbboTT, C. J. If, in order to maintain this action, it were necessary to shew that the legal title to this ship was in the present plaintiffs, there could be no doubt that the defendant would be entitled to
our judgment.
For it is clear that the ship never belonged to the
partnership at all. It was originally the property of Flowerden alone,
Dixon

it

a

is

2

it,

and by him the legal interest was first transferred to Hart, and sublie, however, in 1815
sequently vested in the present defendant.
receives an order to effect an insurance on the ship and freight on the
and accounts with the
partnership account, and he does effect
lost, and he
After this, the ship
partnership for the premiums/'
Then,
truth,
in
the legal
underwriters.
receives the money from the
The right of
title to the ship has nothing to do with this question.
settled rule of law, that
the plaintiffs to recover here depends on
an agent shall not lie allowed to dispute the title of his principal, and
that he shall not, after accounting with his principal, and receiving
the money in that capacity, afterwards saw that he did not do so. and
did not receive
for the benefit of his principal, hut for that of some

lor person. Here the defendant has received the money as agent
fur the partnership, and hi' cannol now he permitted to say. that he
All the rest of the
for the benefit of Flowerden alone.
ved
world, excepl the defendant, mighl dispute the legal title of the plaintherefore, no reason
tiffs to the ship, but lie cannot do it. There
for granting this rule
is,

it

*
.t

the agenl acknowledge the receipl of money or property for the principal, and Induce the principal t" ael thereon, he win he estopped thereafter
Wood v. Blaney, L07 Cal. .i'.>\. 10 Pac. Via
to show thai lie did not receive it.
it
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money

(1895).

rhe concurring opinion

of Bayley

and ii"ir<>.\e; are omitted.
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WITMANv. FELTON.
(Supreme

of

Missouri,

L859.

28

Mo. G01.)

principal and agent. The
a suit between
former under a power of
the
for
sum
of money
latter had collected a
it.
The defence was,
recover
to
was
this
action
brought
and
attorney,
and
this was offered
principal
the
to
not
belong
did
that the money
to be shown generally, and also by the production of a paper in posThe proof was excluded by the court and
session of the plaint ill's.
this exclusion presents the only question in the case.
An agent has discharged his duty when he pays over to his prinIt is of no importance
cipal the money he was authorized to collect.
to him whether his principal's title to the money or property be good
or bad. This is a matter which concerns third persons, who, if they
desire to protect their interests, can easily do so, either before or after
the termination of the controversy between the principal and agent.
This principle of law is conceded, but it is said that the paper called
for in this case, and which it was alleged would show that the money
collected by the defendant belonged to third persons, was admissible

Xapton, J.
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Court

This was

to show that the money was not really collected under the power of
attorney, and was not collected as agents for the plaintiffs. Of course
this could be shown, and if there had been any offer to show this,
But
there could be no doubt the evidence should have been admitted.
the mere fact that the money collected belongs to third persons has no
tendency to disprove the allegation that it was collected as money of
the principal, especially where the only proof previously introduced
in the case was positive and unequivocal that the money was collected
the
under the power of attorney and as agent for the plaintiffs.
the
to
principal
not
belong
does
really
simple fact that the money
is sufficient to rebut, or entitled to any weight in rebutting the positive
proof of agency, then such evidence must be legitimate in all cases
of this kind, and in every suit between principal and agent, the latter

If

can go into the question of the ownership of the property or money
which he has collected, upon the vague presumption that the money
or property was not obtained through the agency, simply because the
principal did not have any right to it. Such a course would defeat
of
all the rules of evidence, and practically annul the responsibility
agents.

Judgment affirmed.

The other judges concur.
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(B) Illegality

as a Defense

TENANT

ELLIOTT.

(Court of Common Pleas,

v.

& P. 3, 4 Rev.

1 Bos.

1797.

581

Rep. 755.)

Assumpsit for money had and received from an insurance company
upon an illegal policy of insurance on a ship lost at sea.
BullER, J. Is the man who has paid over money to another's
use to dispute the legality of the original consideration ? Having once
waived the legality, the money shall never come back into his hands

I

?

it

think he cannot.
to him
sire of those who paid
The defendant took nothing by his motion.

BALDWIN BROS.
Court of Vermont,

(Supreme

POTTER.

v.

1874.

40

Vt. 402.)

a

General assumpsit. Defendant sold for plaintiff prize candy on comlottery" vvithin the meanHe claimed this was "setting up
mission.
account.
Judgment for
to
and
refused
statute,
ing of the Vermont

plaintiff.
PiERPOiNT,

J.

it

necessary in this case to
We do not find
Ch.
question as to whether the contract for the sale of the.
property referred to, by the plaintiffs, to the several persons who purwere contracts made in violation of law, and therefore void,
chased
not between the parties to those contracts; neior not. This action
founded upon, or brought to enforce them. If those contracts
ther
will
respect to them;
illegal, the law will nol aid either party
How the seller to sue for and recover the price of the property
has been paid, the purchaser cannot
sold,
has not been paid;
back. The facts in this case show that the purnd recover
chasers paid the money to the plaintiffs, not to the plaintiffs personally,
to rebut to the defendant as the agent of the plaintiffs, authorized
became
the
money,
plaintiff's
was
so
paid,
When the money
ceive it.
iVndant as such agent, the law,
was received' by the
and when

consider

it

it

if

ideration

thereof,

implies

a

in

it

d<

it

it

it

if

in

is

it

is

it,

the

promise on the part of the defendant,

is

is

it

this obligation that
to pay
over to his principals, the plaintiffs;
the present action
broughl to enforce; n<> illegality attaches t<> this
dant insists that, inasmuch as the plaintiff
contract.
Bui th(
it
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again. Can the defendant then in conscience keep the money so paid ?
For what purpose should he retain it ? To whom is he to pay it over ;
who is entitled to it but the plaintiff?
Eyre, Ch. J. The defendant is not like a stake-holder. The question is, whether he who has received money to another's use on an iland that not even at the delegal contract, can be allowed to retain
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3

could not have enforced the contracts of sale as between himself and
the purchaser, therefore, as the purchaser lias performed the contracts
through me, as their agent, I can
by paying the money to the plaintiffs
now >et up the illegality of the contract of sale to defeat an action
brought to enforce a contract on my part to pay the money that I as
In other words, because my prinagent receive, over to my principal.
cipal did not receive the money on a legal contract, I am at liberty to
steal the money, appropriate it to my own use, and set my principal at
defiance. We think the law is well settled otherwise, and the fact that
the defendant acted as the agent of the plaintiffs in obtaining orders
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for the goods, does not vary the case. Tenant v. Elliott, 1 B. & P. 3;
Armstrong \. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258, 6 L. Ed. 468; Evans v. City of
Trenton, 24 X. J. Law, 764."
We think the certificate granted by the county court was properly
It has been urged in behalf of the defendant, that the zeal
granted.
with which lie has defended this case shows that he intended no wrong;
but we think the man who receives money in a fiduciary capacity, and
refuses to pay it over, does not improve his condition
with which he holds on to it.
Judgment of the county court affirmed.

BERNARD
(Supreme

Court of Oregon,

v.

by the tenacity

TAYLOR.

23 Or. 416, 31 Pac. 96S, 18 L. It. A. S59, 37
Am. St. Rep. 693.)

1893.

Action to recover $560 deposited with defendant as a wager on a
foot race. Judgment for plaintiff.
Lord, C. J." * * * The next contention for the defendant is

that the alleged agreement was corrupt, illegal, and criminal, in this :
that it was in advance "fixed" that one of the parties should win, and
that certain persons should lose their money. In other words, that the
54 In United
States Express Co. v. Lucas, 36 Ind. 361 (1871), the rule is
stated thus: "We think the agent is estopped to dispute the title of his prinA tenant cannot dispute
cipal tn tin- money which he Has received for him.
the title of the landlord, under and by virtue of which he obtained possession
-\ bailee cannol dispute the title of the bailor from whom
of the premises.
lit- cannot set up title in himself.
especially
he received the thing bailed;
Why should an agenl be allowed to place himself In a position of hostility
to his principal and himself claim that which he has received for him?
Paley
on Agency, p. 10, and note k. and authorities there cited."
Approved In Reed v. Dougan, 54 Ind. 306 (1876), and in Wilt v. Town of
■v. 29 Ind. App. 199, 64 X. B. 228 (11)02).
if. Mexican Int. Banking Co. v. Lichtenstein, 10 Utah. 338, 37 Pac. 574
iis!>}'. in which the court held that an employment to sell lottery tickets creThe employment was void. Both parties were prinates no agency al all.
cipals in a crime and the courts will not help to compel a division of the
(i.niia: Norton v. Blinn, :;:i Ohio St. 145 (1883), which cites with
spoils,
approval Baldwin v. Potter above.
Pari of the o piiiion i< omitted.

I
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5S3

agreement had in contemplation "a job race."
This, it is claimed, put
the plaintiff in pari delicto with the defendant, and, as a consequence,
he is entitled to the benefit of the rule, potior est conditioni possidentis.
The general rule is that the law will not interfere in favor of either party in pari delicto, but will leave them in the condition in which
they are found, from motives of public policy.
There is no doubt,
where money has been paid on an illegal contract, which has been executed, and both parties are in pari delicto, the courts will not compel
the return of the money so paid.
But the cases show that an impor-

livered can be recovered back.
So that, while the contract is executory, the party paying the money or putting up the property may rescind the contract and recover back his money.
This arises out of a
distinction between an action in affirmance of an illegal contract and
one in disaffirmance of it.
In the former, such an action cannot be
maintained, but in the latter an action may be maintained for money
had and received.
The reason is that the plaintiff's claim is not to enforce, but to repudiate, an illegal agreement.
W'hart. Cont. § 354.
In
such case, there is a locus penitentiae.
The wrong is not consummated,
and the contract may be rescinded by either party.

In Edgar v. Fowler, 3 East, 225, Lord Ellenborough said : "In illegal transactions, the money has always been stopped while it is in
transitu to the person entitled to receive it." As Lord Justice Mellish
said: "To hold that the plaintiff is entitled to recover does not carry
out the illegal transaction, but the effect is to put everybody in the
same situation as they were before the illegal transaction
was determined upon, and before the parties took any steps.
If money is paid
or goods delivered for an illegal purpose, the person who has so paid
the money or delivered the goods may recover them back before the

by

it

is

J.,

illegal purpose is carried out; but if he waits till the illegal purpose is
carried out, or if he seeks to enforce the illegal transaction, in neither
can he maintain an action.
The law will not allow that to be done."
In Hastelow v. Jackson, 8 Barn.
Taylor v. Bowers, 1 Q. B. Div. 291.
& C. 221, which was an action by our of the parties to a wager on the
event of a boxing match, commenced against the stakeholder after the
battle had been fought, Littledale,
said: "If two persons enter into
an illegal contract, and money
one to th< other, thai
paid upon

3

in 3

:

8

2

P.

2

&

I

may be recovered back before the execution of the contract, but not
Taunt. 474; Tappenden v. Ranafterwards." Smith v. Bickmore,
467; Lowry v. Bourdieu,
dall,
Bos.
Doug. 452; Muni v.
Term l\. 561
Insurance Co. V. Kip,
Stokes,
Cow. 20; Merrill v.
Millard, *43 X. Y. 208; White v. Bank, 22 Pick. 181; O'Bryan v.
S. W. ?27.
"And this rule," -.,■. Mr. JusFitzpatrick, 48 Ark. 490,
tice Woods, "is applied
the greal majority of the
ven when
4
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tant distinction is made between executory and executed illegal contracts. While the contract is executory, the law will neither enforce it
nor award damages ; but, if it is already executed, nothing paid or de-
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the parties to an illegal contract arc in pari delicto, because the question which of two parties is the more blamable is often difficult of soluand quite immaterial."
Spring Co. v. ECnowlton, 103 U. S. CO, 26
I.. Ed. 347.
The object of the law is to protect the public and not the
This is upon the principle that it best comports with public
parties.
Stacy
policy to arrest the illegal transaction before it is consummated.

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

v. Foss,

1" Me. 335, 36

Am.

l^.

755.

00

These show
It only remains to apply these principles to the facts.
that the plaintiff was cognizant that the race had been fixed in advance ; that one of the parties should win, and that certain other persons should lose their money; that it was a bogus race, and the arrangement based upon it corrupt, and designed to cheat and defraud
the i >ther parties ; but at the same time they show that he repented, and
repudiated the transaction before it was consummated, by demanding
the return of his money the evening of the day before the race, and on
the day of the race, but before it was to come off, and that the defendant refused to pay it back, and that he afterwards forbade the defendant to pay said money to any other person than himself. He availed

himself of the opportunity which the law affords a person to withdraw
from the illegal contract before it has been executed. He repented before the meditated wrong was consummated, and twice demanded to
To allow
withdraw his money, and thereby rescinded the contract.
the plaintiff to recover does not aid or carry out the corrupt and illegal transaction, but the effect is to put the parties in the same condition as they were before it was determined upon.
By allowing the
withdraw,
and not conarrested,
to
contemplated
the
is
wrong
party
summated. This the law encourages, and no obstacle should be thrown
in the way of his repentance. Hence, if the plaintiff retreated before
the bet had been decided, his money ought to have been returned to
him ; and, in default of this, he is entitled to recover.
There was no error, and the judgment must be affirmed.
Be Until the illegal contract is executed both parties are given an opportunity for repentance and rescission.
Seeing the error of his way, the law extends to him a helping hand by aiding him to recover back anything of value
with which he may have parted. Wassermann v. Sloss, 117 Cal. 425, 49 Pac.
566, 38 I- K. A. 176, 59 Am. St. Rep. 209 (1M>7); Munns v. Donovan Com. Co.,
117 Eowa, 516, 93 N. W. 7S9 (1902);
Smith v. Blachley, 1S8 Pa. 550, 41 Atl.
619, 68 Am. St Rep. 887 (1898).
Neither party can recover if it is necessary
for him to set up the illegal transaction. If the principal can make out his
claim without Betting it up, the agent cannot defend on the ground that the
property was to be used for, or was obtained from, an unlawful purpose.
(larke & Co. v. Brown, 77 Ga. GOG, 4 Am. St. Rep. 98 (1886). On the other
hand if the principal's right of recovery is so wrapped up with the illegal
contract that he must set it up to make his case he cannot succeed. Mexican
Int. Banking Co. v. Lichtenstein, 10 Utah, 338, 37 Pac. 574 (1894).
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585

(C) Jus Tertii

HANCOCK
(■Supreme

GOMEZ.

v.

Court of New York,

1871.

58

Barb.

490.)

V2

a

&

it 7,

that they had so collected
the plaintiff, and they acknowledged
both by their accounts rendered, and by their letter to the plaintiff of
Having so received the money, they had no right
1862.
October
Co. They cannot dispute the title of the printo Sale
to return
stranger. Murray v. Vandercipal, by setting up an adverse title in

Ross v. Curtiss, 31 N. Y. 606. 57
The ruling below was therefore erroneous, and the judgment
costs to abide the event.
new trial ordered
should be reversed and

MERCANTILE

CO. v.

8

(Supreme Court of Oregon, 1905.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK.

47 Or. 361,

Ann.

82 Pac.

8,
2

MOSS

;

a

bilt, 39'Barb. 140;

L. R. A. [N. S.]

657,

Cas. 569).

of an action at law
equity to restrain the prosecution
recover back money
Miller
to
brought by defendant against William
in
an
action by Helmick
on
judgment
collected by him as attorney
had,
claimed,
an interest
or
knew
plaintiff
Neither
Porter.
against
in the judgment. Helmick assigned to defendant bank, which notiMiller
fied Miller to collect and remit, less his fees for collection.
collected, but while preparing to remit yielded to plaintiff's demand
for the money, on the supposition that the hank was acting for plaintiff.
Defendant thereupon sued Miller, and plaintiff seeks to restrain
in

a

Suit

this suit.
Bean,

r,H

*

*

*

a

it

by

in

J.

[After holding that there was no theory on which
Now, under
equity:]
plaintiff could maintain this suit
the facts as here claimed
the defendant, Miller's relationship to
was that of
mere agent or attorney to collect and remit the
it

In

was pain to
paying back the money if
"The agent win be protected
Needles
iin by the third person for the principal through brand or mistake.
aw Rep. 869, 88
v. Fuson, 24 Ky.
W. 644 (1902).
irt of the opinion is omitted.
B.

I.

1,
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it,

on Sale & Co.,
Plaintiff sent to defendants an order for $1 76.33
as mate of
Hanson
owners of the bark Reindeer, for wages due one
claima
woman
Defendants collected the amount. Later
said bark.
demanded
no
Hanson,
furnishing
proofs,
but
ing to be the widow of
the money, and defendants paid it back to Sale & Co., who paid it
to her. Verdict directed for defendants.
Cardozo, J. The money for which this action was brought was
collected by Gomez, Wallis & Co., by authority of, and as agents for,
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if

it

is

is

a

it

it,

amount due on the rlelmick judgment; and while the general rule
is that an agent who receives money for his principal is estopped to
deny the title, and must return or account for the money to him Eor
whom he received it. this rule does not prevent an agent, when sued
by his principal, from showing that he has been divested- of the property by a title paramount to that of his principal, or thanhe has paid
over the money or propertx to one holding such a titlci
1 (.'lark ec
Skyles, Agency, § 431; Mechem, Agency, § ?2?; I'u/k & Clark v.
Wallace & Lewis. 1( > Ala. 219; Peyser v. Wilcox, T>4 How. Prac.
525; Sims v. Brown, 6 Thomp. & C. 5 ; s. c, affirmed 64 N. Y. 660.
The rule in such case is practically the same as that governing the
relation of bailor and bailee, and surrendering to a paramount title
Western Transportation Co. v. Barber, 56 N. Y.
is a good defense.
544; Burton v. Wilkinson. 18 \ t. 186, 46 Am. Dec. 145. 59 Miller is
therefore not estopped by reason of his relationship to the defendant
hank to set up and prove in the action brought by it against him,
if he can, that the money in fact belonged to the plaintiff, and that
he paid it over on demand prior to the commencement
of such action.
The point in controversy is whether the money collected by him
belonged to the defendant or to the plaintiff. If it was the property
of the bank, Miller is liable to
but
belonged to the plaintiff,
and he paid
over upon demand, such payment will be
complete
defense to the law action.
These are questions properly triable at
law, and according to the procedure applicable thereto.
We are of
the opinion, therefore, that there
no equity in plaintiff's proceeding.
The decree
reversed, and the complaint dismissed.
59 Th'' agent
225, 34 L.

5

&

7

6

5

it

&

a

Q.

t

it

J.

G

is in the same position as
bailee.
B.
Biddle v. Bond,
P.. 137, 11 Jur. X. S. 425, 112 L. T. 178, 13 W. R. 501 (18(55).
may be culpable for the
After notice of lie claim of the third person
agent to pay the money to the principal.
Hunt v. Maniere,
X. R. 181, 34
Beav. i"7. :;i L. J. Ch. 142, li Jur. x. s. 28, 7::. 11 L. T. 723, 13 W. U. ::<;:;
In such case lie should interplead his principal and the third person
(1864).
if he can, or take indemnity from one party and deliver to him who IndemniSims v. Brown, <>4X. Y. 660 (1876), affirmed
Thomp.
fies him.
C.
(1875).
Trover will not lie because the agent holds the property in dispute until the
rights of the claimants are determined.
Fletcher v. Fletcher.
X. If. 452,
in Wando Phosphate Co. v. Parker. 03 Ga. 414, 21
28 Am. Dec. 359 its::."),
is held that the agent is not guilty of conversion
s. B. 53 (1893),
if he deliver- tin- property to his principal promptly, and before suit is brought by
the third person, even though he had notice of the third person's claim.
S.
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ILLINOIS LIXEX
(Supreme

587

Funds or Property
CO. v.

Court of Illinois,

187S.

HOUGH.
91

111. 63.)
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Assumpsit by Hough, who had been manager and president of the
Verdict for plaintiff for $15,000, and defendant apLinen Company.
peals and assigns for error the giving and refusing of instructions,
and that the verdict is not supported by the evidence.
Sheldon, J. 60 * * * The defendant asked the following instruction : "The court instructs the jury, that if you believe, from
the evidence, that the plaintiff, while acting as president of defendant,
drew certain drafts upon the treasurer of defendant for the payment
of money to himself and other persons therein named, and signed the
said drafts with the word 'president' appended to his name, and upon
the face of said drafts, directed the same to be charged to the account
of the defendant, and if you shall further believe, from the evidence,
that the defendant paid the money on said drafts, then you are instructed, as a matter of law, that the fact of the plaintiff's so signing
said drafts, and directing the amount thereof to be charged to the
defendant, would not relieve him of his responsibility to account to
the defendant for the amount of money so drawn by him, and the
burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show that he has applied all
of said money so, as aforesaid, drawn from the treasury of the defendant, to the use of the defendant, and if he has failed to so satof
isfy you in relation to any of the said drafts, by a preponderance

evidence, then the defendant would be entitled to recover therefor
from tlit- said plaintiff" — which the court refused to give, but modified
to the effect that the plaintiff could only be held to account for such
money a>< the evidence showed he had drawn for his own use and
benefit, or such as he had appropriated to his own use, and as thus
modified gave the instruction — all which was excepted to.
There was a sel off in the ca^e, on the part of the defendant, of.
Tin- evidence
moneys paid and advanced, etc., of a large amount.
the
draw
to
treasurer of
upon
shows that the plaintiff had authority
did,
his
and
he
all
drafts were
often
This
the company for money.
the
lor
was
the
of
use
company,
drawn
the
paid. Some of
monej so
however,
All
the
excepuse.
drafts,
with
the
lor
his
own
and some
tion of "He or two, were signed "K. M. Hough, President," and
t.» he charged
to the ace, nut of the
. upon their iace, directed
The treasurer's office was in Chicago, and
Illinois Linen Company.
miles
the factory of the company was at Roselle, some twenty-eight
The plaintiff's place of business was at the latter place, and
distant.
•o

pari

<>f the opinion

La

Itted.
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(Part

3

the treasurer, as may be supposed, could know nothing of the intended use of these drafts, except as appeared upon their face.
Though the assertion is made that upon the face of many of the
drafts it appeared that they were drawn expressly for the benefit of
the company, upon examination of the portion of the record referred
to in support of the assertion, we find but a single draft so showing.
There were one hundred and sixteen of these drafts thus drawn

;

is

is

it

it

if

it

is

it
is

§

§

1

is

if

is

It

company's) they were drawn, and keeping no account or memorandum thereof, but leaving, for whose use the drafts were drawn, to be
shown, as best might be, from memory.
ordinarily the duty of agents to keep regular accounts and
this duty
touchers of the business in the course of their agency, and
not faithfully performed, the omission will always be construed
unfavorably to the rights of the agent, and care will be taken that the
332. /In
principal shall not suffer thereby.; Story on Agency,
468, after observing upon the duty of agents to
Story's Eq. Jur.
remarked further: /'Upon
keep regular accounts and vouchers,
bound to keep the propert}! of his
similar grounds, as an agent
he mixes
up with his own the
principal distinct from his own,
to
be the property of
in
equity,
whole will be taken, both at law and
under such cirmatter
the
subject
until
the
the principal,
agent puts
as
might
satisfactorily
as
distinguished
be
that
cumstances
may
have been before the unauthorized mixture on his part,— in other
words, the agent
put to the necessity of showing, clearly, what part
unable to do this,
of the property belongs to him and so far as he

a

is

/6

treated as the property of his principal."
Analogous to the mixture of property was this confusion of private
and company uses of these moneys, admitting, we think, of the apsimilar principle to the above. The
plication against the plaintiff of
drafts having been drawn, indiscriminately and undistinguishably, for
private and company uses, we think the burden of distinguishing beHe knew the purposes
tween them was imposed upon the plaintiff.

it

5

A
«i Yates v. Arclen, Fed. Cas. No. 18,126,
Cranch, C. C. 526 (1838).
Lupton v. WMte, 15 Ves. 432, 10 It. It. 94 (1808), per Eldon,
leading case
R. R. 212 (1802),
Ves. 46,
Lord Ch. See, also, Lord Chedwortb v. Edwards,
Every presumption will be against
Beav. 284 (1846).
and Clarke v. Tipping,
clear account showing which is his
such an agent, and it' lie cannot render
and which his principal's property or funds, in- will be denied his commission
for his services. Gray v. Haig, 20 Beav. 21!) (1854).
a

!)

6

8

Is
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it,

upon the company, amounting to the sum of $36,736.68. The plaintiff
himself admits that certain ones of them, amounting to $10,520.58,
were for his own individual account, and testifies: "I kept no acof any individual transactions with
count, record or memorandum
the company, supposing it would be on the company books."
There was remissness of duty here, on the part of the plaintiff, in
his manner of dealing with this large amount of the company's monas he did, from the treasury of the company, upon
ey, drawing
trace
upon them to show for whose use (his or the
drafts with no
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—
tor which the drafts were drawn, whether for his own or the comThe company, presumably, did not know, there being
pany's use.
nothing in the form the drafts were drawn to give information.
We are of opinion that, at least under the facts of this case, the
instruction, as drawn, should have been given, and that there was error in the modification of it.
The error in respect of instructions makes it unnecessary to consider the point as to the verdict not being sustained by the evidence.
The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.

MASSACHUSETTS LIFE INS. CO.
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(Superior Court of City of New York, 1870.
49 X. Y. 668.)

32 N.

v.

CARPENTER.

Y. Super. Ct.

734,

affirmed

Action for balance of account alleged to be due from defendant
Defense, that the moneys were embezzled by
as agent of plaintiff.
a clerk.
Spencer, J. I have examined critically the findings of fact and
law made by the referee in this case, and conclude they are fully supported by the evidence, and that the judgment in this action should
This fact clearly appears from the evidence, and does
be affirmed.
not seem to be contested, "That the defendant mixed the money and
funds of the plaintiffs with moneys and funds of his own and of
third parties, at the office and the bank, and that the money embezzled by the clerk was taken from these moneys and funds, which
were so mixed and commingled that it is impossible to determine
io whom the money embezzled actually belonged at the time." This
action on the part of defendant made him liable to account to the

plaintiffs for their moneys received by him, even admitting that a
loss had occurred. 68
By the act of defendant the identity of plaintiffs' moneys was lost,
and the loss should fall upon the defendant, as Story justly remarks,
"as a sort of penalty" for the agent's negligence in not keeping his
When
principal's money separate from his own and that of others.
lose to mingle these funds of the plaintiff with his own. etc.,
his own, and incurred the liability
made the same substantially
and duty of answering to the plaintiffs for the full amount of the
A loss of a part of these joint and mixed funds must be sustained wholly by the defendant.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

"The
re.
(1002).

agent <]<"•- not, In general, Insure the money <>rproperty Intrusted to
Louisville ft N. K. Co. v. Bufflngton, 131 Ala. GliO, 81 Bouth. 592

•''Mil

n

i

i.,

is a\i>

C0NSEQ1 BNCBS

MILLER
(Supreme

Court

of

New

v.

OF THE

KKI.ATION

(Part

3

CLARK.

York,

L871.

5 Lans.

388.)

Appeal by defendant from a judgment entered in Eavor of plaintiff,
upon the report of a referee, on an action for money had and received 1»\ defendant of the plaintiff.

fulfills and performs strictly his duties
and obligations to his principal as agent, he is neither debtor to such
principal, nor liable to be charged with interest for the moneys which
have come to his hands in that capacity.
If an agent mixes the money of his principal with his own and
makes use of it, he is liable to pay interest upon it from that time;
or puts
to
or if he uses it separately and makes a profit upon
in
or
while
his
the
entitled
to
such
hands,
interest
principal
profit
interest.
is

it

it,

so received ; hut as long as he

6

a

is

not liable to be charged
But as
general proposition, an agent
with interest upon moneys receiyed and held by him for the use of
In order to render him liable for interest, some other
the principal.
fact must be shown in addition to the mere receiving and retaining
the money in his hands. Dnnlap's Paley on Agency, 49, 50; Williams
v. Storrs,
Johns. Ch. 353, 10 Am. Dec. 340.

as

*

*

*

is

is

I

is

a

The question upon which the right of
principal to charge his
agent with interest on the funds in his hands depends, was not litibefore the referee, and there
neither evidence nor finding
upon tin- subject.
The charge of interest upon the several amounts
from the time they were received by the defendant
without any
foundation of fact to uphold it, and
an error of law. 04 The exception to such allowance is, therefore, well taken.
Part of tlic opinion

If

6

t.

E

2

•

Is

is omitted.
agenl
not chargeable
with interest if lie merely suffers the money
tain dead in lii< hands.
Rogers v. Boehm,
Esp. 7<M (1798), per Ld.
Kenyon
Be is chargeable, however, if he deposits liis principal's money in
his own genera] bank aceounl and draws out and uses it.
Blodgett's
Est.
60 vt. iin. L5 Ail. L09 (1888).
Cf. Williams v. Storrs,
Johns. Ch. 353, L0 Am. Dec. 340 (1822), per Kent. Ch. And so be is
he keeps
against bla principal's Interest.
Bischoffsheim
v. Baltzer (C. C.) 21 Fed.
■' The

it
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Johnson, J. ea
The defendant was the plaintiff's agent,
and received the money, and property to be converted into money, to
lie did, as all the
pay, lay out and expend in the plaintiff's business.
evidence shows, and as the referee must have found in suhstance, so
pay, lay out and expend nearly, if not quite, all the moneys he so
recen ed.
An agent receiving the money of his principal to be used and expended in his principal's business, does not, by receiving, keeping and
expending it, in the manner contemplated, become the debtor of his
He is liable to account for all the funds
principal in any legal sense.
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WHITECOMB
(Court of Chancery,

1711.

v.
1

591

JACOB.
Salkeld,

1G0.) 65

If one employs a factor, and entrusts him with the disposal of
merchandize, and the factor receives the money, and dies indebted
(in) to debts of a higher nature, and it appears by evidence that this
money was vested in other goods, and remains unpaid, those goods
shall be taken as part of the merchant's estate, and not the factor's ;
but if the factor have the money, it shall be looked upon as the factor's estate, and must first answer the debts of a superior creditor,
etc., for in regard that money has no earmark, equity cannot follow
that in behalf

of him that employed

VEIL

&

PETRAY

v.

the factor.

MITCHELL'S ADM'RS.

(Circuit Court of the United States. Third Circuit,

1821.

4 Wash.

C. C. 105,
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Fed. Oas. No. 16,908.)

The special verdict stated, that in the lifetime of Abner Mitchel, the
intestate, the plaintiffs sent to him, for sale, two bills of exchange on
The intestate
France, with instructions to remit them the proceeds.
sold the bills, and remitted to the plaintiffs the proceeds of one of
them, except $60, which he had in bank notes of the South Carolina
banks.
For the other bill he took the check of the purchaser, payaBefore the check came to maturity,
ble some days after the sale.
died,
in
his
Mitchel
leaving
possession the check, and the South Carall of which came to the hands of the
$60;
to
notes
olina
amounting
defendants, who received payment of the check when the same became due. On another account, the plaint ill's were indebted to the
intestate, in a balance of $344.S2. The intestate died insolvent, and
the question reserved for the opinion of the court is, whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to recover the amount of the check, and the
note- fur $60, after deducting what is due to the intestate.
WASHINGTON, Circuit Justice. Tin- cases upon this subject are uniand when he has failed Cor a long time i" account, or has conHauxhursl v. Hovey, L'c. Vt. "'II (1854).
pay Interest.
While the agenl sued Cor an accounting ims n right of set-off Cor
off.
siiniv jnstiv due him In the agency, be may nol sel off antecedent debts, outTagg v. Bowman, 108 Pa 273, 56 Am. Rep. 204 (1885); td.,
side the agency.

531

(1884),
to

tracted

. 370

(1882).

But money deposited In
Accord:
Scot! v. Surman, Wllles, W0 (1742).
Us
bank In the name of "W. & <'".. Agt," can be followed and recovered.
Identity i- nol lost
Baker v. X. ^ . Nat. Bank, mo \. v. 31, -J N. E. 152, Lti
M Is
M. 16 Abb. N. <'. 158 (1885).
Abb. N. •'. 158, 53 Am. Rep. 150 (1885);
Pearce v. Dill, 149 [nd. 136,
not necessary to trace the Identical coin or bills.
»;<i Ky. (3
v. Bailey,
ts \. e. T^s (1897).
Cf. with the ;ii>"\«' Fahnestock
Mete.) 18, 77 Am. !».•<-. 161 (1860), in which the property of the principal was
.; .,,,,i Hi,, money paid oul before notice of the principal's claim,
and Mobile & M. Ry. <•>. v. Felrath, <'>7Ala. 189 (1880), pointing ou1 thai
in Beattj v, M
money has no earmarks.
See the discriminating discussion
Cleod, 1 1 La. Ann. ~>\ (1850).

\

ami
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laying down the rule, that where the principal can trace his
the hands of his agent or factor, whether it be the ideninto
rt)
tical article which first came to the hands of the factor, or other
property purchased for the principal 1>\ the factor with the proceeds;
he nu\ follow it, either into the hands of the factor, or of his legal
representatives, or of his assigns if he should become insolvent or
a bankrupt."
The factor is a trustee for the principal, so long as
he retains the property,
or its representative in his bands; and bis
subject to the same trust,
assignees, or legal representatives take
in

it,

i

unless indeed,
into money;
they cannot defeat by turning
before nocharacter,
in
their
representative
away
they should pay
necesthis point of view only, that notice
tice oi the claim.
for
plaintiffs.
sary. Judgment
is

is

in

It

it

it

which

CARTMEIX

v.

AIXARD.
1S71.

70

Ky.

[7

Bush]

482.)

it

it

it

&

;

&

a

;

a

J.

Hardin,
The appellee brought this action to recover of the
appellants $1,215.83, for money received to the plaintiff's use, as the
proceeds of the sales of one hundred barrels of flour consigned by
the plaintiff at Paducah, Kentucky, to the defendants, in two parcels
of fifty barrels each, and received by them for sale as commission
the first consignment being remerchants at Memphis, Tennessee;
last
ceived January 17, 1868, and the
January 29, 1868, and both
claimed in the petition.
amount
sold,
the
yielding together
parcels
It appears that the proceeds of sales of the flour as received were
deposited by the defendants to their own credit in the Gayoso Savbank of recognized responsibility in Memphis
ings Institution,
and on the 23d of January, 1868, they received from that bank, in
draft of the bank
payment of their own check on their deposits,
Co., of New
for $580.25 on the banking firm of Duncan, Sherman
York and on the 4th of February, 1868, they in like manner obCo. for $635.57.
tained the draft of the bank on Duncan, Sherman
These drafts were both made payable to the plaintiff's order, and duly
transmitted to and received by him; and
appears that on receipt
of the first draft the plaintiff forwarded
to New York for presentment and payment, but that
was duly protested for nonpayment
on the 5th of February, 1868, and returned to and received by the
plaintiff at Paducah on the day of his receipt of the second draft;
and therefore both drafts were remitted by him to the defendants,

S.

A

3

2

ea All that is required is that the property or money shall have some earmark <>rother appropriate Identity.
Whitley v. Foy, 59 N. C. 34, 78 Am. Dec.
l:nl;«-r v. X. V. N;it. Hunk, 100 N. Y. 31,
N. E. 452, 16 Abb. N. C.
236 (I860);
Thompson v. Perkins, Fed. Cus. No. 13,972,
158, 53 Am. Rep. 150 (1885);
Mason, 232 (1823), per Story, J.
third person bona fide taking property from the agent can get no better
title than the agent bad or was authorized to transfer. Stevenson v. Kyle,
E. 886, 57 Am. St. Rep. 854 (1890).
W. v.,. 229, 24
12
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with notice that he would look to them for payment of the proceeds
of the flour.
Admitting the receipt and sales of the flour, the defendants by
their answer relied on their transmission to the plaintiff of said drafts
of their underof the Gayoso Saving Institution as a performance

a

;

it
is

it

It

deposited.
appears from the evidence the appellants deposited the money
in the bank as their own, and
was placed to their general credit
with the bank with other money previously deposited and subject to
their drafts
and
neither alleged nor proved that this disposition
of the proceeds of the appellee's property was authorized
by the

of the appellants' agency, or any special direction of their
trustee or agent makes an
principal.
general rule that
unauthorized
investment or deposit of funds in his hands as such
banker,
common account with
together with his own money in
such
conversion of the funds, and
disposition will be treated as
devolves on him any loss which may be sustained by the banker's
1270; Story on Agency,
insolvency (Story's Equity Jurisprudence,
;7
shown in this case for exempting
and no sufficient reason
from the operation of this rule.
a

a

if

;'

is

§

a

a

a

a

is

It

terms

it

Nor

clid the acceptance

of the first

draft

sent to the appellee on
and returned, without

Co., which was protested

&

Duncan, Sherman

the

J.
J.

4

laches on the part of the appellee, extinguish
ity of the appellants.
Eiager v. Boswell,

liabilSiory on

pre-existing

Marsh.

<>-;

appellee, not having been accepthim with the previous one, which had

by

t<> the

pa} ment.

affirmed.

i

•*To make the principal liable for
the money of hh principal in

:'..". in.
mode

tea

i"

(1864).
opei

Jones,

ii' .in agenl ha
ate account

ii' I'n. 636 (1862).

Godd.Pb.A

a.— 38

on bank failures the :iLr<'nt must
separate account Webster v. Pierce,
funds for several principals the safer
Liber
for each "in-.
Bank of Northern
ins>rs

a

Wherefore the judgment

is

as

a

fruitles

proved

s

§

1')''.
Bills of Exchange,
The second draft remitted
ed, was properly returned

i^
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it

is,

taking as factors, and a bar to the action.
A trial of the cause by the court resulted in a judgment for the
plaintiff for $1,215.83, from which this appeal is prosecuted.
whether, concedThe only material question to be determined
ing the right of the appellants to remit the proceeds of the sales as
received to the appellee by bank exchange according to what appears to have been the custom of commission merchants at Memphis, the act of depositing the money in the bank to their own credit,
thus placing
beyond the control of the appellee, and creating
liability therefor of the bank to themselves, did not change the character of their responsibility to the appellee, from that which the law
devolved on them as agents to that of his debtors for the funds so
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IV. Mode or Remittance

WARWICKE
(Court

v.

NOAKES. 68

of King's Bench al Nisi Prius, 1791.

Assumpsit

For

goods

sold and delivered,

l

Peake, as, 3 rt. It. 053.)

and money

had and re-

ceived.

The plaintiff was a hop merchant, and the defendant his customer,
living at Sherbourne in Dorsetshire. The plaintiff sold him hops,
and also sold hops to several other persons in that neighbourhood ;
and requested the defendant (as his friend) to receive the money due
to him from his other customers, and remit him by the post a bill
for those sums, and also the money due to him from the defendant
A bill was accordingly remitted, but the letter got into bad
himself.
hands, and the bill was received by some third person at the banker's
Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

on whom it was drawn.

Lord Ki.xvon.

Had no directions been given about the mode of
still this being done in the usual way of transacting business of this nature, I should have held the defendant clearly disIt was so decharged from the money he had received as agent.
termined in the Court of Chancery forty years since : and as the
plaintiff in this case directed the defendant to remit the whole money
in this way, it was remitted at the peril of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff was nonsuited.
remittance,

V. Form of

MOORE
(Supreme

v.

Liability

McKIBBIN.

Court of New York,

1860.

33

Barb.

24G.)

Action for the conversion of horses belonging to plaintiff and sold
by defendant. From judgment of non-suit plaintiff appeals.
Johnson, J. fi9 The defendant, as appears from the evidence, had
He was to sell for
authority to sell the horses, but not at the price.
not less than $500. and actually sold them for $200.
The case of Sarjeant v. Blunt, 16 Johns. 74, is directly upon the
point that an action for the conversion of the property will not lie
against an agent, for selling under the price fixed.
The same rule is
laid down in Cairnes & Lord v. Bleecker, 12 Johns. 300, though the
See, also, McMorris v. Simpson, 21
point was not there decided.
Kerr v. Cotton, '_'•">
In the absence of instrucAccord:
Tex. 411 (1859).
tions as i" the mode of remittance the agent may properly conform to the
in such cases.
Potter v. Morland, 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 384 (1853).
Pari of the opinion is omitted.
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DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF AGENT TO HIS PRINCIPAL

595

Wend. 610. This must be so upon principle, or else the purchaser
would get no title. Xo one, I apprehend, would pretend that the purchaser did not get a good title, because the agent having power to sell.
sold for a price something less than he was instructed to sell at. If the
purchaser gets a good title, it must be upon the ground that the agent
had the right to sell. If he could sell and transfer a valid title, the sale
could not be tortious.
The wrong in such a case consists, not in the
act of selling, which is authorized, but in the breach of duty, in selling
at the reduced and unauthorized price.
It is not the want of authority,
but the exercise of it contrary to the measure prescribed, which constitutes the wrong.
The nonsuit at the circuit was therefore properly
* * *
ordered ; and a new trial must be denied.

BARTELS
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(Supreme

Burgess,

J.

Court of Missouri,
70

This

v.

KINNINGER.

1898.

144

W

Mo. 370. 46 S. W. 1G3.)

a proceeding
in equity by the plaintiff
and Alvina Kinninger, his wife, and A. G.
Landgraf, to have set aside certain conveyances made by John E.
Kinninger to them, and to subject the property described in the petition to sale under execution under a judgment held by plaintiff against

against

is

John E. Kinninger

John E. Kinninger.

The property conveyed to the defendants Alvina
Kinninger and Landgraf were separate and distinct tracts ; the tract
conveyed to Alvina Kinninger being the homestead of John E. Kinninger.
The trial in the court below resulted in a judgment and decree
in favor of plaintiff, and against John E. Kinninger and Alvina Kinninger, setting aside the deed from John to her, and in favor of Landgraf. John E. Kinninger and Alvina Kinninger appealed.
Xo appeal
was taken from the judgment in favor of Landgraf.
John E. Kinninger acquired the properly involved in this appeal by
<k^A from Aaron Abernathy and wife, on March 17, 1890, and filed
the deed for record in the recorder's office of the county in which it
on the 6th day of May, 1890.
Kinninger and wife occupied the
homestead from the time of this purchase, and were
* * *
the time of the institution of this suit.
1890, and for a long time before that time, John E. Kinninger was the ag< nl of his mother, the plaintiff, in loaning her money
' 'n that day he had on hand the sum
and collecting interesl thereon.
of $2,533, which he received from her former agent, T. B. Whitledge.
ontinued to be his mother's agent until September 2, 1893, when
and plaintiff ascertained thai he had used of
ttlement;
her money the sum of $1,340 or $1,342, and, being unable to pay the
same, h<- executed to her his note for that sum, upon which judgment
render* d in her favor for the sum of $1,413.57, in the circuit court
property

as their

cupying
On January 1.

" ■

it at

Pari "f the opinion

\n omitted.
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of Cape Girardeau county, at the May term, 1894.
Execution was issued on this judgment July 21, 1894, which was returned unsatisfied,
no property hem- found whereon to levy the same.
Defendants contend that the petition does not state facts sufficient to
authorize the intervention of a court of equity, for the reason that it discloses upon its face that at the time that John E. Kinninger acquired
the property in question, and occupied it as his homestead, he was not
indebted to plaintiff in any sum of money whatever, but, on the other
hand, he was her agent, and that that relationship continued to exist
until this settlement, on September 2, 1893, when it was dissolved ;
that the relationship of principal and agent and of debtor and creditor
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cannot exist at the same time between the same parties, and .is to the
same subject-matter; and, as the deed from Abernathy to John E. for
the homestead was recorded in the recorder's office of the proper
county long before that time, that the homestead is not subject to levy
* * *
and sale under execution for the payment of that debt.
If John E. Kinninger acquired the property in question for a homestead, was occupying it as such, and had placed his deed thereto upon
record, before the debt was contracted or the cause of action accrued
upon which the judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff against
him, it was not subject to execution issued under that judgment ; and,

if exempt from execution, no fraud was perpetrated upon plaintiff by
reason of the conveyance of it by him to his wife, Alvina, although the
deed was without consideration. Davis v. Land, 88 Mo. 436. "Creditors have no interest in such property, as it cannot be subjected to the
payment of their debts by proceeding in equity any more than it can be
Bank v. Guthrey, 127 Mo.
seized under attachment or execution."
189, 29 S. W. 1004, 48 Am. St. Rep. 621 ; Kendall v. Powers, 96 Mo.
142, 8 S. W. 793, 9 Am. St. Rep. 326 ; Holland v. Kreider, 86 Mo.
But, if subject to execution, the deed from Kinninger to his wife
59.
is fraudulent and void as against this plaintiff, because without consideration, and merely a voluntary conveyance.
The question, then, is
as to what time plaintiff's cause of action or the debt upon which the
judgment was rendered accrued, — whether before or after the acquisition of the homestead.
As a general rule, when money is placed in
the hands of an agent to loan for a principal, the act of the agent in
handling the money is the act of the principal, and, as to such money,
the relation of debtor cannot exist, and only commences on the termination of the agency; but where the agent violates his instructions,
as in this case, which were to loan the money on real estate, and, instead of so doing, converts it to his own use, a different rule prevails,
and his principal may at once sue and recover it from him without deIn Farrand v. Hurlbut, 7 Minn. 477 (Gil. 383), the plaintiff
mand.
placed a sum of money in the hands of the defendant, to be loaned or
invested by him in her name. He loaned it in his own name, and for
his own use and benefit ; and it was held that such act amounted to a

Ch. 1)

DUTIES AXD LIABILITIES OF AGENT TO HIS PRINCIPAL

J7

5l

and the plaintiff could maintain action for the money and
In
damages from the time of the conversion, without any demand.
authorities
result
of
the
may
"The
Mechem, Ag. § 477, it is said:
be said to be that, if the agent parts with the property in any way or
for aiiv purpose not authorized, he is liable for a conversion."
The evidence showed that John E. Kinninger had converted a part
of the money intrusted to him by his mother, to be loaned out for her
conversion,

upon real-estate security, to his own use, prior to the 8th day of January, 1890, the time that his deed to his homestead was recorded.
Upon such conversion a cause of action at once accrued to plaintiff
71
and existed at the time of the acquisition of
against him therefor,
Moreover, Kinninger tacitly admitted, by charging
such homestead.
himself in the settlement between himself and his mother with interest
amounting to $178 from January 1, 1890, to January 1, 1891, that he
had converted about all of the money to his own use before the 8th

from

VI. Necessity of Notice and Demand

BEDELL
(Supreme

v.

JANNEY.

Court of Illinois,

1847.

9 111. 193.)

Suit by defendant in error for money collected for him by plaintiff
in error, and not paid over.
Thomas, J. 72 * * * The plaintiffs' allegations were, that they

had placed a demand due them in the hands of the defendant for collection ; and that he had received the money on that demand, and appropriated it to his own use. The testimony corresponded with, and
fully sustained these allegations.
It consisted of the defendant's admissions in writing, of his reception of the plaintiffs' demand for collection ; of his receipt of money
shown by parol evidence to have been collected thereon; and of a
transcript from a justice's docket, showing the institution of a suit bench justice on -aid demand, and the proceedings thereon, to their
termination in the execution on which the money was eventually col!, and paid over to defendant, and oral testimony
explanatory of
the documentary.
It was, consequently, properly adjudged admissible,
7i 'I'll.' principal has iii- election to roe on the agency contract or Cor conNichols
on, but he cannot have the benefit of both in the same action.
v. Gage, L0 Or. B2 (1881).
ley collected
for the principal
Here failure of the agenl to account for
money
Is aot conversion,
hit duty u> hand over the Identical
unless it we
collected.
Schanz v. Martin, ■:t Mi c. Rep. 192, 75 N. v. Bupp. '.>'->7(1902).
Walaot, in general, required to band over the specific proceeds.
The ag< at
ter v. Bennett, 16 N. v. 260 11857).
rt of the opinion

Is

i->
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The property is therefore not exempt
day of January, 1890.
* * *
execution which may be issued on said judgment.

omitted.
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both upon the grounds of its relevancy and its competency. It proved
everything alleged by the plaintiffs, and was therefore properly held
sufficient to entitle them to a recovery.
Nor is this result varied by the Eacl that the commencement oi the
plaintiffs' suit was not preceded by a demand of payment from the defendant. 73 The doctrine contained in the instructions of the Circuit
A person is entitlejd to
Court on this point is undoubtedly correct.
received by the latter,
soon
as
so
him
for
money collected
b) another
its immediate paydemands
collector
the
of
aith
on
the
part
and
ment by him; hut nevertheless, he is ordinarily not subjected to suit
for his failure or omission to make such payment, until after demand

Tinkham v. ITeyworth, 31 111. 519.
has been made of him.
general rule in such cases, it may he presumed that payment
has been delayed by reason of the want of safe and convenient means
of transmission, or of some other good and sufficient cause, and that
the recipient of the money, still considering himself as entitled to no
more than enough reasonably to compensate him for his services in
But, where so long a time
collecting it. will pay it over on demand.
of
the
money, as to rebut any such
has elapsed since the collection
collector,
he
may well be considered as
presumption in favor of the
neither law nor reason
use,
then,
and
his
own
to
it
having appropriated
he should be
non-feasance,
his
for
be
sued
he
can
requires that before

therefor
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As

a

requested to do what his conduct sufficiently indicates his determination not to do.
The circumstances of the case at bar establish for it peculiar claims
to exemption from the operation of the general rule referred to, as
The defendant had been so
regulating the liabilities of collectors.
long the recipient of the plaintiffs' money without accounting to them
for it. or being called upon by them to do so, that when, at length,
they endeavored to collect it from him by suit, he claimed that time

had absolved him from his liability; that the Statute of Limitations
had afforded the privilege of a repose, not to be disturbed by having
The Court
obtruded upon him this outlawed claim of his employers.
there had
to
whether
therefore,
say
it
to
the
jury
well submit
might,
mollplaintiffs'
of
the
defendant
the
not been such an appropriation by
When the cod
is Demand and refusal constitutes evidence of conversion.
version can Ik- shown in some other way no demand need he made. Nading
See, also, Wiley v. Logan, 95
v. Howe, 23 ind. App. 690, 55 X. E. 1032 (1900).
X. <'. 358 (18S6), in which ir is said: "A demand previous to bringing an action for money collected by an agent, is to enable the latter to pay it over
without incurring the cost of suit, for the principal must seek him and not
Totter v. Sturges, L2 X. C. T'.i (1826); Moore v. Hyman, 34
he the principal.
X. C. 38 (1851); Hyman v. Gray, 49 X. C. L55 (1856); Kivett v. Massey, 63
But a demand is not required where the agency is denied,
(1869).
unl collected, or the agent's responsibil
claim set up exceeding tie' a
Waddell v. Swann, !tl X. C. 108 (1884), and
ity is disputed in the answer.
cited in the opinion."
situation of the parties and of the contract of agency may determine
Clark v. Moody, IT Mass. 145
whether demand before suit is necessary.
21 1.
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right to a demand of payof proceedings against him for its
ment before the commencement
And well might the jury respond affirmatively to that
legal coercion.
proposition, and say, as by their verdict they did say, that there had
been so unreasonable and vexatious a delay of payment, on the part
of the defendant, as to entitle the plaintiffs to recover not only the
amount collected by the defendant for their use (after deducting
therefrom a reasonable compensation for his services), but also interest
ey to his own use as to deprive him of the

thereon.

This view of the subject is fully sustained by authority, so far as the
right to commence suit without a previous demand is concerned.
Hawlev v. Sage. 15 Conn. 52: Estes v. Stokes, 2 Rich. 133; Richards
v. Killam, 10 Mass. 244: Graves v. Ticknor, 6 N. H. 541.
The right to a recovery of interest in such cases as the jury found
Rev. St. c.
the case at bar to be, is expressly given by our statute.
54. § 1.
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Barber,

3

Upon this question of interest, see, also, the
* Affirmed.
* *
Caines, 266.

MODERN WOODMEN OF AMERICA
(Supreme

Court

of Nebraska,

1903.

v.

<;* Neb. 660,

case of Pease v.

COLMAN.
94

N. W. 814.)

after the allowance of a moA statement of the facts will be found in the
tion for rehearing.
The emformer decision, published in 64 Neb. 162, 89 N. W. 641.
death
his
of
the
time
at
ployment in which the deceased was engaged
Ames, C. 74

This cause

is resubmitted

not prohibited by the contract of insurance, but it was stipulated
that, if he should engage therein, he should forfeit his beneficiary interest, unless he should file with the head clerk of the order a written
waiver of any liability by it for loss by death as a direct result of
He did not file such a document, but the clerk of
such occupation.
the local camp, through an assistant, continued to collect the monthly
assessments or dues, and to remit them to the head clerk, with full
and
\'>v a period of three months,
ledge of the circumstances,

Correctly speaking, the question is
death of the insured.
not whether the association, by this conduct of its agent, waived a
forfeiture, hut whether it waived the waiver required of the in-

until

the

ed.

*

*

*

It was
not void, hut voidable.
waiver,
written
a
force
filing
by
optional with him to continue it
and it was optional with the association so to continue it without such
ents, or otherwise
waiver.
He was not delinquent of dues or
The association acted through it^ agents, and,
liable to suspension.
It demanded,
being a corporation, it could not act by other means.
The certificate held

by Colman

\\;i>

in

i '

Pari ol the opinion
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167. 75

it
is

1

is

It recommended that the former decision of this court be adhered
to, and the judgment of the district court affirmed.
H"i-TiE, C, concurs.
Per Curiam. For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion,
ordered that the former decision of this court be adhered to, and the
judgment of the district court affirmed.

&

CLARK
(Supreme

CO. v.

BANK OF WHEELING.

Court of Pennsylvania,

1851.

17

Pa.

19

322.)

&

Action by Bank of Wheeling against Clark
Co. for the amount
bill of exchange, purchased by the latter, for the former and lost
Co. in informing the bank of the
by reason of an error of Clark
party to whom the bill was sent. On judgment for plaintiff defendant brings error.
Lewis, 77 It
an agent's imperative duty to give his principal
nectimely notice of every fact or circumstance which may make
essary for him to take measures for his security.
Paley, 38; Devall
And
irbridge,
Watts
S. 306.
by his neglect to do this,
if,

&

4

it

J.

is

&

of

a

Accord: Pringle v. Mod. Woodmen of Am., 76 Neb. 384, 107 N. W. 756,
N. \v. 231 (1906);
The Distilled Spirits, 11 Wall. 367, 20 I,. Ed. 167 (1870);
post, p. is:;.
For the agent to fail to communicate the facts in order to take
advantage for himself is
fraud upon his principal. Snell v. Goodlander, 90
Minn. 533, 97 N. W. 121 (1903).
75

113

a

4

it Followed in Moore v. Thompson,
Phila. 164, 30 Leg. Int.
(1873) in
which the agenl was held liable for Josses due to the agent's failure to give
the principal notice of attachment proceedings.
77 I'urt of the opinion
is omitted.
9
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Ed.

*

is

is

is,

received, and retained his assessments with full knowledge of all the
It cannot be supposed that it
circumstances until after his death.
The
intended to take and keep his money without consideration.
knowledge of its agent; authorized to make the collection, was the
knowledge oi the company of all the circumstances under which the
This is not tin- same as saying that the agent
payments were made.
waived the forfeiture.
It was waived by the association by taking
and retaining the money of the insured with notice of all the facts
within the knowledge of its agent. It is the duty of an agent to
communicate to his principal all the facts concerning the service in
which he is engaged that come to his knowledge in the course of his
employment, and this duty, in a subsequent action between his prinwith exceptions not necessary to be
cipal and a third person, he
This
the
here noted, conclusively presumed to have performed.
foundation of the doctrine, necessary to the public safety, that notice to an agent
notice to his principal. Mechem on Agency, pars.
Bradley, J., in Re Distilled Spirits, 11 Wall. 367, 20 L.
719] 72^:
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the principal has suffered a loss, he is entitled to be indemnified by
the agent. Brown v. Arrott, 6 Watts & S. 416. In a case of this
kind Mr. Justice Kennedy considers it just and reasonable that the
agent "should be held responsible for any loss that has happened,
which possibly might have been avoided, had he only performed his
And where goods or funds are
duty to the principal as his agent."
a sub-agent, and the former is
of
hands
in
the
the
agent
placed by
information), the same carewithholding
of
negligence
gross
guilty
(in
ful and considerate judge was of opinion that it "would not be going
too far to hold that the agent, by his conduct, had impliedly agreed
to be answerable for any loss that should arise from the default of

Brown v. Arrott, 6 Watts & S. 421.
his sub-agent."
these principles be correct in the case of an ordinary agent for
the sale of goods, their application to an agency like the one before
us (for purchasing and remitting drafts on Philadelphia and Xew
York, on account of a bank in the interior) is demanded by the true
And
interests of trade, and the urgent necessities of financial credit.
be
approindicated
that
just
as
so
stringent
of
liability
measure
if a
priate, where there is only a nonfeasance, how just and necessary is
In the use of that
its application to an act of positive malfeasance.
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If

term, as applicable to the conduct of the defendants, we are far from
to them an intention to deceive or otherwise to wrong the
plaintiff. But it was their duty to give information immediately and
accurately, of the destination of the bill of exchange which had been
and the statement that
purchased with the funds of the plaintiff:
it had been sent to E. W. Clark & Co. of Philadelphia (when in fact
it had been forwarded to John T. Smith & Co. of New York), was
of a material fact as fully authorized the
such a misrepresentation
plaintiff to consider the funds still in the hands of the defendants;
or in other words, to hold them liable for all loss occasioned by the
imputing

Until the plaintiff was advised of
default of John T. Smith & Co.
& Co., the insolvency and deto
Smith
draft
the remittance of the
the agent, whose gross neglect
of
at
the
risk
stood
fault of the latter
had deprived the bank of all
facts
the
of
misstatement
and positive
* * *
interest.
own
its
to
protect
power
Judgment affirmed.

TEASLEYv.
(Supreme

Court

of Georgia,

L900.

BE VDLEY.

110 Ga.

197, 86

s. BJ. 782, 78 Am. St. Rep.

113.)

Laura Sadler sued her sister's husband, defendant Teasley, for an
accounting of moneys from time to time put in his hands to be loaned
ami rents collected from land of the estate of her father and a de
She had for 44 years lived in defendant's home, and had Wi
, calling
for no accounting until shortly before instituting this

602
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suit, which resulted in a judgment in her favor.
A new trial heing
died before
error,
sued
but
plaintiff
defendant
writ
of
out a
denied,
were made parties to the
the case was called, and her administrators
suit.
Cobb, T. 7S * * * 1. As long as a person who is in possession
oi the property o\ another, using the same for the owner's benefit, recognizes the hitter's owner-hip. no lapse of time will bar the owner from
Before any
ting his title as against the person in possession.
lapse of time will be a bar to the owner, it must appear that the person
in possession has given notice, or there must be circumstances shown

would be equivalent to notice, to the owner that the person in
In such a case the statute will
possession claims adversely to him.
begin to run from the date of such notice. Until the owner has such
notice, he has the right to treat the possession of the other person as
his own.
Keaton v. Greenwood, 8 Ga. 97. This is the principle at the
foundation of that familiar rule now embodied in section 3198 of the
Civil Code that "subsisting trusts, cognizable only in a court of equity,
are not within the ordinary statutes of limitation." Chancellor Kent, in
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which

Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch. 90, 11 Am. Dec. 417, states the same
"The trusts intended by the courts of
rule in the following language:
equity not to be reached or affected by the statute of limitations are
those technical and continuing trusts which are not at all cognizable at
law, but fall within the proper, peculiar, and exclusive jurisdiction of
this court."
Although the rule just stated is applicable in terms alone to cases of
technical trusts which are cognizable only in a court of equity, the
principle upon which it is founded is applicable in some cases where a
technical trust had not been created ; the principle being, as above
stated, that, as long as one recognizes that property in his possession
belongs to another, the latter has the right to treat the possession as
his own. The factor in possession of funds belonging to his principal,
when there is nothing in the contract or the custom of the place requiring that the funds should be paid over at any particular time, cannot
set up title to such funds without notice to the principal that he no longer holds the same for his benefit ; and the statute of limitations does
not begin to run in his favor until such notice, or there are circumstances equivalent to notice, or until there has been a demand and refusal to pay, or there has been an account rendered, accompanied by
In England a similar rule has been applied in the
an offer to settle.
case of bailiffs and stewards who collected rents and held the same subThe rule was also applied in casject to the order of their principals.
es of agents having possession of the funds of the principal, when, as
in the case of factors, neither under the contract nor the custom of
In
the trade, the money was to be paid over at any particular time.
all such cases the property in the hands of the factor, bailiff, steward,
78

Part of the opinion

is omitted.
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the case might be, is treated as the property of the principossession of the agent is the possession of the principal ;
of action accrues in favor of the principal until a demand
or a notice, or what is equivalent thereto, that the agent
is holding adversely ; and not until the right of action accrues does the
statute of limitations begin to run in favor of the agent. This rule is
in some cases subject to the exception that after the lapse of a reasonable time a demand will be presumed, and the statute of limitations
will begin to run from the time such demand would be presumed to
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or agent, as
pal, and the
and no right
and refusal,

have been made. See. in this connection, 1 Wood, Lim. Act. (2d Ed.)
863; Mechem, Ag. § 533; Oliver
§ 123; 2 Perry, Trusts (5th Ed.) §
v. Hammond, 85 Ga. 323, 331, 11 S. E. 655; Patterson v. Blanchard,
98 Ga. 518. 25 S. E. 572; 27 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (1st Ed.) p. 100
Where one receives
et seq.; Blount v. Beall, 95 Ga. 182, 22 S. E. 52.
collect the prininvest,
and
time,
to
money from another from time to
for the bento
time
time
from
same
il or interest, and reinvest the
the
between
another,
the
agreement
and it is contemplated by
efit of
the
for
same
the
use
shall
the
money
parties that the person receiving
is
the
when
money
no
time
specified
is
there
other,
and
benefit of the
the
deto
same
subject
hold
the
would
such
person
be returned,
mand of the other, and no limitation would run against the person
owning the fund in favor of the one who had collected it until there
had been a demand and refusal, or there had been such a lapse of time
as the law would presume a demand and refusal, or until an account
had been rendered accompanied by an offer to settle, or the one in possession notified the owner that he no longer held it as the owner's but
claimed title to it himself.
Applying this rule to the allegations of the present petition, there
was no error in overruling the demurrer, so far as it raised the point
that the plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the statute of limitaThe
tions, and that the demand of the plaintiff had become stale.
amendment to the petition merely amplified the allegations in the original petition, and was, therefore, not subject to the objection raised in
the demurrer thereto that it sel forth a new and distinct cause of acThe relation existing between plaintiff and defendant was not

technical, subsisting trust cognizable only in a court of
result therefrom, and for this reason the provisions of
31 p. 3153) requiring express trusts to be de
clared in writing, and prohibiting the creation of such a trust in favor
sui juris who is laboring under no disability, have no apWhile such a trust was nol created, and
plication in the presenl case.
not intended to be created, between the parties, the same princi]
which are at the foundation of the rule which presents a trustee in a
hnical trusl from pleading the vtntnte of limitations against the claim
of the cestui que trusl would prevent an agent, of the character that
h

that

a

lity would

the

all..

tition make the defendant,

from

relying

upon
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tattlte of limitations as a defense until there had been an account
rendered, accompanied by an offer to settle, a refusal, upon demand, to
settle, an express repudiation
of the agency, or such a change in the
relation between the parties as would be sufficient to put the principal
As an instance
on notice that the agency was no longer recognized.
in which this rule was applied, where no express trust existed, see
(Miver v. 1 [ammond, supra. Until one or the other of these contingencies happened, the possession of the defendant was the possession of
the plaintiff, and no limitation of time would operate to debar the latter
from calling the former to account, with the single exception that, if
the nature of the transactions was such that after the lapse of a reasonaBle time the law would presume a demand and refusal, then the

statute would begin to run from the date such demand would be presumed. If the relation which the defendant bore to the plaintiff was
that of a confidential continuing agent, no such presumption would
arise until such relation ceased. The evidence introduced in behalf of
the plaintiff tended to establish the allegations in the petition as to the
character of the agency under which the defendant managed and controlled the funds of plaintiff, and, such evidence, as a whole, being
sufficient to authorize a recovery by the plaintiff of at least a portion
of the amount claimed by her, there was no error in overruling a mo-

Certain portions of the charge, made the subject of
in the motion for a new trial, were substantially
error
of
assignments
in accord with wdiat is now ruled, and were, therefore, not erroneous.
contended that, if he occupied the relation of
2. The defendant
agent at all to the plaintiff, he was simply her agent to collect her money, and that in such a case the statute of limitations would begin to
run in his favor certainly from the time that the principal had knowlWhen an agent is apedge that the agent had made the collection.
pointed for the sole purpose of collecting and paying over money, the
statute of limitations begins to run in favor of the agent from the time
tion for a nonsuit.

that the fact that the collection had been made came to the knowledge
of the principal.
Schofield v. Woolley, 98 Ga. 548, 25 S. E. 769, 58
Am. St. Rep. 315. There being positive evidence introduced in behalf
of the defendant that as to some of the items with which it was sought
to charge him the sums came into his hands under authority simply to
collect and pay over, it was error to refuse, at his request, to give
an instruction to the jury embodying the principle above referred
* * *
♦•q7 9

For

this and other errors, reversed.

Garrick, L. R. 5 Ch. App. Cas. 233, 39 L. J. Ch.
The statute does not begin to run until there is a
This requires notice, or conditions excuscomplete presenl cause of action.
ing notice, by the agent, and demand by the principal. The principal eannot,
er, by Calling to make a demand within a reasonable time, delay the opJett v. Hempstead, 25 Ark. 462 (1869). A mere right
eratlon of the statute.
There must also be a wrong,
not constitute a cause of action.
in this case a failure by the agent to account after demand by the principal.
-

369,

A-

•■!:

L8 W.

Burdich

R. 387

v.

(1870).
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II

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT

SECTION

1.—

COMPENSATION TO THE AGENT
I. General Rule

Succession
(Supreme

Court of Louisiana.

of

KREKELER.

1892.

44

La. Ann.

726,

11 South.

35.)

Fenner, J.
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William Krekeler, the husband of Mrs. Lizette Krekeler, died on March 13, 1890, leaving an estate consisting of some movables and several houses and lots, valued altogether at $4,873.90, belonging jointly to his succession and his widow as partners in comHe left no forced heirs. Mrs. Krekeler was nearly 70 years
munity.
old, in infirm health, weighing nearly 350 pounds, unaccustomed and
She sent for an acquaintance, Charles
unable to attend to business.
Kummell, and asked him to take charge of her interest, and attend to
her affairs and property, which he agreed to do. He attended to the
opening of her husband's succession in her behalf as surviving wife,
managed the property, attended to repairs, paid the taxes, collected the
rents, and did all her business for her. As indicated, the property belonged to the community, and Mrs. Krekeler, under the law, would
only have enjoyed the usufruct of the husband's half, which, at her

But Mrs. Krekeler informed
death, would have passed to his heirs.
will in 1858. Search
made
a
notarial
husband
had
Kummell that her
in his house and papers failed to find the copy. Attention was turned
The counsel and notary of the succession made
to notarial records.
Mr. Kummell himself made active
avail.
without
search
diligent
efforts to find it. After others had abandoned the search as fruitless.
he discovered the will in the records of the notary, Coffey, indexed by
The will made Mrs.
mistake under the letter "C," instead of "K."
It was probated, and she went into
Krekeler sole universal legatee.
possession of the entire estate as sole owner on the 4th of December,
Very shortly afterwards — on 21st December, 1890 ^be .lied
on was opened, and is under admin
Her
suddenly in church.
to whom Kummell presented a
istration by the public administrator,
S-'-'
for
bill for $500 for services and
expenses. The administrator ad-

auld v. Butcher, 22 Can. 100 (1879).
Only 111••11 will the statute begin <" run.
s.. when Hi" :iL'int bae been guilty of Fraud tin- Btatute runs from 111. - time
tin- fraud \\:i~. or by the use of reasonable diligence mlghl have been, tliscovi v. ii
ford, iu> [owa, :>7. '••:: N. \v. :.s (1903); McDowell v. Pol
B Pa. 189, 19 \m. !»'■'•. 503 (1848).
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Krekeler opposed

AND

CONSEQ1 BNCBS

and placed
it. and from

it

on

OF T11K

his account.

UIOI.ATION

(Part

3

The heirs of Mrs.

judgment maintaining the opposition
and rejecting the claim for services Kummell prosecutes this appeal.
The opposition came with a had grace from the heirs who profited so
directly by Kummell's services, and we think the judge erred in maintaining it. We cannot distinguish the case from Waterman v. Gihson,
5 La. Ann. 672, where we said:
"It is said that a contract of mandate
is presumed to he gratuitous, unless there have been a contrary agreement.
Under our Code, which has modified the principles of the Roman law. it is not of the essence of mandate that it be gratuitous; and,
in our opinion, it is not necessary for an agent to establish an express
agreement that he should have a pecuniary remuneration for his services. Courts may infer such an agreement from the nature of the emIt would be unreasonable
ploymenl and the relations of the parties.
to look upon the undertaking of the defendant as a mere office d'ami."
See. also, Succession of Fowler, 7 La. Ann. 207; 3 Baudry, Lacantinerie No. 908 ; 27 Laurent, No. 346. 1 This record exhibits no relations between Kummell and the deceased except those of long acHe is not shown to have been a relative, or even a very
quaintance.
close friend, or to have been under any obligations of any kind, or to
have derived any advantage from his employment.
Aside from such
relations, the services are certainly of a character which no person
would be expected to render gratuitously.
There is nothing in the evidence intimating that either party expected or intended that they
should be gratuitous.
The sudden death of Mrs. Krekeler, before any
occasion for a settlement had arisen, robs of significance the failure to
make the claim during her lifetime. We see no reason to doubt that,
had she lived, Mrs. Krekeler expected to pay, and would have paid, a
reasonable compensation for these services.
Considering, however, the
value of the estate, and that its entire revenues for the time of services
did not exceed $500, we are disposed to think the charge somewhat
a

i In Martin v. Roberts (C. C.) 36 Fed. 217 (1888), Simonton, J., thus stated
the rule: "In the transactions of commerce time is money.
In business there
is no place for sentiment.
No services are gratuitous,
not expressly declared
'In the ordinary course of commercial agencies a compensation is always
so.
understood to belong to the agent, in consideration
of the duties and responsibilities which he assn
s, and the labor and services which he performs.'
Bish,
Story, Ag. § 326;
Cont. § 21!), and cases quoted;
Id. § 220, and eases
quoted: :: Add. Cont § 1401.
In the case of Ravenel v. Pinckney's Assignee,
factors, commission merchants, commercial agents, and assignees are held
entitled to compensation
from the usages of trade;' that is to say, by immemorial usage it is distinctly understood
thai all persons engaged in commerce, called upon to do services In the due course of business, are ex necessitate entitled to compensation, as growing out of, and inseparably connected with, the contract of their employment.
I am of the opinion that the defendant is entitled to compensation for his services, and that this was in contemplation, of both parties in the creation and progress of the agency.
lie
cannot be deprived of this, unless it be shown by the testimony that he has
it for a consideration.
This does not apreleased, waived, or surrendered
pear."
See, also, Weston v. Davis, 24 Me. 374 (1841).
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excessive, and that an allowance of $300, in addition to the expenses,
will suffice. We have considered the suggestion as to our jurisdiction,
but think it disposed of by our decision in Brierre v. Creditors, 43 La.
Ann. 423, 9 South. 640.
It is therefore ordered and decreed that judgment appealed from
be amended by increasing the amount allowed Charles Kummell from
$22 to $322, and that, as thus amended, the same be affirmed,

appellees

to pay cost of appeal.

LOCKWOOD
(Supreme

Court of Judicature

v.

ROBBINS.

of Indiana,

1890.

125

Ind.

398,

25 N.

E.

455.)

Mitchell, J.
Leon Robbins filed a claim for three years and
six months' work and labor against the estate of Alonzo Lockwood,
deceased. * * *
The material facts as returned in a special verdict were that the
plaintiff, a minor about 12 years old, without father or other guardian,
entered the decedent's service in 1876, and continued therein until
March, 18S0, during which time he performed service for the latter
at his instance and request, of the value, after deducting board, clothThe
ing, washing, and mending furnished by the decedent of $80.
between
the
plaintiff
contract
under
any
services were not performed
and decedent, nor between the latter and any other person authorized
to contract for the plaintiff. Upon the facts found, the court very
properly entered judgment for the plaintiff. It does not appear that
the plaintiff was taken into the decedent's family and cared for and
On the contrary, he entered his service
treated as a member thereof.
and performed labor at the decedent's instance and request, and, although there was no special contract for remuneration, the law raises

Pari of the opinion

Is

is

omitted.

a

is,

an implied obl igati on to pay what the services were reasonably worth.
"Gerard v. Dill. 96" Ind. 47' >. Where one is taken into the family of another, and is regarded and treated in every respect as a member of the
household, then, even though there may be no ties of blood, there is
no implied obligation to pay for services rendered on the one hand,
Brown v. Yarvan, 74 Ind. 305,
nor for boaFd furnished on the other.
cited;
v.
82 Ind. 550; Wright v. McBaw,
La
Marquess
and cases
(, 2
case.
not such
however,
The
Larinan,
End. 103.
presenl
costs.
affirfned,
with
The judgment
»
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WALLACE
(Supreme

Court

of Pennsylvania,

Otf TUE

v.

FLOYD.

1867.

29 Pa.

RELATION

L84, 72 Am.

(Part

3

Doc. G20.)

Armstrong, J. Nathan Floyd, who was plaintiff below, brought
suit against W. W. Wallace, for three years and three months' servHe declared in assumpsit in the
ices as clerk at Iron Citj Furnace.
The pleas were non ascommon counts and on a quantum meruit.
sumpsit, payment, etc. The cause was arbitrated, and an award filed
in favour of plaintiff for $299.14, from which he appealed, and on a
trial in court obtained a verdict for $650. The defendant, Wallace,

moved for a new trial, and on the 17th of March, 1854, after argument, by consent of counsel, on payment of the amount of the award,
with interest and costs, the verdict was set aside as to the residue of
plaintiff's claim, and defendant let into a defence as to the value of

if

1.

a

is

a

is

it

;

a

2.

if

a

fixed salary per year, he cannot recover more than the
fendant at
amount agreed upon.
fixed sum, and continued
defendant made
That
bargain at
bound by
till he left without
special bargain to raise his salary, he
under
continued
that
he
the presumption being,
his original contract
the same contract.
To these points the court answered:
"We decline to charge as requested in the foregoing points. When
was on terms that the defendant might
the verdict was set aside,
the istake defence as to the value of the plaintiff's services. That
The jury will determine from the whole evidence
sue in this case.

a

it

is

It

is

a

is

a

it,

a

a

is

what was the value of the plaintiff's services."
very true, as contended for, that courts in granting new trials,
have
right to make terms. The terms usually made are such as relate to the payment of costs, the compliance with rules of court, or
But
with some stipulation not affecting the merits of the controversy.
contract,
or
shut
nature
of
to make terms which would change the
might be an exercise of powout the evidence necessary to support
promote the interests of the
er not calculated in
to
degree
very high
When, however, the terms on which
new trial
granted,
parties.
not to be gathare spread on the face of the record, their meaning
ered from any latent intention that may have existed, but from the imadmitted by the argument of the
port of the language used.
counsel for the defendant in error, that the points submitted on the
denies their
part of Wallace, as abstract propositions, are correct, but
He insists that according to the terms of the
application to this case.
new trial, the issue was "as to the value of the plainorder granting

It
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a

it,

plaintiff's services.
the deThe cause again came on for trial, and in the course of
fendant, Wallace, alleged and proved
special contract at $300 per annum. And prayed the court to instruct the jury:
the jury believe that the plaintiff engaged to serve the deThat
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a

it

;

is

;

a^

it

;

it

is

if

3

it

is

it

Court of Michigan,

Marston,

1880.

13

(Supremo

CUDDY.

v.

Mich.

273,

M.I

5

it

MILLAR

N. W. 316, 38 Am. Rep.

J.

We have been unable to discover any error in
C.
The conversation that took place between Brace and on
the plaintiffs was clearly admissible
was the commenceevidence.
ment and
part of the conversation or negotiations which led to the
bad
tendency to show that
error.
employment of the defendant
and
was
was
to
be
ed amount
admissible in any view of the
paid,
a

It

in

a

in

It

this case.

117 (1831).

A. —88

I

«

i

A

C

i:

21

I-.

(imnil'iiA

it

Is

al

error t>>
When tiic contract stipulates the compensation of the agi
are reason
Instruct ill'- |ury thai tii<' agent maj recover whal bis BerVlce
ably worth, McCormicB
or to admit eviBro. v. Bn i>. it Tex. 191 (1877);
dence as i" Hi" reasonable value of the services rendered, Hamilton v. Froth
v,, (1880),
Ingham, 59 Mich 253, 146 N. W.
age and custom cannot preBower v. Jones, s Bing.
vail agalnul the stipulations of the agency contract
i
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if

a

it

it

a

a

if

a

it,
it
is

If

a

tiff's services." That the question was not how much Wallace agreed
to give, or Floyd proposed to take, but simply how much the services
And the error of the court
were worth independent of the contract.
The terms of the order
was in thinking with the claimant's counsel.
did not restrict or prescribe the mode or kind of proof by which the
I know of no standard of
value of the services was to be ascertained.
value that could be more satisfactory than that which the parties fix
for themselves ; and where there is a special contract, fixing the terms
and conditions on which one party shall serve another, in the absence
conclusive.
tenant holds
of proof rescinding or altering
new contract, the terms and conditions
over without notice to quit, or
man agree to serve another for
of his old lease will govern. So,
month or year, at
stipulated sum per month or year, and silently
will be on the old terms. If there
continues longer in the service,
was the duty of Floyd to give notice
was
special contract existing,
would
he wished to alter or enlarge its terms
and
to his employer
then have been incumbent on Wallace to accede to the demand or terminate the service. The court said in answer to the defendant's offer,
"The inquiry
as to the value of plaintiff's services, and not as to the
and, so far as the evidence may tend to show their
contract price
value,
From this the jury might very readily suppose
admitted."
was only the other
that the "contract price" was excluded, and that
If no conevidence in the cause from which they could fix the value.
there was
tract was proved, this might be correct.
But
special
would control
agreement, as
alleged, not changed or rescinded,
and
was error to mingle
with other evidence to enhance the value.
Judgment reversed and venire de novo awarded.
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On the other hand the defendants below denied that any sum
was agreed upon, but that they were to pay him what the) thought he
was worth to them.
This could not mean that they could, after the
services had been performed, fix the compensation at such sum as they
Parties may make such an agreement, but we think this lanpleased.
If no agreement as to comguage does not warrant any such view.
pensation was made, then the law would imply that they six mid pay
what his services were reasonably worth,' and the court so instrn
There was no error in the court permitting the jury to take
the jury.
to their room the computation made by the plaintiff's attorney.
It was
but an aid to the jury in estimating the amount due the plaintiff, if
they found his theory of the case to be correct.
They were in no way
and they could not consider
as evidence or be misled
bound by
To permit the jury to take such paper was but
thereby.
accordance with long, well settled practice, and was unobjectionable.
The judgment must be affirmed with costs.
The other Justices concurred.

VILAS

v.

DOWNER.

Court of Vermont,

(Supreme

1849.

21

Vt.

419.)

Book account for services by plaintiff as attorney for defendant in
sundry. suits. Defendant claimed plaintiff's charges were unreasonably high.

Poland,

*

*

*

is

a

in

in

a

a

a

is

think

it
is

J.b

From the report of the auditors in this
apparent, that they allowed the plaintiff's charges,
as they were presented before them, solely upon the ground, that they
were charged according to his usual and customary rule of charging
for his professional services, without reference to their being reasonable, or that they had been acquiesced in or assented to by the defendant. This, then, presents the question, as to what should be the rule
of compensation for the services of an attorney, who
employed by
client to manage
suit, without any special agreement as to the amount
of his charges for such service.
In England, and in some of the neighboring states, such questions
cannot well arise, because the bills of attorneys for services for their
clients are always settled by
master, or
taxation, to be made by
actions to recover for their servprothonotary, of the court; and,
ices, the amount
fixed by such taxation.
this state we have
But
no such practice; and attorneys are left, in common with every other
class of citizens, who bring suits to recover the price of their labor, to
commence their suits and have not only their right but amount of recase we

a

*

promise, however, is implied only when tliere is no express agreeSuch
ment as to the amount of the compensation,
Weston v. Davis, lm Me. :;7t
(1841).
'■
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employer, to pay the person employed such sum, as his services are reasonably worth, or as he reasonably deserves to have ; and on the purchase of goods, without express stipulation as to price, the purchaser
is only bound to pay what the goods are reasonably worth.
We are not able to find any reason, or authority, to distinguish the
rule in relation to the employment of lawyers from that which obtains
in every other employment for service. It must of course be more difficult, often, to determine what the sum should be, for service, the
value of which depends much upon professional skill and learning.
than in the case of mere mechanical or physical labor ; but after all
we think the same principles must govern both, and that in this case
the auditors should have examined the plaintiff's charges, and allowed
him what he reasonably deserved, with a proper reference to the nature of the business performed by him for the defendant, and his own
standing in his profession for learning and skillfulness,
whereby the
value of his services was enhanced to the defendant.
For the purpose of aiding in the determination of the value of the
plaintiff's services, we think it was proper for the auditors to receive
evidence of the usual prices charged and received for similar services
to those rendered by the plaintiff for the defendant by other men of
the same profession with the plaintiff, in the same vicinity, and in the
same courts; and that the evidence offered by the defendant for that
purpose, and which was rejected by the auditors, should have been received. Such evidence could not, from the nature of the case, furnish
an exact and certain rule to determine the amount of the plaintiff's
charges; as other cases, precisely 'like those of the defendant, might
n<>t he frequent,
and other attorneys of precisely equal professional
reputation and skill with the plaintiff might not he found in the vicinity; hut we think such evidence would afford an approximation to the
In all ordinary cases, in detrue ride to govern the plaintiff 's charges.

it

in
a

It

a

in

it

a

by

a

in

6

iii

termining the value of services, evidence is received of what is commonly and usually charged by oilier persons for the like services; and
in determining
the value of goods, evidence is received of what similar article- are boughl and sold for,
order to ascertain their value
and
our opinion the price "i
market;
lawyer's professii mal labor
the same rule.
musl he ascertained and determined
would he
wholly unjust, to require
person employing
lawyer to manage
suit, (when- of course
could nol be known to either party, how long
court, or tin amount of professional labor, which
would continue
the agency contract falls i" ii\ tin- amount of the agent's cointlon evidence should \»- admitted i" shovi its reasonable value,
Toomy
Dunphy, 86 Cal. 839, 26 Pac. 130 (1800).

••Whenever
\
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covery determined by a jury, or by auditors, according to their choice
of actions. What rule, then, should govern the triers, in fixing the
amount of damages to be awarded to a plaintiff in such a case? In all
ether cases of employment, or hiring, where no stipulation is mad
to price, the law implies a promise, or agreement, on the part of the
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GOTLEIB.

1888.

*

*

v.

Dec. 109.)

Ohio

Cir. Ct.

191,

2

(Circuit Court of Ohio, First Circuit,

3

HARRISON

*

tit

would be required to carry it through,) to stipulate as to the amount of
his charges, or else be compelled to pay such charges, as the lawyer
to make against him.
should sec
Judgment reversed and case recommitted.

Ohio

Cir.

.

*

*

*

a

in

is

a

a

a

a

Gotleib was
there being no great controversy as to any one point.
in
that busireal estate broker, and had never been engaged
not
firm
Sons,
doing
Failer
Isaac
ness.
He was on intimate terms with
at
his
made
headquarters
and
street,
Main
of
business at the foot
lease
or
property
to
desire
purchase
of
their
He
knew
store.
their
casual walk with
for their business higher up in the city, and on
piece of property on
some of the members of the firm, he noticed
After this, apparently of his
Vine street, owned by Mr. Harrison.

a

a

:

a

own motion, he sought the acquaintance of Mr. Harrison (they being
strangers to each other), and spoke to him of this property, and told
location, and that this
him he had friends who were looking for
Harrison asked who they were, and on being told,
might suit them.
said
"Bring your friends to see me." No price for the property was
spoken of, and no terms as to rental or purchase.
material character
Gotleib does not claim that anything else of
broker,
Harrison
that
he was
took place at that time, or that he told

an aror compensation
or
that
the
anything
was
into
between
parties,
entered
rangement
else was said or done to advise Harrison thereof, or to show that he
had any idea that he (Gotleib) expected compensation.
Gotleib told Failer Sons what he had done, and they called upon
Harrison, and their negotiations resulted after some time, in the erecto
lease of
tion by the latter of
storehouse upon this lot, and
Gotleib, so far as Harrison
them for several years at
large rent.
knew, had nothing whatever to do with the negotiations, and nothing
further passed between them on the subject till, as Gotleib says, just
before the completion of the arrangement (Harrison says after it), he
Gotleib seems to have
notified the latter that he would expect pay.
but
was not employed by
Failer
to
make
the
Sons
lease,
encouraged
a

Part of the opinion

is omitted.

it

if

would expect any commission

a

he

a

or that

i
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The action was brought by Gotleib against
Smith, C.
Harrison to recover what he claimed was the value of services renlease by Harrison of certain real estate to
effecting
him
dered
Isaac Failer Sons; and his employment was denied by Harrison, or
that any services were rendered for which the latter was liable to pay.
conceded that the evidence tends to show this state of facts,
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them to aid in the matter, and received no compensation therefor
from them.
There being no claim of an express employment of Gotleib, was
there an implied contract that he was to be paid for his services by

Harrison?

if

it,

Blackstone, in vol. 2, 443, says : "Implied contracts are such as reason and justice dictate, and which therefore the law presumes that
and the question whether a liaevery man undertakes to perform;"
bility is incurred by one person to compensate another for services rendered to him, in the absence of an express contract, is, in a multitude
of cases, to be determined solely by the acts of the parties themselves,
their relations to each other, and the peculiar circumstances which
surrounded them at the time. For there can be no question, but that
one person may render valuable services to another, with his knowledge and consent, and yet no obligation to pay therefor will arise, for
or
the person renthe reason that neither of the parties intended

is

a

is

a

it,

a

is

it

is

it

it,

if

a

express agreement as to payment on the defendant's part, infer
the plaintiff undertook and completed the wall with
promise to pay,
and the
the expectation that the defendant would pay him for
defendant had reason to know, that the plaintiff was so acting with
And
that expectation, and allowed him so to act without objection."
said, "that
conceded to be the law, that
in the decision
promise to pay for the party wall, would not be inferred from the
fact (alone) that the plaintiff, with the defendant's knowledge, built

if

a

B.

is

and that the defendant used it.
stated conAnd in W'ald's Pollock on Contracts, page 11, the law
cisely thus: "If A., with B.'s knowledge, but without any express
rule expeel to be paid
work for
such as people as
requ<
I'.,
and
there are no special
or
its result,
for,
accepts the work
work for nothing,
do
to
meant
A.
the
show
that
circumstances to
no
or that I'.. honestly believed that such was his intention, there
is

if

\.\

if

in

is

B.

b)

V

it

a

inferring

a

in

And tin-

a

to pay what A.'s labor
worth.
promise
pure inference of fact, the question being, whether B.'s
reasonable man
position would
conduct has been such that
done to
meanl to neat the work as
thai
understand from
The doing of the work with B.'s knowledj
his express order.

difficulty

is
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a

charge therefor, yet the cirdering the service did intend to make
person of ordinary judgment
cumstances may have been such that
would not suppose that such a charge would be made, and the party
receiving the service did not, in fact, so believe.
The authorities cited and relied upon by the defendant in error,
we think, sustain this doctrine.
one,
The case of Day v. Caton, 119 Mass. 513, 20 Am. Rep. 347,
this: "In an action to recover the value of
the syllabus of which
one-half of
party wall erected by plaintiff, partly on his estate, and
partly on that of the defendant, the jury may, in the absence of an
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KELATION

(Part

3

oi a contract, anil B.'s conduct is the acceptance."
Accepting this as the law, the question is, was it given substantially to
the jury by the court ?
An examination of the charge of the court leads us to the conclusion that it was not. While in one part of it there is ;i statement that
if the services were rendered by Gotleib voluntarily, as a matter of
accommodation, or a matter of kindness, to any person, or for Failer
Sons, he could not recover, yet no stress is laid upon this, and in several places where the court seems to recapitulate, and to give the law
which is to govern the jury, in substance it is charged that all that
was necessary to entitle the plaintiff to recover, was that service should
have been rendered to Harrison, and that he had the benefit of it,
the proposal

that the service was rendered for him. All this might have
Harrison not be liable at all. There are cases occurring
continually, where one person renders valuable service for another,
and yet
not bound
and the latter knows it and avails himself of
If the services are such as people ordinarily expect
to pay for it.
to be paid for, and there are no special circumstances to show that
promise to pay may fairly
particular instance,
they were not in
and knew

a

a

inferred.
But we think, that under the circumstances disclosed in this case,
jury could properly find
where there was so little evidence on which
that services had been rendered by Gotleib to Harrison, the former instate
tending to charge, and the latter to pay therefor, or to show
presumption, or that the service
of fact that would give rise to such
was really rendered for Harrison's benefit and not for the benefit of
a

a

a

be

his own

friends,

that the defendant

was entitled,

on proper

request

it

a

if

it

a

a

a

a

it

therefor, to have the rule with the proper limitations which we have
This was attempted by the counsel
tried to state, given to the jury.
was, as appears by the bill of exceptions,
for the defendant, but
contained
whole, and
series of charges to be given as
by asking
recovery he should have
the statement that to entitle the plaintiff to
real estate broker, and that Harrison knew it.
shown that he was
— for others than professional brokers may, in
not
law
This was
good
cases,
be
to compensation for services rendered in
entitled
proper
In strictmatters of this kind, and that without an express contract.
ness, therefore, the court was justified in refusing to give the charge
as a whole, though the other parts of
may have been entirely sound.
But we think the statement of the law as given by the court to the
jury. was. under the circumstances shown, misleading and erroneous,
in making the right of Gotleib to recover, to depend alone upon the
question whether he rendered the services for Harrison and that the
latter knew it. They should further have been instructed, that
the
service rendered by Gotleib was such as people usually charge for (in
this case
question of fact and not of law) and there was nothing diswhich would show that Gotleib had not the intention of ehargd
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a

it,

or that Harrison might well believe that he was not to
ing for
pay for such service, that they might properly infer
promise on the
This was not done, and for this reason we
part of Harrison to pay.
think the judgment should be reversed.

II. Wiikx the Agent Abandons
TIMBERLAKE
(Supreme

Court of Mississippi,

1S'J3.

v.

Agency

THAYER.

Miss.

71

the;

279,

14 South.

44G, 24

L. R. A.

231.)

a

a

a

is

If

it

it

J.9

a

6

Accord:

McLlney

v.

it

Gompraht,

7

§

4,

is

;

4

X

it

■

Misc.

Rep.

L69,

27

N.

Y. Supp.

263

(1884)

□

8 I

f

I

125 (1824),
528 (1837);

\. Esterly,

a

2

la

-;

Pari of iii'> opinion
omiued.
io Accord: Start v. Parker,
Pick. 287, 18 km. Dec
for the prevailing rule; <>
v. Reale, 19 Pick.
:;i
.".»;
Ooddard,
Am. !>.<•. (;.-'„s (isn2); Nellchka
Me. 10U.
if.. 12 n. W. i.'.t (1882). Tie rule baa
vigorously
in
leading ca
Brittoi v. Turner,
N. II. 181, 26
1
1
1
<
•
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a

a

Attachment against Vandiver and Trotter, makers, and Timberlake, indorser, of
promissory note. Case dismissed by plaintiff as
to Vandiver and Trotter.
Defendant claimed release by reason of
contract that plaintiff was to accept services from Vandiver in payment of the note. The trial court instructed the jury that
Vandiver
made an entire contract for services, but abandoned the service without the fault or consent of Thayer before the expiration of
year,
then Vandiver was entitled to nothing for the service actually rendered. From judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals.
Cooper,
we were authorized to make the law, instead of
as
announcing
already made, we would unhesitatingly hold
that one contracting to render personal service to another for
specified time could, upon breach of the contract by himself, recover from
that other for the value of the service rendered by him, and received
diminution of his demand to the extent
by that other, subject to
of the damage flowing from his breach of contract.
In Britton v.
Turner,
X. II. 481, 26 Am. Dec. 713. Judge Parker demonstrates,
in an admirable and powerful opinion, the equity of such
rule; and
was held in that case that such was the rule of the common law.
The courts of some of the slates have followed or been influenced by
that opinion, and have overturned or mitigated the vigorous rule of
the common law.
Pixler v. Nichols',
[owa, 106, 74 Am. Dec. 298;
Coe v. Smith,
End. 79, 58 Am. Dec. 618; Riggs v. Horde, 25 Tex.
Supp. 456, 78 Am. I'--. 584; Chamblee v. Baker, 95 X. C. 98; Parcell v. McComber, 11 Neb. 209,
X. \V. 529, 38 Am. Rep. 366.
But the decided weight of authority
to the contrary. 10
Lawson,
470, note
("out. Carr.
and authorities there cited.
And
was

leading

Miller

v.
'_'!» Minn.

assailed, especially
Am. Dec. 713 (1834).
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3

&

4

a

it

6

&

2

a

it,

decided at am early day in this state thai an entire contract of this
character could not be apportioned, and that, under the circumstances named, no recovery could be had by the party guilty of the
breach of contract ; that he could not recover on the special contract,
nor upon
quantum meruit,
because he himself had not performed
Wooten v. Read,
because of the existence of the special contract.
M. 634, and
Smedcs
In Hariston v. Sale,
M. 585.
Smedes
was held that an overseer's
Robinson v. Sanders, 24 Miss. 391,
definite time, was not
contract with his employer, though made for
an entire contract,
and recoveries were allowed on the common
The cases relied on to support the rule announced in these
counts.
McCord, 246, 17 Am. Dec. 740;
decisions were Byrd v. Boyd,

N. W.
this case, Cobb, J., in Parcell v. McCornber, 11 Neb. 209,
Rep. 366 (1881) says:
"There is an important question presented in this case, one upon which it
cannot bo claimed that the authorities, either as expressed in the opinions of
courts or the treatises of text writers, are agreed. Until the last fifty years it
was quite generally hold to be the law, both in England and in America, that
person, having agreed to work for another for a definite period of
where
time, voluntarily leaves such service without any fault on the part of the employer, and without his consent, before the expiration of the term, he cannot
The rearecover in any form of action for the services actually rendered.
soning upon which the decisions holding this view were generally sustained
well expressed by Morton, J., in delivering the opinion of the court in Olm'The plaintiff cannot
stead v. Beale, 19 Pick. 52S, in the following language:
recover on his express contract, because he has not executed it on his part,
He cannot recondition precedent to the payment.
and the performance is
quantum meruit for the labor performed, because an express concover on
tract always excludes an implied one in relation to the same matter.'
N. II. 481, 26 Am. Dec. 713, de"But in "the case of Britton v. Turner.
marked departure was taken from the former line of decicided in 1834,
Tn that case, one quite parallel to the case at bar, it was held that
sions.
party actually receives labor
character
contract is made of such
'where
benefit and advantage over aud above the
or materials, and thereby derives
damage which has resulted from the breach of the contract by the other parnew consideraty, the labor actually done, and the value received, furnish
tion, and the law thereupon raises a promise to pay to the extent of the reaAnd again: 'In fact we think the technical
sonable worth of such excess.'
condition precedent,
of the whole labor is
reasoning, that the performance
and the right to recover anything dependent upon it, that the contract being
and there being an express contract,
entire there can be no apportionment,
of service,
can be Implied, even upon the subsequent performance
th<
beneficial servis not properly applicable to this species of contract, where
reason to believe
ice has been "actually performed; for we have abundant
is that the hired laborer
thai the general understanding of the community
shall be entitled to compensation for the service actually performed, though
for, and such contracts must be
not continue the entire term contracted
unless an express
limed to be made with reference to that understanding,
beneficial service has been performstipulation shows the contrary. Where
under contracts of this kind, the mutual agreeed and received, therefore,
so
ments cannot be considered as going to the whole of the consideration,
as to make them mutual conditions, the one precedent to the other, without
"
specific proviso to that effect.'
Mich. 449 (1858); Duncan v. Baker, 21 Kan.
See. also, Allen v. McKibben,
7

la approving

a

a

a

i

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

6

a

a

is

5

:i

99
a
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oL",>, 38 Am.

(1878).

can be had if the contract of employment
forfeiture for wrongful abandonment by the agent.

No recovery

expressly stipulates
Harmon v. Salmon
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Eaken v. Harrison, 4 McCord, 249; McClure v. Pyatt, 4 McCord,
Of these the leading case is Byrd v. Boyd; the others simply
26.
follow it. In Byrd v. Boyd the court evidently legislates the exception into the law, and so, in effect, declared ; for, after referring
to the rule of the common law, the court proceeds to say, "There is,
however, a third class of cases for which it is necessary to provide,"
and then declares that these cases for which it is necessary for the
court "to provide" are "those where the employer reaps the full benefit of the services which have been rendered, but some circumstance
the overseer necessary and
which renders his discharging
not immediately connected with the
; and that, perhaps,
contract, as in the present case."
Judgment reversed.
occurs

justifiable

35 Me. 447, 58 Am. Dec. 718 (1853) ; Richardson v. Woehler,
Mich. 90 (1872).
If an agent abandons his undertaking he will not be entitled to commisScoville v.
sions, if his principal afterwards contracts with the third party.
Trustees of Schools, 65 111. 523 (1872); Warren v. Rendrock Powder Co., 56
On the other hand, if the contract proHun. 849, 9 N. Y. Supp. 842 (1890).
the agent may recover the installments
vides for payment in Installments,
Taylor
already earned, notwithstanding his refusal to complete the service.
v. Laird, 1 II. & N. 266; Cunningham v. Morrell, 10 Johns. 203, 6 Am. Dec.
And by the better rule, if the agent have a sufficient excuse for
332 (1813).
failure to complete the service, as sickness, he can recover what his services
are worth to the principal, deducting any damages sustained by the termination of the relation. Wolfe v. Bowes, -" \. V. 197, 75 Am. Dec. 3SS (1859);
Patrick v. Putnam, 27 Vt. 759 (1855); Patterson v. Gage, 23 Vt. 558, 56 Am.
absence, particularly for cause, may not
A mere temporary
Dec. 96 (1851).
Thrift v. Payne, 71 111. 408 (1874). The death
amount to an abandonment.
of the agent before the completion of the services is regarded as an act of
God which it is fair to assume, as an Implied term of the contract, the parThe contract is broken and
ties intended should excuse nonperformance.
recovery may be bad in quantum meruit, not in excess of the contract price,
for the' work performed, subject to deductions from any damage the princiClark v.
pal suffered because the agenl was unable to complete the service.
Gilbert, 26 N. Y. 279. M Am. Dec. 189 (1863); Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N. Y. 197,
75 Am. Dec. 388 (1859).

Falls Mfg. Co.,
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am>

iiatil
(Court

of

CM]

Appeals

v.

KKij.or.r,.
Fourth District,
\\ . 389.)

of Texas,
636,

RELATION

(i'art

3

11
1906.

42 Tex.

Civ.

App.

'.»i s.

is

§

is

it,

Hah] sold 1,000 acres of land for Kellogg at $29,500.
He telegraphed, "Sold your land twenty-two thousand to you."
Kellogg
this to mean $22,000, plus the agent's commission
understood
of
$1,000, and accepted.
When he learned the true price he sued Hahl
for S7. 500.
XiMi.L. J. 12 * * * It is hardly necessary to state the law apIt has been known and
plicable to the facts disclosed by this record.
recognized by mankind throughout all the ages. It is written in the
on the Twelve Tables, in the laws of every
Ten Commandments,
nation, and in the heart of every man.
Nor is it necessary to state
that the relation of principal and agent is fiduciary, requiring the
most perfect loyalty and the utmost good faith, the strictest integrity,
and the fairest dealing on the part of the agent to his principal.
Perry on Trusts,
§ 206; Bigel. on Fraud, 295; Kerr on Fraud, 152, 182;
Whart. Ag. 244, 245; Mech. Ag. §§ 465, 469, 470, 643. Therefore,
from the principles of law and equity applicable to the facts in this
case, it follows that the court did not err, as is urged in plaintiff in
in rendering judgment in favor of plaintiff
error's assignments,
against Hahl for $6,500. This disposes of the assignments of error
of the plaintiff in error.
By defendant in error's cross-assignments
it is contended that the
court erred in not rendering judgment in his favor of $7,500, for the
reason that Hahl, as an agent, was guilty of such fraud, gross misconduct, and bad faith to his principal as to deprive him of the right
to compensation
for his services.
Upon the question presented by
this assignment, the trial judge expressed doubt, not as to the facts,
but as to the law, upon which he deemed the authorities conflicting
and resolved the doubt in favor of the defendant.
The rule upon this
question, as we understand
that, where an agent
guilty of such
misconduct as amounts to treachery, or has wholly failed to recognize
the duties and responsibilities imposed upon him by his situation, he
should receive no compensation
whatever.
Mechem on Agency,
619; Story on Agency,
333, 334; Brannan v. Strauss, 75 111. 234;
Myers v. Walker, 31 111. 354; Sumner v. Reicheniker,
Kan. 320;
9

§§

Humphrey v. Eddy Transp. Co., 107 Mich. 163, 65 N. W. 13
For gross negligence or misconduct the agent may not merely lose
his commissions, bul be liable to liis principal for damages sustained thereby,
or for Interest on money in the agent's bands and not reported to the princiSidway v. Am. Mtg. Co., TSl III. 270, 78 N. E. 563 (1906), affirming 119
pal.
ill. App. 502 (1905); Porter v. Silvers. :;r,
<i. 295 (1871);
v.
Schleifenbaum
M Conn. 623, 71 Atl. 899 (1909).
Rundbaken,
Illegal agencies, see ante,
kecord:

(1895).

i
n
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12 Part of the opinion

is omitted.
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Cleveland & St. L. R. Co. v. Pattison, 15 Ind. 70; Vennum v. Gregory, 21 Iowa, 328; Sea v. Carpenter, 16 Ohio, 412; Libhart v. Wood,
1 Watts & S. 265, 37 Am. Dec. 461 ; Segar v. Parrish, 20 Grat. 672 ;
Xeilson v. Bowman, 29 Grat. 732; Jackson v. Pleasanton, 101 Ya.
2<2, 43 S. E. 574;
Jansen v. Williams, 36 Neb. 869, 55 N. W. 279,
in L. R. A. 207; Peterson v. Mayer, 46 Minn. 468, 49 X. W. 245,
"To
13 L. R. A. 72; Lahr v. Kraemer, 91 Minn. 26, 97 N. W. 419.
And,
settled."
is
well
this extent," says Mechem on Agency, "the law
after an extensive examination of the authorities, the writer has
been unable to find or recall an exception to the principle as stated.
Wherefore, we conclude that the defendant was not, under the facts
in this case, entitled to retain $1,000 as commission for the sale; and
that the judgment should have been for that sum in addition to the
Therefore, the judgment will be amended by adding that sum
$6,500.
to the amount rendered by the trial court, thus making the judgment
in favor of plaintiff against the defendant Hahl $7,500, and as so
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amended the judgment is affirmed.

III.

When the Agent is Discharged

MACFARREX
(Supreme

13

v.

GALLIXGER.

210 Pa. 74,
Court of Pennsylvania, 1904.
::i Pittsb. Leg. J. [N. S.] 390.)

Bill in equity for an account.
ant to sell lots.

59

Atl.

435,

affirming

Plaintiffs were employed by defend-

The contract was one of agency only, and therefore
PER Curiam.
A very material stipulation
revocable at any time for good cause.
of the- contract was that plaintiffs should "deposit daily all money
,ed" to the order of defendant, and, this not being done, defendant terminated the agreemenl ami took charge of the business
himself.
The finding of the court below on this point is that, "while
the terminating
of the contract may have resulted in loss to plaintiffs,
The agreemenl does not
thev alone are responsible for this h,ss.
upon all lots sold by plaintiffs; it provides
them
to
tor the payment
by defendant of 25 per cent, of moneys col: and paid over daily, which 25 per cent, is to be in full of all
This agreement, at least to the extent
demands for compensation.
that it requires daily payments, was almost continuously violated by
plaintiffs from the time the first payments were made to them under
ide for a commission

• mis
ia

until

The opinion

its termination."
on rehearing

is omitted.
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An account having been stated, it appeared that plaintiffs were
re-ml than the commissions
indebted to defendant in a greater am
The bill, theref ore, was properly dismissed.
tained by the latter.
Decree affirmed, at costs of appellants.

HILDEBRAND
(Supreme

v.

Court of Wisconsin,

AMERICAN FINE ARTS CO.
1901.

109

Wis.

171, 85 N.

W.

2G8, 53

L. R. A.

826.)

Suit by plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of Alfred L. Hildehrand. deceased, for damages for breach of a contract whereby
defendant agreed to employ deceased as salesman for defendant for
one year from January 1, 1897.
June 9, 1897, deceased was disDefendant alleged that the discharge
charged without his consent.
was for disobedience, negligence and because of the dissolute habits
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of deceased.

MARSHALi, J. 14 * * * The sole defense to plaintiff's claim
pleaded in the answer, that was supported by evidence on the trial,
and was then and is now insisted upon, is that the contract of em15
It is claimed that
ploy ment was entire and was terminated for cause.
the rule, that where an employe wrongfully terminates such a contract he cannot recover upon it for services rendered, applies to a case
14

Part of the opinion is omitted.

-•" As to the righl of the agenl to compensation
:e
when he is discharged,
Clover v. Henderson, 120 Mo. 367, 25 S. W. 175, 41 Am. St. Rep. 695 (1891)
ante, p. 229; Sheahan v. National S. S. Co., 87 Fed. L67, MO C. C. A. 593, ante,
P. 227.
ord: Royal Remedy Co. v. Gregory Grocer Co., 90 Mo. App. 53 (1901);
Strong v. West. 110 Ga. 382, 35 S. E. 693 (1900). in which the court says:
"Where an agency is prematurely terminated by the net of the principal, the
agent's right of recovery is measured by the terms of the agreement
See 1
Am. & Eng. Ene. Law list Ed.) p. 399, and authorities cited in note 3. It ap] cars in this ease that the work of getting possession of the property as to

which Mrs. Strong was equitably entitled to lie subrogated to the rights of the
Lombard Company was rendered very difficult on accounl of the failure of
the Lombard Company to pass to her the legal title, but this was finally accomplished by West, who, after recovery, was in possession with the right to make
;i sale.
It does not appear that be was mismanaging the property in any renor. with any degree of certainty, that he could not have made a sale
Cor a sufficient amount to have paid the deht and reimbursed
himself.
Under
erma of his contract he was entitled to a full opportunity to bring about
this result, and when he was deprived of this right by the explicit directions
of Mrs. Strong thai the property should be taken from his hands and turned
,:i of he,- own selection she thereby deprived
over to a
West
o r the means to which he had agreed to look for reimbursement
under the
of the original contract, and, having done so, she became liable to pay
him for his services."
C£ Milligan v. Owen, VS.; Iowa. 285, 98 X. W. 792 (1904) in which the principal gave the agent no definite assurance for the continuance of the agency.
The burden ol showing thai the agency was revoked before the expiration
Ilollingsvvorth v. Young Counof a reasonable time rests on the defendant.
ty, io Tex. Civ. App. 590, :u s. W. 1094 (1905).
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where such a contract has been terminated by the employer for cause.
In
Counsel for respondent seems to concede that such is the law.
conshows
evidence
the
that
that view it is insisted upon one side
clusively that the contract was entire, and therefore that plaintiff
cannot recover ; and upon the other that it was not entire, and therefore that the judgment is right. Whether the trial court considered
the turning point in the case to be the one in controversy between

In England it appears that if an employe is prevented from carrying out his contract to the end, because of the conduct of his emplover in discharging him for cause, he cannot recover for services
Smith, Mast. & S. (Ed.
rendered up to the time of the discharge.
Wood, Mast. & S. § 129. But, generally speak1895) pp. 220-222;
ing, such is not the law in this country. Id. § 130; 14 Am. & Eng.
Enc. Law, p. 793, and cases cited; 2 Suth. Dam. (2d Ed.) p. 1546;
Tavlor v. Paterson, 9 La. Ann. 251; Lawrence v. Gullifer, 38 Me.
The rule in England and this country is thus stated by Wood
532.
on Master & Servant, at section 84: "If the contract is for a term.
is at so much a day, week or
although the rate of compensation

yet if the contract is silent as to the time of payment, it is
entire and indivisible, and full performance must precede a right o\
rec overy," in the ab ence of circumstances showing that the contract
"So inexorable has
by the parties as entire.
was not understood
rule b~een regarded in England tli.it it lias been held that where
rvant hired tor a term dies before full performance, no recover)
could he had by his executors tor the wages earned at the time of

month,

is

r<
a

his death, and the same mle is held in the case of a servanl disi
I'm such is not now the rule in this cenmtry, but in ah
for cau e
contract,
where the servant is prevented from performing his
on
of
ith, or
being discharged from
eftnef by
entitled to rei
the service, whether rightfully or not, he
b)

'

ognized that the rule does not apply where performance is prevented
bv act of God or the conduct of the party charged with the liability.
In Meche'm, Ag. § 435, it is said that the rule that no recovery can
be had on an entire contract, without full performance, does not extend to those cases where the contract between the employer and
employe is terminated by consent of the employer.

si<
;
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counsel and decided it in respondent's favor, and in that way reached
the conclusion embodied in the judgment, does not definitely appear.
Both counsel have misconceived the principles governing the facts
of this case. The rule that an action cannot be maintained by an
employe upon an entire contract without first fully performing on
his part, does not apply where such performance is prevented by the
employer, though such prevention be for cause. In the leading case
in this court on the scope of the rule contended for, Diefenback v.
Stark, 56 Wis. 462, 468, 14 N. W. 621, 43 Am. Rep. 719, it was rec-

the

services

actually

rendered."
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may exist thai will enable an employer, who has
dischargee] an employe for cause, to defeat, in whole or in part, any
claim for wages up to the time 01 the discharge, but the mere fact
Me may
that the contract is entire will noi give him thai power.
recoup such damages as are allowable to him in such a case under
the rules of law. because of the conduct of the employe rendering
But they must he claimed in the pleading
his cTiscKarge necessary.
Mechem, A.g. § 619; Suth. Dam., suand established on the trial.
pra; Newman v. Reagan, 63 Ma. 7??. The text in Sutherland is well
Circumstances

applicable

to

a

case where an employe

under an entire contract

vol-

;

it,

is

and that applicable where such an employe
untarily abandons
prevented from carrying out his contract by the justifiable conduct
of his employer in discharging him. In the former case he cannot
in the latter he can mainmaintain an action upon the contract at all
of the discharge, subtime
tain such an action for wages up to the
damages.
recoup
to
ject, however, to the right of the employer

if

is

:

is

it

is

is

What has been said does not militate at all against the general
rule laid down in Diefenback v. Stark, supra, to the effect that when
entire, the consideration moving from each party to
contract
entire, and their rights are reciprocal, full performance
the other
by one being requisite to his claiming any benefit under the contract
admits of exHowever, like most general rules,
from the other.
the
that
which
one
being
ceptions, and there are several of them,
condition
The
preceviz.
here,
key to plaintiff's right of recovery
the contract be
waived
dent, of full performance by one party,

a

it

it

it,

is

by his
by the other party, regardless of whether
such
perwrongfully
preventing
or
mere consent or by his rightfully
entire
an
formance,
for
terminating
cause
the
'ldie only bearing
contract by one party has on the rights of the other seeking commay be stated as follows:
pensation for what he has done under
from
by consent of the other
withdraws
If one party to contract
thereof,
for what he has done
recover
can
he
after part performance
terminated

a

rate.
party to an entire contract, after part perbe prevented by the wrongful conduct of
him,
thereof
by
formance
he
to
such other complete performance,
from
rendering
other
the
can recover upon the contract for what he has done, at the contract
rate, and his damages for not being allowed to fully perform, not
exceeding the full amounl he could have earned by such perform
a

at the contract

If
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supported by the notes and is as follows: "The general rule, when a
servant is discharged for cause, is to allow him his w_ag.es to the time
of discharge, subject to deductions for his torts and deficiencies."
.X.. such damages were claimed here. On the contrary, as we have
-ecu. it was conceded on the trial that plaintiff was entitled to the
judgment rendered, unless precluded therefrom by reason of the contract of employment being entire.
There is danger, as is evidenced by this case, of confusing the law
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ance. If, after part performance of such a contract by one party,
he is rightfully prevented by the other from further performance, he
can recover on the contract for the part performance, not exceeding
the contract rate, being liable to respond in damages to the adverse
party to the amount of the latter's legal damages caused by the acts
that justified the termination of the contract.
The foregoing is in harmony with Walsh v. Fisher, 102 Wis. 172.
7S N. W. 437, 43 L. R. A. 810, 72 Am. St. Rep. 865 ; Winkler v.
Carriage Co., 99 Wis. 1S4, 74 N. W. 793 ; Dickinson v. Plow Co.,
101 Wis. 157, 76 N. W. 1108; and other cases decided by this court.
In this class of cases it is said the basis of recovery is the contract,
though the amount recoverable is by no means absolutely fixed thereby. It prima facie furnishes the standard from which to compute the
value of the claimant's services, and while the recovery cannot excomputable by such standard it may be reduced by
The rule is laid down in Wood, Mast. & S., at
suffered.
damages
section 130, thus : "A dismissal for cause before the expiration of
the term does not operate as a rescission of the contract so as to enaHe must either sue
ble the servant to sue upon quantum meruit.
upon the contract or for damages for its breach, and in either event
the result of his recovery is the contract price, subject to such deductions as the master is legally entitled to." That is to say, while
the person dismissed from service for cause cannot sue upon a quantum meruit, his recovery must be upon a quantum meruit on the contract basis, it being presumed that he earned and deserves the contract price for the time his services continued, till the contrary be
shown by evidence establishing a right to deductions therefrom as
In short, as said by one of the authorities
recoverable damages.
above quo ted, the discharged servant is entitled in any event "to his
but subject to deductions for his
es l" the time of his discharge,
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ceed the amount

16

torts and deficiencies."
It follows from the principles stated that the judgment appealed
from is right, regardless of any question presented in the briefs of
Plaintiff's intestate, after part performance
counsel for either side.
of his contract with appellant, was for good cause prevented from
rate, with
at the contract
Such performance,
co m pleting his term.
was rendered.
to the sum for which judgment
est, amounted
lined for the acts, of which the intestate yyas
, tii.it ii.
That being the situation at
ted his discharge.
ordered, there was nothing before the
to any diminution oi the amount earned
bv the intestate at the contracl rate.
The Judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
trie jiidgmenl
titling appellant

ie Accord:

was

Bhute v. McVltle

(Tex. Civ.

App.)

72 s.

W. 433 (ltxta);
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CO.

Minn. 156, 62 N. W. I'JO, 27 L. R. A.
Rep. 611.)

wtv. J. On the 25th of February, 1892, the plaintiff entered into
written agreement with tin- defendant corporation, whereby it agreed
:•> employ him as its assistant manager,
from and after that date, as
long as he should own in his own name 50 shares of the capital stock
"I said corporation, fully paid up, and the business of said corporation
shall he continued, not exceeding the term of the existence of said corporation, and pay him for such services the sum of $1,500 per annum,
payable monthly during that time, and whereby he agreed to perform
said services during that time. He has ever since owned, as provided,
the 50 shares of said stock, and performed said services ever since that
time until the 28th of October, 1893, when he was discharged and dismissed by the defendant without cause. He alleges these facts in his
complaint in this action, and also alleges that he has been ever since he
was so dismissed, and is now, ready and willing to perform said services as so agreed upon, and that there is now due him the sum of $125
for each of the months of March and April, 1894, and prays judgment
\ »r the sum of $250.
The defendant in its answer, for a second defense, alleges that on March 2, 1894, plaintiff commenced a similar action to this for the recovery of the sum of $512, for the period of time
from his said discharge to the 1st of March, 1894, alleging the same
facts and the same breach, and that on April 16, 1894, he recovered
(
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a

nent in that action against this defendant for that sum and costs,
and this is pleaded in bar of the present action. The plaintiff demurred
to this defense, and from an order sustaining the demurrer the defendant appeals.

The plaintiff brought each action for installments of w7ages claimed
to be due, on the theory of constructive service.
The doctrine of constructive service was first laid down by Lord Ellenborough in Gandell
v. Pontigny, 4 Camp. 375, and this case was followed in England and
this country for a long time (Wood, Mast. & Serv. 254), and is still
upheld by several courts (Isaacs v. Davies, 68 Ga. 169; Armfield v.
Nash, 31 Miss. 361 ; Strauss v. Meertief, 64 Ala. 299, 38 Am. Rep. 8).
It has been repudiated by the courts of England (Goodman v. Pocock,
15 Adol. & E. [N. S.] 574; Wood, Mast. & Serv. 254), and by many of
the courts in this country (Id.; and notes to Decamp v. Hewitt, 11
Rob. [La.] 290, 43 Am. Dec. 204), as unsound and inconsistent with
. as it assumes that the discharged servant has since his discharge
remained ready, willing, and able to perform the services for which
he was hired, while sound principles require him to seek employment
elsewhere, and thereby mitigate the damages caused by his discharge.
) lis remedy is for damages for breach of the contract, and not for
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But the courts, which deny his right to rewages for its performance.
cover wages as for constructive service, have denied him any remedy
except one for damages, which, if seemingly more logical in theory, is
These courts give him no remedy
most absurd in its practical results.
except the one which is given for the recovery of loss of profits for
the breach of other contracts, and hold that the contract is entire,
even though the wages are payable in installments, and that he exhausts his remedy by an action for a part of such damages, no matter
how long the contract would have run if it had not been broken. See
58 Am. Rep. 821 :
James v. Allen Co., 44 Ohio St. 226, 6 N. E. 246,
Woodworth,
31 Barb.
v.
Leverich,
401
Colburn
;
4 Daly,
Moodv v.
Dec.
160.
Am.
212,
82
Mo.
Co.,
33
v.
Railroad
381 ; Booge
all the damages for such a breach of such
a contract can furnish any adequate remedy, or do anything like subBy its charter the life of this corstantial justice between the parties.
is commenced immediately aftIf
the
action
poration is thirty years.
be assessed for this thirty
damages
breach,
how
can
prospective
er the
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No

one action to recover

To presume that the discharged servant
years, or for even one year?
of that time to obtain other employfor
a
able
large
part
will not be
ment, and award him large damages, might be grossly unjust to the
Again, the servant is entitled to actual indemnity, not to
defendant.
such speculative indemnity as must necessarily be given by awarding
him prospective damages. His contract was not a speculative one, and
the law should not make it such. That men can and do find employIt
ment is the general rule, and enforced idleness the exception.
not be presumed in advance that the exceptional will occur.
conflict with the rule that, in an action for retrospective
This
damages for such a breach, the burden is on ihe defendant to show
In that
that the discharged servant could have found employment.
When it apcase, as in others, reasonable diligence will be presumed.
pears that he has not found employment or been employed, there is no
it
presumption that it was his fault, and, under such circumstances,
should

is not in

But to presume
will be presumed that the exceptional has happened.
is
In
an action for
will
different.
very
the
happen
exceptional
that
services,
for
beyond
of
a
contract
damages
a
breach
prospective
such
and uncertain, and cann.a be asthe day of trial arc too contingent
ed. 2 Suth. Dam. 171 ; Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355; Fowler
routt v. Armour, 24 \la. 194; Wright v. Falkner, 37 Ala. 274;
Colburn
Then,

v.

Woodworth,

31

Barb. 385.

can have bu1 one action, it is m
sary for him to starve and wait as long as possible before commencing
it.
If he waits longer than six years after the breach, the statute of
If he
limitations will have run, and lie will lose liis whole claim.
brings hi- action within the six years, he will lose his claim tor the
( fader this rule, the mi
balance of the time after tin- 'lay i if trial.
if the discharged

10

servant

ill!-

ra
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is no greater than for
is a travesty on
remedy
a 6 or 7 year contract.
monthly,
for
a
has
weekly,
servanl
stipulated
the
Although
or quarterly income, it assumes that he can live for years without any
The fal
me, alter which time he \\ ill cease to live or need income.
lies in assuming that, on the breach of the contract, loss of wages
jes For the breach of a 30 year contract

Such

ol

a

1 profits, and that the same rule of damages apwhile in fact the cases are wholly dissimilar, and there is scarcely
In the one case the liability is absolute; in
a parallel between them.
the other it is contingent.
If the rule of damages were the .same, then,
■
the breach ^>i the contract for service, the discharged
in thi
:it should be allowed only the amount which the stipulated wages
•1 the market value of the service to be performed,
without regard
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to whether he could obtain other employment or not. If the stipulated
- did not exceed the market value of the service, he would be entitled to only nominal damages; and in no case could his failure to
Clearly, this is
find other employment vary the measure of damages.
In the one case the liability is a contingent liability for
the ride.
- : in the other case it is an absolute liability for loss of
Such contingent liability cannot be ascertained in advance of
profits.
the happening of the contingency, and that is why prospective damages
for loss of wages are too contingent and are too speculative and uncertain to be allowed, while retrospective damages for such loss are of
the n
On the other hand, if damages for loss of
tain character.
profits are too speculative and uncertain to be allowed, they are equal"The pecuniary advan•spective or retrospective.
- which would have been realized but for the defendant's act must
rtained without the aid which their actual existence would
The plaintiff's right to recover for such a loss depends on his
. ith sufficient certainty that such advantages would have re-■(], and. therefore, that the act complained
of prevented them." 1
Suth. Dam. (1st Ed.) 107.
It i
lion that the servant wrongfully discharged is entitled to
l"-s
of wages, and for the full measure of this indemnity
for
mity
the i
This liability accrues by installments on
rly liable.
Each contingency consists in the failure of
ntingencies.
t without
his fault to earn, during the installment period
amount of wages which he would have
rformed, and the master is liable for
- rule of damages is not consistent
with the docservice, but it is the rule which has usually been
hi'-h adopted that doctrine.
Under that docild be held liable to the discharged
servant for
rned, while in fact he is held only for indemnity for loss
The fici
instructive service is false and illogical, but
wen under that fiction is correct and logintract,

the
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It is simply a case of a wrong- reason given for a correct rule.
Instead of rejecting- the false reason and retaining the correct rule,
many courts have rejected both the rule and the reason. In our i
ion, this rule of damages should be retained; but the true grour
which it is based is not that of constructive service, but the liabilil

cal. 1T
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the master to indemnify the discharged servant, not to pay him wa
and this indemnity accrues by installments.
The original breach : total, but the failure to pay the successive installments constil
cessive breaches.
Since the days of Lord Ellenborough this
cases has been in some courts an exception to the rule that then
be but one action for damages for the breach of a contract, and there
are strong reasons why it should be an exception.
Because th<
charged servant may, if he so elects, bring successive actions i'>r the
installments of indemnity as they accrue, it does not follow that he
cannot elect to consider the breach total, and bring one action for all
his damages, and recover all of the same accruing up to the time <•{
trial. Fowler & Proutt v. Armour. 24 Ala. 194; Strauss v. Meertief,
64 Ala. 299, 38 Am. Rep. 8. But the wrongdoer can have
He should not be allowed to take advantage of
election.
wrong, and, for the purpose of preventing the use of any
remedy and defeating any adequate recovery, to insist that
breach is total.
The order appealed from should be affirmed. So ordered.

MERRIMAN
(Supreme

v.

Court

no such
his own
adequatg
his own

McCORMICK HARVESTING MACH. CO.
of Wisconsin, 1807. 08 WIb. 800, 71 v w Li

and dam;
Action to r
an agent's commissions,
Plaintiffs were employed to sell
ure to perforin contracts.

I

to
I,
machines and supplies, to house the machine
liver, set up and fairly start every
every machine sold. After taking twi
!, and the contract was annulled./
nine order-, plaintiffs
18
Then- w as n
cts : |
Winslow, J.
tatin
[After stati
nor
there an) vcrj ma
is
case,
of
the
serious dispul
cl made by tl
terial difference bel veen the findin
I with regard to the failui
those made by the circuit judj
till the order for binding twine, which Will
:in<l

if Tin- in iu-i Ice of the rule
irtli In th(
docl rlne of consl ru< I
nlz< d.
Neverthele i th<
cif consl ructlve sen Ice, even
in Hi,,.- 1. ad v. Ba< b, 7^ Md, 132, 27 Atl
St. Rep. 273 I lt»03) ; Howai d
and especially in James v. Allen County, it Ohl
-_'i (1SS7).
See, also, extended note In 51
Pari "f the opinion Is omitted.
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there was a radical difference between the legal conclusions resulting
from the facts. The referee was of opinion that the plaintiffs were
entitled to recover their full commissions upon all machines for which
they had taken orders, except when they afterwards furnished a different machine; while the circuit judge concluded that they were entor their services in obtaining the orders,
titled to no compensation
save

for the one machine delivered before the cancellation

of the con-

tract.

is

a

is

is

is

is

a

is

it

it

it

is

it

provision that commissions shall only be paid on machines sold and
Had the
settled for, and none shall be paid on orders not filled.
plaintiffs brought action for their commissions after taking the orders, and prior to the cancellation of the contract,
very certain
that they could not recover them, because they had not been earned,
nor could they have recovered upon quantum meruit, because the
contract
an entire contract as to each commission. Now the theory upon which the referee allowed the entire commission was that
imby the cancellation of the contract the defendant had rendered
hence
that they ought
out, and
possible for the plaintiffs to carry
to recover the full commission, because they were ready to carry
out, but were prevented by the defendant from doing so.
The well-settled rule
contractor's performance
that when

i.

2

stopped by the fault of the employer, he may recover upon quantum
meruit for what he has done, and also may recover damages for
being prevented from completing the work.
Suth. Dam. (2d Ed.)
713.
But this second element of damages,
e., the damages resulting from being prevented from completing the work, are plainly
Where the
given because of the wrongful stoppage of the work.
in
accord
with
contract
and
strict
stoppage
absolutely rightful,
ns, there can be no damages, because damages do not arise
from the proper exercise of
Now in the present case
legal right.
the parties had agreed that the defendant might at any time end the
contract, and take into its possession all orders, notes, accounts, moneys, machines, or other property of the defendant in the hands of
a

is

§
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We find ourselves unable to agree with either conclusion. We
think, under the provisions of the contract, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the reasonable value of their services in obtaining
the orders for machines which were afterwards actually filled with
McCormick machines, and no more. The reason for this conclusion we will briefly state. The contract provides for a certain commission upon the sale of each machine, which is to be earned, not
by obtaining the order alone, but by receiving and housing the machine, setting it up, and running
instructing the purchaser, receiving and transmitting the money or notes therefor, and by rendering
Manifestly the contract
other services connected with the sale.
not earned except by the perentire as to each commission, and
Furthermore, there
special
formance of all the requirements.

DUTIES AND
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(J29

The provision is certainly very drastic, but it is adthe plaintiffs.
mittedly a part of the contract, and no claim of fraud or mistake
is made with reference to it. Under these circumstances, the court's
duty is simply to construe it. It was put in the contract with a definite purpose, and that purpose plainly was to give the defendant
power to end the agency at any time, and place the entire business
This power must be reasonably construed.
It
in other hands.
should not be construed as depriving the plaintiffs of reasonable remuneration for their services already rendered in obtaining orders
which are afterwards filled with McCormick machines, 19 but it certainly must be construed as authorizing the defendant lawfully to end
the agency at any time, and thus rightfully to prevent the earning
It was certainly the duty of the plaintiffs
of the full commissions.
to surrender up the orders they had taken to the defendant when the
contract was canceled. Not only does the contract provide that they
shall do so, but it further provides that they shall not retain any of
We
defendant's property in their hands as security for commissions.
do not think, however, that, where it can be shown that any such
order was aftenvards actually filled with a McCormick machine, this
failure of duty should prevent the plaintiffs from recovering the reasonable value of their services in obtaining the order.
As it cannot
be ascertained from the evidence just how many of the orders taken
were afterwards filled with McCormick machines, nor what the reasonable value of the preliminary canvassing and procuring of such
orders was, further testimony must needs be taken upon these ques*
* *
tions.
Reversed and remanded.

IV. Commissions to the Agent

GILLETT
(Supreme

v.

CORUM.

Court of Kansas,

1871.

7

Kan.

156.)

20

This case comes here on error from the district
J.
court of Leavenworth county, this being its second visit to this tribunal. 5 Kan. 60S.
Oil the first trial in the court below, judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiff, (defendant in error here,) which
by this court reversed for error in the instructions.
On a second trial, the plaintiff again obtained judgment, which judgment is
now sought to he reversed, also on account of alleged errors in the
P.Rr.wr.R,

i» The discharge of an agent cannot affect tiis <■
missions already earned,
though aol 'lor until the deliver] of the goods Bold
Dibble v. Dlmlck,
L43
-V
549, 38 V i:. 724 (1894), affirming
Ml c. Rep. L90, 23 \. v. Supp. 880
Mfg. Go. \. Brewer, 7^ Ark. 202, 93
W. 785 (1906), unless
the contract
agency, Wheeler
(rotated
Wilson Mfg Co. v. Gal
livan, L0 Neb. 818,
x. W. 1061 (1880).
10 Part of the
omitted.
<'iani.ni
is

i

&

ol

In

8.

I

ST.
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The action was broughl to recover for services alleged
performed by Corum as the agent of Gillett, in the sale
of a tract of land. These facts appear from the testimony without
controversy: tli That plaintiff at one time was authorized by defendant to act as his agent in selling the land, and promised compensation
it he accomplished a sale: (2) thai he had some negotiations with a
man named Dunlap, concerning the sale of said land during the continuance o\ such authority: (3) that said Dunlap afterwards purchased
fr.un defendant, personally, said land, at a price not less than that for
which plaintiff was authorized to sell; and (4) that intermediate the
first suggestion by plaintiff to Dunlap of a sale of this land, and the
final consummation of the sale by defendant, Dunlap was absent in
the southern part of the state, for a few days, looking at land there.
There is a dispute in the testimony as to whether plaintiff's authority
as agent was revoked prior to the sale; whether negotiations between
plaintiff and Dunlap were broken off, and negotiations afterwards
commenced anew between Dunlap and defendant directly ; and also
what part, if any, plaintiff had in furthering the sale after Duninstructions.
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to have been

lap's return.
1. With this statement of the case let us examine the alleged erOur attention is called to three : First, the court refused to
rors.
give the eighth instruction asked by defendant, which reads as follows: "If Corum was authorized by Gillett to sell the land or find
a purchaser at a certain price, and Dunlap had not, at or before the
time he went south, proposed to take the land at that price, or at a
price which was afterwards accepted, and such a proposal was not
pending when he went south, and if before his return, or before negotiations were renewed, Corum's authority had been revoked or had
expired, and Dunlap afterwards went directly to Gillett and made a
bargain and purchased the land from him, Corum is not entitled to
.

er."

The court had just given,
two instructions:

at the instance

of the defendant,

these

was no proposition
pending between Corum and
I If there
Dunlap when Dunlap went south, and if before Dunlap returned
Gillett revoked the authority of Corum to sell, or such authority had
expired, and if afterwards Dunlap negotiated with Gillett himself
and purchased the land from him, Corum is not entitled to recover.
"i/i Unless Corum, while his authority continued unrevoked or
unexpired, had effected a bargain or sale, or had found a purchaser
in a condition and ready and willing to take the land on the terms
upon which Gillett had authorized Corum to sell, he, Corum, cannot recover."
These two instructions gave the
light for the defendant as he could
uction restates what is said in
to this objection, that the court is

law to the jury in as favorable
ask; and in so far as the eighth
the sixth and seventh, it is open
not bound to repeat what it has
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once said. It restates the law given in the sixth and seventh, hut it
narrows the essential statement so far as to render it justly objecWould not a
It reads: "If Dunlap had not proposed."
tionable.
been sufhave
Dunlap
an
and
acceptance
by
from
Corum
proposition
This instruction in effect tells the jury that unless Dunlap
ficient?
proposed to buy before Corum's authority was revoked, the latter
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It excludes everything but a proposition from
could recover nothing.
We think the court had fully stated the law, and properly
Dunlap.
refused the eighth instruction.
"If the plaintiff was
2. The court instructed the jury as follows:
in
and
pursuance of the authoragent of the defendant, as he claims,
of
the
premises, and put the purity given him found a purchaser
reference to the land,
with
communication
chaser and defendant in

and negotiations were thereby set on foot between them which led
to a bargain and sale of the premises, the defendant could not, by
taking the negotiations out of the hands of the plaintiff, and completing the sale in person, defeat the plaintiff's right to compensation."
the law were not as stated, the
We fail to see any error in this.
An
occupation of a real estate agent would be precarious indeed.
He looks around and finds a
agent is employed to sell real estate.
purchaser, one who is able and ready and willing to buy. He brings
the parties together and starts negotiations which result in a sale.
Can the principal after this discharge the agent, consummate the sale
We think not. That
himself, and rejuse the agent compensation?
He finds one.
fur,
find
a
is to
purchaser.
which the agent is employed

If

ITedgets the benefit of his labor and must pay fur it.
Law,
2
Hilt.
107.
Carman,
334;
v.
29
X.
Ludlow
Shepherd,
J.

The pri ncipa l
■i v.

The case cited by counsel for plaintiff in error (McGavock v. Woodlief, 20 How. 221, 15 L. Ed. <S84) is not in point. There the agent
had brought a supposed purchaser t<> his principal; the terms named
But, when
had been accepted : a contract reciting those terms signed.
they came to the execution of the deeds and the payment of the consideration,

the supposed purchaser was unable to pay, and the atThe agent found a party who was willing
tempted "-ale fell through.
1 fe therefore found no purchaser, and
to buy. but not able nor ready!
"was entitled to no commission. 21 * * *
Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
Warren Chemical A Mfg. Co. v. Bolbrook, 118 N. Y. 586, 28 N.
Qrogan v. Smith, 7 T. L. R. L32, ? Eng.
L6 Am. St. Rep. 788 (1890);
The third party must be willing to contract on the
Bui. Cas, 533 (1890).
■(fled terms or the agenl baa aol earned bis commissions.
Alta Investmenl
Co. v. Worden, 25 Colo. 215, 53 Pac. L047 (1898).
2i

I.

Accord:

908,

EFFECTS
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PATTERSON.

of Appeals of Maryland,

L881.

58 Md. 226.)

Attrill owned a controlling interest in the Crescent City Gas Light
Company of New Orleans, and desired to make some arrangement to
buy the works of the old Company, the New Orleans Gas Light ComHe offered Patterson $50,000 if he would go to New Orleans
pany.
and effect some compromise of the conflicting claims of the two companies. The efforts failed and Patterson advised suit. Attrill finally
brought suit and was completely successful, in consequence of which
he was able to amalgamate the new with the old company on favorable
terms.
Patterson demanded his $50,000, but was refused and brought
suit. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appealed.
Irving, J. 22 * * * It may be laid down, as a general rule, that
an agent's authority to act for a principal, is always revocable at the
will of the principal; and may at any time be put an end to by withdrawing the authority; unless the authority be coupled with an interest ; or has been conferred on the agent for a valuable compensa1 Parsons on Contracts,
69;
tion moving from him to the principal.
Wharton on Agency, 95, and notes; Story on Agency, §§ 463 and 464;

v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 174, 5 L. Ed. 589 ; Simpson v. Lamb,
53 Pa. 266;
Hartley's
E. C. L., 603; Blackstone v. Buttermore,
Appeal, 53 Pa. 212, 91 Am. Dec. 207; Creager v. Link, 7 Md. 259.
What constitutes an authority coupled with an interest, the decisions
without exception, are agreed about. In Hunt v. Rousmanier already
cited, Chief Justice Marshall says, it "is an interest in the thing itself
on which the power is to be exercised, and not an interest in that
which is to be produced by the exercise of the power." In Blackstone
53 Pa. 266, the same rule is laid down in almost the
v. Buttermore,
same terms, and that is now the doctrine of all the text books.
There is a class of cases, where, if the agent has done something
in virtue of his authority, and incurred expense before the agency
For example, if the
is revoked, he will be entitled to be reimbursed.
negotiations of a broker employed to sell property be broken off by
the principal, after he has gone to trouble and expense in the matter,

Hunt

84

for what he has aone, on a quantum
This
§ 329; Wharton on Agency, § 322.
case having been assimilated to the case of a broker to sell real or
personal estate, or negotiate a loan, it is necessary to lay down the
that the broker
general rule applying to such agents. The rule
after
not entitled to his commissions till the work
complete; but,
the sale
virtually effected, the principal takes the matter into his
own hands, and revokes the agency, he cannot escape the payment of
In such cases, and there are many of them in the
commissions.
will

be entitled

to recover

is

22

Part of the opinion is omitn

rl.

is

is,

Story on Agency,

if

he

meruit.

is
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is

It

is,

if

if

;

a

of

first begun, because of some publications by the agent, who sued for
commissions, were broken off.
Several months afterwards, by the
other parties, the purchaser was induced to renew the
influence
The court of final resort, said the
treaty, and bought the property.
plaintiff, was improperly allowed to recover commissions, and judg-

a

is

a

a

It

ment was reversed.
Applying these principles to the case in hand, we cannot see how
Patterson can be regarded as having contributed, in any proper legal
can hardly
of the result finally attained.
sense, to the production
to
conof
terms
dictation
It
the
was
be termed
compromise.
he
advised
that,
because
insists
Patterson
foe.
But
or
captured
quered
for the "compromise,"
entitled to his compensation;
the suit, he
The inof the suit, "was
good one."
ed at the termination

b)

;

it

in

by

A

It

1

tad the bare instistitution of the suit did not bring the compromise.
tution of suit brought the compromise, Patterson's claim would be
was, however, nothing less than the judgment of
better founded
OUrt of last resort, after tedious and costly litigation that rendered the old company helpless, that brought consolidation.
si-ntial condition, then, in the original contract, was not fulfilled
the agent,
lie did not procure the compromise.
Earp v. Cum
All the parti
ible to speak on the subject, as
min-, say he did nothing towards bringing
and they were not
aboul
The
influenced,
anything he had done.
the slightest degree,
original contract, as we have said, did not give Patterson unlimited
in
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a

a

it

it,

books, the broker is regarded as having earned his commission or
compensation, by being the procuring cause of the transaction being
Ewell's Evans on Agency, § 453 ; Keys v. Johnson,
consummated.
In Keener v. Harrod & Brooke, 2 Md. 71, 56 Am. Dec.
68 Pa. 42.
706. Judge Tuck, speaking for this court, expounds the principle controlling such cases thus: "We understand the rule to be this, (in
the absence of evidence of usage,) that the mere fact of the agent
having introduced the purchaser to the seller, or disclosed the names
by which they came together to treat, will not entitle to compensation ; but, if it appears, that such introduction or disclosure was the
foundation on which the negotiation was begun, conducted, and the
sale made, the parties cannot afterward, by agreement between themselves, withdraw the matter from the agent's hands, so as to deprive
This case, and all others are in harthe agent of his commissions."
establishes the rule that the agent must be the procuring
mony with
being consummated.
cause of the transaction, whatever
matter of proof.
The fact that the agent brought the parties tothe transaction was consummated
presumption,
gether, might raise
but that
he
was
the procuring cause
thereafter,
that
in
short time
396, 93
Cummins,
Pa.
54
v.
done
in
rebutted,
as
was
Earp
could be
anybody
Am. Dec. 718, where the purchaser (who the court said,
knew, must know) testified he "was not influenced at all in making
There, the negotiations, which were
the purchase, by the agent."
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powers, to settle the matter by any means whatever, including costly
fee, no
so thai he should be entitled to lus contingent
litigation,
* Reversed.
* *
matter \n>\\ the result was brought about. 8'

LA FORCE
(Kansas City Court

v.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY.

of Appeals,

Missouri,

1904.

10G Mo.

App.

517,

81

S. W.
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209.)

This action was instituted by plaintiff to recover a
ELLISON, ].'-*
commission for the sale of real estate in Kansas City, Mo., belonging
The trial court found against the plaintiff, and, judgto defendant.
for defendant, the former appealed.
entered
ment being
It appears that the plaintiff resided in Kansas City, and that the
defendant was at St. Louis, and that they entered into a written conThis contract was executed
tract concerning the sale of the property.
on the 21st of October, 1901, and was to be in force for the limited
But some
time of 90 days, which period expired January 21, 1902.
10 or 12 days before the limit expired it was extended, by mutual
agreement, for a period of 30 days further ; such extension expiring
Before the contract was executed, plaintiff
on February 21, 1902.
thought he could sell the property if he had the exclusive control
of it. He had especially in view as purchasers a firm of wholesale
merchants in Kansas City. We here set out the contract: "Kansas
City, Mo., Oct. 21, 1901. This memorandum of agreement, by and

between Washington University, a corporation under the laws of Missouri, party of the first part, of St. Louis, Missouri, and Felix L. La
Force, of Jackson county, Missouri, party of the second part, witnesscth : Said party of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum
of one dollar paid by second party, the receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged, does hereby give the said second party the exclusive
m and privilege to buy their southeast corner of Eighth and May

streets, Kansas City, Missouri [describing it], The price agreed upon
by said first party to sell to said second party, is the sum of fifty-six
thousand and five hundred dollars, net, for the 150x142 feet, no comTerms: Cash, or one-third
mission to be paid by said first party.
at five per cent, from Janinterest
bear
cash; deferred payments to
or
to purchase is to run for
21st,
1902.
This
contract
option
uary
of purchase by the said
the
event
In
from
this
date.
ninety days
Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378, 38 Am. Rep. 441
Accord:
(1881); Kelly v. Marshall, 172 Pa. 396, 33 Atl. G90 (1896); and Lumley v.
Nicholson, 34 Wkly. Rep. 716 (1886), In which the principal actually did afterward contract with parties introduced to him by the agent.
The fad thai an agenl has procured a customer for his principal does not
Gilbert v. Quinlan, 59 Hun,
mortgage the business of Buch customer forever.
Curtis v. Nixon, 24 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 70(5
508, 13 N. V. Supp. 'ill (1891);
(1871).

■t of the opinion
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second party or his assigns, the said first party is to convey said real
estate free and clear of all incumbrance, except West Terrace Park
assessment ; and they also agree to furnish a complete abstract from
government down to date, also certificates as to judgment and taxes.
In the event second party elects to buy said real estate within the time
herein agreed, or sells the same, the said first party is to give the second party or his assigns thirty days' extra time to examine title and
Said thirty days' extra time is to date from the date
close the deal.
In the event said second party fails
of expiration of this contract.
of
the terms of this contract as herein specified,
to take advantage
this instrument becomes void." On the reverse side is the following:
"St. Louis. Mo., Jan. 10, 1902. By mutual consent the above contract

until February 21, 1902."
During the first 90-day period plaintiff made diligent effort to sell,
but towards the latter part he saw he would not be able to consummate a sale within the time limited, and he sought an extension for
The defendant refused that length of
another period of 90 days.
time, but did extend the contract for a period of 30 days, as already
Plaintiff faithfully
stated, and as is shown in the copy just set out.
time, but without
extended
pur.-ued his endeavor to sell through the
within which
extension
obtain
another
to
He
endeavored
success.
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is extended

he

hoped

to make

a sale,

but defendant

refused.

Several

months

after the expiration of the extended time, defendant sold the property
to the wholesale linn with whom plaintiff had been negotiating from
Plaintiff claimed the usual and customary commission
the beginning.
on sales of that magnitude, which defendant refused to pay, contend-

* * *
ing that it was under no obligation to pay any amount.
So, conceding that the contract made plaintiff an agent to sell, it
is manifest that such agency was a definite and limited agency in the
following particulars, viz.: that it was for a specific period (including
< October 21, 1901, that the price should
extension) of 120 days from
to be no commission charged.
It is
there
was
and
that
be $56,500;
Now,
conceded that thr sale was not made within the time limited.
the law is that, even wh< re there is n<> specific time named as limiting
the agency, and a reasonable time elapses without a sale (circumstances considered), the owner may in good faith, without design to
avoid payment of commission, revoke the agency and sell to the party
Sibbald v. Iron Co., 83
with whom the agent had hem negotiating.
. ?<7x, 38 Am. Rep, 1 11 : Wylie v. Bank, 61 N. Y. 415;
Stedman
1':" I.
Fairchild v. Cunningham,
v. Richardson,
79, 37 S. W. 259;
Bj much greater reason, therefore, should
84 Minn, 521, 88 WW. 15.
it he said that, where parties stipulate that an agency t<> sell another's

property i- limited to a definite period, it will terminate at that period; and. if a air ha- not been made within the time, no COmpen i
tion (in the ah en i of fraud) can be recovered on accounl of a subThe law has I"' n repeatedly so declared.
sequent -ale by the owner.
v. Griffin, 71 Mo. App. 524; Beauchamp v. Higgins, 20 Mo. App.
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>; AntisLOO Ky. 79, 83, 37 S. W. 25
Stedman v. Richardson,
in his
Mechem,
\Y.
N.
944.
del v. Canfield,
119 Mich. 229, 236, 77
work on Agency, § 965, says that: "It will be seen from this rule
that when the time is limited the performance must ho within that time,
and the broker will not he entitled to commissions because efforts
28
begun within that time hear fruit after its expiration."
It seems that the plaintiff must have recognized that such was the

514;

law, for he incorporated in the contract a stipulation which protected
him, in case the time should expire after he had made the sale, but
before it was consummated, viz.: that, in the event he should sell
the property "within the time herein agreed," the defendant would
give "thirty days' extra time to examine the title and close the deal."
the contract is to he construed as creating an
And that is not all.
agency, it was not only for a specific time, but it was authority to
The condispose of it for a designated net sum, without commission.
withdisclose,
of
the
parties
tract and the subsequent correspondence
defendant
that
understood
the
that
or
parties
out doubt
question,
would be satisfied to receive the amount named, and that plaintiff was
Upon
to have all over that amount he could obtain for the property.
that basis plaintiff sought, and very properly sought, to obtain a price
several thousand dollars in advance of the price named in the conIf he had been successful, his compensation would have been
tract.
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If

The compensation
manyfold greater than the sum he now claims.
If he succeeded, it might be very
for plaintiff's labor was contingent.
* * *
large ; and if he failed it would be nothing.
Affirmed.

ATTERBURY
(Kansas City Courts of Appeals,
99

v.

HOPKINS.

Missouri,

1906.

122

Mo. App.

172,

S. W. 11.)

Ellison, J. 26 Defendants

engaged the plaintiffs, for a stated commission, to sell or exchange for them their stock of hardware and a
Plaintiffs charge that
house and lot, all in the town of Brunswick.
they procured a purchaser for the property, and that defendants refilled to pay them their commission, whereupon they instituted this action. They prevailed in the trial court.
Much of the matter urged by appellants against the judgment is outside the issues made by their answer, and the theory upon which they
tried the case in the circuit court.
The answer admits the employment of plaintiffs, and that they procured a purchaser, and sets up but
one defense, and that is that plaintiffs accepted employment at their
25 it is enough however if the agent procure customers able and willing to
perform, even though the principal cannot, or does not, contract with such
Kelly v. Phelps, 57 Wis. 425, 15 N. W. 385 (18S3).
customer.
2(5 Part of the opinion is omitted.
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hands when, without their knowledge or consent, plaintiffs were also
The law is that one cannot sein the employment of such purchaser.
cretly act for one party while in the employ of the opposing party, and
"that, if he does, he forfeits all right to compensation at the hands
The reason for this just
of" the party thus deceived and betrayed.
rule ceases, however, if there is no deception, and each of the oppos"If, having full knowledge
ing parties are aware of the dual agency.
of his relations to each, they see fit mutually to confide in him, there
can be no legal objection to such an employment, nor will either of
the principals be permitted afterwards to escape responsibility beMechem on Agency, § 67;
cause of such double employment."
27
The issue
McGuire, 108 Mo. App. 594, 84 S. W. 164.
in respect to the law thus stated was fully and fairly submitted to
the jury, and the verdict, being supported by the evidence we accept
* * * Judgment affirmed.
as conclusive.
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Stripling

v.

SECTION 2.— REIMBURSEMENT

ADAMSON
(Court of Common Pleas,

1827.

AND INDEMNITY

JARVIS.

v.
4

Bing.

66,

13 B. C.

L.

403.)

Best, C. J.
A motion has been made in arrest of judgment
count, on which only
after verdict. The plaintiff relies on the second
his verdict and judgment are to be entered.
Stripped of the technical language with which it is encumbered,
the case stated on the second count is this: that the defendant having property of great value in his possession, represented to the
plaintiff that he had authority to dispose of such property; and followed this representation by a request, that the plaintiff would sell
The plaintiff, believing the repthe property for him, the defendant.
resentation of the defendant as to his right to the property, and nol
knowing, either at the time the representation was made, or at any
time after, that it was not his, as the agent of the defendant, sold
and after paying such sums out of the proceeds
the property;
as bound to pay, and making such deductions as he had a righl
28

r
be distinctions between Illegal and i<"-:ii doable agencies are discussed
at length In Bell v. McConnell,
37 Ohio St 396, n Am. Rep. 628 (1881), wl
from i>«itii principals, where
flnds ii«. objection to recovery of commissions
both are fully advised, and consent t<> the doable employment, though such

in such case each principal gi
transactions
are regarded with suspicion,
what he contracted for, and should paj for It The rule forbidding double
i^ for the benefit of the principals, and if they consent to i' that i
nn end to the objection.
Fryer v. Barker, L42 Iowa, 708, 121 N. \v. 526, -•"•
mte, p. 518 IT.
I. i:
\. i.\. s.i 177 (1909).
B
Part ol the ■•;Inion I omitted,

in
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to make, and which the defendant appears to have allowed, paid the
residue to the defendant,
The defendant, who had induced the plaintiff to make this sale by
his false representation and requesl to sell, and who, after the sale,
continued to assert his right to sell, and confirmed the agency of the
plaintiff by accepting from him the residue of the proceeds of the
The consequence has
sale, had no right to dispose of this property.
been, that the plaintiff, supposing, from the defendant's false representations, he had an authority which he had not, and acting as the
defendant's agent, has rendered himself liable to an action at the
suit of the true owner of the goods, and has been obliged to pay dam-

costs, whilst the defendant, the sole cause of the sale, quietly
herns the fruits of it in his pocket.
It has been stated at the bar that this case is to be governed by the
—
principle- that regulate all laws of principal and agent: agreed:
every man who employs another to do an act which the employer
appears to have a right to authorize him to do, undertakes to indemnify him for all such acts as would be lawful if the employer had the
authority he pretends to have. A contrary doctrine would create
great alarm.

a

if,

Auctioneers, brokers, factors, and agents, do not take
having
These would be indeed surprised,
demnities.
man and paid him the proceeds, and having suffered
for
in an action at the suit of the true owners, they were to
selves wrong-doers, and could not recover compensation

regular insold goods
afterwards
find themfrom him

it

2

a

is

is

a

is

8

who had induced them to do the wrong.
T. R. 186,
It was certainly decided in Merryweather v. Nixon,
contribution;
Lord
for
another
sue
that one wrong-doer could not
of
cases
not
affect
would
decision
the
Kenyon, however, said, "that
unnot
do
acts,
to
another
man
employed
indemnity, where one
right." This
lawful in themselves, for the purpose of asserting
intelligible.
that
on
the
subject
case
decided
tin- only
Vern. 592, but
There
case of Walton v. Hanbury et ah,

of

is

it

is

impossible to get at the principle
stated, that
so imperfectly
of the judgment.
The case of Philips v. Biggs, Hardr. 164, was never decided; but
the Court of Chancery seemed to consider the case of two sheriffs
of Middlesex, where one had paid the damages in an action for an
tzvo
as like the case
escape, and sued the other for contribution,

joint obligors.
From the inclination of the Court on this last case, and from the
concluding part of Lord Kenyon's judgment in Merryweather v.
Nixon, and from reason, justice, and sound policy, the rule that
wrong-doers cannot have redress or contribution against each other
confined to cases wdiere the person seeking redress must be presumed to have known that he was doing an unlawful act.

is
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of another from a person who has no auis a wrong-doer to the person whose goods
he takes ; yet he may recover compensation
against the person who
sold the goods to him, although the person who sold them did not
undertake that he had a right to sell, and did not know that he had
no right to sell.
That is proved by Medina v. Stoughton, 1 Salk.
210; Sanders v. Powel, 1 Lev. 129; Crosse v. Gardner, Carth. 90;
a man buys the goods

thority to sell them,

he

Roll. Abr.

91, 1. 5. and many other cases.
These cases rest on this principle, that if a man, having the possession of property which gives him the character of owner, affirms
that he is owner, and thereby induces a man to buy, when in point
of fact the affirmant is not the owner, he is liable to an action.
It has been said, that is because there is a breach of contract to rest
the action on, and that there is no contract in this case. This is not
the true principle: it is this: he who affirms either what he does not
know to be true, or knows to be false, to another's prejudice and his
own gain, is both in morality and law guilty of falsehood, and must
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1

answer in damages.
But here is a contract: the plaintiff is hired by defendant to sell,
which implies a warranty to indemnify against all the consequences
that follow the sale.- 8 * * *

Rule discharged.
- ■r ri Hoggan

Cahoon, 20 Ftnh. 441. 7" Par. 512, Oft Am. St. Pep. 837
pui- the matter thus: "if the allegations arc in fact true,
the plaintiff baa a righl of recovery.
The facts stated arc such as to characterize the case a- an exception to the rule of law that tori feasors or wrongThat rule applies to cases
doers cannol have redress against each other.
(1903),

v.

tin- court

where he who seeks redress knew or musl be presumed to have known that
the transaction
which resulted in the damages he was compelled to pay was
in this
tortious ami unlawful.
But where, as appears from the allegations
an agenl arts in good faith tor his principal, under the principals dithat the transaction is lawful,
rection, and relies upon his representations
and the same is not manifestly unlawful, the law implies Indemnity, for damof third parties, to the agenl from the principal; and if. as the result
of acta bo performed, the agenl is mulcted In damages, the principal must
respond to the agenl for the Bame, as well as for the necessary expenses Incurred in resisting the claims of third parties who were Injured by the tr.in-action.
The agenl lias the right to assume that the principal will not call
upon him to perform any duty which would render him liable in damages to
Having do personal Interest in the act, other than the per
third persons.
formance of hi- duty, the agent should not be required to suffer loss from
the doing of an act apparently
lawful in Itself, and which he has undertakami for the benefit ami advantage of his principal.
en to <io bj the direction
if in the performance of such an act, therefore, the agenl invades the rights
of third persons, and imurs liability to them, the loss Should fall rather lift
on him for whose hem-lit and by whose direction
it was done, than upon him
then,
Wherever,
whose only intention was to do hi- duty to his principal.
the agent is called upon by hi- principal to do an act which is not manifestly
Illegal, ami which he does not know to he wrong, the law implies a promise
the agent for such losses ami dam
on the part of the principal to Indemnify
from the execution of the agency.
Bow directly and Immediately
Thus an agent i- entitled to he Indemnified when he is compelled to pay dam
for taking personal property by direction of hia principal, which, though

EFFECTS

C40

a\i>

BACON
(City

Ooturl

of New

OF THE

CONSEQUENCES

v.

FOURTH

RELATION

(Part 3

NAT. BANK. 80

York, Trial Term,

L889.

9 N.

Y. Supp. 435.0

J. The foes paid to the attorneys in Boston were exfrom which the law implies a request
circumstances
pended
to pay for them on the part of the plaintiff. Legal advice and services may he as necessary to protect the property as the aid of a physician or surgeon is to protect life. Neither may prove serviceable in
some cases, in others extremely so, depending in a measure on results.
Prudence requires their employment in all cases wherein property
It would be negligence not to employ profesor life is imperiled.
sional aid in cases requiring it. The result does not determine the
The condition of things at the time
riety of the employment.
must decide that. A party who acts according to the best lights that
It is
can be obtained at the moment is not negligent, but discreet.
McAdam, C.
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under

elementary that an agent is not permitted to reap any of the profits
of his agency properly belonging to his principal; so, on the other
hand, he is entitled to be indemnified against all losses which have
Story, Ag. §§
been innocently sustained by him on the same account.
339, 340; Ewell's Evans, Ag. 473 ; Howe v. Railroad Co., 38 Barb. 124.
The naked depositary ought neither to be injured nor benefited in
In an emergency he
any respect by the trust undertaken by him.
has an implied authority to incur expenses on behalf of the owner
for the preservation of the property. Edw. Railm. § 66.
It is a familiar rule that an agent has the duty of taking such steps
necessary for the protection of his principal's inas are reasonably
terests, and for the preservation of his principal's property, and
that, having made outlays for that purpose, he is entitled to reimbursements at the hands of his principal. Story, Ag. § 335 ; Whart.
Ag. § 314. The reason of the rule is that a request on the part of the
principal is inferred where the advances are made in the regular
course of business, or even on the spur of some pressing urgency not
provided for by any rule, since the employer may fairly be taken to
have authorized the employed to make the expenditure under any circumstances that a prudent man would conceive necessary for the
In Harter v.
Smith, Merc. Law, § 169.
safeguard of his interest.
claimed adversely by another, he has reasonable ground to believe to belong
to bis principal.'
Mechem on Agency, § 653."
An Innocent agent who has been arrested and imprisoned for obeying the
orders <>f his principal can recover from the principal damages therefor.
Howe v. Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie R. Co., 37 N. Y. 297 (1807), affirming 38 Barb.
124

p

Accord:
Carson v. Ely, 28 Mo. 378 (1859), where the condition of the
demanded Immediate expenditure by the agent to preserve them. Propcidental charges and expenses for warehouse room, duties, freight, salrepairs, journeys, and other acts, to preserve the property, and to enthe objects of the principal are to be paid by
title agenl to accomplish
Ruffner v. Hewitt, 7 \v. Ya. 585, 609 (1874).
him.
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Blanchard, 64 Barb. 617, the rule was applied to the case of a horse
which, while in the bailee's possession, had his leg broken; and it
was held that the bailee had, from the nature of the case, an implied
authority to contract in behalf of the bailor with a competent farrier
for the care of the animal. Indeed, this just rule of implied authority
and indemnity pervades the law of principal and agent, and of bailments as well.
The expenditure made by the Maverick National
Bank was the proper exercise by it of the discretion conferred by the
nature of the transaction. It was reasonable in amount, the services
rendered were necessary, and there is no principle of justice that requires that it should lose the amount so paid. The expenditure was
to protect the plaintiff's interest in the property; was made for his
sole benefit, at a place far distant from his residence, and impliedly
at his request.
The expenditure, being a proper one, was legally
authorized, and is a good counterclaim against the plaintiff; and,
the cause of action for the balance of his demand having been legally
discharged by payment into court, it follows that there must be judgment for the defendant, with costs from the time of such payment.
Dakin v. Dunning, 7 Hill, 30, 42 Am. Dec. 33; Becker v. Boon, 61

N. Y.

332.

POWELL
(Supreme

v.

TRUSTEES OF, VILLAGE OF NEWBURGH.

Court of Judicature

of New

York,

1S22.

19

Jolms.

2S4.)

Special action on the case. The declaration contained the usual
money counts, for costs and expenses paid out by plaintiffs while
trustees of the village of Newburgh in defending a suit for closing a
They successfully defended the suit, but their successors,
highway.
the present trustees, refused to reimburse them.
SPENCER, C. J. On the argument of the cause, I confess the inclination of my mind was strongly against the plaintiff's right to recover; but subsequent reflection and examination has led me to a
different conclusion.
I will state some adjudged
cases, that bear strong analogy to the
ut. and then deduce sonic general rules from them.
In Ramsay v. Gardner, 11 John*.. 439, the defendant, being in want of money,
d to tlie plaint iff to inform him bow he should draw a sum of
. from a relation
in Scotland;
it resulted in the defendant's
drawing a bill, which the plaintiff endorsed and negotiated; the bill
returned prot< sted, and the plaintiff had to pay _'() per cent, dam
It was objected to the plaintiffs recovery, thai the plaintiff
nol authorized to sell the bill, bm that having doni
d be
CMme liable in damagi
. it was his own fault, and he OUghl to hear
the loss.
It was decided, that the plaintiff acted a> tin- defendant's
: iii
the negotiation "i the hill, withoul
an) expected benefit;
<Iodd.Pb.A

a. — ii
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that the damages were paid by the plaintiff as agenl ; and judgment
was given for the plaintiff,
tn Exhall v. Patridge and others, 8 Term
Rep. 308, the plaintiff's goods happened to be on premises chargefor rent in arrear, and the
able with rent; they were distrained
plaintiff was obliged to pay the rent to redeem them; it was held,
that he might maintain an action for money paid to the use of the
original lessees, who were In >und by covenant to pay the rent. In
Child v. Morley, 8 Term Rep. 610, the plaintiff, a broker, contracted,
by the authority of the defendant, for the sale of stock at a future

day; the defendant refused to make good the bargain by paying the
difference, whereupon the plaintiff paid the difference, and brought
his action against his employer; it was decided that the broker
might recover in a special action on the case, but not on an implied
In the case of
promise, because he had paid the money voluntarily.
D'Arcy v. l.yle. 5 Bin. 441, it was decided, that damages incurred
by an agent, without his own fault, in the management of the principal's affairs, or in consequence of such management, must be borne
The case was thus: The plaintiff went to Cape
by the principal.
Francois, with a power of attorney to demand a debt of Suckley &
He
On the voyage, the power of attorney was lost.
Co. there.
stated this to S. & Co. who consented to deliver up the goods of
the defendant ; but before the goods were delivered, they were attached by the creditors of S. & Co. The plaintiff interposed a claim
in behalf of the defendant, and the goods were delivered to the plaintiff, by the decree of the Chamber of Justice. The plaintiff then sold
The plaintiff
the goods, and remitted the proceeds to the defendant.
was, afterwards, compelled, in an arbitrary manner, and by duress, to
let judgment go against him, at the suit of the attaching creditors,
upon false allegations, and was compelled to pay them their claim.
It was held, that the plaintiff might recover of the defendant, his principal, the amount thus paid, not exceeding the value of the defendant's goods.
Ch. J. Tilghman expressed his approbation of the law,
as laid down by Heineccius, b. 13, p. 269, 270, and 2 Ersk. Inst. 534,
that damages incurred by an agent, or in the course of the principal's affairs, or in consequence of such management, were to be
It w ras admitted, that where an agent, on a
borne by the principal.
journey, on business of his principal, was robbed of his own money,
the principal would not be answerable,
because carrying his own
money was not necessarily connected with the business of his prinSo, if he received a wound, the principal is not bound to pay
cipal.
the expense of the cure, for it was the personal risk of the agent.
The distinction appears to be, between those cases which arise naturally out of the agency, and such as are casual, or oblique, not proceeding directly from the execution of the mandate.
Upon this printowards
a
doctrine
stands
the
of
contribution
average;
general
ciple
where the owner of a vessel cuts away a mast, to avoid impending
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ruin, there the owners of goods are personally liable for the amount
of contribution, on the ground that the act was done, by the general
agent, for the safety of the property.
In Stocking v. Sage et al.,
1 Conn. 522. Ch. J. Swift laid down these principles,
to which the
other Judges agreed: "That where an agent, acting faithfully, without fault, in the proper service of the principal, is subjected to expense, he ought to be reimbursed.
If sued on a contract made in
the course of his agency, pursuant to his authority, though the suit
be without cause, and he eventually succeeds, the law implies that
the principal will indemnify him, and refund the expense;
for this
he can maintain an action of indebitatus assumpsit ; and the proof
of these facts will be sufficient to warrant the jury to find the promise."
These principles are precisely applicable to this case: the
plaintiffs were sued for an act done by them as the agents and trustees of the corporation, in the course of their agency, and pursuant
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to authority.

They acted faithfully and without fault, and are entitled to recover, for every thing reasonably and necessarily
disbursed in and about their defence and which could not be included
in the taxation of costs, in the judgment recovered against Gardner. 31
Judgment for the plaintiffs.

CLIFTON
(Supreme

Pl aintiff,

Court of Arkansas,

a blacksm it h

v.

1894.

ROSS.
6*0

Ark.

07.

28 S.

at the request of defendant,
X«, price was fixed by Ross,

W.

1085.)

a farmer,

pur-

chased fnr him a mill.
but he refused
to take the mill becaus e he feared it was fob" small.
Clifton had purchased the mill in his own name, and was Obliged t«> pay for it. and
n ow sues defe ndant to recover the price.
Judgment for defendant
and plaintiff apn ea led.

"Riddick, J. 3S

[Aft.r stating the facts:] The question for us to
is wh ether the circuit court erred in instructing the jury
that if no price was agreed upon for the mill they must find for de
[endant. To constitute a sale it is not necessary that the parties agree
on a price, f..r ; if no pj
bj the parties, the law implies that
dete rmine

Jt_sh aU

be what

th e thing

sold is reasonably

worth.

This

Is said

to

'" An agent who is sued on his principal's
account need not let ludgment
on i trim.
II. ■may defend and appeal tin- •■■•is,.,
and the principal must
reimburse him for all proper charges.
First Nat Bank v. Tenney, ia ill.
App. 544 (1892); Belz v. Guthman, 82 111. App. 624 (1806), in which a sherifl
ued for levying on goods pointed out to him by Ms principal;
Shearer
v - Guardian Trust Co., 136 Mo. App. 229, 116 8.
W. 166 (1909), In which an
i on breach of a warranty.
agenl
Neither need he wall t<> be Bued,
but Ik- may pay damages without
rait, and recover of his principal to the
extent of the actual liability.
Baveland v. Green, 86 Wis. 612 (1875).
Part of ii
pinion Lb omitted.

/
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I'M.) (>;). note;
Taft v.
elementary law.
Benj. Sales (Bennett's
Travi>, L36 Mass. 95.
But, if the testimony of Clifton is true, lie
did not sell the mill to "Ross, but purchased it for him ; and it is a
general rule of law that all reasonable and necessary outlays and advances paid by an agent for his principal in the course of his employment must he repaid by the latter.
Whart. Ag. §§ 313, 314; Median,
Kg. 543; Hihb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 13 Sup. Ct. 950, 37 L. Ed.
A request to undertake an agency or employment, the proper
819.
execution of which involves the expenditure of money on the part of
the agent, operates not only as an implied request on the part of the
principal to incur such expenditure, but also as a promise to repay it.
If, without being induced by fraud or misrepreMeehem, Ag. 544.
sentation on the part of Clifton, Ross requested Clifton to purchase
or as a
a mill, and Clifton, in the execution of such an undertaking,
liable for
was compelled to pay for the mill, then Ross
result of
the same be reasonable, and this whether there
such expenditure,
was any price agreed upon or not. In the absence of any agreement
or direction about the price to be paid, Clifton would, in such
case,
ordinarily have the right to pay the fair market price for such mill,
and to recover the same from Ross. 33
Judgment reversed.

a

*

*

*

;

2

a

9.

9

33 Accord:
Greene v. Goddard,
Mete. (Mass.") 212 (1845), In which the
agent was allowed to recover expenses incurred by reason of the failure of
the drawee of bills drawn by the agent for the principal. The principal made
good the face of the bills, but refused to pay the expenses.
See Irions v.
Cook, 33 N. C. 203 (1850), in which the third person refused to lease to the
principal, and the agent took the lease in his own came and paid the interr>0, 37 L. Ed. 819
est, and Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 497, 13 Sup. Ct.
(1893).
The right of action does not accrue before the agent has paid the money.
The obligation to pay the indemnity does not ripen into
cause of action before the thing to be indemnified against has happened.
Otter Creek Lumber
Co. v. McBlwee, 37 111. App. 285 (1890).
As to recovery after termination of the agency, of money expended during
also, U. S. v. Jarvis.
the agency, see ante, p. 211 ff.
Ware (Dav. 274) 278, Fed.
as. No. 15,408
(1840), supra, p. 204, allowing the agent to recover for ofMeyer v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 150 Mo. App. 170, 130
fice rent and furnishings;
S. W.
"The limitation on the rule above
H911,), in which the court says:
referred to recognizes the right of the principal to revoke the agency, but
reckons with such equities as may have accrued in the agent's favor while
acting in good faith toward executing the trust;
for, though the principal
may revoke an agency so given for an indefinite time, the circumstances
of
'I"- case not Infrequently present
right
situation in which there inheres
ie compensation
against the principal on the precepts of natural justice alone, notwithstanding the abstract right of revocation
which the law
generously concedes.
In this view, ev.
where an indefinite agency has been
revoked, if
appears the agent, induced by his appointment,
has in good
faith incurred expense, devoted time, and bestowed labor in the matter of
ill" agency without having a sufficient opportunity to recoup such outlays
from the undertaking,
the principal will he required to compensate him in
thai behalf, for the law will not permit one to thus deprive another of value
without awarding Just compensation.
But the just principle acted upon by
the courts In the circumstances
suggested requires no more than In every
instance the agent shall be afforded
reasonable opportunity
to avail himself'
of the preliminary expenditure and efforts put forward to the end of executing the authority conferred, and. it" it
denied him, that the principal should

is

a

it

n

a

a

5

<
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ROOME.

Pleas of New York City and County,
N. Y. Supp. 250.)

1894.

7

Misc. Rep.

167,

27
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From judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals.
OrEGERicn, T. The plaintiff's assignor, one Schell, was the owner
of certain premises in this city, and the defendant, Roome, was his
Schell
agent to collect the rents of, and to care for, such property.
had sent the following letter of instructions to the defendant, who
Mr.
docs not deny having received it: "New York, June 7, 1892.
Concerning my house, 131 ^West 25th street, I
Roome — Dear Sir:
have made arrangements with Mantel, 32 Carmine St., to keep the
roof in repair for one year, and with O'Brien & Ryder, plumbers, 154
Spring street, to attend to the plumbing work, tank, and engine for
* * * In case you need the services of any of these
one year.
people at any time, to do any of the above work, please send for them,
[Signed] Edward P. Schell."
and they will do the work.

In January,

1893,

the pipes, water-closets,

etc.,

upon the premises

One
frozen up, and the services of a plumber were required.
Young was called in by the defendant's brother-in-law (who is admitted to have had authority to act for him in the matter) to do the
Young's bill for his services amounted to $119.99,
work of repairing.
which defendant, after some delay, paid. Upon accounting to Schell
for rents received, he retained this amount, for the recovery of which
The answer was a general denial, and set
this action was brought.
for said last-mentioned sum paid by him to Young
up a counterclaim
lor such se rvices. The justice rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff for the full amount claimed, and the defendant has brought

were

this appeal.

In speaking of an agent's right to recover his disbursements, made
for t in benefit of his principal. Story, in his work on Agency (7th
Ivl. § 3M), p. 412), says: "I hit this liability of the plaintiff proceeds
upon the ground that the advahceSj < xpenses, and disbursements have
incurred, and reasonably and in good faith paid, withbeerTproperly
*
* *
on the pari of the agent.
However, if the
default
out aTTy
and
and
without
made
has
voluntarily
authority,
agent
officiously,
advances or payments, the principal will not be bound to any reim,

'7. 26 S. W.
Glover v. Benderson, 120 Mo, •">'
itlon accordingly.
ii Am. St Rep. 695; Royal Remedy Co v. Gregory Grocer Co., 00 Mo.
11
App. 63; Davis v. Barr, il' N. v. si. Rep. Ill; Mechem's Agency, g 620
la obvious thai the principle reflected In the limitation on the rule above ;i<i
verted to affords plaintiff no righl of recovery, Cor liis evidence is conclusive
to i i i*• effect
thai ii«' enjoyed the agencj Cor n years, and it yielded to blm
it appears ms well thai do ex
ii considerable
profll during all of thai time,
pendlture was made by blm In thai behalf other than the si:,, n; paid oul hi

the flrsl Instance to Burtscher, and tl
while executing the agency In years g<

recouped
by."

Cr

bis commissions
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16,

or unskillfulncss of Fhe agent."
the rule
A3 laid down in bowler v. Bank, 67 X. V. 138, 145, 1
i- that: "An gent
entitled to be indemnified against all damages
him, and all cost to which he may
and losses which are incurred
34
be subjecteH; in the course of his agency, without fault on his part."
N. Y. Supp. "l.v
. Y.)
See/also, Morinel v. Heller (Super.
not entitled to
the present ease
Under these mlcs. the agent
direct disobedience of his principal's inrecover.
Having acted
structions, he incurred the expenses clearly "without authority."

The judgment

should be affirmed, with costs.

BYERS
(Supreme

v.

DANLEY.

Court of Arkansas,

1871.

27

Ark.

77.)

g

it

is

a

in

Suit
equity by Danley against Byers and others to quiet and pertitle,
From
and for the possession and rents of certain lands.
fect
taken.
One Smith, as
decree giving Danley possession an appeal
Northrop failed
agent of Northrop, purchased and paid for the lands.
After
Smith his compensation, expenses and reimbursement.
for
time Smith took possession of the land and paid taxes on
12 years, when he quitclaimed
to Danley, who knew all the facts. He
held the lands for five years and paid taxes until the commencement of
lit.
Byers and the other defendants claimed under deeds from

.

it

in

It

*

*

*

J.

These deeds plaintiff claimed
the original grantor and his assignees.
were fraudulent.
35
BENNETT,
being evident, from the above agreehis
ment and authorities, that Smith can have no trust declared
may be asked, inasmuch as he was the agent for Northrop
and advanced the money to make the purchase, what equities he had
uch advances, or what remedy had he against Northrop or the
land- purchased?

Pari of the opinion

is

>,

a

a

it

a

&

'Accord:
Becknian v. Wilson, ul Cal. •".."..")(1882), in which an agent in
charge of property rebuilt, after
Ore; St. L., A.
T. II. R. Co. v. Thomas,
85 in. it',} (1877), in which an agent defended taking his principal's money
(<i another
in the ground thai
had been turned over under compulsion
Money paid by an agenl on
emploj'6.
contract Cor ids principal must be on
to make, or he will nut be entitled to reimthe contracl he was authorized
Money paid on
ment
Ross v. Clark, 18 Colo. 90, 31 Pac. 107 (1893).
Thompson
contract known by the agenl to be illegal cannot be recovered.
Bros. v. Cummings, 68 Ga. L24 (1881); Samuels v. Oliver, L30 111. 7:;. 22 X.
There can be no recovery for expenses caused by the agent's
99 (1889).
r
negligence, Veltum v. Koehler, 85 Minn. 12. ss X. W. 132 (1901).

•
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First, if Xorthrop was a non-resident of Arkansas, as alleged in the
bill, he could have made out his account against him, attached it to the
proper affidavit, under the statute, attached the lands and ha<"1 them
Here
sold to pay the debt. See Gould's Digest, 163, §§ 1, 2, 3, etc.
would have been a complete remedy at law.
Second. Smith could have sent h„ account to Illinois and there
brought assumpsit for money paid for Northrop, at his request, and
Xorthrop, not being insolvent, he in this way had another complete
remedy at law.
Independent of these personal remedies, agents have, for the payment of their commissions, advances, disbursements and responsibilities, in the course of their agency, an established right, which in many
cases becomes more important and effectual than any other means of
remedial redress ; that is to say, an agents' lien. Story, in his work on
Agency, 433, defines this lien "to be a right in one nan to retain that
which is in his possession, belonging to another, until certain demands
of him, the person in possession, are satisfied. It is a qualified right
therefore, which may be exercised over the property of another person.
These liens of agents, like all liens, arise by operation of law. Chief
Justice Gibbs, in Wilson v. Heather, 5 Taunt. 642, said: "The right
of lien does not arise out of any contract whatsoever, but out of a
right to hold property, until the party claiming the lien has been paid
for the operation he performs."
Thus we see, if Smith was an agent of Xorthrop and, in carrying
out the objects of his agency, he advanced money or incurred expenses
for his principal, he had a lien and only a lien upon the title papers
and the land for his commissions, services, expenses and advances,
which grew out of this relation and was incident to Xorthrop's indebtedness to him. The extent of this was but a mere right to retain them
until his demand- were satisfied, and in this case, the property being
real estate, he could retain it until the rents and profits had discharged
In case of a mortgagee who ejects his mortgagor, he can
the lien.
only hold the lands until the rents and profits pay his debts or disSo,
mortgagor voluntarily surrenders the po
charge his lien.
virtue of his possion, no absolute- estate passes to the mortgagee
same

into

for certain purposes nor
title, except upon mere

a

is

it

a

•1. bul simply
right to retain the
any adverse holding so as to ripen
Milliard on
umption of payment.
cannot be conti tided thai an agents'

it

a

a

a

b)

'

It

2

Mortgages, L6.
lien stands upon higher ground
than that of
the solemn acl of the parties.
mortgaj
Then Smith, having no title, could not convey
greater one to Danwhich
lien
could nol exisl for
merely
and
having
ley, the appellee,
and the
transferred,
m<. incut without
ion,
could
nol
be
posses
effort of Smith to release the same to appellee, and delivering him the
•I, as alleged
the bill, destroyed the lien and the appellee
Hence,
his release.
360, 367.
nothing
Story on Agency,
§§

by

in

a
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appellee can have no title or right of possession to the lands in con*
110 *
*
troversy by reason of Smith's lien.
dismiss
the hill for want of
Cause remanded, with instructions to
equity.
4

UNDERHILL
(Supreme

Court of New
72

Action for

App. Div. 71, 7<; N.

From

a

V.

1902.

Supp. 266.)

hy Edward C. Underhill against Nina Jorjudgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.

a

of_

Reversed.
The complaint in this action avers that the plaintiff, from about the
30th day of April, 1886, to on or about the 11th day of May, 1901,
aeted as the agent; factor, and manager of the defendants under authority of a written power of attorney ; that plaintiff, under such power
of attorney, had the entire management of the property of said defendants, the corpus of which originally amounted to $87,766, and that
by his judicious handling of the same it increased to the sum of $93,266; that during the time that plaintiff has been so employed he has
which he has
received and collected the sum of $159,109.42, all
which he
of
$7,955.42,
sum
the
defendants,
except
the
to
turned over
lien for his
now has in his possession, and upon which he claims

is

is

is

services and expenses paid in the management of said agency; Unit
$7,plaintiff believes that the reasonable value of his said services
955.42; that he
ready, willing, and able to account for and pay over
to said defendants so much of said sum as the court shall decide, in
not entitled to the whole thereof; that no
shall decide he
case
agreed price has ever been fixed upon with defendants for his said services, and that he has necessarily expended in the management of said
property the sum of $5,592, for which he has had no recompense; that
defendants during all the times aforesaid had been, and now are, relien
he should not claim
siding in Europe, and that he fears that,
and
should
services
and
expenses,
for
his
retained
the
amount
upon
pay over the same to the defendants, they would remove the same out
of the jurisdiction of this court, and that said defendants could only be
Wherefore plaintiff deforeign jurisdiction.
served with process in
mands judgment for $13,547.98, and that plaintiff's lien upon the said
sum of $7,955.42 for the amount of the value of said services and disbursements be defined and enforced against said sum; that plaintiff
a

a

if

it

8

a

5

ChickerBin. 53S (1813).
Accord:
Cranston v. Philadelphia Ins. Co.,
Ing v. Bosmer, iu Mass. L83 (1815).
lien, is a
An agreemenl to give credit, or any contract inconsistent with
N. H. 441, 31
waiver of it. Stoddard Woolen Manufactory v. Huntley,
Cf. Welker v.
Am Dec. 198 (1837); Ball v. Jackson, 20 rick. 194 (1838).
H tod. App. 699, on X. B. ■':•",(1909), in which the contract was
Appleman,
found not to be Inconsistent "One of the earliest cases recognizing an agent's
lien (in this case
factor's) is Kruger v. Wilcox, Ambler 252 (1755), cited in
Newhall v. Dunlap, 14 -Me. ISO, :;i Am. Dec. 45 (1841).
a
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have judgment against said defendants for whatever sum he may be
entitled to above said sum of $7,955.42; and that the defendants be
restrained from interfering with said last-mentioned sum until the determination of this action ; and for such other and further relief as to
The defendants demurred to
the court shall seem just and equitable.
the complaint upon the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient
to-eonstitute a cause of action, which demurrer the court below sustained, and from the judgment entered therein dismissing the complaint this appeal is taken.
Hatch. J. 37 * * * We arc also of opinio n that sufficient facts
are alle ged in this complaint to establish a lien in favor of the plaintiff
uporTthe fund in question, at least to the extent of his claim for expenses and disbursements paid out by the plaintiff in its management.
In Muller v. Pondir, 55 X. Y. 325, 14 Am. Rep. 259, it was said by
Judge Allen : "An agent may have a lien on the property of his principal for moneys advanced or liabilities incurred in his behalf; and,
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if

moneys have been advanced or
of the principal, and
ceeds and fruit of such advances
the agent, or within his reach,
the solvency

liabilities incurred upon the faith of
he becomes insolvent while the proor liability are in the possession of

and before they have come to the
actual possession of the principal, within every principle of equity the
If
agent has a lien upon the same for his protection and indemnity.
been
permitted to
"necessary to his protection, the plaintiff would have
which
would
best prorepudiate the agency, and assume that position
of
his
principal."
of
the
insolvency
tect himself from loss by reason
The evident reason why the lien is given is that by the expenditure
made and liabilities assumed the agent has benefited the principal,
-rolected the fund, or, at least, improved the principal's condition.
As the irresponsibility of the principal would defeat the nght of the
agent in securing reimbursement, equity raises out of such situation

It must follow, therefore,
for his protection a lien upon the fund.
that whenever a condition exists which would cause loss to the agent
ft He parted with the funds in his hands, equity will interpose so far
. protect the agent's right in the premises, and raise out of the
The complaint avers that the decondition a lien upon the fund.
nts are residents of England, and that, if he parts with the posion of the money, it will he removed beyond the Jurisdiction of
In such case the same reasons exist for
ourt and it s process.
- a lien upon the fund as would exist in the case of instates a per
It skeins clear, therefore, that this complainl
solvency.
fecth good cause of action for equitable interposition,
judgments should
It '
that both the final ami interlocutory
ed, with costs to the plaintiff in this court and in the courl
below, and leave given to the defendants to answer within 20 ■

upon the paymenl
•»The

rest

of

such

of the opinion

costs.
La on page 818.
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III

OF THE AGENT TO THE THIRD PERSON

SECTION

1.— IN

CONTRACT

I. General Rule

ANDERSON
(Supreme

Court of Alabama,

v.

1896.
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Rep.

TIMBERLAKE.

114

Ala. :m,

22

South.

431,

02

Am.

St.

105.)

Action on the common counts by Timberlake against Anderson. The
latter was in fact a mere agent of the North Alabama Lumber Company running their "Crow Creek Mill." Timberlake furnished money
to pay the hands, and goods and merchandise for the mill. The company was bankrupt and plaintiff testified that he gave credit solely to
Anderson.
There was much evidence contra.
BrickELL, C. J. 1 The legal presumption is, when a known agent
deals or contracts within the scope of his authority, that credit is
extended to the principal, and not to the agent; and that the dealing
is the act, or the contract is the engagement, of the principal alone,
as if he were personally present and acting or contracting.
This presumption prevails in the absence of evidence that credit was given
to the agent exclusively, and the burden of proof rests upon the party
the contract or promise is in
seeking to charge him personally.
writing, its construction and effect are, ordinarily, questions of law
for the decision of the court.
But when the contract or promise is
verbal, the question whether the credit was given to the agent in exclusion of the credit of the principal is a question of fact, for the
determination of the jury, to be ascertained from a consideration of
all the circumstances attending the transaction.
Mechem, Ag. § 558;
1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 1119, 1120;
Whitney v. Wyman,
101 U. S. 392, 25 L. Ed. 1050.
In 1 Am. Lead. Cas. (5th Ed.) 764,
speaking in reference to verbal contracts made by or through an
agent, it is said that : "When the relation of principal and agent exists in reference to a contract, and is known to the other party to exist, and the principal is disclosed at the time as such, the contract is
the contract of the principal, and the agent is not bound, unless credit
has been given to him expressly and exclusively, and it was clearly

If

i Part of

the opinion is omitted.
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but if credit was
his intention to assume a personal responsibilty ;
given to him exclusively, and he intended to give his own personal
engagement, he will be bound; and this, upon sufficient evidence, is
of the case." In
a question for the jury, on all the circumstances
the recent case of Humes v. Furnace Co., 98 Ala. 461, 13 South. 36S.
it was said by Coleman, J.: "To hold an agent personally liable in
cases in which he discloses his principal, and that the services to be
are for the sole benefit of the principal, and the contract
mTcTered
is within the scope of his authority, it must be shown that the credit
was given exclusively to the agent, and that the agent was informed

of that fact."
Applying this well-settled principle, the instructions to the jury,
given at the instance of the plaintiff, numbered 1, 2, and 4, are essenThey proceed, manifestly, on the theory that the
tially erroneous.
principal, the North Alabama Lumber & Manufacturing Company,
and the defendant, as agent, were or could be bound, jointly or severally, by the same contract or engagement, or that the promise of the
one could be collateral to the promise of the other, while the true
inquiry — an inquiry to be solved by the jury upon a consideration of
the course of dealing between the parties, and all the attending facts
and circumstances — was whether any credit was given to the principal,
or whether it was given exclusively to the defendant, and it was his
intention to become the sole debtor to the plaintiff. The fact that the
defendant, at the commencement of the transaction from which the
account originated, may have directed the accounts, as created, to be
charged to him, or to himself and Kilpatrick, to which so much of
prominence is given by the instructions^ is far from being decisive that
lie intended to become the sole debtor, or a debtor jointly with Kilpatrick, to the exclusion of all liability on the part of the North AlaNor is it decisive that
bama Lumber & Manufacturing Company.

plaintiff did not extend any credit whatever to that company. The
purpose of the direction may have been only to separate and distinguish the accounts the defendant was creating as agent from the individual dealings he was having, or might have, with the plaintiff.
As a fact, the direction is for the consideration of the jury, to he

the

taken in connection with all other facts and circumstances attending
whether exclusive
the dealings between the parties, in ascertaining
Credit was extended to the defendant, and whether, with knowledge
* * *
of that fact, he intended to assume individual responsibility.
Reversed and remanded.
Warner, J., quotes the rule as
v. Bpradley,
39 Ga. 85 (1809),
eral nil.-. Btandlng on Btrong Foundations,
Ch. Kent: "it
is duly
every system of Jurisprudence, thai where an agent
Mini pervading
tituted and Dames hi- principal, and contracts in his name, the principal
- Kent's Cum. 8
ponslble, and not 11**- agent."

J

Tiller
by

t'.r.L'

EFFECTS

am>

CONSEQUENCES

HOVEY
(Supreme

Courl

«»r

v.

OF THE

RELATION

(Part

3

PITCHER.

Missouri,

L850.

18 M<>. 191.)

A.ssjmpsit to recover $200, which it was alleged Hovey agreed to
pay if plaintiff, as sheriff, would add tins to the $300 reward lie was
about to offer for the apprehension and delivery of an escaped prisPlea the general issue, and
oner wanted on a charge of murder.
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judgment for plaintiff.
NapTON, J. 3 The principal and most important objection to the
judgment in this case arises from the instructions which the court
The defendant introduced proof to
gave on the subject of agency.
show that he made no contract with Pitcher, in relation to the reward
offered by the latter for the apprehension and delivery of Harper,
and also some evidence to show that, if he made any, it was in the

The Circuit Court gave two
character of an agent for Meredith.
instructions on this subject, one at the instance of plaintiff, and the
The latter was correct, the former not.
other asked by the defendant.
It does not follow, because a person discloses himself to be an agent,
and gives the name of his principal, that he is therefore not personally liable. The person with whom he is dealing may be unwilling to
trust the principal, and yet willing to contract with the agent, upon
his personal responsibility; and it then becomes a question of fact,
to be determined by the circumstances of the case, whether the credit
was given to the agent or not. The conversation and acts of the parties, at the time of the contract, must necessarily be evidence, indeed,
in the absence of any written agreement, the only evidence of what
The
the contract was. These are the res gestae — the contract itself.
admission of such testimony does not impair, to the slightest extent,
that well settled rule that a party cannot make evidence for himself ;
This rule
that his declarations in his own favor are not admissible.
is understood to be confined to declarations and acts ex post facto,
if I may be allowed the phrase — made in the absence of the party contracted with and after the transaction has passed away.
The second instruction given at the plaintiff's instance is certainly
but if I understand it aright, it is calculated to mislead.
obscure;

The premises laid down in the first branch of the instruction are followed by a conclusion, which seems to have no bearing upon the case,
and so far might be regarded as harmless, but a second sequence is
drawn from them in the concluding paragraph, which not only' makes
the meaning of the entire instructions very obscure, but is in itself
ieous. Had the jury been told that the defendant's declarations
that he was agent, and was authorized to offer a reward, were not
sufficient of themselves to authorize a verdict in his favor, no objection could have been made to the proposition.
a

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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The
was the contract made with Hovey as the agent of Meredith?
concludes with a distinct and independent proposition :
instruction
"And unless the jury believe from other evidence that the said declarations of Hovey that he offered the reward as such agent, they
This last clause was certainly calculated to
must find for plaintiff."
mislead.
Hovey's declarations to Pitcher or Pitcher's agent, Heard,
between them, as
evidence of the understanding
were undoubtedly
the jury to
enable
To
Heard.
or
well as what was said by Pitcher
for
to know
them
was
it
proper
ascertain the intent of both parties,
contract.
the
time
of
them
at
the
supposed
between
all that passed
Declarations made by Hovey at other times and to other persons would
* * *
of course be inadmissible.
Reversed

and remanded.

°
II. Unauthorized Contracts
SMOUT
(Court of Exchequer,

1842.

12

v.
L.

ILBERY.
J.

Bxch. 357, 10 Mees. & W. 1.)

Debt for goods sold and delivered, and on an account stated. Verdict For plaintiff, and defendant obtained a rule to show cause why a
"new trial should not be bad.
Ai.or.Ksox, B. 4 This case was argued at the Sittings after last
The
Hilary Term, before my brothers Curney, Rolfe, and myself.
The defendant was the widow of a Mr.
facts were shortly these.

Ilberv, who died abroad: and the plaintiff, during the husband's life
time, had supplied, and after hi- death had continued to supply, •
The husband left England for
for the use of the family in England.
in that
a in March. l.^'>, and died on the 14th day of October,
TKe news of his death first arrived in England on the 13th
1840; and the only question now remaining for
ion of the Court
whether the defendant was liable for
was
lippliecl after her husband's death, and before
sible that the knowledge of that fact could he communicated to
it

is,

March,

«
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have existed, and yet the plaintiff may not have thought proper to
give Meredith credit, and may have preferred contracting with the
There was evidence to warrant this hypothesis and coundefendant.
But the instruction
ter evidence which the jury were to determine.
proceeds to direct the jury that from such declarations alone, unsupported by other evidence, they must not find Hovey an agent. It was
immaterial whether Hovey was agent or not; that is, whether he
was an authorized agent or not. The controversy was not between
him and his supposed principal, but between him and a third party,
claiming to have contracted with him upon his individual responsibility, and the material question was, Did the parties so contract or

Pari of the opinion

is omitted.
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There was

was communicated to her
no doubl thai such knowledge
soon as it was possible; and thai the defendant had paid into Court
sufficient to cover all the goods supplied to the family by the plaintiff
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as

subsequently to the L3th March, 1840.
\\ e took time to consider this question, and to examine the authoriThe point, how
ties on this subject, which is one of some difficulty.
far an agenl is personally liable who, having in fact no authority, professes to hind his principal, has on various occasions been discussed.
There is no doubt that in the case of a fraudulent misrepre sentatio n
o\ his authority, with an intention to deceive, the agent would he perBut independently of this, which is perfectly free
sonally responsible.
from donht. there seem to be still two other classes of cases, in which
an agent who without actual authority makes a contract in the name
of his princip al", is personally liable, even where no proof of such
fraudulent intention can be given.
First, where he has no authority,
and knows it, hut nevertheless makes the contract as having such auIn that case, on the plainest principles of justice, he is liable.
thority.
he
For
induces the other party to enter into the contract on what
of a fact peculiarly within his own
amounts to a misrepresentation
know ledge ; and it is but just, that he who does so should be considered as holding himself out as one having competent authority to
contract, and as guarantying the consequences arising from any want
of such authority.
But there is a third class, in which the Courts
have held, that where a party making the contract as agent bona fide
believes that such authority is vested in him, hut has in fact no such
In these cases, it is true, the
authority, he is still personally liable.
agent is not actuated by any fraudulent motives ; nor has he made
But still his liability
any statement which he knows to be untrue.
depends on the same principles as before.
It is a wrong, differing
only in degree, but not in its essence, from the former case, to state
as true what the individual making such statement does not know
to he true, even though he does not know it to be false, but believes,
without sufficient grounds, that the statement will ultimately turn out
to be correct.
And if that wrong produces injury to a third person,
wdio is wdiolly ignorant of the grounds on which such belief of the
supposed agent is founded, and who has relied on the correctness of
his assertion, it is equally just that he who makes such assertion should
be personally liable for its consequences.
' )n examination
of the authorities, we are satisfied that all the cases
in which the agent has been held personally responsible, will be found
to arrange themselves under one or other of these three classes. In all
of them it will he found, that he has either been guilty of some fraud,
has made some statement which he knew to be false, or has stated as
true what he did not know to be true, omitting at the same time to give
such information to the other contracting party, as would enable him
equally with himself to judge as to the authority under which he prod

to act.

I

t-
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Polhill v. Walthe first, it is not necessary to cite any instance.
B. & Ad. 114, is an instance of the second ; and the cases where
the agent never had any authority to contract at all, but believed that
he had, as when he acted on a forged warrant of attorney, which he
thought to be genuine, and the like, are instances of the third class.
To these may be added those cited by Air. Justice Story, in his book
on Agency, p. 226, note 3. * * *
The present case seems to us to be distinguishable from all these
Here the agent had in fact full authority originally to
authorities.
contract and did contract in the name of the principal. There is no

Of

ter,

3

'gr ou nd for saying, that in representing her authority as continuing,
There was no mala fides on her part —
-she-did any wrong whatever.
no want of due diligence in acquiring knowledge of the revocation —
-no-omission to state any fact within her knowledge relating to it. and
the-revocation itself was by the act of God. The continuance of the
die principal was, under these circumstances, a fact equally
If, then, the true
within the knowledge of both contracting parties.
is,
be some wrong
must
that
there
principle derivable from the cases
to make him
in
order
of
the
of
omission
on
the
part
agent,
or
right
his
of
in
the
name
principal, it
made
liable
on
a
contract
personally
will follow that the agent is not responsible in such a case as the
And to this conclusion we have come. We were, in the
present.
course of the argument, pressed with the difficulty, that it the defendant be not personally liable, there is no one liable on this contract
at all; for Blades v. Free, V B. & Cr. 167, 4 Man. & Ry. 282, has decided, that in such a case the executors of the husband are not liable.
This may be so: hut we do not think that if it be so, it affords to us
In the ordinary
a sufficient ground for holding the defendant liable.
lifetime, for
in
her
husband's
makes
a
who
contract
case of a wife
«if

which the husband is not liable, the same consequence follows.
that case, as here, no one is liable upon the contract so made.
Rule absolute accordingly.

Dec.

ELLIS.

York,
n.

L802.

Johns. Caa

7i>.

'J

New

In

Am.

i

"t

i

(Supreme

Courl "f Judicature

v.

•".

dusenbury

p,,rt

of attorney could not bind tin- principal beyond
An authority to collect debts cannot,
of it.

by

r

I

a

by

a

In error on certiorari from
Justice's Court. Judgment for plain
not.- signed
Dusenbury "for Peter Sharpe."
tiff on
pi;i. Curia
but that
Dusenl
can h<- no question
re
The
the note, without having any authority for that purpose.

construction,

In- an

authority

t<> ^ive

the plain im
any possible

not

I

f

a

is,

was not personally
whether
then,
>usenbur)
w<- are of opinion
this
point
his
note.
On
as
own
•nsIBle,
for
another, executes
from
that
under
authority
person,
pr<
Th«- onlv question,
if
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note in his name, he is bound; and the name of the person for
whom he assumed to act will be rejected, as surplusage. The party
who accepts of a note, under such mistake or imposition, ought to
have the same remedy against the attorney, who imposes on him,
as he would have had against the pretended principal, it he had been

a

really bound.

Judgment of affirmance.

HALL
(Supreme

Court of California,
a

CRANDALL
1866.

2!) Cal.

et al.

567,

89

Am.

Dec. 64.)

promissory note made for the Auburn Turnpike Com-

pany by its president, the defendant.
Sanderson, J. 5 * * * But upon this head it is sufficient to
say that the present action is founded strictly upon the note itself,
and not upon the wrong done to the plaintiffs by the defendants in
executing it without authority; and we are of the opinion that if
the defendants have, by their action in the premises, incurred a personal liability at common law, such liability does not arise from any
obligation created by the note itself, but from the wrong done. In
all such cases, the remedy against the agent is an action to recover
the money, if any has been paid him, or the value of the work olr
labor, if any has been performed for him, under the supposed contract, or special damages resulting to the plaintiff by reason of the

is

it,

defendants' wrong in undertaking to act for another without authorit v.
If an agent in executing a contract, employ terms which in legal
effect, charge himself, he may be sued upon the instrument itself as a
contracting party. This is so because by the use of such terms, he
But if the instrument does not conhas made the contract his own.
contains language which in legal
words
or
in
other
terms,
tain such
cannot be sued on the instruthe
bind
only,
agent
the
effect
principal
If
ment itself for the obvious reason that the contract is not his.
then the contract is not binding upon the principal because the agent
and
not binding on the agent because
had no authority to make
is

1

7

8

6

;

§

is is

it

it

wholly
does not contain apt words to charge him personally,
void.
some conflict of authority, but the better
Upon this point there
reason, in our judgment,
with those cases which hold the rule to
264a, and marginal
be as above stated. Story on Agency (5th Ed.)
Parsons on Contracts,
notes, where the authorities are collected
Cush. 54. See, also, Sayre v. Nichols,
54 to 58; Abbey v. Chase,
Cal. 227; Haskell
v. Dallas,
280;
Am.
Dec
Davidson
Cal. 538, 68
v. Cornish. 13 Cal. 47; Shaver v. Ocean Min. Co., 21 Cal. 45, which
will
c
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et al. v.

be

found

to bear in some
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cases, which hold that the agent may be sued upon the contract itself, treat all matter which the contract contains in relation to the
principal as surplusage, which is, in effect, to make a new contract
for the parties concerned instead of construing the one which they
themselves have made.
The contract in the present case is not binding upon the supposed

is

is

it

It

it,

principal (the company) because the supposed agents (the defendas we held in Hall v. Auburn
ants) had no authority to make
Turnpike Co., 27 Cal. 255, 87 Am. Dec. 75.
not binding upon
the defendants, because
does not contain apt words to charge them.
From the terms employed, the contract
manifestly the contract of

*

*

*

III. On What Contract Liable
HAUPT
Court of Appeals

(Supreme

v.

VINT.

of West Virginia, 1911.
L. R. A. [N. S.] 518.)

68

W. Va.

657,

70 S.

E.

702, 34

J.
J.

a

Action by Haupt, payee of note, against Vint, maker of the note,
the De Ran Lumber Company, indorser on the note, and
De
Ran, by whom the indorsement was made. Judgment for plaintiff,
and rJetendant Lumber" Company brings error.
—

is

J.
J.

is
in a

*

*

*

in

a

■

it

,

is

li,

J.7

Both the declaration and the proof
-POTTT:xnAR<".r.i\
show that the De Ran Lumber Company
corporation. It
sued
and there
no proof of authority
De Ran, its manby whom the indorsement was made, or any other person, to
bind
by an accommodation
indorsement,
guaranty, or suretyship,
ncc sufficient to establish an original promise by the cor•i'Mi.
As
general rule, corporations cannot lend their credit
the form oi accommodation indorsements,
suretyships, and guar-

i

i-

s

.i«ft
v. Jfork, L0 Gush, ■::^ (1852), per Shaw, <'. J.
cord:
Though do
liable on tin- contract, the agenl may however !><•liable in ca
misrepresenting
v. Seeberger, 7:: in. ajjp. 87 (1898);
bis authority.
McCormick
Bartletl v. Tucker, mi \i :i
\m. Rep. 240 (1870); Duncan v. Mies,
82 in. 632, B3 Am. Dec. 293 (1863); Simpson v. Garland, 7»; .Mr. 203
(1884).
Part of the opinion
omitted.

one

Is

»
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is

the company and not the defendants.
It
clear upon inspection of
the instrument
that the defendants intended to bind the company
and not themselves, and that the plaintiffs so understood it.
This
action therefore being ex directo against the defendants on the note
itself, cannot, in our judgment, be sustained at common law for reasons which have been already stated.
Upon the question whether
the plaintiff can make
case which will charge the defendants at
common law, we intimate no opinion.
Judgment dismissing" the case affirmed.
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To fix such a liability upon a corporation, it is ne cessary to
establish, not only authority in the officer or agent to execute the
paper, but also power in the corporation to bind itself in that way.
This rule is universally applied to banking, insurance, railroad, plank
road, and other transportation companies, manufacturing companies,
and building and loan associations.
It would he useless to consume
space here in citing the decisions declaring and applying this law.
They are collated in 10 Cyc. 110'); 7 A. & E. Enc.
788; Mora761;

Clark, Corp.

184,

p.

Cook, Corp.

§

423;

389,

§

Corp.

§§

.

L,.

antic?.

486.

a

is

&

1

§

&

8

a

a

but only as
warrantor of the signature, against whom assumpsit,
sounding in damages, lies, or as
wrongdoer, making him liable in
Ballou v. Talbot, 16 Mass.
trespass on the case for fraud and deceit.
461,
Am. Dec. 146; White v. Madison, 26 N. Y. 117; Dun- v.
Parker, 52 N. Y. 499; Clark
575;
Skyles, Agency,
E.
A.
Enc. L. 1128; 31 Cyc. 1614, 1615, saying: "As to the ground upon
which the liability of an agent contracting for another without authority rests, the authorities in the several states differ widely, nor
easy to reconcile the various decisions in the same state. In some
jurisdictions, particularly in the earlier cases,
held that an action
may be maintained against the agent as principal upon the contract
itself, although
contains no apt words to bind him personally, but
only to bind the principal, upon the theory that the contract must
have been intended to bind some one;
not the principal, then the
By the great weight of recent authority, however, this theory
agent.
has been emphatically repudiated, and
now generally held, more
logically, that the agent cannot be held upon the contract unless
contains apt words to bind him personally, in the absence of which
the only remedy
by an action for the breach of his implied warranty or an action for deceit
the circumstances warrant the latter
*
remedy."
Reversed and remanded.
is

*

*

if

is

it

it
is

if

it

it

it
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(I
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a

a

it

a

a

it

J.
J.

by

De Ran,
whom the indorsement
was made, has been
defendant,
becomes necessary to determine, for the purnew trial, whether his lack of authority to hind his principoses of
has been held that
perpal makes him personally liable. Though
son who has signed the name of another to
note or other contract
without authority
liable thereon as promisor or covenantor
dRich. 255; DuseribUry v. Ellis,
Cas.
70,
Ings v. Brown,
Johns.
Am. Dec. 144), reason and the weight of authority are to the con
trary, and make him liable, not on the instrument, as
party to it,
As

made

LIABILITY
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HANCOCK

GoO

YUNKER.

Court of Illinois,

1876.

83

111. 20S.)

is

s

is

is

is

It

is

is

it

it,

Scholfield, J. Two questions are presented by this record for
our determination:
First — Does the covenant in the lease to pay rent purport to be the
covenant of the defendants, individually?
Second — If the defendants did not, in fact, bind a legally organized
corporation by the terms of the lease, are they, themselves, liable to an
action of covenant upon it?
As to the fi rst point, we think it clear the covenants in the lease, on
behalf of the lessee, do not purport to be the covenants of the defendants, individually.
X. W. Distilling Co. v. Brant, 69 111. 658, 18
Am. Rep. 631. The case is not analogous to Powers v. Briggs et al.,
79 111. 493. 22 Am. Rep. 175, and other cases of like tenor cited by
the counsel for the plaintiff.
The evidence shows that "The Chicago Literary Association" was
organized as a corporation, de facto, at least. It was the lessee, and
its associates, successors and assigns, are all the covenants that
by
relate to the payment of rent, taxes, rates, care and repair of the premises, and surrender of possession, etc., to be performed.
And, at the
recited, the party of the first part, the
conclusion of the lease,
plaintiff, signs in his own proper person, and the party of the second
part, which
"The Chicago Literary Association," signs "through its
trustees."
thus seen, the entire phraseology of the instrument expressly excludes the idea of an intentional personal liability, and
such as
appropriate and ordinarily used to express corporate liability.
I'pon the econd point there
no doubt that "the signature of an
agent amounts to an affirmation that he has authority to dn the particular act, or. at all events, that he, bona fide, believes himself to have
that

authority"

Storj

in

■

•

can an agent be sued on the very instrument itself, as
contracting party, unless there arc apt words therein SO to charge
Thus,
him.
m acting as agenl (<>v another should, withoul
authority or exceeding his authority, make and execute
deed
the
name of his principal, and not
his own name, the agent would not
be liable thereon, although
would nol hind the principal."
But he
furth'
where there ;ire apt words which mav charge him
sonally. and yel
his own nami
ame,
enl of another, the question may be pre ented under
different aspect, and he
give.-, this example:
"If an agent should, without due authority,
:-

that

§

in

i.

of

in

a

§

these

of

whether

is

on Agency,
264.
But the question here
defendants may be held liable to the plaintiff
Proper form
action, but whether they are liable
this form
action — e., covenant upon the base.
Story,
the work jusl quoted from,
264a, says: "It seems clear
nol

in

i

a

in

h<

it

in

a

il

a
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'T

a

\.

by

C.

it

promissory note, saying in
promise to pay,' etc., and sign
D.,
B., his agent, or 'A. B., agent of C. D.,' in such
case
may the words as to the agency be rejected, and the agent be held personally answerable as the promisor of the note?" "Upon this point,"
<1<>not seem
to be entirely agreed."
The
says, "the authorities
same, in substance, will be found in Chitty on Contracts
(11th Am. Ed.)
314.
See. also. Stetson v. Patten,
Greenl. 358, 11 Am. Dec.
\. Talbott, 16 Mass. 461,
Am. Dec. 146; Delius v. Cawthorn,
"0; Abbey v. Chase,
13
Cush. 56, 57; Moor v. Wilson, 26
N. H. 332 American Leading Cases (5th Ed.) Notes to Rathbon v.
636.
Budlong, 767, side
The question under consideration was not before the court in Wheeler v. Reed, 36 111. 81, nor in Mann et al. v. Richardson, 66 111. 481, and
what was there said affecting
was by way of argument merely, and,
so far as intended to announce
principle, must be understood as
restricted to cases where there are apt words in the instrument to
charge the agent personally, by rejecting the words descriptive of his
agency as surplusage.
In Duncan v. Niles, 32 111. 532, 83 Am. Dec. 293, the court quoted
with approval, however, this language from the opinion of the court
in Abbey v. Chase, supra, and predicated the decision upon
and
upon other cases of like tenor: "When one who has no authority to
act as another's agent assumes so to act, and makes either
deed or
not personally liable on
simple contract in the name of the other, he
the covenants in the deed, or on the promise in the simple contract,
unless
contain apt words to bind him personally.
The only remedy
an action on the case for falsely
against him in this commonwealth,
assuming authority to act as agent."
true, in that case the agent sought to be held personally responsible assumed to act as the agent of
public corporation,
and
there
distinction between the measure of liability imposed upon
public and private agents but the authorities referred to and relied
the remedy
upon apply, so far as the form
concerned, as well to
private as to public agents.
We regard what
quoted from Story, supra, as
correct statement
of the result of the authorities, and think
not inconsistent with
anything that has been heretofore decided by this court.
Inasmuch, therefore, as the undertaking to perform the covenants in
the lease of the party of the second part assumes to be that of "The
Chicago Literary Association" alone, and there are no apt words from
which an individual undertaking can be implied,
we shall reject the
a

6

a

it,

a

is

is

it

a<--cord, see the late case

of Roberts

v.

Tuttle,

(1901

36

if

8

it
is

a

is

is

of

;

a

is

a

is

It

s

Utah,

614,

105 Pac.

916

it

In some cases, particularly early American cases, the agent is held on the
contract with the third person as though
were his personal contract.
GilPort, 454, 31 Am. Dec. 715 (1838); Byars v. Doores' Adm^r,
n,
20 Mo. 284 (1855);
This is sometimes
Meech v. Smith,
Wend. 315 (1831).
Justified on the ground that by striking out of the contract the parts which
7

7
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name "The Chicago Literary Association" wherever it occurs, we must
hold that the defendants cannot be held individually responsible in
the present action on the lease, and affirm the judgment.
Judgment affirmed.

THILMANY
(Supreme

Court of Iowa,

v.
1S99.

IOWA PAPER BAG CO.
10S

Iowa,

357,

79 N.

W.

261,

et al.
75 Am.

St. Rep.

259.)
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Action to recover the price of a car load of paper shipped by plaintiff to the Bag Company.
Daggett as vice president of a bank had
written plaintiff a letter of guaranty on the strength of which the
paper had been shipped. The Bag Company was insolvent, and it had
been decided in a previous action that a national bank could not make
Plaintiff now seeks to
such a guaranty, and therefore was not liable.
make Daggett personally liable.
9
* * * We now turn to the main point in the
R,

QEEME

J.

and first to the proposition that defendant Daggett is liable because of the form of the guaranty.
It is signed, "Iowa National Bank,
by William Daggett, V. P." Clearly, this is an obligation of the company ; and the form of the signature just as clearly indicates that Daggett signed it in a representative capacity, and not as an individual. To
hold that the contract binds Daggett personally, we must eliminate the
"by," and hold that the initials "V. P." are "descriptio
preposition
personae." This we cannot do, as it is not our province to make conThe use of the pronouns "we" and "our" in the
tracts for parties.
letter of guaranty is of no significance.
They are often used in reThere is no
ferring to a corporation as a collection of individuals.
tion in our mind- but that all the parties to this contract regarded
it as the obligation of the bank, and not of the defendant Daggett in
case,

the agent bad no authority t<>put there the remainder clearly binds the agent.
An Interesting discussion of this theory
Weare v. Gove, li N. n. L96 (1862).
v. Long, mi Kan. 155, mi Pac. 1070, :J.". L. R, a. (N. S.)
Ls found in Simmonds
:.r,::
Many cases make no distinction between an action against the
(1900).
■in the unauthorized
contract made for the principal and an action baswarranty of authority. BLroeger v. Pltcairn, mi Pa. 311,
ed on the implied
In others liability Of 'he agent when apl words to
IT Am. Rep. 718 (1882).
hind him are not used must '"• in e;i Sc, for his fraud or misrepresentation.
Ogin Buch a case, in the absence of misrepresentation,
there is no liability.
And others, though
i-'-i (1853).
den v. Raymond,
22 Conn. 879, 58 Am Dec
really rests upon the latter, still refuse to set
aisslng that the Liability
:i judgment
against the agenl because ii was based upon ;i breach of
the wrong contract.
Buch an error is not prejudicial to the agent'f
and La Immaterial.
Oliver v. Morawetz, :iT wis. :;:;:_'. 72 N. \v. stt (1897).
Mill others, particularly 11 e English courts, are inclined to deny relief
itself, when it con
f11 if the action Is brought on the contract
ngali
Jenkins v. Butchlnson, 1:; Q. B. Til. L3
tains no apt words to hind him.
Jur. 763, 18 1.. .1. >>. B. 274, 86 1 I L Til (1849). The agent may he liable
Simpson v. Gurin another form of action, but not upon the contract Itself.
land, T«; Me. 203 (1884).
»

Part of the opinion

Is omitted.
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his individual capacity; and, as this is the proper legal construction of
the instrument,
nothing further need be said on the first proposition
urged by appellant's counsel.
\s to the second proposition, the rule has been broadly stated
2.
over and over again that when an agent conjract s in excess o .iliis_authority, or acts without authority, or assumes to have author ity when
lie has none, or far any reason fails to hind his principal, he is
himself hound.
Winter v. I lite, 3 Iowa, 142; Allen v. Pegram, 16
Iowa. 163; Andrews v. Tedford, 37 Iowa, 314; Lewis v. Tilton, 64
That this is the general
Iowa. 220, 1" X. W . 911, 52 Am. Rep. 436.
rule must he conceded, and, as applied to the facts of the cited cases,
it is correct.
But, like nearly every other general rule, it is suhject to
exceptions, some of which we will notice.
The reasons generally given for the rule are: First, That, as an
agent assumes to represent a principal, he cannot he heard to say that
ii had no authority, or that there was in fact no principal to be bound ;
he
for, if he assumes to represent another, he impliedly warrants that
If,
there is such another, and that he has authority to represent him.
then, there is no principal, or the agent has no authority to act for him,
an action will lie for deceit or misrepresentation.
Second. The law
assumes that the contract was intended to bind some one, and, if the
principal is not bound, the contract must be that of the agent. This
last rule is generally applied to executed contracts, and an action will
lie for benefits received by the agent. Some cases go to the extent of
rejecting all parts of the contract relating to the obligation of the prinAs
cipal, and then treat it as the personal contract of the agent.
illustrating this rule, see Byars v. Doores, 20 Mo. 284; Woodes v. Dennett, 9 X.'h. 55 ; Terwilliger v. Murphy, 104 Ind. 32, 3 N. E. 404. A
third reason for the rule is that the agent impliedly warrants his authority to act for his principal, and, if he has no such power, an action
lies for breach of warranty.
Xow, it is apparent that if the party with whom the agent contracts
has notice of the facts relating to the authority of the agent, and is as
fully advised as to his authority as the agent himself, there can be no
action for deceit. And so the text writers have generally stated this as
to the general rule.
Mechem on Agency, at sections 545
and 546, thus states the law :
*
* Of course, if the other party knew, or by the
"Sec. 545.
exercise of reasonable care might have discovered, the want of authority, he cannot recover. This implied warranty by the agent of his
authority must ordinarily be limited to its existence as a matter of
fact, and not he held to include a warranty of its adequacy or suffiin point of law.
. 546. Where Agent Discloses
All the Facts Relating to His
Where, however, the agent, acting in good faith, fully.
Authority.
»ses to the other party at the time all the facts and circumstances
touching the authority under which he assumes to act, so that the other
an exception

-y>
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cannot claim exemption."
Judge Story, in his valuable work on Agency (section 265), says:
"This doctrine, however, as to the liability of the agent where he contracts in the name and for the benefit of the principal, without having
due authority, is founded upon the supposition that the want of authority is unknown to the other party, or, if known, that the agent underBut circumtakes to guaranty a ratification of the act by the principal.
or
not be held
would
not
might
in
which
the
agent
stances may arise
liable,
if
that
want of
without
authority,
if
acted
he
to be personally
unknown
to
both
parties."
or
known
to
both
parties
was
authority
Abundant authorities are cited by each author in support of these
The same thought is equally applicable to the third reapropositions.
son above given for the general rule. And it may be further said that
the implied warranty of the agent does not relate to the power of the
lie simply covenants
principal to enter into the particular contract,
that he has authority to act for his principal, not that the act of the
Hence it has been justly said that the
principal is legal and binding.
contract must be one which the law would enforce against the principal, if it had been authorized by him, else the anomaly would exist

a right of action against an assumed agent for an unauthorized representation <>i his power to make the contract, when a hreach
of the contract itself, if it had been authorized, would have furnished
Abeles v. Cochran, 22 Kan.
no ground of action againsl the principal.
406, 31 Am. Rep. 194; Baltzen v. Nicolay, ?3 X. V. 467; Mechem, Ag.
\S; Snow v. 11 ix. 54 \"t. 478.
In the case now under consideration the defendant Daggett made no
mentations as t.» his authority, save that contained in the letter itHe is guilty of no actionable deceit, unless it he found in the fact
that he signed the letnr of guaranty as vice president, and thus repMe had this aulied that he had authority to represent his bank.
made
for
no
hank
has
national
question
thority, if any officer of a
die
of
any
t->
the
contract
bank
making
his authority
re]
not, then, hased upon any
The action
authorized
hut upon the invalidit) of the
as to his authority,
misrepresentation
contract itself as between plaintiff and the hank. There was no actionpresumed to know as much about the
able deceit, for the plaintiff
There
as we have said,
powers of national hank.-, as the defendant.
in

i^

it,

of giving

is,

is

ti

is

•
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party, from such information or otherwise, is fully informed as to the
It is
existence and extent of his authority, he cannot be held liable.
'
material, in these cases, that the party claiming a want of authority in
If he
the agent should be ignorant of the truth touching the agency.
has full knowledge of the facts, or of such facts as are sufficient to put
him upon inquiry, and he fails to avail himself of such knowledge, or
of the means of knowledge reasonably accessible to him, he cannot say
that he was misled, simply on the ground that the other assumed to
Of course, if the agent conceals or
act as agent without authority.
misrepresents material factSj to the detriment of the other party, he
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no implied warranty by an agent thai his principal has authority to
make the contract.
As a rule, that is a question of law, of which each
In the case against the hank we held
pany has equal knowledge.
that the national hanks have no authority to enter into such contracts,
and as the plaintiff has no right of action against the hank upon a contract o\ guaranty, such as the one in suit, no recovery should be permitted against the agent ; for this would hold every agent to a warranAs we have seen, this is
ty of the legality of his principal's contracts.
not the obligation of the agent.
The second reason sometimes given
for the general rule of liability of the agent does not appear to us to
be sound.
By the application of this principle a new contract is made
for the parties. An engagement is created which the parties did not
intend to assume, and the decided weight of authority is against such
rule.
See Hall v. Crandall, 29 Cal. 567, 89 Am. Dec. 64; Ogden v.
Raymond, 22 Conn. 379, 58 Am. Dec. 429; Duncan v. Niles, 32 111.
532, 83 Am. Dec. 293; Stetson v. Patten, 2 Greenl. 358, 11 Am. Dec.
; Abbey v. Chase, 6 Cush. 56; White v. Madison, 26 N. Y. 117;
McCurdy v. Rogers, 21 Wis. 199, 91 Am. Dec. 468.
We should be slow to adopt any rule which would bind a party wrho
Indid not by the terms of his contract agree to become responsible.
deed, the question seems to be put at rest, so far as this court is concerned, in Willett v. Young, 82 Iowa, 292, 47 N. W. 990, 11 L. R. A.
115.
The rules herein announced are not in conflict with any of the
The case of Winter v. Hite, supra,
previous decisions of this court.
related to the contract of an executrix, and it is there said that such
In the case of
cases should not be confounded with those of agency.
Andrew-s v. Tedford, supra, the question was left undecided.
Allen v.
Pegram was an action against an agent who assumed to act for a principal that had no existence ; and so was Lewis v. Tilton, 64 Iowa, 220,
These cases come clearly within the
19 X. W. 911, 52 Am. Rep. 436.
In other cases cited by appellant's coungeneral rule first announced.
sel the agent was held liable because of the form of his signature.
They have no application to the question before us. 10
We do not think that Daggett, the agent, is personally liable, under
the facts disclosed in this case, and the judgment is affirmed.
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io See especially Baltzen v. Nicolay, 53 N. T. 407 (1S73), in which the contract was unenforceable
as coming under the statute of frauds; Bloodgood
v. Short, 50 Misc. Rep. 286, 98 N. V. Supp. 77.~i (1906), in which the agenl lacked the necessary written power of attorney
to sell land; and Beattie v. Ld.
Ebury, L. R. 7 Ch. Cas. 777, 41 L. J. Ch. 804, 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 398, 20 Wkly.
Rep. !H n^TU). affirmed in L. R. 7 II. L. 102, 44 L. J. Ch. 20, 30 L. T. Rep.
581, -'2 Wkly. Rep. 897 (1^74), distinguishing the leading case of Collen v.
Wtright, 8 Eq. & 1'.. 647, 4 Jur. X. S. ::~>7.27 L. J. Q. B. 215, <; Wkly. Rep. 123,
in the Latter case Cockburn, O. J., dissenting, vig92 E. C. L. ')17 (1857).
orously criticises the invention of a contract of implied warranty of authority. The doctrine is upheld in Anderson v. Adams, 43 Or. 621, 74 Pac.
in the leading case of Farmers' Co-op. Trust Co.
215 (1903), and especially
. . Floyd, 47 Ohio St 525, 20 N. E. 110, 12 L. R. A. 340, 21 Am. St. Rep. 840
10).

LIABILITY

Ch. 3)

THE AGENT TO THE

OF

THIRD

PERSON

6G5

IV. Non-Existent Principal

EICHBAUM
(Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania,

1843.

v.
6

IRONS.
Watts &

S.

67,

40

Am. (Dec. 540.)

dinner furnished on the order of the defendants to
Defendants Davis
celebrate the Whig victory at the election of 1840.
but a majority
the
in
meeting,
the
proposal
and Eichbaum opposed
plaintiff.
directed
for
Verdict
for
it.
voted
Gibson, C. J. This case is unique, but really resolvable on prina

It seemed, at first, to resemble the case of a committee sued
ciple.
for the price of meats and wines furnished on its order to a club:
but though the defendants acted in obedience to a constituency, it was,
unlike a club, which is a permanent body, an intactible and irresponsiThe plaintiff, being examined without objection, testified
ble one.
that he furnished the dinner on the order of the Whig party, but that
It is probable that
it was to the committee he looked for payment.
neither he nor they spent a thought on the subject; but it is not,

to be concluded that he agreed to give the dinner. for
nothing; and the responsibilities of the parties concerned are /o be
determined on the ordinary principles of the law of contracts./ The
facts are, that the defendants and others, being a committee constituted
by a popular meeting to order and manage a dinner, contracted with
and directed the secretary of the meeting to
the plaintiff to furnish
Club, an affiliated society,
to
the Tippecanoe
the
proceeding
report
it,

therefore,

for its approbate

>n.

not be pretended that nobody was responsible to the
the defendants were not, who else was?
plaintiff for the order; and,
club, we would have some!VeTe~TrreyTd be viewed as the agents of
thing palpable to deal with. The question would be, whether they had
become personally liable by having exceeded their authority, or
whether they had not contracted on the credit of their constituents.
definite association, organized for indefinite existence:
club
But
particular occasion, to be lost in the
not an ephemeral meeting, for
would be unreasonable to. prfsnmf that
crowd at its dissolution.
It

a

a

a

is

a

if

NowJLjvvill

plajntiffagxeed to trust te

responsibility

is
a

partner,

l.ord Abinger, in Flemyng v. Hect
member
seemed to have thoughl thai
the notion was
ploded by Chief Justice Tyndal, in
an.

17''.

a

180,

of

Welsb.

a

I'.. mi.

I

Vez.

Meeson
club

ft &

a

a

a

;

Tt a

a

•

a

so desperate, or furnish
which
had
vanished into not]
dinner on the credit of
meeting
that the plaintiff
and
nol
to
are
imagine
we
was already delunct
its
lost
had
individuality
by the .lis
which
body
Consented to look to
would
mass.
Bui
in
tinthe
question
general
persion of its members
met ting to be
not depend on the law of partnership, even were such
club; for though Lord Eldon, in Beaumont v. Meredith,
'•das

th

3
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trial
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of Todd v. Emly, cited in Wordsworth

on Joint

3

Stock

183.

Neither is it determinable on tin- law of pj jncipaj and agent ; for
\t first, 1 thought the credit might have been
there was no principal
given to the primary meetings on the authority of those cases in which
officers have been held liable to have contracted on the credit of the
government; but the certainty of payment, in those instances, was
the
so great as to make the moral responsibility of the government
a
of
moral
responsibility
populace,
so
the
Not
preferable security.
In a case like
which is infinitely weakened by being infinitely divided.
and,
inverted;
the absence
in
credit
is
of
this, the usual presumption
relied on
have
is
to
the
vendor
supposed
contrary,
evidence
the
to
of
of the persons who gave the order. What we have
the responsibility
to (\o. then, is to determine how far each of the defendants was a

is

it

is

it

a

a

&

a

9

it

it

;

is

It

4

one, in exclusion to those who happen to be his guests*. This principle
Did the
Stark. R. 366.
leducibie from Delauney v. Strickland,
defendants, then, all concur in the order given for the dinner in question? If they did not, the plaintiff cannot recover.
not disputed that they were present wdien the measure was
but
proved that Davis and Eichbaum opposed
definitely adopted
What then? They at last submitwas under consideration.
while
their own. In Braithresolution
and
made
the
ted to the majority,
401,
committee who was
of
member
Skofield,
B.
C.
waite v.
work done, was
have
certain
resolution
of
to
the
at
adoption
present
Every member present assents before
held liable to the tradesmen.

it

is

;

is

;

it

a

party to acts
hand to whatever the majority may do, and becomes
11
If he would escape redone,
may be, directly against his will.
sponsibility for them, he ought to protest, and throw up his memberand there was no evidence that any of the defendants
ship on the spot
did so. On the contrary, they all remained till the meeting was dissolved, and the order given.
true, that Mr. Davis afterwards deIt
but the dinner was in prepasired the plaintiff to give the matter up
the
ration, and
was too late to retract.
Of what importance, then

Ac

S.

<

»-

2

6

a

a

a

a

;

a

a

a

nAceord:
Frendendall v. Taylor, 2.", Wis. 538, 09 Am. Dee. 203 (1868),
in which
committee of the State Fireman's Association contracted for
Ash v. Guie, 07 Pa. 493, 39 Am. Rep.
well, or tank, for
3tate tournament
contract
masonic lodge were sued on
in which members of
818 (1855),
masonic temple; Lewis v. Tilton, 04 Iowa, 220, 19 N. w. 911, 52 Am.
for
Rep. 436 (1881), in which a committee of a Good Templars Lodge signed
S. I». 498, 62 \. W.
lease for lodge room-: Winona Lumber Co. v. Church,
C. P. 174, 12 Jur. X. S. 1016, :;« L. J.
Kelner v. Baxter, L. R,
L07 (1895);
Cf. Hollman v. Fullin,
. P. 94, 12 I.. T. Rep. N.
313, 15 W. It. 278 (18GG).
EL 254 (1884).
Cab.

1
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it,

party to it.
When several dine together at a tavern, each is liable for the reckthey are liable
Cbllyer on Partn. 25, note w. But, I take
oning.
jointly and not severally; for though only one should orflfT, thos£_
given to
become parties, except where credit
who approve of
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disputed fact of his having partook of the repast with the rest ? Had
would, according to Delauney v. Strickland, have made him liable despite of other considerations ; but he
had become irrecoverably liable by the order of the committee, given
in his presence, and apparently with his approbation.
The defendants have not pleaded the non-joinder of the other members in abatement ; and the evidence showed such a joint liability of
those who have been sued, as warranted the direction. Judgment af-

he done so, his final accession

firmed.

CODDIXG
(Supreme

Court of Nebraska,

v.

MUXSON.

52 Xeb. 5S0, 72 X. W.
Rep. 524.)

1S97.

846,

66

Am. St.

C. 12 Munson sued Codding, alleging that he had sold and
;
(
conveyed to him certain land for the price of $10,000, that $ >.7. n
thereof had been paid, and praying judgment for the remaining $250.
The answer was a general denial. The plaintiff recovered, and the defendant brings the case here by petition in error.
The evidence discloses that there were held several open meetings
of citizens of York for the purpose of securing the location there of
an institution for the care of orphans, under the patronage of the Wo-

man's Home Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church.
It was understood that a gift of about $10,000 would be necessary
Both plaintiff and defendant attended the
to accomplish the purpose.
It was determined that
meetings, and contributed to the undertaking.
the donations should be in the form of negotiable promissory notes,
marie to the order of a trustee to be designated for that purpose.

A

It

is

is

d

a

It

it,

committee appointed at one of the meetings, under power possessed
or assumed by
designated the defendant, Codding, as trustee.
would seem that the institution was formally located at York, but,
instead of giving the notes or their proceeds to the society, the land
of plaintiff was purchased, and conveyed to "Anson B. Codding, trusCodding inhe in turn conveying to the missionary society.
notes
to Munson,
number
subscription
of
without recourse
made
Munson,
items
other
accepted
by
with
and these notes, together
not
conadmits
Munson
receiving.
which
up the sum of $9,750,
or
remainder
the
that
claimed,
than
was
other
tended that the price
as to Codding's personal liability
The only question
paid.

if

is

1,

quite clear and
the evidence
So far as has been state.
therefor.
he posAs to the extenl of Codding's authority,
from conflict.
other
or
him
between
the
transactions
of
and
nature
the
any,
citizens of York on the one side and Munson on the other with
exceedingly vague, and
to the purchase, the evidence

ii

Part of the opinion

Is

omitted.

i

is

i

1
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Still it is upon the last quesmuch to inference, if not to conjecture.
tion that the case must be made chiefly to turn.
It is the general rule that one who assumes to act as agent for a
principal who has no legal status or existence renders himself individually liable on contracts so made. Learn v. Upstill, 52 Neb. 271,
This doctrine receives its most frequent application in
72 X. \Y. 213.
cases like the present, where a person or committee incurs obligations
as the result of

instructions given by

a

body gathered together

infor-

— of
because of the difficulty in all cases — the impossibility in many
of
action
the
to
fixing it upon the persons taking part in or submitting
the
whom
with
the
however,
If,
person
the evanescent assemblage.
contract is made expressly agrees to look to another source for the
performance of its obligations, or if the circumstances be such as to
disclose an intention not to charge the agent, as where the other
agrees to accept the proceeds of a particular fund, there is no lon-

and it may be rebutted by
ger reason to indulge the presumption,
of
the general rule is clearly
This
qualification
proof of such facts.
recognized
by nearly all the cases
is
and
Upstill,
indicated in Learn v.
cited
by Judge Norval in
cases
See
subject.
the
general
discussing
Learn v. Upstill; also Heath v. Goslin, 80 Mo. 310, 50 Am. Rep. 505 ;
Button v. Winslow, 53 Vt. 430; Comfort v. Graham, 87 Iowa, 295,

X. W. 242.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, the evidence would
raise prima facie the presumption upon which the general rule is
based. On the other hand, it was sufficient to justify the inference that
the plaintiff did not look to defendant personally, but was to receive
The instructions
notes, or their proceeds.
merely the subscription
and submitted to
should have stated the law as we have indicated
Instead thereof, the court charged
the jury the issues bearing thereon.
"If you find from the evidence that Codding was in
Hows:
this transaction only agent and trustee for the Mothers' Jewels Home,
and that all his transactions as such agent and trustee have been perThis
formed in good faith, then you should find for the defendant."
was erroneous, because
made Codding's release from liability deupon his acting as agent for the home, and his performing his
was not claimed that he was agent for the home,
duty in good faith.
This principal having no legal status,
but for the citizens of York.
should
have
been
that Codding was liable unless the
the instruction
look solely to the subscriptions.
Munson
was
was
that
to
agreement
it

it,

54

It
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mally for a special purpose, and possessing no definite membership or
The rule is founded upon a presumpcontinued power of existence.
tion of fact, and is not the expression of any positive or rigid legal
The presumption referred to is that the parties to a contract
principle.
contemplate the creation of a legal obligation capable of enforcement,
and that, therefore, it is understood that the obligation shall rest on
wdio actively participate in the making of the contract,
the individuals
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The error was prejudicial to the defendant, because there was no evi13
and a verdict
dence of an agency such as the instruction submitted,
that
phase of the
for plaintiff was therefore required without regard to
induced
have
a different
evidence which, if properly submitted, might
*
*
*
finding.
Reversed

and remanded.

Ex

parte

HARTOP.
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(High Court of Chancery,

1806.

12 Ves.

Jr.

349.)

This petition was presented by the messenger under a Commission
of Bankrupt, upon the petition of George Sanders ; praying, that the
Solicitor, who sued out the Commission, or the petitioning creditor,
or one of them, may pay to the petitioner the sum of £26. 13s. the balance due upon his bill of fees, and also the sum of £183., paid by him
under an award for damages and costs in an action of trespass brought
against him : the Bankruptcy not being established ; and the Commission being superseded ; and the petitioning creditor being absconded.
The petitioner had sued the petitioning creditor; and obtained from
him payment in part of his bill.
Erskine, Lord Chancellor. This petition has two very important
objects; 1st, as it regards the justice of this demand: 2dly, as to
the jurisdiction to give relief to the parties, if they are in a condition
to have it any where. The prayer of the petition is material: not,
that the Solicitor only may pay, but, that either he or the petitioning
creditor, or one of them, shall pay the residue of the petitioner's bill,
as messenger, and a further sum composed of damages and costs,
paid by the petitioner under an award in an action brought against
him.

of law is better ascertained, or stands upon a stronger
foundation, than this; that, where an agent names his principal, the
^principal is responsible: nor the agent: but, for the application
that rule, the agent must name his principal as the person to be reof an upholsterer, employed to fur,usible.
In the « - .iiiiin
only one branch of business, he ap
nish a house: dealing himself
those articles, in which he docs not
to
furnish
plies to other persons

No

deal.

rule

know,

Those persons

the house

is mine.

follow, that

That

is

expressly

though the person to
am
furnished,
Supof
responsible.
articles
the
have the enjoymenl
a
bring
an
an
\
to
Attorney
instructs
case.
person
another
pose
tion; who employs his own stationer, generally employed by him.
The client has nothing to do with the stationer, if the Attorney be,,.,! to them.

I'.nt

n

does

not

1,

itThe burden of showing thai the principal is non-existent, or a sham, is
if there i a responsible principal, the agenl
on the party suing the agent
Fulton v. Bewail, LL6 Ajpp.
trho liae acted for blm, of course, i aol Liable.
Div. tii. 102 N. V. suj-p. LOO (1907).

/
"*

y

i
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by

is

The clienl pays the Attorney. The stationer therecomes insolvent.
fore has no remedj against the client.
This petitioner insists, that the Solicitor must he taken to he the j)*uue
to look; not the petitioning
person employing him; to whom he
creditor. The Solicitor, undertaking to sue out the Commission,
the Solicitor,
goes to his own Messenger; who. being employed
But this petitioner
has no remedy against the petitioning creditor.
appears to me to have decided this for himself; having sued Sanders,

a

.

I

I

to decide the general question.
have no jurisdicshould regret to find,
As to the jurisdiction,
Commission under the authority of the
The party suing out
tion.
Great Seal, employing the Messenger, either himself, or by his Solicibond to the Great Seal, and responsieffect, giving
tor, to give
ble to the Great Seal for the due prosecution of the Commission,
responsible in
The Solicitor,
have no doubt of the jurisdiction.

if

I

a

it

X

a

if

I

in

it

any degree, will be responsible, not only for the fees, but also for all
was his duty to direct the Messenger to
as
the consequences;
situation of such
withdraw; for
will not put the Messenger
has any money
he
account,
also
must
responsibility. The Solicitor
an
affidavit
as to that.
make
him
hands.
Let
of Sanders's in his

Principal Undisclosed

MURPHY
(Supreme

v.

Court of California,

HELMRICH.
1884.

66 Cal.

69,

4

V.

Pac. 958.)

^

*

Action to recover the difference between the contract and market
price of one hundred shares of gas stock which plaintiff claims to
have sold to defendants.
14
* The defendants, by their answer to the
M< Kr.i:,
action,
in
the
specifically denied the averments of the comcomplaint
acted in the transaction "solely as brokers
that
set
and
they
up
plaint,
and agents for others," and the only questions at issue were: (1)
Did the defendants buy the stock as charged in the complaint? (2)
Did they buy for themselves or as agents for another?

J.
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is

if

a

a

a

note from him;
and having obtained
the petitioning creditor;
for
proceeding against him,
which was paid. What colour was there
and no pretence of
undertaker;
the Solicitor being the original
employed the
Solicitor
That
that
the
objection,
joint undertaking?
but being
him,
near
going
creditor
not
Messenger, the petitioning
Solicitor
look
to
the
to
therefore
being
messenger
the
total stranger,
the
peticonsidered
having
this
here:
petitioner
lie
does
not
only,
the Messenger
tioning creditor as his debtor; which could not be,
not necessary therefore
It
had been employed by the Solicitor.

i* Part

of the opinion

is omitted.
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The evidence shows that there was a complete verbal contract of
sale, which was followed by written admissions of the contract, signed
These they signed by their own names, and not
by the defendants.
In
as agents for any other person whom they named as principal.
thus signing them they bound themselves as principals, even if they
were acting for another, unless it was so understood and intended between them and their vendor.
But their memoranda did not disclose
the name of any principal, and there was no evidence given tending
to prove that there was any other known person for whom they
acted and intended to bind.
Where an agent does not attempt in an
instrument to bind his principal, and in terms imposes the obligati on on himself, the rule is that he incurs by such ac t a personal liaDayton v.
Unity, even although he described himsplf as agent .
This personal liability they assumed;
"\Yarne. 43 N. J. Law. 659.
for, while vaguely intimating that there was somebody for whom
they were acting, they guarantied the plaintiff, as their vendor, that
he would be paid the $95.50 per share for the stock which they
agreed to buy from him, and afterwards directed him to sell it and
He accordingly sold the stock
they would make good any deficiency.
in open market and accounted to them. Under those circumstances
on the ground of agency
they are not relievable from responsibility
for some unknown person.
"
"
a person,
says Chancellor Kent, "would excuse hims elf f n >m
responsibility on thn n-mnnfl
a gency, he m ust show that he djs;
closed his principal at the time of making the contract, and that he
acted on his behalf so as to enable the party with whom he deals to
have recourse to the principal in ca-e the agent had authority to bind
"
hi m."
The ag ent become s personally liable when the principal is
not known, or when there is no responsible principal, or where the
v nt become s liable by an undertaking in his own name, or when he,

If

d

Kent, Comm. 630, 63 1. 15
Knglish law: "A man has a right to the charac-

exceed s his power."
h is

the

2

ter, credit, and substance oi trie person with whom he contracts.
with an agent who dues not
refore] he inter- into a contract
is that he is invited to
his principal's name, the presumption
credit to the agent; -till more if the agent does not disclose his
See, also, Benj. Sales,
Anson, Cont. 345.
cipal's existence."

We find ii" error
is The
iil<- by
i

in the record.

:i LT't 11 may bo contract

adding

Ms personal

:is

If.
give
give

prin235,

Judgment and order affirmed.

to make both
to thai

responsibility
w. L050

blmseli and liis principal ii:ioi the principal. Dockarty

i;i Neb.
in general, In Bucb ca
(1902).
the tiiini person may pursue either, <>r both, until be recovers the contract
As to election, and what cod
Knapp v. Simon, 96 V v. 284 (1884).
price.
ee i".-i, p. i:;s n.; also, Am. Alkali <'«>.\. Kurtz (C. 0.) Vi4 Fed
a- recovery.
Uounsavllle v. Insuranci
There can be bi
(19051.
• . 1:1], :,() s. E. 619 (19 '•■;•
•

v,.»
x.
132,

EFFECTS
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AND

COCHRAN
(Supreme

Court of South

OF THE

C0NSBQ1 BINGES

Dakota,
Gaa

1910.

v.

RELATION

(Part 3

RICE.

26

B. D. 393,

12S

N. W. 583,

Ann.

L913B, r>70.)

owned certain hay. and a granary containing wheat, all
Defendant was managing agent of the Westof the value of $912.
ern Land & Investment Company, which owned 40 acres adjoining
the granary. Rice employed one Stevens to plow this field. Stevens
sent his two boys to do the plowing, and they set fire to stubble in
The fire spread and burned plaintiff's hay and granary.
the field.

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Plaintiff

Plaintiff recovered judgment and defendant appeals.
Smith T- 10 [After holding that Stevens was not an independent
* * * Appellant's contention that he cannot be
contractor:]
held liable because he acted only as agent of the corporation cannot
His own evidence affirmatively shows that his agency
be sustained.
was not disclosed to Stevens, nor is it shown that Stevens had any
Having assumed to act as principal, no
knowledge of the facts.
in is apparent why he should not be held to have assumed the
of a principal toward third persons for the act of a
responsibilities
In 31 Cyc. 1555, the rule is very clearly and
servant or employe.
concisely stated: "An agent who enters into a contract in his own
name without disclosing the identity of his principal renders himself
personally liable, even though the third person knows that ne is acting as agent, unless it affirmatively appears that it was the mutual
intention of the parties to the contract that the agent should not be
bound.
With stronger reason, an agent who, without disclosing his
into contractual relations in his own name with one
enters
agency,
who is unaware of the agency, binds himself and becomes subject
to all liabilities, express and implied, created by the contract and
transaction, in like manner as if he were the real principal, although
in contracting he may have intended to act solely for his principal.
If the agent would avoid personal liability on a contract entered into
by him in behalf of his principal, he must disclose not only the fact
that he is acting in a representative capacity, but also the identity of
his principal, although, if the other party has actual knowledge of the
principal's identity, it would have the same effect to relieve the agent
as a disclosure

by the latter.

The disclosure of the principal's identity need not be made at the
inception of the transaction; it is sufficient if it is made before liability is incurred on either side; but a disclosure made after liability
31
is incurred comes too late to relieve the agent from liability."
Cyc. 1560, says: "While an agent is not liable to third persons for
injury resulting from his omission to perform a duty owed to the
principal alone, he is liable to them for injury resulting from his
i« L'art of the opinion

Is oiuitted.
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misfeasance or malfeasance, meaning by those terms the breach of
duty owed to third persons generally, independent of the particular
Accordingly, an agent may be held
duties imposed by his agency.
liable in damages to third persons for conversion, fraud, and deceit,
In an action against an agent for misfeasand even for negligence.
it
is
no defense that he acted as agent or by
malfeasance,
ance or
the authority or direction of another, for no one can lawfully authe commission of a tort."
Appellant also contends that the evidence
act of Stevens in starting the fire was done
thorize

fails to show

that the

as a necessary

part of
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This question was fully
the services rendered under his employment.
and fairly submitted to the jury under instructions decidedly favorable to the defendant, upon evidence disclosing all the surrounding
conditions, and their verdict cannot be disturbed upon appeal.
A full and careful consideration of the entire record before us discloses no reversible error.
The order and judgment of the trial court are affirmed.

WINSOR
(Supreme

Judicial Court

of

v.

GRIGGS.

Massachusetts,

17
1S49.

5 Cush.

210.)

of assumpsit upon an award, and the
Wilde. J.
first question to be decided is, whe ther the defendant is bound by
the submission to arbitration, he having signed the same as agent,
but without disclosing the name of his principal. And on this ques-

This

^
'/

is an action

tion the rule of law is well laid down by Judge Story in his Com"A person," he says.
mentaries on the Law of Agency, §§ 266, 267.
"co ntrac ting a^ a-cnt, will be personally responsible, where, at the
time of making the contract, he does not disclose the fact of his
~a gencyT
And the same principle will apply to contracts made by
"agents, where the\ are known to be a. < ts, and acting in that charfor until i
acter, but t he~na:iM- of their principal is not disclosed;
to suppose, that the other contracting
aisciosure^ it i> impossible
party is willing to enter into a contract, exonerating the agent, and
tru-YIn- to an unl nown principal, who may he insolvent, or incapable of binding himself."
This is a very reasonable rule of law, and it is supported by the
"If a per
2 Kent, 630, 631, and the cases there cited.
authorities.
"
chancellor Kent, would excuse himself fro m responsibillty on the -round of agency, he must diow that he disclosed his
The same principle
principal at the time of making the contract."
Is laid down as a~rTfTe "of law well settled, by lord Tenterden, in the

it Accord:
• i i

Horan \. Bughe
0. A. 681 (1904).
r;
>.1"kA a.-

(D. 0.) !'-".» iv<i. l-is dim;;), aiiirined

ilm.»

Fed.

A

EFFECTS

and C0NSEQ1 ENCES

OF THE

RELATION

(Part

^>

J.,

!i<!

Thompson v. Davenport, () B. & C. 7^, and by Parker, C.
clear,
in Stackpole v. Arnold. 11 Mass. 27,
Am. Dec. 150.
therefore, that the defendant
submission,
the
hound
by
personally
winch he signed as agent, as he did not disclose the name of his_
dors not appear that the same was known to the
principal, and
*

*

plaintiffs.
Judgment of

is

*

it

is

6

It

case of

the

court of common

NICHOLS
Court

(Supreme

New York.

WEIL.

Appellate Term. 1D00.
N. Y. Supp. 177.)

Misc. Rep.

30

441,

01'

J.

Upon evidence ample therefor the learned justice
below determined that the plaintiff had rendered work, labor, and
material
upon certain premises under an
services and furnished
agreement with the defendant, who testified that he had informed
the plaintiff that he was not the owner, but the attorney for the owner, of the premises.
Inasmuch as the defendant did not disclose the
name of his principal, his contention against personal liability was inArgersinger v. MacNaughton, 114 N. Y. 535, 21 N. E.
Am. St. Rep. 687; Nelson v. Andrews, 19 Misc. Rep. 623,

1022,

11

44 N.

Y.

18

Supp. 384.
Judgment affirmed,

HOLT
(Commission

All concur.

with costs.

ROSS. 19

v.

of Appeals of the State of New York,

1873.

Barb.

554.)

Eep. 615, affirming

59

a

a

Action to recover back the amount paid by
chants' Union Express Company of which Ross
draft upon
forged indorsement by the payee.
creditor and was payable to
upon Holt by
isNeely

54 N.

Y.

472, 13 Am.

plaintiff to the Merwas president, upon
The draft was drawn
It
one T. D. Ford.

a

effectual.

28 S. W. 800, 27 L. R. A. 503, 4d Am. St.
minor boughl whisky "for two sick teachers."
The court held this
sale to the minor, and therefore Illegal.
19 Approved
in McClure v. Cent. Trust Co., 165 N. Y. 108, 58 X. B. 777, 53
Edgar Lumber Co. v. McGeehan, 124
I.. R. A. 153 (1900), but cf. Alexander
Wis. 325, L02 X. W. 571 (1905), in which the court pointed out thai one dealing
with, the •-'••lit of
known principal, in the regular course of conducting the
in the absence of any
principal's busim ss by such agent, is presumptively,
Forresl v.
evidence contra, dealing as agenl on the credil of the principal.
McCarthy, 30 Misc. Rep. 125, 63 N. Y. Supp. 853 (1899), in which the plaintiff's testimony Clearly showed she consciously dealt with defendant as the
representative of his principal, and thai she had had previous dealings of the
acting as such, or is
The question
no! whether one is agent,
same sort
was understood by
Ui own to be SUCh, but whether in the given transaction
66,

a

v. State, 60 Ark.
(1894),
in which

&

;i

Is

it

is

L48

a

Rep.

m
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fell into the hands of a stranger, who forged the indorsement of T.
D. Ford, and the draft so indorsed was cashed by the Express ComPlaintiff, supposing the indorsement genuine, paid the Expany.
press Company, and afterwards was compelled to pay a second time
The Express Company claimed to have acted merely
to the creditor.
as agent in the collection.
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Earl,

Com. The Express Company, when it presented the draft
to the plaintiffs for payment and received payment, did not disclose
its agency ; therefore it is liable, as if actually principal in the transaction.
It was so decided in Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, 1 Hill,
287.
It was not sufficient that the defendant acted as agent ; to
shield itself from liability it should have disclosed its agency.
Such is
the rule as to all agents. To shield themselves from liability for their
acts they must give the names of their principals. Such is the rule
in reference to the transfer of negotiable paper.
If the transferrer
be only an agent, if he did not at the time disclose the name of his
principal, and the bill or note proves to be a forgery, he is personally
liable for the consideration
received.
Gurney v. Wormsley, 4 Ell. &
B. 133; Morrison v. Currie, 4 Duer, 79; 2 Pars. Notes, 38.
It matters not that the general business of the express company
was to act as agent for others.
It could have owned this draft and
have collected it as principal. Knowledge in plaintiffs that defendant
might have acted as agent was not enough; and it was nol the duty
of the plaintiffs to inquire, before paying, whether the defendant was
acting as principal or agent. It was the duty of defendant, if it desired to be protected as agent, to have given notice of its agency.
The drawn
a draft are supposed
to know the signature of the
drawer, but are not supposed to have the same knowledge of the
signature of an indorser.
By acceptance and payment the drawee's
do not admit or guarantee the genuineness of the indorsement by the
Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, supra; 1 Pars. Notes, 322;
payee.
This

is therefore

a

clear case

for affirmance.

20

the parties thai tii«' third person dealt on the credll of the agent, or on that
nf the principal. Worthington v. Cowles, L12 Mass. ::<» (1873).
'I'hf Cad thai one Is a factor or broker would oo1 relieve him from the
Ity of disclosing
his principal, it be would escape personal liability.
Hamlin v. AbelL 120 Mo. 188, 25 8. W. 516 (1894); Argersinger \. MacNaugh
ton,
N. Y. 535, -I X. E. 1022, 11 Am. St. Rep. 087 (1889).
And the sa
thing Is true of an auctioneer.
Meyer v. Redmond,
App. Div. L23, 125
\. V. Bupp. 1052 (1910); Mille v. Hum. 20 Wend. 431 (1838). Cf. aexl

III

ill

<-\er.

i he iii~ enting

opinion

of Reynolds,

<\, la omitted.

EFFECTS
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ami

MERCER
(Supreme

Assumpsit

Court of Michigan,
by
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v.

1906.

RELATION

(Part

3

LE1TIY.
189

Mich.

447,

102

N.

W.

972.)

against Leihy.
Coombs stole some horses, and brought them to

Mercer

defendants' auction rooms, where they were sold at auction to the
plaintiff, who afterward sued the auctioneers to recover the money
paidj and a judgment of no cause of action was rendered by the circuit judge before whom the case was tried without a jury. Plaintiff
appealed, and alleges error upon the finding of fact that the auctioneer sufficiently disclosed his principal to relieve the defendants,
* * *
his employers, from liability.
The rule is well established that an auctioneer who does not disclose his principal is presumed to contract upon his own behalf, except where he expressly contracts upon the understanding that he
will not do so. On the other hand, if he discloses the fact of agency
and his principal, the law presumes that he does not contract upon
his own behalf, but for the principal. The question here seems to
be whether anything less than a disclosure of the name of the principal is sufficient, and a number of authorities are cited which use
language to the effect that a disclosure of the name of the principal
is essential.
Many of these are cases where there is nothing to indicate that there was an agency; others that the principal was not
present, and no clue to his identity could be found in the facts stated ;
while there are others which show that there was an absent principal,
yet the language used makes such indefinite reference to him as not
to afford an opportunity to immediately ascertain who he is.
Such is the case of Neely v. State, an Arkansas case reported
in 60 Ark. 66, 28 S. W. 800, 27 L. R. A. 503, 46 Am. St. Rep. 148,
where a minor bought intoxicating liquor, which he said was for two
at a neighboring college, without naming or otherwise
identifying them. Raymond v. Proprietors of Crown & Eagle Mills,
2 Mete. (Mass.) 319, is another case where the court held that it was
not error to submit the question of the sufficiency of the disclosure
to the jury, where an agent stated that goods which he was buying
So in
were for the C. & E. Mills, the language being ambiguous.
Cobb v. Knapp, 71 N. Y. 350, 27 Am. Rep. 51, the statement that
the property was for the Blissville Distillery was held not conclusive. In each of these cases except the first there is an implication
that the facts shown might be found sufficient, otherwise they should
not have gone to the jury. They were not so strong in favor of the
agent as the case before us, because the opportunity to ascertain was
not immediately present; and in the case last mentioned there was
testimony not only that the plaintiff did not know who were the proteachers

2i Part of the opinion is omitted.
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prietors of the distillery, but that the defendant directed the property
to be charged to him.
In Hanson v. Roberdean, Peake, N. P. 163, it is indicated, as it is
in many later authorities, that, where the auctioneer fully discloses
the fact of his agency and his principal, the presumption arises that
he is iv >t contracting upon his own behalf, and that the law recogIn 2 Kent,
nizes the transactio n a s one on behalf of the princ ipal.
Cum. 630, 631, it is said: "If a person would excuse himself from
responsibility on the ground of agency, he must show that he disclosed his pr incipal (not the name of his principal) at the time of makingthe contract, and that he acted on his behalf." Other authorities
quoted from text-writers and other sources are found in Neely v.
State, 60 Ark. 66, 28 S. W. 800, 27 L. R. A. 504, 46 Am. St. Rep.
See, also, Reinhardt on Agency, § 303.
We are of the opinion that the statement, frequently found, that
the agent, to avoid personal liability, must disclose the name of his
principal, is due to the fact that such is, in the nature of things, the
natural and ordinary, and many times the only convenient and pracThe important information to be
ticable, way of identifying him.
is an agent, acting for a
auctioneer
the
is
that
to
the
purchaser
given
seem that the accurate
would
it
discloses,
and
he
whom
principal
where other means
indispensable
not
is
name
his
principal's
of
giving
of clearly pointing out and identifying him are adopted.
The testimony in this case indisputably shows that the principal
was present, and in the presence of the plaintiff identified himself to
a degree sufficient to carry that question to a jury, or to the court,
It is equally certain
where, as in this case, a jury has been waived.
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148.

that the auctioneer disclosed the fact of agency, and it is inferable
that he designed to and did inform those present that he was not
selling the property as his own, but for and on behalf of a man who
came from Ypsilanti, was present, and upon whom he called to ap22
We are of the opinion that the
pear and make himself known.
as one of fact, subject to
the
question
in
treating
err
court did not
his finding upon the
review
cannot
course,
we
Of
him.
decision by
merits.

The judgment

is

affirmed.

at When the third party knows perfectly well of tiio agency it is nol oe<
Warren v. Dickson, -7 ill. LIB (1862).
for ih" agent to disclose it.
;is agent for
"The agenl need not. Bay in so many words, 'I am acting mereLj
IM \ principal."'
Brown v. Ami . 58 Minn. 176, 61 N. W. 448 (1894).
it j j ,,,,! enough however thai the third party has the means <»r ascertaining
;is agent
The principal
the principal, and knows that the agent is acting
De Remer v. Brown, L6B N. Y. U0, 59 v B.
must in -..in.- way i"- disclosed.
Y. 198, 58 N. B. 777, G3 L. It.
McClure v. Oent Trust Co., L65 S.
129 (1991);
'
A. 158 (1999); Cobb v. Knapp, «' N - v ::|v - L 7 Am - ll «'i'- 51 <1877 >-
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VI.

Fob Money
C
(Courl

Pratt,

C.

J.

\UY

of King's

(Tart 3

RELATION

Mistake, Fraud,

by

etc.

\\ EBSTER.

v.

Bench,

Where money

plies it. the party has
election.
The defendant was

L721.

i

Strange,

180.)

is paid to the servant

his remedy

against

the

master

and he misapor servant at

and took
a clerk of the Smith-Sea Company,
payments on the third subscription; the plaintiff paid him
. and he by mistake never entered it in the book, but however
And the Chief Justice ruled, that no
paid it over to the company.
That if he had not paid it over the
action would lie against him.
had
his
option, either to charge him or the complaintiff would have
of payment to a goldsmith's servant,
common
case
in
as
the
panv :
who does not carry it to the account of his master, the party has an
election to go against either: he may charge the servant, because till
the money is paid over the servant receives it to his use; or he may
by the servant and make his demand upon the master, because
the payment to the servant is made in confidence of the credit given

in
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Paid

OF THE

the

him by the master.

SHEPARD
(Supreme

Court of Minnesota.

v.

1890.

SHERIN.
~i:\ Minn.

382,

45

N.

W. 718.)

Action to recover money paid by mistake. There was judgment for
plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
GiLi-ii.i.AX, C. J. ( )n the evidence, there could be_no_ cmestion o[ _
the main facts in the case, especially that the overpayment was merely
through mistake of fact, and not through any fraud or fault on the
part of defendant; that he received it expressly for his principal,
R. \Y. Sherin, and had paid the money over to him the same day.
These facts were found by the court below; and on the motion for
filed, had
a new trial the court, as appears from its memorandum
But the court also found
no doubt of the propriety of those findings.
as a fact that the defendant so paid over the money without notice
of any mistake; and, because it thought this finding was not justified
The evidence as to notice
nee, it ordered a new trial.
1 not have justified any finding of notice to defendant that would
have changed the proper result of the action.
The l aw regulating the
liability of an agent to the party paying it for money paid to him for
rincipal through mistake is well settled. We find it as well stated
y where in Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137, 9 L. Ed. 373:
"When the money is paid voluntarily, and by mistake, to an agent, and
he cannot be made personally
he has paid it over to his principal,

LIABILITY
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AGENT TO THE THIRD

PEJw6n

67$

over, he is a pprised of the m isSee.
he is personally liable."
" take^and
7 Johns.
v.
Hearsev
Harrison,
Pruyn.
566;
1
v.
Cowp.
alsor"Buller
179; La Farge v. Kneeland, 7 Cow. 456; Mowatt v. McLelan, 1
responsib

lej__but^JiEiQr^rjayin^it

n ot to pay it over,

required

\Yend. 173.
The noti ce of
_ar2alne^djToT
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and requirement not to pay to the prinThe rule that, if he pays over without
formal.
notice, he is not liable, is for the agent's protection; and, to deprive
him of the protection, the notice to him should be sufficient to apprise
him what the mistake is, and that by reason of it the party paying
it to him intends to reclaim it.
The only notice of which there was any evidence came about in
the mistake,

he

this way: The principal held the note and mortgage of one Burrows.
The latter had arranged for a loan from plaintiff, and, as a part of
the money to be loaned, the latter was to pay off the note and mortThe principal had authorized defendant to receive a specified
gage.
sum as due on the note and mortgage, and on receiving it to deliver a
The sum specified was
satisfaction piece executed by the principal.
The mistake claimed
paid to him, and he delivered the satisfaction.
the payment "I
after
that
was in the amount due. Burrows testified
had made a
I
they
him
thought
I
told
went out and saw Sherin.
he had got
He
said
much.
too
note
the
They had figured
mistake.
son [the
my
train,
was
wrong,
if
anything
there
and
said,
to go to the
notice.
evidence
of
all
the
was
This
right."
it
make
principal] would

._

/

plaintiff, it would have been hardly
nnl liavc apprised defendant that he intended
~^^cSnHT'
I'm it was by one
""tcTTecTa im whatever might have been overpaid.
According to the arrangement
ith..rity in the matter.
w ho had
""between plaintiff an"d Burrows, the former could charge the lattery,
with only what was actually due on the note and mortgage, and paid'
by him. In what was overpaid, plaintiff, and not Burrows, was solely
As relates to notice that could affect the rights of the
interested.
parties, the finding of the court that there was none was the only
Had

su ch not ice been given by the
1!l 'l

that, on the evidence, could be made.
points out various rulings on the trial which he
claims to be erroneous, and sufficient to justify an order granting a
new trial.
They have no bearing on the matter of notice, the point
to which plaintiff's case failed, and therefore they could not prejufinding

The respondent

dice him.

Order

re versed.

23

of Dickinson, J.. Le omitted.
ti ie above third persom musl seek their remedy n lt.i i nst the
principal, Granger v. Hathaway, it Mich. ~>"<i(1869), except when the agenl
in thai case ii" may i><-sued to re^
has nol changed Ms original position,
LOB m
Pancoasl v. Dlnsmore,
r i,.-i.'k the money paid him bj mi take.
ill, 76 AH. !•;, 134 Am. st. Rep. 582 11909).
The i
I,, ,

i

miring opinion

(.180

EFFECTS
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CONSEQ1 BN< ES OF THE

BULLER
(Court

of

v.

RELATION

(Part 3

HARRISON."

King's Bench,

1777,

2 Oowp.

5G5.)

should not be granted in this

Upon shewing cause why a new trial
Lord Mansfield read his report as follows:
This was an action for money had and received, brought by the
plaintiff against the defendant, to recover hack a sum of £2,100. paid
him as due upon a policy of insurance, as agent for the insured,
This sum the
Messrs. Ludlow ami Shaw, resident at New York.
plaintiff had paid, thinking the loss was fair. Notice of the loss was
Part of
given by the defendant to the plaintiff on the 20th of April.
case.

was paid at that time, and the remainder on the 6th of
on which day the defendant passed the whole sum
in his account with Messrs. Ludlow and Shaw, and gave credit to
them for it against a sum of £3,000. in which they stood indebted to
On the 17th of May, notice was given by the plaintiff to the
him.
defendant that it was a foul loss. At this time, nothing had happened
to alter the situation of the defendant, or to make it different from
what it was on the 20th of April. He had accepted no fresh bills, advanced no sum of money, nor given any new credit to his principals ;
hut affairs between them and him remained precisely in the same
The question at the trial was,
situation as on the 20th of April.
against the defendant, as
whether this action could be maintained
agent of the insured; which depended on this; whether me defendin
ant's having placed this money to the account of his principals,
the manner before stated, was equivalent to a payment of it over.

the money
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May following;

In general the principle of law is clear; that if money be mispaid
to an agent expressly for the use of his principal, and the agent has
paid it over, he is not liable in an action by the person who mispaid
it : because it is just, that one man should not be a loser by the mistake of another ; and the person who made the mistake is not without
redress, but has his remedy over against the principal. On the other
hand it is just, that as the agent ought not to lose, he should not be
And therefore, if after the payment so
a gainer by the mistake.
made to him, and before he has paid the money over to his principal,
the person corrects the mistake; the agent cannot afterwards pay
it over to his principal without making himself liable to the real
But the present case turns upon this; that
owner for the amount.
the agent was precisely in the same situation at the time the mistake
At the trial I inclined to think the plaintiff
was discovered, as before.
ought to recover; but did not direct the jury; and they found for

24 Accord:
Smith v. Binder, 7-", 111. 492 (1874). Contra: Cabot v. Shaw, 148
There is no presumption that the agent has
Mass. 159, -<> N. EL '■>■>
(1889).
paid the money over to the principal. He must prove it. Law v. Nunn, 3
<,:i. 90 UM7).
He must show that he actually parted with the money, or
U. S. Nat Bank v. Nat. Park Bank, 59 Hun,
something equivalent thereto.
495 15 N. Y. Supp. 411 (1891), affirmed 129 N. Y. 647, 29 N. E. 1028 (1891).
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I

I am satisfied
mistook in leaving it open to the
the defendant.
jury : For it is clearly a question of law, not a matter of fact : And
in conscience the defendant is not entitled to retain the money. Therefore I should have left it to the jury in this manner ; if you are satisfied that the money was paid by mistake, and the defendant's situation not altered by any new circumstance since, but that every thing
remained in the same state as it was on the 20th of April, you ought
to find for the plaintiff.
Mr. Bearcroft and Mr. Davenport, who shewed cause, insisted that
the defendant had a right to retain the money in question.
Mr. Wallace and Mr. Dunning were in support of the rule; but
Lord Mansfield, thought the case so clear, that his lordship stopped
Mr. Dunning, as being unnecessary to give himself any trouble.
I am very glad this motion has been made:
Lord Mansfield.
for I desire nothing so much as that all questions of mercantile law
should be fully settled and ascertained ; and it is of much more consequence that they should be so, than which way the decision is. The
jury were embarrassed on the question whether this was a payment
To many purposes, it would be. It is now argued, that this
over.
If it were, it
is not a mere placing to account, but a making rest.
were enthe
I
believe
jury
verily
would not vary the case a straw.
no
There
is
imputation
over.
it
as
a
payment
tangled in considering
It is
of the insured.
upon a man who trusts to a misrepresentation
know,
him
to
to
it
honour;
makes
of
it
consequence
his
but
to
greatly
The whole question
how far his remedy goes if he is imposed upon.
at the trial was. whether the defendant, who was an agent, had paid
Now, the law is clear, that if an agent pay over
the money over.
money which has been paid to him by mistake, he does no wrong;
and the plaintiff must call on the principal ; And in the case of Muil, where it appeared that the money was paid over,
man versus
But, on the other hand, shall a man.
the plaintiff was nonsuited.
though innocent, gain by a mistake, or be in a better situation than
if the mistake bad not happened? Certainly not. In this case, there
was no new credit, no acceptance of new bills, no fresh goods bought
In short, no alteration in the situation which
or money advanced
and
his
principals stood in towards each other on the
the defendant

What then is the case? The defendant has trusted
20th of April.
He trafficks to the country
and
Co.
and given them credit.
Ludlow
where they live, and has agents there who know how to get the money
The plaintiff is a stranger to them and never heard of their
back.
Is it conscientious then, that the defendant should keep money
names.
and should say, though
which he has got by their misrepresentation,
there is no alteration in my accounl with my principal, this is a hit,
If there had been any new
I have kr"' the money and I will keep it?

given, it would have been proper to have left it to the jury to
whether any prejudice had happened to the defendant by means
Bui here no prejudice at all is proved, and none
of this payment;
credil

EFFECTS
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inferred. Under these circumstances I think (and Mr. JusVston with whom I have talked the matter over is of the same
opinion) thai the defendant has no defence in point of law, and in
point of equity and conscience he ought nol to retain the money in
is

to be

question.

Mr. Justice W'n. u:s and Mr. Justice Asiiiiikst were of the same
opinion.
Per Curiam. Rule for a new trial absolute.

MOWATT
(Supreme

Court of Judicature

v.

McLELAN.

of New

York,

25

1828.

1

Wend.

17.1.)

J. This was an action to recover hack money paid
mistake.
The defendant, as attorney for Mrs. Charity Wright,,
The defendant in those actions
brought three actions of dower.
vouched to warranty the ancestor of the Mowatts, the plaintiffs.
The
-nits were compromised by the payment of $1,000 to the defendant,
as the attorney of Mrs. Wright; on the receipt of which, Mrs. Wright
executed a release of her dower, and her children released their interest, and the suits were withdrawn. The defendant paid over to his
client's orders $800, and retained $200 for his costs and counsel fees,
Savage, C.
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by

7
9

whic h is found to be a moderate compensation.
Upon making this
payment and settlement, the defendant took > a receipt in full.
Soon
after the compromise, a conveyance was found from Wright and wife
to Col. Burr, executed about thirty years previous.
The money was
paid by the plaintiffs the 24th November, 1821, and this suit brought
in 1827, to recover from the defendant the $200 retained by him for
his fees.
These facts are found by a special verdict in the court of common
pleas for the city of New York, on which that court gave judgment
for the defendant.
( .
Two questions arise in this case: 1. Whether Mrs. Wright is liable
to refund the sum of $1000 thus received by her? and if soJ-t2. Is the
defendant liable to refund the $200 retained by him for his costs?
As the first question is one upon which Mrs. Wright has not been
heard, and as that question, we are informed by counsel, will be disci in a suit now pending against Mrs. Wright, I shall consider
first the latter question, assuming for the present argument the lia-

In Buller v. Harrison, 1 Cowper, 566, Lord
[For Lord Mansfield's statement of the law, see

bility of Mrs. Wright.

Mansfield
-ays:
ante, p. 681.]

Accord:
Holland v. Russell, 1 Best & S. 4^\101 Tt. C. L. 424 (1861).
Payment to the principal relieves the agent of liability to the third person
though afterward the principal returns the money to the agent in set*
Bogart v. Crosby, 80 Cm L95, 22 Pac. 84 (1889).
tlement for his services.
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The case of Edwards v. Hodding, 5 Taunt. 815, was an action
against the defendant as agent and auctioneer for the deposit made
The dehv the plaintiff, as purchaser of a freehold estate at auction.
fendant had paid over the deposit after notice that the purchaser was
dissatisfied with the title, and therefore the payment over did not proIn the case of Cox v. Prentice, 3 Maule & Sel. 345, the
tect him.
defendant, as agent of his correspondent at Gibraltar, had sold the
plaintiffs a bar of silver, for which they paid more than the value.
from the mistake of the assay-master. Upon discovering the mistake,
the plaintiffs applied to the defendant for a return of the money, ofThe defendant refused, on the ground
fering to return the silver.
that he had forwarded his account to his correspondent, in which he
had credited him with the full sum ; it appeared, however, that the
account was still unsettled between them.
Lord Ellenborough states
the principle of the agent's liability where there is no change of circumstances, and says, here it is admitted that no money has been paid
over by the defendant to his principal, nor has there been any other
He then arthing done by him to create a change of circumstances.
of
the
justice,
the
case
liability
Bayley,
the
principal.
upon
gues
speaking of the case of Buller v. Harrison, says, "That case decides,
that

if

things

remain

in the same state as they did here, the action

will lie against the agent."
The same point has been so decided in
this court.
Hearsey v. Pruyn, 7 Johns. 182, and 7 Cowen, 460, La
In the latter case, Kneeland had received money
Farge v. Kneeland.
for Braham and Atwood, which the plaintiff was entitled to recover
from them; but the defendant had passed it to the credit of his principals, and that credit was passed to the credit of another account.
This we considered equivalent to a payment. Tt closed the account
between the agent and his principals, and therefore we held the agent
Jn this respect, that case differed from the cases of
was discharged.
In both these cases the acBuller v. Harrison and Cox v. Prentice.
count remained open; no change of circumstances had taken place;
an erroneous credil had been given, which might be balanced by a
no settlement
corresponding charge on the debit side of the account;
had taken place, nor any closing of the accounts between the parties.
In the case now under consideration, the money was honestly and
fairly received byTKeTlefendant as agent for his client, who, we now
The defendant disposed of the whole
assume, ought to pa\ it back.
of it according to the due. lion- of his client, paid her $500, paid
one Ivlias Baldwin, retained $200 to himself, and finallv setace,
with his principal, by taking a receipt
tled his
.unts and <
and ii seems to
scd
out of hi- hands;
in full.
never
The $200
pa
onceded, that if he had paid the whole sum to Mrs! WrigTit, and
he had paid him Hack $200 in other money, this action could nol
And is it possible that the rights ol parlies in this courl
If the transaction was
id upon idle and unmeaning ceremonies?
what it purports,

it was in reality

a

payment by till' 'defendant

'

ami
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the money
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in his hand s, which
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ho had received as her agent,

This closed _the, acand payment by her to
he
corrected
It
to
ihcni.
is
not
count between
by a charge in an
America
either
correspondent
account.
no
There
open
foreign
or at Gibraltar, as
the cases above cited, of Buller v. Harrison and
Cox v. Prentice.
the plaintiffs recover here, the defendant must
resort to his action to recover his money. This the plaintiffs can also
the defendalleged,
and indeed have done. And here, too,
ant should be driven to his action against his client, his remedy
The plaintiffs do not sue till the statute of
lapse of time.
gone
and already more than six years
limitations
closing upon them
have elapsed since the settlement between the defendant and his client.
not liable, and that the judgam of opinion that the defendant

if

I

is

;

is

by

is

is

it

If

in

is"

in

her attorney of his costs.

ment of the court below be affirmed.

v.

SKINNER.
1770.

5

(Court of King's Bench,

26

Burrow,

2639.)

The defendant was an auctioneer; and, in that character, had sold
plaintiff an interest in land, for which the plaintiff had paid him
a deposit of £50. but, upon an objection to the title, and the want of
sure of certain circumstances which ought to have been disclosed
at the time of the bidding, the plaintiff (the purchaser) declined going
on with the contract
and, in the opinion of the court, she had sufficient reason for so doing.
She therefore required the auctioneer to
£50.
The auctioneer refused. Whereupon,
pay her back his deposit of
the bidder brought this action against him, to recover it. The aucand the plaintiff obtioneer paid £8. into court. The cause was tried
new trial; and had
tained
verdict.
The auctioneer moved for

a

a

a

:

:

•

to the

tin

Approved

v.

Allen,

In Read v. Riddle, 48 N. J. Law, 350,
Mo. App. 636, 103 S. W. 138 (1007).

125

7

a

it

it

it,

a

a

it it

if

rule to shew cause.
But, upon shewing cause,
The Court were clear, that the action lay against the auctioneer.
The money does not appear to have been paid over by him to his prinBut
cipal.
had been so, yet the objection appears to have been
He
made before
either was or ought to have been so paid over.
was
stake-holder,
mere depositary of the £50. and ought not to
have parted with
till such time as the sale should be finished and
completed, and
should appear in the event to whom
properly belonged.
They also thought that the auctioneer had acknowledged himself to
be liable to the action, by paying money into court.
They therefore unanimously discharged the rule for shewing cause
new trial.
why there should not be
2
e
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BURROUGH

Atl.

487

(1886);

Mar-

LIABILITY
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SADLER
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OF
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1766.

4

Burrow,

19S4.)

motion having been made, on behalf of the plaintiff, to set aside a

no n-suit— —
On the last day of Easter Term last (1766), Mr. Justice Aston
ported from Mr. Baron Perrot who tried the cause, That this was
action for money had and received to the plaintiff's use; and that
""counsel for the plaintiff, who opened the cause at the trial, stated

rean
the
the

action to be brought with intention to try the right of Lady Windsor
to a quitrent of one shilling, and to another sum of six-pence for mises.
They stated, that the defendant was her receiver; and demanded them
of the plaintiff, as such. That the plaintiff paid the Is. 6d. to the defendant; and took a receipt for them, by which, the defendant acto have received them for the use of Lady Windsor.
knowledged
That, in fact, these sums were not due to Lady Windsor ; and that they
were therefore received without any good consideration; and consequently, that this action well lay against the defendant into whose hands
they were paid. And they were prepared with, and would have called
evidence to the right.
"Hut the judge (Mr. Baron Perrot) was of opinion, that under these
That nothcircumstances, the action did not lie against the defendant.
ing could be more absurd than to make the collector or receiver of another person liable to an action for every payment that was voluntarily
made to him ; and to leave him to be defended, or deserted, by his principal, as such principal should think fit. That it was (in his opinion)^
yet still more absurd, as he did not see how a verdict given in this
cause could ever be received in evidence for or against the right which
That if this action lay in
might in a future cause come to be tried.
who, by his
h a case as this, it would lie against every attorney
direction,
should demand and receive money as due to his
client's
client, which the supposed debtor might voluntarily pay, and afterlie thought that if the one shilling and
wards think fit to dispute.
over
to Lady Windsor, the plaintiff might
six-pence had been paid
11 Approved by Lord Kenyon, 0. J., In Greenway
v. iiunl, 4 T. R. 553 (1792).
in such cases the moment the money is in the agent's hands ii is virtually In
Coleridge, J., In Bamford
v. Shnttleworth, n A.d. &
the principal's hands.
There is no privity between the agenl and
EL 926, 39 ED. 0. L. 188 (1840).
Bills v. Goulton, [1803] i Q. B.
the third per on, aor any fiduciary relation.
the
cannot be tried In an action against
The ri -lit oi the principal
The cause of action, 11
55 111 176 (1870).
nt.
Bhipherd r. Onderwood,
Bailey v. Cornell, 66 Mich, hit, 33 N. W. 50
agalnsl the principal
;,.
linii'inan
The contrad i thai of the prtncip.il. :m<i nut of the np-ui.
713, 70 S. W. WO (11
the leading case of Colvln v. Bolbrook, 2 N. v. 126 (1847),
us App. Dlv. 901, L08 N.
v. Meeker,
approved and followed
In [fisher
U56 (1852).
Supp. 2G1 (1907), and Co tlgan v. Newland, 12 Barb
ney, and
not apply where the principal hae no right to the
Winningham v. [rancher, 52 Mo. app.
could nol recover
from the agent
55

Neb.

dally

ST.

v. Newnan,

it
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EVANS, or LADY WINDSOR'S CASE."

(Court of King's Bench,

A

PERSON

93).

ill

iv is

am- CONSEQUENCES

RELATION

OF THE

(Part

:*>

.

if

it

was nol paid over, yel the payment to her reeasily prove it: ami
ceiver was I'.'.Mnoni to her; and therefore the action ought to haw
been brought against her.
'I'm: Coikt. mi Thursday 12th June last, were unanimous, that

facts stated in the report, the plaintiff ought iml to recover
against the defendant, in this action; and that the action ought to have
been brought against Lady
indsor herself, and not against her agent
and therefore they discharged the rule for setting aside the nun suit .
They though
the principles upon which action
for money had and
received to the plaintiff's use are founded, did not apply to the cir
liberal action founded upon
cumstances ^i the present case.
large principles o\ equity, where the defendant can n<>t conscientious]}
lio'd the money.
The defence
any equity that will rebut ih e. art inn.
a

It

is

is

s

t,

:

\\

upon, the

MOORE
Court of Judicature

(Supreme

v.

;

a

is

:

a

SHIELDS.

of Indiana,

L889.

121

Ind.

2G7,

2.3 N.

E.

89.)

28

part of the opinion

*

a

is

;

is

a

it

omitted.

it

in

a

*

* a

8

a

sum of money paid to defendant for
Suit to recover
township
warrant, or note, issued in violation of his official duty, and without
Judgment for defendant.
any consideration, by
township trustee.
Mitchell, C. J.There was evidence tending to prove
that the appellants were paid
comparatively large sum for negotiating the township warrant in question, which was absolutely worthless.
They urged the plaintiff below to purchase, and recommended the
paper as good, within their knowledge.
There was evidence tending
to show that they knew the paper was irregularly issued, without any
short, that
consideration whatever;
was fraudulently issued. Under these circumstances they received the plaintiff's money; the latter
over to them in reliance upon the declaration made by them,
paying
that they had purchased
number of similar warrants as an investment, and that they regarded them as good as county or government
bonds.
said that the appellants were merely agents or brokers to
sell the warrant and that they are hence not liable, after having paid

It
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2

is

1

a

it

it

is

'Phis money was paid to the known agent of Lady W.
He
liable^
to her for it; whether he has actually paid
over to her, or not: he
for her. And Lord Mansfield expressed
received
dissent to the
case of Jacob versus Allen, in
Salk. 27, and his approbation of Pond
versus Underwood, in
Ld. Raym. 1210, 1211, which
contrary to it.
He said, he kept clear of all payments to third persons, but w here 'tis
known agent in which case, the action ought to he brought against
to
the principal, unless in special cases, (as under notice, or mala fidc.j
But they were unanimous, both upon principles and authorities, thai
where
mistaken
judge at nisi prius non-suits the plaintiff, and
the Court, upon motion, may set aside the non-suit.
Rule discharged.

LIABILITY

Ch. 3)

OF

THE AGENT TO THE TIIIKD PERSON

GST

The conclusion does not follow.
over the money to their principal.
"Even an auctioneer or broker who sells property for one who lias
no title, and pays over to his principal the proceeds, with no knowledge
of the defect of title or want of authority, is held liable for its conversion to the real owner." Hills v. Snell, 104 Mass. 173; Alexander
105 Ind. 81-86, 4 N. E. 433, 5 N. E. 908, 55 Am.
v. Swackhamer,

it

it

it,

Rep. 180, and cases cited.
Much more is a broker liable who sells and obtains money for worthless paper, which he knows has been fraudulently issued, in violation
of law, even though he may have paid the money over to his principal.
Where one person receives the money of another under such circumstances, that, in equity, — in good conscience, — he ought not to retain it.
to the person from whom
except to return
or otherwise dispose of
was received, an action for money had and received will lie to re-

3

it

is

2

4

&

is

a

a

&

if

person gets money Into bis bands Illegally h<> eannol discharge
Campb. .".'.>•;
Townson
v. Wilson,
paying
over to another.
Larkin v. Hapgood, 56 VI. 597 (1884); Wallis
(1808), per Ld. Ellenborough
Law, 167, 51
Bocchino v. Cook, <">7V
v. Shelly (C. <'.i 30 Fed. 717 (1887);
appeared
Cow. i.'i (1825), In which
Atl. 187 (1902); Frye v. Lockwood,
that the principal was really conducting the defense, though the action was
v. Clopton,
In
60 Miss. 349 (1882),
Bee, also, O'Conner
against the agent.
which the agent was required, to pay back usurious Interest.
i< also liable when lie receives the money without authority, and
The _
80 Kan.
Slmmonds v.
enter Into the contract.
the principal
r.
v. Pinover (D. C.)
R. A. (N. 8.) 553 (1909);
155, L01 Pac. 1070, 23
vv <n. in which the agent received
faith, bul on
ney
Fed. 305
bas been coi
Ltted by the
When an act of bankruptcy
forged Indorsement.
to bim the agent will be liable
before the agent pays over
principal
it (1884).
13
B.
Even
the agent
for the money. Ex parte Edwards,
bis principal bad no right to tin- money,
mi good faith, be will I"- liable
to her deceased bus
:i~ where the principal Intended i" obtain representation
band, and the ir»
received several debts and paid them over to her. When
legal representative,
the agent was held
the widow {-.\\\i-i\ of appointment
in these
Hare, h'>'.»(1846).
v. MUdon,
Bharland
liable for the amounts.
Hi,, third per on maj elect
which t<>bold, the principal <>r the agent,
ther.
Incon
tebt with an intent to bold
election to bold
but
The remedies are n< concurrent Eufaula Grocery Co. v. M'>. Nat Bank, n
Ala. i"~. -I South. 38$) (1898).
any
by

u
.r

a •"-

g

I

If

I
».
7

s

tl

i

>i

I

5

a

•
1
1
1

.1

If

Q.

j

ii

In

I.

8.

I

r<

:i
r
<
■
1
1
1

I

it

J.

;

l

it

-■•

himself

:■
1
1
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back. McFadden v. Wilson, 96 Ind. 253.
In an action for money had and received, there need be no privity
of contract proved, other than such as arises out of the fact that the defendant has received the plaintiff's money under circumstances which
make
against conscience that he should retain it. Walker v. Conant,
Amer.
<V? Mich. 194, 31 X. \V. 786; People v. Speir. 77 X. Y. 144;
Eng. Cyclop. Law, 860. "If one man has obtained money from another through the medium of oppression, imposition, or deceit, such
money is, in contemplation of law, received for the use of the injured
promise on the part of him
case the law implies
party." In such
Mcreturn
the
who
in the wrong to
money to the lawful owner.
-°
413;
Def.
469-171.
Act.
Ind.
Wait.
v.
Dank.
Queen
The application of the principles above stated justify the judgment.
affirmed, with costs.
We have found no error. The judgment
cover

lii

688

1:1

is and

D.
^Queen's

roxsiui i.ncks of Tin: kki.A'iion

OWEN

&

CO. v.

CRONK.

Division of the High Court of Justice.

Bench

(Part 3

[lsor>l

l

Q.

B. Div.

266.)

embarrassed, put their business into
Owen
trustees, by whom Cronk was appointed receiver.
& Co. bad printing done by Judd & Co., and were presented by the
manager with a bill which they claimed to be extortionate, but he refused to return to them the special blocks and type furnished by them
until they paid. Under this "duress of goods," of which Cronk had
no knowledge, they gave the manager a check, which Cronk indorsed
Action to recover the excess
and paid into his receivership account.

Judd & Co., being financially

the hands

oi

charges.

case is not a difficult one to decide when once
It is said that the defendant was a receiver,
Upon the facts, it appears to me that he was an
not a mere servant.
agent, not a principal, and in my opinion the learned judge has come to
Had the defendant any
The next question
conclusion.
a right
knowledge that the money had been improperly obtained from the
no evidence that, at the time when
plaintiffs? In my opinion, there
the check was paid to Macintosh, the defendant knew anything of the

Lopes, L.

J. The

is

is

it

I

is

if

?

I

it

is,

The next quescircumstances under which the payment was made.
Did the defendant pay over the cheque to his principals before
tion
had been wrongly obtained from the plainhe had any notice that
The learned judge has come to the conclusion — and think righttiffs
— that he did.
an agent has
clearly settled that
think the law
of
which
has
been wrongthe
payment
received for his principal money
he has any
before
to
the
principal
over
he
pays
fully obtained, and
the person
to
from
liability
any
he
protected
notice of the wrong,
hand,
notice
with
the
if,
other
agent,
But
the
on
the
who paid
money.

ly

it

of the wrong, pays the money to his principal, he will nevertheless be
Here the depersonally liable to the person who made the payment.
fendant, being an agent, paid the cheque to the account of his prinhad been improperly obcipals before he had had any notice that
He has complied with the requirements
tained from the plaintiffs.
of the law, and, therefore, the action cannot be maintained against him,
30
and the decision of the learned judge was right.
Appeal dismissed.
Hauenstein
of Kslior. M. R., and Riffby, L. J., are omitted.
Law, 98, 62 Atl. 184 (1905); McDonald v. Napier, 14 Ga. 89
judgment to save the third person from
the agent was paid
The ease
cation, and the judgment was afterward set aside.
discriminating discussion of what will and what will not protect

The opinions

J.

contains
the agent.

a

30

v. Buh, i:; N.
(1853), in which
a
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(Court

v.

of the King's Bench,

PERSON

EVERETT.
1811.

14

East.

y

CS9

5^2.)

Lord ElxENBOROUGH, C. J., 31 delivered the judgment of the Court.
This was a case argued in this court, in the last Hilary and Easter
terms, on a motion to set aside a nonsuit, which took place at a trial
before me at the sittings at Guildhall after last Michaelmas term. The
action was for money had and received, brought by the plaintiff to re—cover £300..
being part of the amount of a bill of £1126. 2s., remitted
by one James Kelly from the Cape of Good Hope to the defendant's
hoUsel in a letter dated Cape Town, 8th July ISO'J; in which Kelly
say-. "I remit you by the YYarley £1126. 2s., which I particularly request you will order to be paid to the following persons, who will produce their letters of advice from me on the subject," etc.
Amongst
the persons, he names the plaintiff Williams (wine merchant, Gracechurch street), for £300.
And he afterwards made another remittance
And then he adds : "I desire the
for £500. on the same "terms.
amounts paid each person to be put on the back of their respective
Williams by
bills." etc. "and that every bill paid off be cancelled."
his attorney, long before the bills became due, gave the defendant
EvereTt notice of a letter he had received from Kelly, ordering his debt
of £300. to be paid out of that remittance, and offered him an indemnif a banking house if he would hand over the bill to him ; but Everett
refusal to indorse the bill away, or to act upon the letter; admitting.
"""tTcnvever, that he had received the letter directing the application of
the money in the manner already stated.
The question at the trial
was. whether the plaintiff was entitled to receive from the defendants
the amount of his demand on Kelly for £300. out of the bill for £112*>.
which was admitted to have been
it became due.

*

*

received by the defendants

when

The question which has been argued before

us is, whether the defendants, by receiving this bill, did not accede to
the purposes for which it was professedly remitted to them by Kelly,
and bind themselves so to apply it ; and whether, therefore, the amount

of

such bill paid to them when due did not instantly become by operation of law money had and received to the use of the several persons
ntioned in Kelly's letter as the creditors in satisfaction of wto
bills it was to be applied, and of coui
to £3 ( X). of it. money had
and received to the use of the plaintiff.
It will be observed, that there
•

on the part of the defendants to hold this money [or. the
purposes mentioned in the letter; but, <>n the contrary, an \
fusil to the cTCdftdr so to do.
If. in order to constitute a privity
tween the plaintiff and <\>i< tidants as to the subject of this demand, an
11 I'm rt

Ooi

<>Ttl

piiiion

it

|g omltte<L

o
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assenl express or implied be necessary the assent can in this ca.se be
only an Implied one, and that too implied against the express dissent
of the parties to he charged. By the act of receiving the hill, the defendant agree to hold it till paid, and its contents, when paid, for the
It is entire to the remitter to give, and counteruse ^i the remitter.
mand, his own directions respecting the hill as often as he pleases, and
the persons to whom the hill is remitted may still hold the hill till received, and its amount when received, for the use of the remitter him-
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self, until by some engagement entered into by themselves with the
person who is the object of the remittance, they have precluded themselves from so doing, and have appropriated the remittance to the use
of such person. After such a circumstance, they cannot retract the
consent the) may have once given, hut ar e bound to hold it for the
If it he money had and received for the use
I the appointee.
of the plaintiff under the orders which accompanied the remittance,

it occurs as fit to be asked, idicn did if become so? It could not
be so before the money was received on the bill becoming due: and
at that instant, suppose the defendants had been robbed of the cash
or notes in which the bill in question had been paid, or they had
been burnt or lost by accident, who would have borne the loss thus
occasioned?
Surely the remitter Kelly, and not the plaintiff and his
other creditors, in whose favour he had directed the application of the
This apmoney according to their several proportions to be made.
pears to us to decide the question : for in all cases of specific property
lost in the hands of an agent, where the agent is not himself responsible
for the cause of the loss, the liability to bear the loss is the test and
consequence of being the proprietor, as the principal of such agent.
The case of De Bernales v. Fuller and Co., which has been urged in
from
argument on the part of the plaintiff, is clearly distinguishable
case,
in
i. e.
circumstance,
the
that
that
defendants
the present by this
Fuller and Co., had antecedently received the bill, which was to he
paid at their house, from Newnham and Co., the bankers of the plaintiff De Bernales, the holder, for the very purpose of receiving payment
for them, the Newnhams, of such bill: and having taken the bill for
this purpose, the Court thought that Fuller and Co. could not by themselves or their clerk renounce this purpose, but must apply the money,
brought by Fuller's clerk specifically for the discharge of that bill then
lying at their house, to that very purpose and no other ; and that they
were in effect to be regarded in that case as the plaintiff De Bernales'
agents, through the intervention of Newnham's house, for the purpose
of that receipt, and could therefore hold and apply it to no other.
Here no agency for the plaintiff ever commenced, but was repudiated
We are of opinion, therefore^by the defendants in the first instance.
that upon no principle of law can the defendants he said to stand in
such privity in respect to the plaintiff, as that the £300. claimed by this
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action can be said to have been money had and received to the plainTifFSTr-e : of course, therefore, the nonsuit must stand, and the rule
32
"for setting it aside be discharged,.

SECTION 2.— IN TORT

EULKELEY
(Court of Exchequer,

v.

DUNBAR. 33

IT!)!'.

1

Anstruthers,

.'57.)

to be by him indorsed on their account as required, was, by menaces,
compelled to endorse them to the defendants for a debt of his own.
The bill prayed a discovery of these matters, and that the notes might
be delivered up. The defendant, Dunbar, in his answer said, that he
had only acted as agent for the defendant Duff, and disclaimed having
-

in the cases.
In Hall v. Marston, IT Mass. 575
ii is laid down as settled law that "if A. promises 1?. for a valuable
to pay < the latter may maintain assumpsit for the money."
consideration
The court, perhaps properly, distinguishes the case from Williams v. Everett,
supra, on the ground thai in thai case there was no promise to pay, bul
positive refusal of the agenl to act
This was approved in Lawrence v. Fox,
l'u N. V. 268 (1859) (vigorous
dissenting opinion by Comstock, J.), the court
holding that "the law operating on the ad of the parties creates the duty.
privity, and implies the promise and obligation on which the
blishes
action
founded."
The application of the doctrine was strictly limited in
w York.
Barlow v. Myers, <w x. v. i::. -_m Am. Etep. 582 (1876) with review
Wheat v. Rice, '•>" X. Y. 296 (1884), in which the promise was not
Of cases;
may
made to pay any definite parlies, bul only indefinite creditors; and
applied to an agenl receiving money from his principal for
he doubted if
a third person, hut making no undertaking to pay according
to directions;
man v. Whitney, 24 Wend. l'<;ii. ."..". Am. Dec. 618 (1840), qo! disproved in
X. Y. Supp. 805 (1890); Burton
See, also, Meyer v. Stitz,
the later cases,
In Massachusetts
v. Larkin, ::•; Kan. 246, 13 Pac. 398, 59 Am. Rep. 541 (1887).
is difflcull
to reconcile later cases
the same limitations are to he noted, and
Borden v. Boardman,
with Hall v. Marsten, supra.
L57 Mass. HO, 32 \. E.
Mass. 3S5 (1809),
See also the early cases of Penny v. Lincoln,
(1892).
Am. Dec. 66 (1812).
and freeman v. Otis,
Mass. L'TJ.
very
In Maine the doctrine of Hall v. Marsten. supra, has heen given
Keeiie v. Sage, "■">Me. L38 (1883), which the New Jersey
broad application.
Nolan v. Manton, 46 N. J. Law. 231, •"><>
Am.
court has declined to follow;
Rep. I":: (1884), following the earlier case of Sergeanl v. Stryker, L6 N.
(|
Law, 164, 32 Am. Dec,
in the case of money received h.\ the
(1837).
third person
would seem that bis duty is
enl from hie principal tor
to his principal alone.
\. Y. 126 (1848); Elal] v. Lau
Colvin v. Holbrook,
Ises to pay the third person,
derdale, id V
70 (1871), until the agenl pr
ugngemenl with
odwin v. Bowden, 54 Me. \24 (1867), or enters into sm
over, Stevens v. Hill,
Esp. 247 (li<05). per Lord
third person to pay
I'd. 580, 599,
Ellenborough,
Tierman v.
Ed. 234 (1831).
id the agenl ha- done some ad recognizing the appropriation of the money
to the particular purposes specified, the money
at the rfss of the principal
and Bubjed to hi- rcaii.
Tierman v. Jackson, supra; Malcolm v. Scott,

There is much confusion

">

'_'

a

it

i
i

J.

a

6

'.»

9

5

it

'.>

it

it

is

a

a

'..

(1822),

I
a

L.

5

(1850).

Accord
Riley \. Bell,

<

'■..801

ampbell

120 Iowa.

v. Billman, 10 B. Mon. 508,
618, 95 X. W. 170 (1903).

•">

is

8

5

3

it

■
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The bill stated, that one Valentine, the agent in London for the
plaintiff's (merchants at Lincoln), having received bills from them,

<',t ,\m

Dec.

195 (1851);

*x.

i
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anything in the notes; and therefore in istcd on being struck out as a
to this answer
Exceptions
and only examined as a witness.
were taken, and allowed.
When an agent commits a fraud, he is answerable
By the COURT.
as principal, to the person injured, who is not to he sent round to seek
If the money or notes had been
the party benefited by the fraud.
he ha d paid i* "vpr before action
and
agent,
fide
the
received bona
by
brought, that would have been a good defense; but hern there is a
charge

root

such

a

of

fraud,

criminal charge

And this is n.-t
must be answered.
will screen him from the discovery sought.

which
as

GARRETT
(Supreme

Court

v.

of Washington,

SPARKS BROS.
1911.

61

Wash.

397,

112

Pac. 501.)
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Gose, J. This is a suit to recover money alleged to have been obtained from the plaintiff through the fraud of the defendant. , There
was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant has appealed.

The testiis abundant evidence to support the judgment.
as agent
acting
was
that
shows
the
appellant
of
the
monv
respondent
for the Plantations Company for the sale of certain tracts of orchard
land; that the appellant represented to the respondent that the
Plantations Company owned a piece of land called "Plantations," divided into small tracts, free and clear of all incumbrances; that the
There

paid the
respondent, believing and relying upon the representations,
appellant $1,000 on the purchase price of one of the tracts ; that the
representations were false, and that the Plantations Company, as the
appellant well knew, did not own the land, but that it had only a
contract of purchase, which it later forfeited.
The appellant argues that the only issue is "the resp onsibility of
an agent to answer to a third person for the default of a disclosed
principal." On the contrary, the issue is the liability of the appellant

The appellant cites in support of its
to answer for its own frattd.
contention Wilson v. Wold, 21 Wash. 398, 58 Pac. 223, 75 Am. St.
Rep. 846; Nelson v. Title Trust Company, 52 Wash. 258, 100 Pac.
730, and Davis v. Lee, 52 Wash. 330, 100 Pac. 752, 132 Am. St. Rep.
It is fundaThey have no application to the present issue.
973.
mental that a party, whether acting for himself or another, is liable
The fact that the principal is also
in damages for his own fraud.
liable does not relieve from responsibility the party who actually
commits the wrong. In such cases, the liability of the principal can
The party who has been
only rest upon the delict of its agent.
may elect to sue either or both.
The judgment is affirmed.

wronged

34

or fraud, the
a* Where Intent
prosecution
is necessary,
as in malicious
agenl must share the wrongdoing.
He will then be a principal, for in torts
all are wrongdoers, and the rule- of principal and agent does not exist. Car-

/

/
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(Court of King's Bench,

PERSON

693

SMITH. 36
1752.

1

Wilson.

328.)

In trover, the jury find a special verdict which in substance is
shortly this. That upon the 22d of September 1749 Hughes was possessed of the goods in the declaration as his own property, and became a bankrupt that day, that the plaintiff is assignee under the
that upon the 23d of September 1749, the defendant
commission;
Smith, who is servant and riding clerk to Mr. Garraway to whom
the bankrupt was considerably indebted, went to the bankrupt's shop
(to try to get his master's money) and found it shut up, and that
the bankrupt delivered to Smith the goods in the declaration, who
gave a receipt for the same in the name of his master, and sold the
same for his master's use.
It was objected that the action was improperly brought against the
servant Smith, who acted wholly in this matter for his master, and
that the conversion is found to be to the use of his master, which is
the gist of an action of trover; after two arguments at the bar, the
court gave judgment for the plaintiff.
The point is, whether the defendant is not a
LiCE, Chief Justice.
tort-feasor, for if he is so, no authority that he can derive from his
master can excuse him from being liable in this action.
had no right to deliver these goods to Smith ;
the gist of trover is the detainer or disposal of goods (which are the
and it is found that the defendant
property of another) wrongfully;
Hughes

the

bankrupt

raher v. Allen, 112 Iowa, L68, 83 N. W. 902 (1900); Weber v. Weber, IT Mich.
i
569, n X. W. 389 (1882);
Gutchess v. Whitney, 46 Barb. 139 (1866); H
v. De Grott, i". How. Prac. (N. Y.i -'ill (1857), distinguishing between :m agent
participanl in a fraud: Wimple
ni and a knowing
Instn
as .-in unconscious
< ;>
. . App.) 117 s. W. 1034 (1909), excusing the agent when
v. Patterson
(T< ..

made bj him.
the representations
v. Page, 83 Me. 234, 22 Ail. L01, 23 Am. St. Rep. 772
Many
Greenway v. Fisher, L C. & P. L90, L2 B. 0. l/. L18 (1824).
I
I .
of conversion by an agenl Involve the disposal of goods
<>r
of a bankrupt,
which maj account for the somewhat extreme application
See Stephens v. Elwell, I M. &
the doctrine of conversion against the agent.
i ic Rev. Rep. i5fl (1815), a leading case.
Many American cases refuse
ipplication '>r the action of trover
far, and criticise tl
>
in u'""<l faith for Ins principal.
ni who I'
v. Mule, - Cal. 571, 56 Am. 1•••<■.
363 (1852), which limits the agenfs liability
roprlated the Roods <>f the third
;■ bas bj
■ ■•other act deprived
the owner of bis pro
In Si
ner v. Holmes, i<>_' Mass.
ed or Implied.
with
■ liability to an agenl who in
to liia
ng them
iiinii of the doctrine

he honestly

believes

!:

MePheters

■

,■

C. B. 599, 2

■
In
i

L. R. V II

Jur.

l to!
W. K

i .

I

.

r, 44

I.. .1. Q.

B.

169, 33 I.. T.

Rep
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himselj disposed oi them to his master's use, which his master could
give him no authority to do; ami this is a conversion in Smith, this
sal being his own tortious act ; the <;r£ 0/ selling the goods w
//;<* conversion, and whether to the use of himself, or another, it makes
I am very well satisfied that this servant lias done
no difference;
wrong, and that no authority that could be derived from his master
before, or after the fact, can excuse him.
The finding that the defendant disposed of the goods for his master's use is only the conclusion of the jury, and does not hind the court,
the taking upon him to dispose of another's property is the tortious
Judgment for the plaintiff per tolam
act, and the gist of this action.
curiam.

HEUGH

v.

EARL OF ABERGAVENNY
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(Superior Courts of England and Ireland,

AND DELVES. 36

L874.

2:*> W. R. 40.)

The bill in this suit stated that the plaintiff was owner of certain
land in Kent, abutting on that of the defendant, the earl of Abergavenny, and that some dispute having arisen between the plaintiff and
the said defendant as to a weir situate on the plaintiff's land, the said
defendant and the defendant Delves, a land agent who professed to
act on his behalf had respectively threatened and still intended to enter forcibly on the plaintiff's land and to pull down and destroy the
The bill prayed for an injunction to restrain the defendants
weir.

from so doing.
The defendant Delves demurred to the bill for want of equity on
the ground that he had no interest, being a mere agent acting under
the instructions of the other defendant.
Jkssi'.i., M. R., said there could be no agency as between wrongWant of interest was no defense to a charge of tort, though
doers.
committed under the direction of another.
The wrongdoer became
personally liable. The demurrer must be overruled.

DENNY
(Supreme

v.

MANHATTAN

Court of New York,

1S4G.

CO.
2 Denio,

115.)

Case, for alleged violation of duty by defendants, as agents of the
Planter.-' Bank of Tennessee, in refusing to permit a transfer to plaintiffs on the transfer books of the Planters' Bank, kept by them, of 281
shares of stock in that bank, alleged to belong to plaintiffs as trustees.
We entertain a pretty strong impression that the
PER Curiam.
have
failed
to show a good title to the stock ; but our deciplaintiffs
sion will be put upon another ground, concerning which we have had
Thorp v. Burling, 11 Johns. 285 (1814).
rgnorance of the tresA.c ord:
pass will not save the agfiit. Ili^'insoii v. York, 5 Mass. .",11 (1809).
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hav;
no doubt from the moment the case was opened. If the plaintiffs
defendants,
a cause of action against any one, it is not against the
The defendants were
but against the Planters' Bank of Tennessee.
no
them
duty. They were the
owed
not the agent of the plaintiffs and
to discharge their
for
a
Bank;
neglect
and
agent of the Planters'
and
to no one else. If
principal
to
their
are
answerable
agency, they
known
of
a
agent, the rule is
the
neglect
are
injured
by
third persons
respondeat superior, and generally the action must be brought against
the principal.

Judgment for defendants.

FELTUS
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(Supreme

v.

SWAN.

Court of Mississippi,

1884.

37
C>2 Miss.

415.)

Action for damages resulting from the neglect and refusal of den,
a drain,. by
JendantTa s agent 63 the owner <>fa plantatio to keep open
of
land
plaintiff. The
reas on of wh ich water was backed up on the
declaration.
the
'co urt bel ow_JustahK-d a demurrer to
Campbell, C. J. The app ellee being a mere agent was not liable
Story on Agency, §§
for an omission of duty except to his principal.
535,
Dunlap's
536;
Paley's Agenon
Agency, §§
308, 309; Wharton
cy, 396.

The proposed amendment would not have made the declaration
good, fur whatever motive operated on the agent, the char-.' against
him was only that he had failed to do, and not that he had done anything maliciously, and for nonfeasance or omission to act at all the
nt is answerable

only to his employer.

Affirmed.

GREENBERG
(Supreme

Court

of

v.

WHITCOMB LUMBER CO.

Wisconsin,
139,

1895.
18 Am.

ct al.

1/

Wis. 225, 63 N. Wi. 93, 28 L. R. A.
St. Rep. 911.)

90

injury caused by a defective saw
was manager of the mill.
Defendant
Semple
fenciants' sawmill.
1
m
demurrers.
came
The case
up
NY.wma'.. I
[After holding that the complainl states a cause
*
*
* Wheth er the c omplaint
of action as t" the company:]
Parian Semple is more
e of action against the defendant
Whitcqmb dumber
or
servant
of
was
He
the
the
agcnl
complex.
mpany, charged with the oversight and management of its opera.:
tions, and with the duty of providing a safe machine for the work
Action fur damages for personal

<'f.

Delanej v. Rochereau, 34 La, Ann.
cord:
the cases following.
Part <>f tin- opinion is omitted.

L123,

11 Am.

Rep. 156(1882).
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which the plaintiff was engaged. The principle is well settled that
agent or se rvant is responsible to third persons onl\ lor injuries
which are occasioned hy his niisfcasani e. and not for those occasioned
1>\ his mere nonfeasance.
Some confusion has arisen in the cases,
from a failure to observe clearly the distinction between nonfeasance
and misfeasance.
These terms arc v ery accurately defined, and their
in

the
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y

*'

application to quest ions ^'i negligence pointed out, by Judge M.Ucalt
in Bell v. Josselyn, 3 Gray, 30'\ 03 Am. Dec. 741.
".Nonfeasance,'';
says the learned judge, "is the omission of an act which a person ought
to do; misfeasance is the improper doing of an act which a person
might lawfully d^ ; malfeasance is the doing of an act which a person
ougHl not to do at all."
The application of these definitions to the case at bar is not difficult.
It was Scmple's duty to have had this machine safe. His neglect to do
But that alone would not ha ve harmed the plain so was nonfeasance.
tiff, if he had not set him to work upon it. To set him to worl upon
this defective and dangerous machine, knowing it toTe cl angerou. s,
was doing improperly an act which one might lawfully do in a proper
manner.
It was misfeasance. Both elements, nonfeasance and misfeasance, entered into the act, or fact, which caused the plaintiff's
damages. But the nonfeasance alone could not have produced it. The
hor this the defendant Semph
misfeasance was the efficient cause,
responsible to the plaintiff. Mechem, Ag. § 569 et seq. ; 14 Am. &
En'g. Knc. Law. 873, and cases cited in note 4; Wood, Mast. & Serv.
31'
(2d Ed.) 667; Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102, 39 Am. Rep. 437.
is
It
of
the
same
action.
The complaint states but a single cause
cause of action against both defendants, arising from the same acts of
negligence, — the master for the negligence of its servant; the servant
Both master and servant, being liable for
for his own misfeasance.
Wood,
negligence,
of
the same acts
may be joined as defendants.
Mast. & Serv. supra: Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343, 32 Am. Dec.
507 ; Phelps v. Wait, 30 N. Y. 78.
The order appealed from by the Whitcomb Lumber Company is
affirmed, and the order appealed from by the plaintiff is reversed.
■illuminating

of Cobb, P. .7.. in So. Ry. <'o. v. Grizzle,
St. Rep. L91 (1906), which holds that when
of his contracl with his
the performance
principal he is responsible for omissions, or commissions, in the execution of
whereby some third person is Injured, to the same extent as if
Lgency
Also, Ellis v. McNaughton,
be had committed the wrong in liis own behalf.
It; Mich. 237, 42 N. W. 1113, 15 Am. St. Rep. 308 (1889).
discussion

124 Ga. 735, 53 S. E. 244, L10 Am.
-'••hi has entered upon

LIABILITY
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OF

BAIRD
(Supreme

Court of Illinois,

v.
132

1890.
22 Am.

W*

PERSON

SHIPMAN.
111. 16,

23

N. E. 3S4, 7

L. R. A.

128,

St. Rep. 504.)

The following opinion of the appellate court fully
presents the question arising upon this record :
"GarnETT, P. J. This is an appeal from a judgment for dam;
founded on the alleged negligence of appellants, by which the death
6? Joseph" Garnett, appellee's intestate, is said to have been caused.
The place where the injury happened was in a barn situated on premises on Michigan avenue, in Chicago, belonging to Aaron C. Good-

Per Curiam.

man, who was then, and for several years before had been, a resid
Hartford, Conn.
Appellants were his agents for renting the
1884 and 1885, and during both years were
the
during
years
premises
carrying on the real-estate business in Chicago. O n the trial, evince was given tending to show that they had in fact complete con—
trol ot the premises, with the residence and barn thereon, repairing
and there was no proof that in such
me, in their discretion;
The prop erty
-matters they received any directions from the owner.
-Was rented by appellants to Emma R. Wheeler and A. K. Tillman
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of

to April 30, 1885, and to Emma R. Wheeler
Both leases were in writto April 30, 1886.
to keep
tin terms of each lease the tenants covenanted
rented
the
last
lea>e
The tenant n the
the premises in good repair.
Pierce,
from
same
the
Apj
K.
who occupied
premi
[lie
The evidence tends to prove that when the lease
5.
was made to Emma R. Wheeler the large carriage door to the barn

April

from

1,

from May
ing, and by

1884,

1885,

1,

i

through one
.Mire condition, and that appellants,
Warner, the i
of their renting department, verbally agreed
Nothing
with AirsTWEeeler to put the premises in thorough repair.
was done to improve the condition of the door; and on Jun e Yl,

•n
1
. while thcTdeceasert. an expresgrha n b\ occupatii m, was
"
in del ivering a load of kindlin- in the barn for one of the parties livighing about 400 pound-, fell from its
mred him to such an extent that he died the next

make

"Appellants

il)

point,:

two

e ;

of

thi

.

| in

liable

is
such

nothing more
cases,

inding must be
led rule.

pn

than

the

verdict

is

clearly

entii

ordinary conflicl of evidence
tion of fad for the jury; and
ourt, in deference

r<

asily dis|
;

the

to them.

attributable

"There

and

(Goodman,)

That

(2) that they were the agents
to him only for any negligence

il

only for

i

i h

of

hi

to the well
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must have duo regard to the rights and safety of third
He cannot in all cases find shelter behind his principal. If.
in the course of his agency ho is int rusted with the operation of a
dangerous machine, to guard himself from personal liability, he must
use proper care in its management and supervision, so that others, in
the use oi ordinary care, will not suffer in life, limb, or property.

pal; bul

he

>ns.

a

is

is

a

§

:

*"■•

Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102, 39
without proper safeguards.
Am. Rep. 437.
"A number of authorities charged the agent, in such cases, on the
Mechem,
-•ground of misfeasance, as distinguished from nonfeasance.
572, says
in his work on Agency,
'Some confusion has crept into
failure to observe clearly the distinction between
certain cases from
not
As has been seen, the agent
nonfeasance and misfeasance.
liable to strangers for injuries sustained by them, because he did not
undertake the performance of some duty which he owed to his prinnonfeasance.
cipal, and imposed upon him by his relation, which
.Misfeasance may involve,

also, to some extent, the idea of not doing,

while engaged in the performance of his underwas his duty to do under the
taking, does not do something which
circumstances, — does not take that precaution, does not exercise that
All this
clue regard for the rights of others requires.
care, which
not the not doing of that which
not doing but
imposed
upon the agent merely by virtue of his relation, but of that which
responsible individual, in common
imposed upon him by law, as
It
the same not doing which
with all other members of society.
constitutes actionable negligence in any relation.' To the same effect
are Lottman v. Barnett, 62 Mo. 159; Martin v. Benoist, 20 Mo. App.
Gray, 309,
263; Harriman v. Stowe, 57 Mo. 93; Bell v. Josselyn,
63 Am. Dec. 741.
Campbell v. Sugar Co., 62
"A case parallel to that now- in hand
Me. 552, 16 Am. Rep. 503, where agents of the Portland Sugar Comwharf belonging to the
pany had the charge and management of
in retenants,
to keep
agreeing
the
same
to
rented
company, and
it

a

is

3

is

a

is

is

it

;

is

\

a

it

as where the agent,

is
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it,

It is
Suydam v. Moore. S Barb. 358.
Phelps v. Wait, 30 N. Y. 7$.
not his contract with the principal which exposes him to, or protects
him from, liability to third persons, but his common-law obligation
to so use that which he controls as not to injure another.
That obligation is neither increased nor diminished by his entrance upon the
duties of agency ; nor can its breach be excused by the plea that his
Delaney v. Rochereau, 34 La. Ann. 1123, 44
principal is chargeable.
Am. Rep. 456.
"If the agent once actually undertakes and enters upon the execution of a particular work, it is his duty to use reasonable care in the
so as not to cause any injury to third persons
manner of executing
which may be the natural consequence of his acts; and he cannot
escape this duty by abandoning its execution midway, and leaving
things in
dangerous condition, by reason of his having so left them
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pair. They allowed the covering to become old, worn, and insecure,
The court held the
by means of which the plaintiff was injured.
to
the
injured
person with their
agents were equally responsible
principals.

40 The whole distinction between nonfeasance
and misfeasance is vigorously attacked, and the basis of decision in such cases is put instead on the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, in Lough v. John Davis & Co., 30
The
Wash. 204, 70 Pac. 491, 59 L. R. A. 802, 01 Am. St. Rep. 848 (1902).
rule that the agent's liability to third persons in tort depends on whether the
wrong consists in a nonfeasance or a misfeasance seems to go back to Lord
Hun's statemenl in Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym. 646, 12 Mod. 488 (1701), that,
"a servant or deputy quatenus such cannot be charged for neglect, but the
principal only shall be charged for it: but for a misfeasance an action will

S.

•':

iie against a servant or deputy, but not quatenus deputy or servant, but as a
As has been pointed out, not only was this a dissenting opinion,
wrongdoer.''
was Dot even involved in the ease, nor was it Involved in
but this question
Stone v. Cartwright, 6 T. It. 411 (1795), which was cited as authority for it."
Ne vertheless so weighty was the word of Lord Holt, that his dictum in a
dissenting opinion was followed by STory on Agency, § 308, and by great numbers of decisions, many of which found it necessary to newly define nonfeasance in order to fasten liability on an agent for a wrong done to a third perSee Bell
whicb ordinarily would be called mere neglect, or nonfeasance.
Gray, 309, 63 Am. Dee. Til (1855); Osborne v. Morgan, 130
v. Josselyn,
Mass. L02, 39 Am. Rep. 137 (1881), approved In Stiewel v. Borman, 63 Ark.
\v. mi (1896); Hagerty v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co., 38 Mont
30, -':7
Md.
u. a. (N. S.) 356 (1908); Gas Co. v. Connor,
69 98 Pac. 643, 25
s Atl. Tl'.".. 32 I.. R. A. (N. S.i 809 (1910);
Schlosser v. Railway Co.,
10, 157,
20 N. D W6, 127 X. w. 502 (1910).
Others, by following the rub-, and adhering to the ordinary meaning of nonDelaney v. Rochfeasance, airiv.- at decisions in conflict with these last
obi.,
ereau, 34 La. Ann. 1123, n Am. Rep. 156 (1882); Henshaw v. Noble.
Heisk. 44 (1871); Feltus v. Swan, sust l'l'i; (1857); Erwin v. Davenport,
W. 470 (1902); Van Antwerp v.
pra: Drake v. Hagan, 108 Tenn. 265, 67
Linton, 89 Hun, H7. ::•". N. V. Supp, -".i y (1895), citing the dictum of Andrews,
J., in Murray v. Usher, 117 N. V. 542, 23 N. E. 564 (1889).
Still others hold that the liability does not grow out of any privity of pardoes aot rest In contract at all, but on
ties or of any relation of agency,
of all to so use what they control as not to inthe common-law obligation
jure another, whether In the use of their own. or of the property of another
been \n>
duty and lias
agent in this view the question is. was there
Co., supra;
Ellis v. So. Ry, Co., 72 s. «'. 165,
Lough v. John Davis
latedV
Note to Baird v. Shipman, supra,
:.-j.
L. R a. (N. S.) 378 (1905).
E. 228,
Bldg. Co., mi
in 22 Am. St Rep. 512; note to Mayer v. Thompson Hutchinson
Parry v.
\h, 611 16 South. 620,53 Am. St. Rep. 88,
28
R. A 133 (1894);
L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 93, 27
731,
smith. L. R.
C. P. Div. 325, is L. .1. 0.
\V. It. B01 (1875).
According to all the cases the agent is aot liable for Injuries due to causes
Kuhnerl v. Angell,
hie agency and of his act* under it.
outside the scoi
liable for
Bui he
10 N. i>. 59, 84 v w. 579, ss Am. St Rep. 675 (1900).
of bis agency.
Harriman v. Stowe,
acts of ml tea ance In the performance
primary,
The liability of the agent
".7 Mo. 93.
also liable.
The principal
the principal,
the agent is Innocent, bo
that of the principal secondary,
mthal, 154 Cal. 120, 97 Pac. 875, 129 Am. St Rep. 171 (1908).
L.
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"Wharton, in his work on Negligence, § 535, insists that the distinction, in this class of cases, between nonfeasance and misfeasance
40
that the true doctrine is that when an
i no longer be sustained,
ed to work on a particular thing, and has surrendered
agent i
the thing in question into the principal's hands, then the agent ceases
to be liable to third persons for hurt received by them from such

K*

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

r

AM'

EFFECTS

TOO

CONSEQUENCES

OF THE

RELATION

(Part

3

thing, though the hurt is remotely due to the agent's negligence, the
n being that the causal relation
between the agent ami the person hurt is broken by the interposition of the principal as a distinct
ami duties, hut that, even where there
center of legal responsibilities
i> no such interrupting <<i causal connection, and the agent's negligence directl) injures a stranger, the agent having liberty of action
in respect to the injury, then such stranger can recover
from the
agent damages for the injury.
"The rule, whether as stated by Mechem or Wharton, is sufficient
to charge appellants with damages, under the circumstances disclosed
in this record.
They had the same control of the premises in (pus
tion as the owner would have had if he had resided in Chicago, and
attended to his own leasing and repairing. In that respect, appellants
remained in control of the premises until the door fell upon the deceased.
There was no interruption of the causal relation between
them and the injured man.
They were, in fact, for the time being,
substituted in the place of the owner, so far as the control and manThe principle that makes
agement of the property was concerned.
an independent contractor, to whose control premises upon which he
is working are surrendered,
liable for damages to strangers caused
by his negligence, although he is at the time doing the work under
contract with the owner (Whart. Neg. § 440), would seem to be sufficient to hold appellants.
The owner of cattle, who places them in the
hands of an agister, is not liable for damages committed by them
while they are under control of the agister.
It is the possession and
control of the cattle which fix the liability; and the law imposes upon
the agister the duty to protect strangers from injury by them.
Ward
v. Brown, 64 111. 307, 16 Am. Rep. 561 ; Ozburn v. Adams, 70 111.

"When appellants

rented the premises to Mrs. Wheeler in the dancondition
shown
by the evidence, they voluntarily set in mogerous
tion an agency which, in the ordinary and natural course of events,
would expose persons entering the barn to personal injury. Use of
the barn, for the purpose for which it was used when the deceased
came to his death, was one of its ordinary and appropriate uses, and
might, by ordinary foresight, have been anticipated.
If the insecure
condition of the door fastening had arisen after the letting to Mrs.
Whei

would be presented;
but, as it existed
the owner or persons in control
are chargeable with the consequences.
Gridley v. Bloomington, OS
111. 47; Ton.:
Neither error
npton, 129 111. 379,21 N. E. 800.
is well a
and the judgment is affirmed."
We fu!!\ concur in the legal pro]
asserted in the foregoing
is therein said in
opinion, and deem it unnecessary to add t
ort of that proposition. The judgment is affirmed.
tit question

re and at the time of the letting,
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LIABILITY OF THIRD PERSONS TO THE AGENT
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(Supreme

v.

IN CONTRACT

CAXTIXE.

Court of Judicature of New York,

10

1S13.

Johns.

?,S7.)

Assumpsit for money had and received, to the use of plaintiff. Gunn
was agent to collect money for Stephen Simmons and gave the contract t<> Cantine tor collection. Cantine collected and refused to ac•eb'unt to Gunn.
It appears affirmatively, from the case, that the
Per Curiam.
He was a
plaintiff had no beneficial interest in the money collected.
debt;
and there
this
collect
"TrTefe attorney employed by Simmons to
collected
money
the
to
defendant
pay
wailvo express promise by the
"TcTthe plaintiff.
""The letter of attorney was revocable at pleasure; and the law will
not raise any assumpsit to the plaintiff from the facts in this case.
"THIslsTbyno means, so strong a case as that of Pigott v. Thompson,
3 Bos. & Pull. 147, and yet in that case the agent was not permitted
to sue in his own name. The defendant is entitled to judgment.

Judgment for the defendant.

j

THATCHER

(Circuit Court of the United Btates,
to

-The

v.
L828.

WINSLOW.
6 Mason,

1

68, Fed.

r ;1<=.No.

13,863.)

payable
umpsil on certain notes made by Lewis Rousmaniere,
defendant [Andrew Window |. or Fffs order, at the Merchants'
Tin- declaration contained" various counts against
Newport.
indorsee, in favour of the plaintiff | I >avid Thatcher]

Plea, the general issue.
the trial, the defence turned principally upon the point ol for
Another
Roiismaniere.
of the" defendant's name, as indoi
notes
i was made, viz., that the plaintiff was not the owner of the

as indorser.

At

cord:

i *erfi
29, 26 Am. Dec. 214 (1833).
v. Dickens,
hi a note Indorsed In blank and pul I
nai
Drr
by evidence.
unless his righl la controverted
\ • d Cas. No. 10,589 (lfi 17).

Cocke

ue in his own

ollectlon,
McLean, 243,

An ugenl
in s hands
i
v. Lacy,
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in question. hut thai thc\ belonged to tlic Merchants' Hank at Mewport, liy which bank thej were original!} discounted ; and that the
notes, since the death iA Pousmank re (who committed suicide), had
been delivered to the plaintiff by the Merchants' I lank for the purpose
^i suing the same in his own name in the circuit court;
and thai
plaintiff had no interest whatsoever therein.
A witness, called for
the plaintiff, upon his cross examination, fully established the latter
point.
11 the facts stated by the witness on this
STORY, Circuit Justice.
last point are not denied, T think the cause is at an end.
Unless
the plaintiff is a real holde r of the note, aiul jias some interest in it,.
he cannot
maintain
an action as indorsee
against the defendant.
Here the proof is, that the .Merchants' blank is the real holder, and
the plaintiff is merely an agent f or the bank. _J take it not to be
mpctent for a mere agent to maintain an action on a negotiable
note in bis hands, although it be with the consent of his principal.
Tie must be the owner of the note, or have some substantial interest
^yiden" Q
therein.
Prima facie indeed the posse ssion of ^nrh R n ^t°
^i the party's being
bolder for
valuable considerat ion, and unles
the note has been previa
tolen, or received by him under suss

a

a

,

is

is

if

5

a

it

a

is

is

it

r

is

picious circumstances, he
not bound to prove by. othe evidence
such a bona fide bolder.
that he
Put
admitted or proved,
aliunde, that he
but
mere agent, and holds the note as such, he
not competent to recover
in his own name.. See
judgment upon
Gunn v. Cantine, 10 Johns. 387; Gilmore v. Pope,
Mass. 491.
The plaintiff discontinued his suit.

SARGENT

MORRIS.
&

3

Barn.
Aid.
E. C. L. 1G6.)

1820.
5

(Court of Kind's Bench,

v.

277,

22

R. It.

3S2,

I

a

)eclaration stated, that the defendant was the owner of
vessel lythe river Gaudalquiver,
and bound to London; and the plaintiff,
at the special instance and request of the defendant, caused to be shipped on board the vessel certain goods, to be taken care of, and safely
and securely conveyed by the defendant within the vessel, under the
deck thereof, to London, and there to be safely delivered, dry. ajidjaielL
conditioned, for the plaintiff; and in consideration thereof, and of
certain freight to be paid by plaintiff to defendant, he undertook to
take care of and safely convey the said goods and merchandizes, within the vessel, and under the deck thereof, and deliver the same as lore
Preach, that the defendant placed and put the goods upon the
said.
deck of the vessel, and otherwise conducted himself with great negljreason whereof the goods were greatly damaged.
Plea nop
gence,
At the trial before Abbott, C.
at the London sittings
impsit.

a

a

J.,

-

by

ing

in
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last Trinity term, it appeared that the goods were shipped by
Bayo & Son of Seville, and that they were the parties interested in the
"""
By the bill of lading, the Captain acknowledged to have re"goo'ds.
ived on board the vessel, and. under the deck thereof, of Don Pedro
Bayo & Son, the goods therein mentioned; and it then proceeded in the
following words: "I undertake to deliver the same to yon, and in
your name, according to custom and usage, to Mr. Sargent or bis asThe plaintiff on rece iving advice of the
^STgTIsT paying freight," etc.
[pment, effected an insurance on account of Bayo, and advanced the
It was objected, that the action ought to have been brought
premiums.
after

by Bayo & Son, and not by the present plaintiff. The Lord Chief Justice directed the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff, with liberty to
A rule nisi having been obthe defendant to move to enter a nonsuit.
tained accordingly.

on a special contract; and the decthat die plaintiff caused to be shipped on board the delaration
"""Tendant's vessel, certain goods, to be carried and delivered to the plaintiff, and that he undertook and promised the plaintiff accordingly.
The declaration therefore describes the plaintiff as the original ship_
Xow I
per, and the original contract as having been made with him.
behalf,
but
on
and
for
acts
me
my
if
an
to
be
this:
agent
rule
take the

Bayi.ky,

J. This

is an action

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

states,

in bis own name, then, inasmuch as he is the person with whom the
contract is made, it is no answer to an action in his name, to say, that
he is merely an agent, unless you can also show, that he is prohibited
from carrying on that action by the person on whose behalf the C_on
tract was made. Tn such cases, however, you may bring your action.
either in the name nf the pari)- by whom the contract was made, or of
2
In policies of insurance,
the party for whom the contract was made.
it is a common practice to bring your action, either in the name of the

In this case the contract appears, by the terms of
agent or principal.
Then
bill of lading, to have been made with the Spanish house.
for whom was it made? why, upon the evidence in the cause, on acIt is, however, urged, that inasmuch as
count of the Spanish house.
i had made certain advances on their account, they were his
Xow. in the first place, there is no
ids at the time of the shipment.
.v, that, at the time of the shipment, he had made any
evidcii' i
At that time, the. right oj action was vested m the
advance whatever.
\\ hat was done subsequently docs
d.
partv to whom tl
the

not affect this point

rlvance. I take it to have been made jn
make, an advance for his princi

the ordinary way in which an agent

*-'»; s. W. !>i<; iivui. the court la.> (town
a in Tinsley v. Dowell, ^7 T.\. •_•:•..
ii-iinlaTn an :i<0«iii in Ills
the rulf that <>ii.. wlin coiitiiKts : is ;iL-i'iil .-a in
n Trail,
d'n till
general rule there firo rrmr
Vvn name ami right upon 111
i raet - 111 his "" n nam• I » \\ here Hi.' agent
i. in- principal who La unknown;
(.'{) where, hy (he usages offra.|... the ngent is authorized to act :i- owner of I lie property; ih win
and In
ngent tins an Interest in Hie subject matter ol the edufriict,
ther lie profe; <o<\ to net as imenl or i

*

rri

7i'l

is \\i>

i I
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to sue his principal, on
indeed, the goods had readiedlien till he had hern repaid; but
his possession"! he rfnglll have had
The
no lien can take place (ill the ^Kn|> come into his possession.
lien made in respect of advances subsequent to the shipment, never can satisfy the allegation of the plaintiff, that he had
caused the goods to
shipped, and that the defendants contracted
with him to deliver; the contract, in fact, was not with him, hut with
seems to me, that the contract
not made
Dayo. For these reasons,
I

be entitled

out in evidence, and that the action cannot be supported.

MILLER
(Supreme

Court

3

it

is

Be

■l"
a

a

'it

he would

the advance was made.

i\

of which

iv

STATE BANK OF DULUTIL*

v.

of Minnesota,

1894.

57

Minn.

319,

59

N. W. 309.)

&

&

J.

&

i.

J.

&

while his agency continued, maintain an action in his own name on the
deposit, he certainly could not after his relation to the deposit ceased
by the revocation of his agency with respect to it.
The assignment of his principals, Simon Clark
Co., worked such
revocation.

Order reversed.

LETERMAN
(Supreme

v.

CHARLOTTESVILLE/ETJMBER

Court of Appeals

Assumpsit.

Buchanan,

of Virginia,

1910.

110

Va. 709,

(UM—
CO.

67

S/ E.

281.)

Judgment for plaintiff.

<>i Abbott, 0. J., and Best, J., are omitted.
Sims v. Bond,
I'..
AH. 389,
M. cos, 27 E. C. L. 97 (1833).
Accord:
N.
Pari of the opinion
omitted.
&

2

&

5

The opinions

Ls

4 b

a

(

in

is

J.b

In the view we take of this case, the only question
whether or not the trial court erred in
necessary to be considered
striking out the special plea filed by Leterman (the plaintiff in error),
who was defendant
that court.
)ne objection made to the plea is: "That the plea sets forth the fact
that the contract between the plaintiff and defendant was entered into
firm, composed of himself and one
by the defendant on behalf of
Alfred Wollberg, which matter has been already formally and finally

5
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by

Miller for balance of money deposited by him _as agent.
Suit
The hank claimed the equitable right to set off against the deposit
Co. and held by the bank. Judgment
notes indorsed by Simon Clark
for plaintiff, new trial denied, and defendant appeals.
(oi, i"ii, ax, C.
Plaintiff was agent for Simon Clark
Co., and,
as such, deposited money of theirs with defendant to the credit of himCo. made
Miller, Agent." Afterwards Simon Clark
self — "A.
not,
in
or
could
an assignment
Whether plaintiff could
insolvency.
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/C
:

the issue on the plea in abatement. A n agent mav even h emme liable
on a contract contrary to his actual intention ; but, if he contracts in
as to make himself personsuch a form or under such circumstances
afterwards,
his principal was or
whether
he
cannot
ally responsible,
was not known at the time of the contract, relieve himself of that re2 Clark & Skyles on Agency, § 566, and cases cited; 1
sponsibility.
Min. Inst. 235-237; 3 Rob. Pr. (New) 54, and authorities cited.

^<_

Another objection made to the plea is that it "attempts to set off the
claim of the partnership of Leterman & Wollberg against the individual demand of the plaintiff against the defendant."
JV Vhere a pe rso n enters into _a_simple contract, oral or in writing,
other than a negotiable instrument, in his own name, when he is in

of another and for his benefit, without disclosother party to the contract may, as a general
rule, hold cither the agent or his principal, when discovered, personally
But lie cannoi hold both. 1 Min. Inst. pp. 236,
liable on the contract.
237, and cases cited;
3 "Rob. I'r. (New) 50, and cases cited; Clark &
Skyles on Agency, §§ 457, 568.

Fact acting as the agent

irig~his principal,

It

the

also equally well settled that upon such a contract either the
or the principal may sue; the defendant, where the princip
the same situation at the
Sties upon
being entitled to be placed
time of the disclosure of the real principal as
the agent had been the
a. 263, 26 S. K.
National
Bank v. Nolting, 94
contracting party.
Rob. i'r. (New) 36, and cases cited;
Min. Inst. 239, and
is

on the ag' nt's
•

h

§

b)

is

i

\

G0DD.PR.(S

in

the contract

in in

of

r<

by

:
c

damages as have resulted 1>\
the other party — unless his principal
entitled to recover the full me.i ure o
the suit; and he
res
the same manner as though the ai tion had been brought
damages
Se,- Clark
624; Mcchcm on
on Agency,
principal.

the breach

may

"'

the other party

uch damages as have resulted
such
part.
m the other hand,

if

■ it

i

n]

from the breach of

by

§

614.
Skyles on Law of Agency,
pnn< ip.il be sued

the ag<
of the undisclosed
to the contract, the latter ma)

<

Clark

cas'

&

3

1

\

if

in

it,

it

If
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adjudicated by submitting tbat question to a jury at a former term of
this court, as is shown in writing filed by the plaintiff, by counsel, as
one of the grounds for excluding said plea."
The only effect of the verdict of the jury upon the issue raised by
the plea in abatement for the nonjoinder of Alfred Wollberg as a party
defendant was to establish the fact that the contract, for the breach of
which the plaintiff sought to recover damages, was made with Leterman personally, and not with the firm of Leterman & Wollberg, and
tHat the~plaintiff had the right to sue the former for a breach of the
It did not determine that Leterman, in making that contract.
contract.
not
have
been acting, as averred in his special plea, in behalf of
may
That question was not involved in
the firm of Leterman & Wollberg.

» ^*<s

A

.ill'.
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Agency, §§ 755. 763; Joseph v. Knox, 3 Camp. 320 322; Gardner v.
Davis, 2 Car. & Payne, 49; United States Tel. Co. v. Gildersleve, 29
106
Md. 232, 96 Am. Dec. 519, 522, 523; Rhoades v. Blackiston,
Mass. 334, s Am. Rep. 332, 333, 334; 31 Cyc. L564; Shelby v. Burrow, 76 Ark. 558, 89 S. \\ . 464, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 303, <» Ann. Cas.
554. ami not<
There arc exceptions to the general principles of law slated above;
and need
but they do not affect the question now under consideration,
Hi >t. therefore, be mentioned.
Since either party to the contract set up in the special plea had the
right to sue the other for its breach, if he failed to keep and perform
it on his part, it follows that either, when sued by the other for its
breach, had the right to set up as a defense, under section 3299 of the
. any matter which would "entitle him either to recover damages
at law from the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims,
in equity, in whole or in part, against the obligation of the
sued on.
"The plain purpose of that section," as said by Judge Moncure in
Huff v. Broyles, 26 Grat. 283, 285, "was to give precisely the same
measure of relief on a plea filed under the same as could be obtained
* * * "
See
in an independent action brought for the same cause.
Am. Manganese Co. v. Va. Manganese Co., 91 Va. 272, 282, 21 S.
or relief
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c<intract"

Columbia Accident Ass'n v. Rockey, 93 Va. 678, 25 S. E.
Mangus v. McClelland, 93 Va. 786, 22 S. E. 364; Tyson v.
Williamson, 96 Va. 636, 32 S. E. 42 ; Kinzie v. Riely, Ex'r, 100 Va.

E. 466;
1009;

709, 42 S.

E.

872.

By section 3303 of the Code it is declared that a defendant who files
a plea under section 3299 shall be deemed to have brought an action at
the time of filing such plea.
The defendant having the right to set up in a special plea under section 3299 any damages which resulted from a breach of the contract
which he could have recovered in an independent action, the fact that
his recovery over, if any, was for the benefit of Leterman & Wollberg,
furnished no ground of objection to the special plea ; for it is settled

if the agent of an undisclosed principal sues, it is no ground of
defense that the beneficial interest is in another, or that the plaintiff, if
See
will be bound to account to another.
he makes a recovery,
des v. Blackiston, supra; United States Tel. Co. v. Gildersleve,
supra: Joseph v. Knox, supra; Seaman v. Slater (C. C.) 49 Fed. 37;
Clark & Skyles on Agency, § 619; Mechem on Agency, § 755.
The damages claimed in the special plea, as it avers, resulted from
that,

also tin' leading ease <>!"Rhoades v. Blackiston, 106 Mass. :;::4, 8 Am.
Rep. 332 (1871).
tinier the Code provision thai "every action must lie prosecuted in tin- name Of the real party in interest,'' except that "a trustee of
*
*
an express trust
may sue" in his own name, the a^ent who has
contracted in his own oame is held to he a trustee of an express trust.
Considerant v. Brisbane, 22 X. V. 389 (1860).
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the failure on the part of the plaintiff to do the work, to recover the
price of which he brought his action, in the manner and within the
time provided by the contract, and the defendant had the right, under
section 3299 of the Code, to set them up and to get the benefit of them
in this action as fully as if he had instituted an independent action to
recover them. Xo prejudice can result to the plaintiff from compelling
him on his part to answer for not performing the contract to the agent,
* * *
whom he is holding for its breach, instead of the principal.
Reversed.

FISHER

v.

MARSH.

i

Declaration for £27. for the lease of land by plaintiff b;
tnToccasion of tin ' ".ford races. Plea, never indebted.
r.LACKia-KW T. 7 I am of opinion that the nonsuit should be set
I think there was
aside, and the rule for a new trial made absolute.
to maintain
was
entitled
a case to go to the jury that the plaintiff
the

*

*

of

the

*

action.

The ground

nonsuit

was that, although

there was

a

letting

plaintiff was not the proper person to
and occupation under it.
sue; for notwithstanding the defendant had made himself liable to
the plaintiff's employers, yet unless he was liable to pay the plaintiff
Rut
think there was eviin the wrong name.
tne \vr:
The plaintiff was
tract with the plaintiff personally.,
dence of
auctioneer and was known to be such; and this would
indeed •
I

ii't

the

other person employed him, and that he had
to the highest bidder.
land beyond that of letting
contract, naming his
that when an agent makes
The general rule
made with the principal and not with the
Principal, the contracl
thai

some

it

the

— agent.

BUI

is

tir

is

by

a

a

the

S

i
l

in

M.
Hi— i;.., v. Scim-t,
as decided
In the present case the
are collected.
effect said. "I let the. kind;
plaintiff on pu tting up this land for hire
paid to me that the person
and
undertake upon
joyment of it." Then the defendant
ing the land shall ha
a clear
and being the highest bidder, there
having bid for
Tl
of the contract
tract by the defendant to become tenant.
mi claim*
\Y. M'U, where

&- a

in

cases

I

T

<>r the opinion

omitfc

dL

Pari

U

ol

were not reduced to writing; but does the fact
auctioneer prevent the contract being with him?

o

i-

it,

"

in

1
"

it
;

if

a

in

third person
nt with
such terms that he
may be made
he
fulfilment
of
says, "I for niv own
as
personally bound to the
the agent.
contract
personal
such
self contract,
b;

—

a

is,

in

be evidence

'
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evidence to go to the jury. There are reasons in the present case why
[alntiff should enter into the contraet. making liimself personally
liable; there are also reasons why lie should not: but here was evidence on which the jury might say that he had done so, unless the
is conclusive to the contrary.
Fact of the plaintiff being auctioneer
In Kranklyn v. Lamond, I C. P.. (0/ (E. C. L. R. vol. 56), the plaintiff had bought rail\\a\ shares at an auction under circumstances much
like those in the present case, and in an action against the auctioneers,
who had not disclosed their principal at the time of the sale, for not
transferring the shares, the Court held the proper inference to be that
That is a distinct
the contract was with the auctioneer personally.
of a contract
evidence
was
authority that in the present case there
8

it

it

;

is

a

a

&

3

a

I

I

9

a

is

a

of which
with reference to the conditions of sale, the construction
was for them; not that there was no evidence to support an action
new trial
for use and occupation by the plaintiffs. And they granted
on the question of fact, which was for the jury, viz., "By whose permission did the occupation take place, and by whom was the contract
That appears from the judgments of Patteson and Coleridge,
made?"
case to go to the
solely whether there was
If. Here the question
jury that the plaintiff had made the contract personally, and for the
think there was.
have expressed
reasons which

S.

i

a

Is

Ill

2

•■

rule extends to all contracts made in the name of the agent, whether
Willson, Civ. Cas.
known or unknown,
the principal
Edwards v. Kzell,
Ga. 38, 2G S. B. 308, 50 L.
it. App. 276 (1884); Carter v. So. Ry. Co.,
beneficial interest in the conR. A. 354 (1900), especially if the agent 1ms
v. Potter, 26 N. C. 257 (1844).
Cf. Evrit v. Bancroft, 22
tract, Whitehead
Ohio St. L72 (1871), in which the interest of the agent was not in the con(missions lie expected to earn if the contract was made.
tract, but in the
v. Andrews (Tex. Civ. App.) 60
W. 459 (1900).
The opinions of Afellor and slice, ,i.j., are omitted.
s
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if

it,

with the plaintiff personally.
Next, there being such a contract, and the defendant having been
may the rent be recovered in an action
let into possession under
The plaintiff having let the defendant into
for use and occupation?
possession under the contract, the defendant would be estopped from
should be proved, and the
were requisite that
denying the title
In
case therefore turns upon the contract for use and occupation.
A.
E. 132 (E. C. L. R. vol. 30), the auctioneers
Evans v. Evans,
in effect said that they were selling for David Jones, whose name apNow, prima
peared on the conditions of sale as approving them.
named,
the prinfacie, when an agent makes
person
contract for
nevercontract
considered as making the
cipal and not the agent
the
auctioneers
that
the
plaintiffs
case was set up on behalf of
theless
were the proper parties to sue, because the contract was made with
them, and they had an interest in the premises as creditors of their
The Judge had told the jury that the contract was with
principal.
The Court thought that direction was not correct
the auctioneers.
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SPACKMAN.
Barn. & Adol.

9G2. 22 E.

C. L. 402.)

a

J.,

Assumps it for not delivering goods. At the trial before Lord Tenverterden, C.
at the sittings in London alter Trinity term 1831,
The
reference.
to
£600.
subject
for
the
plaintiffs
dict was found
of
award,
request
at
the
to
the
it.
annexed
and
his
made
"""arb itrator
The
effect:
plaincounsel,
following
the
to
statement
"~aeTenda nt's.
tiffs being broker-, and authorized by one Hudson to buy for him
""twenty tuns of Greenland whale oil, employed Bentley, an oil broker,
Bentley applied to the defendant
to make such purchase for them.
a

jor

a

-

to the plaintiffs. The defendant at first refused
to sell to the plaintiffs: but, upon being informed by Bentley that
they were purchasing not for themselves, but as brokers for unnamed
and bought and sold note-,
principals, he agreed to sell to them;
defendant,
signed by Bentley, were sent by him to the plaintiffs and
Short,
Messrs.
for
"Bought
-irr-wtnch the" goods were stated to be
Brown, and Iiowver" (the plaintiffs), "of Mr. W. F. Spackman" (the
defendant), on the terms therein specified to be paid for by the buyers
bought note to
corresponding
The plaintiffs sent
in ready money.
Hudson, their principal; and they afterwards, under
general au-

.

a

a

—

sold the goods for his account, through another
this
The bought and sold notes
Co.
Messrs. Buc
thg buying
laintiffs and
uck & "n as
transacti on mentioned the
— and sellin
pa rt ies. On this sale being ommunicated to Hudson, hf
which had been sent to him, declaring that he
re turnedj T
—woul have no thing to do with the oil as purchaser or seller; and to
led. The defendant afterwards refused to dethis the plaintii
in

,

d

g

c

p

B

fc>

k

_b

frorrThim,

&

thOnty
roker,

..

of his agreement, and the plaintiffs, being
Co.. were obliged to
to fulfill their engagement with Buck
sum

in satisfaction, the market having risen
was contended, on behalf of
contract.
ludson's
pudiation of the contract, and the ac-

.

i

&

by

t.

;'

il

I

Ihr defendant, thai
quiescen ce of the plaintiffs therein, put an end to the engagement be
'.,.;.
The arbitrator, however, was oi
intifT and defendant,
either the rights of
affect
did not
opinion that tl.
and
liabilities of the plaintiffs and
as against Hudson, or the rights
the defendant should pay the
awarded
that
fore
He then
-n
them in their settlement
loss
tained
the
the
amount
of
plaintiffs
with Buck
Co. A rule nisi was obtained this term for setting aside
award, on the ground that the action was nol maintainable upon
fact-- above stated.
had at firs some difficult) in comii
Lord TENTERDEN, C.
ituatcd
£•conclusion that the nlaimTfl
But on 1... .king to
ci. idd sue up'.n the contract for their own benefit.
form of
the contract itself, tin
iiotTiTng to pr<
the

■

t

I

J.

the

,

:iey

It

""unable
pav them

&

m pursuance

a

liver

t
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note is, "Boughl Cos Messrs. Short, Brown, and Bowyer,"
tuns oj Greenland oil. at so much per Urn, to he paid for by
h\
The sold note is in the like form.
the buyers in ready money.
The ££st of the farts are
both the plaintiffs appear as the principals,
dehors the present question.
The rule will therefore In- discharged.
Parke, J. There was no fraud upon the defendant in this ease.
He was informed that there was an unknown principal, and such was
the fact.
It is found that the plaintiffs were authorized hy Hudson
buy the oil of the defendant, and the contract was binding both
on Hudson. Then
on them, and, if the defendant chose to enforce
called the repudiasaid the contract was put an end to by what
tion on Hudson's part: that
by his informing the plaintiffs that
he would have nothing more to do with the purchase or sale, and
no more, in
But this
their acquiescing in such determination.
effect, than
Hudson had thought proper to sell the benefit of his
contract to any other person, which he might have done without the
the bought

is it,

I

a

consent of the plaintiffs: and his doing so would have been nothing
10
It clearly would not have determined the conto the defendant.
right concluthink, therefore, that the arbitrator came to
tract.
sion. 11

STEVENSON

v.

(Court of King's Bench,

MORTIMER.
1778.

Cowper,

805.)

f

a

it

it

r

a

:

is

it

by

I.

a

a

Action for money had and received, brought by plaintiffs, as owncustom
of
boat carrying chalk and lime, against defendant, as
house officer, for excessive fees collected by defendant from the master of the boat.
ord Mansfield delivered his opinion as follows. — The ground
of the nonsuit at the trial was, that this action could not be well maintained
the plaintiffs, who are the ozvncrs of the vessel in question;
but
ought to have been brought by the master, who actually paid
That ground, therefore, makes now the only question
the money.
not
fore us
As to which, there
particle of doubt.
Qui acit
ahum, facit per se. Where
man pays money by his agent, which
ought not to have been paid, either the agent, or principal, may bring
an action to recover
back. The agent may, from the authority of
the principal; and the principal may, as proving
to have been paid
ers

a

I

-

4

it

is

it,
it

is

If money
known agent, and an action brought
by his agent.
paid to
ainst him for
an answer to such action, that he has paid
to his principal.
liur. 1984, ante, p. 685.
lere
Sadler v. Evans,
i:>- statute la; - the burthen on the master from necessity;
and makes
io.\s to the right of every man to elect with what parties he will deal,
and it- effeel on the righl of the agenl or principal to sue, see post, p. 704.
The opinions of. Taunton and Patteson, JJ., are omitted.
1
1
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him personally liable to penalties if he neglects to perform the requisiBut still he is entitled to charge the necessary fees, &c. upit.
And in tin'
ere
on his doing so. to the account of his ozmers.
in
master
doubt
of
which
the
stood
to
the
the
relation
plainno
can be
riff? : for he is the zcitncss, and he swears, that the money was paid
Therefore, they are very well warby the order of the plaintiffs.
ranted to maintain the action.— If the parties had gone to trial upon
-" an
apprehension that the only question to be tried was. Whether this
was a case within the act of parliament, consequently, whether any
fee was due; the plaintiff could not have been permitted to surprise
the defendant at the trial, by starting another ground, upon which to
An action for money had and received is
recover a Norfolk groat.
Neither party is allowed to engoverned by the most liberal equity.
But here, the plaintiff gave notice, that he
trap the "tiier in form.
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—t ion s Tif

meant to insist that too much was taken; and therefore, both came
Thereto the trial with equal knowledge of the matter in dispute.
fore, the rule for a new trial must be absolute. — Lord Mansfiki.i>
added, that he thought, the plaintiffs ought to let the defendant know
the amount of the excess which they claimed ; that the defendant
might have an opportunity of paying money into court; and the rule
was drawn up accordingly.

KENT
(Supreme

Contract
e

Judicial

a S

r

"

BORNSTEIN.

<-f Massachusetts,

12

1866.

12

Allen.

342.)

$50, paid by plaintiff to defendant in
counterfeit bill, judgment for plaintiff and defend-

recover

to

for

Court

v.

back

ant alleged exceptions.
— TTTokuav, C. i:! The facts of this case do not bring it within the
J.
familiar principle relied on by the defendant, that a mere agent or
servant, with whom a contract, either express or implied, is entered
into in behalf of another, and who has no beneficial interest in the
The plaintiff bad postransaction, cannot support an action thereon.
Mis
m of mo ne) belonging to another, for a speciaf purpose only.
n
f
sales
authorityWas strictly limited'. Tt was confined to the, ^nakingr
od>

in the

-lore and

the payment

of

the money received

therefor

with the money as
to a third person.
authority
His duty
for
whatever.
it
any
purpose
mi. or to appropriate
course
in
the
it
for
which
he
sell
to
might
merely
^oo.ls
of the day, and to hold it in hi- pos ession till the hour for the daily
payment of it over to the sheriff's keeper arrived, when he was bound
Il<-

had

no

to

deal

kecord:
[loll v. Ely, 1 E a B. 796, 17 .fur. swi,
in the absence of mistake or fraud the agent cannot
letter
thority in an action against the third person.
'ill-' third person is not accountable
A|.|>. .v.i (1002).
Winklej v. F.,v,., us n. 11. 518 (1854).
i Pari "f tin- opinion is omitted.

72 B. C. I.. 705 (1853).
set up i«i- want of auv. Van Patten, 103 in.

for the agent's

fault.
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to pay it over to him.
Any act or dealing with the money beyond
this was outside of the scopj of his employment.
He had no authority to enter Into any contract concerning the money in liis hands, or
to exchange it for other money with third persons.
An authority to
r eceive the prrn'mls of sales in a shop did not ejripovver the pl aintiff
to exchange the money received in small sums for hills of larger de
nominations with persons who made no purehases of goods.
No evTdenee was offered to show any usage of business, either general or
the inference that the plaintiff's auSpecial, which would authorize
thority was extended beyond the precise terms of his employment, so
as to embrace a transaction similar to that which he entered into with
the defendant's gge.uL
In this state of the evidence, it is clear that the plaintiff exceeded

that the transaction has been ratified by the principal.
For aught that
we can know, the plaintiff is still liable for the amount of the genuine
hills which he exchanged for the counterfeit one.
It cannot therefore be said that the plaintiff has no beneficial interest in the cause of
action on which this suit is brought.
On the contrary, it plainly appears that his right to recover in this action is the only mode in which

indemnify himself against the rightful claim of his employer for
the loss caused' by his abuse of the authority intrusted to him. * * *
Exceptions overruled.

he can

SCHAEFER

v.

HENKEE.

(Court of Appeals of New York. 1878.
57 How. Prac.

75 N.

Y.

378,

7 Abb.

N. C. 1,

97.)

Action upon a lease under seal executed by "]. Romaine Brown,
Agent," as lessor, and by defendant as lessee.
MiLLER, J. 14 The plaintiffs were not parties to the lease upon
which this action was brought.
It was not signed by them. Their

it

it,

names did not appear in
and there was nothing in the lease to show
that they had any thing to do with or any interest in the demised
premises or the execution of the lease, or that
was executed in their
behalf.
was made by one Brown, as lessor, who
described therein, and who signed
as agent;
not stated in the lease for
but
whom he acted. The covenants are all between "J- Romaine Brown,
agent, the party of the first part," and the defendant, as party of the
second part; and
not made to appear that the defendant had any
knowledge or intimation wdiatever that Brown was acting on the behalf of the plaintiffs or for their benefit. For whom Brown was agent
it
is

*■*Part

of tho opinion is omitted.

it
is

it

is

It
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his authority in exchanging the smaller bills in his possession for one
of the denomination of fifty dollars, and he is liable to his employer
for the loss occasioned by his unauthorized act. ft dors not appear
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was not made known to the defendant, and it only appears by parol
the trial that Brown was authorized orally by the plaintiffs
The signature
to make a demise of the premises described in the lease.
instrument,
and
attached
is
to
the
his
seal
and
of Crown is as agent,
the
defendant.
The
plaintiffs,
and
sealed
by
is
also signed
the same

proof upon

without any assignment of Brown's interest under the lease, bring this
action to recover the rent unpaid, upon the ground that Brown merely
—acted as their agent by their authority, and that they are the actual
The question to be determined is whether the acparties in interest.
tual owners of the lease, which is in the nature of a deed inter partes,

*—
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which was not and does not on its face show that it was executed by
them, but which does show an execution by a third person, claiming to
act as agent without disclosing the name of his principal, and which
contains covenants between the parties actually signing and sealing the
same, can maintain an action upon it for the rent reserved therein,
even although the person who executed the same, describing himself
"agent and party of the first part," had oral authority to enter into the
and acted as the owner's agent in the transaction.
seems to be quite well established that in general an action
upon a sealed instrument of this description must be brought by and
in the name of a person who is a party to such instrument, and that a
third person or a stranger to the instrument cannot maintain an action
The question presented has been the subject of freupon the same.
quent consideration in the courts, and I think it is established in this
state that where it distinctly appears from the instrument executed that

contract,

The rule

the seal affixed is the seal of the person subscribing, who designates
as agent, and not the seal of the principal, that the former only
He alone enis the real party who can maintain an action on the same.
to the covenants and is liable for any failure to fulfill, and he
He is named in the indenture as
only can prosecute the other party.

himself

a party, and an action will not lie on behalf of or against any person
who is not a party to the instrument, or who does not lawfully repreTt is unnecessary to review all
sent or occupy the place of such party.
the decisions bearing upon the question, as in a very recent case the
principle discussed has been considered by this court, and the whole
subject, as well as the decisions relating to the same, deliberately and

carefulb

.

Partridge,

64

\.

Y.

35'7,

21

Am.

In the ca e cited an action was brought to recover purRep. 617.
oney unpaid upon a contract for the sale and purchase <>t
land-.
The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs entered into an agree•
in writing with one Hurlburd, who was acting under the authorfendants, whereb) the plaintiffs sold and the defendants
through Hurlburd boughl a certain described piece <>f land, for a price
named, which price the defendants, through their agent, Hurlburd,
ified. Th<- agreemenl was in writing, but did not
..

that Partridge

was

a

principal

party, and

was signed and sealed

?
c

-
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Hurlburd individually. The name of Partridge did not appear in
instrument, but the plaintiffs offered to prove that Hurlburd was
acting solely for and under the direction of Partridge, who made or
caused the first payment to be made as Partridge's agent or trustee in
Proof was also ofthe transaction, and that his authority was oral.
fered to show that Hurlburd was constituted such agent by parol; and
that the plaintiffs did no1 know that Partridge was the real principal.
The complaint was dismissed, and it was held by this court that a contract of this description under seal could not he enforced as the simple
contract oi another not mentioned in or a party to the instrument, on
proof that the vendee named had oral authority from such other to enter into the contract, and acted as agent in the transaction; at least, in
the absence of proof of some act of ratification on the part of the unThe opinion of Andrews, J., in the case cited,
disclosed principal.
1>\

the

now presented ; and it appears to be unnecessary to review or examine the prior cases which have a bearing upon
the subject.
Unless some distinction of a vital character exists between that case and the one now to be determined, the former must be
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fully covers

the question

regarded as decisive of the case at bar.
The claim of the learned counsel for the appellant, that as the contract in case of a lease is not required to be under seal, it may be regarded as a simple contract, upon which the principal may sue or be
sued in his own name, and the seal may be rejected as surplusage, is
also considered in the opinion in the case cited ; and without indorsing
the correctness of the cases relied upon, it is remarked that these are
cases which hold this doctrine; "but the principal's interest in the contract appears upon its face, and he has received the benefit of perfi irmance by the other party, and has ratified and confirmed it by acts
in pais."
It is therefore settled law, that in order to take a case out
of the general rule, where the contract is one which is valid without a
seal, and the seal is therefore of no account, it must appear that the
contract was really made on behalf of the principal, from the instrument, and that the party derived benefit from and accepted and confirmed it by acts on his part. Within this rule, it remains to he considered whether the case at bar differs from that cited. An attempted
distinction is sought to be maintained, for the reason that in the case
cited, Hurlburd, the agent, did not enter into the agreement to sell as
agent, while here Brown signs as agent, which, it is claimed, is notice
of the capacity in which he contracts. This we think is not sufficient;
and to establish any real distinction it should appear for whom he was

The plaintiffs
agent, and that the parties claiming were his principals.
not being named in the lease, and it not appearing that they had any
interest therein, there is no more ground for claiming that Brown was
The use of
their agent than that he was the agent of some stranger.
the word "agent" has but little significance of itself, and as the principal- are not named, cannot be regarded as applying more to one per-
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It did not take away from Brown's obligation,
son than to another.
is
named
as
he
because
agent. The covenants are between the parties
who are only named in the instrument and no other parties. Any othAs
er interpretation would be a contravention of its obvious import.
was said in the case cited, "We find no authority for the proposition
that a contract under seal may be turned into the simple contract of a
plirty not in a ny way appearing on its face to be a party to or interested in it, on "proof dehors the instrument, that the nominal party was
riot 11 .
To render the principal liable, where
agent of another."
"""There is a contract by deed, made by an attorney or agent, it must be
made in the name of the principal.
Huntington v. Knox, 7 Cush. 374,

It would be going
cited and approved in Briggs v. Partridge, supra.
very far to hold that a distinction so trifling and unimportant would
authorize a disregard of the decision cited, and thus virtually establish a new and different principle than one which has been settled
* * *
thereby.
and

Allen, JJ.,

dissent.

NEFF

v.

Judgment affirmed.

BADEN.

(Court of Appeals of Kentucky,

1843.

3 B. Mon.

408.)

BrECK, J.
Xeff executed his obligation under seal, to James
Speed, lawful agent of 1laden, in which it is recited that Speed, as the
lawful agent of I laden, leased to Xeff, for the term of ten years, a lot
in the city of Louisville, and covenanted, as the agent of Baden, to
n.
XelY covenanted to pay Speed as agent, sevThe
enty-five dollars per year, rent, payable one half semi-annually.
Xeff alone.

1 by

this action of covenant, and
assigned a's a br< ach, the failure of Xeff to pay one year's rent, which
had become due. The defendant demurred — the demurrer was overruled, and judgment against him, to which he prosecutes this writ of

Upon that covenant,

I

laden has brought

T

is,

whether the action can be
for consideration
of
name
maintained
Baden.
the
The covenant
expressed to pa\ Speed, and we arc clearly of opinio'oncaimothesystauied "' '>e name of Baden.
The numerous authorities referred to have been examined, but we
think, do not sustain the action.
and cause reman. led, that the
The judgment U therefore
defendant's demurrer may he sustained, and judgment thereon renP

l

is

in

The only question

dered for

def<

iidaiit.

18

'■'<

u

bj

n

:i

•',

3

1

Ohio, 70, it Am. Dec. 581 (1827), In which the
Porta v. Rider,
i:. Mon.
(1.845),
covenant in his name, and Tharp v. Farquar,
in which the eourl sustained
covan agent on
demurrer
to an action
enant

"ii

*

error.

t
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CLEASBY.

of King's Bench, 1813.

i

Manle

ft B. 576.)

In conside ration that the bankru pts would deliver to
goods to be sold on account of the bankrupts, the defendant undertook to sell them, and to render a true and just account
Breach ; that the deof the sale, and ^\ the monies arising therefrom.
fendant hath not rendered to the bankrupts, or t o" the plaTnfttts as
aforesaid, a just and true account of the sale, or of the monies arising.
Second count, that the bankrupts had delivered goods to the defendant
to he sold, hut the defendant had not rendered a just account of the
said goods, Third count, for not rendering a just account after the reFourth count, for not renceipt of the monies arising from the sale.

Declaration:
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the defendant

There we're
dering a just account of the goods after the sale thereof.
non-assumpsit,
stated.
Plea,
an
account
and
counts,
also the money
with notice of set-off.
At the trial before Lord Ellenborough, C. J., at the London sittings
after Hilary term, it appeared in evidence that on the 23rd October
1810, the bankrupts ordered the defendant (a broker) to purchase for
them, at his public sale, a quantity of spirit of turpentine for exportation. The defendant accordingly made the purchase for £1090. 7s. 4d.,
The defendant
which was agreed to be paid for in bills at 2 months.
3W not mention to the bankrupts at the time of the purchase the name
of the seller, nor did it appear in the bill of parcels, nor did the defendant deliver any written paper containing the name; but in fact
the goods belonged to Le Mesurier & Co., and were sold by the debut
fendant as their broker acting under a del credere commission;
never authorized him to guaranty their house to Le
the bankrupts

Mesurier & Co., or ever knew that he had so done. SoonjrftexJiie,.
gave the defendant directions to ship the
purchase the bankrupts
goods, who then for the first time informed them that Le Mesurier &
Co. were the proprietors, and referred the bankrupts to them to get
after which, the dethe necessary documents for shipping the goods;
turpentine ; but the
of
the
the
Co.
&
price
fendant paid Le Mesurier
not
appear. The bankdid
made
this
payment
precise time when he
Mesurier,
and difficulties
with
interviews
Le
had
several
rupts having
resolution
their
abandoned
the
shipment,
occurred
in
procuring
having
of shipping, and directed the defendant to re-sell the goods; who accordingly re-sold them at different periods, the first of which was on
The
and the last on the 31st of December, 1810.
of the re-sales was £683. 4s. 5d. Before the time stipulated
for the payment of the turpentine the bankrupts became embarrassed,
The question
and on the 10th of January, 1811, stopped payment.

the 27th November,

produce

was, whether the defendant was entitled to take credit in his account
with the assignees of Smith & Co. for the price of the turpentines so
paid to Le Mesurier & Co. His Lordship stated the rule to the jury
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to be this, that a factor represents his principal until the principal is
disclosed, but when that is done, his character of factor is at an end,
and the principal bed 'ines the person to be dealt with.
Until that time
payments may be made by the factor, and be the subject of set-off by
The jury found a verdict for
him in his account with the principal.
the plaintiff, without allowing the set-off, and in Easter term a rule
nisi for a new trial having been obtained.
Lord Ellenbokough, C. J. In this case I have not seen, nor am
likely to see, any thing to induce me to alter my opinion as to the right
of the broker to receive payment until his principal appears. The jnoment however the principal does appear, provided it be before payment, he comes into his full rights to receive it ; that is a rule for the
But yet if the principal authorize his
protection of the principal.
agen t to receive payment, such payment will be goo d against him . So
under these circumstances if Cleasby had received payment, it would
have been good;
fi r to this extent we must give effect to the del
credere commission, that it authorized him to receive payment, his
The only point on
principal not having countermanded such authority.
which the question for a new trial is to be considered, is how far there
If a
was a right of set-off or mutual credit as it regards the broker.
broker continued the presumptive principal, unquestionably every right
t-f.ff belonged to him which belonged to his principal, but when
once the principal is disclosed, the right of set-off no longer continues.
The question then must -land on the mutual credit. I wish to have it
tfer ascertained, whether this be considered as a right of set-off or

HOLDEN
(Supreme

Court

.

RUTLAND R. CO.

v.

Vermont,

of

^

of the principal took place. 16

of mutual credit, when the disclosure
Rule absolute.

L901.

73

vt.

:U7,

Atl.

50

lOOfi.)

for negligence in the sale of a mileage book. Plea not guilty.
for defendant in a directed verdict. m
7
son,
Tlie mileage book in question was purchased of the
defend ant's tickel agent at Burlington by the plaintiff, as the agent of
Dana O. Coles, but the plaintiff did not make known his agency nor
In selling such tickets, the purchaser's nana
disclose his principal.

Ju dgment

J7

red

to

to the contraci

printed in the back pari of
to
by the ticket ,i L:
his
"Mr
own
ned
nana- thereto, instead of
that of his principal.
I'.y lore,- of the contract it is the duty of the
agent to enter the purchaser's
name in the front pari of the
book as the person to whom the
kel
sued and entitled to transportation thereon.
In the place tor SO doing the selling agent en
n

i i

—-~~— —

---

■

-

t

Le Blanc and
Part of the opinion is omitted.
•

'

i

I

is

b«

The plaintiff, being
tJMokTh' <;

ti<

the book.

'
7
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Ilolden," instead of "I). F. Hoi den," the
kick pari of the hook as the purchaser.
The t icket was then used h\ the plaintiff in going from P.urlington to
tered the name of

plaintiff's name signed

P.

in the

a

is

a

d

*

*

*

is

is

is

if

is

■

9

&

is

it

5

/whom

it

;

is

is

a

it

is

a

o

informed Coles that his daughter was going with him, whereupon
her name was inserted in the book, as before stated. Assuming that
her name might properly have been there inserted as
member of
the purchaser's
family, thereby entitling her to transportation
upon
the ticket, under the provisions of the contract
could be done only
a

he

it

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

it,

j

a

h_\

Rutland ami return.
I 'pon his return he gave the hook to Coles, and
paid him [or the numher of mi
I.
Ahout two months afterwards, the plaintiff hired the hook of Coles, and, with his daughter,,
attempted to go from Burlington to Rutland on another journey.
The daughter's name had then heen inserted in the front part of
Cojes as
the hook
memJiei of the purchaser's family, and
pcr-_
m entitled to transportation thereon.
In making this ourney over
the defendant's road, the plaintiff offered the hook for the transporta
tion i^i himself and daughter, hut the conductor refused to accept
and they rode without paying fare to Rutland, where' the plaintiff
was arretted at the request of the conductor, and detained for some
little time before being released. The plaintiff claims that his name
should have heen entered in the front part of the hook as the person
to whom the ticket was issued, and that to enter the name of "A.
F. Ilolden" instead was negligence by the ticket agent; and, further, that the damages suffered by the plaintiff by reason of the conductor's refusal to accept the book for transportation were the result
of this negligence, for which the defendant
liable. The court below- ordered
verdict for the defendant, to which the plaintiff exWas this error?
the sole question.
cepted.
The plaintiff purchased the mileage honk for Coles, and as his
agent, but he neither disclosed his agency nor his principal,
[n these
w ell- settled rule of daw thai
circumstances
an action fur
breach of contract not under seal may be brought in the, na me of _
either the agent or the principal, — in the name of the agent because
he has been treated by the defendant as the other party to the contract
in the name of the principal because he
the person really
interested in the contract, for whose benefit
was made, an
with .
considered in law as made.
Dicev, Parties, 136; Sims v.
Adol. 393; Lapham v. Green,
Rarn.
Vt. 407.
Bona]
JBmUiaaL-this rule of law shall not be so exercised as to work an injustice to.
the other party to the contract, other rules incident thereto are
One of these
equally well established.
that,
the action
brought
by the agent in his own name, the defendant may avail himself o
-• defenses which are good against the
the plaintiff
agent who
on record: also of any defense that would be good against the principal in whose interest the action
brought. Dicey, Parties, 142;
Smith, Lead. Cas. 428.
\\ hen the plaintiff hired the book to make the journey in question,
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Neither
by the ticket agent at the station where the ticket was sold.
*
*
*
the plaintiff nor Coles had any right so to insert it.
This defense being available in an action brought by the agent in
Let judgment be
his own name, the verdict was properly ordered.
affirmed.

18

SECTION 2.— IN TORT

FAULKNER

v.

BROWN.

Court of Judicature of Now York,

1834.

13 Wend.

C,?,.)

Error from the Schenectady common pleas. Faulkner had in his
possession a quantity of leather, belonging to one Van Slyck, who
had left the same with him, and requested him to take care of it.
It was stolen from the possession of Faulkner, and sold by the thief
Faulkner demanded the leather of Brown, and on his
to Brown.
refusal to deliver it up. brought an action of trover against him in a
justice's court. The justice being of opinion that Faulkner was not
entitled to maintain an action for the leather in his own name, rendered judgment against him for costs. The common pleas of Schenectady affirmed the judgment on certiorari, and the plaintiff sued out
writ of error.
Savage, C. J. Both courts were clearly wrong. To maintain troThe
ver, the plaintiff must have the general or special property.
leather;
had
Van
Slyck
the
in
plaintiff here had
a] property

a

The action may, in most cases, be brought
general property.
or
special owner of the goods for a conversion
either by the general
jud
and
gme nt obtained by one is a good bar to the
by a stranger,
P ossession under the rightful
2 Saund. 47, e.
the other.
having
s
no co lor of right,
on
a
against
^n.
mi
sufficient
er
is
own
bail; even a general
bring
trover
factor,
may
r,
a
e
carri
a
agister,
ment will sutlice without being made for any special purpose, but only
Here is a general bailment.
for the benefit ..f th.- rightful owner.
the

It would be monstrously inconvenient if a wrongdoer could come
ion of him who had the possession
and take things oul of the |
Sutton v. Buck, 2 Taunt. 309, per Chamiiti'ul owner.
undei
bre, [usti< e. Though a mere servant has not such a special property
bailee, or tri
any
enable him to maintain trover, yet
r

a

ill

i:. 'am. ii Am. si. Rep.
m keep the agew
i.i.ii.T. i;i .M.I. 288 (1884); Saladin v. Mil
Balto. «•":'! 'to- Co. v.
chell, I.", in. 79 (1867), in which part pwinenl was made t-> th" agent bel
Brown r. Morris, 83 N. 0. 251 (1880), where
th.- principal was disclosed;
the
not Induced
the third person paid the agenl andeva misapprehension
principal, and then set op iiii- paym/nl by way of counterclaim; and Qlrard
Am. Dec. 327 (1818).
Serg. ,v R. 19,

Uoss.t

s.
v. harden, 82 Ga. 219,
the principal and apenl agr

bj

I

which

I

,,.

in

;»

(18HK)

7

,-. hi

L52

i.
:,
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other person

who is responsible to his principal, may maintain the
action, and the lawl'ul possession, of the -nods is prima facie evidence
^i property.
Dyer v. Vandenbergh. 11 |ohns. 11". n. 2 Sannd. 47;
1 East,244;
1 East, 214 ; 1 Salk. 290;
Cro. Eliz. 819; Hotchkiss v.
McVickar, 12 Johns. 407, per Spencer, J. The defendant may,
undoubtedly, show a paramounl title in a third person, Schermerhorn
v. Van Volkenburgh,
11 Johns. 529, bul in this case the plaintiff is
the bailee of the general owner.
Numerous other cases might be
cited, bul they are unnecessary.

Judgment reversed.

PORTER
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(Supreme

v.

SCHENDEL. lt

Court of New York, Appellate Term,
55 N. Y. Supp. 602.)

1899.

25 Misc.

Hep. 779,

We have carefully examined the evidence in this
PER Curiam.
case, and have come to the conclusion that there was sufficient, if
credited, to sustain a finding that the injury to property complained

of was caused by the negligence of the defendant.
It was peculiaxly . . .
the province of the court below to determine wdiat credit should be
given to the witnesses on the trial, and we see no reason for_r £yieaz= —
ing his judgment on this question.
We are further satisfied that, although the plaintiffs were not the
general owners of the goods which were injured, it was competent
for them to recover the damages so suffered, in an action instituted
They were factors, having possession
by them in their own names.
of the goods in question for sale, and, by special agreement, were
guarantors of the purchase money on sales made by them. They
were also bound to incur certain expenditures,
for which they were
entitled

to be reimbursed,

and they were also to receive

an agreed

commission on such sales. There was some evidence in the case
tending to show that, at the time of the injury complained of, the
ignors or general owners of the property were indebted to them
on open account with respect to these matters.
For the amount so
due the plaintiffs undoubtedly had a lien on the goods in their hands.
Story, Ag. § 34.
They had, therefore, a special property therein,
couided with the possession of the goods, sufficient to support their
right to institute such an action as this ; and the recovery of the
judgment here will be a bar to any action which might hereafter be
brought by the general owner, to whom it is the duty of the plaintiffs
to account for the amount realized by them in this action.
1 Am.
cord:
Williams v. Millington, 1 II. Bl. SI (1788).
The agent in posi ni" property may maintain trespass against a wrongdoer.
Taylor v.
83 vt. 175, 21 ah. 610 (1891).
But see Galveston, ii. & 8. A. Ky. (Jo.
: ton, 15
A.pp. 145, 38 s. w. 647 (1897), which holds that, if
plaintiff by bis own pleadings or evidence shows that he holds as agent, the
action must be m the name of the principal.
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& Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1166; Faulkner v. Brown, 13 Wend.
Gorum v. Carey, 1 Abb. Prac. 285 ; Mechanics' & Traders' Bank
v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat. Bank, 60 X. Y. 40, 52.
The judgment in favor of the plaintiff must be affirmed. Judgment
63 ;

affirmed, with costs.

MORAN
(Supreme

Judicial Court of
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52

v.

DUNPHY.

Massachusetts,

L. R. A.

115, S3 Am.

177 Mass. 485. 59 N. E. 125,
St. Rep. 2S9.)

1901.

Tort on two counts, first, that defendant, with intent to injure
plaintiff and induce and instigate his employer to discharge him, did
maliciously, willfully and wrongfully, by certain slanderous charges,
induce^and instigate the said employer to discharge plaintiff; second,
that defendant, with intent to injure plaintiff and to induce the said
employer to discharge him, did maliciously and wrongfully induce
The case came up on appeal
said employer to discharge him, etc.
from a judgment sustaining defendant's demurrer.
Holmes; C. J. The first count of the declaration in this case substantially follows the form held bad in May v. Wood, 172 Mass. 11,
51 X. E. 191, and Rice v. Albee, 164 Mass.' 88, 41 X. E. 122, and the
plaintiff's argument is directed to getting those cases overruled. It
appears in the Reports that the later decision did not command the
assent of all of us, and it is quite possible,

at least, that if the ques-

tion came up now for the first time the majority might be found to be
Van Horn v. Van Horn, 56 X. J.
on the side which did not prevail.
But it is not desirable that decisions
Law, 318, 319, 28 Atl. 669.
should oscillate with changes in the bench, and we accept what was
Still we deem it proper to call attention to the
decided as the law.
What they
fact that the cases cited go only to a point of pleading.
decide, so far as they bear on the present case, is merely that the
substance of false statements by which a defendant is alleged to have
induce?! a third person to break or end his contract must be set out.
That we accept. Bui in view of the series of decisions by this court,
from Walker v. Cronin, L07 Mass, 555, through Morasse v. BrocmX

L. R. A. 524. 121 Am. St. Rep. 474;
Mass. 148, 26 X. E. 417, 10 L. R. A. 468;
Tasker v. Stanley,
Guntner,
167 Mass. 92, 44 X. E. 1077, 32 I,. R. A.
elahn v.
722, 57 Am. St. Rep. 4 13; Hartnetl v. Association, 169 Mass. 229,
47 X. E. 1002, 38 I.. R. A. 194; and Weston \. Barnicoat, 175 Mass.
;. I-;. 619, 49 U R. A 612
to Planl v. Woods, 176 Mass.
.. E. KM1, 51 I.. R. A. 339, 79 Am. St. Rep. 330, we cannot
admit a doubt that maliciousl) and without justifiable cause to induce
'
'Tson to end his employment of the plaintiff, vvlicthi i the illlent Mi lalse slanders or successful persuasion, is an actionable
151

Mass.

5f>7,

25

X. K.
153

CTr.'&A.

J

—10

74, 8

ri ri. is

722

tort

See,

am>

CONSEQUENCES

also, Angle v. Railway,

151

OF

Tin: RELATION

U.

S.

1,

(Tart

3

13, 14 Sup. Ct. 240,

38 1.. Ed. 55.

We apprehend that there no longer is any difficulty in r ecognizin g
that a right to Be protected from malicious interference may be incident to a right arising out of a contract, although a contract, so far
Is concerned, imposes a duty only on the promisor.
as performance
Again, in the case of a contract oi employment, even when the cm :
loyment is at will, the fact that the employer is free from liability

r
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for discharging the plaintiff does not carry with it immunity to the
defendant who has controlled the employer 's action to the plaintiff's
The notion that the employer's immunity must be a nonconharm.
ductor, so far as any remoter liability was concerned, troubled some
of the judges in Allen v. Flood [1898] App. Cas. 1, but is disposed
20
See, also, May v.
by the cases cited.
of for this commonwealth
So,
again, it may be
Wood, 172 Mass. 11, 14, 15, 51 N. E. 191.
492, 501, 502, 57
Woods,
Mass.
176
taken to be settled by Plant v.
motives may
that
330,
\". E. 1011, 51 L. R. A. 339, 79 Am. St. Rep.
20 The principle of liability in such cases is thus stated by Brett, L. J., in
50 L. .7. Q. B. 305, 44 L. T. Rep.
Bowen v. Hall. f. Q. R. D. 333, 45 .1. I\ :'>7.">,
Atkinson,
N. S. 7."». 29 W. R. 367 (1S81) (quoted with approval in Chipley v.
23 Fla. 206, 1 South. 934, 11 Am. St. Rep. 367 [1887]): '"vYlierever a man does
an art which in fact and in law is a wrongful act, and such an act as may
as a natural and probable consequence of it, produce injury to another, and
which in the particular ease does produce such injury, an action on the case
will lie. That if these conditions are satisfied the action does not the less
he because the natural and probable consequence of the act complained of
is an act done by a third person, or because such act so done by a third person is a breach of duty or contract by him, or an act illegal on his part, or
liability on him. That though it
imposing an actionable
an act otherwise
has 1 n said the law implies that the act of the third party, being one which
he has free will and power to do or not to do, is his own wilful act, and therefore is qoI the natural and probable result of the defendant's act, and though
this may he so in many cases, yet if the law were so to imply in every ease
That though
it would he an implication contrary to manifest truth and fact.
it has been said that if the act of the third person is a breach of duty or
contract, or is an act which is illegal for him to do, the law will not recognize that it is a natural or probable consequence of the defendant's act; yet,
if this were so held in all cases the law would, in some instances, refuse to
*
*
*
That merely to persuade
uize what manifestly is true in fact.
;i person to break his contract
may not be wrongful in law or fact, still, if
the persuasion be used for the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff or
of l enefiting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff, it is a malicious act,
which in law and in fact is a wrongful act, and therefore an actionable act,
that the
if injury issues from it. * * * That it cannot he maintained
breach of contract is not a natural and probable consequence of the act of
only
persuading the third person to break his contract; the breach is not
the aatural and probable consequence but by the terms of the proposition
which Involves the success of the persuasion, it is the actual consequence.'
The same rule has been extended to a libel which injured the agent's husiNo liability attaches if the act of
Weiss v. Whittemore, 28 .Mich. 366.
tie- third person was one he had a legal right to do, whatever the motive,
Raycroft v. Tayntor, 68 \'t. 219, 35
and whatever the effect on the agent.
Ul 53 .';:: L. R. A. 225, 54 Am. Si. Rep. 882. As to the rule in England, sec
<;7
the leading case of Allen v. Flood [1898] a. <'. 1, 77 L. T. Rep. N. S. 717,
of the
l.. .i. <,». ]-,. 119, It T. I.. Rep. L25, 16 YV. R. 258, and the discussion
.-.line in 1 .Mich. Law Rev. 28.
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determine the question of liability; that, while intentional interference of the kind supposed may be privileged if for certain purposes,
yet, if due only to malevolence, it must be answered for.
On that
point the judges were of one mind.
See 176 Mass. 504, 57 N. E.

1011, 51 L. R. A. 339, 79 Am. St. Rep. 330.
Finally, we see no
sound distinction between persuading by malevolent advice and accomplishing the same result by falsehood or putting in fear. In all
cases the employer is controlled through motives created by the defendant for the unprivileged purpose.
It appears to us not to matter
which motive is relied upon. If accomplishing the end by one of them
is a wrong to the plaintiff, accomplishing it by either of the others
must be equally a wrong.
It foll ows from what we have said that we are of opinion that both
counts of the declaration disclose a good cause of action, although
the first, on the authority of May v. Wood. 172 Mass. 14, 51 N. E.
191, must be held insufficient
in point of form. The second is not
within the authority or reason of that case, and is in a form similar to
the third count, which was held good in Walker v. Cronin.
See

Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216. As to that the demurrer will be
overruled.
As to the other the cTenuTrrer will be sustained, but it
seems to us that under the circumstances
the plaintiff should be
given an opportunity to amend.

Demurrer to first count
overruled.

/

sustained.

Demurrer to second

count

7lU
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I. Disclosed Principal
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(Superior Court of Judicature

v.

CLARK.

of New Hampshire,

1855.

30 N. H. 245.)

Assumpsit on an account annexed to the writ amounting to $260.22.
Verdict for plaintiff.
Eastman. J. 1 We cannot entertain any doubt of the competency
Me
of the evidence to show Neal to be the agent of the defendant.
Neal,
Agent."
occupied a store on which was the sign of "John T.
On his cards and bills he was designated in the same way. To the
witness, who inquired of him for whom he was agent, he made a reply
which induced the witness to call upon Clark, and inquire of him if
Xeal was his agent, and upon the inquiry being thus made, Clark
He, moreover, agreed that goods
frankly answered that he was.
It also appeared that Clark
had
desired.
Neal,
he
as
might be sent to
in conversation with
store,
in
and
out
of
the
engaged
was frequently
Xeal. This plain admission of the defendant, coupled with the other
circumstances, was entirely competent to show the agency, and thus
settle the first exception taken at the trial. It is unnecessary to examine it further, as it appears to be yielded in the argument.
Neal's agency being thus established, it follows that whatever he _
mTghTcTo within the legitimate scope of that agency would bind the__
Story on Agency, §
defendant, as much so as if done by himself.
126; Palev on Agency, 200; 2 Kent's Com. 620; Lobdell v. Baker,
1 Mete. (Mass.) 202, 35 Am. Dec. 358; Towle v. Leavitt, 3 Foster's
Rep. 374.
Before any goods were sent, the defendant informed the plaintiff's
clerk that Neal was his agent, and that the plaintiffs might send
goods to Neal. Neal, as the defendant's agent, accordingly ordered
several bills of goods, and afterwards, between the ordering of each
bill, stated that he had received the goods, although he did not specThese acts and admissions of Neal we,rc those of
ify the quantity.

Clark, and were competent to snow that
i 1'art of the opinion is omitted.

he had

ordered goods of the
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plaintiff s, and ha d also received goods.
"TcTcharge the defendant for some goods
if no more.

*

*
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PERSON

The evidence was sufficient
for at least a nominal sum,

*

Judgment upon the verdict.

BRENNER
(Supreme

v.

LAWRENCE.

Court, Trial Term, New York County,
58 N. Y. Supp. 769.)

1899.

27

Misc.

Rep.

755,

The defendants conducted a banking house under
They were indebted to the plainthe name of Lawrence & Simonds.
upon them for the money,
calling
plaintiff
sum
of
and.
$425,
in
the
tiff
a check in favor of the
out
make
to
their
cashier
instructed
they
to the custom
according
cashier,
The
due.
the
amount
for
plaintiff
signing it "H. M.
of bankers, drew a check uponTuTprincipals,^"IvToore, Cashier." The defendants failed shortly afterwards, so that

J.

the check was not paid, and the action is against the defendants as
drawers of the check to recover the amount due. The act of Moore,
according to the plain intention of the parties, was the act of the defendants, done in their business, by their direction, for their benefit,
and bound them as effectually as if the check had been signed by
Elwell v. Dodge, 33 Barb. 336; Bank of
the defendants themselves.
the State v. Muskingham Branch Bank, 29 N. Y. 619 ; Lockwood v.
Coley (C. C.) 22 Fed. 192; Melledge v. Iron Co., 59 Mass. (5 Cush.)
158, 51 Am. Dec. 59; Houghton v. Bank, 26 Wis. 663, 7 Am. Rep.
Whether in the hands of a bona fide third person, having no
107.

it

a

it,

knowledge of the facts, the signing by Moore would hold him individually (the word "cashier" being regarded merely as descriptio
personse) is a question that need not be considered, for the plaintiff,
and he knew that Moore was
who had the transaction, sues upon
mere agent, performing an act in the line of his duty for his employers, the defendants, for their benefit and on their account; and
is

in law theirs, not his.
for this reason that the act
The verdict in favor of the plaintiff was properly directed, and the
new trial must be denied.
motion for
a

is

DAVIS
(Supreme

Court

ot New

STork,
86

v.

LYNCH.

Appellate Term,
.V v. Bupp. 225.)

1900.

31

Misc. Rop.

724,

From an order dismissing the complaint
contract.
Action on
plaintiff appeals.
question was
Although the written contract
man,
iufficienj in plaintiff's proofsjo
M. Lynch, there
rge M. Lynch was at the time acting
justify the finding th
is

J.

in

a
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the defendant's agent, and was so regarded by both parties.
It
was, therefore, error to granl the defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint.
It an agenl possessing due authority makes a contract in li is own
name, his principal, whether known or unknown, may be sued therein, unless from the attendant circumstances it is the clear intent of
the parties thai exclusive credit is given to the agent, and that no
Store, Ag.
resorl shall in any event be had against the principal.(
Mall v. Lauderdale, 46
3 >3 ;
Coleman" v. P.ank. 53
§ 160a;
X. Y. 70. We are aware that a contrary rule was declared in Re
Bateman, 7 Misc. Rep. 633, 28 N. Y. Supp. 36, but the statement
of the law there made is not in harmony with the authorities. Although that case was affirmed by the court of appeals, the judgment
was upheld on other grounds.
Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant
to abide the event. All concur.
as
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\.V.

MARVIN
(Court of Appeals

v.

WILBER.

of Now York.

1X7:5.

52 N.

T.

270.)

Action for the purchase price of hops alleged to have been sold
to defendant.
The answer set up, among other things, a defect of
Defendparties defendant in the omission to join George I. Wilber.
ant moved for a nonsuit for nonjoinder of his partner.
Motion denied, verdict for defendant.
The case comes up on appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court in favor of plaintin.

PECKHAM, J. One Yosburgh was an agent of Wilber & Son for
the purchase of Hops"; he waT agent for the firm on ly, not f or this
defendant severally.
Waive any question of the statute of frauds for
this purpose, and assume that he purchased of the plaintiff as agent
of the defendant the hops in question ; that such purchase was made
expressly for the defendant, as thus stated by Vosburgh, although
he had no authority so to purchase, is the defendant severally liable
for such a purcha
of no principle upon which such an action can be main1 know
The whole case is that a person has assumed to act for
tained.
another and incurs an obligation against him without authority, and
2 The act of the agent within the scope of his authority is the aet of the
principal. Renard v. Turner, 12 Ala. 117 (1868); Jones v. Gould, 12:} App.

it would be anomalous and unconscionDiv. u:;ij. 108 N. Y. Supp. 31 (1908).
able to allow the principal to contest the right of the third person on a contrad made by the agent. Zoung v. stein. 152 Mich. 310, lid N. W. 195, 17
And it matters not whether
L. It. A. (N. S.) 231, 125 Am. St. Rep. 412 (1908).
ihc ad of the agent was within the real, or bis apparent, authority. North
River Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill (N. ST.) 262 (1842).
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we are asked
_ whether such an obligation is valid. The plain answer
_
~^enrTs Fo^be that the alleged principal never personally made such a
a 'iirfacLj^and the assumed agent never had any authority to make
Hence, none was made by the defendant.
it.
But it is claimed that this action lies against defendant alone, upon
the ground that a "representation made by a general agent is just as
True, where he is
binding on the defendant as if made by himself."
acting within the line of his agency; but that assumes that Vosburgh
was the general agent of the defendant, which is not true.
If he were the genera! agent of defendant, of course he had the
right to make this contract for him; but he was the general agent
of the firm, and not of the defendant, individually, at all.
the whole inference
The assumption being wholly unfounded,
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founded

thereon

fails.

Vosburgh had no real authority from the defendant ; none is pretended;
and he was clothed with no apparent authority from him
individually.
They
An individual and a firm liability are very different things.
may be different to the creditor as well as to the firm; one may be
solvent

and the other

not.

The counsel cites many cases to sustain the decision of the trial
judge, but they are cases of dormant partners, who confessedly need
not be sued it the plaintiff did not know of the existence of the dormant partner. Such are the cases in New York Dry Dock Co. v.
Treadwel!. 19 Wend. ?2?; Clarkson v. Carter, 3 Cow. 84; Clark v.
Miller, 4 Wend. 628; North v. Bloss, 30 N. Y. 374; Hurlbut v.
Post, 1 Bosw. 36. So if a party purchase for himself, without disclosing that he had a partner, and the vendor was ignorant thereof.
the action may be brought against the party alone who made the contract.
So an agent can hind himself by not disclosing his agency, but
he cannot hind the party for whom he is not an agent no matter how
I f e cannot create an agency b y re pre sent at [pits.
much he assumes.
This action wouTu! ffiTcTouDTecfly lie if it could be established that
the agent of a firm to buy hops was therefore and thereby the agent
of an individual member of that firm, authorized to buy for him and
to make him individually liable therefor. But that position the plaintiff's counsel has nol attempted to establish.
He cites no authority to
Me
and
that effect
simply argues upon the
takes no such position.
this defendant, and
of
was
the
agent
assumption that Vosburgh
The
such authorized to hind him as far as he could bind himself.
court must have acted upon that principle in its charge, that if the
plaintiff did not know that VbsTnirgh was acting for the firm, but
was informed that he acted for the d.-iVudant, that then the defendant
N o amount of repwash.'
This <;niii nt be maintained.
rally.
entation

person may bind hnnscTi as

Tie pTeasrs.

hound by the act of another, that other must,
In this case the asuthority to do the act.

have real or

I'.ut
aj

to he
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This defendant set up in his answer that
sumed agent had neither,
his son was a necessary parly. Imt the plaintiff refused to amend.
The judgment should be reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the
event All concur.

FT. WORTH
(Court

of Appeals

of Texas,

*

L884.

'2

JOHNSON & TRICE.

Willson, Civ.

("as.

Ct. App.

g§ 232,

234.)

*

Wiim:, V. J.
In this case Trice & Tolmson sued the_
railroad company to recover the value of beef furnished to one Barker, claiming that Barker was the agent of the company, and authorized to bind it for the beef purchased by him. Barker was roadmaster for the company, and he also kept a boarding or eating house
in some box cars belonging to the company, which cars were fur1 \c fe d and lodged hands
nished him by the company free of charge.
beef furnished by Trice
The
the
of
company.
in
the
employ
~~\Tho were
Barker,
house
kept
by Barker.
was
for
the
boarding
& Johnson
when he purchased the beef, told Trice that the company was responsible for it. There was no evidence, except the declarations of Barker, that he had any authority to bind the company for the beef.
Held, that there w^as no sufficient proof that Barker was the agent of
The company authorized to bind it by the purchase of the beef.
§234. Special agent; 'principal not bound for acts of, unless, etc.
That a party is agent for another does not render such other liable
for every contract the agent may make. To be binding upon the
principal, the contract must come within the apparent scope of the,
agent's authority. With regard to special agents, the rule is that if
the agent exceeds the special" and limited authority conferred on him,
his principal is not bound by his acts, but they become mere nullities
3
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& D. C. R. CO. v.

*

so far as he is concerned, unless, indeed, he has held him out as pos- :
sessing a more enlarged authority. Story on Agency (9th Ed.) § 126.
The agency conferred upon a roadmaster is special, and does not
confer authority to bind the company for provisions purchased to
4
* * *
supply a boarding house.
Reversed
s
*

and remanded.

Part of the opinion is omitted.
The agenl cannot increase, or enlarge, his authority by unauthorized acts
tn make his principal liable to third persons therefor.
White v. Lee, 97

Miss. 193, 52 South. 206 (1910).
Sec. also, Spies v. Stein, 70 Neb. G41, 97 N.
W. 7."L' (1903), holflin.L' that the unauthorized acts of an agent, not within the
apparent scope of his authority, and not ratified by the principal, actually or
in* lively, cannol hind the principal.
This is especially true if the third
person is aware of the want of authority, Carter v. yEtna Loan Co., 61 Mo.
App. 218 (1895);
Barton-Parker Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 96 Minn. 334, 104 N.
W. 968 (1905), and still more so when the agent is a special one, Fox v. Fisk,
6 How. (Miss.) 328 C1842).
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PAIGE.

v.

Court of New York,

(Supreme

729

PERSON

5

1850.

9

Barb.

150.)

it,

case

is,

whether Paige, the
Hand, J. I
below,
after taking
defendants
the
call
upon
can
below,
plaintiff
*—
testified
sold.
Moulton
the
of
goods
for
the
note
price
Moulton's
that he bought the hay of the plaintiff for the defendants, in 1839
or 1840, and gave his own note for the amount, which he had never
The plaintiff wanted Moulton's note,
paid, and that he was insolvent.
saying the hay was for Hyde, for
who declined at first to give
whom he was purchasing it. But the plaintiff insisted upon Moulton's own note, which he finally gave. The note was payable on de-

think the only point in the

4

It

3

is

a

is

is

is

It

v.

7;

v. Lye, Id.

tion.
There being no dispute about what the witness testified, nor any
ambiguity or doubl as to the meaning of his language, the facts are
undisputed, and the effect of his testimony becomes matter of law.
The judgment of the county court must be affirmed.

i

(Mass.)
See,

18

Mete.

(1854).

f

1,

•

Is

a

a

Ic

»

v. Stone,
L8 Barb.

(B W

Am i»e<'. 420 (1845);
L60,
also, silver v. Jordan, 136 Mass.
who
819 (1884), in which the third person charged the goods Bold to the agent,
The mere taking of the personal obligation
purchased them for defendant
thai credit is given to the
known agent
primp Cade presumption
,,,1 the principal
Merrell v. Wltherby, 120 Ala U8,
aol liable
liO South. «J74, 74 Am. Bt Etep. 89 (1898).
•nth. 09
Accord: Paige
Ranken v. Deforest,

^

■6C6

Taunt. 574. And see
Addison v. Gandasequi,
Denio, 410.
clearly appears that this was done
Luer,
Six or seven yeaTTnave elapsed, and the agent has
in this case.
failed in business, and now the vendor attempts to collect the debt
of the principal. This he can not do.
question of fact for the justice, and that his
said this was
The only
no conflict of evidence.
But there
conclusive.
finding
disclear,
he
and
plaintiff,
the
witness in the cause was called by
transacof
the
this
portion
of
his
relation
in
tinct and unequivocal

Emly

Wavdell

(

"

.f
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a

it
is it

had been given up. Moulton
mand, and there was no proof that
sworn,
impossible not to see that the
and
was the only witness
to
Moulton
pay for the hay.
plaintiff relied entirely upon
and with full knowledge
an
to
agent,
vendor sells goods
Where
for
the purchase money,
the
of
agent,
the
note
takes
o!~the agency,
principal. Beebee
resort
to
the
not
credit,
he
can
his
relies
upon
and
v. Robert. 12 Wend. 417, 27 Am. Dec. 132; Pentz v. Stanton, 10
Wend. 275, 25 Am. Dec. 558; Patterson v. Gandasequi, 15 East, 62;

11 l BCTS

ANIi C0NSEQ1 BNCES OF THB RELATION

DOWDEN
•

arl

of

Errors and Appeals

v.

of New
26

All.

(Part

3

CRYDER.
Jersey,

1S'.».".. ">

n.

J.

Law,

•".'_".),

941.)

Dixon, J. 8

E. 11. Carmack drew a draft on the defendant for
$3,200, payable Four months after date to his own order, and the
defendant accepted it for Cannack!s accommodation.
Thereupon
Carmack indorsed it. and delivered it to one Barnett, with authority
n negotiate it for cash at a reasonable discount.
Uarnett transferred
it to the plaintiff for $2,060 cash and a diamond necklace, which they
valued at $1,100, and then absconded.
At the time of the transfer the
owner of the draft, but held
that
Harnett
was
not
the
knew
plaintiff
merely as agent of Carmack for negotiation. Carmack repudiated
and the draft went to protest; hence this suit.
At the trial in the Essex circuit the cause was submitted to the
jury on the question of fact whether the necklace, prior to the transfer, was the property of the plaintiff or was the property of Barnett,
held by the plaintiff to secure Barnett's debt to him; and the jury
were instructed that in the former case the plaintiff might recover,
it
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the transfer,

but could not in the latter. They found for the defendant.
The cause
is before us on exceptions to the charge of the judge and to his refusals to charge in accordance with the plaintiff's requests.
First the plaintiff asked the judge to charge that the plaintiff's
title to the draft could not be invalidated unless the circumstances
under which he took it proved actual fraud; that mere carelessness
would not impair his title. This legal rule is thoroughly established,
(Hamilton v. Vought, 34 N. J. Law, 187; Copper v. Jersey City, 44
X. J. Law, 634), but it is inapplicable to the present case. The defect
found in the plaintiff's title sprang, not from the law relating to commercial paper, but from the law of agency.
It is a universal principle in the law of agency that the powers of the agent are to be
exercised for the benefit of the principal, and not of the agent or third
Jaques v. Todd, 1 Amer. Lead. Cas. (5th Ed.) 687. Perparties,
sons dealing with one whom they know to be an agent, and to be
exercising his authority for his own benefit, acquire no rights against
the principal by the transaction.
Stainer v. Tysen, 3 Hill, 279; Mecutchen v. Kennady, 27 X. J. Law, 230; Safe-Deposit Co. v. Abbott,
44 X. J. Law, 257; Bank v. Underbill, 102 N. Y. 336, 7 N. E. 293.

Such a transaction is usually, and perhaps properly, spoken of by the
courts as fraudulent, but, however honest the intention of the parties,
the agent's act is invalid merely because circumstances
known to
both prove it to be ultra vires.
In the present case the plaintiff
sought to get rid of the imputation of bad faith, by claiming that
Barnett had told him he had authority to accept the .diamon ds in
exchange for the draft; but it was not pretended that such authority
c

Part of the opinion is omitted.
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was supposed to have been given with knowledge that the agent, had
interest in the redemption of the diamonds.
a personal
Nothing
short of power expressly granted to the agent to deal with the draft
or h i S'own benefit would validate such a use of it in favor of one
cognizant of the facts. Consequently, on the fact found by the jury,
the plaintiff's title was defeated, if not by his actual fraud, by his
knowledge of the agent's misappropriation of the principal's propTh is request was rightly refused, save as its substance was
erty?'

f
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embodied in flic charge delivered.
The second request was to charge that, if the agent represented to
the plaintiff that he had authority to exchange the draft for money
and diamonds, and the plaintiff believed him, Carmack was estopped
from denying the authority; and Campbell v. Nichols, 33 N. J. Law,
For reasons already stated,
81, is cited to support this proposition.
this request did not reach the merits of the case, because it was not
claimed that Carmack had any notice of his agent's interest in the

But, aside from this, the proposition was intrinsically
diamonds.
his
The
unsound.
declarations of an agent, although accompanying
Story,
acts, constitute no evidence of the extent of his authority.
Ag. § 136; Brigham v. Peters, 1 Gray, 139; Baker v. Gerrish, 14
Allen, 201; Gifford v. Landrine, 37 N. J. Eq. 127; Farmers' Bank
The decision in
v. Butchers' Bank, 16 X. Y. 134, 69 Am. Dec. 678.
Campbell v. Nichols does not militate with this rule. The representation there upheld as an estoppel against the principal related, not to
the scope of the agent's power, but to an extrinsic circumstance affecting the character of the instrument which the agent was empowered to dispose of, and which circumstance would be within the
cognizance of the agent or his principal, but not of those dealing
The distinction between a representation by an
with the agent.
agent as to such extrinsic facts and his representation as to the
scope of his authority is clearly drawn in Farmers' Bank v. Butch* * *
ers' Bank, ubi supra.
Judgment affirmed.

the principal received full value in the transacTyler v. Sanborn, 128 in.
Cor the third person.
Bui see Garrett
136 21 N i: 193, 1 \<- R. A. 218, i~> Am. st. Rep. 97 (1889).
v. Trabue,
82 Ala. 227, 3 South 149 (1886), In which it was shown the agenl
if the third party has
Intended to make secrel profits oul of the transaction,
tj,|,. he cannol be affected by the unfaithfulness of the agent, ol
,.,i bona
Bambro v. Burnand, [1904] - K. i>which he had do notice or knowledge.
T. L. R
L0 9 Com. Cas. 251, 73 L. J. K. B. 869, 90 L. T. Rep. N. S. 803, 20
TZ J,. J. K. 1?.
398 :,\i w R 583, reversing [1903] 2 K. B. 399, 8 Com. Cas. 252,
652,
39 L. T. Rep. N. S. L80, 19 T. L. B. 284, 51 W. B.
7

tion
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does n"t
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if bis agent also acted
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EMPIRE STATE INS. CO.
of Appeals

of New

AMERICAN CENT. INS. CO.

v.

v.uu.

(Part 3

RELATION

L38 N.

L893.

v. 446, 34 N. E. 200.)

>N.

(Court

OF TH1

Earl, J.

in

Morris were agents of the plainThe firgj qJ Straub
August, 1889, and on the 7th day of that
Pittsburgh^ Pa.,
month, as such agents, they issued
policy of insurance whereby the
plaintiff insured the Ridgway Lumber Company against loss by fire to
the amount of $2,500.
Subsequently, on the 20th day of August, the
They reported that olicy,
defendant appointed them its agents also.
to the plaintiff on the 19th day of August, and
wrote to its spedaj
agent, Frank Aull, to have the risk reduced to $1,000, and lie notified
the agents to cancel the policy, or reduce the risk to $1,000, by reinMorris,
surance. Thereafter, on the 21st day of September, Straub
defendant,
for
and
the
reinsured
then
plaintiff
being
agents
plaintiff's
risk with the defendant, to the amount of $1,500, by entering the
agreement for reinsurance in their binder book.
Subsequently, on the
12th day of October, the property insured was destroyed by fire, betlie reinsurance had been reported to the defendant or had come
to its knowledge.
The plaintiff paid the amount of its liability under
its policy for the loss, and then brought this action against the defendant to recover three-fifths thereof under its reinsurance agreement.
The defendant refused payment, and defended the action on the
at

it

is

in

it

&

Morris could not bind
ground that Straub
by the agreement for
reinsurance, because they were at the same time the agents of the
plaintiff, and could not act in the dual capacity of agents for both partieThe court below upheld the conteneffecting the reinsurance.
tion of the defendant, and whether
was right in so doing
the sole

is

it

a

is

a

a

a

*

a

is

y

;

It

is

question for our determination.
not doubted that the same person may sometimes act as agent
for the two parties in the same transaction
but he can do so only in
An agent to
case he has no discretion to exercise for either party.
sell for one party may also act as agent for the buyer, but onl
in case
ie price and terms of sale have been fixed by each party, so that noth*
disleft to his discretion.
But an agent to sell, intrusted with
ing
cretion, and thus bound to obtain the best price he can, cannot buy for
In such
case he would occupy an
himself or as agent for another.
conflict
of interests. He
there
be
and
would
antagonistic position,
could not faithfully serve the one party without betraying the interests
of the other. He would at least be under great temptation to betray
the interest of one of the parties.
So
person may sometimes act as__
agent of both parties in the making of any contract; but he cannot do
lien he
invested with
discretion by each party, and when each
entitled to the benefit of his skill and judgment.
The rules of law
upon this subject have been laid down and illustrated in many cases,
of which
sufficient for the present purpose to cite the following:
Utica Ins. Co. v. Toledo Ins. Co., 17 Barb. 132; Ritt v. Insurance Co.,
is
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Barb. 353; New York Cent. Ins. Co. v. National Protection Ins.
Co., 14 N. Y. 85 ; Claflin v. Bank, 25 N. Y. 293 ; Murray v. Beard,
102 N. Y. 505. 509, 7 N. E. 553 ; Porter v. Woodruff, 36 N. J. Eq.
174: Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503, 11 L. Ed. 1076.
Contracts thus negotiated are void at the option of any nonassenting
The policy of the law condemns them. It matters not
party thereto.
that the agent has acted fairly and honestly, and even that neither
party to the contract has suffered injury. It is enough to condemn the
contract that the common agent in fact had any, even the least, disAs said by the chancellor in Porcretion to exercise for the parties.
"So jealous is the law upon this point that it will
ter v. Woodruff:
not even allow the agent or trustee to put himself in a position in which
41
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to be honest must be a strain upon him."
These principles of law are not disputed by the counsel who argued
this case, and they are so thoroughly embodied in the law that they
could not be.
Their difference is as to their application to this case.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that Straub & Morris
had no discretion to exercise for the plaintiff in effecting the reinsurance; that, so far as they had any discretion to exercise, it was for
alone; and thus, that there was no antagonism or inbetween
the duties they owed to each of their principals ;
compatibility
and here we think is his mistake.
Straub & Morris were ordered to
red uce tfTe~ plaintiff's risk by canceling the policy, or by reinsuring
.three fifths thereof, and this order the}- were absolutely bound to obey.
They had a discretion to exercise in determining whether they would
cancel or reinsure, and in making that determination they acted solely
for the plaintiff. They determined to reinsure, and thus the option
they had to cancel disappeared as if it had never existed, and it can
They then owed the duty to the plaintiff to
play no part in this case.
reinsure, if they could.
It does not appear why the plaintiff was unthe defendant

.

willing to carry the £2,500 67 insurance. It may have been because it
thought there was overinsurance, or that the risk was too hazardous,
or that, for some other reason, the insurance was unprofitable or undesirable.
It might have been difficult to obtain the reinsurance from
It is quite clear from what appears in this
any other good company.
the
record that th<
mt would not knowingly have reinsured
risk. Tn order to procure the reinsurance the agents owed the plaintiff
their utmost diligence and skill.
They had issued an improvident or
undesirable policy, and they must have fell under a very strong obli
i Ferguson v. <;
ii. !it Vsl. I. 28 s. ]■:.::-.i7. 10 I.. Et. A. 234 (1896), with
<ii -« ii- ion .■mi] citation of authorities,
especially pernicious are con
tracts in which it appears the third person paid the agent :i comrnl slon "ii
buxineHH transacted
with bis principal. Cltj of Flndlay \. Pertz, <•'•Fed. i-'T.
13 C. C. A. 569, 29 L. El. a. L88 (1896), affirmed 7 1 Fed. 681, 20 C. C. A. 662

full

(189

to whether the contract Is void or voidable, Bee n. y. 0. Ins. Co \. Kal
Protection In
Co., ii \. v. B6 'i^<". reversing 20 Barb. 168 (1864); Hugglns
•
l
Ins. Co., 41 Bio. App. 530 (1

LND CONS! Ql BN< I B OF
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ill

They owed
duty to the plainreduce the risk as directed.
take the reinsurance, even
was
they were convinced that
sirable, hazardous, and unprofitable, and the more thoroughly
convinced ^i these things the more urgent was their duty to
the plaintiff. On the contrary, as gents of the defendant, they.
bound to exercise their discretion on its behalf, and not make
refhstir'ance without inquiring and knowing that the risk was
was their duty to
not to take.the risk
to take.
overinsurance, or
was too hazardous, or
was
and hence this was
case where they
unprofitable and undesirable;
could not in this transaction serve the two masters.
their duties, and the}' were under
There was contlict
strong
their allegiance to one or the other of their printemptation to fail
hence this agreement
clearly one which the policy of the law
mils, and we see no reason to doubt that the court below properly applied the principles of law; and its judgment should be afAll concur.
firmed, with costs.
it

Court

of Arkansas, 1851.

it

if

v.

REARDON.

11

Ark.

[6

WASSELL
(Supreme

Eng.]

705,

44 Am.

Dec. 245.)

,

a

by

J.ft

WALKER,
The defendant executed to the plaintiff's attorneys
iwer of attorney
which they were empowered to confess judgment for said defendant on
note which the plaintiff had placed in
the hands of such attorneys for collection.
By virtue of this power
judgment was regularly confessed and entered of record.
is

*

*

is

.

[

it

t]

*

it

i

1.

it

this Judgment
objected:
the- attorney at law for the plaintiff could not act as attor•r the defendant, touching the same subject matter on acprior retainer by the plaintiff — the interest and rights of
the plaintiff and defendant being adverse.
hat the judgment was not confessed until after the note was
barred by limitation, and that
was the duty of the attorney to have
interposed
e.
icral rule
true that agents cannot act so as to bind their
where they have or represent interests adverse to the prin-

That

:

ounded upon the consideration that the principal
and vigilant attention of the agent to the subject
the policy of the law will not tolerate
nterest
the agent to that of his princiar
may influence his conduct to the prejudice of interests
This well recognized rule
particularly applicable"
ling agents, where the principal contracts for the
of an agent at
time when he has no interest in the subject
d

ill

a

is

it

in

tllc

\
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entrusted to him but subsequently by his own act acquires interest in
it adverse to that of the principal.
In the case before us tbe attorney
had no jnterest in the matter of his agency unless it should arise from
his claim to compensation as a collector, which may or may not have
been otherwise settled; nor had the plaintiff any interest whatever in
the act to be done of which the principal, at the time he instituted him
agent, was not fully advised; and if such disqualification exi.-ted he,
by his own act, expressly waived it by conferring upon the agent such
po wer with a knowledge of the facts. When it is remembered that the
"whole -round upon which this rule is based, rests upon the fraudulent
advantage which such an interest may stimulate the agent to take to
the prejudice of his principal's rights, it will scarcely be contended
that the circumstances of this case bring it within the reason and spirit
of the rule. The principal was informed of the nature and extent of
the interest which the payee in the note had in the act to be performed
5yTne agent. The facts disclosed in the instrument itself prove this ;
and that it was intended that the act to be performed should enure to
the mutual benefit of both the payor and payee : to the first by saving
him the expense incident to a suit in the usual form ; to the other by
facilitating and making certain a recovery.
This therefore was not a mere naked power in which the principal
was alone fnte rested", but a power coupled with an interest in a third
-on. made upon good and sufficient consideration, and in regard to
the principal was well advised, and so far from an undue adin which the
vantage having been taken of him in the relationship
agent stood towards him, he only did that which every truthful honest
. and what every prudent, considerate attorney accedes
man sh
The act which the attorney undertook to perform was in perfect
to.
harmony with the interest of his client and of the duty and integrity of
*
defendant, the payor. 10 * *
Judgment affirmed with costs.
10 Two parties, do matter how diverse their Interest, may by mutual conFltzsimmons v. *<<. Exp. Co.,
sent make a third their agent to bind them.
i»«' Stelger
v. Hollington, 17 Mo. App.
10 Ga. 330, 2 Am Rep. .".tt (1889);
Adam-, Min. Co. v. Senter, 26 Mich. 7:: ds7 -J».
The rule against
382 (1885);
double agency does not apply to cases In which there is no conflict In H
Colo. App.
Brit. Am. Assur. Co. v. Cooper,
duties assumed by the agent
25, i<) Pac. 147 (1895); Colwell v. Keystone Iron Co., 86 Mich, 51 (1877)1

e

which

»'■
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Ill
TRUSLQW
(Supreme

S<

is

v.

11

The

3

of West
S.

B.

Parkersburg

J. M. Mitchell

Virginia,

1907.

61

W. Va.

628,

51.)

Bridge

& Terminal

Railroad

rt of the opinion

i.s

to procure for it options on certain property on the south side of the Little Kanawha river froni
For this service he was to receive a fixed compensaParkersburg.
tion per day. Acting in this capacity, he took from the plaintiffs,
Emma J. and W. F. Truslow, on the 21st day of November, 1902, an
option on certain property owned by them, the title to which was in
the female plaintiff, for which property the sum of $1,600 was to be
The option was taken in the name of J. A. Shrewsbury, asI aid.
signed to Mitchell by Shrewsbury, and by Mitchell assigned to the
By its terms the option was to be accepted within
railroad company.
{
X) days, and on the 31st day of January, 1903, the company notified
the plaintiffs in writing that it would accept the option, and upon
execution to it of deed would pay the price agreed to be paid.
In the latter part of February, or the 1st of March, 1903, the company discovered that the agent, Mitchell, had been taking commission
contracts on all the property optioned by him ; that is, he agreed with
the landowners that in case a sale was effected by him through the
option taken he was to receive a certain additional sum — in this particular instance the sum being $75. Upon discovery of this fact, the
relations
between Mitchell and the company
were severed ; the
company taking from Mitchell an assignment of all commission contracts taken by him. Negotiations were entered into with a view of
obtaining from the plaintiffs a contract more favorable to the company ; and, it refusing to comply with the terms of the option, this
suit was on the 16th day of January, 1904, instituted for the purpose
of compelling a specific performance of the agreement.
Upon a hearing the court decreed that the contract should be specifically enforced,
* * *
and, from this decree, the railroad company has appealed.
The appellant, after taking the assignment of the commission conretained the same in its possession, and has never offered to
r to the appellees either this option or the commission conct, and its action in this respect indicates an intention on its part
the benefits of the contract in case it should deem
nt to do so.
It filed these papers as exhibits with its an1 relies upon its defense to this suit as a repudiation of the
contract.
The fact that the appellant, with full knowledge of all the facts,
act made by Mitchell, renders immaterial another

Company employed
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1

&

a

is

is

a

it

is

is

is

it,

and that
that whether or not
question raised by counsel for
immaterial, as the appelthe appellees knew of the double agency
lant had the right to disaffirm the contract upon discovering such
double agency, irrespective of whether or not the appellees had notice of such agency, and regardless of whether or not the appellant
This position
was damaged thereby.
sound.,
could show that
"W hen an agent acts for both parboth upon reason and authority.
contract requiring the exercise of discretion, the conties in making
voidable in equity upon the application of either party, or the
tract
circumstance
available as
defense in an action at law upon the
Am.
Ency.
Eng.
Law (2d Ed.) 1073; Lloyd v. Colcontract.'!.
587;

;

Bush,

v. Hughes,

32

S.

1,

a

S.

E. 133; Frazier

v.

Brewer,

52

W. Va.

a

306, 43

S.

.

S.

is

it

it

a

if

in

,

p

a

is

it
is

principal
Hut, while this
true.,
equally as well settled that
double ca aci ty
may, upon discovering that his agent has acted in
like manner as
ratify and confirm his acts, and thus be bound
the agent had not exceeded his authority, but had acted wholly with"Where, with
in the powers given to him.
knowledge of all the
facts, the principal acquiesces in the acts of the agent under such
he
his duty to repudiate sueh acts
circumstances as would make
confirmation of the ads
would avoid them, such acquiescence
of the agent." Curry v. TTale, 15 W. Va. 867; Dewing v. Hutton,
Va. 577, 37
48 \\
E. 670; Coulter v. P.latchlev, 51 W. Va. 167, 41

F.

110.

"Where

party originally had
right of defense or of action to defeat or
set aside
transaction on the ground of actual or constructive fraud,
he may lose such remedial right by
subsequent continuation, by acthe party
mere delay or laches.
quiescence, and even
originally possessing the remedial right has obtained full knowledge
the transaction, has become fully
of all tin- material facts involved
aware of its imperfection
and of his own rights to impeach it. or
ight, and might, with reasonable diligence have become so aw:
and all undue influence
wholly removed so that he can
consent,
free
and lie acts deliberately, and with the intention

If

*

*

•

Jur.

§

of ratifying the voidable transaction, then his confirmation
and his remedial right, defensive or affirmativi
964.

D.PB.&A.-

IT

is

ly

is

in

*

by

a

a

a

a
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;

J.

5

Crump v. Ingersoll, 44 Minn. 84, 46 X. W. 141
X.
Eq. 372; Fish v. Leser, 69 111. 394. "A
man cannot be the agent of both the buyer and the seller in the same
nor can
transaction, without the intelligent consent of both parties
an agent act for himself and his principal, nor for two principals on
opposite sides in the same transaction, without like consent. All such
transactions are voidable, and may be repudiated by the principal without proof of injury on his part.
Xothing will defeat the right of the
principal except his own confirmation after full knowledge of all the
26
E. 397, 40 L. R. A. 234.
facts." Ferguson v. Gooch, 94 Va.
ston,

Young

1."

bindii
Pom
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I

it

by

the appellant when, after disThe right to disaffirm was waived
took an assignment
Mitchell's agency for both parties,

is

it

by

it by

its subsequent neglect and omiscontract, and
would not be bound
the consion to notify the appellees that
tract. 11
afWe see no error in the decree of the circuit court, and
firmed.

^i the commission

II. Undisclosed Principal
(A) Simple
PATERSON
(Court

of King's Bench,

v.

Contracts

GANDASEQUI.

1812.

15

East,

62,

18

13 Rev.

Rep. OS.)

&

&

2

a

&

a

in

e

a

It

if
it

J.

h

a

<

a

;

&

i

Soon after, and before the credit expired,
plaintiff's books.
plaintiffs deCo. became insolvent, and thereupon
which being refused, the present acmanded payment of defendant
nontion was brought. At the trial Lord Ellenborough directed
granted.
)n
suit.
rule nisi was
motion to set aside the nonsuit
rd Ellenborough,
The Court av not the least doubt,
C.
that
distinctly appeared that the defendant was the person for
-•• use and whose account the goods weft.' bought,
and that the
plaintiffs knew that fact at the time of the sale, there would not be
But the
the least pretence for charging the defendant in this action.
ap
doubt is, whether that does sufficiently appear by the evidence.
- that the defendant was
present at the counting-house of LarLarrazabal

of dissent within
reasonable time, ratification is pre*
what
reasonable time, sec rj. s. Rolling Stock Co. v. Atl.Co., :;i Ohio St. 450, 32 Am. Rep. 380 (1878),
In Addison v. Gandasequi,
Taunt. ^74, 11 Rev. Rep. 689 (1812) Lord
"ii Bimilar tacts allowed the jury to say whether the goods were
Co., or to Gandasequi through Larrazabal
Co., as facsold t" Larrazabal
See, also. Silver
aside their verdict for defendant
was made with the
319 (1884), in which the contract
alone, but the third person tried to hold the principal, and Be< be v.
ques12 Wend. 413, 27 Am.
><■<■.
is held to be
132 (1834), in which
tion of fact to be determined from all the circumstances of the case whether
the third :■•
the agent exclusive credit.
•

a

it

I

&

&

1

Is
a

a

sence

t,
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a

a

&

Action for goods sold and upon the common money counts. DeCo., of
fendant was
Spanish merchant who employed Larrazabal
London, merchants, to purchase goods for him for
foreign market
Co. applied to PaterLarrazabal
upon
per cent, commission.
son to send to their counting house an assortment of silk hose with
terms and prices.
Defendant was present, inspected the samples, and
Co. gave written orders
selected such as he required.
Larrazabal
large supply to fill defendant's order, but the invoices were made
for
Co., and they were debited for the
out
the name of Larrazabal
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razaba l, where one of the plain tiffs had come by appointment, and in
presence inspec ted and selected such of the ;
.;> lie required : that the goods were afterwards
ordered by Larrazabal &
Co., cred it given to them and the invoices made out in their name and
sent to tlu-m.
The q uestion is, whether all this was done with a
Knowledge of tl
nt being the principal?
The law has been
settled by a variety of cases, that an unknown principal, when di:
Is liable on the contracts which his agent makes tor him: \
erect^
that must be
himself from recovering
over against the principal, by know

liis

edge of that fact, it may be as well to have it reconsidered.
BavlEY, J. There may be a particular course of dealing with
respect to trade in favour of a foreign principal, that he shall not be
liable in cases where a home principal would be liable: that would be

I have generally understood that the seller
question for the jury.
may look to the principal when he discovers him, unless he has abandoned his right to resort to him. I agree that where the seller knows
the principal at the time, and yet elect- to give credit to the agentj he
^must be taken to have abandoned Mich right, and cannot therefore afterwards charge the principal.
1 think it should be reconsidered in this
e whether the plaintiffs did so.
a

Rule absolute.

14

MEEKER
(Commission

v.

CLAGHi

of Appeal of New York,

>RN.

n

1871.

N.

Y.

340.)

Action by a
E [. B. & \\ .
to recover a balance
iron-work and cut-tone. T he articles were furnished for a build
ing of the defendants in Savannah, upon the order of their architect,
The defendants claimed that the articles were fur(diaries Shall.
plaintiff's
nished by
assignors, upon the credit of said Shall, and thai
and the plaintiff claimed that they were
therefor;
had
him
they
paid
t for the <\r
furnished upon the order of said Shall, acting
W, Cornell,

fendani

-.

and upon their credit.
to die plaintiff was in writing and absolute in ;•
ini e, on ci
imination, that
ami >unl recovered in the a I
ted to n
olll 15 Th

The assignment
Two of his a

'1'

"tl

»4

The opinion

e
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making the agent his debtor.
It certainly appeared to me at the
trial that the plaintiffs knew of the defen dant being the principal,
and had elected to take Larrazabal & Co. as their debtor-, or 1 should
not have nonsuited the plaintiffs: but as there may perhaps be a
doubt upon the evidence, whether the plaintiffs had a perfect knowl-

and Le Blan<
nmll ted

.u

. are

omitted,

\M

Tli)

BFFBCTS A\i>

lr

If

/the defendants were known to be
and Shall onl) tTicir agent, then \\w\ <b®WM*
alone responsible^ unless credit was -non exclusively to the agegi, iu__
11" however the defendible
which event the agent alone wa
tune
ants were not known i" he the principals, and credit was at the
then the vendors
Ten to Shall, who was in fact an undisclosed agent,
:ould hold [or iMMiicnl. at their election, either the agent or the prinIt Shall was not m tact the agent of the defendants, and furcipals.
them, then the
nished these articles to them upon his agreement with
defendants are not responsible to the plaintiff. Pentz v. Stanton, 10
9 Barn. &
Wend. _Y1. Z5 Am. Dec. 558; Thomson v. Davenport,
Cases,
Am.
423;
1
446,
447,
7*;
Lead.
Story Agency, N § 267,
Cress.
and undisputed.
fncTpalTTn the transaction,
entary

tlft^

law in view, this case involves only quescan claim exemption from liability upon
That Shall was not their agent, and that
principal; or, 2rThat the vendors knew
to be the principals, and gave the credit exclusively to
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Keeping these principles of
The defendants
t.
ly one ni two grounds :/l.
the vendors dealt with him as
the defendants
the agent.

As to the first ground, there is some evidence tending to show that
* *
*
the agent of the defendants, and acted as such.
We must asinine that Shall was in fact the agent of the defendants,
and that the vendors knew it.

As to the second ground, the evidence should be quite clear that the.
vendors gave exclusive credit to the agent of known principals, before
In all cases, where
we can hold the principals exempt from liability.
the principals seek exemption upon the ground that the credit was exclusively given to their agent, this should clearly appear, and they have
the affirmative to show it; the natural presumption being, in all cases,
that credit is given to the principal rather than to the agent. It is sufficient to say upon this branch of the case, that there is no conclusive
evidence that the credit was given by the vendors, exclusively to the
lit, and that they intended to look to him solely for their pay. It
true, that upon the ledger and day-book of the vendors, the articles
were charged to Shall, and while this furnishes strong evidence that
they were furnished upon his credit, it does not show it conclusively.
The plaintiff gave some explanation, tending to weaken the effect of
nd its weight under all the circumstances of the case,
feree.

The most that can he properly said in behalf of the defendants is,
that tlie plaintiff made a very weak case.
But if the circumstances of
the
nd the evidence, and the legitimate inferences to be drawn
•n them tend in any degri e to uphold the decision of the referee, we
to me thai this is such
'

a case.

e videnc e that Shall was the agent of the ven: i tent for the articles furnished,
in such a sense as
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to bind them by the payment the defendants made to him, even if there
'is any competent evidence of such payment.
Within n umerous decisions that have been made in this court and
alscTin the Supreme Court, the plaintiff, under the absolute assignment
TrTwriting to him, is the legal holder of the claim against the defendants, and the real party in interest as plaintiff in this action.

—

1 am therefore oj^the^optnion that the judgment should be affirmed,
with costs. All concur except Leonard, Com., not sitting.

DARROW

HORNE/PRODUCE CO

v.

(Circuit Court of the United

Stat<#;

57 Fed.

D. Indiana. 1893.

4C.3.)

The question of the s ufficiency of the
The complaint, so far as material
complaint is raised by demurrer!
IcTthe decision of the question involved, is as follows: That heretofore, the 21st day of January, 1893, the plaintiffs, at Chicago, 111.,
sold to the defendant, through its agent and general manager, William

-

6'f

butter, as mentioned in the contract of sale ami
quantity
that said
in writing;
purchase thereof, which contract was and
on the
these
plaintiffs
of
contract, although made for and on account
other
the
defendant
upon
one hand, and for and on account of the
agent-,
said
respective
of
the
names
the
hand, was executed only
Co., for these plaintiffs, and in the name of the
A. A. Kennard
a

&

in

is

Karris,

*

*

in

a

is

is

It

in

by

it

a

in

is

It

*

by

the style of Wm. Harris, for the defendant.
said William Hani-,
of said agents thereby intended to bind
each
fact
but as matter of
each of said agents was thereunto duly
and
thereby,
his said principal
principal.
his
said
In
authorized
—~*~~
true that parol testimony will not be permitted to
undoubtedl)
writing; but, in the absence of ;mv
contract
adicl
control
no just sense contradicts the written
recital appearing therein,
aliunde the writing, that the nameoral
testimony,
show
to
contract
those
of
are
agents, and that undisclosed prin
contract
to
the
signed
Counsel has cited
interest.
cipals are the real parties
unnecessary to
the rule applicable to sealed instruments.
simple
the writing here declared «'ii
examine tho

-

under seal.
■■ sary, as the true
of the adjudged
Story,
ks.
tated in the elementary
found accurately
"I
these
words:
|,i, |.;,i.,
th(
doctrine
1600
the more recent authorities
the doctrine main tained
-«■■du< authority
the agenl pos
that,
compreTieh
own
and
makes
he
seal,
under
not
written contract
to make
not

"f

pj

i-

the opinion

is

omitted

in
I
i

■
s

it

a

i« pari

if

it

It in
is

g

in

1

revi<

i
i

further

st

A

contract,

I
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himself to be ageol or not, and whether
or unknown, he, the agent, will he liable to
also will be
be sued, and be entitled to sue thereon, and his principal
liable to be sued and be entitled to sue thereon, in all cases, unless
from the attendant circumstances it is clearly manifested that an exisive credit i- given to the agent, and it is intended by both parties
be had by or against the principal
r< >ort shall in any event
The doctrine tints asserted lias this title to commendation
upon it.
,md support:
that it nol only furnishes a sound rule for the exposii i*\ contracts, bul that it proceeds upon a principle
of reciprocity,
anil gives to the other contracting party the same rights and remedies
Nor
linst the agent and principal which they possess against him."
The
or vary the written instrument.
does this doctrine contradict
"It docs not deny that it is binding on t hose
same writer observes:
whom on the face of it it purports to hind, but shows that it also hinds
■thcr by reason that the act of the agent in signing the agreement
in pursuance of his authority is in law the act of the principal."
ITig& \\ . 834, 845, and other cases citea under
the above section.
Whan. Ag. § 298, states the doctrine thus: "On nonnegotiable instruments, where the agent is prima facie the contracting party, u.nt is k should appear that the agent is the person exclusively
privileged
or bound, the principal can sue or he sued, and in the latter ease the
contracting party can sue either principal or agent."
Mcchem. Ag. ^§ 695-700. discusses the subject of the liability of
undisclosed principals, and of principals known, but not mentioned
in contract- executed on their account, but signed by the agent alone,
and he shows that in such cases, unless the principal in the mean time
- in good faith paid the agent
supposing he was the principal, the
otl
may overpass the agent, and sue the principal in the first
In section 701 he says: "This rule applies to all simple conis. whether written or unwritten, entered into by an agent in his
name and within the scope of his authority, although the name
of the principal doe- not appear in the instrument, and was not dish the party dealing with the agent supposed that
itter was acting for himself.
And this rule obtains as well in
which are required to be in writing as those to
lidity writing is m
titial. It does not violate the prinich forbid- the contradiction
of a written agreement by parol
r that which forbids the discharging of a party by parol
ligation of his written contract.
The writing is not conI discharged;
the result is merely that an
•
nal party is made liabl
"Whatever the original merits of the rule," says the court in Byingwhether

he describes

he known

a

a

y

1

oral evidei

~V

pon

69, 45 Am. Rep. 314, "that
party not
■tract in writing may be charged as
prinwhen the writing gives no indication
n

n, 134

.",;

name,

'.he principal
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17

*

untenable.

*

fe"n~clant

*

is

it

it,

of an intent to bind any other person than the signer we cannot reas well settled as any part of the law of agency."
for
open
These authorities demonstrate that the first contention of the de-

THOMSON

v.

Demurrer overruled.

R.

110, 17

E

M.

&

C. 7S,

4

Barn.

&

1S29.

9

(Court of King's Bench,

DAVENPORT.

The plaintiff below declared for goods sold and delivered
Verdict for plaintiff.
am of opinion that the direction given
Lord Texterdkx, C.
by the learned Recorder in this case was right, and that the verdict
person sells
take
to be
general rule, that
was also right.
with
he
dealing
the
contract
goods (supposing at the time of
he has
with
whom
that
the
discovers
person
principal), but afterwards
transaction,
for
but
agent
the
in
the
not
principal
been dealing
the
have
debited
time
agent
in
the
mean
he
though
may
third person,
with
he may afterwards recover the amount from the real princihowever, to this qualification, that the state of the acsubject,
pal
not altered to the prejucount between the principal and the agent
at the time of the sale
On the other hand,
dice of the principal.
nominally dealing
the seller knows, not only that the person who
not principal but agent, and also knows who the principal
with him
really is, and, notwithstanding all that knowledge, chooses to make
the agent his debtor, dealing with him and him alone, then, according
Taunt. 574, and Paterson
to the cases of Addison v. Gandassequi,
afterwards, on the failcannot
seller
62,
the
v. Gandasequi, 15 East,
the
round
and
principal, having once
turn
charge
the
agent,
ure of
made his election at the time when he had the power of choosing
At
middle Case.
The present
between the one and the other.
the time of the dealing for the goods, the plaintiffs were informed
that McKune, who came to them to buy the goods, was dealing for
if

a

a
a

is

it,

See

ais.»

that he was an agent,
re

Bateman,

7

that
i

ir

is,

Mfec.

Rep. 838,

28

N.

v.

informed

p.

(1

\.

i

i

Ed.
Chandler

D.

■"•

In

8.

6

ol

561 (1874).
v. Thuey,

/

..II.

a

IS

J\

v

U

Columbia,
Wheat. 326,
Bank v. Bank
the Inten tlng/revie* of the authorities

it

i

^

bj

S.

(

W. 02 (1890), in which the courl held
L6
102 Mo/522,
Kellj
bould be had
the contract showed both parties Intended thai do resort
116 v
,,,,-t the and! cl< ed principal,
and Kayton v. Barnett,
liable, although
24 (1889), In which fhe und inclosed principal was held
with blm if in- had been
shown the' third person would oot have *i«n
,ii^i losed.

Cows

iio

~.uyl>(('" ^-^s

t~M&^*

/

.

Supp. 36 (1894);

Qndeke Land Co. v. Levy, 76 Minn/364, 79 N. W. 314 (1899); Barker v. Gar
89 111.
Heywood
Bros. Co. \. Andrews,
\r\, 83 ill. L84 (1876), approved
6] Kan.
ill. 69 Pac. 259 (1899);
App. L95 (1900); Edwards v. Glhfemeister,
Pac. 878 (1896);
lale 28 Or. 165, Jni. 38 Pac. 67,
Barbre
B. 849, 29 Am St Rep. 766
!<;»,; Waddill \. Bebree, 88 Va. JD12, m
Mechanics'

i

f<>

'

^

D v
/^

{(^

f

"7

/L

but they were not

^

J

a

is

/

fc

4

is

is

if is

;

another,

f.
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They had not, therefore, at thai time the
the principal was.
: making their election.
It is true thai they might, perhaps,
lined those means if they had made further inquiry; but
made no further inquiry.
Not knowing who the principal really
had nol the power at that instant of making their election.
That being so, it seems to me thai this middle ease falls in substance
and effect within the first proposition which I have mentioned, the
rson not known to be an agent; and not within the secI
ond, where the buyer is not merely known to be agent, but the name
There may be another ease, and that
of his principal is also known.
is where a British merchant is buying for a foreigner.
According to
of merchants, and of all persons in trade,
the universal understanding
the credit is then considered to be given to the British buyer, and not
to the foreigner.
In this case, the buyers lived at Dumfries; and a
question might have been raised for the consideration of the jury,
Whether, in consequence of their living at Dumfries, it may not have
been understood among all persons at Liverpool, where there are
great dealings with Scotch houses, that the plaintiffs had given credit
to McKune only, and not to a person living, though not in a foreign
country, yet, in that part of the king's dominions which rendered him
not amenable to any process of our courts? But, instead of directing
the attention of the Recorder to any matter of that nature, the point
insisted upon by the learned counsel at the trial was, that it ought to
have been part of the direction to the jury, that if they were satisfied
the plaintiffs, at the time of the order being given, knew that McKune
buying goods for another, even though his principal might not
be made known to them, they, by afterwards
debiting McKune, had
ek-ctcd him for their debtor.
The point made by the defendant's
counsel, therefore, was that if the plaintiffs knew that McKune was
dealing with them as agent, though they did not know the name of
the principal, they could not turn round on him.
The Recorder
-lit otherwise : he thought that though they did not know that
McKune was buying as agent, yet, if they did not know who his
principal really was, so as to be able to write him down as their
r, the defendant was liable, and so he left the question to the
and I think he did right *in so doing.
The judgment of the
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who

therefore be affirmed.
may be a course of trade by which the seller will
nt who is buying, and not be at liberty at all to
the principal.
Generally speaking, that is the case where an
a house abroad.
There may also have been evipplicable to an agent living here acting
tland.
But that does not appear to have
ide a point in this case, and it is not included in the objection
the charge of the Recorder.
In my opinion,
direction of the Recorder was right ; and it was, with the limits
roed, perfectly consistent
with the justice of the case.
. ,

J. There

I

LIABILITY

Ch. 5)

OF

PRINCIPAL

TGK

THIRD

PERSON/,

~A7\

.

"Where a purchase is made by an agent, the agent does not of neces'
sity so contract as to make himself personally liable; but he may do o' l^( ^C^^-^^cl
If he does make himself personally liable, it does not follow that£{ /-v
so.
a^e^i <c^</
*
the principal may not be liable also, subject to this qualification, that-/
-^»_5
the principal shall not be prejudiced by being made personally liable,
^l/n-*n
if the justice of the case is that he should not be personally liable.
the principal has paid the agent, or if the state of accounts between
the agent here and the principal would make it unjust that the seller
should call on the principal, the fact of payment, or such a state of
accounts, would be an answer to the action brought by the seller
But the
where he had looked to the responsibility of the agent.
seller, who knows who the principal is, and instead of debiting that
principal, debits the agent, is considered, according to the authorities
which have been referred to, as consenting to look to the agent
only, and is thereby precluded from looking to the principal. But
there are cases which establish this position, that although he debits
the agent who has contracted in such a way as to make himself personally liable, yet, unless the seller does something to exonerate the
principal, and to say that he will look to the agent only, he is at libIn
erty to look to the principal when that principal is discovered.
the present case the seller knew that there was a principal; but there
is no authority to show that mere knowledge that there is a principal,
destroys the right of the seller to look to that principal as soon as he
knows who that principal
provided he did not know who he was
said, that
at the time when the purchase was originally made.
of
the
name
the
and
to
asked
charged
the seller ought
have
principal,
him with the price of the goods.
By omitting to <1<>so, he might
have lost his right to claim payment from the principal, hail the latter
paid the agent, or had the state of the accounts between the principal
and the agent been such as to make
unjust that the former should
case circumstanced as
But in
be called upon to make the payment.
does not appear but that the man who has had
this case is, where
the justice of the e.
has not paid for them, what
[roods
That In- -liould pa) for them to the seller or to the solvent ag< nt, otto the estate of the insolvent agent, who has made no payment in re
The justice of tlie case is, a-,
seems t.i me,
Spect of these goods.
seller
shall he paid, and that the
.all on one side, namely, that the
l>e
the
■-hall
buyer (the principal)
person to pay him, provided he

£/

is

a

it

It

is,

it

is

it

Now, upon the evidence,
appears thai
paid anybody else.
and has not paid for them either 1"
lefendant had th<
McKune -a- to the presenl plaintiffs, or to anybody else, lie will he
liable to pay for them either to the plaintiffs or t" McKune's -state.
The justice of the
ems to me, is, that he Bhould pay the
am.
plaintiffs, who were the sellers, and nol any other person.
hi.
the Record*
therefore, of opinion that the direction
i.; ri i.i
law is, that the seller
The general principle
\i.i-:.
shall have his remed) against the principal, rather than against any
of

ri

r

of

I

i

ii

not

|.

has

n
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Where goods arc boughl by an agent, who does not at
thai he is acting as agent, the vendor, although he
lebited the agent, may, upon discovering the principal, resort
to him for payment.
But
the principal be known to the seller at
person.

it'

the time disclose

is

a

is

is

It

it

if

opiir

a

it

is

I

ly

r<

it

a

a

It

I
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it

I

it

:

a

;

is

a

if

a

the time when he makes the contract, and he, with
full knowledge
of the principal, chooses to debil the agent, he thereby makes his
on, and cannot afterwards charge the principal.
in such
Or
case he debits the principal, he cannot afterwards charge the agent.
There
third case
the seller may, in his invoice and bill of parcels,
mention both principal and agenl
he may debit A. as
purchaser
for goods bought through B., his agent.
In that case, he thereby
makes his election to charge the principal, and cannot afterwards resort to the agent. The general principle is, that the seller shall have
his remedy against the principal, although he may by electing to take
the agent as his debtor abandon his right against the principal.
The
case differs from any of those which
have mentioned.
Here
the agent purchased the goods in his own name. The name of the
principal was not then known to the seller, but
afterwards came to
his knowledge.
It seems to me to be more consistent with the general principle of law, that the seller shall have his remedy against the
principal, rather than against any other person, to hold in this case
that the seller, who knew that there was
principal, but did not know
who that principal was, may resort to him as soon as he
discovered. Here the agent did not communicate to the seller sufficient information to enable him to debit any other individual.
The seller
was in the same situation, as
at the time of the contract he had not
known that there was any principal besides the person with whom
he was dealing, and had afterwards
discovered that the goods had
purchased on account of another; and, in that case,
clear
that he might have charged the principal.
said, that he ought
to have ascertained by inquiry of the agent who the principal was, but
think that he was not bound to make such inquiry, and that by
debiting the agent with the price of the goods, he has not precluded
himself from resorting to the principal, whose name was not disclosed
to him.
might have been made
was not
question, whether
:e to this action
that the principal resided in Scotland.
But
lat was not
point made at the trial, nor noticed in the bill of exmot, therefore, take
into our consideration.
For
the
given,
think the plaintiff
entitled to recover.
nt affirmed.
:r., J., having been concerned as counsel in the cause, gave no

LIABILITY

Ch.5)

PRINCIPAL

OF

HEALD
<Court of Exchequer,

1S55.
21

10

L.

J.

v.

\o

THIRD

PERSON

KENW

Exch. 739, 3 C. L. R.
Exch. 76, 3 W. It. 176.)

G12, 1

J

sold and delivered,
riea.t-mat
defendant,
to whom alone credit was gi\
were sold to the agent of
and who was treated as a principal until after defendant had paid
Demurrer and joinder.
and settled with the agent.
Pollock, C. B. T am oi opinioij that the pica is bad. It comes
shortly to this. — A person employs his agent to purchase goods for
him, with authority to pledge his credit. The agent does so, and thus
creates a debt; and I agree with the remark made by my Brother
Parke, that all the cases in which the principal has been held to be
discharged, are cases in which the seller has enabled the agent to
misrepre sent, or where the agent by some conduct adopted by' the
seller has placed his principal in a worse situation than that he ought
It merely states
to be in. This plea contains nothing of that sort.
that the plaintiffs treated Taylor as the principal, and that the defendant bona fide settled with him.
Parke, B. I am of the same opinion. The plea simply states,
that, after the contract was entered into between the plaintiffs and a
third party, the agent of the defendant, under circumstances which
if

it

a

a

is

is

is

I

it,

the latter paid the agent.
rendered the defendant liable upon
It clear, that,
action.
defence
the
no
to
am of opinion that this
bound to
him,
he
for
make
agent
an
to
purchase
person orders
debt;
money
and
the
the
giving
agent
the
agent
see that the
pays
the
agent
unless
to
pays
amount
payment,
not
does
that
for
purpose
accordingly. Bui there are no doubt cases and dicta, which, unless

in

is

p

1

a

it

unjust that the
tween the agent here and the principal would make
of
or
such
fact
the
paymenl
the
should call on
principal,
account, would be an answer to an action brought by the
Hie e.x
ibility of the agent."
where he had looked to tin
rightly undei
verj vague; bul
ion, "make
unjust,"
of the
the
no doubt, true,
what the learned judgi aid
unjusl for him to call upon the buyer for the
seller would make
the conindue.
money; as for example, where the principal
duct of the seller to pay his agem the money on the faith that the
;

i

if

[f

is

i
,

Tl

b)

is

.1

it

'

p

if

it

].,

is

1

afford ground for the
with some qualification,
they be undersl
the
First, there
counsel
defendant.
for
the
taken
the
by
position
Thomson v. Davenport, where that learned
dictum of Bayley,
"
fudge lays down the rule, thai "if the agent does make hims
ma\ not he liable
does not follow that the principal
synallv liable,
also, subject to this qualification, that the principal shall nol he prejuthai
the justici
diced by being made personally liable,
to
then
And
say,
lie
proceeds
he should not be per onally liable."
of
be^tale
accounts
"li the rincipal

.
.
f
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I

by

I

by

a

if

it

Is

• In

v. Stokes, L. R.
Q. B. 598, 41 L. J. Q. B. 253, 26 L. T.
s.i B72, l'1 \v. R. 52 (1872), the court preferred the dictum of Thomto the rule oi Heald v. Kenworthy, bul in Irvine v. Watson,
lit L. J. Q. B. 531, 42 L. T. Hop. (N. S.) 810 (1880), the
B. I>.
deliberate consideration
of the cases, preferred the rule that
ed principal
discharged, upon pay
at to the agent, only when
misled by some conduct <>[ the third person into the belief that the
bad settled will] the third person, and pays the agent in reliance upon
belief.
<w York County Bank v. Stein, 24 Md. 447 (I860);
15 Barb,
170 (1866).
iproved In Harder v. Continental
Card Co., 64
89, 117 N. V. Supp. LOW (1909) (citing Laing v. Butler, 37 Hun, 144
Knapp v. Simon, 96 X. V. 284 [1884]); Fradley v. Ilyland (C. C.)
7

(1

749

onld be an Injn tice to the principal, see Smyth v. Anderson,
21, 13 Jur, 11. l^ I.. .1. 0. 1'. L09, 62 E. C. L. 21 (1849); Yenni v. Ocean
Daly, 421 n^7ij.
■

B

\.

:

Is

It

Armstrong

I.

v

1
'
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it

a

in

is

I

It

i

is

by

a

if

any
settlement on the matter, or
agent and seller have come to
the seller either
words or
made
ntation to that effect
the seller cannot afterwards throw <>i! the mask and sir- the
think that
would be unjust for him to do so.
But
ipal.
no case oi this kind where the plaintiff has been precluded
some waj contributed either to defrom recovering, unless he has
18
This was
the defendant or to induce him to alter his position.
the ground of the decision in W'yatt v. The Mar<|uis of Hertford,
where the seller took the security of the agent unknown to the prinive the agent
receipt as for the money due from the prinof
which the principal dealt differently with his
cipal, in consequence
on
of
such
was properly held that the
the
faith
receipt, and
agent
seller i:^n\\A not sue the principal. So in the case put by Lord Ellenof that
borough, C. J., in Kymer v. Suwercropp, the observations
learned Judge are perfectly correct; for the fact of the seller's allowthe lime for payment to elapse might afford evidence of deceit
on his part, and of his having thereby induced the principal to pay
the agent.
Neither does the case of Smyth v. Anderson, nor the elabjudgment of my Brother Maule, contain anything at variance
with the principle
have stated.
He adopts the proposition expounded
Bayley, J., that the seller cannot recover against the prinhe unfair for him to do so.
cipal,
In Smyth v. Anderson, which
C'-mains
good illustration of this principle, the agent purchased
on account of his principal who resided abroad; but at the
time of the purchase, although he did not inform the seller who his
principal was, the invoice stated that the goods "were bought on
unt of B.," the principal.
The seller drew certain bills of exchange on the agent, who became insolvent before the bills arrived
at maturity.
The principal, after having received advice of the pur:id of the acceptance of the bills by the agent, made, large
remittances on account of the goods to the agent, who at the time
of his
My Brother
ge was largely indebted to his principal.
Maule .says, the Court were of opinion that under such circumstances

/
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it was unfair and unjust to allow the seller to receive the value of the
I think that there is no authority for
goods from the principal.
to the agent, as in this case, precludes
made
a
payment
saying that
from
the principal, unless it appears that
recovering
from
the seller
believe that a settlement has been
to
the
principal
induced
has
he
There is no averment of that kind here, and
made with the agent.
consequently the plaintiffs are entitled to recover.
Alderson, B. I am of the same opi nion. It is clear that the defendant, who is the principal in the transaction, authorized the agent
to contract the debt on his account; the defendant afterwards paid
his agent money, which, however, he did not pay over to the plainNow the defendant is not excused from seeing that the plaintiffs.
tiffs are paid, unless the latter by their acts induced the defendant to
Where the seller trusts the agent
make the payment to their agent.
him as the only party liable,
consider
will
he
only, and says that
seller cannot proceed agajnst
the
and
is
responsible,
the'' agent alone
act
on the part of the creditor
some
be
must
there
But
the principal.
the debtor to his agent
by
the
payment
that
us
in
saying
to warrant
Where a creditor by
creditor.
the
to
'a
as
payment
treated
be
is to
and thereby
his conduct induces the debtor to pay a third party,
the debtor
alters his debtor's position, it would be unjust to call upon
is nothing
there
But
to pay the amount of the debt to the creditor.
is
not disof that sort in this case, and consequently the defendant
charged.

Judgment for the plaintiffs.

(B)

Contracts

VAN DYKE
(Supreme

Court

o* Georgia,

1905.

v.

Under Seal

VAN DYKE.

L23 Ga. 686,

51 S.

B. r^i.

?, Ann.

Cas. !<Ts.»

seal payable to the order of plaintiff,
The note was
and signed b) E. \. Van Dyke, husband of defendant.
I iox. his
as
plaintiff
maker,
given Tor mone) hoitowed by the
paving
an aj
d
for
use
it
was
rned
that
She afterward Jea
own use
"it. (Mi motion
Fpck owned a nd

Declaration on

a note under

and plaintiff excepted.
The general rule with
the facts:]
xt.-.tin[.■ mm.iw J.
[After
] ha Me
crence to holding anjnv h
upyi the coatcatf

the court dismissed

the action

his agent is thus s tated in < ,v. Code 1895, § 3024:f'If an
thV i
diM-l.-se^nTi^TruTTpT^ yTTTwheii discovered,
with the a-, nt may go directly upon the principal, under th
uni(
\incipal shall have previously account*
the agent?' fehis is a codification of the law as i1
fron
inal Coj*fe of 1863, and is nol an innovation resulting
71
I,,
Ga.
118
Lenney v. Finley,
I

"to

e
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was held that:/ "The rule thai an undisclosed principal shall stand
liable for theVAntract of his agent decs nol apply when the contract
is under seal. J Accordingly, a lease, under seal, executed 1>v an agent
as lessee in Mis individual
name, and which does not purport to be
executed on behalf of the principal, is not binding upon the latter,
although it appears from extrinsic evidence that the lessee was the
genera] agent to conduct a business for his principal, and that the
premises were leased to be used in such business."
We are asked to
review and reverse this decision, but the court declines to change the
ruling then made. An examination of the authorities cited in the opinion will show that it was not without foundation.
In Merchants' Bank
ttral Bank, 1 Ga. 418, 44 Am. Dec. 665, ante, p. 460, it was said :
"In the execution of instruments under seal by an agent the general rule
is that it must purport upon its face to-be the contract o\ the princiand signed to it.'] See, also,
pal, and his name must be inserted in
Cbmpton v. Cassada, 32 Ga. 428 (compare Tenant v. Blacker, 27 Ga.
41S; as t<> the execution of
power, see Terry v. Roaahan, 79 Ga.
S. E. 38, 11 Am. St. Rep. 420); Graham v. Camp/ell, 56 Ga.
278,
Am.
In
said
258.
Eng. Enc. L. (2d Ed.) 1141,
has hern
laid down as
common-law doctrine that, when
contract
made
by an instrument under seal, no one but
party to the instrument,
liable to be sued upon
and therefore,
made by an agent of atmust he in the name of the principal, in arder that h/ may
torney,
Ikparty, because otherwise he
not bound by it.l
/Some
of
the
later
decisions,
however,
this doctrine by holding that
qualify
v^
M
when
sealed contract has been executed in sucn form that
in
law the contract of the agent, and not of the principal, but the principal interest in the contract appears upon its face, and he has rethe benefit of the performance
by the other party, and has
ratified and
one which
by acts in pais, and the contract
confirmed
would have been Valid without
seal, the instrument will be binding
on the
note
ttached to the declai\ation__tll£xe_is—
principal.'] In
.oiijg4xiund ica[e hat iQvas executed by Van_D yke as agent,^ o^-~
that
/■•ag/in_ any way connected with it.
Irideed^no_refe£ence__
.to her or to ny agency
made in_ the_papcr.
See Briggs v. PartA"
'4 X. Y. 357, 21 Am. Rep. 617; Mechem on Agency,
701,
rid note; Clark on Contracts,
275,
519; Bishop on Courts,
1070;
Evans v. Wells
Sprftg, 22 Wend. 324— in
which several interesting opinions were filed. /Some courts hold that
do not fall within thelgerTeTal rule, and that
an unnamed principal cannot beAsiied on them.
See Clark on Contracts,
275, p. 519 and notes.
contended that the rule/ applies only to instruments which
common lav/, as to which
seal was necessary;
lat in cases where the instrument would he valid without
seal
the addition of
seal would not bring
within the rule. There are
it,

II
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v. Eldred, 39 Wis. 614;
Wagoner v. Watts, 44 N. J.
126; Shuetze v. Bailey, 40 Mo. 69, 75. The distinction drawn
in this line of authorities, however, has not been followed in
Georgia. In the case of Lenney v. Finley, supra, the instrument
under consideration was a lease for a term less than two years,
which, under our law, conveyed no interest in land, and could
In Rowe v. Ware, 30 Ga.
have been executed without any seal.
278, it was held that "the signature of a sealed instrument by an

Stowell

Law,

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

agent, the principal not being present, is not binding on the princiIn the body of
pal, unless the authority of the agent be under seal."
the opinion it is said : "But it was said that the bond need not have
been under seal, though in point of fact it was so, and therefore the
Not so. The question was whether Tayseal might be disregarded.
lor had authority to sign the names of Hooks and Herndon to this
bond as it is — sealed as it is. Whether a bond without a seal (to use,

for convenience, a short but inaccurate phrase) would be valid has
nothing to do with the case, for there was no such paper in the case.''
This was reaffirmed in Overman v. Atkinson, 102 Ga. 750, 29 S. E.
758.

It is further contended that a note under seal does not fall within
this rule. At common law a note under seal was unknown. S uch an
Broom's
instrument more nearlv approximated a "single bond."
Common Law (9th Ed.) 272, 484; Sivell v. Hogan, 119 Ga. 170.
4'> S. E. 67.
It is unnecessary to discuss the exact status of a sealed
In Albertson v. Holloway, 16 Ga. 377, its nature was considnote.
ered, and it was held that a plea of failure of consideration could he
In

made to a suit based on it.

other

cases there have been

intima-

consideration arose from the presence
See Neil v. Bunn, 58 Ga.
of a seal, but that it might be rebutted.
In Weaver v. Cos
583; Simms v. Lide, 94 Ga. 553, 21 S. E. 220.
by, 109 Ga. 3 ID, 34 S. E. 680, Mr. Justice Lewis said that an instrument then before the court, being under seal, "raised a strong presumption of law" thai it was founded upon a consideration. In Sivell
v. Hogan, 119 Ga. 167, 169, 170,46 S. E. 67, the opinion was strongly
:
expressed, although no direct ruling was made, that a seal ra
tions that

a presumption

of

a

at
the
of the existence of a consideration
conclusive
presumption
time the contrad was entered into, bul not that it has nol since failed,
either wholly or partially; and, accordingly, that want of considera
lion cannot he pleaded, hut failure of consideration may he. Whether
the presumption
thus raised is disputable or conclusive, the la
being under seal gives to the note a character which it would nol

Moreover, the statute ol limitations in regard
otherwise.
' iv. <
note under seal and on< without a seal is nol the same.
1895, §§ 3765, 3767.
Section 3634 of the Civil Code of 1895 >
is a contracl
under seal, and is considered
as follows: "A specialt)
by the law as entered into with more solemnity, and consequent!)
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of higher dignity, than ordinary simple contracts." Under the strict
commercial law prevailing in some jurisdictions, a note under seal
and payable to a named person or order is deemed not negotiable,
Farrar v. Bank of New
but in this state it is treated as negotiable.
York, 90 Ga. 331, 17 S. E. 87; Porter v. McCollum, 15 Ga. 528.
It is apparent that a note under seal occupies a different position in
Hence it is not to he
several respects from one which is not so.
1 merely
as a simple contract, and the seal rejected as surWe think it does fall within the rule announced in Lenney
plusage.
From what has been said it follows the plaintiff
v.
Finley, supra.
could not have recovered against the defendant on the note given by
10
the husband of the latter.
It is contended, however, that, whether the plaintiff can recover on
the note or not, she has a cause of action against the defendant aside
The case of Farrar v. Lee,
from the note, under the facts alleged.
pp. I >i\. 130. 41 N. Y. Supp. 672, was very similar to that now
under consideration.
It is there said: "That the liability rested entirely upon the bond, in which any preliminary contract was merged;
that, as the bond was signed by Tanner [the agent] in his own name,
and not as agent for Lee [the principal], it was not competent to
transfer by parol evidence, or in any other way, from Tanner to Lee,
the obligation which Tanner had assumed personally." In the case
of Lenney v. Finley, supra, it was contended that, if the concealed
principal was not liable on the contract of lease by reason of its being
under seal, nevertheless, having occupied the premises and used them
for the purpose of conducting business, she was liable to the plaintiff.
This contention was denied by the court. In the case of Maddox v.
•n, 91 Ga. 39, 16 S. E. 213, no opinion was written.
The third
headnote appears to conflict with the ruling here made.
The deci>n
made by two justices, and not by a full bench, and was disapproved in Lenney v. Finley, supra.

Under the allegations of the petition the trial court committed no
error in sustaining the demurrer.
All the JusJudgment affirmed.
concurring, except Simmons, C. J., absent.
ccord:
Brlggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357, 21 Am. Rep. 617 (1876);
Fnrcull v. Blttner, 69 Misc. Rep. 112, 125 N. Y. Supp. 36 (1910).
A- to ili<- effect of statutes dispensing with the necessity of seals, see Jones
. Morris, 61 Ala. 518 (1878), ;lll( i Sanger v. Warren, 1)1 Tex. 472, 44 S. W.
6 Am. St. Rep. 913 (1898), holding that they have no effect upon this
ter v. J.iini. 90 .Minn. 395, 96 X. W. 1128 (1903), holding that
"'•• Ml
statute has abolished all differences between simple contracts
- hold that though an
action does not lie against the principal
apon a bond in the agent's name, yet assumpsit li«'s, and the writing may be
the terms of the contract
Violet t v. Powell, 10 B.
' '
• "- •"l v (1850) ; Moore v. Granby Miu. Co.. 80 Mo. 86 (18S3).

LIABILITY

Ch. 5)

OF

(C)

PRINCIPAL

(Supreme

Court of Nebraska,

v.

753

WRAY.

19 Neb. 55S,

18S6.

PERSON

Instruments

Negotiable

WEBSTER

TO THIRD

27

N. W. 644. 5G Am. Rep.

754.)
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Action against E. D. Webster on four contracts made by his Thomas B., in his own name, in connection with the business of a
cattle ranch owned by defendant, but run in the name of his son. In
*■
—r? Neb. 579, 24 X. W. 207, the judgment for plaintiff was affirmed.
~Lt now comes up on a rehearing.
Cobb, J. 20 * * * The point upon which the rehearing was allowed, and upon which Ave think the case turns, is that while in the
^

case of contracts, generally, where one of the persons executing the
same executes it in his own name, without disclosing any one as his
principal or his own character as an agent, if in point of fact he was
acting as the agent of another party, such other party will be held
to be the real party to the contract, yet that this rule does not apply
to negotiable promissory notes.
This question was ably argued at
the bar, as well as by exhaustive briefs by counsel on either side. An
examination of the authorities cited by counsel, with others referred
to therein, led us all, at the consultation, to the conclusion that the
above proposition as to both its branches expresses the law correctly.
Being about to enter upon a collation of authorities upon this point of
the non-liability of an unnamed principal upon negotiable paper, my
attention was attracted to a citation on page 284, 1 Daniel, Keg.
Inst., to an article in 13 Alb. Law J. No. 19, May 6, 1876, p. 32.1.
This article I find so exhaustive of the subject that I will content
myself by giving the conclusions of the writer, and the authorities bj
him cited.
Says our author: "Hut as to bills of exchange and prom
issory notes, it has been long settled that he who takes negotiable
paper contracts with him who, on its face, is a party thereto, and with
no other person.
By Lords Abinger and I'arke, Beckham v. Drake.
"[.•■>. fc \V. 92, 96;
Byles, Bills, 37; Story, Bills, § 76; Edw.
Bills, XQ." Hence evidence is not admissible to charge an\ other person thcreorT~upon the grounds of his having been the copartner or
Mete. Cont. 108; Draper v. Mass
principal of the party named.
The rub
cHusetts Steam-heating
Co., 5 Allen. 340.
eral. it
an
unnamed
not universal, that neither the legal liability of
principal
to be sued, nor his legal righl I" sue on a negotiable instrument, can

'"An by parol evidence ( Fuller v. Hooper, 3
nmediate parties
calf, ].), even a
and although ai
is disclosed upon th<
2 fi I'.u |

of

the opinion

Godd.Pb.4 a.

is

omitted.

I '.ray,

334,

on,
to the ti
I the instrument,

7;,|

is .wi> C0NSEQ1

1:111.

B5NCBS

RELATION

OF THE

(Turf. 3

where the word "agent" or something equivalent is added to the sig
See cases below.
nature of the party signing the instrument.
an unnamed printo
charge
The rule excluding all parol evidence
not
upon the ground
is
placed
cipal as a party to negotiable paper
instrument; hut
the
or
alter
contradict
that such evidence would
other
parol (or unwhich
rule
governs
to
the
general
this exception
of
paper,
nature
the
negotiable
is
from
derived
agreements
which being made for the purpose of being transferred from hand to
hand, and of giving to every successive holder as strong a claim
upon the maker as the original payee had, must indicate on its face
who the maker is ; for any additional liability of the principal not exa

is

it,

n name alone without any addition, or, let us say, with the addition of the word "agent," to his signature — in such a case it is held
that the payee cannot recover against the principal upon the instrument, because it is negotiable and his name is not disclosed upon it.
But what material difference docs it make whether the instrument
is negotiable, when it has not been negotiated? But it must be cond that the weight of authority, if not of reason, is in favor of the
rule excluding all parol evidence, even as between the immediate
It is held that although the party executparties to the transaction.
describes himself as "agent,*' yet, if the name of
the instrument
•
all evidence dehors
rincipal is not disclosed upon the face of
him
to be exthereon,
for
of
the
instrument,
holding
the
purpose

it

J.

in

is

It

wholly immaterial, therefore, that the agent JiaiLiulL
behalf of his principal; that the consideration
aulhority to make
ived for his benefit; that the plaintiff knew the
t's principal, and accepted the note as the promise of the prinWilliams v. Robbins, 16 Gray, 77, 77 Am. Dec. 3%; Slawson

cluded.

"is
Instrument
'courier without baggage,' whose
;i." quoted in Beaton v. Myers,
Colo. r>!>(1877),
latch Transp. Co., mi Mo. 531, L5
W. 417, 12 L. R.
Rep. 351 (1891), In which is an illuminating review of

i.

St

S.

4

a

itiable

counteand in
A. 714,
the au-

Buch cases and cases in which the principal adoptbis business Boubriquet is discussed in in-own v. Pardebl evidenced
recovery on the common counts of
63).
a. Greene (Iowa)
exchange was allowed
Thurston v. Mauro,
- . and in Kenyon
v. Williams, t9 tnd. 44 (1862), it was held there
relief in equity.
Bee, also, Chem. Nat. Bank v. City Bank, 156 111.
'iv in assumpsit); Harper v. Tiffin Nat. Bank,
i'.t. 10 N. E. 328
125.

tl

N.

0.

97

(1896).

1

a

■

in

:

A.

tl

dlstinction between

ed

l
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21

note or bill would not be negotiable.
Barlow v. Congregational Soc, 8 Allen, 460. As between the unnamed principal and a subsequent holder, the reason for the rule in
question seems perfectly clear and satisfactory; but, as between the
immediate parties to the transaction, does the reason for its application exist? For example: An agent purchases goods; discloses the
name of his principal ; and, having express authority, gives the vendible promissory note for the price, signing it with his

pressed in the form of such
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Poring, 5 Allen, 340, 81 Am. Dec. 750. See, also, Stackpole v.
Arnold, 11 Mass. 27, 6 Am. Dec. 150; Brown v. Parker, 7 Allen. 337 ;
Bedford Com. Ins. Co. v. Covell, 8 Mete. 442; Bass v. O'Brien, 12
Cray, 477; Pentz v. Stanton, 10 Wend. 271, 25 Am. Dec. 558;
Thurston v. Mauro, 1 G. Greene, 231 ; Kenyon v. Williams. 1" Ind.
45; Anderton v. Shoup, 17 Ohio St. 125; faber v. Cannon. 8 Mete.
456; Eastern R. Co. v. Benedict, 5 Gray, 561, 66 Am. Dec. 384;
Bank of America v. Hooper, 5 Gray, 567, 66 Am. Dec. 390; De Witt
v. Walton, 9 N. Y. 571 ; Tucker Mfg. Co. v. Fairbanks. 98 Mass. 101.
No fault can be found with the opinion and decision of the court,
so far as the second and fourth causes of action are concerned ; but
in regard to the first and third causes of action, we fail to distinguish
v.

between

simple contracts

in general

and negotiable

paper.
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Upon r e-argument and reconsideration of the authorities, we reach
the conclusion that the district court erred in admitting evidence.
* *
*
The judgment of the district court is therefore reversed,
and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with
law.

(D) Election

to

Hold Principal or Agent

GREENBURG
(Supreme

Van

Court of New Jersey,

This

v.

PALMIERI."
71 X. .1.

1904.

Law.

83, 58

Ad.

207.)

in the Second District
J.
court of Newark against the wife for supplies purchased by her husband for horses owned by her. The plaintiff, before this suit was
brought, sued the husband, and recovered a judgment for the same
After judgment against the husband, the plaint iff learned that
claim.
the husband, in making the purchases, acted as the agent of his wife
in her business, and then this suit was commenced,
from the judgment recovered against (lie wife, the ease is in tin's court by appeal.
In Klliott v. Bodine, 59 X. J. Law, 567, 36 Ail. 1038, Judge V
in delivering the opinion of the court of last resort, says : "Where
credit is given to an agent, the fact of agency being unknown .
tlffie] the party giving credit may elect which lie will hold responsible,
the principal or the a-ent ; and that a husband may act as the agent
of his wife."
In Sates v. Repetto, '.5
1. Law, 294, 47 At 1. 632, Judge Adams,
in expressing
tin views of the Court of Errors and Appeals, says:
"The an:.
uniform in u
doctrine ih.it, when
I the time of the -ile, he
the principal is unknown to the
may, upon di
rt to him, or to I
with whom he dealt, at :
To make an election binding, the party electing must have ii
SvcKF.r.,

is a suit instituted

\\

■

Vecord:

Raymond

\

Crown Mills.

2

Mel

319

ilMti
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of the name pj tlio principal, in addition to the fact of the
there could not be an
•v. for in the absence of Mich knowledge
neither of the agency
notice
had
In this case the plaintiff
nor oi the name of the principal.
If the plaintiff sues alter he is advised of the agency, it is an election, fr.-m which he cannot recede; but where, as in this case, he
a judgment
against the agent when he is in ignorance of
a
of
principal, *s action will lie against the principal,
the existence
Story on
he
discharges the judgment against the agent.
unless

mation

Agency,

§

Mechem

296*;

on Agency, §§ 695-700;

sal 1. 7" Pa. 298.

The judgment below should

be affirmed,

TUTHILL
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(Court of Appeals

v.

Beymer v. Bon-

with costs.

WILSON.

of New York,

1S82.

90

N. T. 423.)

Plaintiff sold Robin's island to one McNish, as agent for one
They assigned to Home, to whom plaintiff conveyed the
Scott.
property, subject to certain mortgages, and took payment, part cash
Home conveyed to Mrs,
and part by bond and mortgage back.
foreclosed the mortand
plaintiff
not
was
paid,
bond
The
Moffett.
Mrs. Moffett.
of
$4,660.62
against
a
deficiency
and
charged
gage
cution was issued and returned unsatisfied, and plaintiff now sues
of
m, as being all the time the real principal and purchaser
bin's island.

*

Besides the plaintiff dealt with Home and
his grantee, Mrs. Moffett, as real principals, and actual owners and
purchasers of the island, and in such utter disregard and repudiation
oi any rights of Wilson, after notice of his claim to be owner, as to
The appellant's idea
estop him now from treating him as principal.

Finch,

T.

23

*

*

to be that Wilson's alleged contract of purchase somehow surfulfillment, and having been made by agents
I its subsequent
an
undisclosed
for
principal, the seller had a remedy against
acting
; could sue the agents as he did, and failing to get satisfaction
have a remedy against the discovered principal. We do not see how
the facts of the case admit of any such proposition; but if they do,
s

if it were possible to say that a right of action for the unpaid purof the land remained to Tuthill, against Horne and
ffett as agents who had become personally liable, and also
•
Wilson as the undisclosed principal, a fatal difficulty remains.
The vendor could not enforce his claim against both the principal
Grantred and the agents who contracted in his behalf.
•
hat each was liable, both were not, for both could not be at one
: same time, since the contract could not be the personal con■ •

omitted.

.
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TERSON

Curtis v. Williamson, L. R., 10 Q. B. 57. The rule is well stated in
Leake's Digest, 503-4, that "if, after discovery of the principal, the
creditor elect to hold the agent liable, and act accordingly in a manner to affect the principal, he will be precluded from afterward charging the principal. He has the right of election as to which of them
but having once made an election he is
he will hold responsible,
bound by it." In the present case the learned trial judge found as
a fact that in July, 1873, the plaintiff had notice that Wilson claimed
to be the real owner of Robin's island.
Yet after that, he took from
Mrs. Moffett a further mortgage; knowing the real principal, he began a foreclosure of the agents' mortgage ; he asked a personal
judgment both against Home and Mrs. Moffett; he omitted to make
the principal a party; he released Home from his liability; pursued
Mrs. Moffett to judgment and execution ; and became repossessed
of Robin's island by virtue of his judgment. By these acts he made
his election to treat the agents as principals, as he had the right to
do, and cannot now recall his choice.
It was said in Priestly v. Fer"
nie, 3 H. & C. 982, that
wher e the agent, having made a contract
in his own name, has been sued on it to judgment, there can be no
doubt that no second action would be maintainable
against the pri
The plaintiff wholly ignored Wilson in pursuing his remedy,
cipal."
as he had a right to do.
He treated the agents as principals, ami
they were such as to him and on the face of the papers.
He cannot
now have a remedy against Wilson. 24 We are unable to discover
But in Gay v. Kelley, 100 Minn. 101, 123 N. W. 295, 26 L. It. A. (X. S.i
'lie court holds thai if the agency is disputed the third person mjj
maintain -nit against both principal and agent until it is disclosed who is In
Lie, though he cannot have judgment against both.
Contra, see 1'iinuli v.
Blttner,
Rep. 112, 125 x. V. s U pp. :;<; (1010);
wvil v. Raymond, if-'
As to why the remedies agalnsl principal and
Mass. 206, 7 \. I'.. 860 (1886).
agent arc Inconsistent,
its Ala.
see Eufania Grocery Co. v. Mo. Nat. Bank,
408, ui South. 389 (1898), and especially
the Leading English cases, Priestly
v. Fernie,
H.
C. '.'77. n Jur. ix. s.i 813, -".i
Exch. L72, 13 i>. T. Rep.
(X. s.i :mi\ i;; \v [;. L089 (1865), and Kendall v. Hamilton,
App. Cas. 504,
•is j.. .J. c. 1-. 705,
T. Rep. (N. s.i lis. 28 \\\ R. 07 (1879).
Cf. Curl
v. Williamson, I.. R. 10
P.. 57, it
.7.
B. :'.7, 31 L. T. Rep. (N. s.i r,7\
L':: \v. be. 236 (1874), in which filing an affidavit of proof agalnsl
the estate "i
an insolvent debtor was held
a- matter of law an election.
Tiic election
must be made within a reasonable time
Qay v. Kelley, supra.
of
three months is not as matter or law unreasonable
"in tin- absei
an}
altering for the worse" of the position of the principal. Berry
i7'.>
ni. 126, L02 <'. C. \. 572 (1910).
too long,
delay of nine months
altered
pedall] if the position of the principal towards his Bgenl bas
v. Mitchell,
brought.
before
ctlon
Smethursl
622
Jur.
241,
226, L02
W.
0. L. 622
(N. S.i !i7^. L-s
i9)
24

..

t

S

and

\

70

(1858).

I

•

i

able time to Investigate and compare the standings of principal ami
62 C. C. A. 382 (1904),
allowed.
Barrel! v. Newby, 127
there seems to he no reason why the principal should complain in an\
if he has net altered hia p" Ition witii the agent Campbell \. HI

3

I

i

(1 a

E.

l

I

i;

7

Q,

B

J

L.

1

tl

n

a

Is

\

t

\

d<

Q.

L.

L,

Q.

II

1

J.

L

&

•':

742 (1909),

i
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tract of the agents, and yet not their contract but that of the principal. The vendor had a choice and was put to his election.
Meeker
v. Clagborn, 44 X. Y. 351; Addison v. Gandasseqni,
4 Taunt. 574;

.•~'s

AMi

EFFECTS

C0NSEQ1 ENCES

OF THE

RELATION

any ground upon which a recover) for the deficiency
*
*
*
can be sustained against Wilson.
Judgment for defendant affirmed.

LINDQUIST
(Supreme

v.

( I

'art 3

un the foreclo-

DICKSON.

98 .Minn. ::<i9, 307 N. W. 958, 8 L. R. A.
1906.
of Minnesota,
|.\. s.| 729, 8 Ann. Oas. L024.)

Court

,B

Action to recover from the defendant, as an unprincipal. For labor and material performed and furnished
in decorating and repairing her house, pursuant to an
the
plaintiff
l>y
alleged contract made for her by her husband, Joseph AT. Dickson.
The complaint alleged, in effect, that at the time the contract was
entered into with the husband he was in fact acting as agent for his
wife, the defendant, but he failed to disclose to the plaintiff the fact
S

\\<r.
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disclosed

C.

J.

ich agency, or the fact that she was the real party in interest
and owned the house, the decorating and improvement of which was
the subject-matter
of the contract; that the plaintiff performed the
contract on his part: that he was not paid therefor; and that he commenced an action against the husband to recover the balance due
him on the contract, and on August 29, 1904, he recovered judgment against him for the sum of $273.68, no part of which has been.
and further that thereafter (in the month of October,
1904) the
plaintiff learned for the first time that the defendant was the real
party in interest, and that the contract was made for her by her
r agent.
This action was commenced in the month of
The defendant by her answer denied that she ever made
ntract alleged in the complaint, and alleged as a defense the

judgment by the plaintiff against her husband, Joseph,
kson.
The trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
ionnt stated, and the defendant appealed from an order der motion for a new trial.
. The first group of alleged errors to be considered
is to the efthat there was no evidence to support the verdict, because there
idence that the husband of the defendant was her agent and
such in making the contract in question, and further that
that the plaintiff relied upon such supposed
contract, but, on the contrary, that he dealt
ith the husband as principal.
It is not controverted that the plainthe time the contract was made, understood that the house
lence

in

making

the

ng with
•t of the opinion

1 improve
belonged to the husband, and that
him as principal, and further that he recovered
is omitted.

LIABILITY
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PRINCIPAL

TO THIRD

739

PERSON

/

a

is
a

/

\

it

a

if,

judgment against the alleged agent upon the same claim which is
the basis of this action, in ignorance of such alleged agency. It is the
contention of the defendant that such judgment is a bar to this action.
""The general rule is that, where a simple contract, by parol or writing, is made by an authorized agent without disclosing his principal,
and the other contracting party subsequently discovers the real party,
lie may abandon his right to look to the agent personally and resort
to the principal. Lindeke Land Co. v. Levy, 76 Minn. 364, 79 X. W.
But whether the creditor can proceed against the undiscovered
314.
principal, after he has obtained a judgment on his claim against the
agent, is a question as to which the adjudged cases are conflicting.
In the case of Kingsley v. Davis, 104 Mass. 178, the creditor, after
being fully informed that the party with whom he made the contract
was acting for an undiscovered principal, brought an action against
Afterwards he
the agent and recovered judgment for his claim.
brought an action against the principal to recover for the same claim,
and the court held that the action against the principal could not be
maintained for the reason that: "The general principle is undisputed
that, when a person contracts with another who is in fact an agent
of an undiscovered principal, he may upon the discovery of the principal resort to him or to the agent with whom he dealt at his elecknowledge of all the facts, he
after having come to
tion.
But
In Beyresort
to the principal."
cannot
elects to hold the agent, he
short
of
satisfao
was
held
that
nothing
298,
Pa.
Bonsall,
79
mer v.
tion of the judgment against the agent would discharge the principal.
The case of Kingsley v. Davis suggests the true basis for solving the
Election implies full knowlIt
question of election.
question.
to make an intelligent
to
enable
party
facts
necessary
of
the
edge

Pederson v. Christopherson, 97 Minn. 491, 106
N. W. 958.
We therefore hold upon principle, and what seems to be the
person contracts with anoth
weight of judiaaTopinion. that":
in fact an agent of an undisclosed principal, and, after learnwho
ing all the facts, brings an action on the contract and recovers judgbar to an action
ment against flic agent, such judgment will be
Iffisl the principal. I'm an unsatisfied judgment against the agent
bar to an anion against the undiscovered principal when (lis
not
of the fact as to the agency
the plaintiff was ignorant
COvefed,
the
Kingsley v. Da\
his
agent.
action against
when he prosecuted
If

if

a

is

a

is

a

/

and deliberate choice.

loi

Mass. 178; Steel Smith Grocer) Co. v. Pottha'st, 109 Eowa, 413,
X. W. 517; Coleman v. Bank, 53 X. Y. 388; Wharton on Vgem
699."
47.2
Enc. of Law, 1139; Mechem on Agency,
Judgmenl affirmed.

*

*

§

I

la

i

e

di

,i:,

In
action pursued t" Judgment after knowledge "f all the facta
Kingsley v. Davis, 104 Haas, its (1870); Murphy v. Hut
election.
843, is South. 178, 23 I.. K. A. (N. S.) 786, IT Ann. Cas. 811
But there mu
discriminating
Ion of the ca
cu
tainlng
a

law an
chh

M

n

;

*

I

§
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OF THB
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RBCATION

(Part

3

OF THE AGKNT

NICHOLS,/

'i^jjt ]rffsi

rrius,

^

170S.

Salk.

289.)

on the can' for a deceit, the plaintiff set forth, that he
silk, whereas
was another
silk for
seyeral parcels
to
silk ami that the defendant, well knowing this deceit, sold
appeared that there
silk. On trial, upon not guilty,
him for
was no actual deceit in the defendant who was the merchant, but that
And the doubt was,
this deceit
was in his factor beyond sea.
And Holt, C. J., was of opinion, that
could charge the merchant?
the merchant was answerable for the deceit of his factor, though not
criminaliter. yet civiliter; for seeing somebody must be loser by this
trust and
more reason that he that employs and puts
it

a

stranger.

And

a

than

a

a

is

it

i.

loser,
confidence in the deceiver should be
had
verdict.
the
this
opinion
plaintiff
upon

&

•

I
•

6

1.

a

&

&

Ii

S.

Hoffman v.
have boon full power of choosing between principal and agent.
An. Ins.. n. 112 Ky. 893, 67
W. -19. 24 Ky. Law Rep. 44 (1902).
i- nol necessary that the judgment shall have been satisfied.
Barrel! v.
Newby, L27 Fed. <;:><;.
62 0. 0. A. 382 (1904), disapproving on this point Beymer
v. Bonsall,
7:> Pa. 298 (1875).
What amounts to an election is well discussed in Berry v. Chase, 102 C.
C. A. reel. 179 Fed. 4'JO (1010), in which it is said by Knappen,
J.: "In our
opinion the evidence was nol sullicient to establish an election by Berry &
either Chase or the brokerage firm, to the exclusion of the other. On the one hand, although the instrument
of assignment in terms conan account againsl Schioss, Miller
Malone, any inference from this
me by an express authorization of suit against any undisclosed
principal. On the other hand, the testimony as to Berry
Co.'s treatment
of tin- account, following the conversation by telephone, was manifestly no
than a conclusion of the witness, and incompetent as evidence.
While
decisive act by
party, after knowledge of his rights and of the facts.
Ion in the case of inconsistent
remedies (Robb v. Vos, 155
13, 15 Sup. Ct
39 L. Ed. 52), yet an act to have the effect of election
The mere act of charging the agent, after knowledge of an
be decisive
ally undisclosed principal, does not, as matter of law, amount to an
onlj to the agent. Jones v. Johnson, 86 Ky. 530,
S. W. 582.
Id, for manifest reasons, that the bringing of suit against both
Iginally undisclosed principal does not constitute an elecold the principal
and discharge the agent.
Mattlage v. Poole, 15
Whether or nol the mere bringing of suit against the agent, withdlng to Judgment, would amount to an election to look to the agent
iii'li the authorities are not entirely agreed;, there was
the agent, nor was there any overt act in our opinion inthe right of Berry
('<>. to ultimately look to Chase.
It is
delay in electing to sue Chase was unreasonable.
We cannot
the absence of any altering for the worse of Chase's position
thi
Scl loss, Miller
Malone, or of any circumstance making the holding
of Chase unjust or unreasonable."
A:

y

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

a

it

If

it

;

•
f

it

of

an action
lit

In

LIABILITY

Ch. 5)

BIRKETT

v.

OP PRINCIPAL

TO THIRD

7G1

PERSON

POSTAL TELEGRAPH CABLE CO.

(Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
1905.
107 App. Div. 115, 94 N. Y. Supp. 91S, affirmed 186 N. Y. 591, 79 N. E. 1101.)

company to recover the overcharges.
Spring, J. T he rule of law go verning this case is elementary.
A
of his agentp rincip al is liable to a third person for the misconduct
committed in the line of his employment, even though the offence.was in excess of his authority, "and the principal did not authorize,
justify, or know of it." Nowack v. Met. St. Rv. Co., 166 X. V. 433 440. 60 X. E. 32, 54 L. R. A. 592, 82 Am. St. Rep. 691; Tarvis v.
Manhattan Beach Co., 148 N. Y. 652-657, 43 N. E. 68. 31 L. R. A.
776, 51 Am. St. Rep. 727 et seq.
Conceding this rule of law, the appellant contends that Harrington
was not in the line of his employment in making false entries in the
accounts rendered to the plaintiff. Harrington had general superinHe had the extendence of the defendant's office in Penn Yan.
clusive handling of its funds at that village.
He was charged with
the rendition of the accounts to the plaintiff, and with collecting for
the telegrams and cablegrams sent by the plaintiff and upon which

ill

it

in

;

fi

it,

there were charges for transmission.
He was acting within the scope
of his acjency in receiving the money for the benefit of the defendant. If the plaintiff had paid the exact amount due, and Harrington
the plaintiff could not have been compelled
had misappropriated
to respond over again on account of the misconduct of Harrington.
Of course, Harrington was not authorized to collect money of the
but
ir telegrams never transmitted
was his duty to c<
""plaintiff
If he collected m<
the sums actually due for their transmission.
hi?
than was due, he did that because of his agency.
TJ
while
with
the plaintiff, turned out to be dishonest
acting
dealings
that capacity.
His delinquency does not exonerate the defendant to
the plaintiff, who relied upon the manifest .authority of Harrington.
■

by

g

is

cannot so easily evade liability for the misdeeds oi
fjxed
the agency, and
eneral line of employment
in whatever an agent does to an innocent third person within thai
line, although ultra vires, he represents his pri
!

The principal
The
a^ent.

The rule applies even though the principal forbade the act
of them, provided they were within the course of hii employment
Ed. 502 (1862);
delphla
EL B. Co. v. Derby, n How. 108, ii
blld
enarius, L86 [owa, 176, L12 N. W. 548 (1907); Dupre v.
in ca
applle
ol
Div. 308, 65 x. v. Supp. 179 (1900).
to
16 HI. 313, 68 Am. !»•-■. 812 (1855),
fcfoir v. Hopkins,
Barwlck v.
rrian, 39 N.
Eg 203 (1884)
Chetwood \.
2"

I.

i

i

e

il

J.

B

pprovPhila

'

ed

ft
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( 'ne Harrington, agent and manager of defendant company at Penn
Van. had systematically overcharged plaintiff for telegrams and appropriated the excess amounts to his own account to the extent oi
The agent confessed and absconded. Birkett now sues the
S2.4SO.24.

52 App.
■•■
the
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3

nductor uses undue violence in removing a passenger from a
train, the railroad company is liable.
The company does not authorthe conductor to handle the passenger harshly; bul it does empower him in certain cases to ejeel the passenger, and it must be held
civillj responsible for whatever the conductor does in carrying out
the authority intrusted to him, even though he oversteps his instrucThe rule here applicable is founded on the old maxim that the
tions.
principal is responsible For hi- agent, not the innocent third person.
The plaintiff was furnished with the tariff books of the defendant,
and by examination of each statement with the tariff rates could have
•;ained that he was being cheated. It is urged that he was negligent in failing to make these examinations, and should not, therefore,
he permitted to recover.
The plaintiff was not obliged to act on the
that
Harrington was defrauding him. The defendant had
mption
its
placed
agent in the responsible position of manager of its busiIt vouched for his integrity to its patrons.
They had a right
to assume he was honest, and were not called upon to enter into
any inspection of the items of his accounts, for the purpose of disThe judgment should be affirmed,"'
ring either fraud or mistake.
\vrtl

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

All

concur.

Bank, L. R. 2 Exch. 259, 36 L. J. Exch. 147, 16 L. T. Rep. N. S. 161, 15 W. R.
to conversion of the property of the third person, Rhomberg v.
Avenarius,
supra, to a til" 1 against the third person, Citizens' life Assur.
Co. v. Brown, A. 0. 423, 73 L. J. P. C. 102. 90 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 739, 20 T L.
K. l'»T. 53 \V. R. 170 (1904).
As to liability of the principal for slanders
•1 by the agent, see Singer Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 150 Ala. 574, i::
South.
210, :. L. K. A. (N. S.i 929, lL'l Am. St. Rep. 90 (1906), as to his neglect, <]<•wrongful
act, Locke v. Stearns. 1 Mete (Mass.) 500, .T) Am. Dec.
other
382 (1840), per Shaw, 0. .7.. limiting it however to the civil, and not the criminal liability of the principal, ;is do the cases generally.
See Higgins v. Wat-rvliet Turnpike Co., 16 N. Y. 23, 7 Am. Rep. 293 (1871); Bank of Palo Alto
.. Pac. Postal Tel Cable Co. (C. C.) 103 Fed. MI (1900), and even to crimes
in which intent Is aol an Ingredient, such as illegal sale of lirpiors.
George
r. Gobey, 128 Mass. 289, 35 Am Rep. 376 (1880).
Where, however, the principal does not participate In the tort, he is not liable in punitive damages.
Maieker v. Soc. Concordia, 71 Conn. 3G9, 42 Atl. 67, 71 Am. St. Ren. 213
^77 (1867),

Modern cases extend the rule to willful and malicious acts of the agent.
'
anson v. Barber, L0 ill. 125, 50 Am. Dec. 416 (1849) (as to malice), and
"■
G. R. Co. (C. C.) 15 Fed. 199, 4 Woods, 569 (1882).
For
an interesting account of the historical development of the tort liability of
■
rinclpal f<>r the ads of the agent, and of the principle upon which it
• KIngan & Co. v. Silvers,
13 Ind. App. 80, 37 N. E. 413 (1S94).
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5 P. C. 394, 43 L.
S.] ISO, 22 W. R. 473.)
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P. C. 31, 30 L. T.
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to be found apparently at variance
of this
the adaptation to circumstances

omitted

?"

made within

There are, however,
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Wilson v.
the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber
the Court
77: and again
Udell
Exchequer
Fuller,
X. 172, 30
If.
v. Atherton,
Ex. 317, where,
true, the
Martin, who
but where Baron
its judgment,
Court was divided
not
hi>
had
held that the plaintiff
case, stated the question
proved
presentation
to be, "Was the agent's situation such as to bring the
7

.

PERSON

Lingley, a timber merchant of New Brunswick, was accustomed to
consign cargoes to Messrs. Mackay of Liverpool, drawing bills on
them which he indorsed to defendant bank.
In August, L888, he
drew several bills, two of which, by his fraud, were not drawn on
On receiving his letter of notification, plaintiffs cabled
any cargoes.
him to remit defendant's guarantee of the bills, or they would refuse
all. When the message arrived, Lingley had made over all his property to trustees and absconded.
The message was taken to Sancton,
cashier and manager of the defendant, who cabled back, "Sent last
mail. — Lingley."
The Mackays being thus deceived, paid the bills,
and now bring deceit against the bank.
Verdict directed for plaintiff,
new trial granted by the Supreme Court of New Brunswick, from
which this appeal is taken.
Sir Montague E. Smith 28 delivered the judgments of their Lordships : * * * The Court appear to treat the question whether
or not Sancton was acting within the scope of his authority (there
being no con flicting evidence as to the general nature of his authority) as a question of law, and hold that Mr. Justice Weldon, instead
• ting the jury that the sending
of the tele-ram was within
the Btfope of Sancton's authority, Qllghj to have directed them that it
was not.
The only question of fact which they direct to be submit
was sanctioned
whether or no1 the sending
ted to the jury
the directors.
as settled law that
answerprincipal
Their. _L ordship regard
benefit from the fraud of his agent, actwhere
he
has
able
received
ing within tin- scope of his authority. This doctrine has been laid
loll in Hern v. Nichols,
Salk. 289, supra,
down by Lord
760; by
Camp. 355; by Pari
Lord Ellenborough
Uexander v. Gibson,
I'.., in Cornfoot v. Fowke,
ML
W. 373, although, under the
culiar circumstance of that case, he held the defendant no1 liable;
Tindal, C.
also by Parke, B.,
W*.;
Moens v. Heyworth, 10 M.
3
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it

in

by

is

It

seldom possible to prove that the fraudulent act
of the printhe express authority
was
committed
complained of
wrongs
authority
to
commit
his
he
general
agenl
cipal, or that
gave
mercantile
ma\ be generall) assumed that,
Indeed
or frauds.
actions, principals do not authorize their agents to act wrongfully, and consequently that frauds are beyond "the scope of the
ne.

a

it

a

in

sense of which the expression
the narrowest
authority"
sense would have the effect of enabling
But SO narrow
admits.
principals largely to avail themselves of the frauds of their agents,
without suffering losses or incurring liabilities on account of them,
and would be opposed as much to justice as to authority. A wider
construction has been put upon the words. Principals have been held
has not been proved that they authorized
liable for frauds when
general authority to
the particular fraud complained of or gave

frauds;

it
is

not easy to define with preciat the same time,
The best
extent to which this liability has been carried.
to be found in the
ition of it, in their Lordships' judgment,
Ex. 259, when
Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L. R.
the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber was delivered by one of the
In that case
learned Judges who ever sat in Westminster Hall.
,it

a

a

a

customer of
the plaintiff was induced to continue to supply oats to
the bank,
contractor with the Government, on
guarantee from its
manager to the effect that the customer's cheque in the plaintiff's
r. in payment for the oats supplied, should be paid on receipt
of the Government money, in priority to any other payment "except
The manager fraudulently concealed from the plainto this bank."
tiff that the customer was indebted to the bank in £12,000.: the result was that the plaintiff was induced to advance money to the cus-

a

a

is

r

a

on
guarantee which turned out to be worthless, and wdiich
the manager must have known to have been worthless when he gave
The declaration contained, among other counts, one for deceit,
it.
in which the fraud of the manager was laid as the fraud of the bank,
on which count alone the judgment
Baron Martin having
based.
directed
venire de novo was ordered by the Exchequer
nonsuit,
iber, whose judgment was delivered by Mr. Justice Willes.
He
himself as follows :— "With respect to the question whethanswerable for the act of his agent in the course of
principal
and for his master's benefit, no sensible distinccan be drawn between the case of fraud and the case of any
is

\

n

is

is

[

is

eneral rule is, that the master
answerable for
the servant or agent as
committed in the.
ice and for the master'- benefit, though no express
and or privity of the master be proved.
The principle
acted
day in running-down cases.
It has been applied also to
direct trespass to goods." After enumerating other instances of its
on, he proceeds: — "In all these cases
may be said, as

it

it

fy
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PERSON

was said here, that the master had not authorized the act. It is true
he has not authorized the particular act, but he has put the agent
in his place to do that class of acts, and he must be answerable for
the manner in which that agent has conducted himself in doing the
20
business which it was the act of his master to place him in."
*
* *
will
humbly recommend
For these reasons their Lordships
Her Majesty that the judgment of the Supreme Court be reversed,
and the order directing a new trial be discharged.

McCORD
(Supreme

v.

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH

Court of Minnesota,
143,

18S8.
12

Minn.

39

Am.

St.

Rep.

39 N.

181,

W.

315,

CO.
1

L. R. A.

G36.)

Dudley & Co., who resided at Grove City.
Minn., were the agents of plaintiff for the purchase of wheat for him.
He resided at Minneapolis, and was in the habit of forwarding money
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Vanderburgh, J. 30

such purchases, in response to telegrams
line, and delivered to him by it. On the 1st
the defendant transmitted and delivered to

o them, to be used in making
sent over the defendant's
se

Jay of February, 1887,
plaintiff the following message, viz.: "Grove City, Minn., February 1,
To T. M. McCord & Co.: Send one thousand or fifteen hun1887.
dred to-morrow. Dudley & Co."
The plaintiff in good faith acted upon this request, believing it to
be genuine, and, in accordance with his custom, forwarded through
the American Express Company the sum of $1,500 in currency, propout, however.
erly addressed to Dudley & Co., at Grove City. It turned
their knowlor
with
tnat this dispatch was not sent by Dudley & Co.,
fraudulent,
and was
and
edge or authority; but it was in fact false
whose
Grove
City,
at
written and sent by the agent of the defendant

He
it was to receive and transmit messages at that place.
American
Express
of
the
same time the agent
pany for the transaction of its business, and for a long time previous
at
to the date mentioned bad so acted as agenl for both companies
busimethod
doing
of
of
plaintiff's
well
was
informed
and
Grove

business

at

City,
with' Dudley & Co.
Grove City, containing

arrival of

package b) expr<
the sum named, it was intercepted and ah

On

the

the

-

is whether the tort waa tor the principal's benefit is often the test
wi.k \ i ■ig Joint Stock Banl , 1 B .2 I ch 269, 36 L. J. Exch. 147, 16
Rep x. s. mi. L5 \v. K. .^77 (1867), a leading
The liability la especially 'clear If the
Rep. MKS (1872).
104, li A,,,
50 Mo
' ilhoun,
w
prlnHpal enjoys the fruits of the agent'a wrong,
acting to protect the prinrli
Or If the b i I
412 (1X57).
" "■ '
'
.
ri v. Manhattan Ry. Co., L3
rights.
Pal
P™;
The agent muat be
\ 136 28 Am st. Rep. 632 (1892).
eipal and not
<•',..

B. D. 724,52
S
L887).

Part

of the

BO u . i:

Brit

tor himself.

ism.

opinion

.1

Mut.

is

Bai
3

P

omittt <i.

Q

,:

' '•'

"

'■■ '

u ">:

,V
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3

The
by the agent, who converted the same to his own use.
.itch was 3cHvere3 to the plaintiff, and the money forwarded in
Hie usual c"5urse of Business.
Tliesc facts, as disclosed by die record,
.sufficient,
we think, to establish the defendant's
liability in this
tcted

;

:i.

Considering

the business relations existing between plaintiff and
the
Co.,
Dudley
dispatch was reasonably interpreted to mean a requisition for one thousand or fifteen hundred dollars.
J. As respects the receiver of the message, it is entirely immaterial
:i what terms or consideration
the telegraph company undertook
to send the message.
It is enough that the message was sent over
the line, and received in due course by plaintiff, and acted on by him
in good faith.
The action is one sounding in tort, and based upon
the claim that the defendant is liable for the fraud and misfeasance
its agent in transmitting a false message prepared by himself.
Telaph Co. v. 1 iryburg, 35 Pa. 298, 78 Am. Dec. 338; Gray, Tel. § 75.
3. The principal contention of defendant
however, that the cornot liable for the fraudulent and tortious act of the agent
poration
ending the message, and that the maxim respondeat superior does
apply in such
case, because the agent in sending the dispatch
not acting for his master, but for himself, and about his own
business, and was in fact the sender, and to be treated as having trannded his authority, and as acting outside of and not in the course
of hi.- employment, nor in furtherance of his master's business. But
the rule which fastens a liability upon the master to third persons
f'.r the wrongful and unauthorized acts of his servant
not confined
ely to that class of cases where the acts complained of are done
in the course of the employment in furtherance of th master's busi-_
ness or interest, though there are many cases which fall within thai
Co., 73 N. Y. 547; Savings Inst. v. Bank, 80 N.'
Am. Rep. 595; Potulni v. Saunders, 37 Minn. 517, 35 N.
W. Rep. 379.
Where the business with which the agent
intrusted involves
by the master to the public or third persons,
the agent,
so employed,
his own wrongful act occasions
violation
of that duty, or an injury to the person interested in its faithful perance by or on behalf of the master, the master
liable for the
it, whether
be founded in contract or be
common-law
1.

e

is

a

if

a

is

6

a

it

is

a

by

j

h

is

it

&

is

§

150,

t

149,

.

in

§§

1

■lions of the parties.
Shear.
R. Neg
154; Tayl. Corp. (2d Ed.)
And
145.
immaterial
that the wrongful ac of the servant
in itself
malicious, or fraudulent.
Thus a carrier of passengers is
for their safety and welfare, and to
^ard
them from insult,
if the servants employed by such carrier
the cour-'
employment disregard these obligations, and
•iously and willfully, and even in disregard of the express factions of their employers, insult and maltreat passengers, under

TTthEd.)

t
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their care, the master is liable.
Stewart v. Railroad Co., 90 N. Y.
In Booth v. Bank, 50 X. Y. 400. an officer
593, 43 Am. Rep. 185.
of a bank wrongfully discharged a judgment which had been recovered by the bank, after it had been assigned to the plaintiff. It was
there claimed that the authority of the officer and the bank itself to
satisfy the judgment had ceased, and that hence the bank was not
bound by what its president did after such assignment.
But the court
held otherwise, evidently upon the same general principle, as respects
the duty of the bank to the assignee, and laid down the general proposition equally applicable to the agent of the defendant in the c;.
bar, that the particular act of the agent or officer was wrongful and
in violation of his duty, yet it was within the general scope of his
ers, and as to innocent third parties dealing with the bank, who
had sustained damages occasioned by such act, the corporation
was
responsible.
And the liability of the corporation in such cases is not affected
by the fact that the particular act which the agent has assumed to
'! ■• is one which the corporation
itself could not rightfully or lawfully
In Bank v. Hank, 16 N. Y. 125, 133, 69 Am. Dec. 678, a case
frequently cited with approval, the teller of a bank was with its consent in the habit of certifying checks for customers, but he had no
authority to certify, in the absence of funds, which would be a false
representation, yet it was held, where he had duly certified a check
though the drawer had no funds, that the bank was liable on the
ground that, as between the bank which had employed the teller, and
held him out as authorized to certify checks, (which involved a representation by one whose duty it was to ascertain and know the facts,)
and an innocent purchaser of the check so certified, the bank- ought
Gould v. Sterling, 23 N. Y. 463; Bank v. Bank, 29
to be the loser.
X. V. 632. See, also, Titus v. Turnpike Co., 61 N. Y. 2.^7 ; Railroad
Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30, 64; Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. I'M).
The defendant selected its agent, placed him in charge of ils bu i
ness at the station in question, and authorized him to semi in.over its line.
receiving dispatches in the usual i
ness, when there is nothing to excite su picion, are entitled to rely
that the agents intrusted with the perforin
upon the presumption
of tin- business of the company have faithfully and hone ll\ di
. and thai the)
would not
charged the dun owed by it to it
knowingly send a false or forged n
i tenure the r< eivej
an unreasonable and impr;
'
if the
dispatch to investigate the que 1;"" ol '' K integrity and I
d( fendanl
I
in the pi i foi hi.uk < i >f their <\\\'
Whether the agent is unfaithful to his tru t,
of, Liu compart . u
or disobeys the instruction
It the corporation fails in th<
no means of knowing.
of its duty through the neglect oi fraud of the agent whom it has
I'
Inlineible.
| to pel fi 'mi it . tl

i

\
EFFECTS

AM'

CONSEQUENCES

OF THE

RELATION

(Part

3

ml dispatches of a similar character, and smii acts
were within the scope of his cinplm mcnl, and the plaintilY could* not
. the circumstances
that made die particular act wrongful and
unauthorized.
As to him, therefore, it must he deemed the act o
the Bank v. Telegraph Co., 52 Cal. 280; Uooth v. Bank,

supra,

Minm.KTON

v.

FOWLER.

of King's Bench at Nisi Prius,

(Court

L698.

1 Balk.

282.)

a

J.

if

a

a

is

is

is

a

&

&

Bank of Palo Alto v. Pac. Postal Tel. Cable Co. (C. C.) 103 Fed.
Bank of Batavia v. New York, L. E.
W. R. Co., 106 N. Y. 195, 12
aim. Rep. Hi) (1887)
contra, Friedlander v. Texas
P. Rv. Co.,
570, :V2 L. Ed. 991 (1SS9).
In the last two cases an
Lent collusion
wiih
third person, issued bills of lading for

/

which lie received no goods.
or are treated
principal and agent. The same
l;. K.
rly all the early
the

a

;

:

841 (1900)

as, cases of master and servant, instead of
principle governs each relation. Such are
Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 468, 14 L. Ed. 502
cases in England.
term "course of employment," see St. Louis,
Ark. 579. 88 S. W. 580, 1133 (1905). The liartetds to corporations whose agents commit torts
the course of their employment
Scofield Rolling Mill Co. v. Ga., 54
•

oi

P.

&

•
.

in

ling
he

day.

of Lord
takes

a

•
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it,

An action upon the case upon the custom of the realm was brought,
against the defendants being masters of a stage-coach; and the plaintiff set forth, that he took a place in the coach for such a town, and
that in the journey the defendants by their negligence lost a trunk
Upon not guilty, pleaded, upon the evidenc e it
the plaintiff's,
appear ed, that this trunk was delivered to the person that drove the
coach, and he promised to take care of
and that the trunk was
the master was charge lit of the coachman's possession; and
■■with this action, was the question.
Holt, C.
was of opinion, that this action did not lie against the master, and^tliat
stage-""
o lachman was not within the custom as
carrier is, unless such as
take
distinct price for carriage of goods 32 as well as persons,
waggons with coaches; and though money be given to the driver, yet
that
gratuity, and cannot bring the master within the custom;
for no master
chargeable with the acts of his servant, but when,
he acts in execution of the authority given by his master, and then
the act of the servant
the act of the master; and the plaintiff was
lited.
Vide Rep. B. R. Temp. Hard. 85, 194. Comyns 25.

Holt that the carrier assumes no liability as to
distinct price for it is, of course, not the law to-

LIABILITY
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OF

STICKNEY
(Supreme

Case for diverting water from
:::
TenxEY, C. J. 33

7G0

MONROE.

v.

Judicial Court of

PERSON

TO THIRD

PRINCIPAL

Maine.

44 Me. 195.)

1857.

is

It

\

alleged

a

-S

*

:;;

laintiff's mill.
in the writ, that the demd earth from the natural
fendant dug up and removed" trie
great depth, and by digging up ami
chobdic river, to
bed of ffie
removing the' hank and bed of the river as aforesaid, and
the "new and enlarged water gates as aforesaid, did divert the water
ete., to the great
of the river from the usual and natural course,
the

and damage of the plaintiffs.
the
The jury were instructed upon this part of the case, that
do
the
Tinker,
to
tenant,
his
authorized
or
defendant "commanded
alleged diverts the water from the
"""Blasting and digging, which
and approved of such acts, after
ratified
mill,
or
saw
shore
plaintiffs'
divert the water, and occasion
in
fact
did
and
done,
they
were
they
would be liable for such dammill,
he
said
,the
plaintiffs'
to
damage
he had no knowledge of such acts, and did not command
age but
or authorize them, nor ratify or adopt them, and had no actual
knowledge of them, he would not be liable for this injury nor could
if

;

;

61

by

oi

is

if

Lowell's power of attorney put into the case, nor his gen<
the jury are satisfkd
in relation to the defendant's mill property,
to dig or exLowell
proved, authorize
that such general agency
nor authorize
water,
the
divert
cavate the bed of the river, so as to
so.
to
do
liberty
Tinker
him to'bind the defendant, by giving
defendant
the
First,
did
the
jury:
to
Special inquiries were put
of the
deepening
and
blasting
and
the
digging
authorize or ratify
amount
what
second,
Tinker;
and,
Ferdinand
channel .d<>ne by
rea
one to the shore saw mill of the plaintiffs,
the digging and blasting of the rocks and deepening of the chanTo the first question, the jury answei
nel by Ferdinand Tinker?

dollars,
and to the second, the sum of seven hundred
to the date of the writ.
to be copied as part
The parties agreed, that the whole verdict
of the case, including the special findings in answer to the questions
nol sel aside, on ac
the verdict for the plaintiffs
proposed, and
motion,
to be
judgment
lint Of errors of the judge, or under the
this
we
From
according to the legal rights of the parties.
court,
and
the
to
submitted
understand that the whole evideno
answerable for
from that,
satisfied that the defendant
found for thai
river,
damage
the
the
the bed
nations made
to be
returned,
and
judgment
verdict
to
the
be added
t

is

r<

in

of

is

it

;

is

ii

'

is

if

is

is

the negative;
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A
a
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The acts of a general ageni, or QB£ whom a man puts in hi place
to transact all his business of a particular kind or of .1 particular
place, will 1miii 1 his principal, so long as he keeps within the scope of _
his authority, though he ma) act contrary to his p rivate in structions :
and the rule is necessar) to prevent fraud, and encourage confidence
2 Kent's Com. (5th I'.d.) o20 ; Lobdcll v. Mauri, 1 Mete.
1 1840); Story on Agency,
202
1
§ 126, and note (1).
fKIass

principal is held liable to third persons, in a civil suit for
torts, negligences,
deceits, concealments, misrepresentations,
and other malfeasances and omissions of duty in his agent, in the
course of his employment, although the principal did not authorize,
justify, or participate in. or indeed know oj such niisconcTnct ; or~~
even if he forbade them or disapproved of them." "In every such
holds out his agent as competent and fit to be
-e. the principal
trusted; and thereby, in effect, he warrants his fidelity and good
••The

frauds,

nciuct
an

the

And
Story's Agency, § 452.
carrier will be liable for the neg-

of his agency."

principle,

a

his agent, by which the goods committed to his custody
lb. § 453.
are damaged or lost.
But although the principal is thus liable for torts and negligences
of his agent, yet we are to understand the doctrine, with its just
limitations,
that the tort or negligence occurs in the course of the
For
is not liable for the torts and negligences
the principal
.ency.
his agent in any matter, beyond the agency, unless he has expressly authorized them to be done, or he has subsequently adopted them
ligence
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in all matters

illustration of
^>i

for his own use and benefit.
lb. § 466, also section 455. The principal is n it re'spoffsirjle for injuries done by the person employed
by him as an agent, which he has not ordered and which were not
Tn ?11 R11p h
in the course of the duty devolved upon such person.
- the proper
remedy is against the immediate wrong doer, for
An misconduct.
lb. § 319.
lie common law. "he that receiveth a trespasser, and agreeth to
trespass, alter it is done, is no trespasser, unless the trespass was
e, or for his benefit, and then his agreement subsequent
amounteth to a commandment;
for in that case, Omnis ratihabitio
retrotrahitar et mandato as quissarator" (aequiparatur).
Coke, 4 Inst.
a

317.

which

the

»ws, that in the management
of the mill property
building of one of the mills upon the dam, upon
Washington and the Madison are situated, and in the re-

made upon the defendant's mills from time to time, and the
supervision of their operations, and the receipt of rents therefor, in
•1 with
the fact that the defendant
had his residence in
•n, and was not personally
at Calais for many years in succes.-•11 was at least held out to the world as the defendant's
t, in the charge of the property aforesaid.
But it is

-^

LIABILITY

OF

PBINCIPAL

TO THIRD

771

PERSON

manifest that the scope of this agency was limited to the busines
keeping the mills in a proper condition, leasing the same, and receiving the rents therefor. 34 It does not appear, that previous to the excavations complained of in this action, he had undertaken to make
such an alteration in the bed of the river, as to cause a diversion of
the water of the same from the wheels of other mills, to the injury of
the owners thereof, or that he had done any unlawful act under his
agency, commanded before or ratified after it was done, by the defendant.
It is true, that Lowell is shown by the evidence to have authorized
the defendant's lessee. Tinker, to have made alterations in the channel of the river, provided no injury should be done thereby to any
one, and when informed by the plaintiffs of the excavations made
by Tinker, and when he saw them, he made no objections to the further prosecution of the work. But at that time the lease to Tinker
had four years and one half to run, and the lessee was entitled, on
request, to have the same extended, and the defendant cannot be
affected by these facts.
From a full view of all the evidence in the case, there is nothing
showing that these excavations were made for the use and benefit of
the defendant, and that they were done by Lowell, or authorized by
him, in the execution of his agency, as he was held out by the defendant; and under the special findings of the jury, and the law applicable to the facts, the defendant cannot be held liable for this por*
* *
tion of the injury alleged by the plaintiffs.
Judgment upon the verdict.

3.— FOR THE DECLARATIONS, REPRESENTATIONS, AND ADMISSIONS OF THE AGENT

SECTION'

STANDARD
(Supreme

Court

action

corporation
Company,"
to sustain which

\. J.

7.".

on

a

»l. I

Law, 204, 88

book

account

of New Jersey.

Comp;

i

'

»il

"Standard

\n.

174.)

br ought by

The defend
how that

it

ant filed

an

Ll\'<

C< ». v.

of Se* Jersey, 1007.

This was

J.

< >IL

a

<

>il

RRISOX,

"Standard

the

corporation

i:

I.

\

I
•

R i

i; !

\

i

R

&

8.

R

i

a

i.

i,

:i

7

\.

la

a

le

the course of bia employment, the agent u n^ much
on
arson e, Fidelity Mm. Life
any third i"
to the principal ;is
104, 55
71 Minn.
\v. 711 (ltt>
So
120 (in
v. Chambers,
101, 7::
how
When the agent m
37,
(N. B.) 020 (1006).
..it
Ime, from hi^ principal's work to engage In an affair wliollj hia
ton, II.
own, he ceases to act
agent
8.
Currle. 100
(07 (1000), approved In Grand Temple,
136, 06 s. w. 1073, i"
w. 17:: (1011).
Order v. Johnson (Tex. Civ. App.) 135
i
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assent
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of llie plaintiff
off

(Tart

RELATION

was

in

3

ordering

The main
filed.
of this faet was

of the defendant toward the estahlishment
cr to prove the statements ..r declarations made hy the \arious
All
in question.
lis with whom it had dealt in the transaction
Agency eann.it he proved by
of these offers were proper]
Until the
leclarations of one assuming to act in that capacity.
suit,
his
to
the
declaraa
party
declarant is shown to he the agent of
are
inailniissisuch
he
is
agent)
tions (mcTuding his declaration that
Brounlield v. Denton. 72 N. J. Law. 235, 61 Atl. 378."
Tter a specific ruling to this effect upon a question put to a witthai was on the stand, the state of the case shows that "the defendant thereupon stated that he desired to show facts and circumstances in the course of the dealings between the alleged plaintiff and
defendant from which as a whole it might be inferred that the New••t
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ark concern was the agent for Standard Oil Company of New York."
"The court adhered to its former ruling, and refused to admit the

testimony.''
If the statement of a desire by the defendant be taken as equivalent
to an offer of proof, the ruling, in effect, was that, if the desire was
to hind a party to the suit by declarations of persons assuming to
the deact as its agents, it was within the ruling already made.
fendant desired to adduce testimony that did not fall within this ruling,
an offer to that effect should have been made in such form that the
court might determine whether the new offer differed in principle
from those already ruled upon. This might have been done either by
putting to a witness a specific question calling for such new testimony,
or, if the court permitted an offer to be made, by making an offer to
From the brief of counsel for the deprove certain definite facts.
fendant, rather than from the state of the case, it is to be gathered
that what the defendant wanted to prove was a series of statements
made by persons not authorized to bind their employer by volunteer
declarations or narratives touching the master's affairs.
It cannot be..
often pointed out that the mere fact that one employ s others tol.
rk for him due- not make him chargeable with wdiat they may say
him Qi his affairs while in his employ.
If he employs them to.
King v. Atlantic
■ for him, a differeal
case may be pre sented.
Co., 70 X. J. Law, 679, 58 Atl. 345.
iding no legal error in the case presented upon this appeal the

If

judgment

of

the

First District Court of Jersey City is affirmed.

Cll.

LIABILITY

5)

OF

PRINCIPAL

HILL
(Supreme

""

PERSON

'3

HELTON.

v.

Court of Alabama,

TO THIRD

1886.

80 Ala.

528,

1 South.

340.)

The appellee brings this suit to recover the proas commission merceeds of cotton* whic E was sola l»y the appellants
ownership or sale
the
to
as
controversy
be
no
to
seems
chant?. There
did .Johnof the cotton. The disputed question is, in what capacity
the proceeds, aclfor
accounted
Martin,
defendants
whom
to
son

Cloptox, J. 35

ff

cotton merely as depot agent, or whether as
between the defendaj
agent of the plaintiff under an arrangement
to cuntrul the >lupmoney
and Martin by which they advanced him
*
*
*
ments of cotton?
Agency, like any other controv ertible fact, may he orovec
It m'av be inferred from previous employment in simcumstances.~
transactions,
or from acts of such nature, and so continuiter acts or
were
furnish a reasonable basis of inference that they
Otis, aS
the agent,
known to the principal, and that he would not h ave allowed
transactions
or
acts
cases,
the
such
In
authorized.
so to act unless
But, m order to be relevant, the alare admissible to prove agency.
- 1
or indirectly, be connected
legb u prmupai m ust, in some way, directly
The agent must have assumed to represent
with the circumstances.
in his name and on hlfi
the principal, and to have performed the acts
nothThe testimony of the witness Allison tended .to prove
behalf
of
shipping
business
in
the
ing more than that Martin was engaged
other than
the coth.n of planter, in the neighborhood of Stevenson
that tins — .
and
proceeds,
the
controlling
the plaintiff, and receiving and
had previous")
he
that
pretended
is
not
It
was generally known.
From the
age*! of the plan, till.
shipped or controlled any o
cotton, sepshipping
of
<
the
business
d
in
v.
facts that Martin
had controlled the cotton^
arate from his duties of depot agent, and
follow,
and
cannot he reasonably innot
does
it
of other planters,
him to sliip and control the cotton
TerTeTI' that the plaintiff authorized
.V ts done by Martin as 'the agent of other
in question as his agent.
■
to prove agency in the
planters are not admissible and relevant
e\
oi
ticular shipment of the plaintiff's cotton; m the absence
'
:! m
line
from
cuxumsl
uthority, express or implied
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Declarati ons mere
them."
adauMiU«p^ l3anner L.
L.
Co., 77 \la.
\\ hart. Ev.
Greenl.
1173;
of authority to make the declaraPreliminary pro,
113, 114.
Tin- letand binding effect.
i- requisite to their admissibility
Martin,
ax£_
i.lie_ikfcudauts,
oli'eivd
of
statements
ten
&

1

§

if

r

ftftl
1S4;

by

§§

Ev.

,

i<> make

of |'.i-i occur e

The evident ])iirpi)se <»f (heir introduction washis declarations.
or
w either the agency and the extent of authority,
purchase
,.f the cotton and payment therefor.
They are not admissible for
and the extent of authority must he estabuthe: purpose.
A^encv
evidence other than the acts and statements of the suplished
Xone of the letters or statements prima facie represent
ent.
Martin as agent of the plaintiff, and
any transaction performed
the discharge of his duties as such ag£nJL__ With two excepwhile
them allude to the cotton
controversy; and those
nrriirrpiVitB)
which make any reference to
are narratives of pi
declarations of
purchase and payment. They do not come within
*

admissibility,?*
for plaintiff affirmed.
*

Judgment

2

Houst. ::11 (1860), supra, pp. 50, 334, In
ccord: Geylin v. De Villeroi,
the court charged the jury: "Wherever one person appoints another his
to represenl him in any business transact ion. then whatever
the agent
bin the scope of his authority, <>rin the lawful prosecution of thai busiAnd. that
becomes in law the act of the principal whom he represents.
wherever the acts of the agent will hind the principal, there the representations, orders, declarations,
admissions and statements of the agent in respect
t" the same subject matter or business, will also hind the principal, if made
orders, declarations,
at the time of the transaction.
These representations,
admissions, or statements arc received and considered as original evidence,
- or tads constituting part of the transaction itself and not as
say; and therefore
is nol necessary, as lias been contended for, to call
the agent himself to prove them, but they may be proved by any other eonitiinony or witness.
is insisted by the counsel for the deBut
that the fad of agency has not been proved in this case, neither exnor by implication or inference,
if
has not, then certainly the plainhas failed, and your verdict should he for the defendant.
But if,
the other hand, the existence of the agency has been shown to the satis>n of the jury, either expressly, or by implication or fair inference, then
the plaintiff
entitled to recover \'<>ywhatever was done, supplied,
led under the directions
of the agent and within the scope of his
substantially the doctrine as stated by Story on Agency,
in Sandford
v. Handy, 23 Wend. 260 (1840).
The conflicting opinions
In Ddell v. Atherton,
II.
N. 171,
Jur. (N. S.) 777, 30 L. J.
I.. T. Rep. (N. S.) 797 (1861), are suggestive.
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LUDIXGTON."

Court of Wisconsin,

(Supreme

TO THIRD

PRINCIPAL

189S.

100

Wis.

441, 7<; X. W. 348.)

alleged that one Meyers was agent of Ludington
;ell his land ; that as such agent he organized a corporation fo buy
it, and by false representations
induced the plaintiff to buy stock in
Wherefore he prayed
such corporation, which was worthless, etc.

The complaint

judgment

;

'.
:;s

The action having come on for trial
before the judge and a jury, and a witness having been upon the
stand, the defendant Ludington objected to any evidence under the
complaint as to him. upon the grounds that the complaint did not
Thereupon the court susstate a cause of action as against him.
ordered
the complaint as to
tained the objection of Ludington, and
entered
of
the
judgment
the
portion
From
him to be dismissed.
the
Ludington,
as
action
dismissing
the
against
thereon accordingly,
T-

plaintiff brings this appeal.
There is no dou bt of the general proposition that

if an a^nf: is
and he does so
the land conveyed,
principal, the latter
as if he had known
548; McKinnon v.
"
Vollmar. 7? Wis. 82, 43 N. W. son, 6 L. R. A. 121, 17 Am. St. Rep.
178; Gunther v. Ullrich, 82 Wis. 222, 52 X. W. 88, 33 Am. St.
Rep. 32. And this is r sp,.,-;nl1v sn where th e principal accepts and
enjoys the benefits ot the pu rchase,. Fintel v. Cook, 88 Wis. 48/.
—W
■ntation which is to bind
I int. even then, "tin
N"! W. 788.
,i innsi \,c
of his
to
the subject-matter
i
u
the princi] al must be made ill
\nd
'
"
wl
"
isuch.
.
it mil
fir ir*
flfenr.v
so »pc
tnalri rm of such
re] resentation must be wit nm tin apparent
f

tl

^'^

i

1
1

a -It

ployed to effect the sale of land- for his p
in respect to
~by means of false representations
his
ii without the authority o
chargeable with such fraud in the same maimer
- authorized the same. Law v. Grant, 37 Wis.

^

§

Mechem, Ag.
743.
his authority."
nade in referem
entations
[ere the all
of the
er
the
was
which
land
of
the
to the sale
atmg and
referei
bnt wh< >llv
■
hat
ise
.uuingtuu na«
no
There
purchase the land.
■
the procuring of subscript!
thiiH' to rlo with the con oration
- allege
thai
True,
»rati< mi.
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each
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n .ini in u
>ucn la sc ai
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I

ii \,„,ni-
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M

b}

Matteson r.
the courl found

N

W. L109 (1903), In which,
B2
Rice, Llfl Wl
of the agenl within the
the representations
,,,- |,i, authoril
the Intention of the principal, bul hj con
nol
■■"vthe ngen«
l>u
und
properts
neetion with the
Ituchcr,
\,t Banl 92 Vrl 315 122 8. W 902(1000
M
KB, B4 N. W. 219 (11
r,n (1849); Olson
Co.,
s« Part ol I)"' opinion
omitted.
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'A

The demurrer pre tenus
>urse ami scope of his employment.
I in the complaint,
but did not
only admitted the issuable fad
Aron v.
admit such mere conclusions of law from the facts alleged.
i ; Wausau.
98 Wis. 592, 7A N. \Y. 354, 40 L. R. A. 733, and
T he repres ent, iti* >ns of Meyers in respect to the
there cited.
ereof, were OQt \\ itliin_the apcorporation, and tiie capi
land,
Besides, it appears
parent scope of his autho
m in the complaint that Mo ers was only an agent of Ludington for
He was not
the purpose of selling the particular lands in question.
eral, lmt only a
The scope of the authority of
nl is ordinarily much more restricted than that of a gpnMecliem,
"While a general agent may hind
eral agent."
Ag. § 285.
his principal when acting within the scope of his apparent authority,

__

although he exceeds his specific instructions, yet that is not the rule
Bryant v. Bank, 95 Wis. 481, 70
in the case of a special agent.!'
7.
182, and authorities
there cited. We are clearly of the opinion
that the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
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\

.The portion of the judgment

of the

c ircuit

court appealed from is

affirmed.

SECTION 4.— FOR NOTICE TO AGENT
I. In General

MERRY
(mph Court of Chancery,

1661.

v.

ABNEY.

1 Ch. Cas. 38, 22 Eng.

Reprint,

682.)

Chief Justice Foster, the Master of the Rolls:
A. contracts with B. for sale of Lands, but sells them to C, etc.,
sans Notice of the first Contract.
ndal contracted with the Plaintiff to sell him certain Lands in
ards Abney the Father, who lived near the
, in behalf of Abney the Son (a Merchant in London) purKendal, and had a Conveyance from Kendal
the Son", and his Heirs.
The Plaintiff's Bill was to be re•itract with Kendal, and against the Conveyance
and char
ice of his Contract to both the Abneys.
Abney the Son pleads himself to be a Purchaser bona fide, without
a:.
lal's Contract with the Plaintiff, and without any
'
'r.
Tru
Court declared, That N<
Father in this Case was
ice to the Son, and should affect the Son, who was the pur-

.
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chaser. 39 So that Notice of a dormant Incumbrance to a Tarty that
And acshall affect the very Purchaser.
p urchase ! h for another,
is Cause decreed, it appearing
at the Hearing, that
Abney the Father had Notice of Merry's Contract before he i urchased for his Son.

FIELD
(Supreme

Court of Indiana.

1904.

CAMPBELL.

v.
164

Ind. MS9, 72 N. E. 260. 108 Am. St. Rep
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301.)

Action by Campbell, as administrator of the estate of one Noblett,
to r ecover on a note, and to foreclose a mortgage which defendant
The note was given
and her husband executed to secure said note.
to raise "monev to pay for the husband a deficit in his accounts as
The evidence showed that, if Noblett
Orange county.
~~treasurer"~of
—
his agent Hicks must have knuwn it.
cTuI noTTm env this purpose
Tlie Indiana statute made any contract of suretyship by a married
Judgment for plaintiff.
woman void.
GiLLETT, I. 40 * * * 4. In determining the extent that Noblett
had notice of what was to be done with the money received by appellant, it is important to consider what notice he himself had, and the
notice, if not the actual knowledge, which his agent, Hicks, had, and
Notwithstanding any conclusions
the notice based on the record.
indulged in by Micks in his testimony, it is plain that he was an agenl
of Noblett, not only to appraise the land, but to pass upon the title
All this was within the scope of his agency,
and conclude the loan.
and to the extent that he had notice or knowledge must notice or
knowledge be imputed to his principal. It is laid down in Story on
^
Agency, § 140, that "notice o f facts to an agent is construc tive notice
thereof to the principal himseff, where it arises from, or is at the time
for, upon general
connected with, the subject matter of his
principles of public policy, it is presumed that the agent has com
id, if In lias not, Mill, the
municated such fad- to the prim
with
the
the
agent
particular business, th
principal Having intruded
acts
and
knqwled
other party has a right to deem his
■
It was said b] Lord Broughman
upon the principal."
notice deu, 3 M>l. & K. 699: "Th-- doctrine of constructive
pends Upon two considerations: First, that certain things exisAillg in
Uh relati" ti or conclucl <>i the parties as in the case between them
;i presumption
so strong of a ctual ktiowlcdgc that the law
the gnowTeclge to ex ist becau • it C hi;Ji1\ improbable that it
■
policy and safety of the public for
M not ; aiC
i

holds

,,,i,,.
\ era.

574,
it

(,,

the agenl

'J Freem.

28

df the opinion

i

Rood

*- party.
notice to <i ■
Reprint, 'a?:: (1706)

la omitted.

Brotherton

v.

Hatt,

2

/
)

*

, F8
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(Part

3

to deny know ledge while he is dealing so as to keep
rant, or gfi that be may keep himself ignorant, and yet
while let his agent know, and himself perhaps profit hy that
In such a ease it would be most Iniquitous and most
rous, and give shelter and encouragement to all kinds of fraud,
were the law not to consider the knowledge of one common to both,
whether it he SO in faet or not." A writer on the law of agency states
the doctrine thus: "The principal is chargeable with notice of all the_
material facts which come to the knowledge of his agent in the transactions in which the agent is acting for the principal. Tf this were
not m», a purchaser would always free himself from possible equities
arising from the acquisition of knowledge of adverse rights by purchasing through an agent.
Jt is against the policy of the law to
rj
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place one who deals through an agent in a better position than one
who deals in person." Huffcutt on Agency, § 141. "My solicitor,"
was said in an English case, "is my alter ego; he is myself.
I
stand in precisely the position he does in the transaction, and therefore his knowledge is my knowledge ; and it would be a monstrous
that I could take advantage of what he knows without the
Boursot v. Savage, L. R. 2 Eq. 134.
disadvantage."

injustice

5. The fact that the mortgage to the bondsmen
of the husband was
of record lifts the information which Noblett admits that he had concerning it above the plane of mere rumor, if his answer upon the
id is to be so construed.
"Any instrument affecting the title
which is properly recorded is absolute notice to every one subsequently dealing with the title, irrespective of whether such person
xamined the records, or even had an opportunity to make an
iuation." Wade on Notice (2d Ed.) § 97. See, also, Webb v.
Dhn Hancock, etc., Co., 162 Ind. 616, 69 N. E. 1006, 66
632; McPherson v. Rollins, 107 N. Y. 316, 14 N. E. 411,
Rep. 826.

L. R. A.
1

Am. St.

Taken as a whole, the authorities warrant the assertion that
notice which the law imputes from notice to an agent, or
from the fact that an instrument in the chain of title is properly of record, is the equivalent of actual notice.
We are not tinnindful that a false representation might sometimes lead a perntemplated
loaning money on real estate security to
omil
nine the record, but we fail to perceive how the effect of such a representation would be to prevent an agent from in6.

the

'

rinci] al of facts which it was nevertheless the agent's
ity to communicate, or why that should furnish any reason for not
cone'
ming, as in other cases, that the duty of the agent
mmunicate facts of importance to his principal was discharged.
And the indulgence of this presumption in the case before us, thereby
infecting Noblett with the notice of Hicks, makes it just, as we

,

Ch.
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think, to hold that the representation of appellant was not of such
a character as to relieve Xoblett of the imputation of record no*

*

tice. 41

*

and a new trial ordered.

reversed

Judgment

CLEMENT

YOUNG-McSHEA AMUSEMENT CO. 42

v.

of New Jersey.

(Court of Errors and Appeals
82,

118

Am.

L906.

70 N.

J.

Eq. 677, 67 Atl.

St. Rep. TIT.)

Company owned a building, fronting on the board
The company is a
known as Young's Hotel.
City,
xyST^oE-^^
co rporati on with 1,500 shares of stock, of which John 1.. Young
owned 1 ,43
He was treasurer of the company, and his son-in-law,
Shackelford, was the secretary.
There were two other directors.
authe company, and had unwritten
Young controlled the
Shackelford was its manager. Clement
thority to lease its property.
soft
space at the entrance of the hotel for
"leased from Young

The Amusernent

a

a

;

not

having

a

si]

lease of
Young
Shackelford made out and
cost of
for ten years, and Clement fitted up the stand at
Shackelford collected the rent and Young reported to the
$0,000.
Two years later, the company brought ejectment, and plaincompany.
Decree for
tiffs filed this bill to enjoin the pro^rniion oj the suit.
perpetual injunction, and the company appeals.
"
tatute
Dixon, J." [After holding that under the New
and.

frauds

such

a

J

of

a

same

the

made by an agent

lease

authority

written

i

Is

The notice may be Im41 Accord:
lhall, 113 Mass. .".•.h (1873).
Suit v. W
Harl v. Sandy, 39 W. Va. 644, 20 S. E. 665 (1894).
plied, as well as express.
The presumption thai the agent has communicated material facts, coming to
Pringle v.
conclusive.
his knowledge aa to the business Intrusted to him.
W. 231
Modern Woodmen of America, 76 Neb. 384, 107 N. w. 756, L13 N.
rant;,.

f

f

it

i. i a

bl

ih
e

11

i

Co., 31 Cal.

160

Pari of the opinion

i860).
U
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I

e

t
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I I
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nt
I

Ij

i

&

A

v

i.

B

,

Is

19

In

&

Is

|

"Notice
*2Accord: Topllff v. Shadwell, 68 Kan. 317, 74 Pac. L120 (1904).
,,, :m agen
ac tg no! arising from, or connected with, the Bubjecl matter
to
nol notice to the principal, unless aetuallj communicated
of bis agency
K20 (isss).
W9, 19 Pac
.7 CaL
Co. v. Monnler,
Renton, Holmes
him."
to bis
the matters pertaining
"The agenl represents the principal only
The notice must be as
Ala. its (1873).
Stewarl v. Sonneborn,
agency."
Pen
the agent's dutj to communicate to bis principal.
matter which
to
v.
win,. 26 Or.
36 Pac. 568, (6 Am. St Rep. 594 (1894); Warren
ipplles with Bpecial force to
Hayes, 7» N. II. 355, 68 Atl. 193 (1907)
-nts ol Its bu
different agent* for different depnr
which ba
corporation
Loan Ass'n v. Watson, 158 Ind, 508,64 v
[nternational Building
.,. (19 02); Ml ouri, K.
Ry. Co. \. Belcher, 88 Tex. 540, 32 B. w
Limita, the previon
a<-<|
dftoj)
By the Kanie rule and within the sa
benefit,
IIu
for
to the principal
knowledge of the ag(
N. W, 910 (1901).
v. Starkey,
82 Minn, 230
Havmmunlcate to his principal
pre ui
Bui the agent
-'"'"> •;■";'
bearing on the subject matter of the
ing direct and Important
Bierce r. Red Biun
ucb fad
the principal will be charged with notl
i
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at will, and considering the effect of the knowlShackelford Lliat complainant was paving the rent
!:
Anally, it is urged that
improvements:]
Young and of Shack elford should he imputed to the

lease
tid

made

the
■>f

comp;
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ming that Young, in executing the lease, was attempting or apthe form of the inpearing to act for the company, notwithstanding
then,
the bounds
he
was
overstepping
that
his
if
strument,
knowledge
no efprincipal,
to
his
thereof
notice
deemed
he
is
to
of his authority
the
By
of
an
power
agent.
the
upon
can
imposed
limitation
be
fective
would
the
agent
his
authority,
limits
the
of
of
transgressing
very act
generally for all practical purposes enlarge them to the full extent of
Nothing short of immediate personal investigation
his transgression.
on the part of the principal would, in most instances, protect his rights.
An examination of the cases already cited will show that such a doctrine has no place in either legal or equitable jurisprudence.
The knowledge of Shackelford cannot be imputed to the company, '
he was never authorized to act as its agent in any matter to
His testimony is explicit and
was pertinent.
!ch that knowledge
uncontradicted that in signing the lease and collecting the rent he acted
solely on behalf of Young, and had no authority whatever from the
Although he was secretary of the company during the runc< mpany.
ning of the lease, and became a director in November, 1903, yet in
neither capacity did any duty rest upon him concerning the complainWhether the view stated in Sooy v. State, 41 N. J.
ants' tenancy.
Law. 394, or that stated in Willard v. Denise, 50 N. J. Eq. 482, 26 Atl.
29, 35 Am. St. Rep. 788, be adopted, knowledge possessed by one percannot be ascribed to another, unless there exists between them a
relation of agency in the exercise of which the knowledge would be
useful.

We find no ground on which, consistently with established rules, the
ree below can be supported, and it must be reversed, and the bill
Decree reversed and bill dismissed.
ed.

DAY
(Supreme

v.

Court of Judicature

WAMSLEY.
of Indiana,

1870.

33

Ind.

145.)

for goods sold and delivered to appellant.
re sold to defendant's wife, from whom he
ow that plaintiff had notice of this, a deposition

tiplaint by appellee

ill a conversation in which deponent told Atkilater a clerk of plaintiff, that Day and wife were separated.
44
* * * The
Ray,
deposition discloses that Atkison, at the

J.

**

Part of the opinion

is omitted.

LIABILITY

Ch. 5)

TO THIRD

PRINCIPAL

OF

Tv I

PERSON

date of the purchase of the goods by appellant's wife, was salesman in
appellee's store and assisted in the sale of part of the goods fo r the
The conversation spoken of by
value of which the suit was brought.
the witness occurred a few months before the date of the sale. It does
riot_§2pear that Atkison was in the employ of the appellee at the date
of the conversation, and therefore notice to him by such conversatii m
would not be, according to Judge Story's view, constructive notice to
Story on Agency, § 140. There are authorihis subsequent employer.

Story, Eq. Jurisp. § 408,
controvert this rule.
a nature as would natsuch
not
of
was
note 2.
his
it
to
principal, if he were
to
communicate
the
agent
urally require
was
the
mere idle talk of 1
It
appellee.
the
of
in
the
employ
actually
and not likely to
discussed,
subject
in
the
interest
no
parties having
J
'make any impression on the mind of the agent. The notice to I
agent, to operate as constructive notice to the principal, must be such j
/
as would reasonably charge the agent, on failure to repeat, with breach
45
will,
under*
and therefore the law
of faith and duty to his employer,
such circumstances only, presume he has communicated his knowledge
Story on Agency, § 140, and authorities cited. The
to his principal.
rule, indeed, is, that the special circumstances of each case must conties, however,

which

or rejection

trol the admission

of the evidence.

Story,

damages and costs.

(High Courl of Chancery.

Hakdwkki;,

40

1746.

SCARB( (ROUGH.

< >F

Atk.

'■'■'■'-■
,;

EARL

v.

iv. Notice

K i .« i ; i \

1:

of

IT. Timk

•"•

10 per cent,

WORSLEY

"-- Reprint,

No case

1026.1

if

in

a

a

is

omltb

Pa.

4

Pari of Hi'' opinion

v.

Fire

[j t,

a

i

Incidentally, Btennetl
'I

acquired

\- n-

■

the
notice
n. \v.

146,

i

I
i
r| I
i

i
1

a

■
"
<

\

\

i

v

1
1
; L.

it \.e to vague rumor and suspicion, see Stanlej v. Schwalby,
Bd. 960 (1896); Sbafer v. Phcriilx
•s.r.. 276, 16 sup. Ot 764, W
:;,,]
v. Malone (C, U.) '■'■■■
1^
Satterfleld
\v. :>
in
w
through Interested
derived
Information
to
35(1888)
Graham, 72 Pa. 184 (1871)
fr
reliable
18 III. 3"
newspapers, and mere notoriety,

L

a

by

of

is

is

i

is

be

it

has

is

*

*

*

Ld. Ch.

would

a

it

gom
Thirdly,
where money
secured
very inconvenient,
court
upon
this
question depending
tate, and there
upon an
to
tht
the right of or about that money, but no question relating
collateral matter, that
secured, but
wholly
tate, upon which
should
be affected with notice
suit
that
the estate pending
purchaser
suit
of
law
the
pendency
creates
by such implication as the

far, and

/

Judgment

The court committed no error in excluding the evidence.

affirmed, with

/)

Jurisp.,

Eq.

supra.

i;
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Fourthly, It is settled, thai notice to an agent or counsel who was
employed in the thing by another person, or in another business, ami
at another time, is no notice to liis client, who employs him afterwards; and it would be ver) mischievous if it was so, for the man of
most practice and greatest eminence would
ous to employ.*'

MOUNTFOKI)
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(High Court of Chancery,

v.

then he the most danger-

SCOTT.

1 Turner & R. L'7 1. l!4 Rev. Rep. 55, 12 Eng.
1823.
Ch. 274, ::t Bug. Rep. 1 L05.)

The hill prayed that defendants either pay plaintiff what was due
him for building certain houses on property leased to Scott, and by
him subleased to defendants Blake, who afterwards sold them to defendant Warren by deed poll, or that they might be decreed to assign to plaintiff all their interest in the original lease to Scott.
The
underlease and deed poll were prepared by the same solicitor, and
he knew that the original lease had been deposited with plaintiff as
for advances to be made in building the houses.
F.i.nox, Ld. Ch. I am clearly of opinion that there is in this case
round for determining that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.
It

security

is true that it is established

that a deposit of deeds is to be taken as
is made for the purpose of securing money; that was laid down by Lord Thurlow, upon the notion
that the deposit could be made for no other purpose ; but the whole
tenor of all the cases is, that that doctrine is not to be carried further.
The Vice Chancellor in this case appears to have proceeded
upon the notion, that notice to a man in one transaction is not to
be taken as notice to him in another transaction ; in that view of
the case it might fall to be considered, whether one transaction might
not follow so close upon the other, as to render it impossible to give
a man credit for having forgotten it.
I should be unwilling to go so
tar as to say, that if an attorney has notice of a transaction in the
morning, he shall be held in a court of equity to have forgotten it
in the evening; it must in all cases depend upon the circumstances.
a fact of evidence that the deposit

"!.<]. Ch. Bardwlcke
-'■'■ 26 Eng. Rep.
■'■■
26 Eng.

reached

the same conclusion

(1745), and in the leading
It. .p. L172 (1748).

970

the United

in Warrick v. Warrick
case of Le Xeve v. Le

states have followed this rule.
See Pepper &
in which the court regards the rule as Cor
nvenlence of lawyer, rather than in conformity to truth.
Houseman
rd Mutual Ass'n, M Pa. 256 (1876), in which Justice
Sharswood savs
'
,h r ' :
grounded
on the fallibility or the memory of man. hut on the
",
1 "thai 1|
during the a^m-v that'the a^ent represents
•
the principal, that notice to him is then notice to
ipal.
Notice to him twenty-tour hours helore the relation <-,„ninenoe<|
►tice than notice twenty-four hours after it
had ceased to he.
Bruschke, 62 ill. A,,,,. 358 (1896), hut cf. Snyder v. Partridge,
138
III. 173, 29 N. E. 851, 32 Am. St. Rep.
130(1891).
! - 190 (1874),

"
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Supposing that when Warner took this assignment, he was affected
with notice of what was known to Gyles in the transaction with
Blake, it is a clear fact in proof in this cause that the lease was n< it
deposited for money advanced at the time ; if it was put into the
hands of the plaintiff as a security at all, it must have been for an
antecedent debt ; but the account which Gyles gives of the transaction is, that the lease was carried to the plaintiff, not for the pur
of being applied as a security for money already advanced. In-,
the purpose of obtaining future credit; I apprehend it has never been
held, that if deeds are carried to a man for the purpose of obtaining
credit from him, he has a lien upon them for what is due to him in
advanced.
Such a decision would
respect of moneys theretofore
of deeds, further than
mortgages
deposit
doctrine
by
the
upon
carry
This decree th/rejEore must be affirmed.
it has ever yet been carried.
affirmed.

Court

(Supreme

48

THE DISTILLED SPIRITS.
of the United stnics.mil Mil. 356,

20

L. Edi

167.)

The United States filed an information, for the forfeiture of 27><
barrels of distilled spirits for fraudulently removing them from a
It was found
bonded warehouse without paying the revenue tax.
barrels,
had
124
bought through one
that Harrington, who claimed
fraud,
but did not parof
knew
the
Boyden
Boyden as his agent.
found against
The
it.
of
jury
nothing
knew
ticipate in it. Harrington
by Harrington and all claimed by Boyden.
* * The substance of the third instruction
BRADLEY, J.
if
the spirits were removed from the warehouse
was,
that
for
prayed
according to the forms of law. and the claimants bought them withThe
out knowledge of the fraud, they were not liable to forfeiture.
court charged in accordance with this prayer with this qualification,
that if Boyden bought the spirits as agent for Harrington, and was
50 barrels

claimed
49

*

cognizant of the fraud, Harrington would be bound by his know!
The claimants insist that this is not law.
The question how far a purchaser is affected with notice of prior
liens, trusts, or frauds, by the knowledge of his agenl who effects
the purchase, is one that has been much mooted in England and this
country. That ho is houn d and affected by SJacli U« e wled |
obtains in negotiating the particular ti
But Lord Hardwicke thought that
onceded.

m, is

the

Madd. 34, 18 Rev
though on a different ground,
v isi. and was approved
Nixon v. Hamilton,
review of th<
in which is nu Interesting
Keen, Ch. 154 (lfi
>thwell,
'
48, 11
100, 1" •'"'• (N, B.l KM. 34 I..
'7
Norw
,\. 8.) in. 12 W. K. 1030, 112
WO (1804).
0.
omitted
Part <>f the opinion

ii

I.

L.

1

<

J.

1

i

8 I
I

is

B

«

I.

122

In

case affirms,
.

isThii

189, 50 Eng. Rep.
w 364
and in Hargr<

rule

•"•

as his agent

g
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RELATION

could not be extended so far as to affed the principal by k nowledge
Warrick
acquired previousl) in a different transaction.
th<
\
Warrick. 3 Atk\ns. 291. Supposing it to bo clear, that the agent
it was certainly
so formerly acquired,
still retained the knowledge
Lord Eldon did not apmaking a very nice and thin distinction.

/will

it

it,

prove of it.
In Mountford v. Scott, 1 Turner & Russell, 274, he says:
whether one transaction
might not
•"It
may fall to he considered
to give a
render
it
other
as
to
impossible
the
follow so close upon
be
unwilling
to go so
I
should
it.
forgotten
for
man credit
having
far as to say, that if an attorney has notice of a transaction in the
morning, he shall be held in a court of equity to have forgotten it
in the evening; it must in all cases depend upon the circumstances."
The distinction taken by Lord Ilardwicke has since been entirely overruled by the Court of Exchequer Chamber in the case of Dresser v.
So that in England the
Norwood. 17 Common Bench, N. S. 466.
doctrine now seems to be established, that if the agent, at the time
of effecting a purchase, has knowledge of any prior lien, trust, or
fraud, affecting the property, no matter when he acquired such
Tf he acquire the knowlknowledge, his principal is affected thereby.
no
question can arise as to his
when he effects the purchase,
to the purchase, the
it
if
he
previous
time
acquired
;
having it at that
to his mind,
and
has
retains
he
still
present
that
presumption

is

in

a

in

if

T

,

a

a

it

it

it

1

i

if

is

it
is

a

is

a

it

is

it

is

is

is

Knowldepend on the lapse of time and other circumstances.
bound to recollect,
:ommunicated to the principal himself he
not bound by knowledge communicated to his agent, unless
But he
present to the agent's mind at the time of effecting the purchase,
was so present seems to be the
ar and satisfactory proof that
tfnly restriction required by the English rule as now understood.
at liberty to communicate
With the qualification that the agent
sound view
his knowledge to his principal,
appears to us to be
bound by the
die subject.
The general rule that
principal
the
his agent
kn
based on the principle of law, that
which
the
to
communicate
to his principal
knowledge
erifs duty
of negotiation, and the prehe
'-ting the subject-matter
not the agent's
sumption that he will perform that duty. When
to communicate such knowledge, when
would be unlawful for
has been acquired confidentialis, for example, when
former client in
prior transaction, the reason
rney for
and
such
case an agent would not be exlo that which would involve the betrayal of professional
confidence, and his principal ought not to be bound by his agent's
and confidential information.
the case
This often happened
and, where men of great professional
eminence were frequently consulted.
They thus became possessed, in
tial manner, of secret trusts or other defects of title, which
dily,
they could legally, communicate to subdifficulty presented itself to Lord Hardwicke's

it
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&

§

is

is

it,

mind, and undoubtedly lay at the bottom of the distinction which he
Had he confined it to such cases, it would have been
established.
entirely unexceptionable.
The general tendency of decisions in this country has been to
adopt the distinction of Lord Hardwicke, but it has several times
been held, in consonance with Lord Eldon's suggestion,^that ifthe
••
agent acquired his information so recently as t<> v e it incredible
his principal will be bound.
that he should have forgotten
This
really an abandonment of the principle on which the distinction
140; Hovey v. Blanchard, 13 N. IT.
founded.
Story on Agency,
145; Patten v. Insurance Co., 40 X. II. $7?\ Hart v. Farmers'
&

MeMechanics' Bank, 33 Vt. 252. The case of Hart v. Farmers'
Bank, 33 Vt. 252, adopts the rule established by the case
Other cases, as that of Bank of United
of Dresser v. Norwood.
Hill, 452, New York Central Insurance Co. v.
States v. Davis,
National Protection Co., 20 Barb. 468, adhere to the more rigid
view.
[See cases collected in note to American edition of 17 Common Bench, N. S., p. 482, and Mr. Justice Clifford's opinion in the
Circuit Court in the present case.]
On the whole, however, we think that the rule as finally settled by
the
above mentioned,
the English courts, with the qualification
deduced from the best consideration of the reasons
true one, and
hand, we think
to the case
on which
founded.
Applying
The fair construction of
that the charge was substantially correct.
the jury believed that Boyden, the agent, was
the charge is, that
cognizant of the fraud at the time of the purchase, Harrington, the
60
The precise words were
principal, was bound by this knowledge.
"that
Boyden bought the spirits as agent for Harrington, and
den was cognizant of the fraud, Harrington would be bound by
his knowledge."
The plain and natural sense of these words, and
thai they
that in which the jury would understand them, we think,
al the time of making the purchase,
refer to Boyden's kno
is

if

it

in

is

is

it

<

is

if

*

*

a

*

is

in

accordance with the law as
construed the charge
strictly
There was no pretence that Boyden acquired his
above explained.
in
fiduciary character.
Judgment affirmed.
knowledge

II

\

i

19

L

Is

v."

.

i

1
7.

j

In

US

7

a

2

lecord: Constanl v. Univ. of Rochester, in \. v. 804, 19 N. E. 681,
leading case; Snyder v. Partridge,
L. R. a. 734,
Am. st. Rep. 789 (1889),
Sehwlnd v. Boyi
188 in. it::. 29 N. !•:. 851, 82 Am si. Rep. L30 (1891);
.M.I. 510, 51 AH.
(1902).
the agent's
There must be clear and atlsfactory proof of the presence
Equitable Securities Co. v. Sheppard, 7^
mind <>rthe antecedent knowledge.
old; Stenrami), in which the Incident
28 South, siu
12 (1886).
net! v. Pa. ETire ins. Co., 68 Iowa, 674, 28 N. w
on of t\«' rule within narrow
The tendency
to keep
197, n Am. St
R.
Parker, 102 Cal. 93, 86 Pac. 874, 24
Wltterbrock
N. w. 129, 24 Aj
Rep.
172 (1894);
Trentor v. Pothen, 16 Minn. 298,
Rep. 225 (1891).
The law does nol presume thai what is ever known will
Ka off man \. Robey, 60 Tex 808, v Am.
alwii
.hi in the memory.
Rep. 264 (1883).

i

Godo.Pb

\

.
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226,

39

Am.

Rep. :»19.)

of certain land.
bank director or trustee, or knowledge
engaged either officially or as an agent
of the bank, is inoperative as a notice

to recover possession
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A notice to a
1.
obtained by him, while not
or attorney in the business
If otherwise, corporations would incur the same liato the bank.
do for the
acts of directors that partnerships
unofficial
the
for
bility
acts of partners; and corporate business would be subjected oftenCarry the proposition,
times to extraordinary confusion and hazards.
that notice to a director is notice to the bank, to its logical sequence,
and a corporation might be made responsible for all the frauds and
all the negligences, pertaining to its business, of any and all its direcAny one director would have as much
tors not officially employed.
power as all the directors.
A single trustee or director has no power to act for the instituIt is
tion that creates his office, except in conjunction with others.
51
directors
the
board
of
If
act.
can
that
the board of directors only
or trustees makes a director or any person its officer or agent to act
for it. then such officer or agent has the same power to act, within the

authority delegated to him, that the board itself has. His authority
Notice to such officer
is in such case the authority of the board.
or agent or attorney, who is at the time acting for the corporation
in the matter in question, and within the range of his authority or
Abbott's Trial Ev. 45, and
supervision, is notice to the corporation.
Fulton Bank v. Canal Co., 4 Paige, 127; La Farge
cases in note;
Fire Ins. Co. v. Bell, 22 Barb. 54; National Bank v.. Norton, 1 Hill
( X. Y.i 578; Bank of U. S. v. Davis, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 454; North River
Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 263; Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co., 10 Md. 517,
174; Bank v. Payne, 25 Conn. 444, 68 Am. Dec. 362;

Foundry v. Dart, 26 Conn. 376; Smith v. South Royalton
Bank, 32 Vt. 341, 76 Am. Dec. 179; Washington Bank v. Lewis, 22
Pick. 24; Commercial Bank v. Cunningham, 24 Pick. 270, 35 Am.
22; Housatonic Bank v. Martin, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 308; 1 Pars.
77; Story, Agen. § 140; South. Law Rev. N. S. vol. 6, p. 45;
..
I
S. 308, 23 L. Ed. 392.
It appears that
Another question arises in the case before us.
knowledge of a previous conveyance was acquired anterior

Farrell

to his employment by the bank, if employed by the bank at all, and
not during or in the course of his employment on their account. The

v.

see First Nat Bank
the knowledge of directors of a corporation,
While engaged In
135, 29 Am. Rep. 262 (1878).
W x. J. Law,
; the corporation,
see City Bank v. Phillips, 22 Mo. 85, 64 Am.
: [nnerarity v. Merchants'
Nat Bank, 139 Mass. 332, 1 N.
2 Am. Bep. Tio (1885); First Nat. Bank v. Blake (C. C.) CO Fed. 78

Christopher,
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question is. whether a principal is bound by knowledge or notice which
his agent had previous to his employment in the service of the principal.
Upon this question the authorities disagree. The negative of the
question has been uniformly maintained in Pennsylvania
and some
other of the states.
In the late case of Houseman v. Building Association, 81 Pa. 256, it was said, that "notice to
it twentyfour hours before the relation commenced is no more notice than
twenty-four hours after it has ceased would he." But we think, all
things considered, the safer and better rule to be that the knowledge

arj ngpnt. obtained pfibrTo his employment as agent, will be an
implied or imputed notice to the principal, under certain limitations
and conditions, which are these:
The knowledge must be present
to the mind of the agent when acting for the principal, so fully in
his mind that it could not have been at the time f
by him;
the knowledge or notice must be of a matter so material to the transaction as to make it the agent's duty to communicate the fact to his

and the agent must himself have no personal interest in
"principal;
the matter which would lead him to conceal his knowledge from his
principal, but must be at liberty to communicate it. Additional modification might be required in some cases.
These elements appearing, it seems just to say that a previous
The presumption,
notice to an agent is present notice to the principal.
and
will
do
what
is
it
that an agent
his right
duty to do, having no
do
or
to
the
interest
contrary, is so strong that the
personal motive

There may be instances where
does not allow it to be denied.
the rule operate- harshly; but, under the rule reversed, many frauds
I u" course, the knowled ge must be that
could be easily perpetrated.
of a person who is executing some agency, and not acting merely in
For instance;
>me ministerial
capacity, as servant or clerk.
the
taken
of
had
acknowledgment
merely
the present case Brown
clerk or copyist,
the deed to the hank, or had transcribed the (\rvi\ as
it"

a

in

law

to be drawn
tion within the

have imposed
duty to impart his knowledge to
deed
the title for the hank
obtain
to
employed

him for the purpose,

Mort.

that

would

a

a

by

if

not

by

such acts would
Bui
the bank.

place the trans:
Notice of the

587.

§

I

an

is

by

it

is

i

(2d Ed.)
unrecorded mortgage upon the property
Tucker
notice to the plaintiff.
employed to make an attachment,
claimed
In the case before us, Brown,
v. Tilton, 55 X. M. 22.\
the bank to mak<
trumenl
the defendant was employed
uch
Brown knew thai
title from
to convey
pei on to the hank.
form his client.
would be his dutj
person had not the title.
Tinlie would be likely to do o. He had no motive nol to do
rul<

it.

It

a

a

by

would

be

it'

•i.iblv

thai he did inform him.
within the rule, though
BrOWtl had been etupl

We think

such

i

pr<

it

law conclusively
it
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ascertain if the grantor had the title, and if he had then to make
the i\ccd.
The general rule or principle touching this ease, guarded by the
utions and conditions stated, is supported by the later English cases,
although the earlier English cases went the other way; is also the
die United States Supreme Court; and is, we think, sustained
of opinion in the state courts where the quesa preponderance
Fuller v. Bennett, 2 Hare, 394; Dresser
tion has been discussed.
v. Norwood, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 466; Rolland v. Hart, L. R. 6 Ch. App.
687; The Distilled Spirits, 11 Wall. 356, 20 L. Ed. 167; Hovey v.
Blanchard, 13 N. H. 148; Hart v. Bank, 33 Vt. 252; Suit v. WoodNational Bank v. Cushman, 121 Mass. 490;
hall. 113 Mass. 391;

Ohio St. 11, 91 Am. Dec. 115; Hoppock
Lawrence v. Tucker, 7 Me. (7 Greenl.) 195;
Johnson,
and following sections and notes. Many
584,
Mort.
Tones
(2d Ed.) §
other cases, on both sides the questions, will be found cited and reviewed, in a learned article in the Amer. Law Reg. (Phila.) New Se-

Anketel
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v.

-

v.

Converse.
14

17

Wis. 303;

ries, vol. 16, p. 1.
An application of this rule to the facts of this case, requires the
verdict to be set aside. S. S. Brown, while a trustee of the Fairfield
Savings Bank, had actual knowledge that John W. Chase had deeded
Knowing that fact, he as an attorney
certain land to Isaac Chase.
of a mortgage of the same land
wrote and took the acknowledgment
bank,
and
the mortgage was recorded
from John W. Chase to the
had knowledge of the
bank
the
whether
first.
The question was
The
taken.
pro forma ruling that
was
the
deed
when
prior
mortgage
notice
to the bank to oversufficient
of
Brown
was
the knowledge
come the legal effect of the fact that the mortgage was recorded before the deed, irrespective of the further question whether Brown was
at the time of making the mortgage, acting as an attorney in the busiIt is conness and employment of the bank or not, was erroneous.
tended that the evidence shows that Brown was acting for the bank.

But the fact being at least questionable,
upon by the jury.
Exceptions sustained.

III.

Exceptions to the Rule of Notice

PURSLEY
(Supreme

it should have been passed

Court of Georgia,

v.
1905.

STAHLEY.
122 Ga. 362,

50 S.

E.

1.39.)

Mrs. Stanley sued Mrs. Pursley on certain notes which she had
signed at the request of Green & Preston, attorneys of plaintiff. She
for
I them $50, and supposed she was signing them as security
that debt.
She could read, but was ignorant of business matters and
did not know what she was signing.
Judgment on the notes.
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Lamar,

guilty of

fraud for his own benefit, the law does not
impute to the principal notice of such fraud,
tnstead of bring com
municated, it would be purposely and fraudulently concealed.
Instead of the lender being hound by constructive notice, the borrower
must be bound by her actual signature to the note for $500.
2. Both parties may be innocent.
The defendant, however, put it
in the power of a third person to do the wrong, and she must bear
the loss.
She was endeavoring to arrange to borrow money to pay
her own debt.
She allowed the creditor to prepare the paper.
He
Notice of
represented the borrower as much as he did the lender.
the fraud could have been as logically imputed to one as to the other.
In law, he was the agent of neither, but drew the note for the ex
cessive amount for his own personal advantage, and in the commis
sion of an independent fraud. 63 Merchants' Bank v. Demere, 92 Ga.
an independent

Frenkel v. Hudson, 82 Ala. 168, 2 Booth. 768, 80 Am. Rep, 788
in which the role was appUed t<>knowledge bj n corporation of facta
own Interest,
Com. Bank v.
known i>y the presldenl who waa acting in hi
Burgwyn, ll<> N. C. 267, it s. i:. 628, L7 L B \. 826 (1892); innerarity v.
Mere-hunts' Nat. Bank, 189 Mass. 882, l \\ E. 282, 82 am Bep. 7H» d
illuminating Heal vV Power Co., i v i Pa.
a leading case; Gnnater v. Bcranton
827, -".7 Atl. 560, 59 Am, Bt Bep. 660 (1897), containing a valuable revlev
the cases, and criticl Lng I li > Nat Bank v. New Milford, 36 Conn. 98 (18
When the agent abandons the object of his agency, and acta for himself, it
ii held be la out Ide the scope <>r bla authority, and t<> that ext
baa i
. i
\
i:
Henrj \ Alii n, 161 N. v. i. r. N. 1
to be agent
Supp. 242 (1894), and followed
19, 28 v
(1896), reversing 77 Hun,
321 (1898);
N.
Ulcu v. Bo. Bostou
nentok v. Ammidown,
165 N. V. 17,
R, A. 716, 16 \m.
Rep 186
917,
R. Co., 150 Mass. 200, 22
Knobelock v. Germania Bav Bank, 50 B.
——
i"' s
followed
Camden Safe D<
v.
Wan
Co 3£
Bank of "
Eq. 180, 58 Atl 007 (1004)
posit
Tro
Co. v. Lord, 67 N.
The exception
ton v. Thompson, 118
1902).
relatii
confidential
his knowh dge
to ca '■- in which the a^ent acquired
Hummel v. Bank of Monro<
It.
so that he
not at libei
5s

Accord:

In

Bt

K

•

In

•
.»

< <
i

L.

S

i
'i

la

In

i

1

A

J.

.i

I

N

i

1

I

i

N

19 JT.

(1886),

A

_

i
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J. [After stating the facts:] The principal is bound by
notice to his agent for the same reason and to the same extent that
he is bound by the act of his agent.
In both cases it must be limited to matters within the scope of the agency.
Notice as to such
mattersTbinds the principal, according to some authorities, on the theory that the agent and principal are to be regarded as one; according
to others, on the theory that the agent may and should act for his
principal on such information; and, according to others, because
there is a presumption that such notice would be communicated.
See
Morris v. Georgia Loan Co., 109 Ga. 24, 34 S. E. 378, 46 L. R. A.
506; Civ. Code 1895, §§ 3027, 3028.
But when the agent departs
from the scope of the agency, and begins to act for himself, and
not for the principal ; when his private interest is allowed to outweigh his duty as a representative;
when to communicate the information would prevent the accomplishment of his fraudulent scheme- he becomes an opposite party, not an agent. The reason for the rule
then ceases.
Where, therefore, the agent, who is an intermediary, is
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Gunster v. Scranton Co., 181 Pa. 327, 37 Atl. 550,
On the facts,
3028, 3940.
650; Civ. Code L895,
The defendant could read. There was no emerclear.
the case
deed and twelve notes. Years afterwards she
She signed
time
signed six additional notes relating to the same debt, and at
K. 38;

St.

P.p.

when
The

it

a

a

is

59 Am.

§§

[9

S

739

was not

judgment

alleged that the agent was present.
All the Justices concurring.
must be affirmed.

And to cases in which the person claiming the
with the agent to defraud the principal. Cowan
75 N. E. 322 (1905).

7
i

!a-#^/^

/

/

/

lX7

.

J
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/

N. W. 136 (1903).
benefit of the notice colludes
orran, 216 Hi. 5'JS, 017,

1>. HO, 95

&

w.

3

S.

889

I.",:.. 27

S.

W.
Hickman v. Green, 112.°,Mo. L65, 2l>
•"■:X. W. 954 (1888);
My.
K. G99,
140, 29 1>. B. A. :;:» (1894); Kennedy v. Green,
And to cases in which lie was
in Kim. Ch. 699, 40 Eng. Rep. 266 (1834).
JEtna Indemnity Co. v. Schroeder, t2 N.
really agent of the opposite party.
[owa
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CHAPTER VI
LIABILITY OF THE THIRD PERSON TO THE PRINCIPAL

SECTION

1.— ON

THE CONTRACT MADE BY THE AGENT
I. Disclosed Principal

FORD
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(Supreme

v.

WILLIAMS.

Court of the United Stat,-.

-\

L858.

Bow.

287,

10

I*

Ed. 36.)

Ford sued Williams on a written contract by which the latter agreed
to receive from Bell 2,000 barrels of flour at $0 per barrel.
Mr. Justice Grikr. The single question presented for our decision
in this case is, whether the principal can maintain an action on a
written contract made by his agent in his own name, without disclosing the name of the principal.
It is not necessary to the validity of a contract, under the statute
of frauds, that the writing disclose the principal.
In the brief memoranda of these contracts usually made by brokers and factors, it i^
seldom done.
If a party is informed that the person with whom he
is dealing is merely the agent for another, and prefers to deal with
the agent personally on his own credit, he will not be allowed afterwards to charge the principal; but when he deals with the agent,
without any disclosure of the fact of his agency, he may elect to
treat the after-discovered
principal as the person with whom he contracted.

The contract of the agent i^ the contract of the principal, and he
may sue or be sued thereon, though not named therein; ami notwithstanding the rule of law that an agreement reduced to writing may not
be contradicted or varied by parol, it is well settled that the principal
may show that the agent who made the contract in his own nam.

Tin- proof does not contradict the writing; it only
acting for him.
Bui the agent, who binds him el_f, will not
the
transaction.
explains
be allowed to contradict the writing by pi o\ mg that he
'
. while the
ing 31
(say
tin- principal
h evidence
that the contra*
but shows that
and

t is the
'

Wil

act

I

bind

it

of

the

nm on

fl

also binds

another,

principal."

it

by

reason tli.it

(See Higgil

f

I
IOT,

9 M

the

?

ni

AM'

BCTS

C0NSEQ1 BNCES
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(Part

3

plaintiff's counsel shows
this question is settled, not only by the courts of
(See New Jersey
and and many of the States, but by this court.
How.
Bank,
6
381, 12 L. Ed.
Merchants'
Co.
v.
Ration

The arraj of

cases and treatises cited by the

that

;

>. cit.)

l

The judgment of the court below is therefore

reverse d^and a ventre

de novo awarded.

BEKBEE
(Supreme

v.

ROBERT.

Court of Judicature of New York,
27

Am.

1S34.

12 Wend.

413,

Dee. 132.)
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Assumpsit for breach of warranty in the sale o f cotton by sample.
The cotto n was bought by Woolley , a broker, in his own name on the
■if plaintiff.
SuTHKkT.AXD, J. 2 The suit was properly brought in the name of

the present plaintiffs.
Woolley acted as their factor or agent merely,
in the purchase of the cotton ; he had no interest in the transaction behe is not responsible to the plaintiffs for the
yond his commissions;
in
defect
the quality of the cotton; he has suffered no injury, and
no action could be sustained in his name against the defendant for
the breach of the implied warranty — there was no express contract or
ment with him.
Woolley, the factor, had failed to pay for
the cotton, Robert could have recovered its value from the plaintiffs.
When goods are brought by a broker or other agent, and he does not
di -close his principal at the time, the principal, when discovered, is
on the contracts which his agent has made for him.
2 Livermore on Agency. 200.
Waring v. Eaverick, 1 Campb. 85; Kymer v.
Suwercropp, Id. 109 ; 4 Taunt. 576, n. a. ; Pentz v. Stanton, 10 Wend.
271, 25 Am. Dec. 558.

If

Where
:nes

the

principal is disclosed at the time of the purchase, it then
of fact, to be determined from all the circum-

a question

stances in the case,

whether
agent or not.

the vendor relied exclusively upon the
he did, he cannot afterwards resort
2 Liver. 200T20trTFEast,
pal.
If
62.
4 Taunt. 574.
'
tiiitiffs might have been made responsible to the defendant for
money upon this contract, it would seem to follow that
is sufficient privity of contract between them, to enable the plain: aintain this action against him for the
alleged violation of
•rt of the agreement.
The general rule is, that the action_shoukL
he brought in the name of the party whose legal interest has been afI

of

the

If

Wade, Hi!) Ala. 95, 19 South. 500, 55 Am. St. Rep. 915
burden of proof to show the agency lies on the prinKingsley v. Siebrecht, !iL' Me. 23, 42 Atl. 249, 69 Am. St.
'itainiiiL' a valuable review of the cases, especially as to
ta Within the Statute of Frauds.
- Part of the opinion
la omitted.
-11 v.
■'
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fected, against the party who committed the injury.
1 Chitty's
PI. 1.
"Hammond on Parties to Action, 3. 1 Bos. & Pull. 101. n. c. 3 Bos.
& Pull. 149, and note. Dawes v. Peck, 8 T. R. 330.
Gunn v. Cantine, 10 Johns. 3^7. Yates v. Foote, 12
Johns. 1. In Spencer v. Field-,
10 \\ end. 87, and Sailly v. Cleveland & Hutton, 10 \Yend. 156,
the
question as to the proper parties to an action was discussed at length,
and most of the authorities
were there referred to.
Those i
clearly show that this action is properly brought in the names of the
present plaintiffs. * * *

New trial denied.

HUMPHREY

1845.

LUCAS.
2 Cur.

&

K.

152. <U E. C.

L. l.Vj

.)

Assum psit for the non-fulfillment of a contract by the defendant,
to transfer to the plaintiff certain shares in "The Birmingham and
"Gloucester Railway Company." Plea, non assumpsit—
The contra I was marie on the Stock Exchange of Liverpool, by
two brokers who were members of thai bod}'.
The plaintiff's brul
did not disclose the name of his principal at the time the contract was
erTfered
into.
The plaintiff was not a member of the Liverpool
Stock Exchange, but he was cognizant of the rules thereof.
Watson, for the defendant, tendered these rules in evidence, in
order to shew that they controlled the contract; and he contended,
that, as, by the rules of the Liverpool Stock Exchange, tl
in question was a contract between the two brokers only, the broker
not ha ving disclosed his principal, the latter was not entitled to
upon

such contract.

CrKsIwELL,

J.

Verdict for

the

—

They

plaintiff.

See the authorities collected,

Russell

on

245,

248.

I

a

n<
•
t.

is,

are not ad missible as evidence for any such
I take the law to b~e clear, that an
purpose.
may make a contract in his own name, and that the principal uia\
afterwards sui upon it. 3 Tn the present case, the plea is the f
IssTTe ; and Erie only question
on this record therefore
whether
the plaintiff made
think he
contract with the defendant or
did.
The ride- of the Liverpool Stock Exchange cannot alter the
general law of the land.

•
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(Court of Queen's Bench at Nisi Prius.

v.

EFFB<
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II. Undisclosed Principal
WOODRUFF
(Supremo

McGEHEE.

v.

Court of Georgia,

L860.

30 Ga.

Action for dama ges for broach of warranty
one tee, plaintiff's agent.
The only reason assigned for
STEPHENS^
J.
warranty is that It is made to the agent, the
I '.ut the authorities
known in the transaction.

158.)

of a horse

made to

the rejection of this,
principal not being
are express that the
principal may claim all his rights, though not at first known, just as
if he had boon known, with the single limitation that the other
party shall not lose any right which he would have against the agent
See
if the agent were principal as he had first been supposed to be.
is
it
is,
that
f
the
doctrine
o
reason
The
418.
Story on Agency,
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§

man should have what really, though
as he can obtain it without injuring
We think the
true character of owner.
name of the before unknown principal,
4
the evidence ought to have been admitted.
Judgment reversed.

but just that every
belongs to him, so
bv appearing in his
maintainable in the

far

WINCHESTER
(Supreme

Judicial

v.

HOWARD.

Court of Massachusetts,
9:J Am.

secretly,,
another
action is
and that

1867.

97

Mass.

303,

Dec. 93.)

Chapman, J. The_court are of_ppinion.J:ri3t it should have. 1
to the jury in this case to determine whether the minds of the
parties really met upon any contract; and if so, what the contract was.
It is true that an agent may sell the property of his principal with-.
out disclosing the fact that he acts as an agent, or that the property
an action in his
t his own ; and the principal may maintain

name to recover the price.
If the purchaser says nothing on.
Huntington v.
is liable to the unknown prin cipal.
K:
.VI. [>ut on the other hand, every man has a right
.. / C-:-h.
As was remarked by Lord
to elect what pari
deal with.
in
Humble
v.
Hunter,
12 Q. B. 311, "You have a right to
Denman
benefit
from
the character, credit and substance
you contemplate
the
There may be good reasons
of the pers on with whom you contract."
principal may be a stranger, both to the promise and
undisclosed
He must, howRea v. Barker (C: C.) 135 Fed. 890 (1904).
•nsideratlon.
•
• that he Is the real principal.
Sims y. Bond, 5 B. & Aid. 389, '-'7

• The

I.. !■?
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why one should be unwilling to buy a pair of oxen that had been
owned or used or were claimed by a particular person, or why he
should be unwilling to have any dealings with that person; and as a
man's right to refuse to enter into a contract is absolute, he is not
obliged to submit the validity of his reasons to a court or jury. 5
In this case it appears that Smith, the plaintiffs' agentj told, the
defendant that he had a pair of oxen for sale, (referring to the <
question,) and that another pair belonging to one Blanchard were
in his possession, which pair he was authorized to sell.
A jury might
properly find that this amounted to a representation tiiat the oxen
in question were his own.
The defendant thenjmade inquiries; in
answer to which Smith affirmed that the oxen had never been hurt;
that the plaintiffs had no mortgage upon them, and that there was
fib claim upon them except the claim which Smith had.
A jury might
properly find that this was, in substance, a representation that the title
to the oxen was exclusively in Smith; and that, as the defendant
was unwilling to deal with the plaintiffs, he made proper inquiries on
the subject, and was led by Smith to believe he was nut dealing
with the plaintiffs.
The defendant took the cattle home with an .
ment that he might return them "if he did not find things as Smith
had told him."
In the course of the evening he was informed that
the cattle belonged to the plaintiffs, and being unwilling to buy oxen
of them, he returned them to Smith the next morning before any bill

of

sale

had been made.

The jury would

be authorized

to find that he

Co. v. Belden Co., 1-7 r. s. ::7'.». 8 Sup. <'t.
L. Ed. 246 (1888), Gray, J., puts the case thus: "Bui every one baa a
selecl and determine with whom be will contract, and cannot have
another person thrusl upon him without iiis consent
In 111«~ familiar phrase
of Lord Denman, 'You have the right t<>the benefit you anticipate from the
character, credit, and substance of the party with whom yon contract.'
Hum
12 Q. B. 310, -'HT;
Winchester
v. Howard, '.'7 Mass. 303, 305,
ble v. Hunter,
03 Am. Dec. 93;
[ce Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 28, 26 Am. Rep. 9; King v. Bat
terson, 13 R. I. 117, 120, 13 Am Rep. 13; Lansden v. McCarthy, 45 Mo. 108.
The rule upon this subject, as applicable to the case at bar, Is well expr<
English treatise: 'Rights arising out of contract cannot be trana
in
recent
they Involve
ferred if they are coupled with liabilities, or
relation <<fperiIims.' rights
Bona! confidence Buch that the party whose agreement conferred
must have Intended them to i»' exercised only
him In whom be actually
"
confided.'
purely executor] contract
applied to
Pancoast v. Dlna
The exception
See, also, Cowan
more, 105 Me. 171, '■> Atl. 13, 134 Am. St Rep. 582 (1900).
v. Curran, 216 ill. 598, 75 N. E. 322 (1905).
Contra: Sell] v Thuey, 148 Mo
W. 62 (1890).
122, 15 s. w. 300 (1898), with which cf. Id., L02 Mo. 522, 15
here
doea not appear
The above exception baa no application
reliability
that ih«' third person relied on the learning, skill, and
<<\'the agent of the undlsclo ed principal,
and where no !"•' onal
invoh.-d.
Wiehle v. Safford, 27 Misc. Rep. 562, 58 N. v. Bupp. 298
and now Bet* up that
Nor t" cases where the principal contracted
ton v.
be whs the real principal, and the" agenl
mere man <>(straw
Burrell, •> Manle
383 (1816).
••
x*ork [ron Co
142
rC
See Moline Malleable
Iron
(1897), summarizing
the exceptions to the role.
5

In Arkansas Valley Smelting

1308, 32
rlghl to

In

L

«

v.

I

S.

A

a

it

(1

b

It

Li

S.

a

Is

bj

a

If

,-i
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urned them within the- terms of the condition upon which he took
: e did not
find things as Smith had told him. \It is
|
whole evidence they would bo justified in
that
the
upon
thus apparent
/v
for
the
defendant.
verdict
N:
a
ling
/
sustained.
options
;onl)

iH^

^^

BARRY
(Supreme

v.

PAGjt

Court of Massachusetts,

Judicial

10

1858.

Gray,

30S.)

^

s.
a citizen of New York to recover the price of goods,
for
Verdict
plaindefendants.
the
Boston
to
factors
in
his'
sold bv
tiff and defendant alleged exceptions.
l'.ic.i i.uw. T. c * * * 2.^As the contract of an agent is in law
the contract of the principal, the latter may come forward and sue
thereon, although at the time the contract was made the agent acted
There is a qualification of the
as and appeared to be the principal.
rule, bv which it is held that when a contract has been made for an

principal, who permits his agent to act as apparent prinin the transaction, the right of the former to intervene and
bring suit in his own name is not allowed in any way to affect or
party, but he will in such
im< air the right of the other contracting
""case be let in to all the equities, set-offs and other defences to which
he would have been entitled, if the action had been brought in the
But in the case at bar it does not appear that
name of the agent.
the defendant has any defence to the action, which he could have
The objection is purely
made if it had been brought by the agent.
undisclosed
cipal

is

i-

3

Tart of tin- opinion

state or country.

7

n

54

Story on Agency,
Taintor v.
note.
Amer.
324,
(4th
Ed.)
Cush.
38 Am. Dec. 618.
llsley v. Merriam,
No fact appears in the exceptions to show
another

Agency

Hill, 72,
Am. Dec. 721.
.

242,

in

it

a

is

a

is,

technical, and goes only to defeat the right of action by the principal,
irrespectively of any meritorious answer to the suit.
It has been sometimes said that when a sale is made by a factor
for a foreign principal, the latter cannot sue for the price. This supposed exception has been put on the ground that in such case the prethat exclusive credit was given to the agent, and
sumption at law
therefore the principal cannot be treated in any manner whatever
But the later and better opinion is, that
as
party to the contract.
principal, whether
such
no
absolute
there
presumption, and that
'ic, may sue to recover the price of goods sold by
factor, unless
made affirmatively
to appear that exclusive
en to the agent, by proof, other than the mere fact tha
cr<

•
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present case out of the
an action in his

ordinary rule by which the principal can maintain
7
own name. .—
Exceptions overruled.

COPELAXD
(Supreme

Court of Alabama,

TOUCHSTONE.

v.

1S49.

16

Ala.

333,

50

Am.

Dec. 181.)

to the County Court of Mobile.
This suit was commenced in a Justice's Court, and taken by apT he plaintiff having established his depeal to the County Court.
offset an ace unit fur work done
defendant
aT'an
the
proved
mand
wheelright in the emwas
a
who
Richardson,
journey-man
one
by
rebuttal
in
proved that the
The
plaintiff
of
defendant.
ployment
contract for the work was made with Richardson alone, that plaintiff
was not informed that he was in the employment of the defendant,

Upon
and that he paid said Richardson for it as the work was done.
tliis state of facts, the cause was submitted to the decision of the
court, and judgment was rendered allowing the defendant's offs et.
— — -'fhis judgment is now assigned as error.
CHILTON, J. It certainly cannot be assumed, that because the
work was done at the shop of the defendant, he is entitled to recover
for it. Copeland contracted with Richardson, in utter ignorance of
the relation which existed between him and his employer, Touch
Conceding, then, that as between the latter and Richardson,
stone.
relation
of principal and agent obtained, or that Richardson wathe
in the employment of Touchstone, who was entitled to all his earn
ings, it is too well settled now to be questioned, that if Copeland

Dresser v. Norwood, 14 <\ B. (N. B.) 574, 588, 108 D. 0. I
in which the third person was allowed to Bel off a debt due him from
Traub v. MllUken, 57 Me 83, 2 Lm. Rep. ii (1869), In which the
the agent;
3
third person bad paid the agent; Talntor v. Prendergast, 3 liiii (N.
Foster v. Graham, 166 Mass. 202, ii N. E 129
88 \m Dec 618 (1842);
quoting witii approval the principal case, Sullivan v. Shaller, TO Conn
v V| with
Belfleld v. Nat Buppij
valuable review of case
10 \.t\ 1054 ii
\ti. 181, 69 \m. Bt Rep. 799 (18
189,
189 Pa
contrad subjecl to all rights of the third per
uch
Th principal tak<
Coin.
Smith,
Fo tor
were the principal.
agenl
the
though
as
s..n. JubI
South, 019, it
19,
Darden,
er
(1865);
Ro
604
-171. 88 Am. Dec.
»

Accord:

;

a

Am

St. Rep. 152 (1888).
the third person ought
hl
guard or

2

I

I

r.

v

e

a

'.'

12 .

(1863)

know he is dealing with an nRont, ho
debt due from the
sel ofl on
claim
Am. Rep*. 117 (1872
396,
35 m,i
241,95 s. W. 164, 115 A.,.. Bt
to distinctions between
the ra
19, 16 L. Ed. •".:
23 How.
ool
are
the United Btate
Iriit
■
ealed lnntri
ed principal on
an m to .„ii i.n agent

rt

Clarke

v. Courtney,

Pel

819,

bo

.
I
'
»;

a

ee of

5

Accord;

ante,

U

712l

i

ol

;

831)

p.

haefer v. Henkel,

...

L

>

,

.i

,1

■

U

I

a

a

to

6

,. ,,,,

|

if

,
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fact — if lie nego tiated with Richardson as the prinhim to be SO, and paid him for the work before he
an> elaim on i lu- part of Touchstone, he will be pro-

ignoranj of litis
I,

supposing

ieh payment.
(
Story" in his work on Agency, p. 43 ), § 430, says — "The
under which such payments are made to
modes and circumstances
lit may have a material bearing on the rights of the principal.
..vments are received by the agenj according- to {he ordinary
fifse ^\ business, or even ii they arc made out of the ordinary
course of business, if the agent alone is known or is supposed to be the
Mr. Pailey lays down the
principal, the latter will be bound thereby.

"If." says he, "the agent act for a principal undissame doctrine.
closed, he has authority to receive payment."
Until the principal ap— T.iv. on Agency,
as
the
proprietor.
to
be
regarded
is
the
agent
pears,
2] l-'averic v. Dennett, 11 East. 38; Coatcs v. Lewis, 1 Camp.
Rep. 444: Blackburn v. Schoales, 2 Id. 341; Stewart v. Aberdein,
4 Mees. & Welsh. 211 ; see, also, Governor v. Daily, 14 Ala. 469, 472.
So. in the case before us, the party dealing with the journeyman,
having no notice of the fact that he was working for the defendant
in error, and having made to him full payment before he was informed
the defendant that he claimed the price of the work, must be confrom any obligation to pay the money over
red as discharged

again to the principal. — Smith's Mercantile Law, 129.
It results from what we have said, that the County Court mistook
the law in holding the plaintiff in error liable for the payment he had
previously made to Richardson.
The judgment is consequently reversed, and the cause remanded.
8

PITTS
(Supreme

v.

Court of Maine,

Judicial

MOWER.
1841.

18

Me. 3G1, 3G Am. Dec. 727.)

jumpsit for the price of a "horse power" sold to defendant by
A. Pitts, who was the agent of plaintiff. The agent took in pay-^
The case comes up on exceptions to
ment notes running to himself.
the ruling and instructions in the trial court.
v, J.
It has been decided, that the disclosure of a trustee
and the judgment upon it are to be received in evidence only between
are parties to the suit.
Wise v. Hilton, 4 Greenl. 435.
thosi
the plaintiff was not a party to the suit in which the
In '
I he is not bound by that judgment.
ids of his principal and takes a promis1 T.

i:

3

Holt, 278,
!.<l. Ellenborough.

may interpose

• 'I to
broker who sells as
C. L. 101 (1816); Coates v.

before pa)

principal. Townsend
Campb. 444
Lewis,
1

.•'

himself, the principal

I
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ment, and forbid it to be made to his agent ; and a payment to the
And the principal may sue in his'
agent after this will not be good.
own name on the contract of sale, except when, as with us, it is exh is said in argument
tinguished by taking a negotiable promise,
For the defendants, that the law will not imply a promise where tl
an express one; and that there being an express one in the note to _J
[iram A. Pitts one cannot be implied to the plaintiff.
The law re
gard> the express contract made with the agent in the purchase as
made with the principal and as remaining unextinguished by tl e
These rights of the principal are well established
hot negotiable.
"and were recognized in the cases of Titcomb v. Seaver, 4 Greenl. 542,
In this case th e defendants
and Edmond v. Caldwell, 15 Me. 340.
were noti fied before payment or judgment against them as trustees,
that the plaintiff was the owner of the property sold, and that he
Tf they thought propclaimed to have the payment made to himself.
er to disregard that notice, the rights of the plaintiff cannot thereby

Exceptions sustained and new trial granted.

SECTION 2.— FOR FUNDS OR PROPERTY OF TIIE PRIN-

CIPAL

TAYLOR
(Court of King's Bench,

1815.

3 Maule

v.

PLUMER.

& 8. 562, 2 Rose,

157, 16 Rev. Rep. 861.)

a

iv
- m

such

it matters do( that the third person has promised
agent Farmers'
Me* hai
A

(
1
1
1

as

principal,

m;iv have under

to

■•"
'

long

p

pyy-rUTh

so

tha

t

g

for any special pnrpo

i
»l di

by

i

it

is

in in

d<
d

J.

a

,'.

Defendant entrusted to one Walsh, his broker, a draft for £22
The broker misapplied the most
with which to buy exchequer bills.
oP'tTie funds from the draft by purchasing American Securities, intending to abscond with them to America. He was arrested before
ping the country, and handed over to his principal the Aim
On the day he misapplied the money he had become
trities.
now bring trover for the sccuritii
bankrupt, and his
After stating the case, his Lordship
l.ord EllEnborough, Ch.
the
not
entitli
this case
said. The plaintiff
th<
point
maintaining
ant ha- succei
him to his
<»f
principal entrusted
""""viz., that" The property

i
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And,
thus
guis hed from all other property.
facthe
from
the
assignees
uf
reco
is
equally
cumstanced
tor, in the event of his becoming a bankrupt, as it was from the
And, indeed, upon a view of
before his bankruptcy.
■tor himself
of the arguments, it should seem
the authorities, and consideration
that it the property in its original state and form was covered with
no change of that slate and form ,
a trust m favour of the principal,
of such trust, or give the factor, or those who represent
than they
[her more valid claim in respect to
An abuse of trust can confer
had before such change.
re>
the party abusing it, nor on those who claim in privity
with him. The argument which has been advanced in favour of the
•iritis, that the property of the principal continues only so long

_

n

it,

st it

pursued in respect to the order and
ceases when the property
ion of it. and that
tortiously
nverted into another form for the use of the factor himself,
liievous in principle, and supported by no authorities of law^
is

Is

authority of the principal

a

it is

And the position which \vas held out in argument on the part of the
plaintiffs, as being the untenable result of the arguments on the part
no doubt
result deducible from those arguof the defendant,
a

ments but unless
be
result at variance with the law, the plaintiffs are not on that account entitled to recover.
The contention on
the part of the defendant was represented by the plaintiffs' counsel
pushed to what he conceived to be an extravagant length, in the
;

if

is

a

a

is

trusted
defendant's counsel being obliged to contend, that "if A.
horse for him, and he purchases
by B. with money to purchase
carriage with that money, that B.
entitled to the carriage." And,
indeed,
he be not so entitled, the case on the part of the defendant appears to be hardly sustainable in argument.
It makes no difference in reason or law into what other form, different from the

it

it

original, the change may have been made, whether
be into that
promissory notes for the security of the money which was produced by the sale of the goods of the principal, as in Scott v. Surman,
Willes, 400, or into other merchandize, as in Whitecomb v. Jacob,
Salk. 160, [or the product of or substitute for the original thing still
- the nature of the thing itself, as
can be ascertained
long as
lit only ceases when the means of ascertainuch, and
the case when the subject
turned into money,
"ounded in
general mass of the same description.
The difficulty which arises in such
case
difficulty of fact and
law, and the dictum that money has no ear-mark must be un;n the same way;
e. as predicated only of an undivided
is

in-

a

is

i.

a

a

an''

pt

a

and undistinguishable mass of current money.
But money in
bag,
apart from other money, guineas, or other coin
the fact were so) for the purpose of being distinguished,
as to fall within the rule on this subject, which
(if
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applies to every other description of personal property whilst it remains, (as the property in question did,) in the hands of the factor,
or his general legal representatives. 10 * * *
A nonsuit must be entered.

PEARCE
(Supreme

Court of Judicature

et al. v.

of Indiana.

DILL,.

1897.

14f> Ind.

inn, 4<5N. IB. 788 I

Plaintiff deposited over $5,000 in her name in the defendant bank,
giving her husband authority to check it out for her busiu
had dealings

with Pearce,

who maintained a bucket shop, and i<
in wheat and corn, he drew checks for
$4,700 in I'earce's favor.
These the hank- received, and transfem '.
the amount to the account of Pearce.
Dill and Pearce are both in
"solvent, and Mrs. Dill seeks in equity to have the court resture to her
account the moneys wrongfully transferred
and still standing in the
"
account of Pearce.
From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
Jordan, J. 11 * * * The insistence of counsel for appellee is
that E. S. Dill, the agent of their client, committed a breach of trust,
and wrongfully diverted the money of his principal into the hands
of the appellant Pearce. and that she has the right, under the fact:
and the law applicable thereto, to trace it into Pearce's hank account,
i.ir

"options"

to which it had been transferred, and have it restored to her by the
court as her property.
The authorities generally affirm and support
the right of a cestui que trust to pursue and recover trust funds wrongfully diverted, where their identity has not been lost, and where they
of parties for value without notice
1 into the handhave nol
of the tru>t. Whenever any property or fund in its original state has
once been impressed with the character or nature of a trust, no sub
sequent change of its original form or condition can devest it of it

trust

:•

pable

of being identified,

and

the

it.

beneficiary thereof may pursue and reclaim it, regardless Ot the form
into
hanged, provided it h;
into whirl] it may havi
All that the
: a bona fide purchaser
without notice.
iw contemplates b\ requiring the property or fund to he identified
is a substantial identification, and. in case the fund consi i- of money,
although not able to trace the
the cestui que trust may reclaim
a

is

a

in

i

a

by

It

a

fund
identical com., or bills, so long
lentil) as
trust fund
well settled principle that the abuse of
tamed.
upon him. nor u;
trustee or fiduciary
who claim
privity with him. Where the fund has been misap]

is

ol

the principal t<> liis
the right
■\ ante, \>. 501 .
omitted
Pari ><f tin- opinion
Good.Pb.4

a

1
1
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(Tart

or converted into other property, or mixed with the funds oi the
trustee! or of those claiming through him. and can ho traced and
to the cestui que trust.
thTcOj courts will atlrihutc the ownership
and will not permit the wrongful act of the trustee or fiduciary in
mixing the trust fund with his own funds, or those of a third party,
to defeat a recovery, but, in general, in such cases, will separate the
trust fund from the others with which it has been commingled, and
store

it

entitled to receive it.

to the beneficiary

X.

36

Bevis

v.

llellin,

63

v. AssoTown oT Monticcllo.
136
Orb
v.
Ind. 313,
Coapstick,
3 X. K. 633;
532,
48 N.
149
Ind.
Shepard v. Bank (No. \7,7^3)

1291 lUuulv v.
ition, 104 End. 70,

Tud.

1'.. 278.

84 Tnd.

11 ( >;

Kichl

also, the many leading authorities collected in a note
c.
to the case of Dank v. Goetz, 32 Am. St. Rep. 119, on page 125
346.

See,

(s.

1'..

N. E. 907).
trust fund exwhen the right to pursue and reclaim
thereof,
traced
when
the
fund
to the pos
istSj that the true owner
another,
restored
to
have
identified,
right
the
and
has
ion of
debt due and owing to him, but for the reason that
to him, not as
138 111. 127, 27

it

a

a

a

in

is

it

and
can make
hi> property, wrongfully diverted and withheld;
whether
case,
in
such
of
to
difference,
right
recovery
the
no
regard
individual
of
the
single
traced
into
possession
been
the fund has
firm or association composed of many persons,
or into the hands of

In re llallett's Estate and Knatchbank account.
into the form of
696;
Englar v. Offutt, 70 Md. 78, 16 Atl.
Bufl v. Ilallett, 13 Ch. Div.
497, 14 Am. St. Rep. 332; National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U.
S. 54. 26 L. Ed. 693.
-r. as we have seen, discloses that Dill was the agent
of the appellee, and only authorized to draw checks upon her money
The relation between him
in the Bank for her use or in her business.
and the appellee was of
fiduciary character, and in the use of her
trustee; and, in
money in this respect he occupied the position of
'■■
■
■

a

>r

a

a

i

«

*

I
'<

by

is

in

*

a

the event that he wrongfully diverted or misapplied such funds, the
trust fund apply. Riehl
rules relating to the pursuit and recovery of
v. Association,
supra; Roca v. Byrne, 145 N. Y. 182, 39 N. E. 812,
*
45 Am. St. Rep. 599.
shown
To summ arize,
conclusion, the agent of the appellee
to have abused his trust
wrongfully diverting the money of his
The latan :e for an illegal consideration.
principal into the hand of
in

in

9

the checks
controversy with knowledge that the funds
upon which they were drawn belonged to appellee, and that Dill, with
whom he deall
the money.
By the means of
misappropriating
these checks, which, in his hands at least, were tainted with the illethe trari
the settlement of which they were drawn,
:

appellant procured the bank to swell his account with the money hemust be said that
longing to appellee. Under the facts, certainly
it
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a11 with the appellee, and neither of
the appellants
position to successfully assail her right to recover."12
Some other alleged errors are discussed by appellants' counsel,
but the judgment is so manifestly right upon the evidence that, even
if we should concede that the intervening rulings of which they complain were erroneous, they would not result in a reversal.
Section
670, Rev. St. 1S94 (section 658, Rev. St.
The judgment is af1881).
firmed, at the cost of the appellants.
a

l re
v

LIME ROCK BANK
(Supreme

Judicial

v.

Court of Massachusetts,

PLIMPTON.
1835.

17 Pick

L59

28

\m

Dec

Wilde, J. The plaintiff's claim is not founded on any privity between the parties, arising from an express contract, but on principles
J>F equity imposing an obligation on the defendants, which the lawwill imply a promise on their part to fulfil. It is contended that the
defendants have money in their hands belonging to the plaintiffs,
which they cannot in equity and good conscience retain, and that in
'
such ca- an action for monc; ; .'
received will lie.
And this
gener al principle is undoubtedly well established by the authorities.
and is reasonable and cannot operate injuriously to any ojic
the
question then is, whether'the defendants have in tin
anv
money which in equity and good conscience belongs to the plaintiffs.
is prove d satisfactorily that the money borrowed by the defendants
of T\
was the money of the plaintiffs in his hands as their

Jt

agent; but of this fact the defendants had no know
of the loan.
It was therefore a lawful contract between

the time
the defend-

if (lie agent exchange - the princlpal'i property,
o exchanged become
the principal's property, and
third party win. \v.\- taken
good faith from
'i "it' debt "f Hi- agent t<>the third pai
to
W \.i. 229, 24 S.
886, .".7 \m. St. Rep. v,

i tl
•

,|

I

I

;i

it

In

u

]

i

hi

d<

is,

d<

n

\

i:

is,

ants and I'arkhur>t;
and if the case had stopped here, it would be
very clear that this action could not be maintained.
For although it
tru e, that the sale by an agent, without authority,
rty other
than money may be disavowed, and set aside in the case of a bona fide
purchaser, yet in respect to mone\ the law is otherwise; not onh
>ecause money has n,, ear mark and cannot be easily identified, but
a different
doctrine would be productive ■
therefore, manifest tl.
the deb nd.tni
if money lent waa the monc; of the plaintiffs, they were liable onlj to
::.-.
had received the money in payment ol theii
Farkh urst, <.r
I'arl
hurst,
thi
euuld nut be maintained, cv<
■'-'.•'in-!
no
aft<
tice to the defendants, that the money belonged to the plaintiffs.
The
whether alter notice the
only question therefore
leudant.s conk

:i it
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lawfulh detain the money: and wo arc of opinion that they could.
\s Parkhurst was indchted to tlu-in in a sum exceeding the loan,
they had a legal right of set off as against Parkhurst, of which they
uld not be deprived b) the intervention of the plaintiffs' claim;

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

and however disinge nuous the defendants' conduct may be considered
in relation to rarkhurst, they had a legal right thus to secure their
own debt.
Their refusal to repay the loan according to agreement
was a breach of promise; but against this the defendants could set off
a ! reach of promise b\ Parkhurst, and this set-off is allowed by law.
iidants, therefore, had a legal right to appropriate the money
lent, to the payment of their own debt. This distinguishes the present
case from that of Mason v. Waite, where the money came into the
defendant's hands unlawfully, and he had no legal or equitable right
But
to retain it ; and also from that of Clarke v. Shee, Cowp. 200.
the law is laid down by Lord Mansfield, in the latter case, is decisive
"
Whe re m oney or notes," it is said,
against the plaintiffs' claim.
and
upon a valuable consideration, they never
"are paid bona fide,
back
the
true owner; but where they come mala
shall be brought
by
a
into
hands,
they are in the nature of specific property;
fide
person's
and if their identity can be traced and ascertained, the party has a
13
right to recover."
Motion to set aside the nonsuit overruled.

DEAN
(Supreme

Judicial Court of

v.

PLUNKETT.

Massachusetts,

1884.

136

Mass.

195.)

Contract on account annexed to recover $1,608.91, and interest, for
Judgment for $119.91. Plaintiffs appeal.
goods sold and delivered.
Devens. J. 14 In Locke v. Lewis, 124 Mass. 1, 26 Am. Rep. 631,
the authorities, which were found to be to some extent conflicting,
were carefully examined ; and it was held that a sale by a partner, in
i» As to money deposited in a bank in such a way as to show the bank that
it does not belong to the depositor personally, see Baker v. N. Y. Nat. Eixch.
100 N. V. 31, 2 N. B. 152, 53 Am. Rep. 150 (1885), in which the money
Ited in the name of "Wilson & Bro., Agents."
See. also, Nat. Bk.
v. in-. Co., i"i i . s. 54, 26 I.. Ed. 693 (1881), in which the bank knew the
1 by the agent belonged to the principal;
Union Stock Yards
Gillespie, 137 r. S.
11 Sup. Ct. 118, 34 L. Ed. 72 1 (1890); and
I
in Exchange v. Bendinger,
109 Fed. 926, 48 C. O. A. 726,
El, A. -,", (1901), in which defendant accepted the principal's money for
an Illegal purp
.. though the money be deposited in the agent's name, and remain in
'. the principal is entitled
to reclaim it from the bank as against
Boca v. Byrne, 145 N. Y. 182, 39 N. E.
Bt
95), affirming 68 Hun, 502, 22 N. Y. Supp. 1039
otl v. Barman, Willes, 100 (1742).
This is so even though some of
<•mingled with tbe money of the principal.
Van Alen v.
Am. Nat Bank, 52 x. Y. i n
i«l J art of the opinion is omitted.

ill,
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payment of his own debt, of goods which were in fact the goods of
tne par tnersnTp, but which the partnership has so entrusted to him
as to enable him to deal with them as his own, and to induce the
public to believe them to be his, and which the creditor received in
faith and without notice that they were the goods of the partwas valid against the partnership and its creditors.
Xo distinction in favor of a partnership can be made where such a transaction is the act of an agent who is not a partner, to whom goods have
been similarly entrusted as the case rests upon the principles of
"All the authorities agree," says Chief Justice Gray, "that
agency.
when a person, entrusted with goods as agent, sells them to one who

has no knowledge that he is agent, but is led to believe, from the
manner in which he has been allowed to deal with the goods, that
ley are his, the other party to the transaction may set off against the
principal a debt of the agent." 124 Mass. 7, 26 Am. Rep. 631.
The principle thus established goes far in disposing of the case at
bar. The plaintiffs are the widow and two of the children of Horatio
N. Dean, who, in company with another child, his sgrj Ransom B.
Dean, had carried on business at Adams under the name and style of
H. N. Dean & Son. Upon the decease of Horatio N. Dean, in August, 1872, Ransom B. Dean, who also was the administrator of his
estate with the will annexed, continued the business, under the same
name and style, as surviving partner, for the benefit of himself and
those interested in his father's estate. T he defendants, wh o r at some
time prior to June, 1877, made the contract with him by which the\
bought the goods, the price of which is sought to be recovered in
this action, believed that he was in reality, as in appearance, then

carrying on said business, as he had done for the first
"as surviving partner, for the benefit of those interested

few

months,

in the estate,

been made in 1875, by which the plaintiffs had agreed to continue and prosecute the business at Adams as
under the name of II. N*. Dean & Son, which was the
copartners
name and style of the original firm, and had const ituted Ransom B.
There was no inten|)can their agenl and attorney to conduct it.
Tn fact, an arrangement

had

but no public notio
of these circumstances,
auditor
necessarih determin
the
of
them was given
tl
defendants
their
the
when
to
unknown
^"TfTaT Fne\ were
from
Perm,
and
when
I
ived
B.
him
with
Ransom
"agreement
■
items
vt
certain
There
were
in
count
the disputed items

tional concealment
;

and the finding

to the defendants before this agreement, their liability for
the defendants do not dispute, and which are not hei

delivered

which
red.
The plaintiffs,

ass uming

Lirviviiig

the

parti

carried on the bu
enti
or inferesl in

to

name and style of the old linn, under
mil B. Dean wn
him all the

pi

'

it,
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merit (they residing elsewhere and without the State), and permitting
him in appearance to continue to conduct the business as surviving
partner, cannot compel those who honestly purchased goods of him
rchj and in ignorance oi his agency, to pay or account for them
15
* * *
except in the manner agreed upon with him.

Judgment affirmed.

SECTION 3.— IN TORT

PATTISON

v.

BARNES.

(Supreme Court of Judicature of Iudiana,

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

V

1S66.

26

Ind.

209.)

iiplaint by Pattison against Barnes alleging that he had emi agent to pay and compromise debts due to and from a partnership, of which plaintiff had been a member; that to deceive and
defraud plaintiff, defendant falsely represented to the agent that plaintiff was indebted to him in a large sum, thereby inducing the agent
to compr omise the debt by a payment of $250; that defendant well
knew plaintiff did not owe him in any way, either personally or as a
Defendant demember of any firm; wherefore he prays judgment.
murred, and the demurrers were sustained.
Plaintiff excepts and
appeals t<> this court.
Elliott, J. 16 * * * No brief has been furnished us by the apThe paragraphs were demurred to separately, for the reason
pellee.
We
that neither stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
are not advised of the particular objection which the court below
: <led as fatal to the complaint, but it is said in the brief of the
appellant's counsel, that it was insisted by the counsel for the defendant that the suit should have been brought by the agent upon whom
the fraud was practiced, and that the plaintiff's remedy was against
34 (1876), in which the agent bought
own name. The principal allowed him
The agent sold
to have the possession of the horse and keep the bill of sale.
the horse to defendant.
Cf. Gussner v. Hawks. 13 N. I). 45.3, 101 N. W. 898
(1904), in which the court held thai the principal could not be divested of the
ownership of his property, without his consent, unless by his conduct he had
■'I himself
to assert his ownership,
as against an Innocent purchaser.
: i.\ If the third person i> charged with knowledge
of the source of the
fund paid over by the agent, he cannot dispute the principal's right. Itiehl v.
;
jville Foundry Ass'n, 104 ind. 70, 3 N. K. 633 (18851; Whitley v. Foy, 59
\. C. 34, 7^ Am. Dec. 236 (1860), In which the court says the principal may
:n bis property unless it has been transferred bona ride to a purchaser
of it. or his assignee, for value withoul notice. This is true as to money or
able paper, but there can I •■do bolder for value without notice of other
property exchanged unless upon the ground of estoppel.
The property in the
• . tiable paper, see Winship & Bro. v. Merchants'
Nat. Bank, fJ Ark. 22 (1
•
!
of the opinion Ls omitted.

la Accord:
Nixon v. Brown, 57 N.
a borse and took :i 1►111 of sale in his

H.
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his a gent, and not against the defendant.
It may be that the plaintiff
eotrttf-fecover
against the agent, as the money" was not paid on a
claim existing against the plaintiff.
Be that as it may, we think it
that the facts stated in either paragraph of the complaint
show
^clear
a valid cause of action in favor of the plaintiff
against the defendant.
Each paragraph charges the defendant with
obtaining the pjaintifl
money from his agent by fraud and deceit, willfully practiced upon
him for that purpose.
The fraud thus perpetrated on the agent was
a fraud on the principal, as the money
obtained by means of the
fraud was the property of the principal, and he is therefore entitled
to his remedy directly against the wrong-doer. 17 We see no valid
objection to either paragraph of the complaint, and think the court
erred in sustaining the demurrers.
The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded,
with instructions to the court below to overrule the demurrers
the second and third paragraphs of the complaint, and for further
proceedings.

GILMORE
(Supreme

Judicial Court of

v.

NEWTON.

Massachusetts,
I

1864.

:> Allen.

171, 85 Am.

749.)

Tort for

the conversion of a horse, which plaintiff, the owner, let
Barrows, and which the latter exchanged with defendant for
another horse.
To an instructed verdict for plaintiff, defendant al
to~~one"

leged exceptions.

Mkivau',

1.
We cannot sustain these exceptions.
The authoriti- s
are decisive that the defendant converted to his own use the plaint if. 's
horse by taking an assignment and possession of him from a pi
who had no authority to dispose of him, and subsequently e:
ing dominion over him.
Stanley v. Gaylord, 1 Cush. Mo. 48 Am.
Dec. 643, and ca-.es there cited; Riley v. Boston Water Power Co.,
11; Williams v. Merle,
11 Cush.
Wend. so. 25 Am. Dec. 604>

Riford

v.

Montgomery,

7

\

if

t.

418; Courtis

v.

Cane, 32 \

t.

232,

76

17 when Hi.- thiol person deceives the agent,
the law v.m treat tin- prln
eip:ii as deceived.
Perkins v. Dvans, 01 Iowa, .... 15 \ VV. 584 (l
tner v. Wright, 15 End. 278 (1860);
Ward v. Borkenhagen, 50 Win i.v.i 7 .\
W. 840 <i
The liability will be the clearer where the third person connives with the
agent to defraud th< principal.
White Sewing Mach, Co \ B<
Mo
App. 117(1801).
And it will Dot matter that the princlpnl might i
Kingman v. Ilero 17 Vffl
i
ered from bis agent
247(1821)
Quin
\n\ profit the third person bat made thereto he
Ian, 88 ill. 297 (1873)
for the principal, who mas recover It In a tort action.
Boston v. Slnuimi
\. i:. 210, 6 I. R \ 029, 15 \m Bt Kep 2.10 i
or of
Sal ford v. Lever, [1891] i Q. B 108, 00 L J g
n i:
Gold, etc., Syndicate, [1900] l Q B
55 .1 P. 244;
Uranl
R
Q B 150, B2 I.. T. 5, L6 T L R B8, (8 w

EFFECTS

AM'

C0NSBQ1 BNCES

RELATION

^v THE

(Part 3

Am. Poo. 174. In McCombie v. Davies, 6 East, 540, Lord Ellen"According to Lord Holt, in Baldwin v. Cole, 6
borough said:
Mod. 212, the very assuming to one's self the property and right
of disposing of another man's goods is a conversion; and certainly a

it,

a

a

it,

it,

a

a

it,
is

This position, though not supported by the cases referred
resisted."
And not only
to by Mr. Greenleaf, may be sustained by other cases.
of
property, without takare there decisions that "a mere purchase"
also decisions that
but
of
not
conversion
ing possession of
etc., of property
bailment,
other
or
pledge,
purchase, receiving
possession
of
and
taking
to
had
no
dispose
who
right
from one
does not always
thereof, without any further act of dominion over
conversion of it. But we need not discuss this class of
constitute
3

Am. St. Rep. 184
Accord: Velsian v. Lewis, 15 Or. 539, 16 Pac. 631,
in which the court said: "At first blush, it may seem strange that one
wliii takes possession (if goods or chattels under
contract of purchase from
wrong-doer, but the exone who had no righl to sell should be treated as
planation of the principle lies in the common-law maxim caveat emptor, which
It Is the buyer's own fault if he
applies to the transfer of personal property.
negligent as not to ascertain the right of the vendor to sell, and he caniccessfnlly invoke his bona tides to protect himself from liability to the
true owner, who can only be divested of his rights or title to his property by
Every person is bound at his peril
his own ait. or by the operation of law.
i-rtain in whom the real title to property is vested, and, however much
diligence he may exerl to that end. he must abide by the consequences of any
Allen, 171, 85 Am. Dec. 749; Spraights v.
mistake.
Gilmore v. Newton.
Hawley, ::'.■ N. V. 441, 100 Am. Dec. 452; Hotchkiss v. Hunt, 49 Me. 213.
right when he himself has
Nothing can lie plainer than that no one can sell
;.. Bell, and that every such wrongful sale, by whomsoever made, whethof the rights of the owner, and in
er by thief or bailee, ait- in derogation
can neither acquire themselves,
to hi- authority, and consequently
any right or title of such owner.. Mere posseson the purchaser
- .ii of another
man's property affords no evidence that the person having
:

a

9

a

a

(1888),

i«

Is

7

a

a

a

e

it

it

i

ha- power to sell it, and he who purchases or intermeddles
that he is protected by the authority of one who lias
with
must see to
power to selL Dixon v. Caldwell, 15 Ohio St. 412, 86 Am. Dec. 487; Spraights
supra; Cooper v. Newman, 45 N. H. 339. A possession taken unv. Hawley,
from one without title, and who has himself been guilty of a
'-inn in disposing of the good or chattels,
possession unauthorized
wrongful at its inception, and which the absence of evil intent in the
possession is based on
purchaser cannot make rightful or lawful.
Such
;.tion of
riL'hr. of property, or a right of dominion over it, derived
from the contract of sale: and what is this in the legal sense but a wrongful
Intermeddling
rtation or detention of the property of another?"
X. II. 146 (1835).
Bolton v. Smith,
•

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

man is guilty of a conversion who takes my property by assignment
18
from an.-ther, who has no authority to dispose of it."
The defendant admits thai although he had no notice that the
Rut he objects to
horse was stolen, yet he acquired no title to him.
the maintenance of this action, because no demand of a delivery of
the horse to the plaintiff was made and refused before the action was
And he cite-, among other books, 2 Greenl. Ev. § 642,
commenced.
where it is said that "a mere purchase of goods, in good faith, from
one who had no right to sell them, is not a conversion of them
against the lawful owner, until his title has been made known and

LIABILITY OF THE THIRD PERSON

Ch.6)

TO THE

PRINCirAL

cases, for no one of them sustains the defendant's objection; for hi?
iment and taking possession
is a case not only of receiving ai
of the horse, hut al-o of afterwards exercising dominion over him hy
See Leonard v. Tidd, 3 Mete. 6;
FaTTtn^ him to a third person.
Ternald v. Chase, 37 Me. 292; Billiter v. Young, 6 El. & Bl. 41.
Demand and refusal are never necessary as evidence of conversion, except when the other acts of the de fendant are not sufficient
v.
when, as in tin- casej
lo proveit fnoTare they evidence of
when
the
deliver
to
property
not in the power of the defendant
delivery
Besides, after property has been converted,
manded.
bar
defeat
an action
or
owner,
will
not
him
demand
on
by
the
to
demand on
for the conversion, but will only mitigate damages.

A

it

a

d<

it

it,

~

809

JETER

Court of Georgia,

(Supreme

Warner,

&

JONES

v.

BLOCKER.
187L

43 Ga.

SSL)

J.

The plaintiffs brought an action against the defenddamages for persuading, enticing and procuring OBS
"William Powell to leave their employment. The plain tiffs allege,
their declaration, that on the 5th day of January, 1871, they entered
with Powell, to
contract, for
valid and legal consideration,
into
"work for them on their farm in Early county, for the year Icvl th..
nlly to the making of said contract, the defendants ni.il:

in

;

a

a

ants to recover

in

ly

persuaded, enticed, procured, and caused the gajd Powell to break
his contract with plaintiff-, leave their employment, and to go inti
the employment of defendants, knowing at the time they djd so thai
said Powell was under contracl with the plaintiffs as before stated,
The defendants demurwhereby they were damaged $500.00.
law to enl
declaration,
as
not being sufficient
the plaintiffs'
and
the plain
dismissed
sustained,
conn
them to recover, which the

tiffs' action, whereupon

the plainti

»ted.

!

rei

is,

a

i

ha

a

••

'

it

i

It

•

was said hy Blackstone "that the retaining another
ant during the time he has agreed to serve his present ma
''"'' ever) ma
-<>
ungenttemanlikc,
th.
valuable
consideration
For
his contract purchased
limited time, the inV(
l

of

h

a

th<
tin
ant, which indorses
br<
the master; and for that injury the law
3d Blacl
special action on the
by
applicable where one
The same principle
142.
man,
to work on his farm, and anothei

•■

ntfact

of employment,

ki i

■

is

a

I

•
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the defendant for the horse was therefore needless for^thT nlainUU.
and would have been useless to the defendant.
Exceptions overruled.

him

nmentari<
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(Tart

3

leave the service of his first employer during the time for which he
1"
It was trier in the Court below to sustain the
was so employed.
demurrer to the plaintiffs' declaration, and dismissing the same.
Jlltlyillemt reversed.

■".

Harl v. Aldridge, Cowper 54 (1774), per Lord Mansfield.
Accord:
The same rule applies when the principal is deprived of the services of ins
Woodward
ogenl by a wrongful Imprisonment of the agent by a third person.
Denio, 369 (1846), and when the agent by threats and Intimiv. Washburn,
Doremus v. Hennessy, 17*; in. 608,
dation is induced to break bis contract
13

L. R A. 7!>7. 802, 68 Am. St. Rep. 203 (1898),
E. 024, 54 N. E. 524,
to distinguish the famous English case of Allen v. Flood. [1898]
attempting
Cf. Bouiiier v. MaB. 119, 77 L. T. 717. 46 W. R. 258.
67 I>.
W. 60, 12 Ky. Law Rep. 737, 11 L. R. A. 550, 34 Am.
cauley, 91 Ky. 135, 15
contract which he is induced
St Rep. L71 (1891). The agenl must be under
Walker v., Cronin, 107 Mass. 555
to break to the injury of the principal.
The principle extends to every grade of service from the most brilliant,
(1871).
llaskins v. Royster, 70 N. C. 601, 16 Am. Rep.
best paid, to the most homely,
Bl. 216, 75 E. C. L.
El.
The Leading case of Lumley v. Gye,
780

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

(1S53).

&

(1874).

216

2

a

S.

Q.

J.

i

\

,

52 N.

PART IV
ACTIONS 1
CHAPTER I
THE FORM

LOVELESS
(Supreme Court of Georgia,

v.

FOWLER.

79 Ga. 134, » S. B.

1887.

103, 11 Am. St. Rep. 407.)

C. J. There was a bailment of goods to l>e sold for
The bailee sold a part on a credit, and a part remained unsold.
He paid the bailor for a portion of them. The bailor then brought
trover against him, requiring bail under the statute applicable to such
actions.
Pending the action, the defendant died, and his administrator was made a party. The alleged value of the stock was $1,156.43, but how much was sold, unsold, or paid for docs not appear.
1. There was authority to sell, and. that being so, the
sale oil a
credit was a mere violation of instructions as to the terms of sale.
Such a sale would pass title, unless the purchaser knew of the violation of instructions, and a sale which passes title is nol a conversion,
though it may be an abuse of authority. It is like selling at a less
The Broker's
price than that named in the agent's instructions.
Case (Clark v. Cummin-). 77 Ga. 64, 4 Am. St. Rep. 72, is not in
A sale "ii credit by an agent in possession of the goods, and
point.
authorized to sell for cash only, is not a conversion; certainly not,
unless it appear that the purchaser had notice of the limitation

iii

the agent's

instructions.

The proper

ol

is

in

it

is

in

is

of

in

2.

not trover, but an
remedy against such agenl
action on the case for violation of instructions or breach oi contract;
material, for
the present instance the class
remedy
and
an
contract, or
tor
breach
action
trover bail
rc<|uiral>le, but
for disobeying instructions,
would not be.

Ix

■

I
v

n
a

In

a

•

In

actions
and practice, of cour
itlon In
and need do special
ca
Part
are cho en to lllti
peculiar
or which tat
of the
practice, and may now profitably
•

'

The ordinary rales of pleading
growing "in of the agencj relation,
The
on Principal and Agent
mi.- which are peculiar t" agency,
Manj
in agency problem
Incidentally
rules of pleading and
examined from tiii- standpoint
•
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Bleckley,

cash.

is,,,

actions

812

4

conversion,
as we do, that the credit sale was not a
sold,
demand
appearing
and
no
part
the
whole
or
stock
either of the
of the action, we
as having been made prior to the commencement
at all on which to
see no evidence in the record of any conversion
Unless an actual conversion by a bailee be shown,
a recovery.
an action of trover against him will not lie, without a previous demand tor the goods, and failure to redeliver.
4. In the argument here it was said that a demand could and would
granted a nonsuit
have been proven had the court not prematurely
to conthus
are
called
upo
on the agreed statement of facts. We
below
u.
«erpreted
whether
court
the
see
to
strue the statement, so as
The parties went to trial on a statement as to what evirrectly.
dence the plaintiff would introduce, and on which he based his right
to recover; which statement was that the goods, of the alleged value
of Sl.15o.43. were delivered by plaintiff to defendant to be sold for
cash, ami plaintiff and defendant were to divide the profits, and the
goods not sold were to be redelivered to plaintiff, and that plaintiff
proposed to prove only that defendant sold a part of the goods, and
sold them for credit, and paid plaintiff for a portion of them, and
there can be no identification of the goods sold or not sold, but plainThis
tiff can only show that goods were turned over to defendant.
statement conceded that plaintiff could prove the facts recited therein, and them only, and was a virtual admission that no demand for
the goods, or any of them, prior to the institution of the suit, could
and the object of the statement being that the court
be established;
determine
the law arising upon the recited facts, though they
might
alone were in evidence before the jury, there was no error in order3.
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(Part

Ruling,

ing a nonsuit.
Judgment affirmed.

McMORRIS
(Supreme

Court of Judicature

v.

SIMPSON.

of New York,

1839.

21

Wend.

610.)

Action of trover. Defendant went to market with his own butter,
He could
and also took some for plaintiff, a neighboring farmer.
not sell it in New York City, and so shipped it South. There was
evidence of usage and custom and of the broad powers given by plaintiff.
The trial judge charged that he was bound to sell in New York
Motion to set aside a verdict for plaintiff.
and not elsewhere.
2
I.
[After holding that the judge was not on the evi* * * The question
dence justified in so charging the jury:]
whether, in any view of the case, this action of trover can be maintained, was d
I on the argument,
and as that point may arise

The
on another trial, it will be proper to give it some consideration.
usual remedies of a principal against his agent are the action
opinion

is omitted.

Ch.

THE FORM

1)

of assumpsit, and a special action on
doubt that trover will sometimes be

the

813

case;

but there can be no

There
good faith, has acted within the general scope of his powers.
must, I think, be an entire departure from his authority before this
The folaction for a conversion of the goods can be maintained.
Lyeds v.
lowing cases will be found to support these positions.
Hay, 4 T. R. 260; Murray v. Burling, 10 Johns. 172; Yaul v. Harbottle, Peake's Cas. 49; Severin v. Keppell, 4 Esp. R. 156; Anon.,
2 Salk. 655; Packard v. Getman, 4 Wend. 613, 21 Am. Dee. 166;
Bromley v. Coxwell, 2 P.os. & Pul. 438; Owen v. Lewyn, 1 Vent.
Catlin v. Bell, 4 Camp. 183, was an action of assumpsit, hut
223.
trover might, perhaps, have been maintained.
In the case at bar, if the defendant was limited to a sale in the city
of New York, and not elsewhere, the delivery of the property to a
third person to be disposed of in another market, would, 1 think, be
3
But there must be a new trial, on the ground that
a conversion.
the case belongs to the jury.
New trial granted.
"See. also, Murray v. Burling,
Whether the action agalnsl an

L0 Johns. 172 (1818).
maj be trover, <>rmust be based upon
agent
:> (allure prop
it' Ms wrong is Blmplj
question,
it
the action sii.>ui<i \»- based on tin- obligation,

ll<

his obligation,
Is a difficult
erly i<> perform bis agency,
the wrong Is an Invasion of the rights of the owner which exists Independent
of the contract, the action Is not rounded on the contract, and could bi
Cotton v. Sharp
Trover Ilea
talned whether the contract existed or not
stein, i i w i 226, v <>Am i>.< 77 1 (1861); Laverty v. Bnethen, 68 N. ^
v
ante, pp. .v.m.
23 Am. Rep. 184 I i 77>.
When the principal is entitled to receive, and the agencj contract req
the agent to pay over, the Identical money received, trovei
i,, other co i the principal and agent are merelj debtor and
on,
Salem Traction Go. v. Anson, n
Itor, and a contract a< Ion

i

v

fl<

i

t

In

II
-

1
1
1
<
-

Pac. 1015, 69 Pac. 675 (1902).
agent baa converted bis principal's property, the
When
portation, or,
and
tort for the tre pa
election to lie
w replevin for its recovery, or to waive ihe
the property,
lion that the agent ba
upon the
sue in assumpsit
Hart<
Ised to paj for It.
and baa pr
217 fl»
Suttle, 94 Mini
(1904); Schick
for mom
be action on
en 57 v,
umption that the
on the
edit on his account
ome benefit from the
ti

a

,
,i

l
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That
remedy.
appropriate
whenever
the
has
conbe
maintained
agent
wrongfully
may
action
verted the property of his principal to his own use ; and the fact of
conversion may be made out, by showing- either a demand and refusal, or that the agent has, without necessity, sold or otherwise disWhen an agent
posed of the property contrary to his instructions.
wrongfully refuses to surrender the goods of his principal, or wholly
departs from his authority in disposing of them, he makes the propBut there must
erty his own, and may be treated as a tort-feasor.
be some act on the part of the agent — a mere omission of duty is not
enough, although the property may be lost in consequence of the
Nor will trover lie where the agent, though wanting in
neglect.
an

SJ

ACTIONS

t

ASHLEY
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(Supreme

Judicial

Court

v.

(Part

4

ROOT.

of Massachusetts,

L862.

l

All. mi.

504.)

Chapman, J. The instruction to the jury thai the plaintiff was not
entitled to recover in this action the sum of $2250 collected by the
The dedefendants and in their hands as his agents was erroneous.
fendants' counsel contends that it was correct, because the declaration is in tort, and this sum can only be recovered in an action of
It is true that the declaration is in tort. It alleges among
contract.
other things that the defendants were the agents of the plaintiff, and
as such undertook to collect and secure a certain note of $2500; that
they collected the sum of $2250 on the note, and lost the balance, and
refused to pay over the money collected upon the plaintiff's demand,
and that their conduct was negligent and fraudulent and a breach of
their duty as agents.
This is one of the numerous classes of cases where a party may
elect to sue either in contract or tort. At common law he might sue
in assumpsit for breach of contract, or in case for breach of duty.
The general rule is well stated in Courtenay v. Earle, 10 C. B. 73,
that where there is an employment, which employment itself creates
a duty, an action on the case will lie for a breach of that duty, although it may consist in doing something contrary to an agreement
made in the course of such employment, by the party on whom the
duty is cast. See also Church v. Mumford, 11 Johns. 479, where the
doctrine is applied to the case of a breach of duty by an attorney ;
and Howe v. Cook, 21 Wend. 29; Gilbert v. Williams, 8 Mass. 51, 5
Am. Dec. 77; Dearborn v. Dearborn, 15 Mass. 316; Dwight v.
Brewster, 1 Pick. 50, 11 Am. Dec. 133. The jury should have been
instructed that the plaintiff could recover in an action of tort for all
the injury which had been caused by the defendants' breach of duty,
whether in the loss of security or the neglect to pay over on demand
the money which they had collected as his agents.
The proof of the statutes of Iowa was in conformity with the provision of Gen. St. c. 131, § 63.
As to certain other questions argued in respect to the admission of
testimony, they may not arise upon a new trial, and therefore it does
not seem to be necessary to decide them.
xeptions sustained.
It does

lie when no money or credit has yet passed from the third porSeo, also, LindRowland v. Barnes, 81 N. C. 234 n^T'.ti.
ning, -J IimI. lis (1850); Challiss v. Wlylie, 35 Kan. 500, 11 Pac. 438
Having made his election the principal must abide by the choice with
all it
Coil v. Stewart, no x. y. 17 (1872), in which the principal --iied in assumpsit, and therefore had to allow a counterclaim by the
nut

agent

THE FORM

Cn. 1)

KING
(Court of Exchequer,

v.

815

ROSSETT.

1827.

lounge

2

&

Jervls,

33.)

Bill against stock-brokers for an accounting.
It prayed a discovery; an account of the true prices at which the stock was sold and
purchased; and an injunction to restrain proceedings at law which
the agents were taking for a balance they claimed to be due from
plaintiff. The agents had rendered plaintiff an account, showing a
balance due them of £625.
Plaintiff claimed this was erroneous and
inaccurate,

and that they really owed him £1000.
Defendants put in
demurrer for want of equity.
ALEXANDER, L. C. B. 4 I can entertain no doubt whatever as to
the course which ought to be pursued in this case, and am clearly of
The bill is filed by a
opinion that the demurrer should be allowed.
is
said
that
fact alone is suffihis
and
it
that
agents,
principal against
sustain
bill.
a
to
the
Undoubtedly,
cient
principal is entitled to an
account from his agent, and may apply to a Court of Equity for that
purpose ; but, as I conceive, before that Court will interfere, a ground
for its interposition must be laid, by showing an account which cannot
fairly be investigated by a Court of Law. Unless Courts of Equit)
were to put that limit to their interference, no case of this description
would ever be tried in a Court of Law, and wherever a person was en*
Demurrer ala set-off, a
be sustained. 8 * *

bill might
titled to
lowed with costs, according to

VILWIG
(Supre

v.

Court

of

practice

the

BALTIM<
Appeals

>RE

&

of Virginia,

of the Court.

o. R.
L884

I
79

Va.

149.)

Bill against Vilwig and Worthen for a discovery on oath by Worthen of his receipt- and credits as agenl "i the company, to determine
the amount for which Vilwig was liable as surety on Worthen's bond.
IIinio-., !.'• The bill charges thai this company, a short time prior
to Januarv 13, 1875, appointed one B. M. Worthen its agenl in Winchester; that the scope of his agency extended from Harper's Ferry
<

Pari "f Hi'' opinion

Is

omitted

effect, merelj
for damages f"r breacb of ;> contract ,,r •'"'
of at law, and eoultj will
appropriately >ii
counts .'ill on one Bide,
Paton v. Clark, 158 Pa, 19, 27 Ml. L10
ike Jurisdiction.
mere money demand, Barry v. Bt<
true "t
name thing
:;i I.. .1. ii. 785,
88,
Jur. V s. L43, 10
T. Eti
though long m< unl
Eng. Repr. 1137 (1862), and
or for
definite comppiiHiitlon.
an agenl upon fixed term
145 24 im, BL Rep, 678 (1891).
Bland, 87 Va. 706 13
»lej v. EI1I1,
H. L.
Bee, also, the leading
Phil 399, Lfl
Ch. 182,
1002 (1848), affirming
Jur. 847, 13
399, ir Eng. Repr. 683
L843).
pinion
omitted.
Pari of
claim,

l\

«

•

i

I

9

le

a

o

Ii

I

I

<

2

1

B

L

I

8,

■

E

.

bj

ti

3.

''•

<

L.

i

:i

(1

i

i

in

Ifl

\

■
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a general

Mi!

(Part

A.CTIONS

4

'

a

if
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of aiding them in making their answer, and more than two years after
an account had been ordered, Vilwig filed an answer, which is not sustained by the proofs however, in which he reserves the right to demur
And in November, 1883, more than eight years after the
to the bill.
bill, Worthen filed an answer in which he demurs to the
the
of
filing
bill, "pleads want of jurisdiction in the court," and denies that any
discovery is needed from him or that he had at any time received any
money as agent for which he had failed to render a full account.
Now, assuming for the purposes of the case, what is certainly not
beyond dispute, that it was competent for the defendant to plead to the
jurisdiction of the court at the time he did, and after he had submitted
to its jurisdiction for so long a time, and in some instances invoked its
ers, we proceed to consider the first error assigned upon this appeal, viz.: The bill should have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The bill in this case, it will be observed, is not a technical bill
of discovery, or, as it is sometimes called, a pure bill of discovery, that
is, a bill filed for the purpose of enforcing discovery in aid of proceedings before some other tribunal, but is a bill for discovery and relief ;
In this sense, "evthat is, it is a bill in equity calling for a discovery.
in equity" may properly be deemed
bill of discovery, since
disclosure from the defendant, on his oath, of the truth of the
(instances constituting the plaintiff's case, as propounded in his
bill.
1483.
The bill in this case not being then the
Story's Eq.
technical bill of discovery, the cause did not necessarily terminate with
the failure to obtain the discovery, and
was competent for the court,
being for an account as well as
discovery, to go on and determine the matter of controversy,
an account was needed for a
proper decision of the case.
For, as courts of equity have jurisdiction
in the case of trustee and cestui que trust, where the cestui que trust
demands an account of moneys received under the trust under the genII
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urg, subject to subordinate agencies at certain intermediate
That Worthen gave bond on the 13th
the line of the road.
on
points
with
appellant)
1875,
John Vilwig as his surety in the
January,
(the
penalty of $3,000, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties as such agent. That Worthen's agency terminated on the 10th
March. 1875, and thai there was then due to the company a sum "of
ess than $1,140.39 with interest, etc., after allowing all credits."
The hill also alleges that Worthen had received as agent of the company large amounts of money for which he had not accounted, and
that no full settlement could he had with him until he should make a
full disclosure on oath as to "the receipts and credits" during these periods.
It then prays for a discovery, an account, and for general reIn May, 1879, more than three years after the plaintiff had been
lief.
required by the court to furnish the defendants with copies of all papertaining to the office of the agent at Winchester, during the
period covered by the bond of Worthen and Vilwig, for the purpose

THE FORM

Ch. 1)

817

eral equity for enforcement of trusts, so "a corresponding equity exists as against an agent or steward, or a person in any similar character, who is bound by his office to render regular accounts. And if he
fails to render such accounts, his employer will have an equity, arising
out of the agent's failure of duty to have the accounts taken in the
court of chancery, where the evidence may be supplied by discovery on
"This equity does not originate," says Adams, "in the mere
oath."
* * * confer
want of discovery, which will not
a jurisdiction for
relief, but in the additional ingredient, that such want has been caused
by the defendant's fault." Adams' Eq. §§ 220, 221.
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In Coffman v. Sangston, 21 Grat. 263, this court said: "The juris
diction of courts of equity in matters of account involving the transactions and dealings of trustees and agents is now well established.
Not that the hare relation of principal and agent justifies the interfer-

ence of the court in every case, but whenever it appears that a dk
ery is necessary, or that there are mutual accounts between the ] dirties, or the remedy at law is not plain, simple and free from difficulty.
the equitable jurisdiction attaches."
Zetelle v. Myers, 1'' Gral
Segar v. Parrish, 20 ('.rat. 680 j Simmons v. Simmons' Adm'r, 33 (hat.
451.
Within this category the case in hand clearly falls. It is a case
requiring an investigation of the complicated account ol an agent occupying a position of confidence and trust, charged virtute officii with
the duty not only of keeping but of rendering regular accounts, and
who was the custodian of most, if not of all of the papers and vouchIn
ers which showed the receipt^ and disbursements of his agency.
such cases the remedy at law is not as plain or free from difficulty as
it is in equity, and this is strikingly illustrated by the case of Richmond & Petersburg R. R. Co. v. Kasey & al.. 30 'hat. 220, where, the
action being covenant, both parties found it necessary to have the ac

count taken before a commissioner. 1 In view of what has been said.
we cannot doubt that the court of equity properly had jurisdiction of
* * *
the case.
r The equity Jurisdiction rests largely upon confidential
relations, Involving
Marvin v. Brooks, 94 N
tin- need of discovery, and the duty of explanation.
<i
Maki
V. 71 (1883);
Rippe v. Stogdill, 61 Wis. 88, 20 N. W. 645 (1884).
v. Johnston, i Ma. id. :;t::. •">''.Eng. Bepr. 742 (1810), which makes tin- equlrj
jurisdiction very broad, with Moxon v Bright, L. B. I Ch 202, 20 i i
\ 8 mm.
9 Jur
\. 8. 061 (1869), and Smith v. Leveaux, 2D
• 3 New Rep. 18, 12 w
R 31, 81
.1. Ch. I'm. 9 L. T. Rep
which an adequate
Ch. 1. 46 Eng. Bepr. 274 (1803), limiting Its use I
the general dlscu
Ion of approprl
•annul be bad al law.
■, vj Pa. 322, s^ Am. 1 H
!

si.

i lODO.PB.d

A
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UNDERHILL
(Supreme

v.

(Part

4

JORDAN.

Court of New York. Appellate Division, First
TL' App. Dlv. 71, 76 X. V. Supp. 266.)

Department,

10012.

Appeal from special term. New York county.
Action for an accounting by Edward C. Underbill against Nina
From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff
Ionian and another.
appeals.

Reversed.

Hatch, J."
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The learned trial court, in making disposition of the
of law raised by the demurrer, seems to have based its conclusion upon the ground that the complaint did not plead an equitable cause
of action, for the reason that the plaintiff had no lien upon the fund in
his hands, and also because he had an adequate remedy at law; and,
further, that the complaint could not be sustained as an action at law to
recover for services rendered without disregarding the substantial averment- of the complaint and the prayer for relief. It is not necessarv, in
support of the conclusion at which we have arrived, to determine whether the averments of the complaint, coupled with the prayer for relief,
Mate a legal cause of action or not. Nor is it absolutely essential to the
maintenance of an equitable action for the relief demanded in this complaint that there should exist a lien upon the fund in plaintiff's hands.
It is clear, from the averments of the complaint, that the plaintiff has
established that there existed between himself and the defendants the
relation of principal and agent of such a character as constituted the
plaintiff a quasi trustee for the defendant, and such relation, within
the doctrine announced in Marvin v. Brooks, 94 N. Y. 71, would have
entitled the defendants to maintain an equitable action to procure an
accounting of the plaintiff's acts in dealing with the trust funds intrusted
to his care and management.
While it is true that the existence of a
bare agency is not sufficient upon which the equitable jurisdiction of the
court can be invoked, yet where the agent's duties are fiduciary in character, and involve a dealing with trust funds, he is regarded in the law
as a quasi trustee, and may be called to account in a court of equity for
his management of the trust fund ; 9 and in such action judgment may
determining the respective rights and liabilities of the parties thered adjusting the respective interests of the parties in and to the trust
-

The facts and the rest of the opinion are on p. CIS.
t lie agency Is fiduciary,
and especially if the legal relief and mode
of obtaining it
ficient, then the jurisdiction in equity attaches in a
Buit by the agent against the principal.
Hapgood v. Berry, 157 Fed. 807, 85
I
I
A. 171 (1
A- •" the agent's remedy in Law against the principal, see ante, p. 005 ff . ;
■ Bibb v. Allen, 149 D. S. 181, 13 Sup. Ot. 050. 37 L. Ed. 819 (1893); Hill
2 Moore, C. P. 120, 8 Taunt. 371, 4 Eng. Ch. 189 (1818).
v. Thompson,
A- to actions by tin- third person againsl the agent, see p. 050 ff.; by the
thir.] person against the principal. ><•(•
p. ~-±\ BE,
;'
When

Till:

Ch. 2)
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In

the present case the complaint avers in terms that the plainthe defendants as agent, factor, and manager, and this
averment is accompanied by facts showing wherein and how he manthat from time to time he rendered
aged the estate of the defendants;
to them accounts of the conduct of the business, and from time to time
paid over money to the defendants arising out of such b
. and
that there has never been a final settlement and adjustment of accounts
between the parties; that in the course of such business the plaintiff
has advanced money for expenses connected with his management of
the defendants' property, for which he has not been paid ; and that the
reasonable value of his services is a specified sum. for which he asks to
be allowed.
The authority which we have cited is clearly decisive of
the proposition that the defendants could maintain an equitable action
for an accounting based upon these facts.
If the defendants could
maintain such an action, then it must follow that the plaintiff has the
reciprocal right to also maintain an action for the same purpose, as it
would be clearly obnoxious to every principle of equity to hold that
one party might invoke the aid of equity and that the other could not.
although the rights and liabilities of each were governed by and arose
out of the same transaction.
It is quite evident that the complaint is inartificially drawn, but such fact does not defeat the plaintiff's rights in
the premises, and furnishes no ground for a demurrer to his complaint.
Enough appears to show the right tc the equitable interposition of the
court, and this is sufficient to resist the demurrer.
Wetmore v. Porter,
* * *
92 N.Y. 76.
fund.

CHAPTER

II

THE PARTIES TO THE ACTION

!'•

For cases illustrating actions by the agent against the third person, see p. 701 ft'.; by the third person againsl the agent, p. 650 ff. ; 1>\
the principal againsl the third person, ante. p. 791 ff., espe<
iall)
Robert,

1,0 s

.

:

;

p.

p.

m

by

by

p.

12 Wend. 413, 17 Am. \hv. 132, ant.-,
792;
the third
againsl the principal, ante,
72A ff.;
the prii
ainst
the ag.-nt, ante,
1>\
506 li.
his principal, ant
v.

ff
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EVIDENCE OF THE AGENCY

SECTION

1.—

SCHMIDT
(Supreme

AND BURDEN OF PROOF

PRESUMPTION

Court of Illinois,

1902.

v.

196

SHAVER.

111. 108,

63 N.

E.

655,

89

Am.

St. Rep.

I'.'irt of the opinion

Is

•

r,

it

a

a

*

*

*

J.1

a

it,

In 1894 appellant, Ida E. Schmidt, by her next friend, obtained a
judgment against the city of Chicago for $5,000 for a personal injury.
The suit was prosecuted for a contingent fee of one-fourth by a claim
At his suggestion
corporation, of which one Beck was president.
As appellant was
Shaver was appointed
guardian of appellant.
poor, and there was delay in recovering the judgment, the guardian
secured a court order to sell it for $4,375. Shaver, through Beck,
sold to Perkins, but Perkins did not meet his agreement, and Shaver
left the assignment in a vault of the Claim Company with some other papers he had there.
Beck took the assignment from the vault
and delivered it to Perkins, receiving a check made out to himself.
The judgment was further assigned several times, finally coming into
the hands of Pearson, one of the appellees.
Shaver heard no more
about
and had none of the proceeds.
They were misappropriated
Appellant came of age, and on finding what had been
by Heck.
Her
bill in equity to set aside all the assignments.
done, brought
bill was dismissed for want of equity and she appealed.
CarTwright,
The judgment could not be collected
at the time, and the court, which had general supervision
of the
good one under the cirguardian, found that the price offered was
cumstances.
We think the probate court had
right to authorize the
The
sale of the judgment at what
found to be its actual value.
never carried out the order of the probate court,
and never delivered the assignment to Perkins, unless Beck was his
•
to make the delivery.
The rights of Perkins and the subseassignees must depend upon establishing an agency in Beck to
make the delivery and receive the payment.
Upon that question, the
burden of proof was upon the defendants, who affirmed the existence
i
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er of the judgment, and was not entitled to the proceeds, but that
they belonged to the guardian, and that Beck could only receive
them as agent for the guardian, and it was therefore incumbent on
him to ascertain what Beck's authority was.
The guardian never
authorized Beck to deliver the assignment or receive payment, and
never knew of the act until it was discovered after his disci
shortly before this suit was begun.
The filing of the assignments
with the clerk of the curt did not operate as constructive notice to
the guardian or appellant.
They were not required to be recorded.
and were not contemplated
by the statute as public records, and
would not amount to constructive notice to any one. Wade, Notice,
§ 119; B« airland v. Peoria Co., 16 111. 538; Betser v. Rankin. 77
289. The guardian never received any part of the proceeds, and never
ratified the sale or the act of Beck in any manner.
The mere fact
that Beck assumed to act as agent in delivering the assignment and
receiving the payment, without the knowledge or subsequent ratification of the guardian, was not sufficient to prove the agency.
beyond question that the guardian never held Beck out as having
authority to receive payment, unless
was
the single act of leaving the assignment for safe-keeping
the vault of
corporation

ti
mis proband! rests on the person setting ui> an agency, not onlj ms
the fad of the agency, but
cope of the authority
Co. v. Kelletl Chatham
Macb
App.) 84 s. w 001 d;i
Clark v. Jordan, 35 w. v.i. 736, 14 s. i;. 255 (1891).
The burden of prool
upon the party who asserts the agency, whether be be the third i"
Church, 27 R.
Ward v. Trust
262, 81 Atl. 651 (1005), or the ngenl
who is Bued personally, and wl
to escape by proof thai be act<
agent, Miller v. Stock,
i>,
Bailey, 163 (1831);
Porl
31 Am. Dec. 715 (It
Tin' weight of evidence need not be
jurj
nphold
flnding by
agency.
Noble v, Burney, L24
163 (1000)
tin' facts proved show thai Buch was tii>' undei
Mill
the parth
v. Dumbauld,
Kan. App. 376, 51
But
the pn
(1898).
are equal, the proof of the
Kelly
Church, 27
N. W. 721 (18«7>;
Ward
851
Proof of the gencj must be clear and
1905).
doubt,
v. Wlghtman,
7^ III. 563 (1875
the verdict must be agalnsl the aicencj
un, m Mol
Beal
M<
170 (1848).
nt with tin
This is the more so if the
strait. .n v. Todd, 82 Me.
in (1(
19, 19 ah
he onus probe ndl
In Hi
Inlon
-I Lord !ran worth In Pole \.
165,
CI
'■•
T. 645
19.
1
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of the relation of principal and agent between the guardian and
Beck.f
There is no presumption of Beck's authority, and one who claims
the benefit of a contract made through an agent has the burden of
proof when the alleged agency is denied. In order to prove the
agency, the defendants were bound to prove an appointment, either
express or implied from the circumstances, or that the guardian held
Beck out as his agent, with authority to make the delivery and receive the payment.
Perkins had notice that Beck was not the own-

actions
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4

Beck was the manager, and the only reason Perkins had for
thai Beck was the agent of the guardian was that he had
m of the assignment.
Beck was not an attorney or broker,
and the sale of judgments was not within the scope of the usual
business carried on by him from which an inference of authority
It is true that, where a person has possession of a
might arise.
promissory note which is (\uc and payable, it may be inferred that
he has authority to receive payment of it (Stiger v. Pent, 111 111.
which

assuming
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. hut authority to receive payment cannot he inferred
from possession when the paper is not clue (Fortune v. Stockton, 182 111. 454,
N. E. 367), and the mere possession of personal property does
55
not generally authorize an inference of power as agent to sell it and
receive the proceeds.
So far as appears Perkins made no inquiry as
to Beck's authority, but from the mere possession of the paper dealt

with him and paid with a check payable to the order of Beck.
He
thereby put it in the power of Beck to misapply the proceeds and defraud the guardian.
He might have protected himself by inquiry,
or by making the check payable to the order of the guardian. There
was no previous course of dealing recognized or acquiesced in by the
guardian from which authority could be inferred, and no other relation out of which an agency ordinarily arises, and we cannot regard
the alleged agency proved by the mere fact that Beck had possession of the assignment.

Neither was there any evidence that the guardian held Beck out as
his agent with authority to make the delivery and receive the proceeds.
Where one party holds another out as his agent with authority to do an act, he is bound by the act of the agent on the
The guardian left the assignment with the corgr< »und of estoppel.
poration merely for safekeeping, and Beck possessed himself of it
gfully, and delivered it in fraud of the rights of the guardian and
Beck knew that he had no authority to deliver the asappellant.
signment, as is clearly shown by his conduct.
He told the guardian
eight months after he had received the proceeds that there was no
prospect of selling the judgment, and kept informing appellant and
would probably
be paid to them
her mother that the judgment
The transaction by Beck was fraudulent,
some time in the future.
and it was essential for defendants to show that Perkins believed in
the existence of, and relied upon, the agency and authority of Beck,
and that he had no notice of the fraud.
It was agreed by counsel
would testify that he purchased the judgment from Mcfaith and for value, and with no knowledge of any dean's title, and that he was advised of the state of the record.
There was no evidence on the same questions as to Perkins,
nly evidence being that he gave the check payable to the order
eck and received the assignment.
The equities of the case are
with the appellant, and, if Perkins did not get title to the judgment,
that Pear-'

m
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The judgment was not
those claiming through him obtained none.
assignable, and all that could be transferred was an equitable title.
Hughes v. Trahern, 64 111. 48. The alleged agency of Beck for the
There was no express appointment or
guardian was not proved.
There was no
authority conferred or intended to be conferred.
previous course of dealing, relation of the parties, usual employment,
or other circumstances from which an appointment could be fairly
The guardian did nothing which ought to e>top him as
implied.
having held out Beck as his agent. * * *
Reversed and remanded.

WISCONSIN BANK
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(Supreme

v.

Court of Wisconsin,

MORLEY
1865.

ct

al.

19 Wis. <'<-.)

Action to foreclose a mortgage, given by one Aldrich to plaintiff.
Aldrich was son-in-law of Morley, and acted as his agent in negotiations with one Miller, president of plaintiff hank, by which Miller
paid a debt he owed Morley by conveying certain property, including this land, to Morley. Aldrich wrongfully took the deed in his
own name, and gave Miller a mortgage on the land to secure a loan
Aldrich intended to pay
made to him the same day by the bank.
Judgment for
the note before it fell due, but died without doing so.
defendant.

* * * The admissibility
of Morley's testimony
C. J.seem less difficult.
established,
the
61
the
controversy
merits
being
had
Aldrich
that
authority from
original
no
pretense
There can be
claimed l>y
Indeed
this
is
scarcely
execute
the
to
mortgage.
Morley
The conversation of Morley and his recommendatioi
the bank.
Miller at the time he introduced Aldrich in the summer of
such authority. They
amount to nothing by way of establishing
employed on occasion
wen- mere general words of commendation,
of the introduction of a stranger, and not intended nor understood as
Miller, who represents the bank throughout
the granl of authority.
took the mortgage knowing thai Aldrich was not
the transaction,
He took it without
the owner and that the property was Morley's.

Dixon,

the

evider e thai Aldrich was authorized by Morh
It turns oul upon trial that Aldrich had no such authority.
thru the mortgage was void as against Morley, and the only
upon which it can be sustained is that taken bj
ed in and ratified it.
thai Morley subsequent^

slight*

cute it.
So far

ground
namely,
.,ii this

•

point it is urged thai Miller, in Septeml
Morley thai he had made the loan and taken the n
Morley waited until Sept< ml
forming Miller thai Aldrich acted without authority.

mitted thai
rt

tl

of the opinion

to omitted.

'

that
i

If
!t

it

"'

1"

^

'"
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me the fact because in the series of letters which passed between Morley and Miller, and which were introduced on the part of
the hank, the first in which Morley denies the validity of the mortBut it is obvious that the letwas dated in September, 1862.
Of
ters introduced were not all which passed between the parties.
he
means
indicate
that
from
no
first
Morley by
those introduced, the
other
hand
it
in
the
On
the
mortgage.
slow
had been
repudiating
to
them,
from
not
that
he
had
inferred
only
to
be
replied
fairly
is
Miller's first communication, but that he had informed him that the
He speaks of the claim as one which must
mortgage was invalid.
be collected from Aldrich's estate. And his letter of September,
1862, was written in answer to one from Miller of the first of the
same month.
Again, Miller's letters tend to the same conclusion.
In that of Tune 11th, 1862, he writes for advice as to what is then to

This
the course taken in regard to Aldrich's affairs in Madison.
by no means indicates that Morley had kept silence, or that he had
But
acquiesced in or acknowledged the validity of the mortgage.
I hold that the
aside from this criticism upon the correspondence,
fact of ratification, if ratification there was, should be as clearly made
out in evidence as that of original authority, in case the bank had
relied upon that.
In either case the burden of proof is upon the
bank. 3 If Morley did not reply to Miller for the space of a year,
or
the
replying, he did not deny Aldrich's authority or admitted
fact was one susceptible of clear and easy proof, and should have
Miller was upon the
placed in clear light before the court.
He could have testified to
Morstand.
or produced the letters.
upon the stand, and he also might have been questioned.
But instead of this, no question of the kind was put to either, and
think there
no evidence in the case authorizing (he assumption of
the counsel, and that the judgment should be affivined.

>.

,

The burden
112

<>f showing

Ala.

228,

20

ratification is on him who
.South. 744 (1896); Coiubs

«

I

is

it

if,

it,

be

•
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after notice from Miller, would constitute a ratification, still I do not
think there is anj proof to warrant the application of the doctrine*.
Morley, who admits the receipt of Miller's letter in September, 1861,
True, he says he wrote to Aldricb
testifies to nothing of the kind.
For information respecting it, but he does not say that he did not
Neither does Miller, himself a witness, testily that
reply to Miller.
Morley neglected to answer, or that Morley first informed him of
Counsel seem to
Aldrich's want of authority in September, 1862.

;elies on it. Monro
Scott, 12 Allen, 40:;
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SECTION 2.— ADMISSIBILITY
I. In General,

LAWRENCE
Court

of Minnesota,

WINONA

L870.

&

ST. P. R. CO.

15 .Minn. 390 [Gil.

313],

2

Am Rep.

130 I

Action for five boxes of household goods dot roved by fire in defendant's warehouse at Waseca.
The goods were shipped from Winona and were consigned to Mankato. It was the custom to carry via
defendant's line to Waseca and thence by team to Mankato.
The
team line was operated by one Phelps under an agreement with defendant that if he would run the team line they would give him all
Mankato freight from their western terminus, Waseca.
Ripley, C. J. 4 * * * The evidence of Phelps' manner of doing
business at Mankato should have been excluded.
Unless he was the
defendant's agent it was irrelevant: and before the ad of B. can be
given in evidence as the act of A. it must be proved thai B. was the
agent of A. Stark, pt. 4, p. 55. The plaintiff claims, indeed, that the
evidence in question itself tends to prove this; but the agency of a
party must be proved from other evidence than his acts before it can
Scotl v.
be shown that his acts are binding upon his alleged principal.
B.'s authority to act for A. may be inferred from
Crane. 1 Conn. 255.
the habit and course of dealing of A. and B., but nol of B. alone, i
Stark, pt. 4. pp. 55, ; ' ). In this
though his acts be done in A.'s name.
case Phelps did not assume to act in the name of the defendant-.

Plaintiff would infer Phelps'

I

a

Is,

by

from the fact that the way-bill,
a
defendants' freight
was
with
the g
signed
which he usually left
team,
as
railroad
charg
well
for
as
included
and
charge
agent,
its
was
to him
act;
'helps'
delivery
the
The leaving of
way-bill
1

n

by

by

it

<

»n its face
purport- to
the act of defendants' freight agent.
the sta
its
and
receipted
delivery,
to
Waseca
only,
transportation
tion agenl to Phelps, (it appearing, according to the evidence introplaintiff himself that the freight was delivered to Phelj
duced
tation agenl upon his receipting therefor and either paying or be
ponsible to defendants for the freight monej
coming personally

prove that

Pari "f tin- opinion

how* ver, that

th<

rJ

is

by

omit

as

the

bills usu
litional to

no pro
this th< re
added
Whether

»f

alwa)
dues, which
for hauling from Wa

included

su

but

cl

-.

i-

not

app< ai
a

-

the consigne<

It

i
i

due them.
wen- delivered to him not

i

:

way-bill
of
ally, but
fendants'

«
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(Supreme

v.

actions

B2Q

(l'art

4

himself,
agent, and if so, at whoso direction or request, or by Phelps
from
the cirinference
no
is
events,
there
does not appear; but, at all
to colas
defendants'
agent,
bill
cumstances that Phelps received the
has
himplaintiff
for
account,
their
on
lect the amount for them and
interest
had
no
defendants
the
that
self introduced positive testimony
in, nor received any part of the moneys received on the transportation
The evidence of Palmer
oi freight between Waseca and Mankato.
he testified only to facts
reason
that
further
the
for
was inadmissible
business at Mankato in
of
doing
fire;
way
Phelps'
after
the
occurring
Mead's
was
in March.
what
it
prove
to
have
tendency
no
could
May
declarations, though of themselves, indeed, they rather go to show that
defendants had no control over the rates of freight between Waseca
They did not tend
and Mankato. yet were inadmissible in any view.
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There
to prove any contract with plaintiff or any usage of defendants.
the
scope
within
were
is no evidence either that the matters in question
a
to
transportain
regard
of his agency or that the declarations were
tion then depending so as to be a part of the res gestae. 1 Greenl. Ev.
subd. 113.
We think,

that there is competent evidence in the case
tending to show that Phelps was an independent common carrier. In
that case defendants were intermediate carriers between Fort Howard
If they were, were they under any responsibility to
and Mankato.
plaintiff at the time of said fire, in respect of such goods? If so, what
* *
*
it?
however,

The Court found that defendants were liable as common carriers until the goods were delivered to Phelps, and on this ground affirmed the
judgment of the district court.

LYOXS
(Supreme

Wright,

v.

THOMPSON.

Court of Iowa,

1864.

16

Iowa,

62.)

Plaintiff seeks to recover for the value of certain
C. J.
goods delivered to A. B. Olmsted & Co.
I rpon the trial, certain orders were introduced,
signed by Boyles and
for the reason
, and defendants
their
introduction
objected to
thereupon ofPlaintiff
Co.
&
that they were not signed by Olmsted
said orders,
signing
that
the
persons
to,
and
did
prove by parol,
I
s

in giving the name, acted for and as the agents of said company. This
lony was objected to, upon the ground that as the agency did not
appear upon the face of the orders, and the principal was not disand the admission of this tesI, the testimony was incompetent;
timony is the first error demanding our attention.
That the authority of an agent, except in special cases, may be
shown by parol, cannot admit of doubt. 2 Greenl. § 61. The case be* nf

tlif- opinion

la

omitted.
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The question

is,

fore us does not fall within any of the exceptions.
Not only so, but
the appellants mistake the application of the rule for which they
tend. The question is not, whether the persons signing the orders
might not be made liable personally for the goods delivered thereon,
but whether it can be shown by parol that they wore acting at the time
as the clerks or agents of and for Olmsted & Co.
If an individual is in the habit of giving orders or directions in relation to the delivery of goods or any thing else by a clerk, there is no
rule violated in allowing the fact of agency to be shown by parol.

if

*

§

*

a

it

establish

is

a

were the goods delivered to or for
particular person.
such delivery, and the person for whom delivered,
an every day practice almost, to show for whom the person ordering
them was acting,
question of agency arises.
Story on Agency,
*
50.
Affirmed.

To

(Supreme

v.

Court of New lork, Appellate
73 N. Y.

SALM(
Term,

>N.
36 Misc.

1901.

Bep. 160,

Supp. 106.)

in

in

a

J.

McAdam,
The plaintiff,
plumber, did and performed work and
furnished material
making repairs to the houses known as No
and 59 West Seventy-First street and No. 132 Wesl Eighty-Fifth
street,
the city of New York, between January and March. 1896, of
tlie value of $136.38. The order for the work and material was given
by one Frank Ybran, and the main question litigated at the trial was
whether Yoran had authority to give the order and bind the defendant
It

thereby.
was conceded that Yoran was the agent employed to colled the
rents, and that, according to the custom of agents, he made out written statements every month to his principal, giving the amount of rents

•

It

w

by

in

a

by

collected, the commissions for collection, and the repairs to the ho
and after deducting these
check was made out
Yoran, for the bal
ancc, to the individual name of the defendant, who deposited the same
his bank.
For five years these statements and checks were sent to
the defendant, the checks being indorsed and dep
and received
to his credit.
He never at any tune objected that thi
were not
properly made OUt, or that Yoran had no authority tO contract bills
for repairs. This evidence was sufficient to require the subm
the question <>i agency and authority to the jury.
ubmitted,
and the jury found that Yoran had tin- required authority, and
fav< >r

it

it.

;

it
'

it

in

is

in

'

by

to lay down

:

in

verdict

is

It

a

of the plaintiff.
can be
which
any inflexible rule
impossible
any
mined what evidence
sufficient toestabli
hut
genera] terms, that what
ma) he said,
idmissible, even though
tendency to pp.,
- the province of the jury to pass upon
Me< hem.

dered

a
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Authority is often implied from the recognition of the
54,
principal or his acquiescence in the acts of the agent (Story, A.g. §§
Treat.
[Kingsley's
§§
Cow.
§65;
Ed.]
Ke.lt.
2 Greenl. Ev. |
Ed.]
127,
Hun,
90
re
Zinke,
circumstances
from
well
(In
as
154. 242), as
rims, where one is accustomed to permit his
V. Supp. 645).
35
wife, child, or servant to purchase goods on his account, all purchases
authorized, and he will be bound to pay for
so made will be deemed
And see Olcott v. Tioga R. Co., 27 X.
242.
Treat.
Cow.
them.
§
Y. Sup]..
546, 84 Am. Pee. 298; Sykes v. Temple, 69 Hun, 448, 23 N.

\.

Y
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425; Lowenstein v. Lombard, Ayres & Co., 164 N. Y. 324, 58 N. E.
The argument by which the defendant
44; Wood, Mast. & S. § 260.
seek- to avoid the application of these rules is unavailing.
We find no errors prejudicial to the appellant, and the judgment
and order must be affirmed, with costs. All concur.

SHARP
(Kansas City Court of Appeals,

v.

KNOX.

Missouri,

1892.

48 Mo. App.

169.)

Suit in equity for cancellation of a certain deed of trust and the surThe evidence
render of a certain promissory note secured thereby.
consisted of an extensive correspondence between Craig and defendant
as to this and other similar business transactions.
6
* * * The undisputed evidence is that on FebSmith, P.

J.

ruary 15. 1888, Craig loaned for Knox to plaintiff $750, taking a note
therefor, payable to Knox on or before three years after date. Plaintiff executed a deed of trust on his land to secure the note. Craig told
plaintiff at the time of the execution of the note that it could be paid
On
The note and deed of trust were sent to Knox.
at his office.
anfrom
loan
another
March 15, 1888, plaintiff through Craig secured
otber capitalist, by giving his note and deed of trust on his land for
the same; out of this last-named loan he paid off to Craig the Knox
note. Craig then told plaintiff that he would give him a receipt against
the note and mortgage, which he accordingly did; he further then told
plaintiff that he did not then have the note in his possession, but would
send back to Knox and get it. The matter thus remained until Craig
failed, wben it was discovered that Knox still held plaintiff's note, and
d of trust bad not been satisfied on the record.
The decisive question presented for our determination is that of
agency, whether Craig was authorized to collect of the plaintiff the
The
note given by him to Knox while it was in the hitter's possession.
rule is elemental that agency is directly proven by express words of
intment, whether orally uttered or contained in some deed or other writing.
It is directly established by evidence of the relative situation of the parties, or of their habits and course of dealing and inter-

thai

•

Tart of the opinion

is omitted.
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course, or is decided from the nature of the employment or from subsequent ratification.
Greenl. Ev. § 60. An agency may be created by
the express words or acts of the principal, or it may be implied from
his conduct and acquiescence; so the nature and extent of the authority of an agent may be implied or inferred from circumstances.
If the
agency arises by implication from numeroi
agent
the
by
with the tacit consent or acquiescence of the principal it is deemed limited to acts of like nature.
Story on Agency, §§ 45. 97. It has been
in effect repeatedly held in this state that agency and the scope of an
agent's authority are facts to be proved like other facts.
They may
be proven by the transactions that have taken place between the principal and the agent, showing what the understanding was as to the scope
of the agent's authority; evidence of a course of dealing by an agent
sanctioned by his principal is one of the recognized modes of proving
the extent of an agency; and such evidence is admissible whether the
party introducing it knew at the time of the transaction in controversy, that the dealings had taken place or not.
Gibson v. Zeibij
Mo. App. 65; Greeley-Burnham Grocery Co. \. Capen, 23 Mo. App.
301; Wheeler v. Metropolitan Co., 23 Mo. App. 190; Brooks v. Jame-

Mo. 505; Franklin v. Globe, 52 Mo. 461; Edwards v. ThomMo. 468. In the last-cited case it is said. "Instances there are
without number to be found in books, when authority of an agent to
act in a given manner follows by inevitable implication from the mere
fact of his employment or from long-continued and repeated acts of
In Mechem on Agency, £ 86, it is stated: "That,
acquiescence."
son,

55

as, 66

where it appears the alleged agent has repeatedly performed acts like
the one in question which the principal has ratified and adopted, his
authority for the performance of the disputed act may be interred.
And this statement of the rule seems fairly supported by a number of
adjudicated cases.
Jewett v. Railroad, 10 [nd. 539; Fisher v. Camp
210;
bell, 9 Port.
Robinson v. Green, 5 liar. 115; Rawson v. Curtiss,
:o
111.
4
:
19
Emerson v. Cogswell, 1" Me. 77: Walsh v. Pierce, 12 \ I
When the principal puts an
130; I 'owner v. Morrison, 2 ('.rat. 237.
general agent, though in a particular line, or \
where
others are justified in the belief thai bis
position
that may be imposed upon him pri
the
restriction
are general,
between him and his principal.
immaterial
except
will
be
vately
Albany v. Meyers, 43 Mo. App. 124; Baker v. Railroad, "1 Mo
hown to exist, tl i
And. when an ag
3 S. \V. 486
ral ratlin- than In.
would be thai th<
authority v.

forward

agent

him in

Mechem on
It

as

a

Vg< n<

,,\ thai

:

thai his

i

Craig

wa

the agenl

■ ■

of Knox, bul
I and limited,

■

tted Cra
tions of the nol
at his home in Indiana,

while
and

t1

under precisely

the

same

a. ciONa

830

(Part

4

that the note in question was collected, and which collections so made
For the performance of the diswere satisfied and adopted by Knox.
puted act in this case we think, under the principles of law just adThe authority of
verted to, the authority tA Craig may he inferred.
Craig, as agent i<i Knox, to collect the note of plaintiff results by inevitable implication from the long-continued and repeated acts of acquiescence, to which reference has been made. We think the general
authority of Craig to collect and otherwise manipulate the Missouri
loans ^i Knox is fairly deducible from the facts shown by the evi7
*
*
*
dence.

Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.

II. Written Power
ELLIOTT
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(Supremo

v.

STOCKS.

Court of Alabama,

1SS0.

8

67

Ala.

330.)

Suit commenced by attachment at the instance of Stocks and
and McElwain.
Elliott
Cothran, Marshall, McCullough
against
claimed the property in question as trustee under a deed of trust by
McElwain given in 1875 to secure large creditors of the Cornwall
Iron Works.
The Works had been in straits, and on January 1,
1874, was bid in at a sale by Cothran, with the consent of the creditors, under an agreement that he should operate for the benefit of
the creditors and upon satisfying them he should have the Works.

It

may
t Tt is not necessary to establish
every agency by direct evidence.
tablished by circumstances, such as the relation of the parties and their
Lindconduct with reference to the subject matter of the alleged contract.
quisl v. Dickson, 98 Minn. 369, 107 N. W. 958, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 729, 8 Ann.
1024 (1906), ante, p. 758; Roberson v. Clevenger, 111 Mo. App. (522, S6 S.
\V. 512 (1905); Hull v. .Puns. 69 Mo. 5S7 (1879); Tennesson River Transfer
Co. v. Kavanaugh, 101 Ala. 1. L3 South. 283 (lstcp. Or by a long course of
dealing by an agenl tor bis principal in which acts in this line have never
Wheeler v. Benton, G7 Minn. 293, G9 N. W.
repudiated by the principal.
927

(li

In the nature of the case greater latitude must be allowed in the admission
of evidence to prove an implied agency than in the case of an express agency.
Patterson v. Van Loon, 186 Pa. 867, to Atl. 495 (1898).
ord: Loudon Savings Fund Society v. Ilagerstown Savings Bank, 36
Pa.

If

198, 7^ Am.

Dec.

390

(1860).

the writing cannot be produced its contents must be clearly proved.
man v. Fitzgerald, l 1 Neb. 290, 15 N. W. 234 (1883).
also, Claflin v. Continental Jersey Works, 85 Ga. 27, 11 S. E. 721 (1890),
p. 337.

i-

competent t<>prove by parol the situation of the parties and
of the agency ;it the time it is made, and the surroundLrcumstances, aol to contradict or enlarge the written power, but to exit and Its scope.
Wood v. Clark, 121 111. 359, 12 X. E. 271 (1887); BrantSouthern Life In-. Co., 53 Ala. 554 (1875).
So. too, proof of the usages
de ri.ny be permitted to Interpret the powers actually given, though not
them. Cawthorn v. Lusk, 97 Ala. 674, 11 South. 7:;i (1892), ante.

However,

it

■>f the subject-matter

p. 310.
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This agreement let in with Cothran the other
defendants in the attachment suit.
The debts were nut paid, and Elliott and
Stuck.
both claim the property.
8
STONE, J.
Many of the questions in this cause are settled by
our
n
he CSSe ° f ElHott V " Stocks & Bro
at ** present terra
>
™n
(6/ Ala. 290).
The instrument under seal of January 1st.
1874, is the written evidence of the contract by which the defendants
agreed to operate the
property known as the Cornwall Iron Works, in joint
adventure
Before that agreement was consummated, the
of the
ownership
property was in Cothran. That agreement let in Marshall,
McCullough, and McElwain.
Before reading it in evidence, it was necessary to prove its execution.
It purported to be signed by Cothran
and McCullough in person, with scrolls for seals annexed,
and the
signature for Marshall was as follows:
"Robert .Marshall by his
attorney in fact, Thomas McCullough.
McCullough was
[Seal.]"
called to prove the execution, and he proved that
both Cothran and
himself executed it in person.
He proved that he executed for
Marshall, and that he had authority to do so. On
cross examination
he was asked if his authority to execute for Marshall
was not in
writing. This question was objected to by plaintiffs, and the c
sustained the objection.
In this the Circuit Court erred.
If the
authority was in writing, it should have been produced, or its destruction shown, or some other excuse, sufficient in law. given,
why
it was not produced.
And, in any event, it was the
privilege and
right of the claimant to cross-examine the witness as to the contents
of the authority to sign, even if the ab
the writing was suffi
Ciently accounted for.
The contract offered in evidence' was under
seal, and authority to execute and seal it must have been in
writing.
to be valid.
1 Greenl.
Jo 1'. * * *
Ev.
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-T

Reversed

and remanded.

MT.
(Supreme Judicial

Court

M<

§

>RRIS

BANK

of Massachusetts,

v. G<

Action by the Mt. Morris Bank againsl
& Co. Verdict for defendants.
Plaintiff

>RHAM.
168 Ha

1897.

the

519,

firm of

Q

1^

v

r

841 I

I.. Gorham

1

ruled.

Hoi.

10

This is an action upon two bills purportii
. J.
upon the defendants by Haines & Co., payable t- the or.'
the draw..-, and to be accepted by the defendants, in the '
'•■ Gorham
V Williams."
& Co. p. p. a. Chas.
William
I of the defendants,
who had charge of their shop, but tl
fendants denied that he had any autho
ign -bin-, and al the
trial put in a written powei
litted nol to
\m

drawn

I of

tl..' opinion

is

omitted.

Part

<>r 11

pinli

tted

actions

(Part

4

Their evidence tended to prove that these
authorized him to do it.
drafts wore issued by Williams in pursuance of a scheme between
Haines and him by which a series of similar drafts had been issued,
lor, without the defendants
•anted, and their payment provided
The defendar.1
anything about the matter.
ever having known
were regular purchasers of pianos from Haines & Co., but their
was that Williams was not authorized to pay for them otherwise
The
than by check on the Central National Bank of Worcester.
beenlarged
had
been
authority
that
Williams'
plaintiff contended
had
this
been
and
whether
that,
of
attorney,
written
power
yond the
done or not. the defendants were chargeable with notice of Williams'
course >->\ dealing, on the ground that, at least, they ought to have
known of it. and might have discovered it by reasonable care, and,
to sign as he
authority
that Williams had ostensible
did.
The defendants had a verdict, and the case is here on excep* * *
tions.
3. The next request with which we have to deal was that there was
no evidence to charge the plaintiff with notice of any irregularity or
want of authority in the issuing of the drafts. The signature "p. p. a."
probably meant, and certainly might have been found to mean, "per
If this was the meaning, not only was this request
power attorney."
refused,
but the question of ostensible authority heretofore
rightly
The letters were notice to the plaintiff on
dealt with was at an end.
the face of the bill that his agent depended for his authority to sign
upon a written document, and the plaintiff took its chances if it did
Alexander v. Mackenzie, 6
not call for the production of the power.
C. B. 766; Attwood v. Munnings, 7 Barn. & C. 278. See Stainback
It was suffiv. Bank, 11 Grat. 269; Stainback v. Read, Id. 281, 286.
ciently favorable to the plaintiff that the judge did not instruct the
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therefore,

as matter of law.
In this connection we may as well dispose of the exception to
The reference on the face
the admission of the power of attorney.
But, in genmore.
without
it
would
to
of the bill
be enough
justify
eral, of course a man who is sued upon a contract made in his name
is not precluded from showing the limits of the powers expressly
conferred by him, merely because the plaintiff has a right and may
attempt to show that the powers were enlarged by the defendant's
1-1
The statement by the judge that, if the inequent conduct.

jury,
4.

strument was given, it was the sole measure of Williams' authority,
plainly referred only to the moment when the instrument was given.
The jury were allowed to find that his authority had been enlarged
afterwards by the defendants' conduct. It is suggested for the plain-

ii

Authority

very often is both written and verbal, and in such easo oral
enlargements and alterations of the written
v. Embury,
iM How. Prac. 11 (1861).
Whitfield v. Brand, 16 M. & W. 282 (1847), in which it is said
!'•.. that where there Is a written power the fact of ageuey may
hut not Ha' terms of the power.

]>p».f may be given of the later
• r.
I'.auk of North America

also,
by P<
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tiff that it did not appear that Williams had any knowledge of the
document, but only that it was deposited with the bank on which
he
was authorized to draw checks.
It is enough to say that we thinkthat the suggestion is not fairly open on the exceptions which
assume
the power to have been effective as between the parties to it. * * *
Exceptions overruled.

III.

Declarations,

Acts and Testimony of the Agent

GAM
(Supreme

HILL

Court of Alabama,

v.

1906.

FUQUA.
Us

Ala.

448, 42 South,

ir.r,.)
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Action for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment.
There
was verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $745. and, after motion for
new trial had been overruled, the defendant prosecuted this appeal.

Anderson, J. 12 The plaintiff recovered damages of the defendant
for his arrest and imprisonment without a warrant, made by one
Boggan, a deputy of the defendant, who was license inspector of the
* * *
city of Birmingham.
There is no proof that the arrest was made by the authority of tindefendant, unless the authority might be inferred from the declaration of Boggan at the time of the arrest:
"Gambill told me that
you and two or three others were the leaders in the Milkmen's \sociation, and that if I could make you pay license the balance would

If this could be considered as a declaration that the defendant
pay."
had authorized the arrest, it was not competent f<>r that pin;
"The authority of an agent, where the question of its existence is directly involved, can only be established by tracing it t<» its source in
some word or act of the alleged principal.
The agenl certainly can
n^t confer
authority upon himself.
Evidence
of his own state
ments or admissions,
therefore, i> n<>t admissible against his principal for the purpose of establishing, enlarging, or renewing his authority; n<T can his authority be established by showing that he
!
as agent or that he claimed t<> have the powers which h<
sumed t"
Mechem on Agency, ^ 100; Galbreath v. I
61
Ala. MO; Wharton on Evidence, § 1184; Scarborough v
nolds, 12 Ala. 252; Postal Co. v. Lenoir. 107 Ala 640, 18 South
. X. R. R. Co. v. Hill. 115 Ala. 334, 22 South.
163.
Any d<
ations of tin- agent as to In- authority were inadmissible, unless other
evidence had been shown from which authority to do the t :
' >r, if the trial couti improperly
he inferred. 1'
admitted de<
of the agent, ili<' error would he cured by evidei
ently
Part
I

ii

<>fHi., opinion is
■
Falrlie v. n

cord
ind.
'I...-

net

omitted

alter tin- mi'-

QODDjPBJk A.— 53

L0

that

Vet.
the

Jr.

1

itaten*

(Tart

ACTIONS

v ;t

4

if

is

it

it
is

7

a

a

is

it

is

is

a

is

;

v.

&

Allen, 33 Tex. 355 12 Am.
Eng. Ency. Law, 775.
sued for an unlawful arrest and imprisonprincipal
ment made or caused by an alleged agent, and there
no evidence
of prior authority or subsequent ratification,
error to leave
to the jury to say whether or not there was such authority or ratifiBut,
cation.
National Bank v. Baker, 77 Md. 463, 26 Atl. 867.
where there
any evidence tending to show the assent of the principal to the acts of the agent, these acts and declarations of the agent,
in connection with such evidence of the principal's assent thereto,
should be allowed to go to the jury.
Gimon v. Terrell, 38 Ala. 208;
McClung's Ex'rs v. Spotswood, 19 Ala. 165.
The acts of the defendant, the day of the trial, in asking the judge
to let him send for Attorney Thach, his conference with him, and
the subsequent dismissal of the prosecution, were facts to go to the
jury as affording an inference, not only of
subsequent ratification,
but of
precedent authorization.
In the case of Shattuck v. Bill, 142
Mass. 61,
X. E. 40,
held: "The plaintiff after his arrest, gave
notice of his intention to take the oath for the relief of poor debtors;
Whitmore
Where

fstllon

Westall,

'Jin- admission

Engine Co. v. Akeman, no Ga. 570, 35 S. E. o:j5
137 N. C. 30, 19
E. 54 (J904).

(1000);

Brit-

S.

y.

ain

M

and evidence was offered of the presence and conduct of the defendant at these hearings, as tending to prove authority from him to
make the affidavit and cause the arrest on his behalf.
To the ad-

a

or claim of
person pretending to act as agent does nut
tend to prove the agency and should be excluded.
McCune v. Badger,
lis Wis. 186, lor, x. w. 667 (1905). His unsworn statements at their very
hearsay.
Gifford v. Landrine, !7 N, .1. Eq. 127 (1883),
To be
Fitzgerald v. Kimed they nrasl be made with the sanctity of an oath.
7';
Neb. 236, 107 X. W. l-l:7 (1906).
ball
If one chooses to take the
.-

even

r
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is

is

a
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.It

introduced from which authority might be inferred; an<1, in case such
evidence was introduced the question of authority would become one
of the jury.
of fact for the determination
Birmingham R. R. Co, v.
Tain. Co., 127 Ala. 137, 28 South. 679.
The only evidence, aside from the declaration of Boggan, as to the
was that he was the defendant's deputy, and had served in
an agent, while actthat capacity for some time.
true that
ing within tlu' scope ^\ his authority, exceeds his authority, the principal would he liable; hut there
nothing to indicate, from the evidence in the case at bar, that I'm^anwas acting within the scope of
his authority in making the arrest, or that he was doing
thing
which his principal had authorized him to do.
No authority to make
arrests without warrants could be implied from the fact that he was
no evidence that
defendant's deputy license inspector, and there
Indeed, there
defendant authorized the arrest.
nothing in the evidence that would indicate that the defendant had authority to arrest
An agent has no implied power
people for violating the ordinance.
to do that which the master himself, being present, would not be authorized to do.
Mali v. Lord, 39 N. Y. 381, 100 Am. Dec. 448;
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mission of this evidence the defendant has no ground of exception.
If the whole proceeding in relation to the arrest was without autl
ity from defendant, it is not reasonable to suppose that he v.

committed

as to the acts and statements

of

1'.

take part in opposition to the application by the plaintiff I
himself therefrom; and his acts in relation thereto, although occurring after the arrest, had a tendency to show that it was initi
by his authority almost as directly as if he had thus ex] I
ed it."
The evidence, therefore, of the subsequent conduct of t.
fendant at the trial, cured any error that may have been previi

Judgment affirmed.

WALSH
(Supreme

Court

v.

ST.

<>f Minnesota,

PAUL TRUST CO.
1888.

:::i

Minn.

i'::.

::*■>X. W.

63L)

it

it

L
-,l

by

it

by

1

t.
,

contract in behalf of the
ing that he had any authority to so act, or
This
sufficient reason, without considering others, why the
testimony of Mr. Warner, relating to such papers, could inn
this case. 14 Judgment affirmed.
t

is
a

estate.

I

•
<
1
1
1
B. 1
>•
•
1
1■
1
1
1

Neither the
Hutchlnaon
agency.

Wl

the word
'

(1888).
i

i-

1

w.

•

i

I

•'•

1
1
>
•-

\.

v

I.

R

i-

\. C

.'Hill

Mel tonali

'
'

'
.«
1
1
1■
»-

~ are
■'
.
.iii<-i\ni>u ».
E. 1015, 7"
347, 51
539
of an agent's declan
not commendable, and
of his agency
Court, to prejudice the Jury. Campbell
by
..I

1010

1

\

It

i

statements of H:.- agent as u> Ms authority, ii<- does bo :ii hia own
The agent cannot Invest
nemann v. Monaghan, l'I Mich. 36 (1871).
\. Polln
ng Machine *'<>■
wiiii authority. Qrovei
Ail.
Eaton \. Granite State Provident
247 (1876);
690
10 Ga. 373, 35 8.
(189<;>: Jones v. Ilarrell,
,\i,l.
,..,..
II,,.
nn.ii :.
I.... t.. Ami ..
nirannn l.\
nllnnrin

i
•
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by

is

Pr.R Curiam.
The appellant's claim against the estate
founded
him with the deci
contract alleged t<> have been made
upon
The making of any contract was put in issue, and upon the
verbally.
trial the appellant failed to prove it. so as to entitle him to recover
the testimony of Mr. Kerr, ami
upon it. From the offer of proof,
to
in
made
the prop, >s
only
from the admission
testimony,
respect
with
familiar
the contract, had heard
Mr.
Kerr
that
was
appears
There was no
was.
the parties, and knew exactly what
offer and no proof as to what that contract was,—what were its terms
The offer to show that Mr. Warner was "acting for
and conditions.
the administrator" of the estate at the time when certain papers belonging to the estate were delivered to him was not equivalent to show-

actions

336

FOWLDS
(Supreme

Court of Minnesota,

v.

(Part

EVANS

1893.

52

4

et al.

Minn.

551,

54

N.

W. 743.)

Evans contracted to construct ninety miles of railway and sublet porto Fowlds. The latter, having $54,000 still unpaid, brings an acred >se his statutory lien. One Wilson had for some time assumed to act as Evans' agent in dealing with plaintiff. Judgment for

tion

defendant.
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*

*

*

But a new trial must be had, as the court
erred in some of its rulings when excluding certain testimony, and
again in striking out portions of that already in, which was proper and
competent as tending to show that Wilson was Evans' agent. We need
not refer to these erroneous rulings specifically, but will call attention
rules of evidence in like cases, under which a part
to well-recognized
of the testimony excluded, and some, at least, of that stricken out,
We have stated the general
should have been received or retained.
did
at Sauk Center for a pewhat
he
course of Wilson's conduct, and
and other subcontractors
months,
plaintiff
while
riod of three or four
he pretended to act for
That
line.
the
on
under Evans were at work
in
a matter of fact way,
and
least,
at
occasion
Evans, and that on one
That Evans
certain.
is
his
him
as
representative,
Evans recognized
of the work
a
part
him
over
took
and
once
visits,
paid him occasional
with him, and that he was recognized by the officers of the road and
by the subcontractors as Evans' agent, was well established ; and that
his course of conduct must have been known by the latter seems beFrom the natural improbabilities that without
yond serious question.
authority he would assume to act in the capacity that he did during
nearly all of the time the work was being done, and from the fact that
such conduct would naturally come to be known by the assumed prinNeibles v. Railway Co.,
cipal, the fact of agency may be presumed.
It was well said in Reynolds v. Collins,
37 Minn. 151, 33 N. W. 332.
•78 Ala. 94, that "as a general rule the fact of agency cannot be established by proof of the acts of the professed agent in the absence of
evidence tending to show the principal's knowledge of such acts, or
assent to them ; yet when the acts are of such a character and so continued as to justify a reasonable inference that the principal had
knowledge of them, and would not have permitted them if unauthorized, the acts themselves are competent evidence of agency."
In view of these rules it is obvious that the court erred in many of
i.i NS,

J.

15

See, also, Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Barlow, 107 Iowa, 252,
BO Pac. '.i" 1* (1905).
of an agency by
advertisement
77 N. W. 1031 (1899), In which a newspaper
the at-'<-iit was held Inadmissible to prove the agency.

If there Is any other evidence of the agency, then the act of the alleged
agent cannot !><■
excluded from the jury, for they are judges of the weight
and sufficiency of the testimony.
S. & N. Ala. R. Co. v. Henlein, 52 Ala. 606,
23 Am. Rep. 578 (1875).
is Part of the opinion is omitted.
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its rulings, particularly when it struck out the
testimony of plaintiff as
to Wilson's trips over the line of work, giving instructions to
the subcontractors in respect to the manner of the performance of their
contracts, and directing them to increase their forces, as
Evans' superintendent of construction.
These acts and the surrounding circumstances had a strong tendency to establish knowledge in Evans of
Wilson's
pretended agency, and, even if it was nothing but pretense, to conclude
him from asserting to the contrary.
With Wilson's acts in connection
with the work, Evans' association with him when in the state, and the
relation between these two persons and the officers of the road while
the work was progressing, and what transpired afterwards, one would
have to be quite skeptical in order to believe that Wilson was not what
he assumed to be. 1(J * * *

Judgment reversed.
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WALES
(Supreme

Court of Colorado.

v.

MOWER.

190S.

41

Oolo.

1-W.

00

Pne. 971.)

Action by Maggie Mower against L. M. Wales and D. S. Baldwin
to restrain the sale of real estate under a trust deed, upon the ground

that the note secured by the trust deed had been paid.
It appeared
that payment had been made to Baldwin who negotiated the loans, but
his authority to receive it was denied. He testified that he had authority.

From

a

judgment

Maxwkll, J. 17

*

of Baldwin's testimony

for plaintiff defendant appeals.
*
Objection was made to the introduction

*

as to his instructions
from appellant in regard
to loaning and reloaning the money, the reception of the exhibil
ferred to, and certain cross-interrogatories
attached to the deposition,
all of which objections were overruled, and error i> assigned upon
these rulings.

The argument in support of th<
nments of error is l
upon the rule that "it is well settled that neither the fact of agency nor
the extent of authority can be proved 1>\ the declarations <>f the all
In support of this contention K. E. Lee S. M. Co. v. I
agent."
bach. 18 Colo. 106, 31 Pac. 771, Extension G. M. & M l o \
ner, _'
I, 64 Pac. 198, and Burson v.
En the Englebach Case it was said:
ed.
App. 449, 72 Pac.
"It is well settled thai neither the i
em y nor the extent i I
And
nt.
thority can be proved by the declarations of the alii

it is equally as well established that, when an agent

mal

i, not known and arcjuli
"But evidence of a general reputntlo
in by the principal, cannot be pul In at proof ol the
'
i
v. Laboi
Thompson
etc.,
b a reputation
311 (19
R. A. (N.
•
i Dion Tru t Co. v. Mel
Is Irrelevant
and should be excluded,

l.

.7

\ti.

n part

109

(1904).

of the opinion

la omitted.

ACTIONS

(rart

4

or docs any

made to the testimony of an alleged agent on the ground here urged.
The court said : "Appellants invoke a generally correct rule of law,
hut an inapplicable one. Plaintiffs were not trying to prove agency by
the declarations of the agent, but by his sworn testimony to the fact.
This they could do. The rule is that the declarations of an agent are
not competent to establish the fact of his agency. But the declarations
of the agent are very different from his testimony to prove the fact of
his agency."
In ( )d,eary v. German-American Ins. Co., 100 Iowa, 390, 69 N. W.
Si '. it was held that the rule that the authority of an agent cannot be
sustained by his own declarations
does not render it impossible to
prove the authority of an agent by his own testimony.
In Howe Machine Co. v. Clark, 15 Kan. 494, Mr. Justice Valentine,
writing the opinion of the court, said : "It is competent to prove a
parol agency, and its nature and scope, by the testimony ef the person
u hi > claims to be the agent. It is competent to prove a parol authority
of any person to act for another, and generally to prove any parol authority of any kind, by the testimony of the person who claims to possess such authority.
But it is not competent to prove the supposed
authority of an agent, for the purpose of binding his principal, by
proving what the supposed agent has said at some previous time. Nor
competent to prove
supposed authority of any kind, as against
the person from whom such authority
claimed to have been received,
claimed,
proving the previous statements of the person who,
had attained such authority."
it

is

is

a

it

i-*

I

by

Xo authority has been cited contrary to the doctrine above announced. The authorities cited are inapplicable to the case at bar, for
the reason that they apply to declarations made by the agent to another, who
introduced as
witness to testify to such declarations,
and not to the direct testimony of the agent himself.
All authorities
hold that the agent
competent to testify to the agency. 18 The testiis

a

i>

Phillips v. Poulter, 111 111. App. 330 (1903).
The asent as
under oath, and subject i<>cross-examination.
Schlitz Brewing Co.
v. Grimmon, 28 Nev. 235, 81 Pac. 43 (1905).
But lie must stun- facts and cir-. and not his opinion, or conclusion, as t<>his agency.
McCormict
rd:

a
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act representing his principal, his declarations made at the
time explanatory of the act arc admissible in evidence on behalf of
tt is true thai as a general rule such declaraeither party,
tions ought not to be received until proof has been made of the agency.
But the order in which evidence may be introduced is almost entirely
within the discretion of the trial court." In all of the cases cited the
testimony of the alleged agent was not introduced.
Here the alleged
The rule invoked does not exclude testimony of an alagent testified.
leged agent as to the fact of agency.
In Fisher v. Denver Nat. Bank, 22 Colo. 373, 382, 45 Pac. 440, it is
held that the alleged agent himself may testify as to the agency.
In Xyhart v. Pennington, 20 Mont. 158, 50 Pac. 414, objection was
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mony of Baldwin having been properly admitted, the exhibits and answers to the cross-interrogatories
were admissible. a> tending to corroborate the testimony of Baldwin, and as explanatory of the manner
in which the business was transacted by the parties.
No error was
committed by the court in admitting the evidence objected to.
* * *

Affirmed.

GARTH
of Common

(Court

Pleas,

HOWARD.

v.

8 Bing.

L832.

451,

LM E.

C.

L. 616.)

Detinue for plate.

Plea, general issue.
At the trial before Tinit appeared that Howard bad, without authority, pawned,
for £200., certain plate belonging to the plaintiff.
The defendant,
Fleming, was a pawnbroker; but the only evidence to show that the
plate had ever been in his possession, was a witness, who stated
that, at the house of the plaintiff's attorney, he
heard Fleming's
shopman say that it was a hard case, for his master had advanced
all the money on the plate at 5 per cent.
This evidence being objected to, was received, subject to a motion to
this Court; and a verdict having been given for the plaintiff, defendant obtained a rule nisi to show cause.
TlNDAL, C. J. The rule in tins case lias been obtained upon two
distinct grounds; but it is unnecessary to give an opinion upon any
other than this, namely, whether the declaration of the shopman >>\

J.,

1

A

202

1812).

if

tl

n

in

in

tl

the

I

with

Mil
ool codcJ

Ive

Howard

v.

i

■

eer of Sheba Gold
v. Southern
agent's t<'>tim."

Blowers

unconnected

i

transactions

t<
i

i
••

by

is

a

private

by

a

i

s.

\

.

by

by

it

Is,

- were in tinthe defendant Fleming, that tl
possession of bis
master, was admissible: for it is clear that, unless Fleming is to be
affected by such declaration,
he is entitled to the verdict upon the
If the transaction out of which this
general issue, non detinet.
arises had been one in tin- ordinary trade or business of the defendant as a pawnbroker, in which trade tin- shopman was agent or
ant to the defendant, a declaration of such agent that his master had
received tb-- g
might probably have been evidence against the
master, as
might be held within the scope of such ag< nt's ant!
to give an answer t" such an inquiry made
any person intei
In that >.i-'-, the rule
in the goods deposited with tla pawnl
the Master of the Rolls in
laid down
Fairlie v. Hast128, which m.v, be regarded as the leadin
10
this
Bui the transaction with Fleming
head of evidence, directly applies.
Ins busii
transaction
pawnbroker, but
appears to us, nol
any other lender of moi
him as
was
loan
show
And there
idence
tn
no

B.
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dal, C.

SIO

(Part

ACTIONS

4

doubted much at the time whether it could be received, and intimated
such doubt by reserving the point : and now, upon consideration with
It is dangerous to
the Court, am satisfied that it is not admissible.
open the door to declarations of agents, beyond what the cases have
The declaration itself is evidence against the principal,
already done.
it is made in his absence, when he has no opnot given upon oath:
portunity to set it aside, if incorrectly made, by any observation, or
any question put to the agent; and it is brought before the Court
It is liable, thereand jury frequently after a long interval of time.
fore, to suspicion originally, from carelessness or misapprehension
in the original hearer; and again to further suspicion, from the faithlessness of memory in the reporter and the facility with which he may
Evidence, therefore, of such a nature,
give an untrue account.
the strictest limits to which the cases
within
be
to
kept
ought always
have confined it ; and as that which was admitted in this case appears
to us to exceed those limits, we think there ought to be a new trial.
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Rule absolute.

EAGLE IRON CO.
(Supreme

Court of Alabama,

1906.

v.
147

BAUGH.
Ala.

613,

41 South.

663.)

by Baugh against the Iron Company for failure to take
cords of wood, which it was alleged plaintiff had sold appellant
The disputed question was whether
through its agent, one Stewart.
Stewart was an agent with such authority.

Action

500

Anderson,

10

"The authority of an agent, where the question
of its existence is directly involved, can only be established by tracing it to its source in some word or act of the alleged principal. The
Evidence of his own
agent cannot confer authority upon himself.
statements or admissions,
therefore, is not admissible against his
principal for the purpose of establishing, enlarging, or renewing his
authority ; nor can his authority be established by showing that he
acted as agent or that he claimed to have the powers which he assumed to exercise."
Mechem on Agency, § 100; Galbreath v. Cole,
61 Ala. 140; Wharton on Evidence,
§ 1184; Scarborough v. Reynolds, 12 Ala. 252; Postal Co. v. Lenoir, 107 Ala. 640, 18 South.
L. & X. R. R. Co. v. Hill, 115 Ala. 334, 22 South. 163. Any
declaration of the agent as to his authority would be admissible,

J.

when other evidence had been shown from which authority to do the
thing may be inferred ; or, if the trial court improperly admitted declarations of the agent, the error would be cured by evidence subsequently iniroduced from which authority might be inferred, and in
case such evidence was introduced the question of authority would be18

Part of the opinion

is omitted.
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one of fact for the determination
of the jury.* 6 Birmingham
137,
Co.,
127 Ala.
28 South. 679.
R. R. Co. v. Tenn.
There was evidence from which the jury could infer that McClane,
had authority to contract for and buy wood for
the superintendent,
the defendant, and to delegate the authority to others, and that
Stewart was its agent, independent of the acts and declarations of
There was evidence from which it could be
McClane and Stewart.
inferred that these men were held out as agents with authority to
buy wood, and also of a ratification by the defendant of their i
* * * For error on another point reversed and remanded.
come

MOYLE

v.

CONGREGATIONAL SOC. OF SALT LAKE CITY.
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(Supreme

Court of Utah,

1S97.

16

Utah,

69, 50 Pac.

806.)

Action for work done and materials furnished in the construction
of defendant's church. The contract was made with Barber & Co. and
The church had
later by agreement assigned to plaintiff's assignor.
paid the full contract price, but plaintiff claimed that at the time of
the assignment of the contract the chairman of the building committee,
one Hollister, as agent for defendant, agreed that the contract price
should be waived, and defendant should pay whatever it oust to do the
work. Hollister had since died. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant
appeals.

Miner, T. 21 * * * The court, over the objection and except i- n
of the defendant, permitted Mr. James and Mr. Pringle, wit
the plaintiff, to testify that in a conversation with Mr. Hollister some
time after the assignment of the Barber contract, and after Barber had
left town, Mr. I lollistcr said that he had got rid of Barber, hut u
>Ut of
him $500 to get him away; that witness James asked I [<
—
mere curiosity— as it did not affect witness' contract with Hollister
-,
him;
u !c<l up with
how he got rid of the contractor, and how he
and 1 would have
that Hollister replied, "We bought him
given him $1,000 to get rid of him. if 1 had to.'" The objection I
testimony was that it was incompetent and irrelevant, simply calling
for a recital of i>a-t events, and does not hind the defendant.
Tl
The admission of this testimony was erroneous.
did not concern the witness, and the declaration Wi
erence to a pasl tran action, and long after thi
W lure the ad of the ag< nt will hind the
was no part of tl i
»© When there is other evidence of the agency, the
" i for th<
may h<- received t.. show thai he purported t.. ■
540, 10
IT" Ma
Nowell v. Chipman,
ome one elae.
If the agency i- admitted, then tl
v
as part of the ■ ■ Bacon 7. 3 hnson, 66 Mich. i
1" 1' ■"•'-•
2i
;

other

PP«

actions

842

(Part

4

is

S.

it,

principal, there his representations, declarations, and admissions rewill also bind him, if made at the same
specting the subject-matter
time, and constituting part of the res gestae. "But an act done by an
by his declarations,
agent cannot be varied, qualified, or explained
which amount to no more than a mere narration of past occurrences,
or by an isolated conversation held, or an isolated aet done, at a later
d.
The reason is that the agent to do the act is not authorized to
and his declaration
narrate what he had done, of how he had done
no part oi the res gestae."
Railroad Co. v. O'Brien, 119 U.
99,

a

is

a

a

§

a

is

it

1

a

is

7

a

a

it

if

the declaration and the main facts are substantially
sufficient
contemporaneous.
The declaration,
however,
must be voluntary
and spontaneous, and so proximate in point of time as to grow out
of, elucidate, and explain the character and quality of the main fact,
and must be so clearly connected with
as virtually to constitute
but one entire transaction, and to preclude the idea of design, afterthought, or
men- narrative of
Mechem, Ag.
past transaction.
715; Railroad Co. v. O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99,
Sup. Ct. 118, 30 L.
Ed. 2'>'>. From the general trend of the testimony,
appears that
this conversation did not occur until several clays after the assignment, and the payment of the $500 by the church to Barber
Co.,
and after Barber had left the city.
We are of the opinion that the
court erred in admitting the testimony.
There are many exceptions taken to the admission and rejection

&

it

§

■- If the principal employs
agents to talk for him, he will be responsible
for what they say, but the mere Cacl that he employs them to work tor him
aim chargeable with what they say aboul him, or his affairs.
Standard Oil Co. v. Linol Co., 75 N. J. haw, 294, 68 Ath 174
(1907) ante, p. 771.
•
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it

a

;

a

by

§

1

7

134.
Mechem, in his work
IS. 30 I.. Ed. 299; Story. Ag.
Sup. Ct.
on Agency (section 714). states the general rule to he: "The statements, representations, or admissions must have been made
the
agent at the time of the transaction, and either while he was actually
engaged in the performance, or so soon after as to be in reality
part
of the transaction
or, to use the common expression, they must have
If, on the other hand, they were made
been
part of the res gestae.
was
undertaken, or after
before the performance
was completed, or
while the agent was not engaged in the performance, or after his auIn such
thority had expired, they are not admissible.
case they
transaction,
amount to no more than
mere narrative of
and do
past
that, while the agent was aunot bind the principal.
The reason
thorized to act or speak at the time and within the scope of his aunot authorized, at
thority, he
subsequent time, to narrate what he
had done, or how he had done it." 22
113; Bank v.
Greenl. Ev.
Clark, 139 X. Y. 307, 34 N. E. 908, 36 Am. St. Rep. 705; Browning
v. Hinkle, 48 Minn. 544, 51 N. W. 605, 31 Am. St. Rep. 691; Polleys
v. Insurance Co., 14 Ale. 141.
Under this general rule,
not required that
perfect coincidence of time between the declaration and the main facts be shown,
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of testimony in the case, but, as those already passed upon
are decisive of the case, we do not consider it necessary to refer
to the remaining exceptions.
For the errors referred to the judgment of the
district court is reversed and set aside, and the case remanded,
with
directions to grant a new trial. 23

PEYTOX
(Court of Appeals

v.

OLD WOOLEN MILLS CO.

of Kentucky, 1906.
Law Rep.

122

K.v.

361.

01

S. W. Tin.

2$

Ky.

1303.)
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O'Rkar, J. 2 *

Appellant, who is a married woman, had been engaged in the mercantile business at Oscar, Ky.. prior to 1900.
In
the latter year the store building and stock of merchandise were
destroyed by tire. The house was rebuilt directly, and within a few
months a new stock of general merchandise was bought, and a merchandising business conducted at that stand, of the same nature and
in the same name as before.
Mrs. Peyton's name in her business
was generally used simply as "F. L. Peyton."
Her husband had
previously conducted the business for her. She personally had but
little to do with it. After the tire in 1900 and when the new business was begun, the style of the concern was "F. 1.. Peyton."
Her
husband's name was Frank Peyton.
He claims it was Frank L.
Peyton.
Perhaps it was.
But it seems that ordinarily he omitted
the "L." in the signature of his own name.
Mrs. Peyton owned a
farm, some houses in Oscar, and other property.
She was solvent.
Her husband was then and is yet insolvent and without credit.
An
interest in the store was sold to one Webb, ami the style of the firm
changed to Peyton, Webb X- Co.
The stock of merchandise owned
by this concern was also destroyed by lire.
Suits were brought by
creditors of the firm, wholesale merchants who had sold it the stock
of merchandise, againsl appellant, Mrs. Frances L. Peyton, to charge
her as a partner upon the firm's indebtedness.
She denied that she
was or ever had been a member of the firm.
The new business was
conducted by Frank Peyton just as had been done, so far as ins
onal managemenl went, when Mis. Peyton owned it.
The
made by the pleadings was whether appellant was a member
<
of the linn of Peyton, Webb & Co.
There was considerable
Frank Peyton, not in the

evidence introduced
by appellees that
of In- wife, represented thai
and not he, was the member of the firm of tin- naui< "f T I.
I'm."
It was al o shown that in giving m the propert)
I" th< county
•Hiu, he listed all the property,
hei lands and the
stock of merchandise, in the name ..t "k. I.. Peyton," that in
■•The concurring opinion "f Zane
i > Pari "i the opinion i - omitted.

•'

•' . '

omitted.
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reports to the R. G. Dunn mercantile agency lie showed that it was
Mrs. Peyton who was the member of the firm. All of this evidence
was introduced
as substantive evidence in support of appellee's contention that appellant, Mrs. Peyton, was in fact the F. L. Peyton
who conducted and was a member of the firm who conducted that
business. This class of e\ idence was objected to by appellant, and was
It was so extensive in volume, and so
admitted over her exceptions.
damaging in character and probable eflect, that there is no doubt of
its being reversible error, if error at all.
Appellees' contention is that, as appellant put her husband in the
position and held him out as her agent, she is bound by his acts and
statements made in that business, as if done and made by her in
It is undeniably true that where one acts in a matter by an
person.
agent, the latter's action in the matter, if within the real or apparent
scope of his agency, is as binding on the principal as if done by the
But it is always necessary to first establish the
principal himself.
fact of the agency, and to show the actual or apparent scope of the
This cannot be done by proving what the agent
agent's authority.
said or represented as to the extent of his authority.
Morgan's
Heirs v. Marshall, 7 J. J. Marsh. 316; Bruen v. Grahn, 5 Ky. Law
Rep. 312; Dieckman v. Weirich, 73 S. W. 1119, 24 Ky. Law Rep.
2340; Cent. Penn. Tel. Co. v. Thompson, 112 Pa. 131, 3 Atl. 439;
Francis v. Edwards, 77 N. C. 271; Galbrcath v. Cole, 61 Ala. 139;
Mussey v. Beecher, 3 Cush. 517.
It must be rare that what one claiming to be the agent of another
said out of court of the nature and extent of his agency can be admitted as evidence of such agency against the principal.
The whole
doctrine of an agent's admission against the principal's interest binding the latter rests upon the idea that it is of the res gestae, the representation or statement of the agent, in such cases, being the ultimate
fact to be proved, and not the admission of some other fact.
A
party's own admissions against his interest may be given in evidence
against him whenever made.
But the admission or declaration of
his agent binds him only when made during the continuance of the
agency and in regard to a transaction then in hand and being executed.
Greenleaf on Evidence, § 113.
When the principal fact to
be established is the liability (but not its extent) of one as principal
in a transaction, what another, though his agent, may have said by
way of admission concerning such principal's liability is hearsay; is
not part of the res gestae, and could not well be within the scope of
an agent's authority to make.
1 Phil, on Evidence (Am. Ed.) 402.
The agent, of course, may as a witness testify to the fact and scope
of his agency, unless otherwise incompetent as a witness.
So, his
agency may be shown by circumstances, as by proof of the conduct
of the principal, acquiescence, approval and the like of the agent's
acts.
Such evidence goes to establish that the alleged principal is
principal, as well as to show the scope of the agency.
The question
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is not whether an agent's statement in the course
receivable as evidence against
of a transaction, and concerning
receivable at all to
statement
the principal, but whether such
which
to
connect
fact
of the agency,
the principal with
prove the
is

a

is

is

it,

being discussed

a

is

It

stated in Evans on Principal and Agent, p. 187:
the matter.
''As
general proposition, what one man says, not upon oath, cannot
The exception must arise out of
be evidence against another man.
situation,
coupled with the declarations made by
some peculiarity of
within the scope of his authority,
undoubtedly,
An agent may
one.
bind his principal by his agreement, and in many case? by his

is

What the agent has said may be what constitutes the agreement
of the principal; or the representations or statements made may be
Therefi
the foundation of the inducement to the agreement.
to prove
admitted
law,
must
be
evidence
not
by
necessary
writing

is

is

a

is

it

is

or his agreement, merely because that person has
An agent can act only within the scope of his
been an agent of his.
him as to
authority; hence, declarations or admissions made
particular fact are not admissible as evidence against the principal,
unless they fall within the nature of the agent's employment as agent
unless, for instance, they form part of the contract which he has en

;

a

by

as to his conduct,

employed to negotiate on behalf of the principal.
contract or other mat
said by an agent respecting
good evidence to affect the
ter in the course of his employment
said on another occasion."
principal, but not
In the case at bar the objectionable evidence was not admis
his
made by Frank Peyton as the agent of his wife, in the
«• the pursuit
trail
the
particular
concerning
cy,
That Frank Peyton
sued for.
the bills
chase of any
.

;

i.

Is

g

of

of

in

i

of

if
it
is

is

a

is

Hence, what

is

tered into and

not

Although

it

of

of

m

tl

in

in

is,

il

,
v

b

in

if

if

is

[

id

is

there any issue as to the
Nor
denied.
Frank Peytoi
there were, and
the
what he said
umstantially,
ting their terms would
But no Mich inqu
j,|, net
his principal.
simply, for whom m
On the contrary,
volved here.
What he said
making the purchases?
ton acting
which
icllant, and
evidence that he
ainst her under any rule

ds
the
purchas
of the contracts
is
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So, with regard to acts
certain statement.
that the agent made
done, the words with which these acts are accompanied frequently
Nevertheless, the admission of the
tend to determine their quality.
A
admission of the principal.
the
to
assimilated
cannot
be
agent
not permitted to conbound by his own admission, and
party
man
precluded from quesimpossible to say
tradict it; but
tioning or contradicting anything any person has asserted as to him,
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cantile business, yel whal he said in her absence respecting the fact
that she was principal and he her agent only cannot be received as
evidence that she was principal.
Such statement is not properly a
involved
the issue being tried, and theretransaction
in
part of any
What Frank Peyton did toward
tore was not part of the res gestae.
such
as listing it for taxation in her
property,
appellant's
managing
name. is. when shown to have occurred as in this case, under cirwithin her knowledge — for she must have
cumstances presumably
known that, as she did not attend to that duty, some one did it for
her — was relevant to show that the property was hers; not because
Frank hey ton said it was, but because by her adoption of his act she
That he kept the bank account in her
asserted it was hers.
name, a fact shown to have been known to her, was also relevant
But what he said to merchants and reupon the same principle.
ported to the mercantile agency were not relevant as against her,
and it was error to have admitted that character of evidence to the
*
jury.

For the reasons indicated, the judgment is reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial under proceedings not inconsistent herewith.

SECTION 3.— WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY

STILL

v.

BOWERS.

(District Court of Philadelphia,

1864.

5

Phila.

.'563.)

Harp.. J. Although the evidence given in this case to show that
Kelty, who ordered the work for which the plaintiff sues, was the
duly authorized agent of both the defendants, as he undoubtedly was
of one of them, may have been but slight, it was still evidence which
could not be withheld from the jury, and which was accordingly left
and
X') them with a caution against giving it too much importance,
an explanation
of its true weight and bearing. They found for the
plaintiff, and we see no sufficient reason for setting aside the verdict.
mership of the mill; the concurrence of both the defendants in removing the old fixtures; the frequent visits of Bowers
after the new machinery had been put up and was running under
the personal superintendence
of Conrow ; the testimony of one of
the workmen that when he applied to Conrow for employment, Bowers v.
for, and joined in referring the witness to Kelty, by
whom he was engaged and paid in the name of Conrow and (lowers,
were all circumstances which, although of comparatively little signifseparately, are, when taken together, enough to show that
finding of the jury cannot be justly impugned, either as being
without evidence, or contrary to its weigfht.

icance
the
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LEVY. 25

(City Court of New York, General

Term, L890.
sr. Rep. 58.)

Y. Supp.

11 N.

684,

34 N.

Y.

Action

on a guaranty of payment for goods to the amount of
Defendant's
name, as guarantor, was signed by his wife.
$379.
The trial judge dismissed the complaint for want of evidence of authority in the wife.
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Per Curiam.
On appeal from this judgment dismissing their
complaint, the plaintiffs are entitled to have all their evidence taken
as true, and to be given the benefit of the most favorable inferences
deducihle therefrom.
Weil v. Railroad Co., 119 X. Y. 152, J.^ X.
E. 487.
Although the statute requires the guaranty to be in writing, it was not necessary that Mrs. Levy's authority to execute it.
as defendant's agent, should also be in writing.
Parol authority is
sufficient, and it may hi- proved by oral testimony.
Worrall v.
Munn, 5 X. V. 229, 55 Am. Dec. 330; inkers v. Townsend, 24 X.
Y.

57; Bank v. Ballou, 49 X. Y. 155.
The defendant told the plaintiffs that

his wife would have charge
of his business; that they could do business with her as they had
with him: and that they could let her have whatever she wanted,
and it would be all right.
On the defendant's return from Europe,
plaintiffs demanded payment from him, and he said if his wile would
tell him that she had guarantied the purchase he would pay the bill.
He asked for, and was allowed to take, the guaranty to show to his
wife, presumably to ask her whether she did make it, and in a few
days returned it with a letter, neither denying nor admitting his
liability. The defendant offered to pay half of the claim before suit
brought. Taking this evidence as true, as we must on this appeal, it
that the jury would have been warranted in drawing the in
ference that Mrs. I.evy had authority from the defendant to si^u his
It is impossible to lay down any inflexible
name to the guaranty.
what evidence shall be sufficient
can
it
which
be
determined
rule by
to establish an agency in any given case; but it may be said, in
general terms, that whatever evidence has the tendenc) to prove the
it is
agency is admissible, even though nol full and sati
is clear

i"

the province of the jur)
I Inn, 4 U>: Manufacti:

pass
v.

upon
Burns,

Bickford

it.

Co., 63 '.. '>
Ala. 606, 23 Am. Rep. 578; Morri on v.
\m. i >ec. 661. Apart from ' :
was sufficient evid< nee oi ratification to go to
v.

[nsuran<

Rig]
Cairnes
\

e

H;

v.
a

v.

v.

Bodli

1

th<

I

U

M
2

!

Bl

Elliott

I

I a it., d

\

X. Y. St. R< p, 570;
Railroad Co. v. H<
Whiteside, 17 Md
i iginal authoi

15

«*, 567,

86

ktl

Hun,

i

actions

B48

Johnson

(Part

Tones. 4 T.arb. 369; Stilwell v. Insurance

v.

Co.,

72

N.

4

Y.

392.

It was error to dismiss
and the judgment entered on such dismissal must be
reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to
abide the event.
The

case

ought to have gone to the jury.

the complaint,

BOOTH
(Supreme

Court of Nebraska,

v.

KESSLER.

1901.

G2 Neb. 704,

87 N.

W. 532.)

Action in equity to foreclose a mortgage which plaintiff alleged
bona fide for value from one Weiss. Defendant claimed
Weiss was the agent of plaintiff and that plaintiff was not an innocent
Kessler applied for a loan in an application which desigpurchaser.
nated Weiss as his agent.
The note and mortgage were made out
to Weiss, and the money was sent to Weiss by plaintiff and credited
to his account in the bank of which Weiss was cashier.
Weiss asd the mortgage to plaintiff, but before it was paid over to de-
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he purchased

fendant

the bank

failed.
* *

* In this connection it is pertinent to rethat the evidence is entirely clear upon the point that the application for the loan was made for the purpose of paying a balance
due on a prior mortgage ; that the prior mortgage was not satisfied,
and that plaintiff was advised of this fact when he accepted the note
and mortgage in question ; and that he forwarded the money to
Weiss evidently for the purpose of having the prior mortgage satisfied before he intended the transaction should be closed.
Other evidence of much the same character was introduced.
We cannot say the trial court was not justified, from all the facts
and circumstances shown in evidence, in finding that in the transaction Weiss acted as the agent of the plaintiff, and that plaintiff did not
in fact purchase the note and mortgage of Weiss as alleged.
There
is no very serious conflict or contradiction in the evidence.
Aside
from the testimony
of the plaintiff wherein he testifies that he
'
t the note and mortgage of Weiss, and paid him for them, —
which is in the nature of a conclusion, rather than a statement of
facts, — there is no substantial controversy as to the facts surroundthe transaction, and which lead up to and establish the ultimate
fact and chief point in controversy; that is, the character of the
transaction as between the three active agents thereto and principal
participants therein.
We incline to the view that, as established by
the evidence, it is a case where reasonable minds might very properly differ as to the proper conclusions to be drawn therefrom,
and, if so, we are not warranted
in disturbing the finding, even

Holcomb, J. 26

mark

*«

Part of the opinion

is omitted.
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e of the
°Pinion that a different conclusion than
reached by the trial^ court might be
more proper."
The rule is that
on appeal and a trial de novo
the findings of the district court will
not be disturbed unless they cannot
be reconciled with anv reasonable
of the testimony, Gadsden v.
Phelps, 37 Neb
56 ^onstrucbon
314; that when only questions of
fact are presente
to which there is sufficient evidence
to sustain the findings of the

SUStained

'

U
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^ -
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Katz, 38
of fact by
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Findings on questions
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a

a

court are entitled to the same weight and the
same presumption
of
correctness as
verdict of
jury, and the rule
the same whether
the case is brought to this court on
error or appeal, and applies to
all classes of actions.
Burlingim v. Warner, 39 Xeb. 493, 58 X. \Y.
The decree appealed from must

be

affirmed.

*
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dence ™« decide
when the matter has
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The court will set aside
.
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CHAPTER IV
TRIAL-PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY

SOUTH
(Supreme

&

Court

NORTH ALABAMA R. CO.
of Alabama,

L875.

52

Ala.

606,

v.

HENLEIN.

23

Am.

Rep. 57.3.)
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Action for failure to deliver a steer received by defendant company for transportation to Montgomery, Alabama. Judgment for
plaintiff and defendant appeals.
Brickkt.l. C. J. 1 The contract of shipment contemplates that
the owner or his agent shall attend the live-stock while in the course
of transportation, and imposes on him the duty of feeding and waterThe
ing them, at his own expense, if delays or accidents occurred.

the place of shipment in charge of an agent of the owner,
The cause of
with them, when delivered to the appellant.
of the animal, for the loss of which a recovery is sought in
Delays in
was matter of controversy in the circuit court.
transportation had occurred, and it may have been supposed the want
The
of food and water, during the delay, was the cause of death.
in
this
appellant, to relieve itself from all imputation of negligence
when
:ct, ottered to prove that at Birmingham, after the delays,
to a person,
no visible injury had happened, its agent proposed
on which
car,
the
switch
off
stock,
to
claiming to be in charge of the

stock left
who was
the death
this case,

This person rethe stock was loaded, and feed and water them.
this evidence,
excluded
The
court
be
done.
fused to permit this to
to whom
that
the
evidence,
person
other
with
because not connected
the proposition was made was the agent of the owners.
The acts or declarations of one professing to be the agent of another are not binding on the principal until his authority is shown, or
McClung's
the assent to, or ratification of such acts or declarations.
Ex'rs v. Spotswood, 19 Ala. 165.
When the fact of agency rests in parol, its existence and the extent of the authority conferred are matters of fact for the determiWhatever evidence has a tendency to prove the
nation of the jury.
In the case cited, C. J. Dargan said: "The
v is admissible.
this,
if there be no proof whatever tending to prove
ct rule is
the agency, the act may be excluded from the jury by the court ; but
if there is any evidence tending to prove the authority of the agent,
then the act cannot be excluded from them, for they are the judges
In determining the
of the weight and sufficiency of the testimony."
admissibility of evidence, its sufficiency must be lost sight of in a
i

Part of the opinion

is omitted.
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great degree; it may be weak and inconclusive, yet if it is relevant
and has a tendency to prove a material fact, it cannot be excluded
without invading the province of the jury. When the fact offered
to be proved is connected with the fact that the contract of shipment
contemplates the presence of the owner or his agent during the
transportation of the stock, and imposes on him the duty of watering, feeding, and caring for them, and with the fact that when the
stock left the place of shipment they were in chai
an agent, who
was with them when delivered to the appellant; the evidence offered
was admissible.
The fact that the person to whom the offer was
made was in charge of the stock, claiming to be the agent, in connection with these facts, had a tendency to show he was the agent ;
and in the absence of contradictory evidence might have been received by the jury as sufficient.
He was where the agent should
have been, and exercising the authority the agent had.
The point
of dispute is not whether the owners had an agent who should have
been in charge of the stock at the time and place of the offer, but
whether the person to whom the offer was made was such agent.
The existence of an agency not being controverted,
the evidence
from
should have gone to the jury, and under proper instructions
the court they should have determined whether the person* to whom
The evidence given
the offer was made was or not appellee's agent.
train
left
the
by the appellees that their agent
convening the stock
before it reached Birmingham, and was nol there when the train
arrived or left, does not affect the admissibility of the evidenc
It was contradictory of the fact thai the person to whom
jected.
the offer was made was the agent of the appellees; but the fact that
evidence is in conflict with or contradictory of other evidence is not
Its credibility and suffi
involved in an inquiry as to it- admissibilty.
ciency is affected by such conflicl or contradiction, and there the
determine the weight it should r.
duty of the jury intei
*
*
in view of the conflict. 8 *
K- \ ers< d and remanded.
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7<; \. W. 7»'»(1N9H), in which there wa
'
i8 N. Y. 1 i" 52 S
franklin Bank SoU •
>r the
i
ny ei Idem e tendii
Ion whether
Held \
Co.,
Trlmhh
court.
■, >, Rupp i ■
Claflln v. Continental Workx, nnte,
(1004)
A- to determination
of written
power.
tu written
be l'-;i«liiiL' case of Loudon >'
■
36 Pa. 198, 7^ Am i
Savlngc Banl
I Hhould Ml) I" He
liyu , ;,
• ii. -y. siiiM-ii'i
V
then
N.,1

v. Da

onlj

actions

WILCOX
Oourt

of Tennessee,

4

HINES.

v.

LOO Tenn.
Rep. 761.)

L897.

5i:4,

45 S.

W.

781,

G6 Am.

St.

Action for injuries caused by the falling of a porch of a house
owned by defendant Wilcox and leased to plaintiff's father. There
was evidence that Wilcox knew of the rotten timbers in the porch
and promised to have them fixed, that shortly after a carpenter
Judgment for
fixed the ]>orch by putting a wooden post under it.
by
plaintiff of
remittitur
Upon a
plaintiff for $4,500 damages.
trial, and
new
for
a
motion
judge overruled a
the circuit
$1,500.
for
pronounced judgment for plaintiff
McAi.i-n.K. J. 3 * * * The third assignment is that the
court erred in admitting testimony that, after the post beneath the
porch was fixed, the workman remarked, "Now, that is safe." On
this subject the court, in its fifth instruction to the jury, said, viz.:
"If you believe from the proof that the carpenter was sent there
for the purpose of making the repairs by the defendant or his authorized agents in charge of the property, then the statement or
assurance of said carpenter, while performing the carpenter's work,
with reference to the porch being safe, on the completion of the
work he had been sent to do, would be admissible, and such statements would be binding upon defendant; but if the proof fails to
establish the fact to your satisfaction that defendant or his authorized agents, etc., did send said carpenter upon the premises for the
purpose of making the repairs upon said porch, then said carpenter
was not the agent or representative of defendant, and defendant is
not bound by anything done or said by said carpenter in making
said repairs."
The evidence above mentioned was objected to upon the ground

a

it,

such declarations, that
that the court must find, before admitting
the negro wdio fixed the post was the agent of defendant. It being
a matter of controversy, upon the proof, whether the negro postfixer was employed by the defendant, the court declined to adjudge
as
disputed question of fact,
the question of agency, but left

Part of the opinion

&

is is

it

it

is omitted.

is

it

a

is

is

1

it

is

if

for the settlement of the jury. The alleged error of the trial judge
was in submitting the admissibility of testimony to the jury, and
the admissiinsisted that,
in not determining
himself. It
bility of the testimony depends upon any fact, that fact must be
found by the court to exist. We are of opinion the ruling of the
circuit judge was correct. In
Am.
Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.)
stated thus: "if the evidence adduced to support
he rule
exists or not
one of
claim of agency
undisputed, whether
law, for the court. Whenever
one of
disputed, however,
•

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

(Supreme

(Part

TRIAL — PROVINCE

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Ch. 4)

OF COURT AND JURY

853

mixed law and fact, for the consideration of the jury, aided by instructions from the court."
In the case of Gulick v. Grover, 33 N. J. Law, 463, 97 Am. Dec.
728, it was held that "when the facts are undisputed the question
whether an agent has the requisite authority to bind his principal is
a question of law, for the court, whether such authority is sought to
be sustained by a previous authorization
or bv subsequent ratification."
In the case of Loudon Sav. Fund Soc. v. Hagerstown Sav. Bank,
36 Pa. 498, 78 Am. Dec. 390, the court said, viz.: "If the authority
[of the agent] be created by power of attorney, or other writing, the
instrument itself must, in general, be produced ; and since the construction of writings belongs to the court, and not to the jury, the
fact and scope of the agency are in such cases questions of law. and
are properly decided by the judge.
But the authority ma\ be by
parol, or it may be implied from the conduct of the employer in
sanctioning the credit given to a person acting in his name. * * *
And in all instances, where the authority, whether general or special, is to be implied from the conduct of the principal, or where
the medium of proof of agency is per testes [by witnesses], the
jury are to judge of the credibility of witnesses, and of the implications to be made from their testimony." The court then said that:
"As the plaintiff here did not produce any written evidenci
Easten's agency, it was the duty of the court to inform the jury
what constitutes agency, express or implied, special or general, and
First, whether the evidence satisfied
to refer to them the questions:
them that Easten was either the general or special agent of the defendants; and. second, whether the issuing of the certificate in
suit was within the scope of his authority." 1 Mechein, Ag. §
106.

*

*

Judgment

*

affirmed.

* it Air i ii viinv
The same principle* govern the conduct of the trini
hi v.
when the decision binges upon ratification of «Mf agent's act
Vineyard M. K. Church. 72 Minn. 78, 74 N. W. 1015 (180S); Rapid Hook 4
\
Fountain,
19
Co. v. I).- Ruyter, iit Mich. "'IT. 78 v W. 78 (1898); Sanford
Mlac. Rep 301, 99 N. v. Supp. 234 (1908); Simon v. Johnson, 106 ala, 844, 18
Bee, also, ante, pp. LOO, L12, 318.
South. 884. 53 \m. si. Rep. 128 (1894).

actions
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CHAPTER V
JUDGMENT

AND DAMAGES

CASSABOGLOU

v.

GIBBS.

Q. B. Div. 220,
(Queen's Bench Division of the Bijjh Court of Justiee, iss2.
r. 1 I.. .1. Q. B. 593, 17 L. T. Rep. 98, 46 J. P. 56S.)
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Watkin Williams, J.

This was a Special Case stated by confor
the
opinion of the Court as to the measure of
sent of the panics
was entitled to recover against the dethe
plaintiff
which
damages
fendants under the following circumstances: The plaintiff is a merThe defendants are commission agents at Hong
chant in London.
On the 23rd of March, 1880,
Kong, having an agency in London.
the plaintiff inquired of the defendants by telegram at what price
they would buy for him cases of the finest dry new crop Persian
The defendants replied to this, and on the 25th of March
opium.
the plaintiff gave them orders to buy for his account certain cases
of the opium described, and to have them shipped by mail steamer.
About the 26th of March, 1880, the defendants purchased for the
plaintiffs what they believed, though erroneously as it turned out, to
be finest dry new crop Persian opium, and on the 30th of March by
On the 7th of April,
letter advised the plaintiff of the purchase.
to
the
plaintiff invoices of the opium,
1880, the defendants forwarded
drawn
had
him
that
upon him for the amounts —
and advised
they
£1,221.
£2,346.
12s.
The plaintiff duly accepted
and
3s.
lid.
namely.
of
the opium in London it
arrival
the
these
drafts.
Upon
and paid
was discovered that no part of it was in accordance with the order,
but it was soft and oily, and unfit for the purposes to which the
It is admitted for the purfinest dry Persian opium is applicable.
poses of this case that there was not in the market at Hong Kong
any finest dry new crop Persian opium, and that the defendants could

The plaintiff immediately
not have purchased any for the plaintiff.
The plainrejected the whole of the opium, and refused to accept it.
tiff, having already sold a portion of the opium, had to make an allowance to the purchasers of £170. on account of the inferiority of
The remainder of the opium was sold at a lower price than
quality.
The plaintiff then brought this acthat paid for it by the plaintiff.
for his loss, and in
tion against the defendants for compensation

"The plaintiff
clause 15 of the case his claim is thus expressed:
claims to be recouped or paid by the defendants the difference between the market price of the article ordered and the proceeds of
the sale of the drug actually sent, as damages for the above-men-

JUDGMENT

AND DAMAGES

tioned alleged breach of the contract of agency or alleged failure to
perform at all the said contract, or alleged gross and culpable negligence as such agents in their conduct of such agency and performance of their duties in connection therewith, or as damages i<>r the
breach of warranty and promise to purchase alleged to be contained
in the telegrams and letters. The defendants have paid into Curt the
sum of £300., and the plaintiff admits that if the defendants are only
liable to make good the loss actually sustained by him in consequence
of the defendants' breach of duty the £300. is sufficient to satisfy his
claim, and the question is whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim for
loss beyond that amount."
We are of opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover from
the defendants anything beyond his actual loss.
The plaintiff employed the defendants as his agents to purchase the opium for him,
and their duty was to use due care, skill and diligence in executing
his orders, and for their failure in this respect they are liable to the
plaintiff for all loss and damage sustained by him through their
omission and negligence.
The plaintiff seeks to treat them as vendors of the opium to him,
and to hold them responsible for damages as for a breach of warranty of the kind and quality of the goods, in which case the n
ure of damages would be not merely the difference between the
to him of the goods and their real value, but the difference bit ween
the value of goods of the description sold and of the goods actually

A single illustration is sufficient to shew the fallacy <<i the
plaintiffs contention.
Suppose one instructs a commission agent to
for
him
a
purchase
very valuable original picture, if it should be

sent.

offered for sale, and the agent carelessly bids for a picture under
the belief that it is the original, and it is knocked down to him for,
say, /100. and he informs Ids employer that he has bought the picture for that sum, and his employer remits tin- money, and the picture i- forwarded, hut upon arrival is discovered to be merel) a copy.

The employer

sold for £90.
N'ow SUpwould have been worth
Is th.' agent liable tor £910. damages, or only tor the actual
£1,000,
it
ed to his employer
through his want of care and skin.'
"t
the
tunand
to
the
is
seems
measure
us that
latter
damages,
therefore that our judgment should be tor the defendants.
Judgmenl lor tin- defendants.
t hat

rejects the picture,

if it had been the

and

it

is

original picture

it

(3

-

i

I.

7

'• i" the principal ;i r
'Tiie Idea i,r dai
raull
tatned by the
wrong done, i-i "■
I
No. 5,978, 2 Broi k 350
nlngham, I •
18 N. 1
W0 (lHXH),
Plumb v. Campbell, 129 HI t"i
Speculative damages, depending mi ;
:;
•.
90
09,
Bell v. Cunningham,
[*<
I
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v.
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MUSSEY.

of Maine.

L833.

10

Mo. 297.)
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Defendant
sold lumber for plaintiff to one Houdlette, taking a
From the vendee, who was doing' a large business, but who
proved to be insolvent.
Defendant took some steps to secure the
debt, getting a note signed by 1 loudlette and one Lilly, but was neither
careful nor skillful in following- it up and in trying to realize on the
It appeared, however, that no security of value
security taken.
could have been obtained. Before the insolvency of the vendee appeared, defendant had made a provisional settlement with plaintiff
by giving his note for $653.43, it being understood that he should
pay only what he collected. Plaintiff brings assumpsit on the note.
Verdict for defendant.
WESTON, J. The jury have found that the defendant, in relation
to the business confided to him, had been guilty of no negligence
to the prejudice of the plaintiff, or by which he had suffered loss.
To omit to do that, which if done would have been fruitless and

unavailing, can in no proper sense be denominated negligence.
The jury were upon this point properly instructed ; and it was their
province to pass upon the facts. Although the defendant had done
his duty to the plaintiff, as the jury have found, yet he might have
assumed to himself the Houdlette debt, and the Judge was requested to rule at the trial, that this was the inference necessarily
The defendant was endeavoring to seto be drawn from the facts.
His proceedings from time to time were dicure his principals.
The security from Lilly was not divided
rected to that object.
precisely as it ought to have been; but it all turned out to be of
no value. 2 We perceive nothing in the facts conclusively proving
that the defendant made, or intended to make, the Houdlette debt
his own. He was not bound to take that hazard upon himself.
He was required only to be faithful to his trust; and the jury have
settled all the facts in favour of the defendant.
Judgment on the verdict.
2 Tt is always competent
for the agent to show that, notwithstanding his
fault, hi- principal has suffered no damages. First Nat. Bank v. Fourth Xat.
in such <-aso he will he liable
Bank, 77 X. Y. 320, :;:: Am. Rep. 'lis (1879).
.,lv nominal damages at most. Allen v. Suydam, 20 Wend. 821, 32 Am.
Dec. 555 (1838); Van Wart v. Wooley, 3 B. & C. 4.39, 10 E. C. L. 204, 1 M. &

M. 520, 22 B. 0. I.. 578 (1824).
There ean he no recovery for the negligence of the agent from whom no
own, oven though it is possible there may be a loss in the future.
:■v. Woodruff, 36 N. -I. Bq. 174 tissi',.
For eases on damages against agent, see ante, pp. 559, 568.

INDEX
[the figures befeb to pages]

ACCEPTING BENEFITS,
Ratification

by,

ACCOUNTING,

see

see

ACQUIESCENCE,
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Ratification by,

Hatification.
of Agent;

Liability
see

Broker.

Ratification.

ACTIONS, see Evidence; Trial; Judgment
ACTIONS, FORM OF, see cases under Liability,
in general, note 811.
In contract or in tort, McMorris 812; aote 813; Asbley 814.
In law or in equity, Moss 585; King B15 and aote.
Bill in equity appropriate, v"ilwig816; note 817; rndcrbill

Various remedies available, McMorris 812; note, 813.
">: Loveleas 811;
Case or irovcr. Minneapolis 559; Moore •">'.

818.

McMor-

ris 813.
or assumpsit, Minneapolis 560; Ashley 814.
Contracl againsl agent, oote 597.
Trover, when appropriate, Perkins ';'.»•".and note; MeMorria BIS;
also <lonverslon.
Against agent, Schanz 193 ; Minneapolis 558; Salem 578; m
594
r.\ agenl vs. third person, Faulkner 719.
S,, T: note v,| v
By principal against third person, Gllmore
Whal amounts to conversion, Bartels 597 and aote; Perkini
and aote; Gllmore 807; Loveless 811; McMorris 818 and
note.
Demand unnecessary, Bartels 698.
Trespass by agenl against third person, Porter 720.
apoll
For disobedience bj agent, Mil
v i»
Assumpsit by principal, McMorris 812; oote 813; Ashlej
; Leterman
vs. third person, Gunn 701 : Thatchei Tut
agent
"tiu : Bhort 709.
Bj third person vb. principal, Webster 724
Bj principal vs. third person, Beebee 792.
\ ! ■ v >'
McMorri B18
\ a, agent ; Minnea]
meruit,
Qtiatitiiin
i;,,
Glover 229; Millar 610; Wlaa
,.,-> in for agent's
When contract specifies amount,
,; " ;
note 809, 010 ; Timberlake

^vi ,

man 827;

ACTIONS, P m:ti E8 TO
Proper part l<
Principal'! i

ADMISSIONS

"i \''

G000.P&A a.

Allrlll

ral,

ncy,

632 ;

'■''"

Kellj

Wa

u ■

Hlldebrai

Btiei

Iso 1 lability.
Beebt e 792;
'

aote 819

Principal;

Howing.
i

lNl>i:\
[The figures refer to pages]

ADOPTION,
Distinguished

from

ratification,

Al>\ \\<1'S.
Bj factor, Greenleaf 653 ;
\1>\

ERSE INTEREST,
Of agent against principal,

Bee

Feild
see

Ratification.

657.

Liability of Agent

AGENCY,
t.
l leflned, Sternaman
from sale, Echols 2; Taylor 13;
Distinguished
Independent contractor, note 10.
Partnership, note 11.
Master ami servant. Kingan 9; note 10.
lease, note 11.
Trust. Taylor 10 ami note.
Maxims of. see Qui Faclt

Snelling

13.

Joint Principals; Joint Agents.
to. set' Agent; Principal;
Purpose for which created, sec Purposes of Agency.
Bow created, see Creation of Agency; Authority.
Classes of, in general, Gibson 20.
Genera] ami special, Gibson 20; Trundy 51; see also General Agent;
Special Agent ; Liability of Principal.
Double Agency,
Agent act for himself and his principal, Moores 298; Hook 3S6.
After termination of the agency, Moore 208.
Agent for two principals, Empire 732: note 733; Truslow 737.
Of vendor and vendee, Whitley 161; Farnsworth 316; Truslow
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Parties

736.

When lawful. Wassell 734; note 735.
Ratified by both, Truslow 737; note 73S.
As affecting right to compensation, Rupp 518; Atterbury 636; note 637.
Termination of, see Termination of Agency.
Delegation of, see Delegation of Agency.

AGENT,

Liability;

see

Defined,

Echols

Compensation;

Reimbursement

of Agent.

1.

Distinguished from servant. Kingan
Prom trustee. Taylor 10: note

8.
10.

note 10.
Prom independent contractor,
From lessee, note 11.
General and special agents, Gibson 20; see also Agency.
Universal agent, note 21.
Collecting, liability of, Bradstreet 491; note 493.
How terminated, see Termination of Agency.
How appointed, see Authority; Creation of Agency.
For what purposes employed, see Purposes of Agency.
Must act in name of principal, Davis 23; Combes 38.
See also Execution
Of Authority.
Who may act as. King .".1 and cases following.
infant as, King 31 : Tebbetts 143.
MacGregor 214; note 292;
i mnol ad for self. First National Bank 96;
Lank .".(is; McAlpln347;
Dowden 730; see also Double Agency.
Ratification by, Trudo 100; note 101.
Right to appoint subagent, see Delegation of Authority.

AMBIGUOUS AUTHORITY, see Construction of Authority.
APPARENT AUTHORITY, see Authority; Estoppel.
APPOINTMENT OF THE AGENT,
ASSOCIATIONS, see Clubs.
JUMPSIT,

see

Actions,

Form of.

see

Authority;

Creation of Agency.

INDEX
[The figures refer to pages]

ATTORNEY AT LAW,

Authority of agent to employ, Eldridge 185; Bacon 640.
Duty and authority in making collections, Miller 429;
Morrison
Liability as collecting agent, see Delegation of Authority
For mistakes, note 562.
Compensation of. Vilas 610.

503

ATTORNEY IN FACT,
How constituted,

Caley 22; see also Creation
As collecting agent, note 432.
Delegation of authority by, Eldridge 185.

of Agency.

AUCTIONEER,

As agent for undisclosed principal, note 675; Mercer 676.
Liability for money paid by mistake. Mowatl 683; Burrough
For property sold without title, Moore 686.
Sue on contract made in own name. Fisher 707.

GS4.
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AUTHORITY

OF AGENT, see Creation of Agency;
Ratification;
tion; Construction of Authority ; Execution of Authority.
How conferred, see Creation of Agency.
Burden of proof to Bhow, Bee Evidence.
Nature,
Implied, Bee Creation of Agency.
When arises. Trnndy .">::: Farmers 335.
When not, Gregory 56; Williams L54; Burchard 287;
329.

Termina-

Patterson

Distinguished from apparent, Columbia 57; Bee also Estoppel.
Extends tn a<ts incidental to employment, Dunw
iv 340; note
342,

139.
to acts of like

Limited

kind. McAlpin .".IV
verbal, Farmers 335; see also Express Authority.
Implied added to, Dunwoodj 340; Valentine 105.
Written, under seal. Sheppard 65; Bee Seal, Authority Under.
When writing required, Caley 22; see also Tower of Actor
ney; Construction of Authority ; Express Authority; Stal
ute of Frauds.
f. Claflin 338; Bee also Construction
of Authority.
Scoi
<»rai evidence to enlarge, Claflin 338;
Reese 34L
To explain, Reese 341; see also Evidence.
Apparent authority and actual, Gregory 54; Bee also Estoppel
of agent of corporation, see Corporations.
] defined, note 325.
Is actual as I" third persons, 'Iriu'L's 300 and note; Ludlow
note:;!'.'.;
.•mil not,-:
Keith 326; Saugertii
Heath
i>a.\iiL'iit 380; Higgins 391.
indicia of authority, Pickering 319; Glllman 320; Vlit ri in 321 :
Express,

Johnston 323.
i" estoppel, Patterson 330
Limited to appearance! given bj principal.

Amounts
2K0

■

Instructions of
Flaubeli

Farn
light

i ;

Burchard

Patterson

•':•-".•: Van Eppt
principal as limiting, M
third pen oni . «(rand Rapid
302;

Ludlow 303 and note; Hutsoi
To ii'ii- :; i:: ; Sorrel 34

Known limitations lint on 804; Bank 806;
also Third P<
ot of authority, In general, Burchard 287; note

i
note 288 ; Grand
limited
Gates 313
When w rltten, <!ummins 291
105,
Includes what, McAlpin 348; Valentine

How

H

287;

note

I

D

Browi

INDEX
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[The figures refer to pages]

AUTHORITY

OF A.GENT Continued,
Third person ascertain at peril, Cummins 291; note 288, 292; Gates
313;
Bee also Third Persona
Usage and custom as affecting, Burchard 288; Oawthorn 811; Gates
314; Johnston 324;
Keith 327; Dunwoody 340; McAlpin 348;
l'a\ iic 382.
Incidental power, Burchard 288; Farmers 335; Dunwoody 340; McAii'in 348; Sprague 360; Payne 383.
. hi authority,
Measured by holding out of principal, Haubelt 301; note 322;
Johnston 323.
J tepends upon,

note 3:u.

Acts within scope bind principal, Mussey 294; Griggs 300.
Frauds, etc., see Torts.
Outside scope of authority, Cummins 291 and note; Moores
297;
Gates 313; Gambill 834.
Of general agenl to <lo acts naturally resulting, Grand Rapids
296;

Griggs

Limitations
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Acts for personal
McAlpin,
308;

300.
on rule,

Ilutson

304.

benefit of agent, note 292;

349;

Hook

Moores

297;

Bank

386.

See also Double Agency.
of agent, Cummins 292;
As shown by acts or representations
note 293; Mussey 295; Grand Rapids 296; Moores 297.
As affecting tort liability of principal, Birkitt 7G1 and note;
Mackay 763; note 765; McCord 706.
Of general and special agencies, note 20; Bank 307; note 335; Mc-

Alpin

348.

agency general rather than special, Sharp 829.
Limitations on authority in, Gates 313; Batty 350; Young 351;
Brown 3S5; Denman 395.
When unknown, Antrim 321; Sorrel 345; note 385.
Scope of apparent authority, Mussey 294; Johnston 323; Keith
326;
note 334; Pacific 343; Sorrel 345; Heath 360; Wilson
Presumption

152.

of general and special authority, see
Special Agent;
note 350; Young 351; Bass
General Assent;
351 : note 352; Hover 770.
Authority to borrow, general rule, note 439.
Power perilous, Exchange 433.
When not Implied, Williams 154.
Of cashier of bank, Moores 297.
To buy. not authority to lend money, Nye 168; Salmon 356.
Of manager of business, Beecher 353; note 358.
How limited. Born 353; note 354.
When Implied from previous acts. Smith 354; note 358.
incidental to the general authority, Salmon 356; note 358.
What may be bought, Brown 357.
Sprague 300; Morey 361.
On credit, Saugerties 358 and note;
To collect, when implied, in general, Barrett 414; Butman 415.
a course of dealing,
Harrison 424; note 425.
From possession of securities, ''lark 244; Burchard 288; note 289;
Howard 392; Roberts 415; Martyn H6; Wolstenholm 410; CurHarrison 424; Schmidt 822.
tis 117: Joy H9; Smith 421;
From power to sell, Cummins 291; Cape! 390; Higgins 391.
From authority to solicit orders, Hahnenfeld 393; Higgins 390.
To c,,iiect Interest, Joy 418 and note; Smith 420.
What Included, McAlpin 349.
When remit proceeds, licdell -"lis.
Of collecting agent to foreclose mortgage, Burchard 200.
To Indorse negotiable paper, Graham 430; note 431.
Distinctions as to extent

INDEX
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AUTHORITY

OF AGENT— Continued,
only cash in payment, Mann 411:
Barker 426; note 427'
Dixon 428; Miller 429.
Not before or after maturity. Mann ni: Schmidt 822.
Compromise or compound the debt, McAlpin
18; Miller 429; Tootle
.".

Receive

432

Wry \\:\.
and note:
business, Dunw
340;
Pacific 344; oote 439.
lmt include power to Indorse negotiable paper, Gould
or rent property, note 439.
claims and bring suit, oote 439.
contracts of employment, Dote »;'>: see also Attorney at Law:

!)".■>

ly

To manage

To lease
To settle
To make
Physician.
To make and indorse negotiable

paper, Graham 430; note 431; Exchange
Gould
139.
r.ank 136; Dusenbury 655.
To sell personal property, sec Liability of A.gen1 to Principal for Loyalty.
Possession as proof of, Pickering 319;
Peerless 363; Covill 364;
Heath 366; note 368;
Howard 392; Biggins 390; Schmidt B22.
Not implied from authority to solicit orders. Clough 368;
Biggins
390; Hahnenfeld 393.
Or to buy. note 369.
Of manager of business, Scudder ::>•.'.»
To warrant quality, Herring ::7<»: no te 372, :'.7.:: Brady :;:.".: w
urn :;t«'.: Conkling ::77: Upton 378.
To rescind sale, Bradford 394; Denman 395; note ::'.>»;.
Not to exchange, Trudo LOO; Taylor 384; Hook 386.
To sell for cash only, note 384; Book :»;.
When agent may collect, Ctammins 291; Cape! 390;
Biggins :;:•]
Hahnenfeld
393.
To fix terms, Bass 351; Daylight379; Sttrn 381; Brown 386; Book
not,.

133;

134;

386.

When

sell

credit. Barksdale 318;
Upton 378;
Payne 882.
and custom. I.; en
.>\
Authority of factor, Daylight 379; Leach 388.
auctioneer,
Dpton -';7'.».
May -ell in the usual manner. DptOD 878.
May do the nsuaJ and necessary thin--. Keith 827; Bass 861; Payne
1,

on

<
»f

Usa.tre

383.

Limitations,

To sell real estate,
May be Implied,

Miit

Not

Brady

Conkling

876;

.".77:

Man- 896; Lyon 101.
clear, note :::i7.
from power to find purchaser,

Payne

888.

be

McCullougb

807;

Cat

KK)

power

thorlty.
Strictlj construed,

required,

Carstens

890;

Bee

ka

aJ
o

written

When

Penfold
108.
may Bell, Penfold
103.
Power of agent to ti\ term-, Trundj 52; McGullou
li::.
-li credit, Whitlej L61
To collect the price, Mann 108; note W9
12,
lampton
cash only, Mann 111.
terminated, Clark 244; d
Not after agencj
To maki conveyance with warrant
106; note 106;
Bchulta k»t
note
"in ej Lj on 401
equitable com rai
to
To modify or re cind, Hampton 112; Puller ton U3;

iTuUerton

BAIL1

W i

.

■:

t

D

I

1

i
i!

I
li

'i
o

What

i
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Strict construction,

Agent

as,

Faulkner

719;

Oilmore

v,| 7,

Loveless

B1L

Valentine
ed.
note

ill

862

[NDBX
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BANK,

Cashier;

see

\-

Corporation.

collecting agent, sec Delegation of Authority.
Monej deposited In agent's name, note 590, 591;

BANKR1 PTCY, see Termination of Agency.
<»r principal as affecting
Liability of agent,

BENEFITS,

Acceptance

B]

WKS IN
Power

sec

Bartop

<',:.; Cribben

Sheppard

of agenl

to,

Williams

593.

069.

Ratification.

DEED,

nil.

to

BORROW,
Authoritj

ratification,

of as

A

Cartwell

66;

l~>.",: see

Swartz

note 68;
also

G9.

Authority to Borrow.

BR( >KER
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Authority

to collect, Biggins 390.
When principal undisclosed, note 798.
To sell in own oame, Pickering 319; Biggins 390.
Real estate broker, power to sell, McCullough 397; note 398.
•
Defined, Carstens 399.
Right to act for two parties, Gaty 513.
Liability for accounting, King M.r>.
Liability when principal not disclosed, note G75.
when earned. Kelly 259; Carstens 399; Gillett G30; AtCompensation,
tn 11 632; note 634; La Force 634.
From both parties, Rupp 518; see also Double Agency.
When forfeited, Atterbury »;:;7: see also Compensation
of Agent.
Who to sue or be sued on contract of, Ford 791; Beebee 792; Humphrey
Tit::.

BURDEN OF PROOF,
BUY,
Agent

to, see

Evidence.

see

Authority

CAPACITY TO ACT,
cieties.

CARE AND SKILL,
CASBIER,

see
see

to Ruy;

Principal;
Liability

Liability of
Agent;

Clubs and Unincorporated So-

of Agent.

nt ion of drafts by, City 4G0.
Liability of hanks on checks signed by, Liebscber

As office cash

CBECKS,

keeper,

for Loyalty.

Agent

Exchange

47G;

Brenner

725.

433.

Authority to Make Negotiable Paper.
Infant.
CLUBS AND UNINCORPORATED SOCIETIES, see Joint Principals.
Who liable for contracts of, Ehrmantraut 113; Eichbaum, GG5; note 666;
<•Illl.li.

see

see

Codding 668.
Nol partnerships,

Ehrmantraut 113; Eichbaum
Ehrmantraut 113.
COLLECTING AGENT,
Liability of, see Delegation of Authority.
Authority to collect, see Authority.
Ratification

COLLUSION,
Between

GG5;

note 6GG.

by,

agenl and third person, note 807.

COMMISSION merchant, see Factor.
COMMISSIONS OF AGENT, see Compensation.
COMPENSATION OF AGENT, see Actions in Quantum
Right In general,

Krekeler

note 606; Lockwood
605;
nt of pay. Wallace
608;
note 609; Millar 010.
<tt' attorney
at law, Vilas 610.
When contract for Implied, Harrison G12.

Meruit;
607.

Lien.

INDEX
[The figures refer to pages]

COMPENSATION OF AGENT— Continued

agency for illegal purpose, Lyon 40; Trlst 43; note 40: see also
Double Agency.
When principal refuses to curry out contract, Gosa r.'T.
When agent abandons agency, Timberlake 615 and note.
see also Reimbursement;
When discharged,
Atkin l':;7 : Sheahan 227;
Glover 229 and following; McFarren 619; note 620; Hlldebrand
•'.mi: Merriman trji: aote 629.
Constructive service doctrine, McMullan 624; note 627.
When disloyal,
Andrews 517; oote ">is : Turnbull 521; McKinley 524;
Banl 618; Atterbury ti.".7: note 638.
When

Acts as mere middleman, Rupp 518.
when earned, Kellj 259; Carstens 400; Merriman 628;
Commissions
lett 630; Attrill 632; note 634.
When fails to make proper accounting, note 588.
Lt
834.
When agency expires before purpose accomplished,

COMPROMISE,
Authority
As

of agent to,

establishing
agency, see
Estoppel : Ratification.

CONFIDENCE,
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Authority

see

OF PRINCIPAL,

CONDUCT

Delegation;

see

Collect

to

Agency.

Double

CONSTRUCTION «>r AUTHORITY,
in view of surrounding circumstances,

Usage and <'nsti.ni.
And of the whole contract, Taylor
When written, Cummins 292; Farmers
Question for court, Bee Trial.
power of attorney,
Strict construction
I Is.
note 1 1^: Renwick
usual and necessary acts,
Includes
power, Very 143; Hopw
Ambiguous
to business of principal,
Restrained
Genera] words how construed, Born 354;
Intentions regarded, Man- 396; note

Lyon

alSO

Keidan

12;
335.

Brantley

401;

Trundy
*

Cummins

292;

Hemstreel

445.

CON! k \<"i\
( )f dgen

Illegal,

Agent

at

wages,

former

gee <!real Ion
j
Bee Ratification;

on what

contrad

CONTR K3TS i MD1
f atto
[>ower

1 I 16.

Brantley

441;

Renwick II s .
406;
Beinstreel

B

of

608;

Wallace

Bee also

Relal Ion.

Liabilltj

liable,

«<r Agenl

,,

see

Liability

149.

ami

146.

Bl THE
d bj

the

V

I'm"

I]

i ■

Yearly Hiring.

of Igent
Authority.

W-

31

■•.. Schan

:it

145

for Accounting;

Seal Authoritj i nder.
of by agent, ■■ i •■" :i "" of Authority.
in presence of prim l|
ee l>
I to convej
equltablt
i ,, . .i .,

Of

Renwick

Compensation.

. ution

COOT BRSIOH

Brantley 441;

173.

CONSTRUCTIVE SERVICE, Bee
HNGENT FEES,
Lyon i": Trial i»'>and note.
CONTINUING EMPLOYMENT,

Bee

52.

To convey

Presumed

140;

j0t

way intent i- effected, ■!larke 154.
Hemstreel
104;
aote 106;
land. Penfold

Also

Implied;

Authority,

Agency;

of

Creation

Gil«

H ,; -

to

i

Third

Pi

note;

i\i>i:\

B64
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CORPORATIONS,

Who agenl of, Trundy 52.
Ac. -lit how appointed, note <'>i.
Can ad only bj agent, Memphis 80; Zottman 131; Modern 599.
of President, Thompson
Authority
L05.
m j ratifj acts of agents, Kelsey 98;
note '.»'•>.
Ratification bj of acts of promoters, Empress 91; Battelle 92.
tication by, hew made, Zottman
129.
Effect of. Merchants
161.
apparenl authority <>t".u't'iiis, Johnston 324.
bility on unauthorized
contracts of agent, lluupt 058.
Liability of agent, Thilmany (»*.li.
Notice to directors of, Clemenl 77'.»: Fairfield 786 and note.
By-laws of, as limiting authority of agent, uote 304.

I I

lURT,
Agency

when question
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CREATION OF AGENCY,

for, see Trial.

Authority;

Written Authority;

Power of At-

Power of Attorney;

Written Authority;

Express Au-

see

torney : Seal. Authority 1'nder.
ends on contract, Raney 48; note 49.
Rests on will of principal, Raney 4S; Pole 49; Marlmry 209; Burke
-in; Burchard 287; note 2SS; see generally Termination of Agency
by Revocation.
How created in general, Caley 22 ; Pole 49; Geylin50; note 334; Farmers •"•••;:»
: Sharp 829.
Oral authority. Trundy 51.
]'..-. estoppel, Pole 50; Columbia 58;
note 59; Johnston 324; Harrison
125.

l'-y

writing,

thority.

see

Implied agency, Pole 49; Geylin 50; Trundy 51; note 53; Gregory 55.
Acts and conduct of principal, Haubelt 301; see also Authority, Implied.
By ratification,
Trundy 52; Soames
By a corporation, Trundy 52.

CREDIT,

see

CUSTOM

AM) USAGE,

DAMAGES,

173;

MacLean

174.

Authority of Agent to Buy.
see Authority;
Usage.
Judgment;

Compensation.
of agent, Minneapolis 559.
eg gence of agent, Walker 568; Cassaboglou
855.
No hiss shown, Folsom Sot; and note.
For wrongful discharge of agent, see Compensation of Agent; see also
Parke -i^: Glover s;-2\ Jacobs 240.
Rule as to measure of , Minneapolis 559 ; Adams 564; Walker 568; CasBaboglou 855 ami note;
Folsom 856 and note.
In action by third person against principal, Cawthorn 312.
^ee

disobedience

DEATH,

Termination of Agency.
Liability of Principal and Agent in Tort,
Actions for, Thilmany 662.
I'l ' LA rations OF AGENT, see Evidence; Liability of Principal.
DEED,
Authority of agent to execute, see Contracts under Seal; Authority to
J Estate; Blanks in a Deed; Execution of Authority.
equitable contrad to convey, Lawrence 65; Morrow 70; Lyon 401;
Seal, Authority Under,
ecution of in principal's presence, Lewis 71.
DEI
Open to third person, see Liability of Third Person to Agent: to Principal; Set-Off.
Bee

INDEX

865
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DEFINITION,
Of
Of
Of
Of
Of
Of

••agency,"
Sternanian 4.
"agent" Echols 1.
"apparent authority," note

325.

Steffens 77.
"factors," Blackstone's Com. 1.
"general and special agents," Gibson 20; Keith 326; Pacific 343:
Sorrel 346; McAlpin 348.
Of "ratification,"' Ellison 73; First Nat. Bank 73; Alexander 79; Town
"est"]. pel."'

176.

DEL CREDERE AGENCY, see Snelling
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY.

15,

18.

Power to delegate. Catlin 483; Bonwell 484.
By joint agents, Loeb 4S1.
Duties involving no confidence or discretion.

Eldridge

4S5 ;

Norwich

486.
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Usage and custom, Bonwell 4S4 ; Darling 400.
Subagent employed by consent of principal, Blowers 4S9.
Subagent is agent of whom, Woods 144; Louisville 4S8;

Blowers 489;
Skinner 490.
Required by necessities of agency. Louisville 48S.
Liability of agent for acts of subagent, Clark 60.
Bradstreet 491:
Of a collecting agenl for acts of correspondent.
Simpson 493; Hoag 503.
Of a bank. Simpson 494; note 498; Bant 199; note 502.
Of an attorney at law. Bradstreet 491; note 493.
DEMAND,
see Actions in Trover.
Necessity of before suing agent for conversion,
Liability ol Agent for Accounting.

In

Loveless

case.

S12.

For collections,

DEPOSITS IN BANK,

Bradstreet
see

counting.

DESOBIPTIO PERSONS,
DIRECTOR,

Bank:
see

492.

Trust Fund:

Execution

Liability

of Agent

for

Ac-

Compensation

of

of Authority

Authority of. see Corporations; Notice.
DISCHARGE OF AGENT, see Termination.
DISCRETION, see Delegation; Double Agency.

DISOBEDIENCE

see Liability of Agent to Obey.
Authority;
Agent;
AGENCY,
Agency;
see
DOUBLE
Agent; Liability of Agent; Llabllitj of Principal.
DRUNKENNESS, see Termination of Agency.
DUTY, see Liability.
<w

Instructions,

EARMARK 3 ee Money.
ELECTION, ee Liability
EMPLOYMENT,
Of agent,

ENTIRE
BQ1

ity.

see

Creation

CONTRACT,

Aiii,, ns

ESTOPPEL,

in,

so.-

of

Undisclosed
Agency;

Ratification

j

Principal
Compensation

of

Agent

Compensation

of

Agent

Actions.

ee Creation

Distinguished
note 180.

see

of

from

Godo.Pb.A a

of Agency; Authority, Apparent.
ratification, Steffens i>>. Judd L88;

St

Louis

167;

[NDBX
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•iti Continued,
Genera] rale as to agency by, Johnston 324; Schmidt S22.
Elements giving rise to, Johnston 325.
Mu-i have been reliance i>\ party claiming, Patterson 330.
r.\ tDl

N< i'.

preeumptlorj of agency, note 288; Gates 313; Schmidt 821 and note.
Or of ratification, Wisconsin 824.
3sltj of showing, note 288; Gates 313.
Burden of proof on one asserting agency, I'ole 50; Gregory 50; note 2S8,
293; V;m Bppes 332; Schmidl 820; note 821.
On principal If sues on agent's contract, note 7'.>2.
On one setting up ratification, Brown 12N; Wisconsin 874 and note.
Shifting of burden, Dodge 569.
Agency bow shown, In general, Geylin 50; Trundy 51; note 288.
Authority of agenl of corporation, Trundy 52.
Admissibility of, faci to bo proven. Sharp S2S.
Admit If bas tendency to show agency, Dickinson S27; Tebbetts 847
No

South s -"".

(if conduct of principal, Webster 724; Lawrence 825; Dickinson
also Boldlng Out of Authority.
Of situation and circumstances of the parties, Sharp 828; note
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South

827
830

850.

Of ratification of previous acts, Haubelt 302.
Of parol evidence, Lyons 826.
When authority is written, Claflin 338; Reese 341; Post 451; Elliot 831 ; Mt. Morris 832 and note; see also Authority.
To explain, not contradict. Higgins 4G5; Barbre 466; note
467; Da r row 742; Ford 791.
To show value of services, Glover 232; Vilas 611.
Of acts of agent as proof of agency, Van Eppes 331; Lawrence 825;
Walsh 835 and note.
When shown principal knew of acts, Fowlds 836.
etc., of agent, Gregory 56; Woods
representations,
Of declarations,
144; note 288; Mussey 294; Moores 297; Bank 308; Gates 313;
Gambill 833; Garth 839;
Dowden 7:51; Hill 774;
note :;:i2:
Eagle 840;

Peyton 844.

To show surrounding circumstances,

Nichols

167.

of res gestae, .Mussey 294; Hovey 652; Hill 773; Moyle
Peyton 844.
841;
As explanatory of transaction, Wales 838.
Mum trace to principal, note 332; Gambill 833; Fowlds 836;
Eagle 840.
Of testimony of agent, Haubelt 301; Wales 838 and note; Peyton 844.
Order of proof, note 834; Wales 838.
i.t and sufficiency for jury, Dickinson 827; Still 846; Tebbetts 847;
Booth 848; South 850.
Not for court it" properly submitted, note 849.
Ratification is question Cor jury. Kelley 1112.
Silence as evidence of, St. Louis L56.
Total want of evidence, Trudo 100; Gates 316.
As part

EXCHANGE,

er of agent to, see Authority to Sell.

EXCLUSIVE AGENCY,
Revoeabillty,

Bee

Termination of Agency.

EXECUTION OF AUTHORITY,

In name of principal, Davis 23; Combes 38; Wilks 450.
Parol evidence to explain signature, Posl 151; note 457.
To bold principal, not excuse agent, Higgins 164;
note 4<m.
ex©

s of

authority, Wilson

453 and

Barbre

note; note 479.

400;

INDEX

8G7
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EXECUTION OF AUTHORITY—

Continued,
455;
Merchants 461; Van Dyke 7:>0; note
7.".!' : see also Contracts
Under Seal.
Of simple contracts, Clarke 455; Frambach 456; note 159; City 460.
In agenfs name, Wiley 155; note 4": City 458.
Descriptive words added to signature, City 458; Tucker 478; note

Of sealed instruments,

Thilmany

479;

Of

By
By
By

Clarke

661.

Look to whole instrument,
Frambach 456 ; City 458.
negotiable instruments, Merchants 462.
Addition of descriptive words, Pratt 403 and note; Rawlings 470;
Keidan 17::: Liebscher 47f>.
Effect of various forms of signature, Tucker 478; note 479.
Parol evidence to explain. Merchants 162; Webster 754.
General rule, Keidan 472; Liebscher
176.
Rule strictly limited to ambiguities upon tare df paper, Richmond 468 and note; Rawlings 470 and note; Liebscher 473.
joint agents, Loeb 480; note im.
( )f a public nature, note 481.
joint and several agents, Guthrie 482.
a partnership, note 181.
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EXPRESS AUTHORITY,

see Authority;
Seal, Authority Qnder; Creation of
icy; Blanks in a I teed.
By parol. Trundy 51.
Written, when necessary, Caley 22.
When required by statute of frauds. Worrall, G3 ; Law rem e64.
Sealed, when necessary, Worrall 00.

FACTORS,
Authority

to sell on credit. Daylight ::7'.»: Leach 388.
To sell in own name, Leach 389.
To collect. Higgins 390.
Duty to obey instruction-. Barksdale 318; Hall 549; Greenleaf SSL
When disobey (o protect selves, Greenleaf 553; Feild 657.
Lien on goods, Porter 720.
Right againsl third persons, Porter 7i'".
Principal sue on contracts by, Beel
792; Barry 796.
Pursue property in hands of. Taylor sou.
Effect of failure to disclose principal, note 675.

FEME COVERT,

FIDELITY,

FIDUCIARY
FORGERY,

Bee Married Woman.
Liability of Agenl for.
RELATIONS, see Liability of Agenl

see

Ratification of. Henry 61 . w llson S3;
FORM OF ACT ION, Bee Actions.

i

i:.\i

Mill

REPRESENTATIONS,

Agent to Third Persons.

see

for Fidelity,

note Si.

Liability of Principal;

Liability of

GENERAL

AG!
Defined, Gibson

20; Trundy 61; Keith 326; Pacific 343; Sorrel 846;
Alpin 348.
Distinguished from special agents, Bank 307; Farmei
336; oote 84
Johnston ::•_•.•:;Keith 326; note 346.
to authority of, gee Authority of \
CONTRA* I
GOVERNMENT
Contracts

to procure,

' e Purpo

i

i

GHAI DITOU8 AGENT,
Llablllt]

Whether

of, i
presumed,

•;

Krekeler

606;

HOLDING OUT OF AUTHORITY,
toppel;

Llal lilt]

oi

ncy,

Pi IndpaL

see

note i

Authority;

Walker
Boo]

(

667.

Authority;

M<-

INDEX
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HUSBAND,

Bee Married Woman.
As agenl of wife, McFarland 24;

IDIOTS, Bee Principal; Agent
ILLEGALITY, Bee Ratification.

defense by agent against

Peyton

principal,

Bee

in g.

AGENCY,

IMPLIED

Creation of Agency;

see

843.

Liability

of Agent for Account-

Authority;

Liability

of Princi-

pal.

INCIDENTAL POWERS,

see

Authority.

ini >BMNITY, Bee Reimbursement.
ENDORSEMENT,
By agent, Bee Authority to Collect; to Make Negotiable

Paper.

INFANT,

Bee Creation of Agency.
As agenl of father, Tebbetts 143.
Capacity as agent, King 31.
As principal, McFarland 24; Williams 28; note 30.

INJUNCTION,

or compel performance of agency, see Termination of Agency,
Revocation;
by Renunciation.

To restrain
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by

INNOCENT PARTY,

One of two must suffer, Mundorff 120; Burch 257; note 292; Mussey 295;
Johnston 324; Saugerties 359; Covill 3G4; McCord 7G7.
When justified by conduct of principal, see Third Person; Authority.

INSANE PERSONS,
INSANITY,
As revocation

Principal.

see

of agency, see Termination of Agency, by Operation of Law.

INSTRUCTIONS, see Authority.
INTENT, see Construction of Authority;

Agency Distinguished from Sale.
To bind principal or agent, note 459.
To ratify. St. Louis 157.
INTEREST, see Liability of Agent for Accounting.
IRREVOCABILITY, Bee Ratification.

JOINT

AGENTS,

of authority by, Loeb 4S0; note 4S1.
Joint and several agents, Guthrie 4S2.
Appointment of as revocation of several authority, note
Execution

JOINT PRINCEPALS,

247.

see Clubs.

Ehrmantraut

I ers of a club,

113.

JUDGMENT AND DAMAGES,

see Damages.
-mod by actual loss, Parke 218; Cassaboglou 855 and note.
When no loss shown, Folsom S5G and note.
For wrongful revocation of agency, see Termination of Agency.
Recoverable in suit by agent, Leterman 705 and cases following.

JURY, PROVINCE OF,
KNOWLEDGE,
lit" facts essentia]

of

to

Bee

Trial.

ratification,

see

Ratification.

custom essential to land principal. Burchard 287; see also Usage.
Liability of Principal for
t wij.n Imputed to principal, see Notice;

Not

LAND,
LAW.

see

Authority

to Sell

ration

Real Estate.

of, see Creation of Agency.

869

INDEX
[The figures refer to pages]

LEASE,

see Authority of Agent to.
Distinguished from agency, note

11.

LEGISLATION,

Contracts to procure, Lyon 41; note 42; Trist 43; note

46.

OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL,
For fidelity and loyalty. In general, Lum 507; Hani 618.
Personal interest of agent, see Compensation of Agent; Lum 607 and
Dote;
Jansen 509; Thompson 513; Andrews r>17 ; Turnbull 521;
Dowdrii 7".t».
513; note 515;
Everhart 515; see also
Double agency, Thompson
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LIABILITY

Double Agency.
When justified, Gatj 51 I; Rupp 519 and note.
Custom cannot justify, Turnbull 521; note 523.
Profit of agent, Turnbull 521; McKinley 524; note 534; Glower
Kellogg 574.
535; Van Dusen 538;
Dealings with principal, Conkey 526; Kich 52S; Shannon 529; l
Gower 535.
530; Forlaw531;
Rule extends to whom, Porlaw 533; note 534.
Must fully disclose lads. Van Dusen .~>:;7: note ."I.",.
When facts fully disclosed, Burke 540; Dennison, 542.
After termination of agency, Dennison ~>i-\ Bartholomew 544 and
note.
When do confidence reposed in agent, Spalding .">r>.
I.
For obedience, in general, Wilson "i«'>: Hall .~i v : Adams .'><'>
in cases df extreme necessity, Wilson 546; Greenleaf 550.
To protect advances of agent, Feild 557.
Instructions ambiguous, Falsken 555.
Usage and custom, Ball 549; Greenleaf 551.
Ratification by principal, Bray 553; Falsken 556.
Form of remedy for disobedience, Minneapolis 559.
For negligence, general rule. Lake 562; Adams 564; Walker 567; Cassaboglou 855.
Measure of damages, Walker 568; Cassaboglou v -".r.: Folsom B56.
Does not insure againsl mistake. Richardson 561 : Lake 562 and note.
Exercise ordinary care, Morrison 5( 16.
When service gratuitous, Elsee 260; Morrison 565; Walker 567.
Elsee 262; note 264; Cannon
When agent abandons undertaking,
see also Liability In
i II ee 262;
and nonfeasance,
Misfeasance

Tort

duty In general, Dodge 569 and note.
Account siimiiii be Itemized, Moyse8 572.
i or full amounl received, Kellogg .".7.". and note.
bj Bubagent, Tripler 575.
Accounting
Effect of accounl Btated, Tharp 577 and note.
Title as between principal and agent, Salem 578.
title, Dixon 579; Witman
q1 dispute principal'
Illegality as defense, Tenant 581; Baldwin 681; note 582; Bern
note 68 I.
ard 583
686 ; note 686.
tertii, 1lancock 586; Mo
Commingling
funds or property, Illinois 587; n
Lial lllty for Interest, Miller ■•'■'" Bedell •
691;
I . Wbitecotnb
Veil 692; Taylor 799;
Principal follow f
Pear* e B01 ; ee a o Tru ' i and
Monej deposited Ui agent's name, see Bans . Cartwell 50
ley, Warw Id •
Remittance ol
v"
Moor<
l perm of liability, Salem 678;
w |g 816; nob
" ,| note.
N, ce It ■ "i demand, Bnrtc
i
, ,| ;
at Viod( rn 600

For accounting,

s 7 11

i

\ 1>1: x
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LIABILITY

OF AGENT TO THIRD

1 delegation of Authority.
When binds t»«►111 self and

PERSON,

see

Execution of Authority;

principal, Merchants 162; Higgins 464.
456; aote 157; Anderson 650;
neral rule. Frambacb
aote 651; Hartop 669.
Credit i" agent exclusively,
Anderson 650; Hovey 652; Hyde 729; Meeker 740.
Unauthorized contracts of agent, Berger 186; Lingenfelder 189; Smout
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654;

Thilmany

662.

Basis of liability, Dusenbury 665; Hall 656; note 657; Thilmany 662;
note 664.
on whai contract, Haupl 657; Hancock 659; note GOO.
Fraudulent representations of agent, Smout 654.
principal, Eiehbaum ('>•;"">;Codding G68; Hartop 0G9.
Nonexistent
Burden of showing, aote 669; sec ;ils<> Clubs.
Contracts after deatb of principal, Smout 654.
Principal undisclosed, general rule, Murphy 671; Cochran G72; Winsor
673;
Nichols 674; Holt 674; note G77; Darrow 742.
Who may I e bound, note 671.
Agenl bow relieve self. Cochran G72.
Rule as to auctioneer, Mercer 676.
For money paid by mistake, etc., Cary c>7s: Shepard 678; note 679.
When agent lias notice of mistake. Shepard 678; Burrough 684.
lias not changed position, Buller 681; note 682; Mowatt 683.
Has paid over before notice, Owen 688.
When right to money is In dispute, Sadler 685 and note.
For money obtained fraudulently, Moore 686; note 687.
For money paid by principal for third person, Williams 689; note 691.
In tort, for fraud. Bulkeley 692; Garrett 692 and note.
For conversion. Perkins 693 and note.
For trespass, Heugb 694 and note.
For nonfeasance. Cochran 672; Denny C94: Feltus 695.
Nonfeasance distinguished
from misfeasance, Cochran 672; Greenberg
note 696; Baird 698; note G99.
695;
I

LABILITY OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT,

see Compensation;

Reimbursement.

LIABILITY

OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSONS,
Of principal for arts of agent, Kingan 8; Raney 47; Thompson

106; Gunter, 285; Van Eppes 332.
Genera] rule stated, Haubelt 301; Farmers 334; Denman 395.
Scope of authority, Trundy 51; Brown 127; Ilaney 146; Farmers 334;
Payne 382; Wilson 452; see also Authority.
Acts known to be unauthorized,
Whitley 161.
Acts for personal benefit of agent, McAlpin 348; see Double Agency.
On contracts made by agent, Webster 724; Brenner 725; note 726.
in agent's name. Brenner 72.",; Davis 726.
( ntside BCOpe Of authority. Marvin 72''.; Ft. Worth 728 and note.
On sole credit of agent, Hyde 72!) and note; Meeker 740.
Not for benefll of principal, Dowden 730 ; note7::i.
When agent acted for hoth parties, Kmpiro i:;2; note 73.3; Truslow, 736.
Rightfully, Wassell 734; note 735.
When principal is undisclosed, see Execution of Authority.
In general, Paterson 739; note 738; Meeker 740; Darrow
741;
Thompson 743; Van Dyke 749.
When principal lias settled with agent, Heald 747; note 748;
1 ia now 7 ii' ; Thompson 7 13.
Contracts under seal. Van Dyke 750; note 7.Y_\
Negotiable
Instruments,
Webster 7."i;;; note 7.14.
Election to hold principal or agent, Greenburg 755; Tuthill
note 757; Lindquist 7.>s>; note 759.
756;
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LIABILITY

OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSONS— Continued,
tort, general rule, Kingan 8; Hern 760; Birkett 7»n and note; Mackay
763; note 765;
McCord 766 and aote; Stickney 770.
Not In course of employment, Middleton 768; Stickney 770; note 771.
Fur frauds, Cooley 17'_': Hoyer 77."..
By ratification, Dempsey 198.
For conversion by ratification, Lewis 116.
For declarations, representations, etc., of agent, Keith 328; standard 772;
Hill 77.*'.: note 774; Boyer 775; see also Evidei
False representations, Hoyer 77.". and aote.
Admissions,
Gunter 285.
For notice to agent, Merry 77''.: note 77'.': see also Not
An to subject-matter
of agency, Field 777.
As to other matters, cote 779; Clement 77'.).
<>r Immaterial
matters, Day 780; aote 781.
Time of receiving, Worslej 781; Mountford 7^; Distilled 783; aote

In

785;

Fairfield

786.

i" rule, Parsley 7 x v aote 7 v '.>.
LIABILITY OF THIRD PERSON TO AGENT,
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Exceptions

In general not liable In contract, Gunn 7m ; Thatcher 7<H.
Contract in agenfs aame, Sargent 702; Leterman 705; Fisher 707; note
708;
Bolder! 718.
Under seal. Schaefer 712; Neff 715; Van Dyke 750.
After termination <d' agency, Miller 704,
Defenses to action by agent, Leterman 706; Munis ~\r,; Holden 718.
For onknown principal, Shorl 709; Munis 716.
Agent recover back money, Stevenson 710; Cent 711.
In tort, sec Actions.
In general, Faulkner 719 and cases following.
For procuring discharge of agent, Moran 721 : note 722.

LIABILITY

OF THIRD

TO PRINCIPAL,

PERSON

On contract made by agent, Ford 791; Beebee 792 and aote
In agent's name, Humphrej 793.
712;
1 Qder seal, Schaefer
Neff 715.
principal, W
Iruff 7'.u ; Barry 796.
Undisclosed
Right of third person to elect with whom to deal, Winchester 794
note 7'.'."..
Iruff 794; Barrj f96; note 797
D< ft 1 ses open to third person, W
Righl of third person to settle with agent, Copeland 798;
PittS 7'.is.
I rust Fund
For funds or property of principal, Taylor 7:»'.t; aote
Money ("Earmarks") Lime 803; Taylor 800; aote 804.
Indicia of authority, Dean 804; aote v <"''.
In tort, PattisoD B06
m, t.
collusion w iii. agent, aote
vn 7: aote v "^.
conversion of principal's property, Gllmore
1 or enticing or Interfering with agent, Jones vn '.». note

LIEN OF \<.i.\

1 . see

Fad

Defined, Bj er
8 17
647; Underwood
Right in general, Byer
Byi 1 647 ; note 648.
Bow terminated,

LIMITATION!;

•■■•
Authority.

• a hi ii. .1 it > to

LOAN
Ratification of, Nye

LOBBYING

COOT

LODI
Liability of

LOl \LTi
LUNATIC,

RACl

meml

B,

Trl

Principal;

:

note
1

to Buy.
1 1L

13.

• « Hub*

■

■•••Liability
•..

Borrow

L67 ;

of Agent to Principal.
a.

649.

872

i

M

>i : x

pages]
l I'hr figures refer t<>

MALFEASANCE,

Bee

Liability

of Agent to Third Person, In Tort.
Authority of Agent to Buy; to Manage Business.

man \<;i: Bl SINESS,

Bee

MARRIAGE
a- termination

relation,

of

Davis

i'.:.

!'ii-t i i.
MARRIED WOMAN, See Busband.
Capacity as principal, McFarland 24.
Wit,, as agenl oi husband, Worrall 62;
Brokerage,

Steffans

Wade

7G;

145.

MASTER,
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Liability for servant's acts, Kingan S; note 9; Dempsey
For servant's contracts, Saugerties 359.
MASTER AND SERVANT,
Distinguished from principal and agent, see Agency.
Historical survey, note 9; 1 »cmpsey 19S.

MECHANICAL ACTS, see
MIDDLEMAN, see Broker.

Delegation

of Authority.

MINISTERIAL

ACTS,

Delegation

of Authority.

MISFEASANCE,
Tort

see

see

Liability

of Agent

to

Principal;

to Third

198.

Person

in

MONET,
Bas

no earmarks,
note 171: Taylor S00; Lime 803; note 804.
Received by collecting agent, see Authority to Collect.
<»f selling agent to receive, see Authority to Sell.
(if agent to recover back, see Liability of Third Lei-son to Agent.
Right of principal to follow, see Liability of Agent for Accounting;
bility of Third Person to Principal for Funds; Trust Fund.
Right of third person to, see Liability of Agent to Third Person.

Lia-

MORTGAGE, see Loan; Blanks in a Deed; Authority to Collect; to Borrow.
Ml Mi I LA L CORPORATION,
ratification by, note 79, 99; Zottrnan 129.
MUTUALITY, see Ratification, Effect of, as to Third Person; Termination
uf Agency.

INSTRUMENTS, see Authority to Make; Construction of
Authority;
Execution of Authority.
Parol evidence to ex [plain, see Evidence; Execution of Authority.
Agent.
NON COMPOS MENTIS, see Principal;
NONFEASANCE, see Liability of Agent to Third Person in Tort; GratuNEGOTIABLE

itous

Agent.

Liability "f Principal for Notice; Corporations.
of agent to give, Modern 599; Clark GOO; Distilled
field 7 V7.
lie has done so, .Modern 600.
Presumption
A- affecting statute of limitations. Teasley G02.
of termination of relation, see Termination of Agency.

NOTICE,

see

Duty

PARENT,

Child a- agent of,

PAROL AUTBORITT,
PAR< »l

lvidlv

i.

see
see
■■ i

Infant.
Authority;

Express Authority.

Ldence.

■ ubs.
PARTN1 B
A- agent for partnership, Worrall 00; Lawrence <;::.
Agent of partnership not agenl of partners, Marvin
Must be acceptable to all partners, note 238.
Authority to sell partnership property, Dean 805.

720.

784;

Fair-

INDEX
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PARTNER—

Continued,

Execution of authority by, note 4S1.
Ratification of act of copartner. Bless 136.
Death of as terminating authority of partnership ageut, note I'M

PAYMENT,
For services of

agent, see Compensation
of Agent
To agent for principal, sec Authority to Collect; to Sell; Liability
Third Person to Principal.
To agent for third person, see Liability of Agent to Third Person.
PERSONAL INFLUENCE, see Purposes of Agency.

PERSONAL LIABILITY,
Of agent,
thority.

see

Liability

PERSONAL TRUSTS,
PHYSICIAN.

of

to Third

Agent

Authority of agent to employ, note 14." ; Mobile
POSSESSION,
Authority implied from, see Authority to Sell.

POST OFFICE,
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To procure

location of, note 42.
wiiii AN INTEREST,

POWER COUPLED
Revocation;

Warranty

of

Au-

of Authority.

Delegation

see

Person;

of

see

by Death.

159.

Termination of Agency,

POWER OF ATTORNEY,

see Written Authority ; Express
necessary, Caley 22.
of Authority.
Construction of, Bee Construction
Recording, ' !aley 22.
Of insane person or infant, Williams 27.
Is a written document, Bit Morris 832.

by

Authority.

When

PRINCIPAL,

Liability
Societies;
see Clubs and Unincorporated
pal ; of Agent ; of Third Person.
Who may ad as, Calej 22 and cases following.
Persons aon compos mentis, Davis 23, 282; McFarland 24
Married women as, McFarland 24.
Infants as, McFarland 24; Williams 28; aote 30.
Lunatics and persons oon sui juris, McFarland 24.
Insane persons as. Williams 27.

PRIVATE INSTRUCTIONS, see Authority.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, see Purposes
PROFIG

S,

rned by agent see

'ii

RS,

PR( >m<

Liabilltj

of Agency.

of Agent tor Fidelity.

see Corporations.

PUBLIC AGENTS,

Utlon of authority by. note 181.
Ideation of acta of, aote 79, 99.
i >, egatlon <>f authority by, note 183.
Persona] advantage In contract! by, note .mit.

PUBLIC OF!

I'i

H

tor Influencing,
Ratification by, note 79

see

Contracts

Purj

PUBLIC POLK
PI RCHASE,
PI RPOSES
Genera]

ency.
i ■• Authority

\'.i

NCY,
rule. Klngan 7
OF

Unlawful i":

wiut

E Agency<

cannot

be d me

of Agenl

to

; Bllrerw
> !"
1 :

'

b3

ag< at,

<

Lay.
I 33
i;: ■

i

Oamblll
36.

of Princi-

si 1

INIU'X
I riw figures refer to pages]

PURPOSES OF AGENOX

Continued,
purposes, Lyon 39.
Contrarj to public policy, Lyon 40; Trlst 11: Memphis 80.
Employment
of personal Influence, Lyon i-'; Trist 44.
[mmoral

QUANTUM MERUIT, see Actions, Form of.
QUI i' \<'i T I'll: ALIUM, etc.,
Implication of the maxim, Sterna man 4;
Stevenson

Kingan

G;

Silverwood,

33;

710.

RATIFICATION,

Defined, First 74; Alexander 79; Town 176.
Distinguished from adoption, Schreyer 76.
From estoppel, Steffens 74; note 76; Thompson 10S; Judd 133; St.
Louis l~>7: note 160.
<>f previous acts as evidence of agency, Haubelt 302.
a-^ creating Implied authority, Trundy 52.
What may be ratified, in general, Alexander 79.
Void and voidable acts. McFarland 24; Memphis 80; Henry 81.
Forgery, see Forgery.
Who may ratify, Alexander 70 and note; First Nat. Bank 97.
A

corporation,

Kelsey
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An agent, Trudo
Essentials of,

100;

98; note 99.
note 101.

of agency. Ellison 73; First Nat. Bank 74; Wilson 85;
Wyckoff 86.
Existence of principal, Alexander 79: Empress 90; Battelle 92.
Act done for principal ratifying. Watson 94.
Knowledge of facts. Valley Bank 102; note 103; Moyle 104; ThompWhitley 161.
son 107; note 110:
Need not know legal effect of the facts, note 103;
Kelley 110.
May assume risk without inquiry, Kelley 111; Ehrniantraut 114
and note:
Lewis 116.
Acceptance of benefits not necessary, Thompson 107; Grant 125.
New consideration
not necessary, First Nat. Bank 97; Grant
125;
Ehrniantraut 114; Lewis 116; Thacher 117; Tebbetts
Assumption

143.

Ratify

all or none, Rudasill

119; Mundorff 120; National Co.
note 124; note 149; La Grande 165; Nye 169.
How when principal cannot be placed in statu quo, National
Co. 123; Cooley, 171.
Intent in ratify, Brown 128.
Relations of parties as showing, Ralphs 137.
Manner ,,{. in general, Zottman 130; Judd 133; Haney 140; St. Louis
122;

157.

When must be in writing, Ehrniantraut 114; Judd 133.
Under seal, Beatb 134; Bless 135; note 136.
Statutory requirements, note 133.
Implied, Ralphs 137; Hartlove 140; Sanders 141.
112;
When not, Danaher
Tebbetts 143 and note; Woods 144;
Wade l 15 and note.
By accepting benefits, National 122; Brown 12s; Rioss i:;o; Haney
117: note 149; Coykendall
151; La Grande 165.
When not a ratification,
Williams 154.
May ratify withoul receiving
107;
benefits, Thompson
Grant
126.

By acquiescence, Lawrence
L37; llartlovc 140.
Act

of stranger

or

164.

Not

compelled

151.

to

of

64;

Kelsey 98;

agent,

ratify,

Thompson

Ralphs 137;

Valley

102;

note

107;
163;

Brown 127;

Ralphs
Ketchem

Coykendall

INDEX
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RATIFICATION—

Continued,
When repudiation necessary,
Whitley 161 and
160;
Mobile
note: Ketchem 163 and note; Triggs 191; see also Estoppel.
By silence, St Louis 156; note 158; Mobile L59; note 160; Whitley
164
By bringing suit or enforcing contract, Kingan 7: La Grande 165;

Xicln.ls HIT: Perry 184.
Limitations. Nye 169; Cooley 171 : note 171.
Proof of. Wisconsin 824 ami note; see also Evident
I'm- court or jury. Kelley 112; note 853; see also Trial.
Effect of, in general, Steffens 78; Alexander 7'.": Memphis 80; Wilson
85; National Co. 124; Grant 125;
/.oilman 130; Bless 135; Haney
Whitley 161; Soames 17::: Maclean 171: Town L76; Shuen146;
feldti7^: Perrj 184; Bergerl86; Schanzl93; Dempsy 200; Farmers 202.

Of parol ratification, Worrall 61; Lawrenci
Cannot be revoked, Memphis 81; Sanders 141;

Haney 146;

Perry

184;

Coffin 1^.".

Of ratifying severable part, Moyle 105; note 124; Nye L69.
of repudiation,
Brown 128; Haney 146.
Of failure to repudiate, see Ratification by Acquiesce]
Limitations on retroactive effect of. Shuenfeldt 17'.".
When rights of third persons intervene, Graham 181.
As to the agent, Berger 187; Lingenfelder i v '-': Shepherd 194

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2015-11-11 15:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t49p34n78
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Effect

to the agent, Goss 197.
Compensation
Effect of inaction of principal, Triggs 19L
Of effort to protect himself, Triggs 191; Schanz 193.
When the agent Is a tort-feasor, note 195.
As to the principal, see Effect In General, also Wilson v.-,: Overbyl95;
197.

For

the agent's tort, Dempsy 198.
As to third person, Farmers 202; note 206.
intervening riL'ht< of. Farmers 205; Graham

REAL ESTATE AGENT,

Broker;

Bee

181.

Authority to Sell Real Estate;

Com-

pensation.

of
AM> INDEMNITY OF AGENT, Bee Compensation
when Discharged;
Termination of Agency; Lien of Agent

REIMBURSEMENT
Agent,
■

note 639; Bacon 640; Powell
in general, Adamson 638;
643; Clifton 644 and note; Burbj 645; note '''hi.
As air.- tci by care and sUiii of agent, note 564

BENT,

see

Authority of Agent

RENUNCIATION,
;

REPUD1
<if
a

Lease.

Bee

Liability of Principal; Liability of Agent

Evidence.

viM'V

act,
unauthorized
. . idence of agency,

■• atlon.

not

REPUTATION,

\ - evidence

<>fagent .

L&

RESCISSION OF CONTRAt

i .

Authority

.\ nt tir .lit > oi
'
i .i - i

and det laratlona
irationa and ad
Peyton B44
841;

Acts

;l

l

ROACTIVE BFJ

Of ratitl

aote

Termination of Agency.

Bee

REPRESENT LTIONS,
Perse

to

<>\-;

I

or agent
ant

Hon,

as,

to

SelL

Bill

71

;

T 7t

to

Third

v 7t'>

INDEX
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REVOCATION.
Of agency,

01

SAI

Termination of
see Ratification.

see

ratification,

t ho

Relation.

E,

from agency, Echols 2; Taylor 13; Snelling 13.
make, see Authority to Sell; to Collect; Liability of Principal to Third Person.
Compensation
for, see Compensation
of Agent
To agent, when binds principal, see Liability of Principal to Third PerDistinguished

Authority

to

son.

SCOPE OF AUTHORITY,

Liability of Principal;

see

Ince of « 'ourt and Jury.
Burden of proof in showing,
l lovi pro voi l. Sharp 829.

Pole 50; note

Authority;

Trial, Prov-

821.

AUTHORITY UNDER, see Authority; Execution of Authority ; Liability of Principal to Third Persons; Liability of Ageut to Third Persons;
Contracts Under Seal.
When necessary, Worrall 60.
Effect of act of agent when seal wanting, Worrall 61.
Conveyance as equitable
contract to convey, Lawrence 65; Mor-

SEAL.

row 70.
when seal is not necessary, Worrall 62; Lawrence 65; Bless
Distinction between sealed and unsealed, Cribben 67.
Statutes abolishing requirements,
Swartz 69; note 70; Post 451.
Signature by agent in principal's presence, Lewis 71.
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Effecl

SECRET INSTRUCTIONS,
SELL, see Sale.
SERVANT,

136.

Authority.

see

Distinguished from agent, see Agency.
Liability of in tort, Perkins 693; also Liability of Agent in Tort.

SET-OFF,

with principal, Peterson 571; Illinois 587; note
Standard 771.
By third person in action by agent. Leterman 706; Morris 716.
In action by principal, Barry 796; note 797; Lime 804.
SEVERAL AGENTS,
Principal may have, Van Eppes 331.
SIGNATURE, see Ratification; Forgery; Execution of Authority; Deed;
Seal. Authority Under.
SLLENCE,
As ratification, see Ratification.
SIMPLE CONTRACTS, see Execution of Authority; Construction of Authority ; Liability of Principal and Agent to Third Persons.
B3

agent in accounting

591;

SOCIETY,

see

Clubs.

Infant.
SPECIAL AGENT,

SON,

see

Defined, <;il><on 20; Trundy 51; Pacific 343; Sorrel 346.
Distinguished from general agents, Bank 307; Farmers 335; note 343;
Johnston 323; Keith 326; note 345, 350.
A- io authority of, see Authority of Agent; Ratification.
Scope of authority of, Boyer 776; see Scope of Authority.

[N8TRUCTIONS,
8PECI1 IC PERFORMANCE,
SPECIAL

agency not

granted,

Renunciation.

see

see

Private Instructions.

Termination of Authority by Revocation;

by

INDEX
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STATE.

Ratification by, note

00.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS, Bee Written Authority.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
When

begins to run. Teasley

In favor of agent. Tharp
SUBAGENT, see Delegation

002:

note 004.

576.

Authority;

of

SUE, see Actions, Parties to.
Effect of suit to ratify contract,
SUI JURIS, see Principal.

TENDER OF SERVICES, see
TERMINATION OF AGENCY,

see

Ratification.

Ratification.

Compensation.
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of purpose, Moore 207.
By accomplishment
Bv efflux of time, Marbury 209; note 210.
By revocation by principal, In general, Marbury 20fi; Burke 210: Brookshire 212;
Gilbert 251; Attrill 632.
Power to revoke in general. Marbury 209; MacGregor 214; Parke
217: Terwilliger 221 ; Glover 230; Stler 234; Blumenthal 240.
213;
Black
agency, MacGregor
"Irrevocable" or "exclusive"
Montague 219.
Btone 215;
Agency partly executed, Terwilliger 221.
shcahan 227;
Agency at will. Parke 217:

Hoover

228;

Btler

234.

for definite term. Clover 230.
Mutuality of undertaking, Glover 230; Btler 235.
Mair 238.
Specific enforcement,
injunction against principal, Barlow 271.
Marbury !
or as security,
Power given tor consideration
Brookshire 212; MacGregor 213; Walsh 216; Parke 211 and
Terwilliger 223
note:
Power coupled wit ii an Interest,
Parke 217: Montague 218; Ter
What Is Marburj 209;
Btler 234;
Bartlej 226;
willlger 222: Taylor 22:.:
Gilberl 252; Hunt 275.
215;
213;
Blackstone
MacGregor
Effecl of, Marbury 209;
Terwilliger 221; Hunt 275.
Montague 219;
Agency

Davis 23.
On revocabllity,
Upon death of principal, Hunt 275.
Insanity of principal, 1 tavis 283.
power vs. right to revoke, Bheahan 227: Glover 230; Blumen
thai 240;
note 241.
Parke 21s; Qlovex
Burke 211;
1 Lbility of principal,
Jacobs 2 h>: Blumenthal 2 12.
Discharge when lustifled, Atkin 237; Jacobs 240.
24
Manner of revocation, In general, Clark 244; Rrooknhlre
kabira
Bj appointment of aether agent, Clark 244; B
I 'a \-ill

,

2 17.

252;
Ahern -.1
disposal of subject matter, Btellj 249; Gilberl
Notice ol revocation,
principal of liability, Anon 258; LoomU
Necessitj
to relieve
1:

To whom given, Bun h 255.
. tive when, Kellj 259.
,,1 failure to give, Burt
\

How

to

given,

'

b 255;

Kellj

I

Burcb

b
nenl
By aband
Gratultou agent y, El
Agencj at will, Becui

iee

262.
1 ota

284;

1

v ^"s

INDKX
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Continued,
TERMINATIONS
OF AGBNC3
Mutuality of undertaking, Gannon
Of remedy, Harlow 271; note
performance

Specific

266.
272.

vs. agent, Rogers -*'>7.
Harlow 272.
agent, Rogers 268;
in favor of agent, Harlow 270.
By operation of law, in general, Qllberl 252;
Ahern 274; Hunt 275.
Bj death, Davis 23; Hunt 275.
When death is unknown
Davis 27S; Deweese
to third party,
279;
aote 280; Smoul B54.
By Incapacity <>f principal in general, Davis 23.
By Insanity,
etc., Davis 282.
Execution void or voidable, Davis 283.
By marriage of principal, a single woman, Davis 23.
By bankruptcy, Davis 23; note 284.
By war. note 284.
Effect of, Gunter 285 and note: Dennian 395.
Upon right of agent to deal with the principal, Dennison 542; note
543;
Bartholomew 544 and note.

Injunction

TESTIMONY,
of agent, see
THIRD PERSON,

vs.

Evidence.
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see Liability
of.
Deals with agent at peril, note

288;
Cummins 291; note 292; Mussey
295;
Moores 298;
Bank 436; Schmidt 822.
Gates 313;
When authority written. Cummins 291; Claflin 338; note 339; see
also Estoppel; Innocent Party: Secret Instructions.
When agent has apparent authority, Griggs 300; Gillman 320; Pick-

ering

319.

acting for benefit of principal, Dowden 730.
TORT, see Liability of Principal; Liability of Agent.
Ratification of. Lewis 116.
Liability of principal for frauds of agent, Moores 299.
For torts in general. Simpson 407.
Of agent In trover, Salem 578; Cochran 672; see Actions.
For misfeasance, frauds, etc., Cochran 672.
Agent

TRESPASS,

not

See Actions,

Form of.

TRIAL.

Province of court and jury, note 288; South 850; note 857.
In determining ratification, Kelley 112; note 853.
Written authority for court. Claflin 338; Anderson 650; note 851; Wilcox 853.

Usually mixed law and fact, Dunwoody 341; Wilcox S52.
If any evidence, then for jury, Peerless 362; Dickinson 827;

Tebbetts B47.
If none, then for court, Gates 316.
If reasonable minds could differ, Booth 848.
If only one conclusion, note 851.
Extent of authority for jury, Grand Rapids 296.

TROVER, see
TRUSTEE,

Actions.

Form

of.

Distinguished fr.nn agent, Taylor 10 and note.
with trust property, Kverhart 516;
Rich

Dealing

TRUST FUND,
Right

Third

to

follow,

Person

UNAUTHORIZED
Third Person;

Liability
Principal.

see
to

ACTS

of Agent

OB
to

Still 846;

of Agent

CONTRACTS,
Third Person;

527.

for Accounting;

see

Liability of

Liability of Principal

Scope of Authority.

to

879

INDEX
[The figures refer to pages]

UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL,

see

Liability

of Principal;

of Agent;

Ratifi-

cation.

SOCIETIES, see clubs.
written Authority; Delegation of
CUSTOM,
see Authority;
USAGE AND
Authority; Ratification.
To compensate the agent, note 606; note 609.
Extent of effect on agent's authority. Gates .".15.
As affecting written authority, Cawthorn oil.
Proof must be clear, McCullough 397.
Knowledge of principal, Burchard 287.
Incidents of legality, Famsworth 317; Gates 315; note 318; Leach 388.
Usage contrary to instructions, Barksdale 318; Leach 388; Ball
To good morals. Turnbuil 521; note 523; Ball 549.
To reason, Bank 501.
To give warranty, see Authority to SelL
As to mode of remittance of funds, Cartwell 593; AVarwlcke oii.

UNINCORPORATED
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WAGES,

Compensation

*eo

of Agent;

Termination of Authority.

WAR.
Terminates agency, see Termination by Operation oi Law.
WARRANTIES, see Authority to Sell.
WARRANTY OF AUTHORITY, Ball 656 and cases following;
of Agent to Third Person.
see also Liability

WIFE,

Married Woman.

see

of Agency;
see Creation
at ; see Termination of Agency.

Of principal,
Agency

WITNESS,
Agent

note 664;

as,

see

Authority

of

Agent;

Evidence.

Evidence.

WRITING,

Execution.
Contracts In, see Ratification;
frauds, see Written Authority.
When required by statute of
written' AUTHORITY, Bee Power of Attorney, Authority; Construction

Authority; Trial.

Ehnnantraut, L14; Judd
required by statute of frauds, Worrall 68;
Maclean 174; Carstens WO.
Affected by usage and custom, Cawthorn 811.
Parol evidence as to, see Evidence.
840;
Mt Moi
n
Expanded by Implied, Olaflin B88; Dunwoodj 889;

When

132,

ri<

832.

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE,
of agent, see Termination
YEARLY

Mil:

; of,

I NO,
Hoover

228;

of Agency.

WWlace

oos.
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